

DIASPORA YOUTH AND ANCESTRAL HOMELAND

MUSLIM MINORITIES

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DIASPORA YOUTH AND ANCESTRAL HOMELAND

*British Pakistani / Kashmiri Youth
Visiting Kin in Pakistan and Kashmir*

BY

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Dedicated to Ali Jaun Adam Kiani and to all of his friends and relations

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INTRODUCTION

The title of this book, “Diaspora Youth and ancestral homeland: British Pakistani and Kashmiri youth and their visits to kin in Pakistan/Azad Kashmir”, arose very naturally in a local neighbourhood youth work context. It is hoped that the completed research can prove useful and relevant to the same context that spawned it, and that as well as being relevant to a wider academic and political debate, it will find its way back home to its neighbourhood. The fateful moment at which the project was born was an animated conversation with a small group of British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people. That conversation inspired the title. The young people’s expressions of their life experiences proved a fruitful starting point for debating academic, governmental and media discourses about British Pakistani/Kashmiri young people’s place and identity in British society. Their personalised, ‘localised truths’ resonate with national and global contests over what is true and what is worth striving for. The fateful moment of the inception of the idea of doing this narrative study of lives was tiny in comparison with the fateful moments that have occurred during its writing for the British Pakistani/Kashmiri people involved, collectively and individually. The topic was not pulled from the air or inspired by famous authors. It came from young peoples’ stories about their localised experiences of identity’s consequences. Their conversations are set against a powerful backdrop of world-events, discourses and academic analysis of ‘culture’s consequences’ (Hofstede 1984). At this time, this is a critical discussion and the political stakes are high concerning the future of Community Relations in Britain.

Review of the literature shows that newer uses of the concepts of diaspora and trans-locality are useful for this study. A subtext of these and of the Islamic term ‘qaum’ (meaning sect, community or grouping) is ‘homeland’ and this has currency because of its use in everyday language. The term Pakistani is problematic because at least half of those interviewed come from Azad Kashmir; this needs to be acknowledged throughout. Hence the title: diaspora youth and ancestral homeland: British Pakistani/Kashmiri youth visiting kin in Pakistan/Azad Kashmir. It is an exploration of what Mandeville

(2000) calls 'the complex politics of a simultaneous here and there' (p. 6).

This book is about ambiguity and conflict in identity construction. It acknowledges that there are various pulls on young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people towards change and simultaneously towards conservatism and resistance to change. For the young people interviewed local space and territory do matter but so do other forces competing for their identifications, transnationally and globally. Although I will go on to contest and criticise binary models of cultural analysis, it is first necessary to describe some such models because they are influential, and because they lend themselves to being tested with my empirical findings in order to postulate alternatives. For me, they were starting points on a mental journey that has taken me away from them. As the story of the research unfolds in the book, so binary models will face an onslaught of objections arising from the young people's reports of their lived experiences. For now, they need to be introduced like characters in a play, in order that our central characters (the young people) can interact with them in subsequent chapters.

In terms of the global values surveys of Geert Hofstede and others, Pakistani culture and British culture are poles apart. Any binary portrayal would place them as opposites, for example in power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity (Hofstede 1984). The global values surveys of Geert Hofstede (Hofstede 1984) explore particular cultural values or 'mental programmes' that prevail in different countries of the world. Considering the main dimensions of his model Pakistani and British cultures are very contrasting. According to Hofstede, in terms of power distance Pakistan is a very stratified society with a considerable difference between rulers and ruled, rich and poor, high caste and low caste people. Culturally hierarchical relationships are scarcely questioned, feudal practices persist and the current government is a military dictatorship. Britain is also stratified but there is greater financial and class mobility and less of a dependency between rich and poor, rulers and ruled, and the current government is democratically elected. British culture emphasises the embrace of rapid change supported by limited need to reduce uncertainty because of the security of being able to rely on relative economic and civic stability. Pakistani culture is conservative as a strategy to reduce the uncertainty of life in a turbulent, vulnerable economic and military context. British culture is high on

individualism; Pakistani culture is high on collectivism. British culture has been moved in the last century away from masculinity. Pakistani culture has not moved far along that dimension, it is a very gendered and patriarchal culture. This implies that the children of Pakistani immigrants to Britain are faced with falling between two cultures frequently at variance with each other. The theme of being “Between Two Cultures” (Community Relations Commission 1976, Anwar 1998, Watson 1977) is influential in public discourse about Race Relations. Superficially such patterns are recognisable but they are of course generalisations. This book claims that such a discourse is over simplified and does not do justice to the ways in which young people are active in negotiating their identity and their place in British society. Rather than seeking global patterns the book seeks local personal experiences and in doing so reveals the complexity and contingency with which thirty young people journey through their lives as British Pakistani/Kashmiris.

Debate about what Huntington named “The Clash of Civilisations” (Huntington 1998) between Islam and ‘the West’ is another model that portrays the world as polarised either side of a divide. Again this book contends that such a portrayal conceals subtlety, range of perspectives and complexity of loyalties. The young people’s lives that are focused on here are lived as Muslims in the West. Their very existence challenges neat categorisation of people. Furthermore making assumptions about their allegiances is dangerous because it leads to them being labelled as enemies within ‘the West’. This demonises them and can lead to violations of their civil liberty, as well as to civil disturbances and even violence and human rights abuses.

The integration of Muslim immigrants in Britain and in Europe has been researched as a ‘problem’ by a succession of sociologists. John Rex sets this so-called problem against the background of the confrontation and polarisation between countries seeing themselves as Islamic on the one hand and the Christian and secular West on the other (Rex 1992). He acknowledges that such portrayal of two sides is simplistic and conceals complex political and economic relations. However, he states that Islamicist ideas are ideologically influential, as are anti-Islamic ideas in the West; and he points out that Islamicist groups in Britain have drawn their ideological notions from Pakistan. He explores a series of political events (such as the Rushdie Affair, Muslim schools and war against Saddam Hussein) and issues that

he concludes have created grave dilemmas for young alienated Muslims. The Home Office report on the disturbances in Oldham and Burnley in 2001 (Home Office 2001) has a strong theme of segregation between communities being a problem and recommends that a range of measures are needed to prevent young people growing up in ethnically isolated ghettos.

Contemporary cultural theorists such as Werbner and Modood (1997) and Hall (1992a) use the term hybridity to describe transformation arising from cultural forms mixing with one another. An academic debate has been developing about cultural hybridity, in which some are still proponents moving towards favouring the term; others are retreating from it and choosing other terminology. This book has moved away from the idea of hybridity in favour of the notion of diaspora. One of the main reasons for this is that the idea of hybridity implies a binary starting point and it was too easy to fall into the trap of contesting binary models whilst continuing to impute them with choices of language and metaphor. Back (1996) and Hall (1992b) use the concept of new ethnicities to move away from false essentialism and to recognise both continuity and change of ethnic identities and community dynamics. Diaspora has again been opted for in this book rather than new ethnicities. Diaspora more truly retains the idea of continuity between the past, the present and the future, along with dispersal, movement, development and change. Ethnicity is problematically associated with categorisation and minority status within the nation state whereas diaspora disrupts this. All of this is a theoretical background for this research project and has framed the book. The research arises out of dissatisfaction with fixed categories, binary models of culture and essentialist notions of geographically and historically determined cultural patterns. By interviewing young people the project aimed to acquire rich, authentic data to illustrate the dynamic, complex reality of shifting cultural influences on the lives of a particular group of young people. It focuses on them as producers, not only consumers of culture.

Generation and *Zeitgeist* bring changes in the characteristics of cultures. Generation is a prominent theme in writing about youth and migration. The idea of first generation migration gives rise to the idea of their children being 'second generation' and their grandchildren being 'third generation immigrants'. The assumption is that with each generation country of origin culture is diluted and 'host' culture is further adopted in a slow process of assimilation through

cultural and language shift. This research will explore the validity of this popular assumption and challenge the idea of generation in relation to British Pakistani and Kashmiri immigration and cultural practices. Related to the idea of generation is the idea of *Zeitgeist*, meaning the nature or spirit of an era of time. What a disturbing *Zeitgeist* this is concerning relations between Islam and the United States of America and their allies (including Britain), waging war and actively engaged in a 'battle over hearts and minds'. Recent national and global events are influencing the attitudes of the young people in the neighbourhood. Amidst calls by the leaders of the warring parties to "choose which side you are on", "you are either with us or against us", there are clear pressures on British Pakistanis and Kashmiris regarding their identity.

This research project was conducted in Sparkbrook, an inner city neighbourhood of Birmingham, U.K. Birmingham is a big industrial city; it has received successive waves of immigrants to meet its labour needs. Most Pakistani and Kashmiri immigrants came after the Second World War, onwards. First men came to work in foundries and factories, later their families joined them. When there was recession long term unemployment became normal for these unqualified workers. The young people that this study focuses on are no longer immigrants, but are British born children and grandchildren of immigrants, with British citizenship. This neighbourhood of Sparkbrook and Sparkhill is famous for its cultural, racial diversity and the research engages with issues that are contested in this context.

Many Sparkbrook residents experience poverty, deprivation, overcrowding and health problems. Various strategies to tackle disadvantage have been tried in the area, in fact there have been a whole series of initiatives to improve the socio-economic situation, the housing stock and the local education and employment opportunities. Approximately 31,948 people live in Sparkbrook Ward that is the context of this research. Roughly half of the population are men, half women. It is a very young population compared with other districts with 33% aged 0–17. In total there were 11,462 Pakistani people recorded in the 2001 census within Sparkbrook Ward; 4,506 of these were under 16 and 3,181 were between 16 and 29. Since this research focuses on the experiences of young people this is a pertinent point. 70.2% of the 0–17 year olds in Sparkbrook District were born in the U.K. There is variation across the district concerning this, with concentrations of new arrivals in particular clusters of streets

(population census 2001). The minority ethnic population made up 79.3% of the Ward's population, compared with 29.6% for Birmingham. These numbers exclude people with a White Irish background. According to the census only 31.4% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi residents aged 16–64 were in employment compared with 64.1% of white residents. An example of one of the smaller neighbourhoods within the ward that is home to several of the young people interviewed for this research is Birmingham 071D. In the index of Multiple Deprivation 2004, it was ranked at 68 out of 32,482 areas in England, where 1 was the most deprived area and 32,482 the least deprived. (Source: Census 2001)

The region of out-migration chosen for this research project, that is still home to relatives of the families of the young people interviewed, stretches from North West Frontier Province and Attock in the west of Panjab and Mirpur and Jhelum to Gujrat. Alison Shaw (2000) offers a detailed anthropological account of life in that region and compares it with the lives of kin living in Oxford, U.K. I make no attempt to do that within this book since she already has that covered. She points out that it is a region of generally rough terrain with irrigation difficulties making agriculture vulnerable to the unpredictability of rainfall and only a limited range of crops can be cultivated in the conditions. High male under-employment means that men look to the cities and abroad for work. There is a long history and tradition of migration for work from the region. Part of that history includes migration for service in the army because the British favoured particular Panjabi Muslim castes with military traditions as sources of army recruits; and from Kashmir a tradition developed of migration for work in British steamship companies (Shaw 2000). The connection between the region, migration for work and Britain is longstanding and on-going.

*“I’m not British or Pakistani or Kashmiri, I’m a Muslim from
Stratford Road”*

This was the kind of statement in conversation with young people in Sparkbrook, a neighbourhood where I am resident and have been a community worker, which inspired the topic of this research project. Through young people's debates about their sense of who they are and who they want to be, coupled with controversy over

the portrayal of young British Muslims in the media and social policy targeted at local Pakistani and Kashmiri youth as a socially excluded category, the idea of the research project began to evolve. As a qualified youth worker I wanted to privilege the voices of teenagers in the process and chose narrative interviewing to accommodate this. After a search for an academic home for this, Cultural Studies became a natural choice. It could offer theoretical underpinning and gave recognition to narrative study of lives as authentic research methodology.

The narrative study of lives is my chosen methodology because I am primarily interested in the stories young people tell about their experiences and the meaning they attach to those tales. A loop from the journeys they have been on, back to daily life in a British city with its institutions and systems, is an important part of these tales. Analysing the transcripts of interviews pointed to common themes arising in their accounts. These themes are compared and contrasted with themes in cultural studies literature. Data presented below is from a qualitative research project that entailed interviewing 30 young people (15 female and 15 male) about their cultural identifications, using the topic of visits to Pakistan or Azad Kashmir as a catalyst. These young people, who were all between 14 and 25 years old, were chosen from people who were born in Britain of parents who were born in rural Pakistan or Kashmir. All of the young people live in neighbourhoods of Birmingham with high concentrations of Pakistani and Kashmiri resident families. All of the interviews have been transcribed and analysed using a qualitative research data analysis software tool. The interviews have been designed within the framework of narrative study of lives (Josselson and Lieblich 1995). Of course this is a very different methodology and scale than world surveys. In its own way it challenges models that make any claim that culture can be categorised or simply defined. People's stories of their own lives challenge with complexity, subtlety and contradictions in their identifications.

Our relations, our place in society and our identities are constructed in the stories that we tell about ourselves and others. Changing these factors entails creating new stories and in so doing, defining new space. (Richards 2003, p. 1)

The book concentrates on one particular site of meaning making: the narratives of thirty British born Pakistani and Kashmiri young

people about their visits to kith and kin in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. These young people's everyday lives are affected by micro-processes of daily identifications (Gillespie 1995). Their relations, their place in society and their identities are constructed in the stories they tell us. They are creating new stories and defining new space. We have the privilege of being an audience for their insights. This narrative research attempts to study the respondents' words and ideas to identify generative themes. It is less concerned with whether the respondent's claims are substantiated than with the construction of their own sense of identity. It tries to address a disjuncture between current public 'knowledge' and people's understandings of their own lived experiences (Song 1998). There are currently powerful public policy discourses, which objectify these young people as socially excluded, marginalized, and culturally confused (Bhattacharyya and Gabriel 1997), falling into a ravine between two worlds. These discourses have been formed by organisations, such as schools, searching for reasons why young British Pakistani people lack "success" within institutions. Here the focus is on the young people's own subjective thoughts about their life experiences.

A specific focus was needed for the interviews to produce animated responses and 'thick description' (Geertz 1973). Visiting kin in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir had just the right effect. It was interesting for respondents to talk about and produced rich data about their senses of belonging and exclusion. As well as being caught up in the identity politics of British urban life, these young people are part of trans-national, trans-local social networks and are members of kinship groups. Far from being an isolated incident, a visit to kin in Pakistan has repercussions for daily life experiences in Britain and for intergenerational relationships. It throws a spotlight onto their sense of self-identity. There are social policy implications from the findings of this research in fields including social services, education, connections, citizenship, immigration and nationality, legal support services, equality of opportunities, managing diversity, mental health, counselling and youth services. The interviews illuminate young people's sense of inclusion and exclusion in Britain. On-going connections with their ancestral homeland have an important impact on young people's lives in Britain's inner cities, an impact which, this study suggests, is misunderstood and underestimated. Young Asian people in Britain live with complex choices of identification to make constantly. This text examines their strategies for coping with being

identified as a minority group of “others” in British Society and for surviving in the face of racism. Pakistani people are still disadvantaged in Britain and one of the political controversies about their economic and social exclusion is their wish to preserve traditions and to remain distinctive rather than to assimilate. The tension between tradition and translation (Hall 1992a) is explored here through the narratives of young people’s real and imagined journeys.

Gender is a very explicit topic in the young people’s narratives. Doing research in any community entails politics of gender. Pakistani and Kashmiri culture takes a specific gendered form that gets a lot of critical attention from ‘Western’ observers. Images of veiled Muslim women and of harems are stereotyped and mythologised. Demonising of the ‘Oriental Islamic World’ is often linked with claims that women suffer more in those societies than in others. Western public opinion tends to ignore the diversity of Muslim cultures and standpoints; and part of the image of Islam as a controlling monolithic religion is a stereotypical conformist unthinking Muslim woman (El-Solh 1994). Western feminist discourse has given insufficient recognition to Asian and Arab women’s own struggles and their contribution against colonialism and exploitation (El Saadawi 1980, Jawad 1998, Khan 1999). Women’s historical subjugation in patriarchies meets with active opposition from a wide range of Muslim women (Afkhani 1995). This is a significant aspect of the political context of this research. The young women respondents all observe some form of *Purdah* and *Hijaab*. Their narratives offer their perspectives on the way they are treated as young British Pakistani and Kashmiri women; they also talk about attitudes of young men and towards young men. Their experiences are listened to with care to avoid falling into traps of hegemonic discourses about the plight of Pakistani and Kashmiri women compared with that of women everywhere. The young men respondents also discuss gender within their stories, giving their views of the way that women are treated in Pakistan, Kashmir and Britain as well as discussing topics relating to masculinity.

The research also has a racialised context. This is explored further within the main text alongside British public discourse about ‘ethnic minorities’. The politics of ethnic separatism have been associated with the divide and conquer logic of colonial domination by European countries (Fanon 1961) and we cannot understand the young people’s perceptions without the historical context of Britain’s relations with Pakistan.

British media discourses about young Muslims in Britain are an important feature of the political context of this research. Before I began interviewing there had been coverage of the Iranian Revolution, the Rushdie's Satanic Verses Affair and the first Gulf War. After I had begun there was coverage of disturbances on the streets of Oldham and Bradford (towns in Northern England) during the Summer of 2001, that produced media images of young Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Kashmiri men rioting in the streets in reaction to marches by right wing, white, racist organisations such as the B.N.P. Then there was the major episode of the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11th 2001 and ceremonies commemorating the victims a year later. There was the war by an international coalition including Britain and Pakistan against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2002 that was very unpopular with the majority of Pakistanis in Britain and in Pakistan. Then the war by the United States of America and its allies including Britain, against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in 2003 and constant news items about Palestine, produced more imagery of young Muslim men as the enemies of the 'civilised' West. All of these crises have an ongoing aftermath and repercussions. Young Pakistani and Kashmiri people in Britain and in Pakistan, particularly young men, are regularly implied to be active in terrorism by Western media reports. It became necessary within this study to paint a picture of the media narrative that is a backdrop to the young people's own narratives. It should be noted that the research was completed before other events that shook the community that the young people are part of. For instance, the research was conducted before the London bombings in 2005, before the earthquake that devastated Kashmir in 2005 and before the notorious cartoons in a Danish satirical magazine provoked passionate demonstrations by groups of Muslims internationally. Two of these events had had their forerunners London followed New York and the street protests over the cartoons were reminiscent of the Rushdie affair.

This research has the aim of informing local youth work policy makers as they develop appropriate initiatives with young people, particularly in areas with high proportions of British Pakistani/Kashmiri youth in their populations such as the Sparkbrook, Sparkhill and Small Heath wards of Birmingham. The book explores the stories of young people in relation to stories told about them by academics, professional service providers, policy makers and the media.

Hopefully, a synopsis of the main evidence and arguments of the book can contribute to a renewed public debate locally between all of these story-tellers.

The approach of this whole research project has been to stress the perspective of the young people themselves on questions about their identity and their narratives about being diaspora youth in relation to their ancestral homelands of Pakistan and Kashmir. Barth's work on ethnic groups and boundaries acknowledged the importance of 'categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves' (Barth 1969 p. 10). What categories of ascription and identification do Pakistani diaspora youth use for themselves?

Eriksen (1993, p. 41) used the analogy that social boundaries are like invisible lines running between groups. Cultural content may change but dichotomisation between group members and outsiders remains. Where do the invisible lines run in the lives of British Pakistani/Kashmiri young people; and is dichotomisation between insiders and outsiders remaining in spite of intra-group cultural change?

Cohen (1988) wrote that ethnic boundaries are largely symbolic; by stressing certain symbols the boundaries are marked out, maintained and defended. Which symbols do British Pakistanis stress? How much contest is there over these symbols between generations or between migrants and post-migrants, or between Pakistanis in Pakistan and Pakistanis abroad?

Moroccan and Turkish migrants can differentiate themselves from the dominant Dutch. "Muslim values pertaining to sexuality, honour, virginity, respect, obedience and marriage are violated by dominant Dutch norms" (Brouwer 1998, p. 148). These are the very values that are defended by British Pakistanis and Kashmiris against violation by dominant British norms. These values are defended to maintain ethnic boundaries contrasting with the immoral West but they are also a constant source of conflict between parents and young people and between migrants and post-migrants. Within Pakistani society these same values are both vehemently upheld and constantly thwarted, sometimes by the same people. Amber Lone in her play 'Paradise' uses the voices of different characters to play out the contentious issues around the hypocrisy of insisting on cultural and religious values and codes of conduct, whilst breaking them. One of the characters, a young woman, accuses men who are regulars at the mosque of policing young women in their own community harshly

and sexually exploiting young white women employees at the same time. There is intra community debate about all of the items in the list . . . sexuality, honour, virginity, respect, obedience and marriage. At the same time there is inter community tension and stereotyping around the same list. Often this takes the form of attrition against the symbols of purdah, hijaab and arranged marriages.

Moroccan and Turkish adolescent girls in the Netherlands who run away from home risk severing ties of kinship and being considered bad-girls, even whores as opposed to good Muslim girls who listen to their parents (Brouwer 1998). Can common experience be found with British Pakistani/Kashmiri young women?

The symbolic aspect of the girl's purity as a marker of the ethnic boundary and family honour is crucial in understanding relations between parents and daughters (the purity of the group is dependent on the purity of its women). Young girl's chastity is essential for this as it is far more than her own business; it is a concern of her family and her community. Virginity is a prerequisite of marriage. Her brothers are party to defending her virginity and her honour by policing and chaperoning her away from men, until her marriage (Brouwer 1998). Then her husband and in-laws take over the watch to ensure that not only does she never commit adultery but also she never so much as looks at another man, or is looked at by him. Cultural norms of 'good girls' in both settings (British Pakistani and Kashmiri and Dutch Moroccan and Turkish) include obedience and respect of parents, acknowledging your father as an authority figure and matters of honour and shame. Not breaking these codes is essential for being counted as 'good', for example it is forbidden to meet or talk with unrelated boys in public; contact is expected to be strictly within the confines of marriage or family life. Young women of the British Pakistani and Kashmiri communities are negotiating these criteria, with their elders and brothers. Those who are in paid work or who are in education cannot realistically avoid meeting and talking with unrelated men.

Brouwer's research in the Netherlands identified reasons for young women running away including conflict (especially with their fathers) about education, association or supposed association with boys and marriage prospects, traditional arranged marriages, conflicts involving punishment, beatings their mothers endured, maltreatment and sexual abuse, and intimidation or humiliation. Within the narratives of several of the young women I interviewed the same reasons were

given for either running away or taking other evasive action. Forced marriage arranged quickly and early is used by some parents as a means of regaining control over a daughter. Fear of being sent to relatives in Turkey or Morocco was identified in the Netherlands study. There is the same fear amongst British Pakistani/Kashmiri young women; a fear based on cases known to them. Three of my respondents were sent as a means of controlling their behaviour.

Ethnic belonging is ritualised and symbolised in so many ways. The journeys to Pakistan of these young people are in themselves a ritual and a symbol of connection and identity. They take pride in symbols of the nation and religion such as Faisal Masjid, expressing how they feel boosted by the feeling that their homeland is beautiful, their architecture and their scenery are breathtaking and the symbolism is of nature and of Islam. Their journeys are often timed to allow them to participate in Eid and wedding celebrations, funerals and rituals around life events. This participation ritualises their inclusion in an ethnic group with a particular history and language. During weddings there are ritual journeys between the family homes of the bride and the groom, and several ritualised knockings on the door and negotiating entry. This can be a metaphor for the constant negotiations for inclusion lived by British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people, both in their ancestral homeland and in diaspora.

Food is an important marker of belonging not only to the family in shared meals, or to the cultural group in terms of cuisine; but eating only halal (permitted) food is a marker of religious observance and of belonging to the ummah. References to eating halal food were made in the narratives, as evidence of observance of culture and religion. Several of the young people said that they enjoy European dishes and miss western fast food when they are in Pakistan and Kashmir, but stressed that they only eat halal and that they certainly do not eat pork or drink alcohol. Daily rotis (traditional flat griddle bread) are not just food for the stomach; they are needed psychologically by Pakistani and Kashmiri people including British ones as a ritual and symbol of continuing to belong to the family and to the ethnic group.

Hajj is a focal ritual of belonging to the ummah, another journey ritual, actual and metaphorical, physical and spiritual. Hajj counteracts ethnic protectionism with a call to allegiance to a worldwide faith community. Given the age group I interviewed few have yet

had a chance to perform Hajj but it enters many of the young people's narratives as a desired journey, a desired ritual of belonging and identification. Responsibility of belonging to the worldwide ummah of Islam includes struggle or jihad. For different young Muslims this means different things. Jihad can be a spiritual struggle and a temporal one; for some people in some situations it involves taking up armed struggle. All of the young people's narratives demonstrate pro-Islamic attitudes to world events, as might be expected. At the same time they show recognition of the complexity of political affairs. Their conclusions about what they or others should do about injustices are divergent and varied.

Whilst it is true that the idea of minority ethnic communities (one of them Pakistani) is in common usage and these young people call themselves British Pakistani, the idea has limitations. It is clear from the narratives that there is more to the experience than being a minority group member. The on-going connection with Pakistan and with the world of Islam interrupts the experience of being minority and becomes diaspora experience. Whilst none of the young people used the term *qaum*, they did use terms like 'them and us', 'you people' and 'our people' indicating that they operate with a tribal type idea of group membership similar to ethnicity. Just as *qaum* and tribal loyalty could conflict with unity of the ummah, nationalism of the neighbourhood (Back 1996) and group identification with the idea of being Pakistani or Kashmiri in Britain can conflict with unity of the Muslim community locally and of the ummah transnationally.

All of these themes are explored in greater depth in the chapters that follow. First there is a chapter about the methodology of this research clarifying that this is not a piece of anthropology and is not an ethnographic study, but is based on interviews with thirty young people and is a narrative study of lives coming from a cultural studies approach. Then there is a series of themed chapters using both literature and young people's narratives to discuss journeys, homeland, race, nation, diaspora, ummah, gender, kin, generation and change, language and cultural shift.

CHAPTER ONE

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

This chapter contains the methodology of the research from epistemology to techniques of data collection, to analysis and interpretation. My ontological standpoint is introduced. Ideas of discourses, narratives and stories are debated as they are at the heart of the study's epistemological approach. An explanation is offered for the narrative study of lives that was the method adopted for data collection. A justification is presented for thematic interpretation of the empirical findings. Some of the ethical and methodological dilemmas faced during the research are raised and discussed.

Ontology and epistemology

This research project focuses on meanings that people attribute to social experiences. I am centrally interested in the meanings that the young people attribute to their experience of visiting their kin in Pakistan. The study attempts to understand how some young people experience a particular journey between social worlds. As a consequence of considering some of the complexities of researching others' experiences, transparency of the research process is important to achieve. Encouragement of dialogue is a central aim of the project and the inter-subjectivity of the research process is acknowledged. I aim to identify the processes that underlie social experiences of young British Pakistani and British Kashmiri people, and that become the basis for action (Wuest 95). I wish to understand processes of identification underlying the experiences of British Muslim youth and to be part of developing knowledge that is pragmatic and representative of young people's voices as a basis for improved action by youth workers and educators to address racism and exclusion. The "something at stake" (Hall 1992a) of this research is the current pattern of social exclusion of young British Asian people in British Society, particularly in the neighbourhood that is the context of the research.

This research makes no claim to be objective, however it does aim to make my standpoint transparent and to set the young people's life stories in context by comparing and contrasting their narratives with the narratives of others about them. There are powerful meta-narratives about second and third generation Muslim "immigrants" living within European nation states propagated by the media, by politicians and by some academics.

Gaze

Bourdieu invites us to 'reflexive sociology' and suggests that in research like this we should objectivise ourselves as a balance for our objectivisation of participants. He calls us to be up front about the scholarly gaze that we cast upon the social world (Bourdieu 1992). In the case of this study, I am trying to portray young people's subjectivities; inevitably however, my research narrative objectivises them as characters in a wider story. Since "all authors, all narrators, are situated; the challenge is to come to terms with the positions in which authors locate themselves" (Tierney page 543), it is important to locate myself as the author. My gaze is white woman's, European and feminist. My middle class origins and opportunities have been tempered with residing and working in working class neighbourhoods, providing opportunities to critique my class gaze reflexively. I have a professional gaze as a Community and Youth worker and an academic gaze shaped by several fields including cultural studies, race and ethnic studies, Community and Youth Studies and Islamic studies. In terms of my faith gaze, I have a background in practising Christianity and have been heavily influenced by and living closely for over twenty years with Muslim people.

The telling of each story was in the context of an interview situation with me, normally in the young person's home, occasionally in an office in a community building. Story telling is a social action designed to make sense to those who are the intended recipients; self-presentation takes place in situations of co-presence (Malone 97). In talking about their identities, the young people inevitably assessed me as the audience for their performance, they weighed up their own conflicting belongings and their assumptions about mine, and then they chose which version to tell. This does not make the story pure fabrication and therefore invalid as research data, but makes

it rich evidence of the identity of the young person in relationship to me as a definable 'other'. These young people come across a lot of people 'like me' and it is significant how they deal with us. Their dealings with White middle class, middle aged, female teachers, social workers and other professional 'gatekeepers' influence their access to a range of services including formal and informal education. My role as interviewer, listening to and watching the young people perform their stories was the role of an audience in the process of interpretation (Regan 98). When I moved from transcribing the tape recordings of their stories to analysing them I entered into a process of text analysis as a reader. Each young person assessed me as the interviewer, who I might be identity wise, what my allegiances are likely to be, what capacities I may have to help their cause (Goffman 70). Having come to a picture of their audience they then performed their story. As players the young people have certain interests to promote (Butler 97) and these come through in their narratives. The young people are defining and redefining their identity against a complex contested backdrop.

Black identities are defined and redefined, imagined and re-imagined, performed and performed again within the flux of history and within specific, changing, spatially determined societal structures (Rahier 1999, p. xxiv).

All of the academic fields that I am part of describe power relationships between people. This means that I come to the task of writing with a perspective that the world is an unfair place that is gendered and racialised, when it should not be. It means that I am committed to promotion of justice between individuals and between minority and majority groups locally and globally. It means that I am part of debates about Islamophobia, orientalism and xenophobia and about poverty as a product of the world economic order. This combination of influences on my subjective gaze gives me an intellectual bias towards listening for situated, localised, relative and changing insights rather than seeking 'truths'. I prefer dialogue as a learning process. Having benefited from feeling a sense of belonging to communities I have a focus on communities as well as individuals. Given the fact that the faith communities of Islam and Christianity are worldwide, I have an interest in the transnational allegiances of individuals as part of the construction of their identity and mine.

Designing a research project about the experiences that British born Pakistani Youth have when they visit Pakistan, I am faced with issues of researching everyday experience. Since Freire defined culture as what ordinary people do everyday (Shor 93) in a similar vein to Williams' 'Culture is Ordinary' (Williams 58), study of culture needs to be situated in experiences of everyday life. Freirean researchers study their respondents' words, ideas and habits to identify generative words and themes. These are then posed by the researcher to spark critical dialogue aimed at getting respondents to be self reflective about the themes prominent in their daily life. How knowledge and life experience relate to each other is at the core of the epistemology and ontology informing my methodology. There is a democratic impulse behind trying to understand lived experience; this impulse is shared by feminism and cultural studies (Gray 97). The impulse came from trying to include voices hitherto absent in the academy such as working class voices, mature women's voices and black voices. The politics of researching people's experiences has been complicated by researchers setting out with such democratising intent but finding themselves within a power relationship that is incompatible with this intent. Often the researched are of interest because of their experiences of marginality and exclusion. They then become objects of voyeuristic, journalistic interest rather than subjects pursuing their own enquiry with liberating affects:

the intellectuals are still borne on the backs of the common people
(De Certeau 88, p. 25)

For researchers there is a tension between an existing body of academic theory and individual stories. Experience can be regarded as a resource for testing theory or as a direct source for the discovery of theory. Often research aimed at privileging respondent's own experiences and understandings addresses a disjuncture between current public knowledge and people's understandings of their own lived experiences. For example Miri Song contrasted public understandings of Chinese families running take aways and these families' own accounts of their lived experiences (Song 98). How should I treat the body of literature already in existence about diaspora youth and ancestral homes? This could help to generate relevant themes which engage young people in a dialogue in a supportive way; on the other hand it could stifle their voices by repeating powerful discourses which objectify them as socially excluded, marginalised, culturally

confused people. Reality is interpreted by the young people and is subjectively meaningful to them (Berger and Luckman 66). This meaning is what I would like to engage in conversation with them about. In spite of all the problems with researching experience I hold to the importance of it. My interest is in supporting young people in

a twofold ontological vocation: to become a subject and to name the world (Collins 77 p. 49)

I hope that the dialogue process of this research will support them in becoming subjects in the construction of their identities and in naming their own experiences.

Discourses and narratives

The theoretical starting point of my methodology is that the stories people tell are not just a report but that social life is itself storied (Somers 1994). The young people's narratives are integral to their identities. Asking young people to tell their stories is a means of naming subjugated knowledges (Foucault 1971) and structures of feeling (Williams 1961); and a way of researching their 'habitus' or socialised subjectivity (Bourdieu 1992) and narrative identity (Somers 1994). Their stories are not only a way to find out about the young people's culture but are actually part of their "webs of significance" (Geertz 1973).

Foucault used the term 'subjugated knowledges' to refer to the way in which dominant discourses work to delegitimize the knowledges of less powerful communities. British Muslims are minority communities with subjugated knowledges and this study is motivated by the desire to relate to such knowledges as legitimate. When Williams used the term 'Structure of feeling' he meant structures created not individually but collectively. These mental structures organising the way of thinking of a social group are complexes of relationships; and the analysis of culture is an attempt to understand their nature. He was suggesting that a particular social group could have a collective mental structure, a consciousness affecting the imaginative world of the individuals who are part of that group. He proposed cultural analysis with the purpose of grasping

how the interactions between all these practices and patterns are lived and experienced as a whole, in any particular period. This is its structure of feeling (Williams 1961, p. 51)

Applied to this research, the analysis can be aimed at grasping whether there is a collective pattern discernible in the young people's individual accounts of their lived experiences of journeys in a particular period of 2001–2003. Is there a 'structure of feeling' of British Pakistani and Kashmiri diaspora youths' visits to kin in their ancestral homeland? According to Bourdieu (1992) cultural practice is a product of socialised subjectivity, meaning that we are socialised into particular ways of behaving, but also into particular ways of thinking. His theory, known as 'habitus', is that a set of historical relations is deposited within individuals in the form of perceptions, appreciations and actions. So individuals embody historical power relationships. In the case of this study the most obvious of these is the history of colonial relations between Britain and Pakistan, of immigration and of international relations between Muslim and non-Muslim states. Individual young people have been socialised within a community that has allegiances arising out of that historical legacy.

Narrative identity links the concepts of narrative and identity to generate an approach to social action and agency. It reminds us that stories are part of social life and that stories guide action and people construct identities through them. Webs of significance was a term first used by Weber and then taken up by Geertz who wrote:

Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning (Geertz 1973, p. 5).

Constructionism rejects the view that there is objective truth waiting for us to discover it (Crotty 98) and is less concerned with whether or not authenticity can be proved. Instead its focus is on understanding how meaning is constructed. This is the focus of my study as well: the ways in which meanings of identity and identifications are constructed in the lives of young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people. Social Constructionism takes a view that language structures our experiences; language actually determines experience (Burr 95). Discourses are

practices which form the objects of which they speak (Foucault 72 p. 49)

People's understandings of their own experiences can be shaped by dominant discourses to which they have been exposed. Authoritative descriptions of experience not only reflect reality; they constitute it. Some elements of experience may be culturally problematic for the teller to express. There may be silences, gaps and contradictions and there are submerged plots (Josselson and Lieblich 95). There are special difficulties involved in interviewing about a taboo topic like 'whiteness'; such interviews can generate memory lapse, shame and evasion (Frankenberg 93). How then as researchers are we to treat accounts and voices of experience? How can we portray the gaps, evasions and submerged plots? In the case of this research, young people sometimes could not express what they wanted to say using English; they could only say what they wanted to in their mother-tongue. For the most part I could understand the language they used and did not have to interrupt to ask for a translation. They also used Islamic terminology from Qur'anic Arabic interjected into English sentences. Again I could mostly follow what was being said because they use very popularly used phrases with which I am familiar in day-to-day conversation. However, it is a challenge to fully portray their intended meaning when using Standard English to write the book. I have resorted to using their language but translating or explaining it where I feel it is necessary. Language is such an important part of culture and meanings are transmitted most directly in shared language.

Michel Foucault's work on the history of madness may sound unrelated to the topic of my research; however, out of this work he developed a description of the way that discourses affect life, and that has everything to do with my research. My research is about how discourses about Muslim Youth in Britain affect their lives. Foucault shows how a concept such as mental illness exists in time, place and social perspective. The idea of 'Islamic fundamentalism' or 'Islamist militant' exists in 2004 in Britain and is a social perspective presented by the media and politicians to justify actions ranging from war, to immigration and asylum policies. A concept is not just abstract; it shapes human experiences and institutions (Foucault 1967). In the case of madness it shapes exclusion and models of containment and cure. In the case of Islamophobic concepts about

Muslims in the west, they shape exclusion and segregation as well as multiculturalist nation building. Foucault refers to the imaginary landscape that powerfully influences the establishment of social policies and institutional practices. Stories about young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris conjure up an imaginary landscape of burqas, puritanical madrassahs, recruitment of mujahideen fighters and colourful but forced marriages. This imagery influences inner city regeneration policies, design of education and welfare services, policing and immigration practices. Foucault said that madness symbolised a great disquiet, suddenly dawning on the horizon of European culture. The concept of madness led to the birth of the asylum. In Britain and the United States of America amongst powerful politicians Islam symbolises a great disquiet threatening Western cultures and being demonised as an enemy of justice, peace and democracy. Islamophobia is linked to war on Afghanistan and Iraq and American backing of Israel against Palestinian resistance to occupation. The British media discourse is a story about the communities that these young people are part of. The story is about exclusion and street violence. It portrays these young people as 'enemies within' of Britain and America. In the media story the young people are different from me, we are in opposite camps on the 'World War map' and on opposite sides of the race lines of British streets. That makes me an outside researcher. Whilst the young people were telling me their stories, it was not as polarised and binary as that. Our lives are entwined in the story of our neighbourhood.

Two spotlights shone on the Pakistani and Kashmiri community in Britain in the months just prior to the interviews being conducted. The first followed street rioting by young men in Oldham and Bradford. These young 'Asian' men were reacting to marches by right wing organisations such as the British National Party. They were mostly Pakistani, Kashmiri and Bangladeshi Muslims. The media followed up the events with stories about young Muslim people in Britain being particularly socially excluded. In the coverage young women were also interviewed, and given a rare opportunity to give their points of view. The second spotlight followed the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the subsequent war in Afghanistan. Pakistan was in an ambivalent position. Its government joined the International Coalition and allowed American planes to fly across its airspace. It anticipated impossible demands being placed at its doorstep to receive Afghan refugees. The majority of

the general population in Pakistan was against bombing of Afghanistan and there have been high profile demonstrations in Pakistan in support of the Taliban regime and even of Osama Bin Laden. British Muslims have been recruited to take part in television debates designed to be confrontational. The young Pakistani and Kashmiri people I have been interviewing have been viewers of all of these images and news stories. This added to their sense of need to clarify their identity as history unfolds and the modern world polarises itself along religious and racial lines. If they complain about civilian casualties in Afghanistan and express their objections to American foreign policy towards Muslims, the British media portrays them as 'enemies within' of Britain and America. If they condemn the attack on the World Trade Center and assert the difference between terrorism and Islam they make little progress; the British press persists in calling the perpetrators of the attack Islamic terrorists. Even though Prime Minister Blair repeatedly said that this was not a war against Islam but against terrorism, there have been repeated demands made by politicians to television audiences to take sides and the sides are still assumed to be Islam and the West rather than terrorism and anti-terrorism.

Whilst current affairs broadcasting caricatures separate us, the interviewees and I have quite a lot in common. Their performances in the interviews were attempts to convey their experiences based on knowledge of our shared background expectancies (Rawls 89). We live in the same neighbourhood. To varying degrees each of the young men and women have heard of me or about me. I am the ex-neighbour of their auntie, customer of their father's shop, or sister-in-law of their Qur'an teacher. When we met for the interview we were different but not straight-forwardly opposites. Our lives are being acted out in a shared geographical and social space. We have different roles but they are part of the same plot.

It is well circulated gossip that I was a Community Worker for a well known charity in the neighbourhood and that I married a Pakistani Muslim man from the border of Kashmir. In some of the interviews there have been other signifiers of my Pakistani connection, my young son has been playing with other family members in the house whilst the interview was happening. Even something as simple as a young woman commenting on my gold (Pakistani) jewellery could influence the interview as a hint of who their audience was for the telling of their story. As they told me about their visits

to Pakistan, their shifting sense of who they are and where they belong, they were making choices all the time about what to include in the tale and what to leave out. My problem as the researcher is how to treat the left out bits of the story.

Narrative study of lives

Qualitative research arising from experience can be criticised for confining the enquiry to everyday settings in which wider social processes are not observable. The everyday world cannot be fully understood within its own scope (Smith 87). However, there are strong examples from which to draw inspiration in feminist use of women's experience to construct and critique theory and strategy (Frankenberg 1993). If individuals' lives are understood as socially and politically constructed then individual accounts can describe shared experiences and can be used to theorise. The "sixth moment of ethnography" (Denzin and Lincoln 2000) no longer stresses objective and naturalistic representations but allows for attention to be focused on people's own representations of their worlds. Truth is recognised as being localised, multiple, contested and embodied in particular life stories. Inspired by use of life stories by Ruth Frankenberg and Janet Parr (Frankenberg 1993, Parr 1998) I included this technique in my methodology. Ruth Frankenberg used life stories with white women exploring the social construction of whiteness. Her work is cited by Ann Gray as good research practice when researching 'experience' (Gray 1997). Just as she was, I will be exploring identities. Janet Parr used life stories of mature women students to explore their experiences of adult and higher education. She felt that writing about mature women students tended to marginalise notions of the women's agency; I feel that writing about young British Asians tends to portray them as trapped and plays down their strategies for living. Both Ruth Frankenberg and Janet Parr were surprised by unexpected findings about the details of how white women's lives are racially structured and about the links between mature women's pain and their pursuit of education. I am excited by the promise of being surprised by the narratives. I am interested in the discourses and knowledge that guide the conduct of everyday lives.

Interviews and video diary room

The basis of my choice of people to interview was that they are British born of Pakistani or Kashmiri parents, aged 14–25 and that they have visited kin in Pakistan or Kashmir within the last 4 years. The young people interviewed are resident in Birmingham. Half are women and half are men. I recorded which localities they visited in Pakistan or Kashmir. I also went to a youth centre in Birmingham with a significant number of users within the target group of my research and used a technique of asking them to come into a ‘diary room’ and to tell the story of their visits to Pakistan and Kashmir to the camera as if it were their brother or sister. I was in the room and the camera had a young person from the centre operating it. I have been a Community Worker in Sparkbrook for nearly 20 years and I enjoy good networks of contact and trust with local young Pakistani and Kashmiri people as a result of relationships established over a prolonged period. I also have professional links with youth workers in the area who have informally offered their assistance in inviting young people to be interviewed or to produce video diaries for the research.

All young people interviewed were born in and are resident in the U.K. All visited villages rather than cities in Pakistan or Azad Kashmir. The table below gives further details about the circumstances of each person.

They may have certain life experiences in common but this is in fact a very diverse group in terms of class, gender, caste, religious organisational affiliation, age, marital status, sexuality, ability or disability, place of residence, mother-tongue language and cultural practices.

Young women interviewed 2003

CODE	AGE	OCCUPATION	REGION VISITED	MARITAL STATUS	LIVES WITH
Aneesah(F)	15	School pupil	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents + 3 brothers
Asiyah(F)	20	Artist+P/T F. Ed	Jhelum	engaged	Mother + 3 sisters
Bilqees(F)	14	School pupil	Attock	unmarried	Parents, 2 brothers + 1 sister
Farhanah(F)	23	Childcare work	Mirpur	married	Husband + 2 children
Ghazalah(F)	17	Call centre	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents, sister, bro-in-law, brother
Inas(F)	22	Clerical NHS	Jhelum	unmarried	Mother, grandmother
Mumtaz(F)	19	Insurance	Mirpur	married	Mother, brothers, baby daughter
Nabila(F)	20	Building Soc.	Attock	married	Parents, brothers, sister-in-law
Parveen(F)	15	School pupil	Attock	unmarried	Parents, gr-parents, brother, sister
Rifat(F)	22	Beautician	Mirpur	married	Husband, parents-in-law, 2 sons
Shafeeqa(F)	22	Care assistant	Punjab	divorced	alone
Salma(F)	21	I.T. at home	Jhelum	married	Parents, husband, 2 brothers, sister
Sameera(F)	20	Sewing at home	Attock	married	Sister + brother-in-law
Zahrah(F)	18	Blood Service	Mirpur	engaged	Parents, 5 sisters, 1 brother
Zakiyyah(F)	19	P/T F.E. studies	Mirpur	unmarried	2 brothers

Young men interviewed 2003

CODE	AGE	OCCUPATION	REGION VISITED	MARITAL STATUS	LIVES WITH
Arif(M)	20	Call centre	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents, sister, bro-in-law, 2 bro.s
Ahmad(M)	23	Shop assistant	Jhelum	married	Wife, parents, baby son, brother
Bilal(M)	19	Security	Attock	unmarried	Parents, sister
Fareed(M)	16	School pupil	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents, sister, 2 brothers
Haroon(M)	22	I.T. P/T F.E.	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents, sister, 2 brothers
Idrees(M)	14	School pupils	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents, 2 brothers
Jaabir(M)	20	Security	Attock	unmarried	Parents, 3 sisters
Mazhar(M)	24	Taxi driver	Mirpur	divorced	Mother, 5 sisters
Nadim(M)	14	School pupil	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents, sister, brother, uncle
Nazaqat(M)	22	Car mechanic	Attock	married	Parents, wife, 2 children
Omran(M)	15	School pupil	Attock	unmarried	Parents, 4 brothers, 2 sisters
Qayyum(M)	17	F.E. student	Jhelum	unmarried	Parents, 2 brothers
Tanweer(M)	20	F.E. student	Mirpur	unmarried	Mother, sister
Walid(M)	19	Unemployed	Jhelum	married	Parents, sister, brother-in-law, bro.

Table (cont.)

CODE	AGE	OCCUPATION	REGION VISITED	MARITAL STATUS	LIVES WITH
Zulfaqar(M)	21	I.T. operator	Mirpur	unmarried	Parents, 2 sisters, brother, granny

The interviews were focused, unstructured interviews with a non-directive form of questioning. The kind of questions used can be seen from the following example:

Interview schedule 11th July 2003

Introduction

My research is about the effects that visits to Pakistan have on the identities of British Pakistani young people

1. *Factual (normally not asked during interview, only if still unknown)*

age

gender

Do you have family connections with Pakistan?

Where were you born, brought up and educated?

How many times have you visited Pakistan?

How old were you when you visited there?

When was the last time?

Are you married?

To a British born Pakistani, a Pakistan born Pakistani or someone else?

Do you have any children?

Do you speak your relatives' language fluently?

2. *General*

How do you describe your own identity?
What experiences have you had of visiting Pakistan?
What struck you about Pakistan?
How would you describe it to a British born Pakistani young person who had never been there before?
What was it like arriving back here?
How do you think your experiences of visiting Pakistan have effected your sense of identity?
In what ways do you identify with Pakistani culture?
What aspects of Pakistani life would you prefer to distance yourself from?
Can you give me examples of how your visit has effected your relationship with other people in your family?
Whom did you go to see in Pakistan?
What contact do you keep with them when you're not there?
On what occasions have you visited?

3. *Specific visit*

Where did you visit?
When was it?
What was the purpose of your visit?
Whose idea was the visit?
Did you have to go or did you go by your own choice?
What was it like arriving there?
What was it like for you, staying over there?
If you had to live there, how would you feel about it?
How did you fit in there?
Can people there tell that you are from here?
How?
Can they tell by the way that you speak?
How?
How did your relatives treat you?
What image do you think they have of British born Pakistanis?
How did you treat them?
What do you think the effect has been of your visits to Pakistan on what you feel like here?
How do you think your experience of this visit to Pakistan was different from a tourist's experience?

4. *Britain*

Has the journey made you think about anything differently than before? How has your view been modified?

What does it mean to you to live in this country?

What is Pakistani life in Britain like? How do you relate to it?

How do you feel about this experience?

How do you think your journeys have contributed to that?

Can you tell me about your feelings of where 'home' is? What makes it feel like home?

(check out attachment to territory and preface with illustrations from their own answers)

The question of identity comes up at certain moments, for you what are these moments? What triggers your focus to shift on to identity?

What about different ways of identifying, for example Islam *(or e.g.s. from own answers)* how important are these to you?

5. *Change*

How do you think the culture and identity of your generation of British born Pakistanis is changing and developing?

What cultural changes have you noticed taking place in Pakistan?

What were your perceptions of Pakistan before you went there?

How did this compare with realities when you got there? (how were your impressions changed by visiting)

Do you feel under pressure to keep in touch with Pakistan?

If so, can you describe to me who from and in what way?

What about pressure to keep Pakistani culture up in the way you live here?

6. *Community*

What kind of community exists that you have dealings with? Do you feel part of that, if so how, if not why?

How did your relatives and friends in Britain get involved in your journey?

Why?

What connection, if any, would you like to keep up with Pakistan?

If you have children, how would you like them to relate to Pakistan?

How would you like them to relate to other Pakistani people in Britain?

7. *Responses*

Who have you discussed the visit with, how do they respond?

8. *Loose ends: revisit some of the interview, particularly explore contradictions or unclear answers*

I have interviewed young British Pakistani people with the intention of hearing their own understandings of the way their identities are shaped by the stories of their lives. I was also interested in hearing from them how their identifications inform the choices they make about their lives in Birmingham. To do this I needed a topic that would spark them off to talk about their identifications, I chose journeys to visit family in Pakistan. This proved effective. They spoke about experiences of displacement and home, of belonging and feeling excluded and journeying, exploring and returning to familiarity. Their story telling was more than can be transcribed (although I did tape and transcribe), as they got animated by the story itself, the telling became a performance.

Interpretation and analysis of stories

Thematic investigation and narrative study of lives came together when it came to the analysis of the transcripts of the young people's stories. Rather than opting for grounded theory methods of treating the transcripts as text and coding each line to categorise findings and then to deduce analysis, I chose thematic interpretation. Listening to taped interviews, watching video diary footage repeatedly, and reading full transcripts, I searched for the generative themes of the young people and for their ways of 'naming' their experiences. 'Naming the world' is an important concept in Freire's pedagogy. These themes and names became the focuses for interpretation and analysis of the stories.

Once I had written up a draft of this interpretation and analysis, I returned to dialogue with some of the same young people, and some other British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people, to reflect again on these themes and to check with them whether the naming had resonance with them. Was it their naming of the world or had I imposed my naming on their stories? The draft was revised over a period of dialogue.

Thematic investigation

Freire proposes “subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical relationship” (Freire 1972, p. 27). By this he means that people live subjectively within a world that has objective social realities that are the product of human action. It is a similar point to that made by Giddens about structure and agency; that action and structure presuppose one another, they are in a dialectical relation (Giddens 1979). Applied to my own research this is a helpful epistemological starting point because it is consistent with my standpoint that binary oppositions used to dichotomise cultural practices limit rather than illuminating our understanding. Life is complex, young British Pakistani people are each individuals with distinctive subjective life experiences, they also have a commonality in that they are living in a shared time and place, with a shared history and shared relationship to power in British society. Within this there are subjective differences such as specific opportunities and threats in individual’s lives. There are also commonalities amongst sub-groups for example young women. Freire was against objectivism because it denies subjectivity. “To deny the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the world and history is naïve and simplistic. It is to admit the impossible: a world without men.” (Freire 1972, p. 27). He was also against “subjectivism, which postulates men without a world” (Freire 1972, p. 27). Historical composition is a key idea for Freire, Giddens makes a related assertion, that social theory must acknowledge time-space intersections (Giddens 1979). For this narrative study of lives, history, time and space are all critical ingredients. The young people’s narratives are set against a backdrop of metanarratives of this historical epoch. Each metanarrative has its own history. For example, the war on Iraq in 2003 is described by many Muslims as the eleventh crusade, and carries with it a metanarrative about the clash between Islam and the West that is current, powerful and pertinent to the stories of young British Muslims. Ronald Arnett wrote an article framing Paulo Freire’s work within the metaphors of story and narrative, central metaphors for my research. Rather than information being objective fact, information emerges from a standpoint. (Arnett 2002). Such information, told from a particular perspective, can be communicated in the form of story or narrative. However, a note of caution is needed because Freire’s own use of the word

narrative has a different significance; he criticises narrative teaching meaning a teacher narrating and the student's being expected to listen, comprehend, record and be able to repeat the teacher's narrative. The metaphor is used differently in my research; the stories and narratives of the young people in dialogue with me are what count. Arnett wrote that Freire's communication ethic is story-centred and dialogic between active participants (Arnett 2002). He also reminds us that Freire connects the idea of agency with making a difference and with hope for historical change. By communication ethic, Arnett means ethics of inquiry that are communicative and collaborative as opposed to ethics concerned with objectivity and anonymity. Communication ethic requires real dialogue that does not set up a power imbalance between a teacher and a student or between an investigator and a subject, but focuses on themes arising from the life experiences of people whose reflections on those experiences are respected and treated as the starting point of dialogue and learning together. For Freire thematic investigation was a planning stage for political literacy work with agents. This research has a story-centred, dialogic communication ethic and is motivated by a desire to reflect with young people on their agency and ability to make a difference as well as to reflect on the powerful political and social structures they face.

Freire's pedagogy begins with life familiar to the 'Other'. This research begins with life familiar to British Pakistani young people. Freire uses the term 'the people's thematic universe', to describe the 'complex of their generative themes'. By this he means that people operate in a symbolic world, there are powerful themes that construct their lifeworlds and views. History and culture are communicated in words and other symbols thematically. This study investigates young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people's thematic universe. It uses a Freire style methodology of thematic investigation. Such a methodology has at its heart a commitment to dialogue, to action and to change.

"The methodology of that investigation must likewise be dialogical, providing the opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's awareness in regard to these themes." . . . "the object of the investigation is not men (as if men were anatomical fragments) but rather thought-language men use to refer to reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world, which is the source of their generative themes." (Freire 1972, p. 69)

The methodology of this investigation attempts to provide the opportunity both to discover the generative themes of British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people arising from their visits to kin in Pakistan and Kashmir, and to stimulate our (their and my) awareness in regard to these themes. The object of the investigation is not the individual young people but the thought-language they use to refer to their experiences, their perceptions and view of the world. In other words their stories are the object of this research. Generative themes can only be found in the people-world relationship. Shifting the focus of the investigation from the meaningful themes to the people themselves would be treating the people as objects of the investigation. Instead the investigation of thematicity involves the investigation of the people's thinking and of their reflections on situationality (Freire 1972). The themes reflected on in the findings and analysis of this research are about the relationship between the young people interviewed and the world, the young people are not the objects of the research they are its co-creators. According to Freire, generative themes have significance, plurality, transformations, historical composition (Freire 1972). This research investigates the significance of diaspora and ancestral homeland to young people and it is clear that there is a plurality of voices on this topic amongst the young people interviewed. Their generative themes and within these their views are transformative, they change and they also precipitate changes. Humans can 'take on' life and construct it/transform it. They/we are creative beings. The generative themes of the young people taking part in this investigation have a historical composition, meaning that they are connected with a historical flow of ideas and standpoints, they reflect historic experiences leading up to present experiences, and they themselves will soon be part of history. Historical themes are never isolated, independent, disconnected or static. The complex of interrelating themes of an epoch constitutes its 'thematic universe'.

The methodology of thematic investigation involves presenting significant dimensions of an individual's contextual reality, the analysis of which will make it possible for him or her to recognise the interaction of the various components of that reality. In this case, the methodology involves presenting dimensions of journeys to Pakistan and Kashmir, the analysis of which make it possible to recognise the interaction of various components of the reality of being diaspora youth and relating to an ancestral homeland.

Examples of themes/codes initially identified and later refined

IDENTITY	Security of property	Gender
British	Feelings (of safety or	Uncles
Pakistani	fear)	Social Control
Asian	Racism	Wealth
Muslim		
'Other'	TRADITION/	TIME
Displacement	CULTURE	Rhythms
Fluidity	Ritual	Pace
	Expectations	Passing time
AGENCY	Ethnicism	Holidays
Work	Arranged marriages	
Mobility	Reinventing tradition	GENERATION
Choice of partner	Izzat	Youth
Lifestyle choices	Impression	Elders
Conflict	Management	Older siblings and
Contingency/competency to shift	Consumption	their peers
Congruence	Codes of conduct	Younger siblings and
Urban unrest education	Authenticity	their peers
	Heritage	
	RELIGION	CHANGE
PLACE	COLLECTIVITIES	Globalisation
Home preference	Family relationships	DIASPORA
Feeling at home	-cousins	Modes of communication
Territory	Peer groups	Drift of language
Whose household	Friendships	Codes of conduct
Staying in	Attention	Translation
Going Out	Privacy	Pain of separation
Historic sites	Allegiance	
SAFETY	POWER	MODERNITY
Sexual harassment	Fathers	
Beatings	Mothers	

Social research ethics

The researcher has an obligation to scholarship and therefore to seeking and representing knowledge as truthfully as possible. We are also members of communities with moral and ethical codes (Peacock et al., American Anthropological Association, 1998). I have moral obligations as a member of an extended family in a neighbourhood

and as a youth worker, as well as a researcher and lecturer. Any statements that I disseminate from this research project must be carefully considered for their social and political implications for myself and others. I need to insure as far as possible that the statements are “well understood, properly contextualized, and responsibly utilized” (Peacock et al., American Anthropological Association 1998 preamble). This research deals with contested truths with currently powerful social and political implications. However, it is unlikely at this stage to be widely disseminated, its audience will probably be small and specialist for now.

None the less the process of gathering data had to be carefully thought out so as to avoid negative affects on the lives of respondents. In a couple of cases breach of confidentiality could have placed young people’s safety at risk, otherwise there were less dramatic but nonetheless important protections of young people’s dignity and self esteem at stake.

It was not difficult for me to find plenty of potential participants in my own usual contexts. I was not under pressure to find sufficient young people to interview and therefore I had no need to put any kind of pressure on them. Sometimes researchers feel anxious about finding respondents and resort to persuasion that compromises the right of people not to be researched (Sagarin 1973).

From the outset there has been a clear explanation from me about the nature of the research project and how their contribution will be used, where the findings will be published and so forth. As far as the interviews are concerned, informed consent has been given as far as possible. Of course they don’t fully understand some of the description I gave of how the findings will be processed and passed on because University is outside their experience.

Ethical dilemmas in this research on ‘race’ and gender were prominent considerations. One of the ethical issues was being frank about sensitive topics, whilst avoiding feeding racist and sexist stereotypes. Eurocentrism and sexism in the social sciences perpetuates and it was important to make sure that my findings could not be misread and misrepresented. Avoiding harm to the respondents and to myself, informed consent, confidentiality, maintaining of relationships, strategies to invite disclosure (on both sides), intention, action/research as action and research spawning action, ‘telling the truth’ and responsible dissemination were all real concerns for this project (Back and Solomos 1992).

Michelle Fine (1992) argues that much qualitative research has reproduced a colonising discourse of the “other”. A central ethical challenge for this research has been to steer clear of doing so. Inevitably the cultural standards of the researcher influence my interpretations of the young people’s narratives. However, every attempt has been made to be reflective about the possibility of power differential between researcher and researched leading to ‘othering’ and to perpetuating a colonial, imperialist and racist discourse. Guba and Lincoln (1989) call for an ‘empowering, educative’ ethic. This is in line with the Freirean methodology employed for this study

There are inevitably methodological and ethical considerations about researching the experience of ‘others’. What will they gain from the research project? I am fundamentally different from them in age, in racial identity and in daily life experience. The challenge will be to find techniques whereby their interpretations of their own lives are articulated.

Identity is a discourse and it is essential to know who is using it, who decides, who labels me and what all this interest in cultural identity means, where does it lead (El Saadawi 1997, p. 118).

Who benefits from examined life is central to making ethical judgements about publication of results but also about protection from harm and from infringement of privacy. When the private is made public it can cause mental, legal, social and financial harm. The most obvious beneficiary is the researcher. As author I am fully responsible for the written study (Krieger 1991). The aim is that young people will benefit too, by clarifying their perspectives in dialogue and by the stimulation to reflect on an aspect of their lives. It is also hoped that they will feel affirmed and encouraged by a positive interest being taken in their experiences and their views. The research is also intended to inform understanding and policy in formal and informal educational settings. In this way it can be usefully applied and benefit young people and staff who work with them.

A problem for me, as researcher, is what to do with the conversation and interactions I have with the young people that are relevant to their story, but fall outside the actual interview for which I have their informed consent. To give an example, I interviewed Sameera in the front room of her home. She told me a story of all her fondest memories of Pakistan and how glad she is to have been brought up with a strong sense of Pakistani identity and with knowledge of

mother-tongue, culture and religious practice. We went into another room in the house where her sister was. When her sister was told a version of the same story, she laughed and said *“how could you tell her that Sameera, that is so not true”*. Sameera defended herself by saying that it was true; it was just not the whole truth. They both then told me about another visit to Pakistan that led to Sameera marrying a man with whom she has been in conflict ever since, and a major component in the conflict is the extent to which her husband feels obliged to support his relatives in Pakistan personally and financially at the expense of the household in Britain. Sameera’s sister also reminded her of some of their shared antipathy towards aspects of Pakistani culture, in particular gender role expectations. In this case the conversation afterwards was much more valuable material for my research than the original interview.

Like telling personal secrets from behind a hand, controversies and issues within the African American community are not easily made public. Some narrators resist for fear of ‘airing dirty laundry’ or exposing information that should be kept within the confines of the community (Etter-Lewis 1996)

Presenting, protecting one’s own face and commitment to “involvement obligations” (Goffman 1959, 1967) is a serious part of any interaction such as these interviews. Protection of family honour, ‘what other people think’ is traditionally very important (Westwood 1995). Several of the young people interviewed express irritation with the degree to which their relatives are controlled by concern for *izzat*. They are inclined to care less about what other people think and to wish to be true to themselves and have an attitude that other people should mind their own business. On the other hand several of the same respondents express pride in their family’s real or imagined history, the family’s narrative of its heritage. The same goes for allegiance to the imagined or real community of Pakistanis in Britain. There is a sense in which each story I have been told contains guards against damaging the reputation and name of that community. Each critique offered by a young person is tempered with a loyal protection of the right of a minority ethnic community in Britain to be accepted and allowed to live with dignity, rather than with exploitation and contempt.

To summarise the ethical standpoint of the study: informed consent was sought, disavowing racist discourses was an aim of the study, minimizing of harm and concern for the well being of research par-

ticipants was important and the researcher attempted to have a positive educative effect in the way she related and engaged with the young people she interviewed. Choices of whose voices were represented were made on the basis of 'naming subjugated knowledges' (Foucault 1971). How representations of those voices are constructed acknowledges that it is a dialogue that is represented arising out of close interaction between researcher and people researched. Reflexivity concentrated on how not to 'other' people whilst studying aspects of racialising practice; avoiding the danger of creating 'victimologies' (Rastas 2001) or 'demonologies' of young people; and on concern with uses of the knowledge gained.

The following chapters are a presentation of the findings of the research and are sub-divided according to generative themes in accordance with the method of thematic investigation. For each theme, words of the young people from transcripts of the interviews and video diaries are quoted in bold italics. These are followed by a discussion by the researcher. This discussion has been revisited with some of the young people and revised according to their comment; and considers theoretical and political implications of what the young people had to say.

The research investigates the part of generation in cultural change. It equally investigates migration as a force for both conservatism and change. When analysing the transcripts of interviews with the young people, qualitative research data analysis software was used to select the most prominent topics raised by the young people themselves. None of these appear to have been predetermined by the questions asked by the researcher; these were general questions about what it was like to visit Pakistan and what it was like to return to Britain afterwards.

Identities are troubling because they embody so many paradoxes: about our sense of self and our recognition of others; about conflicting belongings in a changing history and a complex modern world; and about the possibility of social action in and through our collective identities (Weeks 2000, p. 162).

As will be demonstrated, the findings embrace these paradoxes rather than simplifying them and consigning them to tidy categorisations. Instead, the following findings are organised flexibly around themes that were particularly prominent in the young people's own narratives during the interviews. Each theme should be read as a thread in the tapestry rather than as a discrete block of data.

CHAPTER TWO

JOURNEYS

Throughout the book the core metaphor of a journey is present. The writing of the book has been a journey in itself. It is also about the actual and imaginary journeys made by young people and it is about transition and change in identity constructions that can be depicted as a life journey. Whilst other metaphors trap the writer and reader back into polar and binary pictures, the journey has a flow. It is continuous, it involves an active decision-making traveller and it is not constrained to one fixed departure and destination point, it occupies the space between dynamically, it can be two way and we can change its path by the way that we live it. Journeys inevitably involve movement and change. Certainly there is movement and change from the inception of the research idea to its conclusions. There is also a shift in the thinking of the young people who were part of the research; nothing is static about identity constructions in the twenty-first century.

At the heart of the notion of diaspora is the image of a journey (Brah 1996, p. 182)

This research takes real journeys as its starting point but has constant reference to the image of a journey at the heart of the notion of diaspora. As Stuart Hall has reminded us cultural identity is about becoming as well as being (Hall 1990), it undergoes constant transformation. This research explores stories of young people's real and figurative journeys and tracks some of the cultural identity that is becoming theirs. Far from being passive passengers on the journey these travellers are agents of change playing a transformative role (Hall 1992b), generating new cultural forms. Young Muslim people have the influence of imagery of journeys in Islam that are actual as well as ritual and spiritual. Islam has several powerful journeys within its symbolism; for instance Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam. Every Muslim who is able to, should perform Hajj at least once in their life. Hajj is a pilgrimage to holy sites in Saudi Arabia, a ritualised journey during the Islamic month of the Hajj. It entails

a series of rites at the sacred mosque at Mecca and the nearby areas of Mina, Muzdalifa, and Arafat. At other times of year ‘umrah can be done, which is a shorter pilgrimage to Mecca and also forms part of Hajj. Pilgrims performing ‘umrah circle seven times around the Ka’ba, the house of God said to have been established by Adam and rebuilt by Abraham. Muslims from all over the world gather for Hajj and Umrah, they are gatherings representing the Ummah (the worldwide Muslim Community) and part of the powerful experience for participants is witnessing the diversity of the mass of pilgrims, all of whom feel that they belong to the Ummah. The Ka’ba is the focal point for the prayers of all Muslims; it marks the direction to pray towards. In this way the journey of Hajj is figuratively made five times a day. Another powerfully symbolic journey in Islam is the Hijrah, when the prophet Muhammad (pbuh), according to Islam migrated with his followers from Mecca to Yathrib now called Medina. The hijrah is significant imagery of migration, transition, change and development as the original hijrah marked the start of the Islamic era. A further epic journey in Islam is the night journey made by Muhammad (pbuh) when the angel Gabriel woke Muhammad and led him to a miraculous steed called the Buraq which carried him to Jerusalem from where he ascended to heaven. Muslims celebrate Laylat al-isra’wa’l-mi’raj (the Night of the journey and ascension) on the 27th day of the month of Rajab. So there is a tradition in Islam of associating journeys with significant choices about commitment to alliances and allegiances and to personal and spiritual change and development.

Journeys lend themselves to being narrated and through narration of journeys we can tell stories about our lives and about our sense of affiliation to or alienation from different places, societies and cultural practices. Writers and novelists love journeys for that reason. Within this research, journeys serve as a metaphor for discovery of new learning; and journeys serve to spark narration by young travellers, diaspora youth visiting kin in their ancestral “homeland”.

Translocality

Verity Saifullah Khan (1979) suggests that social stresses of Pakistani migrants in Britain derive from three ‘arenas’; traditional culture and

emigration area; the migration process; and settlement in the new environment and society. These three arenas lead to stress before migration, stress of migration and stress post migration. Before there was village life, interpersonal relations, family structure and socio-economic situation that in many ways was very contrasting, however traditional institutions re-emerge in modified form in Britain.

Whilst these young people are in some senses transnational, they are in all senses bi-local. They are familiar and connected with two very specific lived-in locations; these are not imagined lifeworlds, but lifeworlds with territories. They are a 'changing same' to use Paul Gilroy's term (Gilroy 1993). Being geographically transposed their lives have some continuity and connection with Pakistan and Kashmir, but they are changing rapidly and differently than their kin there. People in villages in Pakistan and Kashmir could also be described as a changing same; life there has commonality with the life of diaspora biraderi but also has its own dynamic of change and development.

British Pakistani young people are exposed to a cultural cocktail of urban youth cultures, British and American hegemony, Islam counter-hegemony, multiculturalism and ethnic communitarianism. They live in a very specific geographical and political space and time. Whilst they work out their relationship with their diaspora and their homeland they are encountering and living with other people doing so with other diasporas and other homelands. Their 'identific space' (Hintzen 1999) is full of possible permutations and is contested so that they have the opportunity to negotiate their identity creatively. The other side of this opportunity is uncertainty and stress. This leads to a complex pattern of risk-taking, mixing and experimenting, with retreats into conservatism and tradition to lessen uncertainty.

One of their localities is an inner-city neighbourhood that they understand as a particular territory within which they belong, the other locality is a village thousands of miles away but as near as a phone-call. The inner-city neighbourhood is a diaspora space characterised by generations of migration experience to and from all over the world. Integration into this neighbourhood has been well developed and established. However, integration beyond the neighbourhood is clearly problematic within the young people's narratives. Equally in Pakistan and Kashmir village life has been customised to integrate biraderi from Britain. This does not mean that the young people can easily integrate more generally in Pakistani and Kashmiri

society. In both localities they are integrated but very localised and have problems of segregation from the wider society that each locality is set in.

Double consciousness (Du Bois 1905) sounds like a very dualistic concept but it does not suggest that people hold two separate consciousnesses apart in one mind, rather it describes the ability to be conscious of two ways of viewing the world and to develop extra insight by having access to more than one cultural approach and practice. In a gestalt way double consciousness can mean that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people's whole life experience and whole ability to name the world is greater than the sum of two cultures. So bi-locality cannot be assumed to automatically produce binary patterns of identity formation, the world is not so black and white as that, as can be observed from the young people's own narratives.

Two-way travelling

The research had journeys as a starting point for young people's narratives about their sense of self hood. The words of their narratives are one level of the stories of their journeys but there is another expression, a symbolic level of their behaviour when they visit their kin. A whole cultural ritual has developed around journeys to and from Pakistan and Kashmir that these young people participate in. When they are about to depart family and friends visit, eat together and wish the travellers well. On their return the same crowd gathers for village and kinship news gleaned during the visit. Often this story telling is illustrated with photographs and video footage documenting family events and showing the changing appearances of relatives as they age.

Unlike some ritual journeys that translate the traveller from one place to a new place and a new understanding and condition such as the hijra (migration of the Prophet Muhammad p.b.u.h. and his followers) or the initial migration from Pakistan or Kashmir to Britain, these journeys are two way; more like pilgrimage from which the vast majority of pilgrims return to the daily life they left to go on pilgrimage. They do not come back unchanged, however they do have to make sense of the whole journey outward and return. For

this generation of young people the possibility of regular trips to and from the ancestral homeland is real. Unlike the days when their parents took ten years to save up to afford a visit, air travel is cheaper and more accessible these days.

The two-way nature of the young people's travelling has implications for travelling theory (Mandaville 2001). The journey from the interpretations of Islam prominent in Pakistan since Pakistan's inception in 1947, to critical Islam debated amongst young British Muslims in study circles is not a one-way journey. There is plenty of coming and going in the interpretations of Islam just as there is plenty of coming and going between Pakistan, Kashmir and Britain. For many of the young people other real journeys have influenced the spiritual Islamic journey they are on. Some have been to Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) or to Ziyarat (pilgrimage to shrines). Some have been able to meet Muslims and non-Muslims in other European countries; and all have met Muslims from many countries other than Pakistan and Kashmir. By meeting other British Muslims, they have met Muslims influenced by the contexts of Bangladesh, East Africa, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, to name a few. Part of the diaspora experience is having religious leaders newly arrived from Pakistan or Kashmir to give lectures, to teach classes and to conduct religious rites. Their teachers are schooled in Pakistan and Kashmir. Islam has very particular influences there, particular schools of thought which influenced the founders of Pakistan who were both nationalist and pan-Islamic at once (not easy to achieve). There are also scholars arriving from all over the world, and there are scholars who studied in Britain. This could be fertile ground for debate and for critical Islam. Critical Islam and the opportunities for debate in Britain influence young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris; however, they are also influenced by that special blend of nationalism and pan-Islam that persists in the specific cultural and state practices of Islam in Pakistan and Kashmir.

It is evident from the young people's narratives that they have complex identifications and are accustomed to negotiating social boundaries. For those who are skilled and capable of handling and even enjoying this complexity this is an opportunity. Even for them the process can be tiring and there are times when a rest in a safe and familiar 'homespace' (hooks 1990) is needed. However, those who are less well equipped to deal with the complexity of negotiating

boundaries can become stressed and retreat or rebel. Education and employment institutions are a particularly challenging site of struggle in relation to this negotiation.

Young people through their stories express a need for support of positive journeys either to Pakistan and Kashmir or to Umra or Hajj or Ziyarat, or elsewhere in Europe or 'the Muslim world'. They also demonstrate in their stories, a need for support and assistance to be available to help out when journeys go wrong. They do not only need consulate services but advice, guidance, translation and practical travel information; medical services, legal services and in a few cases refuge. Furthermore they may need support when re-entering Britain, to re-enter education or employment and to re-establish themselves. There is a particular need for this when they have just got married in Pakistan or Kashmir and have returned to the U.K. without their partner.

Going over there: four weddings and a funeral

INAS (F) When you're here you don't want to go- you do want to go and you don't want to go (if you get me) but when you're there you just don't want to come back.

SALMA (F) This time the facilities were very modern. It was like going from our life in England to the same again. People have changed as well; they're more like here as well.

NABILA (F). I went with my Mum to her brother's house. I begged my parents to let me go back. I went there for a two-month holiday by myself

BILAAL (M) I know friends who are going there often. It's a regular everyday thing to go to Pakistan, its no big deal. Just go over there, check out your family and all that, come back, carry on, get ready to go again. I suppose if you go to get married or for a funeral it might be a bit of an excitement and fluster, but otherwise it's normal these days, almost routine.

BILQEES (F) It was a really, really good experience.

HAROON (M) I wasn't really planning to go. My Mum said that we're going. To start with I said no, but then I decided it would be okay. On the way it was a joke, a PIA farce, chaos all around you. If you like to plan, Pakistan would drive you mad, but if you're simple and take things as they come, you'll fit in okay.

SHAFEEQA (F) I went once for nine months and that was enough. I was 17 or 18. My idea was a holiday for 5 weeks. I wasn't going to get married

or nothing. In Pakistan I found out I had a single ticket and my Dad had a return ticket, that's when I realised I was stuck. Me and my Dad had arguments but then he went back and left me with my Dad's brother's family.

FARHANAH (F) I must have been about 16 when I went, I really went because my sister had left home and she ran off with a guy and she came back and it was really a way of . . . the reason I went to Pakistan was to get her away from this guy. So it wasn't a very positive note in the first place 'cause I didn't want to go, it was our parents' idea. Er, I think that we were scared—yeh—that our parents wanted us to get married and that was the whole reason they were sending us so I remember we were really, really upset.

INAS (F) I've been at my Dad's death, his funeral was over there (and then it was my cousin's wedding). I wasn't really happy, not really, because his grave's so far away. If he was here then at least we could go each Sunday, put flowers on his grave and things like that. We could go and pray at his grave and when we really miss him, at least if he was here we could go and see his grave and things like that.

JAABIR (M) We were having land problems so I had to go with my Mum.

MUMTAZ (F) I really liked it there. Here there's been a lot of trouble in my family. My brothers have been in trouble since they were little. They've got no job, one's been in prison. They're both druggies. My parents worry about them all the time. Going to Pakistan was a way of getting out. They all treated me as a new bride. My husband was so nice to me. He is decent and respected. I got respect, being his wife. I had a lot of company of girls my age. Here I'm having to struggle to earn money, to look after the baby and to deal with the immigration people.

NABILA (F) Here you've got life, you've got a day where you go out to work, come home, spend time with family, sleep and it's busy. There you get families coming and going, there's a routine of prayers and meals and that gives us women a routine of work but it's a totally different pace of life than over here and not so much get up and go. Here I can plan my day to do what I want, there everybody waits for everybody else and kind of just waits to see what happens.

SALMA (F) We say 'insha Allah' too, but over there they really think that way, whatever God wills will happen, it's all planned out we just don't know it yet. That affects their sense of everything basically.

NAZAQAT (M) They know we live different over here, busy busy with studying and earning and that, and we came over for a holiday. We don't have to help and that, they take us out and drop their work and that to pass time with us.

QAYYUM (M) It's a completely different pace over there.

INAS (F) Three weeks there go really fast and you just want to be there a bit longer and a bit longer to spend more time with the family and things like that.

For some of those interviewed, a journey to relatives in Kashmir or Pakistan is a reward used by parents as an incentive for passing an exam, good behaviour or some other successful achievement such as learning to recite the Qur'an. For others sending them to Pakistan or Kashmir has been used as a means of controlling them or curtailing their behaviour in Britain. One respondent was sent to Pakistan for a year with her sister because her sister had run away from home. Another said that her father took the whole family to Pakistan because he was worried about her brother drinking alcohol and having a friendship group that he disapproved of.

Several of the young people commented about the different perception and relationship to time that there is between Pakistan and Kashmir and Britain. This includes attitudes to present awareness and use of time (hour by hour), day-by-day attitudes, attitudes to planning, and orientations to the past and the future. Rhythms of activities, pace, passing time and holidays are all understood very differently in Pakistan than in Britain.

There was little consistent within the narratives about going to Pakistan and Kashmir. Whilst some young people both male and female report a very positive experience and a strong desire to return there, others say they hated it and could not wait to come back to Britain, hoping to never have to go there again. Many have ambivalence about wanting to go there and simultaneously not wanting to. Ironically, they describe having the same ambivalence about wanting to and yet not wanting to return to the United Kingdom. Some young people who travel regularly to and from Pakistan and Kashmir think of the experience as ordinary and commonplace, "no big deal". For them there has been a narrowing of the idea of difference between their life in Britain and their life there.

Parental control of the planning of trips is a recurrent theme in the narratives. At the extreme of this is fear of forced marriages or of enforced lengthy stays in Pakistan as a kind of penance for misdemeanours or mistrust of behaviour and relationships in Britain. The young people also complain about other unwelcome obligations to the extended family. Common reasons for going over there are grandparents' or parent's funerals, cousin's weddings and their own weddings. Some accompany their parents going to sort out land or

property matters, for others it is a holiday for a few weeks, or a way of escaping problems in the United Kingdom.

These young people do face challenges arising from their post-migration family and community histories. Families have been divided by distance and by national and European immigration policies. Pakistan and Britain are in distinctly different geopolitical camps in terms of the world political arena and this affects British media portrayal of Pakistani communities in the West. However, deducing from these 'facts' discourses about identities and life experiences is projecting assumed experiences onto these young people.

At face value binary accounts seem to be supported by these young people's accounts of their journeys. Pakistan and Kashmir are geographically distant from the U.K. and culturally, politically, socially and economically different. It is easy to form a picture of the young people as being caught in between competing systems. Whilst there is contrast and new experience to be contended with in their lives, for these young people there is no such clear separation between two worlds. For them there is continuity and a daily negotiation process involving aggregate cultural and sub-cultural influences and choices. This negotiation is their 'normal' and 'no big deal'. Pakistan and Kashmir are 'other' but familiar, known 'other' and partially internalised from early childhood.

It is clear from these narratives that Pakistan and Kashmir are a constant subtext of the young people's lives. When they physically visit places there they bring with them the stories that have been woven into their everyday conversations in family circles in Britain. News travels fast these days of births, deaths and marriages but also of incidents in people's relationships with each other. Having the news does not always feel 'real'; going and touching the soil of a grandparent's grave or holding a child, makes the news concrete and connects people at a different level than a video or a phone conversation. The time lived in Pakistan or Kashmir becomes storied and the stories are brought back and woven into Birmingham conversations again.

Village: out of sight but not out of mind

A kinship group in Pakistan or Kashmir is often rooted in a village that is a complex of biraderi relations, homes, property, land and territories. A visit to kin by urban inner city dwellers is a visit to

village life. It is not simply a visit such as any other guest or traveller would make with all of the exploration of alternative cultural and practical ways of living. It is a visit to the young person's own family and to the place he or she has always been urged to consider their own village. Villages have a way of supporting a particularly strong sense of belonging, of insiders and outsiders, of benefits and responsibilities of collective living. They can be deeply conservative yet deeply reassuring to anyone in search of the security of knowing who you are, where you come from and what is expected of you. Traditional lifestyle restricts, yet it also reduces the stress of decision-making. There are few choices or decisions for most people in a village to make. Many of the decisions are taken by a few elders and many aspects of life are prescribed by tradition, climate or circumstances. Add to this a culture of trusting in Allah, and life becomes very day-to-day, with some things very predictable and others unpredictable. Uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 1984) is exercised by behaving as people from one's own family have always behaved for example following traditional gender roles and *zat* roles; this contrasts with the uncertainties of living in a volatile political and economic climate, with no welfare state and health risks.

Inner city areas of Birmingham in many ways are a world away from village life in rural Kashmir, in other ways neighbourhoods operate like urban villages and there is less contrast between life in inner-city neighbourhood urban villages and village life in Pakistan and Kashmir than there appears to be from the outside. Socially there is much more in common than there is environmentally. Diaspora space (Brah 1996) has within it an intricate web of on-going relations with 'the village'. There are villages in diaspora (communities of people living in diaspora who all consider the same village theirs). These diaspora villages are part of the context in which many British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people have grown up. When they go to visit the homeland they are going to visit the home village and within it the homestead. The home village has a much clearer link with their lives in Britain than the generalised homeland does.

Negotiating the borders

NABILA (F) Somehow I can live in both worlds now and mostly I can manage the two together but that can be stressful

HAROON (M) Some people say the way you walk the way you talk, they can tell over there you're from here, but I think if you are willing to fit in, you can. There's no need to put on airs and graces, just go along with their ways naturally, you can drift in fully in a couple of months. I wouldn't mind living there as long as I could plan from here what sort of job to do there and so forth to support myself. Otherwise it would be insecure and worrying.

TANWEER (M) I've lived through that: people arguing over inheritance in Pakistan. I got really confused by it all and I couldn't escape it. I was in the middle of it all.

ZULFAQAR (M) There's so much hassle in Pakistan, you can't relax. Fight your way through one thing, struggle with the next, fight your way to get anywhere, slow progress. Each time I went for three weeks. I couldn't hack it for longer than that. I visited the village but I couldn't stay there with nothing happening for days on end so I told the family I had work to do and headed off. I stayed in a hotel in Mirpur. It was more lively there and I had better privacy and freedom to do my things.

PARVEEN (F) It was a bit unusual but you do feel connected, you just have to adjust yourself a bit.

INAS (F) If I have children I'm sure I want to take them there a lot, but then again as a small family take them different places around rather than just keeping them in one place. Also, I don't want them to see only England and Pakistan, I'd like them to travel and see more. I would love to take them to Karachi because I've always wanted to go there myself, and more modernised places where they'd enjoy themselves, not like 'backwards', but probably in their time they are going to be more modernised, 'cause slowly they are already getting that way.

SAMEERA (F) As soon as I got there I was just myself basically and everyone liked it so I was just asking them what I was supposed to do next and I just went along like that. If I did anything wrong, we just laughed about it.

ZAHRAH (F) Probably to live there in the village or even a small town would freak me out but in Islamabad say, I wouldn't mind keeping the option open of living over there, say when I'm married, because it's similar to here in that you can work and that, and the facilities are good.

FARHANAH (F) Since I've got married and had my children, I've been really regular. I think it was a having a choice of where to live and er, it was on my terms, not their terms and I could do as I like whereas before you know I was kind of made to stay with the relatives. There were a lot of restrictions—I did things secretly but . . .

Managing the interface between cultural expectations in Pakistan and Kashmir and cultural expectations in Britain is a skill that most of the young people have in some measure; they describe it as both possible and stressful. They mention times when they have made choices about whether or not to fit in; this suggests a high level of awareness and competence. Negotiations that would be stressful any way such as inheritance, buying and selling land or property, funeral or wedding arrangements, travel arrangements and so on are even more stressful with added cultural differences and practices to contend with and resultant confusion. The words 'struggle' and 'hassle' are frequent in the young people's accounts of their visits to Pakistan. On the other hand they talked about getting help from relatives and about quickly learning to adjust to different lifestyles and ways of doing things. There is a prevalent attitude amongst the young people that Pakistan is "backwards", but is modernising. Several of them described a need for privacy and for freedom to make their own independent decisions. They suggested that the only way that they could get these was by leaving their kin households and travelling independently. Young men found this far more achievable than young women who were under great social pressure to stay at home with relatives and only to venture out accompanied.

Individualism and collectivism are poles of the spectrum by which Hofstede (1984) and other global surveyors of culture categorise 'cultures'. The young people's narratives show awareness of the tension of living with these poles being pulls on them in opposite directions. They contrast the collectivism of village life in Pakistan and Kashmir with the individualism of city work and college life in Britain. Then they come to extended family and community life in Birmingham inner city streets and can articulate a complex site of tension between responsibilities and accountabilities to family, friends, ethnicity, religion and neighbourhood versus individual ambitions and freedoms. They walk this tightrope daily and mostly skilfully, but sometimes the stress of doing so takes its toll. In their lives the poles are both ever present, making it difficult to imagine arriving at a position to be able to categorise their culture using these criteria.

Another of Hofstede's (1984) factors for categorising 'cultures' is uncertainty avoidance. Sticking to tradition and staying in a place and a group that you can claim to firmly belong to is a good way of avoiding uncertainty. You know who you are, where you live, whom you belong with, what is expected of you and what you can expect

of others. Extended families are generally good at being proactive in responding to life's uncertainties and crises with support. Reciprocity and involvement in *lena-dena* sometimes leaves little time for anything else. The price of this can be seclusion, leading to social and economic exclusion. Again these young people are sophisticated in recognising mechanisms for uncertainty avoidance, but equally recognising the need to take risks and to be active for change. They are experiencing rapid change. Sometimes, like all of us, they embrace this or at least cope with it comfortably, at other times they retreat to uncertainty avoidance strategies such as staying in and around 'home'. Often the nuclear family and peer group get prioritised over extended family and *lena dena* is limited to these closer people in order to have time for education and work that in turn may offer some security. It is hard to imagine how British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people's culture could be categorised using the uncertainty avoidance criteria. May be this could be done for a very specific moment freeze-framed but not for such a dynamic, shifting, constant negotiation process.

Change

ZULFAQAR (M) The people in my village don't know anything about politics or even anything outside, they don't even know who the government are, they are in a world of their own. It would be all right if that world was perfect but it's not, things need sorting, problems that are affecting people badly. That's not my style; I like having a point of view and trying to change things that I think are wrong instead of burying my head in the sand. What hope would there be if we all did that?

One of the aspects of life in Pakistan that strikes the young people when they first visit is poverty. For example, they describe their confusion at how to respond to people with disabilities begging on the streets. They also talk about the lack of sanitation and facilities in the homes of their relatives. A number of them also state some commitment to action such as giving money to charities. It is clear from the words of a few of the respondents that they are well informed and actively politically engaged with issues including Kashmir, antiracism in Britain and other international affairs such as Palestine and Iraq. In this sphere they are behaving as conscious, deliberate change agents.

CHAPTER THREE

HOMELAND

Diaspora is different from travel (though it works through travel practices) in that it is not temporary. It involves dwelling, maintaining communities, having collective homes away from home. . . . (Clifford 1997, p. 287).

Home is a constant subtext of diaspora; the word includes a notion of a home from where dispersion occurs (Brah 1996). This research study explores whether Pakistan and Kashmir are a constant subtext of young British and Kashmiri people's lives and tries to gain insights into their sense of where 'home' is. The word diaspora is not part of the young people's vocabulary, home is. In this way it is a more important word in the title of this research than diaspora in that it is accessible and open to direct comment by the young people interviewed. One of the characteristics of a diaspora listed by Safran (1991) is that people of a diaspora retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland. Another is that members of the diaspora feel committed to maintenance of the safety and prosperity of the homeland and continue to relate to that homeland for their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity. There is no doubt that Pakistanis and Kashmiris in Britain fulfil all of these criteria at the moment but will this weaken from generation to generation? Young people may become less committed to Pakistan and Kashmir and become more preoccupied with their lives in Britain. This research project involved asking thirty young people about this.

The dominant and popular political narrative of "race" in Britain almost always begins, opens, within the framework of post-1945 Britain, this period of post-war immigration is referred to as the period of settlement (Hesse 1993, p. 163).

This leads Hesse to raise the question "what is it to be settled?" (Hesse 1993, p. 167) Whilst Hesse discusses this in relation to Jamaicans arriving in Britain, it is equally an important question about Pakistanis who arrived in Britain in the 1950s and who are arriving now. For many immigrants arriving soon after 1945, England was the "motherland"

because they had all grown up in the 'British Empire'. However, it was also the colonising power that their countries were struggling for independence from, and on arrival it proved to be unworthy of the nurturing image of a motherland; it was a hostile, cold racist land in which it was a struggle to survive, let alone thrive and be happy. Nowadays immigrants still arrive with high hopes of wealth and expectations of welfare services, and they still have a hard time arriving and making a living for themselves. However, it has to be acknowledged that there are established 'settlements' of Pakistani and Kashmiri people in British cities and towns like Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford, Cardiff, Rochdale, Burnley and Oldham. Within these settlements that started around employment in industry, through chain migration, biraderi (extended family) groups have carved out a place or places for them to settle down in Britain. For many British Pakistanis and Kashmiris today the map of Britain in their mind consists of the places where their biraderi (extended family) have settled. It remains ambiguous for many of them whether these places of settlement are really 'home'. Anwar referred to a myth of return amongst migrants who came to earn and return but became trapped in long term earning and dependency relationships into staying in Britain and calling their households over to join them. This myth has dwindled, certainly amongst British-born young people; however, connection with the ancestral homeland Pakistan or Kashmir as "home" has persisted. Stuart Hall uses the term translation to describe those identities composed of people who have left forever their homelands and now have lives that cut across frontiers. They retain links with their places of origin and their traditions, but have no illusion of return. Pakistanis and Kashmiris in Britain definitely continue to retain strong links with their biraderi (extended family) homes "back home". The narratives of the young people are an opportunity to assess the degree to which they could be considered translated; how far has the illusion of return vanished? Hall suggests a tension between translation and tradition (Hall 1992a), powerful attempts to construct coherent identities with reference to the past and the ancestral homeland. Tradition is characterised by attachments to local and particular cultural practices and to real and imaginary communities with real and imagined shared history. Pakistanis in Britain may have translated their lives into Britain, but how far are they translated in the sense of being less attached to local and particular roots?

As Hesse points out,

The heterographies of settlement, which narrativize the spatial and temporal institution of community, appropriate regional Britain both in iconographic and cartographic vernaculars: Handsworth (Birmingham), Brixton (London), Moss Side (Manchester), Chapel-town (Leeds), Liverpool 8 signify not merely the dispersed incidence of Black settlement but the traces of agency, assertion, harassment, local politics, recreational routes and cultural expressivity (Hesse 1993, p. 177).

Britain has an assimilationist national identity that has great trouble with groups that detract from the nation and also with those who keep allegiances and on-going practical connections with a homeland elsewhere. This contravenes the plan that immigrants should gradually jettison their former ways of being, thinking and living in order to adopt 'the British way' and to fully patriotically adopt Britain as home. British politicians find it disturbing when connections with the homeland include active participation in nationalist struggles such as the contest over Kashmir. If that nationalism is linked transnationally to solidarity with other nationalist struggles such as those in Chechnya, Bosnia and Palestine, British politicians are even more disturbed.

Collective and individual returns home can take the form of literature, returns in the imagination, films, home videos, telephone calls, conversations and sharing of memories. Such returns are just as important in keeping attachments and loyalties alive as the 'real' journeys young people make to kin in the 'homeland'. Inevitably there is a disjuncture between the homeland of collective narratives and memories and that encountered through physical visits.

'Home' is a combination of reality and fantasy. The idealised 'home' is a place of safety and renewal, and a place to call one's own, a place of privacy from public gaze and interference. The realities for many people do not match this ideal; home can be a place of domestic violence, exploitation, conflict and struggle to make ends meet. For millions of women, home is the site of domestic work and heavy responsibility for caring for other's needs. When she was trying to identify spaces that fulfil the idealised home, bell hooks (1990) described a homeplace which is a space of resistance, safety, renewal and entitlement to be one's self, her homespace represents an act of decolonisation by Black women. This home is not one place but a space characterised by the qualities of the idealised home. For many

young people in Britain, the family home is not synonymous with this idealised home at all. It may be a place of conflict, even violence. It often does not feel like their own place but the territory and domain of their parents where the parent's rules govern. Some create a home in their bedroom or around their bed in a shared bedroom. Many dream of having their own home to move out to. This may also be the case for British Pakistani young people. One difference is that some boys may retain the traditional patrilocal expectation that they will remain in the family home and settle there even after marriage.

Being 'valayati': what they think of us

INAS (F) Oh God, when I went for the visa in Birmingham it started, the way the man looked at me. He looked at me, looked at the ceiling like he was 'diss'ing me, tutted to himself and muttered 'British born'. They disapprove of how I dress, how I talk, walk, work, everything. It would be easier for them if I didn't even exist but I do and I have a right to go to Pakistan, to my Dad's house, just as much right as them lot.

HAROON (M) They think we're picky, very choosy about things and that we think we're generally better than them. Also they think we had freedom in England to get up to dodgy things like dating and that, they disrespect you for that and they're jealous at the same time.

QAYYUM (M) They think we're arrogant and lazy and we think we're better than them. It's true . . . we are better than them and we do let them do all the work when we go over there. They owe us, we send them money and where would they be without us being in the U.K. and improving their houses and sending them cash? We are proud of it and I have no intention of working when I'm there. I'm just going to chill and enjoy myself, relax and mess about.

ANEESAH (F) They think I'm weird; they call me the 'English girl'. They think we live like white girls in films or soaps, like we live in 'Neighbours', funny ideas. They treat us nicely, but they feel we are too proud.

FARHANAH (F) I took on board my children's feelings. The younger one always felt threatened by the people there. He found them very er in your face. There was no kind of distance between you. He just hated that. So they probably find us standoffish, maybe secretive and selfish kind of thing, pushing them away because we want our own privacy and space.

NABILA (F) Some British born Pakistanis act as though they are a cut above in Pakistan. Even if they say nothing people there can sense the attitude.

I'm glad my Mum brought us up to expect Pakistan to be a place where we are equal and belong. They never get used to us leaving. They feel that having a foreign relative in the house brightens the atmosphere. They call me the light of their house. When I come they get in a good mood and when I leave they get depressed.

ARIF (M) I don't know. I'm not sure if they'd have me. To tell you the truth I don't know what they'd say or do, or how I'd feel, I'm just avoiding that whole scene because it's easier and I'm more comfortable out of there.

BILQEES (F) They look up to you and you're looked after, treated a bit special.

PARVEEN (F) When you go one time they treat you like a guest, but go a lot and they don't want to know you. I prefer it like that just mixing in normal.

JAABIR (M) They just treat us like we're millionaires, really rich compared to them, they expect us to have deep pockets and pay out all day long, send them money, pay for things. To some degree they're right, pounds do go a lot further than rupees, but they don't get it, that we aren't rich at all in England we're in debt and struggling.

ARIF (M) Over there we're not treated like we belong, they call us Valayatis (meaning we're from over here) and even "whiteys". It knocks your identity when you think you are going to where you belong and you're treated as an outsider. Especially as when you come back you'll be a "Paki".

SAMEERA (F) Some people say all the British born girls are . . . they've had boyfriends and that and they've seen them and things before they're actually married. Some of them label us that way even when they see us. I think it's unfair but I've seen quite a few girls who have actually done that, but that shouldn't give us girls a reputation as well.

A really clear identification of 'them' and 'us' comes out in the young people's narratives about British born Pakistani and Kashmiri people and those who continue to be resident there. British young people sense that their Pakistani relatives recognise and resent an attitude of superiority in them. They feel like they are in a lose-lose situation because they are regarded as foreigners in Pakistan and in Britain and racist connotations are oppressive to them in both settings. Young women particularly complain that they feel dismissed and disapproved of by their kin in Pakistan and Kashmir. They think that their dress code, conduct and behaviour are all disapproved of and that they are labelled as permissive of premarital sexual relations. This would be a very negative and disparaging attitude within that

cultural context. The young visitors from Britain go as guests yet they are young and they are relatives and they stay longer than another kind of guest. After a while when they continue not to work they are regarded as lazy and exploitative. There are also different attitudes between 'residents' and 'guests' concerning privacy and space.

Returning to Britain: back to 'reality'

ANEESAH (F) I really started to cry when I had to leave there. I wanted to live there but I decided it would be too hard.

FAREED (M) Pakistan is where I really want to be. I'm saving already for the next ticket. Here I get hooked into television and just sit in front of it. There forget TV, there's loads to do, places to go, people to spend time with, it's interesting without television.

AHMAD (M) All I want is peace in life. I can't find it there or here, there are people fighting and I can't feel settled and at peace anywhere I go. When I come back here, I can't feel like it's my home, like my country. Even though I will live here my whole life and most likely this is the future of my kids, I just can't feel it's mine and be happy and settled.

MUMTAZ (F) I really didn't want to come back. I would prefer to live there forever, but I had to come to earn money and to have the baby. Hospitals here have better resources so it was safer to have her in England and my family wanted her to be British born for nationality.

BILQEES (F) I didn't want to come back just missing people, torn away, like emigrating.

JAABIR (M) I didn't really want to come back. I wouldn't mind living there for the rest of my life but work is a problem. I didn't miss England that much. Going there built certain characteristics in me; I've got more confidence in myself now.

FAREED (M) When I came back I hardly knew where I lived, it looked funny and it was dark and cold.

HAROON (M) It was all right at first but when I was put back a class I regretted it. Otherwise I just fitted back in, nothing much had changed. Adjusting back here was easy. You can see it in different ways. You can see it as going to a totally different society and worry about adjusting there and then here or (like me) I just take it all as it comes. There's a lot of connection between Pakistan and around here in the area, I just stay local for a while and concentrate on the connections 'til I'm settled to face college or work.

FARHANAH (F) When I come back I usually say ‘Oh God’ I’m not going back again for years because of the hassle of the airport and er, the people there when you’re out and about, the bad experience of beggars

NABILA (F) Its hard to come back. I used to find it very difficult. For three weeks I just slept. It was a big shock. Now I’m better at it, I’ve grown strong and I have a different tolerance level.

ZULFIQAAR (M) When I’m there I want to be here; when I’m here I want to be there!

Many of the young people interviewed expressed feelings of real loss and pain at leaving kin in villages in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also recognition that it would be too hard to stay. One even described leaving Pakistan as ‘like emigrating’. This is an interesting connection with the original departure of their parents bound for Britain as migrants. Whilst a few of the group really want to be in Pakistan and a few were really relieved to leave, most were torn at the point of leaving to return to the United Kingdom. Several expressed being unable to settle and to find peace in either place and experienced difficulty in adjusting back to British life. Others acknowledged that there is a transition to make but said that they have tried and tested ways of re-entering their life in Britain, starting at home, moving to local community circles and then re-engaging with work, college and the wider society. These young people claim to easily take adjustment backwards and forwards transnationally in their stride. They have developed a particular transnational competence.

The narratives of the young people do not give the impression that they are ‘translated’ (Hall 1992a) fully. They are in transition and they are proficient at micro level translation both linguistically and culturally but they have not transformed and reinvented tradition sufficiently to count as Hall’s version of ‘translated’. Part of the idea of being ‘translated’ is that the illusion of return vanishes. Whilst they do not have an illusion of return in the same way as their parents or newly arrived spouses, many of them none the less maintain their attachment to Pakistan and Kashmir and keep up the possibility of visiting there on a regular basis. Neither are they nomads (Terry 1995). They are clear where they are based and where their future lies, but they are also clear that they identify transnationally, and that they wish to retain a connection with relatives in Pakistan and Kashmir and to have a second home or home from home there.

Home from home from home

ZAHRA (F) I count this as home but I know that it's home away from home kind of. That's my real home but this is my home where I'm living now.

HAROON (M) I feel at home there and here, especially around this area or in the village over there, beyond that is getting away from home, out and about.

OMRAN (M) We've been able to improve our houses over there a lot by sending money from here, they are decent now, actually really nice. Here we've bought a new house, did you know? So I have a few houses and they are all home to me. I'm going to move out of home if my brothers stay when they get married, but if they leave, I'll stay. Anyhow I'll stay around this area.

PARVEEN (F) I didn't feel its my place, I feel that better here.

ANEESAH (F) If I was going to live there for ever I would really miss this house. I'd be sad to leave school here and friends here. I'd feel scared and shy because I wouldn't have seen the relatives over there for a long time. I'd miss all the family here because we're close together day-to-day. This is home, that would take time to become a new home.

SAMEERA (F) I suppose I was born here, I've got all my friends here. I just look at it as I was born here, I was raised here, I call this my home but when you go back there you don't feel like returning back to England. It's very easy just to fit in there, where you have the whole family around and everyone around is so caring.

AHMAD (M) No matter where I live, my home is Kashmir.

ANEESAH (F) Both are home. This is my actual home, but I have a right to be there and feel at home there, I feel comfortable like at home.

PARVEEN (F) It's a relief to get back here though, cause this is home at the end of the day.

INAS (F) I feel a right to live there. I couldn't live there though, I just couldn't.

ARIF (M) I still call it "back home" but I don't know why, its not home at all, when we go there that's clear.

This topic is discussed in the narratives with ambivalence. On the one hand Pakistan and Kashmir are home on the other hand they are not. Credentials for what counts as home are explored by the storytellers. Being born in Britain makes it home; being raised in Britain makes it home. Friends and family in both places make both feel like home and make both missed when absent, in this sense there is a constant absence from home simultaneously with a con-

stant being at home. Bricks and mortar, actual houses count as home, references were made throughout the narratives to houses, in Britain or in Pakistan, with long-standing residency by the family. Building new houses or renovating existing ones in both places were close topics to the topic of home. Sorting out property and land is among the reasons given for travelling to Pakistan and Kashmir, either when property or land has been inherited or when parents have to carry out some transactions with tenants, builders, banks or co-owners. Several young people in this study talked about decisions about property in Pakistan or Kashmir being stressful and a source of tension. They weighed up the pros and cons in their narratives and remained inconclusive about whether they should claim their property inheritance or not and if so, how to go about it. Several of them had experience of family feuds over property. They were not ambivalent in the same way about property in Britain, many aiming to own their own home. As told by the respondents, the topic of houses in Britain and Pakistan or Kashmir is closely linked to remittances: sending money there secures a right to call the place home in a very tangible way, however it also eats into resources that could be used to own, maintain and improve a household to call home in Britain.

Right or entitlement to live in particular places was asserted by all of the young people interviewed, they were keen to clarify that it is significant to maintain a right to count both places as home even if they never intend to exercise that right. Some feel that they could happily live in Pakistan or Kashmir but most feel that it would be unrealistic to consider that an option because of the need to earn money. In this sense they are real children and grandchildren of migrant workers. They retain the attitude that going to Britain is necessary for economic reasons, not only for themselves but also for dependents.

The idea of home in the narratives is sometimes used to refer to a household, but also sometimes used for a familiar patch of territory in the British city or in the Pakistani or Kashmiri village. Occasionally it is also linked to nationalism especially by British Kashmiris. Home is where allegiance is rather than residence and home is therefore Kashmir, a symbolic homeland. This qualifies several of the young people as diasporic in their thinking and attachments to the idea of homeland. Many of the respondents expressed idealised, nationalistic sentiments about Pakistan as well and listed national icons as special places to travel to in order to feel proud.

Home as a theme in the narratives is sometimes about where the young person resides at the moment and sometimes a 'sense of home': a description of what it means to feel at home or not to feel at home. In either sense, a mixture of fantasy and reality is evident and it is hard to decipher the difference. Interviewing the young people here, some remembered feeling overwhelmingly loved and welcomed in Pakistan, others recalled being completely desperate to leave the place. Either of these recollections is likely to be a mixture of fantasy and reality. Their idea about their safe home territory in Birmingham is based on a complex mixture of both fantasy and reality. The same applies to their ancestral homeland: it is viewed with a mixture of reality and fantasy. There are many examples in the narratives of new discoveries being made when visiting Kashmir and Pakistan. Visiting does not necessarily replace fantasies with realities. We can fantasise about a place when we are in it, not only when we are distant from it. Equally we can fantasise about a home when we are away from it in spite of having detailed first hand knowledge of it.

Territory: familiar places

BILAAL (M) I call home Birmingham around where I live 'cause that's where I was born, that's where I've been brought up and went school, that's where I know everyone, work, everything day to day.

ARIF (M) How it is, virtually our whole village came over from Kashmir to here to the same neighbourhood over here. There is a strong tie between the two places with constant coming and going. The same village just split into two locations far apart. As time goes the connection is weakening a bit because we're not direct immigrants, but it's not fully breaking.

BILQEES (F) You should know your own country but that shouldn't stop us living here, going to school with friends. I miss there but I am comfortable living here in this area as well, everyone here is from there anyhow.

OMRAN (M) I like it at my aunty's house better. My uncle's is on the edge of town near the main road. It is set back away from everything. My aunty's is right in the middle where all the houses are crowded together, near the mosque and a market. That's where I like it more, where everything is happening. Over here I know this side and everyone over here . . . meaning around this road and these roads this side of Stratford Road. In my whole life I've only gone from here walking distance, or to town, or to our village in Pakistan

(via Manchester airport or Heathrow airport). Once I went to a relative's house in Cardiff, but I can't remember it properly. My Mum went to Saudi Arabia but she only took my little brother. I stayed home. School, Mosque, shops, everything's nearby and I know round here backwards, I feel safe here but not other places.

PARVEEN (F) In a way it's like freedom cause it's a huge place and you can live outside. Your parents think everyone's got the same culture so they let you mix with everyone in the village more freely than they let you mix around here. There they like let you walk around freely. Here you always have to ask permission to go here or there and the answers always no, but there our parents get happy and relax and let us go about more with less worry.

INAS (F) We hardly get to do things like you know go and stay at other houses and that, go to mate's houses for the whole day. We can't but they can.

NADIM (M) I like to go there because I'm more happy there. Their garden is much bigger. We're not allowed to play on the road here but there we can play anywhere in the whole village.

ANEESAH (F) I would like Birmingham if the Labour made big open spaces by knocking down buildings and putting a river here. You can't feel proud of it like this, crowded and dirty, too much litter and traffic.

FAREED (M) I only really know Birmingham, I know the people, the atmosphere everything. What I know I don't like, but still I know it. I like there but I don't know it much so I don't know properly what I would like and not like if I knew.

OMRAN (M) It's our place, we don't want to come back but we have to.

FAREED (M) If you come with me to Pakistan, I can show you our family's land exactly, where it is, where its boundaries are and what's what about who inherited what from whom. I feel proud that it's all ours.

There is no evidence amongst the sample of attachment to a 'myth of return' (Anwar 1979). However, there is plenty of attachment to Pakistan and Kashmir as a place of current and on-going family connection, practical commitment and political engagement. They have a sense of emotional attachment and an assumption of connection and accountability. One of the features of the conversations transcribed is the evidence of regular contact between young people growing up in Britain and their relatives in Pakistan or Kashmir. This does not mean that they know their relatives well but it does mean that they live with a sense of being connected. The contact is through short international phone calls, letters, video recordings of family events and audiocassettes. It is fairly ritualised and patterned.

When a family friend is travelling gifts and hand delivered messages are taken. It is a pattern that has built up since migration and has become in a way a new tradition.

Britain is now clearly home for all of the young people in this project. However, there is recognition of Pakistan or of Kashmir as their parents' and grandparents' homeland and as a focus for Pakistanis or Kashmiris now living throughout the world. Every young person interviewed was unequivocal about where home is. Home is in Birmingham. In fact they were more specific. They named specific neighbourhoods of Birmingham and those neighbourhoods are famous for housing concentrations of minority ethnic communities' residents. The young people displayed considerable attachment and identification with these neighbourhoods. As young people of the Pakistani/ Kashmiri diaspora, they inhabit a distinctively Pakistani/Kashmiri patch of streets in Birmingham. They live in 'diaspora space' (Brah 1996). This is marked territory. There is a public show along the main roads of Pakistani and Kashmiri businesses. One of the areas they name is called "the Balti belt" by Birmingham City Council, due to the number of Pakistani and Kashmiri restaurants there. The local action research project found that many local young people requested opportunities to travel safely to see places beyond their immediate familiar territory. They found that young people have territory as a key theme and consciousness.

The knowledge the young people have of Pakistan/Kashmir is geographically very limited. It focuses on a particular village or district of a city in which their relatives live. Many of them complain that is all they have had exposure to and would like to see more. Equally they complain that their relatives there have very little mobility and know a restricted territory very well but know nowhere else. An interesting comparison then comes in, with the way that the young people relate to territory in Britain. They are similarly very confined to one patch (Westwood 1995). They know an inner city neighbourhood very well but have limited exposure to anywhere else. Often their discourse displays a loyalty to that location which Back (1996) has named 'the nationalism of the neighbourhood'. Young men have a carefully developed knowledge of their home patch in Britain and a desire to lose the disadvantage of being a stranger in the Pakistani or Kashmiri village as fast as possible. Most young women have a different kind of map of the same territories in Britain and Pakistan and Kashmir; they know less houses but from the inside

and they use different routes through the same area. In Britain the majority of those interviewed have greater opportunities to go out and to extend familiar geography by going to school, college or work further from home than the households they visit, and to go shopping either in local high streets or in the city centre. In Pakistan they also get chances to go shopping with groups of women in nearby towns or in the bazaars of the cities accompanied by relatives, however they complain that such excursions are too infrequent and limited and that they cannot just set off there alone whenever they wish to. Some complain that they are never allowed to go anywhere except relatives homes. Others welcome the relaxation of their parent's strict insistence on them coming straight home and staying in when they reach the familiar territory of the parent's village. Young men women and young men definitely show a different relationship to space in both settings Britain and Pakistan and Kashmir.

The young people interviewed clearly had a strong and detailed identification with two locations and operate with reference to iconographic and cartographic vernaculars about place and space (Hesse 1993): territory is marked out and symbolic as well as a practical resource. In some cases they linked the locations with their identifications for example, a 'Muslim neighbourhood' linked to a 'Muslim country' in other cases they contrasted them with each other and stated a clear connection with one and dissociation with the other. The former could be said to be an example of people living in diaspora space (Brah 1996). They have a well developed 'nationalism of the neighbourhood' (Back) in Britain and for some this nationalism of the neighbourhood is reinforced by linking that neighbourhood with Pakistan or Kashmir as a nation to identify with.

CHAPTER FOUR

RACE AND NATION

As a legacy of British colonialism and imperialism, there is unfortunately a pervasive racist discourse of 'race'. In order to justify slavery and subordination of colonised peoples, imperialist ruling classes turned to 19th century scientific racism based on theories of biological superiority and inferiority of 'races'. As this 'science' became discredited it largely gave way to a new racism emerging based on cultural differences and 'ethnicity'. Several sociologists in the 1980s wrote of the growing presence of a British "new racism" (Barker 1981, Gilroy 1987, Cohen 1988). Tariq Modood argues that in fact both biological and culturalist forms of racism continue to operate together. He further conflates these racisms with class. Referring to British Pakistani book burners in Bradford and Birmingham during the Rushdie affair, he wrote:

"If a racial underclass exists in Britain here it is" "a semi-industrialized, newly urbanized working class community that is only one generation away from rural peasantry" (Modood 1992, p. 261).

This suggests that they were perceived as black, as inferior, as culturally alien, working class and not far from peasant, all conflated into one negative, categorising discourse about them. Far from being passive in this category, Modood actually went on to describe their forthright opposition to the Satanic Verses based on working class anger and religious devotionism.

Wayne Richards describes the experience of being positioned as the racial other:

Being positioned as the racial other however, opened up a chasm, which could not be bridged by time and adaptation. This was a profound split which told me that there was a sacred space to which I could never belong. This space is called whiteness. The split between whiteness and blackness then becomes the structuring framework through which power is exercised (Richards 2003, p. 3).

The enduring discourse of "race" sometimes includes Pakistanis and Kashmiris as "black", at other times creates a special category,

historically invented by British imperialists to distinguish people who had moved to East Africa from India from people of African origin, “Asian” (Rattansi 2000). However, they are never counted as white and are no more allowed to belong in the ‘sacred space of whiteness’ than Wayne Richard’s experience: as far as the racist split is concerned young Pakistani and Kashmiri Britons know full well which side they are ascribed to by the ‘projective violence of race’ (Richards 2003). South Asian generally is taken to include Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Indians, Bangladeshis and people whose ancestors left India and went to East Africa. Anti-racists responded in different ways to these racial framings. Sometimes to underline the shared experiences of being victims of racism and exclusion, Pakistanis and Kashmiris have been part of Black solidarity, however this is often fraught with tensions between ‘Asian’ and ‘African-Caribbean’ communities in local political arenas, neighbourhoods and streets. At other times they have been part of pan-Asian alliances. However, Lewis suggests that a unitary Asian identity is “a fragile invention” (Lewis 1997, p. 129) due to community consolidation around religious identities. Pan-Asian identification is also challenged by nationalisms; for example Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan after a violent struggle and there is still residual conflict between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain.

Just as racist discourses can work in a complex mix of biological and culturalist constructs, anti-racism can operate with shifting and contested identity tags. It is interesting to analyse how the young people’s narratives for this research situate themselves in relation to these identities, and to what extent like many academics of the 1990s they contest the essentialisms such identities imply. Whichever racist account prevails, young Asian people are very aware of persisting racism and are concerned that race relations may get worse rather than better (Rattansi 2000) in the forms of discrimination, disadvantage, community relations, racial violence and harassment. A national survey by the Policy Studies institute found that a substantial proportion of Pakistani people are living in serious poverty. This is a fact that young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people are aware of within their everyday lives, and through media reports including those of satellite “Asian” networks.

All evidence points to the desire on the part of young Asians to retain a variety of vestiges of their cultures of origin as a positive mark of

difference, a refusal ever to attempt to merge invisibly into a nebulous blob of ill-defined Britishness (Rattansi 2000, p. 24).

Tariq Modood suggests that Asian ethnic pride is necessary for group mobilisation against the particular culturalist racism of cultural antipathy towards Asians. He claims that the majority of Asians reject the notion that they are Black and concentrate for their means of resistance to racism on ethnic identification. Ethnicity is used as the means of the "social organisation of cultural difference" (Barth 1969). They relate to an ethnic group based on shared belief by its members that they are of common descent. In the case of Pakistanis this is not identical to their national allegiance to Pakistan. Pakistan is multi-ethnic, including Pathans, Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, and descendants of refugees from various parts of India, Iran and Afghanistan. Kashmiris on the other hand claim common ethnicity and a common ancestral homeland of Kashmir, a currently hotly disputed territory. Their ethnic identification is torn across by religious difference and there is a war over the future of the homeland between Hindus and Muslims. This is reflected in the imagined boundaries of the ethnic group. There is an important distinction between ethnicities of self-ascription and ascription by others (Barth 1969:13).

Ethnic minority is a central idea in the politics of social differentiation in Britain (Jenkins 1997). It is a powerful political categorising mechanism. Individuals are frequently asked on bureaucratic forms to identify their ethnic origin. The choices offered in this context rarely include Kashmiri and often use the national identity Pakistani, as if it were synonymous with ethnicity. Hence British Pakistanis are classified by the State differently than the way they see themselves. Furthermore the notion of ethnic minority is marginalizing in that the term implies assignment to inferiority (Rex 1997). Ethnic is frequently only used to refer to non-white people rather than being regarded as a neutral, universal attribute of personal choice and heritage. Many of the forms asking for ethnic identification only offer one category to white people "white", a race category based on skin colour rather than a shared cultural heritage. The term ethnic minority is therefore contested and problematic. The contrasting of ethnicities of self-ascription by the young people interviewed and the ascriptions given by others will be part of the analysis of the findings of this research project.

The restrictive immigration policies of Britain are one prong of a

two-prong approach to race relations in Britain based on the assimilationist discourse summed up in Roy Hattersley's (Roy Hattersley is former Member of Parliament for Sparkbrook) words about limiting immigration:

Without integration limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible (Rose et al., 1969, p. 229).

The idea is that in order for assimilation or integration to be achieved immigration needs to be restricted at the point of entry so that the number of non-white immigrants remains small enough to be tolerated by the racist electorate. Too many immigrants, according to this assimilation logic, would be hard to assimilate due to real or perceived competition for housing, jobs and services and may be a threat to the nation's coherence, stability, economic advantage and security. The other prong is measures aimed at social cohesion. For social cohesion to be achieved, so the argument goes, discrimination, disadvantage, deprivation and segregation need to be curbed using joined up solutions.

The pluralist approach has attempted the decontestation of race and ethnicity in Britain using the political rhetoric of multiculturalism (Hesse 2000). Multiculturalism gives the impression of being about an individualist, liberal ethos of personal choice of lifestyle and cultural practice. However, it is frequently in fact specifically about racially marked cross-cultural processes (Hesse 2000).

Immigration

In the years following the second world war Britain needed labour and looked to colonies and ex-colonies including Pakistan to fulfil the need. In 1951 the Pakistani population in Britain was around 5000 (Nielsen 1984), between 1960 and 1966 there were almost 100,000 arrivals and between 1976 and 1981 a further 77,000 arrivals. Most early migrants were economically motivated young men; once they became slightly established with work and lodgings they were followed by other male relatives from their kinship group. Women and children began to arrive later when the men called their wives and children to join them. Due to financial and immigration legal circumstances, the idea of being temporary migrant workers earning and returning diminished and families began to make their lives together in Britain, where possible.

The dominant discourses in British social policy regarding immigration have been a contest between assimilation, integration and pluralism. Assimilation suggests that a minority group of immigrants gradually learns and accepts the culture, language and patterns of living of a 'host community' (Patterson 1963). It implies that the reward for such adaptation of attitudes and practices is acceptance and equal rights. Integration requires less change on the part of the incoming group. It involves adjustment in areas such as participation in education, work and public life, without a requirement to live a culturally English home life in private (Taylor 1974). Cultural pluralism describes a society where groups differing in religion, culture and living patterns such as family patterns find a common public life, but tolerate a diversity of individual and group lifestyle choices.

Related to the idea of assimilation is the work of functionalist Chicago sociologists Park and Burgess on 'zones of transition' in cities (Burgess 1926). They suggested that immigrants go through a transition from contact to competition, to accommodation, to assimilation. They also claimed that this transition can be spatially mapped in cities by observing the way that new immigrant communities live in particular zones and how, as they move towards assimilation they physically move their work, their homes and the geography of their participation. Eisenstadt (1954) suggested a different model, also aligned to the assimilation thesis, that of decision to migrate, de-socialisation and re-socialisation. Other sociologists have a conflict perspective, for example Shibutani and Kwan (1965) claim that ethnic segregation is a pattern in virtually all cities and that tradition quarters grow up due to competition and conflict between ethnic groups. According to them the competitive advantage of certain groups can be seen in these spatial patterns of population distribution.

John Rex (1967) claimed that sometimes minority groups seek a non-assimilated and distinct position in a society that demands assimilation, but that this is rare. He claimed that one such case is Muslim immigrants in industrial societies. He identified conflict between a group's desire for distinction and the host community's insistence on the elimination of 'alien' cultural practices. Discussing 'problems of assimilation' he acknowledged that separateness of the minority may not in fact be their choice but may be imposed, commenting that 'peasants' coming into urban society from colonial territories may wish to assimilate but be denied the right to, due to hosts' racist, supremacist, colonialist attitudes.

Integration and segregation

When the earlier migrants arrived in the 1960s there was widespread exclusion from access to public housing and to mortgage loans. This led them to live in private rented housing in specific areas of inner cities that white people were vacating (Modood 1997). The pattern of chain migration of patronage and kinship support meant that this began a degree of racial segregation that persists now. By 1974 British Pakistanis continued to be in cheaper, older inner-city properties, but three-quarters had become homeowners. The young people interviewed for this study were born around that time or just after and have lived in those areas all of their lives, in many cases living in the same house. Even when families moved house it tended to be within the same area. In 1988 John Rex argued that Asian immigrants had been segregated and oppressed during the 1950s and sixties and that census statistics showed that urban segregation was increasing in the 1970s and eighties, not decreasing (Rex 1988). In the 1990s Pakistanis were

consistently at a disadvantage with respect to white people, and often with respect to other minorities (Modood 1997, p. 31).

This refers to employment, education and particularly to household incomes and standard of living. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were the most residentially segregated of all groups.

Following disturbances in the summer of 2001 in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham Mr Blunkett, the Home Secretary, said that the nation needed diversity, not segregation. The Home Office reports into the disturbances partly blamed self-segregation for racial tension and urged people from 'ethnic minorities' to develop a sense of belonging in Britain. Critics of government policy say that multiculturalism has been used as a justification for policies that contain communities and isolate them (Ali 1992). Giving minorities limited autonomy and encouraging the celebration of diversity, whilst playing down the effects of racism, helps to shield those in power from challenges to the current social and political framework. Using the idea ethnic minorities implies that groups of people wish to persist in identifying on ethnic grounds and to continue to live marginally. When this segregation becomes problematic and turns into disturbances, people themselves are blamed for ghetto life. Multiculturalist discourse supports introspective, separatist communities and leaders of com-

munities, particularly male elders, are able to trade off this for their own power interests.

In fact, many of the current strategies that propose to make marginal cultures visible tend to reproduce ideologies of racism, as well as male dominance and middle-class privilege (Davis 1996).

For young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people their relationship with male elders is fraught. It is an unequal power relationship with built in tensions and contradictions. When the elders are fathers and grandfathers there is a mixture of love, loyalty, respect, affection with resentment about restrictions placed on their lifestyle choices. When the elders are community leaders there is no love and respect has to be earned. Otherwise young people regard elders as out of touch and unable to improve anything. The advantages of education give young people the edge over their elders when it comes to dealing with white institutions, both in terms of language and political literacy. Multiculturalism is a hegemonic discourse in Britain's inner city schools and many young people are strongly influenced by the notion. Wahneema Lubiano describes this as "Like being mugged by a metaphor" (Lubiano 1996). However, young people have learned to be more sophisticated and contingent in their everyday lives than the rhetoric of multiculturalism implies. They embody multicultural life and at the same time critique it with their daily behaviour. With multiculturalism

The existing order in the community is sanctioned by the way things are said to be done in an ever more mythologized version of the homeland, and reference to the teaching of Islam (Ali 1992, p. 113).

British Asian communities and Muslim communities in particular are regarded as a threat to notions of British Identity. John Patten MP wrote in 1989 to Muslim Leaders during the Rushdie Affair about what it means to be a British Muslim and stressed that there is no room for separation or segregation. By contrast the Muslim delegation he received proposed development of Muslim family law including separate courts; and reinforced their demands for state funding of Muslim schools. They asserted the rights of non-European religious and cultural minorities in the context of secular hegemony (Yuval-Davis 1992).

Inclusion and exclusion

In discussing the Satanic Verses affair, Tariq Modood (Modood 1992) suggested that Pakistani Muslims in Birmingham and Bradford were living with the legacy of their forebears in India under British colonial rule. As a means of resistance and survival in the face of subordination, their forebears clung to 'their Islam' and stubbornly clung on to custom, tradition and religion as a means of asserting their right to political and social worth. Likewise the young British Muslims burning copies of Rushdie's novel on the streets, in spite of much opposition in Britain, displayed deep-rooted conservatism and religious devotionism, at the same time as demonstrating spontaneous working class anger and hurt pride. Modood describes Pakistanis in Britain as having been "nurtured over generations in a besieged conservatism" (Modood 1992, p. 262).

This idea of being besieged can be linked with more recent images of British Pakistanis and Kashmiris, including youth, as ghettoised, enclosed and a hidden underclass. Pnina Werbner (Werbner 2002) cites the Satanic Verses affair as a moment at which the hidden encapsulated politics of diasporan Pakistanis in Britain became visible to the wider British public. Although the respondents of my research were maybe eight years old or less at the time of the Rushdie affair there is a political continuity between that and the disturbances in Bradford in 2001. Again young men demonstrated on the streets, in defence of their community. This time they were not up against a heretical intellectual but against organised racist parties. They were defending their community and their families from the threat that they perceived from these groups. They said that their elders had put up with a lot of racism and discrimination, now they were saying enough is enough. Unfortunately the press account of the disturbances in Northern English towns claimed that the incidents of rioting had been sparked off by Asian young men putting up notices in Burnley demarcating no-go zones for white people. The press also mentioned an incident in which a white pensioner had been violently attacked by Asian youth and claimed that there is a growing pattern of racist attacks with white people as victims and Asian young men as attackers. Again the Muslim community in Britain was perceived as ghettoised and excluded, separatist and antagonistic to the centre of British public life. Muslims had clashed publicly with the state over the publication of the Satanic Verses. Later they supported

Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. Then they were defending inner city turf and claiming territory in a separatist fashion. The Home Office report (2001) into the race riots in the three Northern towns partly blamed self segregation, and urged British Asian people to play an active role in bringing up future generations to feel more British, for the sake of social cohesion.

Britain, like almost all countries, has been affected by globalisation and is now host to communities for whom concerns about their country of origin can be refreshed daily. In these circumstances, strategies for making them feel at home, rather than as reluctant exiles, need to be established (Home Office 2001, p. 18).

The report named “many of the young people” as a particular source of hope because of their expressions of desire to break down barriers between different groups in communities. “They also hope for changes in parental attitudes where they seem to want to cling to some past life, perhaps one left behind in their country of origin” (Home Office 2001, p. 18). This leaves the reader with contradictory images of young people, young men as separatist rebels on the streets versus ‘many young people’ who want to break down barriers. It would be interesting to know whether this is gendered, are the ‘many young people’ women? Further young people are regarded as a source of hope because they want to break from their parents’ attachments to traditional, customary ways of life. This ties in with an idea that preoccupied policy makers in the 1970s regarding young British Asian people, the problems they faced as a result of the assumed conflict between traditional values of their home and the modern freedoms of secular British society. Here the theme resurfaces in 2001. The assumption in the 1960s was that there would be gradual assimilation of immigrants into the ‘host’ society; the notion of ‘host’ is still present in the discourse of this 2001 report. As the years have gone by and this assimilation has not been marked and obvious, the rhetoric has changed to that of celebrating diversity but working against separatism, an attempt to compromise for the sake of avoiding violence.

The current research explores through interviews which of these pictures is the self-image of 30 British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people. Are they trying to break with the traditions of their parents? Are they torn by the culture-conflict between home mother culture and the adopted culture of the British public sphere encountered

through school, work and college? Do they have a separatist agenda, marking out a defensive border around particular settlements or do they wish to break down barriers and cooperate with the social cohesion agenda? How do they relate to the country of origin of their parents and grandparents? How do they see their future in relation to that country and to Britain?

A key theme of New Labour government policy makers in this decade is social exclusion; they set up a social exclusion unit from which various initiatives have been emerging. One of the groups of people defined as socially excluded is young Pakistani and Bangladeshi people in poor neighbourhoods. They are defined as socially excluded because of their lack of educational qualifications, high levels of unemployment and disengagement with publicly funded regeneration schemes. It is unclear from the policy rhetoric whether they are included with their parents in a category of socially excluded people because they are thought of as belonging to a disadvantaged community, or whether they are thought of as doubly excluded: from British institutions and from the public sphere of British Pakistani life. Either way they are framed as excluded rather than included people, a group on the margins that permanently experience liminal lives. This assumes that there is agreement about where the centre is and where the margin is, it suggests that centrality and marginality have fixed meanings (Werbner 2002). If the centre is Britain as a nation, then British Pakistani young people are regarded as necessary to co-opt for the sake of national cohesion. However, if we imagine a more relativist notion of centres and margins, they are included in some national, transnational, and global lived worlds and excluded from others. Inclusion and exclusion can also shift according to time, to political events and to individual and collective choices being made.

Nation

ZAHRA (F) British Pakistanis we are, we're from both

INAS (F) I think of myself as British and Pakistani. Not just British 'cause at the end of the day we're brought up in England and we're British that way but we can't, you know, forget that our parents are from Pakistan.

MAZHAR (M) Oh God, that question, the tick box question, I always have problems with this one. Pakistani or Kashmiri for the ethnicity box I suppose,

both really and British for nationality usually. But it would be best if I never had to choose between boxes or live in boxes at all.

HAROON (M) It's like every country. It's got good parts, its got bad parts. It's a matter of what you want to get out of Pakistan—drug dealing and corruption or decent family relations, cultural heritage and that. It's a beautiful country, go there, avoid the bad and enjoy the good.

ZAHERA (F) I think the way the government operates in Pakistan, all the corruption and all that needs to change. When you think about it and hear about it its not very nice, you want the country to become like any other country, not like a third world country.

BILAAL (M) Pakistani definitely comes into it. The way I identify myself is where my parents are from. I mean I was having this debate with my cousin the other day, where he was saying he's British. I personally, the way I see it, where your parents are from is your identity

BILAAL (M) Go and see for yourself, at the end of the day you are Pakistani, check out the atmosphere. It will affect the way you carry yourself, and what you can make of yourself if you feel proud to be Pakistani.

HAROON (M) When I'm in Pakistan I say I'm Pakistani, in Britain I say British. It depends like who you're talking to, where you are and why you think they're asking. The way I see it patriotism and things like that I don't believe in really. The world's big with so many different countries, you don't have to be patriotic to where you travel to or even live. It's more about your self. If I restrict myself to be only Pakistani well then you don't learn the British culture. Generally if when you're talking to people its arrogant and ignorant 'I'm this' 'I'm that'. When you go there to Pakistan you go to see family not to sing the national anthem. The same here, you don't come back here to bow down to the Queen sort of thing.

TANWEER (M) British Pakistani that's what I am; or Pakistani British. Pakistani British, British Pakistani . . .

IDREES (M) British Pakistanis we are. Our parents are Pakistani. I'm born here so I'm a British Pakistani. I like visiting there, but I live here.

FARHANAH (F) When I went with my husband we went to different parts of Pakistan. I didn't realise how nice it was. That just made me want to go again and again and again.

PARVEEN (F) I feel British when I'm surrounded by British people, but I feel Pakistani with Pakistanis and Kashmiri with Kashmiris.

ANEESAHA (F) I'm Pakistani and I'm born in England

NADIM (M) If I had to chose I'd rather live there, but I don't have to. I want to keep in touch and go and live there part of the time as an adult and here part of the time.

BILQEES (F) I feel British because of my environment here but once I go to Pakistan I feel Pakistani, we talk our own language.

It was very consistent amongst the respondents to refer to themselves as British Pakistani. They found it normal to be dual nationals and felt no need to chose, finding it self evident that they are both. National allegiance and patriotism were taken as less important than developing a sense of confident self-identity. Official categorisation was regarded as limiting, oppressive and unnecessary. However, when asked officially they would claim the right to be British citizens based on being born in Britain but would use Pakistani or Kashmiri as descriptors for their ethnicity based on their parents or grandparents being born in Pakistan. This is interesting because Pakistan is a multi-ethnic nation state. Many of the young people describe how they use contingency; they define themselves differently according to where they are, whom they are with, which language is being spoken, who is asking and why they are asking.

Dual nationality

In legal terms these young people are all dual nationals. This research was less concerned with legal terms than with identification. In identification terms, the young people are also dual nationals with an ambivalent relationship with both nations concerned, particularly ambivalent towards Britain.

Being part of a 'Black and Minority Ethnic' group in Britain, inclusion and exclusion in Britain is a controversy that young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people have grown up with. They are all too familiar with excluding racist discourse and practice. They know at first hand about Islamophobia, race and sex discrimination and prejudices towards Pakistani people in Britain. This means that they are aware of limits and boundaries placed on their full inclusion on equal terms in British society. However, this does not mean that they accept exclusion. Far from it, they assert that they have a right to be treated as full members of British society, to be respected and to be entitled to all of the benefits of membership.

Following disturbances in Northern British towns a social cohesion agenda emerged as a government response, funding initiatives aimed at fostering greater cohesion locally in neighbourhoods and

lessening the likelihood of future street violence. From the narratives of thirty young people interviewed there is a mixed reaction to this agenda ranging from full support through scepticism to rejection. Young women in particular criticise use of violence, favouring talking and negotiation as better ways of working for change. However, many of the respondents are sceptical about whether social cohesion can be achieved by short-term funded projects with simplistic aims and many of the young people mistrust programmes designed to divert them from demonstrating against racism and fascism, or against threats to the safety, security and welfare of their community.

Transnationalism means the overcoming of national boundaries and borders by organising internationally. It can refer to the networks of corporations or of international organisations, governmentally, non-governmentally or commercially. For the most part the young people I interviewed are not participants in such transnational movements. It would be more accurate to describe them as dual national because they operate between two nations. Their dealings with both nations are either micro or at the level of personal identification, rather than transnational as such. There are cases in which they have to deal with cross-national legalities such as immigration applications, marriages and divorces, inheritance matters and moving relative's corpses from one country to the other for burial. This can be complicated and can cause frustration and suffering when bureaucracy prevents effective solving of problems.

The narratives show a clear sense of being part of a 'people', a recognisable minority ethnic group in Britain. The Islamic word 'qaum' is not used by them but the idea is. The idea is of a group of people who share a common history, language and cultural tradition. It is a looser term than ethnicity, used rather flexibly to refer to 'my people'. This can mean anything from a large kinship group to all Pakistanis and Kashmiris in the world. Nationalists often link ethnicity with citizenship of a nation but in Pakistan and Kashmir there are many qaums, nationhood in Pakistani thinking is not based on one shared ethnicity. The young people interviewed realise that British citizenship is linked with Englishness in its discourse. However, they are clear that they are British Pakistanis and assert their entitlement to dual nationality and dual citizenship. They are quicker to assert their rights than to understand their duties in the citizenship system.

The narratives recorded for this research do not show much

evidence of real transnationalism so much as translocalism. In terms of national affiliation most of those interviewed use a hyphenated label, the most popular being British Pakistani or British Kashmiri. In the current world order it is interesting that none of them mentioned being European at all.

As well as assigning a hyphenated national tag to them-selves, many of the young people do identify with transnational movements, the most consistent being the Ummah. Although they did not specifically use the word ummah in their narratives, they show political sympathy for Muslims in war situations and situations of oppression and disaster in the world, informed by internet and Muslim news coverage and by community debate and information transmitted through mosques and campaigns. However, they also display nationalism and hostility, for example animosity towards British Bangladeshi people based on the discourse arising from the history of the independence war between Bangladesh and Pakistan.

'Race'

FARHANAH (F) I was born in England, parents are from Pakistan. Up until about five years ago I would have said I was Pakistani first, although I didn't feel Pakistani probably. But I think it's because, because I wasn't white, so I wasn't English as such and I felt maybe I looked more Pakistani so therefore I was Pakistani. I never call myself Asian never, never (even though I know other people call me that).

Sometimes I think white people are being accurate with their stereotypes because I don't think we've moved on as much as we could have, particularly regards women. I feel very oppressed but then again I feel as if I always have to be one step ahead kind of, to prove that I'm not weak and brainless. That's always in my brain; I really have an attitude about that. I just think it's people's lack of knowledge and understanding. Before I thought they're being rude, they're picking on me, they haven't got a clue but now I can see the other side of it as well; may be they haven't had a chance to meet a Pakistani girl before. That's why I like it when people ask me, instead of assuming, ask me what I feel and I think.

ZULFIQAAR (M) I was relieved to get back to the U.K.-that's pretty ironic isn't it, being relieved to be in this racist, colonialist place where we're supposed to know our place. It's exclusive and locks us all out, but there you are, I felt relieved to get back: better the devil you know!

ARIF (M) We go over there to get away from being called “Paki” this and that and treated like something on the bottom of someone’s shoe. What do we get in so-called “back home”; they label us and call us “whiteys”.

PARVEEN (F) Why can’t we all live together, what is the problem with living with us lot. Just because we’re Pakistani, we’re all human beings. It’s like bogus to fight because I’m Pakistani, you’re Bengali or you’re white or that.

JAABIR (M) You brush past someone in the street and they say ‘why did you push me?’ and then sometimes add ‘Paki bastard’.

FAREED (M) Sometimes you get older brothers or parents, to small children . . . if they’re dirty like they’ve played in mud or something. They’ll say you look like a Bengali or you look like a Jamaican. It’s supposed to be insulting and make the small child run to wash themselves. It is kind of racist but er, that’s the kind of stuff they say.

PARVEEN (F) They just look at each other’s skin, the majority of Bengalis are quite brown and Pakistanis are fair, but they shouldn’t. They are all Muslims, they look different that’s all. They shouldn’t fight each other.

BILQEES (F) If you call us Paki, we feel that’s offensive. If I’m in your way why not say ‘excuse me’, there’s no need to call me Paki.

Being on the receiving end of direct racism in Britain came up many times in the stories of the young people. The pain of fleeing this to go to Pakistan and being called “whitey” was deeply felt by several of the respondents independently of each other. There were also several references to the racist attitudes held by Pakistani and Kashmiri people about other groups such as Bengali and Jamaican people, stereotypes and derision linked with skin colour.

They contest essentialisms of culture but not of race or religion. Whilst many of the young people favoured the idea of ‘mixing’, this was within a very multiculturalist paradigm. The idea they espouse is one of separate racial and ‘ethnic’ groups with distinctive differences, but with opportunities for friendships and neighbourliness across clearly maintained boundaries. They identified themselves and their peers as Pakistanis without contesting the idea. Although some mention was made of being willing to marry anyone as long as they are Muslim; in practice the priority appears to be to stay with their biraderi and with the Pakistani/Kashmiri ‘community’, including marrying a partner acceptable to that community (Pakistani or Kashmiri). It is interesting to note that the term Asian was very rarely a self-designation within the narratives.

In relation to the “Black and Minority Ethnic” policies agenda,

these diaspora youth get frustrated with the local political process that favours consultation with ‘community leaders’ (normally older men). A few are political activists in relation to specific campaigns such as the ‘stop the war coalition’.

The strategies that the young people describe themselves as employing to deal with racism are similar to those described in the literature (see political context chapter). Sometimes they defend themselves, or their community, physically and verbally; occasionally this includes fighting. Sometimes they retreat or withdraw from racist society, including switching media channels. Sometimes they distance themselves from the cultural practices of their community in an attempt to draw less animosity, but most are convinced of the futility of this because of the pernicious, discriminating nature of racism. In the interview transcripts the young people never mention the word Islamophobia as such, talk far more about racism and take anti-Muslim behaviours as a brand of racism.

Immigrant relatives

ZAHRA (F) I was born in England but I'm from Pakistan. My family lives there but I've had the opportunity to come and live here because my parents wanted to come here for us to have a better quality of life due to the way things are over there money-wise and the way the government runs

BILAAL (M) From my personal experience, talking to people who have just come over recently from Pakistan, sometimes I feel sorry for them. What it is with Pakistan for them, I think they've got the image, wrong image, that Britain is made of gold and that this is the opportunity of their life to make so much of themselves. Obviously I understand the salaries over there are low and work and employment are low; there isn't really much future over there for them, because of the corrupt government as well. Coming over is like heaven to them but when they get here they don't tend to enjoy themselves. As for how us British Pakistanis see them, sometimes you feel sorry for them, you welcome them, try to help them to fit in; but you tend to have a view that they're backwards and they don't know much. But I mean, as I've been told, people in Pakistan tend to be a bit too clever for their age. They look innocent but they are a bit crafty ('Ushyar' they say) so you can't trust them.

NABILA (F) I can't imagine him arriving here. God knows what it will be like. At the moment I'm dedicated to my career. He knows that in theory but how will he cope in real life. Over there I am carefree There are plenty of girls

my age. We have a routine of work and then messing around and relaxing, enjoying company. He holds a lot of responsibility there, running the whole household even at his young age: buying land, collecting rent and he has to think straight. He does the thinking for all of us. I don't know how he'll handle the change of coming over here and maybe finding it difficult to get a job, living with my parents, usually women live with their in-laws, not the other way round. I just have to wait and see I suppose.

MUMTAZ (F) I've got a four months old daughter but I had to go back to work, I've been back at work for a month, my pay slips are needed for him to get a visa. They've refused him. Whenever he phones he wants to try to get a visa straight away. He is totally fixed on coming over here. He really doesn't understand what it's like here. He doesn't understand anything about here really.

Whilst the young people interviewed share the view of immigrants, past and present, that England is a place of economic opportunity, security and stability, this is tempered with the belief that unrealistic 'streets paved with gold notions' are damaging illusions setting people up for disillusionment with the realities they face in British conurbations. Pity for newly arrived migrants springs from observing the struggle they have to adjust, their disappointment with lack of opportunities and racism, and the lack of understanding of life in British inner cities they exhibit. Some ridicule is mixed in with the pity; of language difficulties and other cross cultural communication problems. British Pakistanis have a superiority script in relation to their Pakistani migrant neighbours and cousins comprising of negative stereotypical images of Pakistanis being 'backwards and crafty'. These are obviously contradictory ideas but are none the less held simultaneously. Pity, ridicule and stereotypes take on a special significance when the imminently arriving migrant is the young woman's husband and father of her child. Issues surround the couple early in their marriage about responsibilities and work—home balance, ultimately about power relations between them. Pride and dignity of the migrant young man is also threatened by not keeping to the tradition of living patrilocally. When the migrant is a woman the issues arise in a different configuration.

ZULFIQAAR (M) How ironic to feel relieved to get back to Britain.

All of the respondents for this research are post-migrants, however they live in extended families in Britain that include migrants of the

same age group. Many of them are married to a cousin who migrated to Britain to join them after marriage. This makes it irrelevant to write or speak in terms of first or second or third generation migrants. The idea of generations is complicated by chain migration. Migrants and post-migrants living within the same households as each other influence each other's attitudes. Post-migrants say that they

NABILA (F) Feel sorry for Pakistani migrants arriving in Britain because they are often regarded and treated as 'backward'. They hear new arrivals being made a joke of by mimicking of their way of speaking English and by telling stories about their ignorance of the British system and way of life. They are also aware of the exploitation in the labour market of newly arrived immigrants from Pakistan and Kashmir, including exploitation by their own communities. Young post-migrants feel some distance from migrants but also feel empathy and affinity.

QAYYUM (M) In some ways they're completely different from us but in other ways they are exactly like us.

FAREED (M) I want to live here but I want my family from there to come here. They are what I like about Pakistan. The trouble is they find it hard here, mostly they don't take to it, they just be depressed and miss there all the time.

Migrants and post-migrants have different future orientations and points of reference. Economic migrants often work out logically that their future will be in Britain, particularly if they have children who are being educated here. However, to them this is a trap and a sacrifice that they make in order to earn money for their family both here and in Pakistan/Kashmir. Post-migrants mostly have a future orientation to living in Britain that is more positive and not sacrificial but a preference.

RIFFAT (F) My future is here. I'm against building houses and investing over there.

MAZHAR (M) Home is here.

NADIM (M) I'm a happy British person.

However, no generalisations can be made because several of the post-migrants interviewed made very similar statements to those one might expect from migrants, such as wishing that they could live in

Pakistan or Kashmir but realising that they have to return to the U.K. to earn or to gain the education they need in order to earn in the future.

To a large extent the 'myth of return' has evaporated as a psychological escape mechanism for post-migrants but the whole point of the myth of return is that it was a myth, a fantasy. Post-migrants may not have the same myth associated with returning to their own birthplace, however they still can dream of a life in Pakistan or Kashmir instead of inner city Birmingham.

RIFFAT (F) I had a dream that I belonged there but when I arrived I realised I didn't . . . that we were visitors and would go back.

Migrants also dreamed but had awakenings, realising that they were now visitors in their own original home. Post-migrants do have less sense of entitlement and plausibility of return to a place they have always been only a visitor to.

HAROON (M) It's important to every human being to say I belong to a certain sect or a certain country, it gives a sense of security that our parents had and in a way we've got that less.

The 'myth of return' has changed in form but the idea and experience of being part of a diaspora still entails a dream of return, it is just less tangible or enshrined in a plan for a specific future. Through certain cultural and religious events the homeland is imagined and enacted by those who do not know it very well. Patches of Pakistani and Kashmiri concentration in British cities become a new place to return to when faced with stigmatisation and discrimination, new sites of difference and home territory that Avtar Brah calls "diaspora space". They have to face up to discrimination and stigmatisation more directly or to find alternative psychological means of escaping the full pain of racism. Young post-migrant British Pakistanis and Kashmiris fight, but they also retreat or take flight, everyone needs to sometimes. They fought far right racist groups on the streets of Northern English towns, a few of them have travelled abroad to fight in wars or civil wars that they consider to be jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Palestine or Iraq. Rather than just the escapism of going back to Pakistan or Kashmir, post-migrants have other kinds of real or imaginary journeys as means of actual

or psychological flight. These include holidays in Pakistan or Kashmir but also journeys to other Muslim countries. For many the most significant journey to do in life would still be the Hajj, to Mecca.

Young British Muslims assert the rights of a religious minority against secular hegemony, some do this actively but all those interviewed do hold this perspective. Their religious interpretation and discernment is an extension of educational opportunities to research topics for themselves. In ethnically divided Britain, Islam's ummah symbolised and recreated each year in the Hajj is an attractive alternative to ethnicism. Local mosques however, are frequently organised by and around ethnic groups and so the jamaat locally is rarely a true reflection of the worldwide Ummah. Glimpses of Islam united and diverse are rare but treasured by idealistic young Muslims.

Young Pakistanis also have things to say about mixed friendship groups, youth culture and whether contact with dominant British culture make them feel more or less Pakistani/ Kashmiri.

FARHANAH (F) 'I'm part of a women's group. I feel very much part of that . . . mostly Asian women some Pakistani but some Indian or African Asian'

HAROON (M) 'You're not taught from home how to handle mixing with mixed cultures; you have to work it out yourself how to go about it. If you're told from a young age not to mix just stick to Pakistani, what you know, you may not pick up bad things but you don't pick up good things or maybe drop some bad Pakistani thoughts and habits'

BILAAL (M) 'I've got a mixed group of friends but I've got a close group of Muslim friends as well'

FARAHANAH (F) 'Before I was made to stay with relatives, there were a lot of restrictions, now it is on my terms'

Race is the marker immediately used to describe why they feel Pakistani/Kashmiri in British society, rather than culture. Feeling different and not being English is linked to not being white. The experience of being stereotyped is again racialised; it is white people who stereotype Asian women, who then feel as if they have to constantly defend and assert themselves to disprove such stereotypes as passive and illiterate. The group that one young woman feels very much part of is a group of Asian women.

Young people who have lost contact with their families relate to the 'homeland' in a new way.

CHAPTER FIVE

DIASPORA

The word diaspora is of Greek origin meaning ‘to sow over’. Whilst Greeks thought of diaspora as migration and colonisation, in the Jewish tradition it is associated with exile, slavery and forced dispersal as escape from genocide and persecution. The term diaspora is used in Greek translations of the Bible (Deuteronomy 28:25) to refer to the Jews after the Babylonian exile, and has been picked up from that source and applied at various points in history by Jews and by Christians including African slaves. In the foundation issue of “Diaspora” (Safran 1991) the lead essay was by William Safran. When Safran is cited, some scholars imply that the launch of that journal marks a moment at which the notion of Diaspora was popularised and introduced into Cultural Studies. Other scholars refer to the publication of the *Black Atlantic* by Paul Gilroy (Gilroy 1993) as a moment of influential recommendation of the term by a respected Cultural Studies theorist. He certainly extended the use of the term. The concluding chapter of the *Black Atlantic* includes a meditation on the value of the diaspora concept to import from Jewish sources into black history studies and Pan-African politics. Pakistani and Kashmiri youth in Britain are nearly all Muslims and are neither colonisers nor slaves or exiles, but can the term diaspora be useful in examining their experiences? The word is now used in a number of new contexts and has become a popular concept in Cultural Studies. It is now used to describe the circumstances of a wide range of people who are living in a different location than their ancestors did. In that sense British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people may be thought of as diaspora youth and distinguished from people still living in Pakistan (formerly part of India under British colonial rule). Understood as a transnational social organisation relating both to the society of origin and the society of settlement (Wahlbeck, 2002) diaspora can help us to understand the social reality in which British Pakistanis and Kashmiris live. The themes of dispersal, exile and slavery do not apply to Pakistani and Kashmiri youth and their communal history in the way they do for African-Caribbean youth in

Britain, there is not the same resonance. However, they too are post-colonial people with an interest in the history of the exploitation of colonised forebears and South Asian politics.

If I use the concept of diaspora, how is it to be named: the Asian Diaspora, South Asian Diaspora, Indian Diaspora, Pakistani Diaspora, Kashmiri Diaspora? Avtar Brah (Brah 1996) uses “South Asian diaspora”. She conceptualises diaspora not as one set of historical experiences but as a composite of many journeys linked by economic, political and cultural specificities. Vijay Mishra (Mishra 1996) theorises the Indian diaspora starting with its beginning as part of British imperial movement of labour. Later came the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, within the lifetimes of the grandparents and some of the parents of the young people interviewed for this study. However, Mishra does recognise a distinction between earlier migration and post world war two migrations to Britain. He distinguishes between the old and new Indian diasporas. I will concentrate on the descendants of those people from the new Indian diaspora who became Pakistani and Muslim residents of disputed territory in Kashmir. In the Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy suggests that the concept of diaspora should be

cherished for its ability to pose the relationship between ethnic sameness and differentiation: a changing same (Gilroy 1993, p. xi)

This idea of a changing same could well prove relevant for analysing the situation of British Pakistani and Kashmiri youth. Diaspora can be a powerful term because it contests racialised Western nation states by being in a different relationship to territory (Hesse 1993), however if it is prefixed with a nation-state name such as India or Pakistan this positive feature is lost. The term Indian diaspora has not been adopted for this study; rather I simply refer to British-born Pakistani and Kashmiri young people as diaspora youth. Safran includes Pakistanis in Britain in his long list of diaspora peoples (Safran 1991). He lists key characteristics of diasporas but allows that contemporary diasporas need not fulfil all of these characteristics to be included in the “metaphoric designation” of diaspora (Safran 1991). Robin Cohen (Cohen 1997) offered revisions to Safran’s defining characteristics. He suggests that time has to pass before a group of migrants can come to be regarded as a diaspora and that it is necessary not to “creolise” too much to continue to be regarded as a diaspora. Time has passed since the parents of the subjects of

this study migrated to Britain, however migration from Pakistan and Kashmir started with chain migration and continues still, there was not one episode of migration. My study involves descendants of immigrants; however, these young people do have relationships with newly arrived immigrants of their own age. Cohen (Cohen 1997) offers a typology of diasporas. The type that would apply to Pakistanis in Britain would be a labour diaspora. The findings of the study will explore whether or not British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people have “creolised” too much to be regarded as diaspora youth, rather than cultural hybrids.

Creolisation and hybridity are terms, like diaspora, that have been coined by cultural studies writers (Hall 1990, Werbner and Modood 1997, Lowe 1991). Contemporary cultural theorists claim to use the terms to describe cultural transformation arising from cultural forms mixing and inspiring one another. Lowe uses the ideas of hybridity and multiplicity to criticise representations that have reduced the national diversities of Asian Americans into simple binaries. Lowe argues that Asian American social subjects are the sites of a variety of differences that are complex and politically enabling. Vertovec (1997) discusses the differences between syncretic and hybrid identities, on the one hand, and multicultural competence, on the other. The young people within this study have a great deal of competence but their very way of living, thinking and interacting with each other and with others is a challenge to multiculturalism. It is syncretic and hybrid but also stridently counter-hegemonic and assertively distinct. Their form of syncretism is a way out of rather than into assimilation. The young people who are the subjects of this study have various hyphenated identities such as British Asian, Muslim Youth, British Pakistani, and British Muslim. Each of these suggests cross-cultural experiences and strong possibilities of hybridity. Part of the task of this research is to listen to the young people’s own narratives for indications of their own sense of meaning of these labels and mixtures. Although the term hybridity has become popular and respectable in cultural theory and is useful for conceptualising new cultural forms arising from cross-cultural encounters, it is problematic. The term sounds binary and in fact multicultural Britain is a whirl of many cultural influences. It is also sinister in that it was originally a racist term similar in meaning to the discredited term “half breed”. Its use in biology is a dangerous association given the history of racist biological discourses of physiognomy and

essentialism (Young 1995). Diaspora as coined in the Black Atlantic is much more positively associated with collective struggles against racism, xenophobia and discrimination.

There are positive virtues of retaining diasporic identity (Cohen 1997) because the tension between ethnic, national and trans-national identity is often creative and enriching, it presents people with choices and opportunities. It opposes counter tendencies to globalisation such as nationalism and racism. Avtar Brah (Brah 1996) argues that diaspora offers a critique of discourses of fixed origins. She celebrates the idea of diaspora because it means heterogeneous, contested space rather than bi-polar oppositions. Writings about Pakistani youth in the 1970s (Community Relations Commission 1976, Anwar 1998, Watson 1977) tended to portray them as between two cultures. Diaspora offers a way of acknowledging the complexity of the cultural influences on them and the cultural creations they are engaged in. Mishra (Mishra 1996) calls the new 'Indian diaspora' the diaspora of the border. This diaspora keeps in touch with India through family networks and marriage. It is this border diaspora then which includes the subjects of this research. Their journeys to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir are a physical way of keeping in touch with family networks and many young British Pakistanis still marry people from Pakistan and continue to live in Britain. Brah (Brah 1996) also links the idea of diaspora to the metaphor of 'border' in order to find useful ways of theorising recent migrations and new displacements. Mishra and Brah both discuss a theory of diaspora space as the space of the border. This research project is focused on experiences of living in the diaspora space of the border.

Brah (Brah 1996) welcomes the concept of diaspora as an alternative to 'minority'. She discusses how problematic the discourse of Majority/Minority relations is in Britain. The current way of looking at ethnic relations, in terms of a relation between localised minorities and majorities is inadequate to describe British Pakistani and Kashmiri's specific experiences. However, Anthias (1998) argues that the claim that the concept of diaspora moves away from essentialist versions of 'race' and ethnicity is flawed. In fact diaspora is still based on ethnicity and implies primordial bonds of homeland. It is a way of describing a territorial shift but does not disrupt the idea of ethnicity. Anthias (1998) points out that diaspora does not overcome fully problems identified with ethnicity and that both ethnicity and diaspora give inadequate weight to differences of class, gender

and trans-ethnic alliances. One powerful trans-ethnic alliance for British Pakistani young people is Islam. This study will challenge the use made of the notion of ethnic minority by British social policy makers. The idea of ethnic minority is used in explanations of particular patterns of social exclusion and disadvantage. It describes a power relationship. Patterns of social exclusion and disadvantage need attention and so do their causal power relationships. However, the idea has weaknesses. It suggests essentialist discrete ethnic groups, racialises boundaries between people and ignores transnational and global economic, social and political power relationships. Transnationalism is not a relationship between nation states but is human relations beyond national boundaries. Globalisation has allowed people to sustain transnational social relations and networks more easily and this has led to 'transnational social spaces' (Beck 1999, Faist 2000), 'planetary networks' and a 'world of flows' (Castells 1997). The concept of diaspora can combine the local and the global and instead of trying to understand relationships only within the confines of a specific territory, it invokes itself as extra-territorial (Wahlbeck 2002). It suggests a wider vision, an ability to think globally and live locally, but also to occupy transnational space over and beyond geographic and political borders.

By focusing on a group of people who are living in contested "identific space" (Hintzen 1999) or "diaspora space" (Brah 1996) this research project is a challenge to any model in the study of cultures that traces traits across geographical distributions. It also challenges binary or polar models by suggesting that life is more shifting and complex than these models ever give space for. Diaspora is a concept that supports this approach well.

Vertovec (1997) identifies diasporas—and especially South Asian religious diasporas—as social forms, as types of consciousness, and as modes of cultural production. He discusses structural, conscious and non-conscious factors in the reconstruction of identities. He links these factors to types of diaspora according to the diaspora's social form and mode of cultural production. This study focuses on young people who are reconstructing diaspora identities consciously and non-consciously in response to structural factors including place, nation, colonial history, gender, ethnicity, race, generation, chain migration and international relations between countries including wars and economic power relations. They are producers and consumers of a great variety of cultural modes of production some linked

to the Pakistani or Kashmiri diaspora, others completely distinct from it and others 'hybrid'. Vertovec (1997) points to changes in the meanings, relationships, and practice of religion and culture as diasporas experiment with disassociating them from each other. The Pakistani diaspora or the Kashmiri diaspora may be one social form that the young people are part of, they are also part of other social forms such as local 'Muslim communities', neighbourhoods and networks; and transnational social forms.

Transnationalism has led to a range of movements of transnational resistance from divergent political viewpoints, whether this is anti-capitalist protesters or religious movements (Howe 2002). Religious movements are among the oldest of the transnationals (Hoebler Rudolph 1997). Despite predictions by social scientists that scientific and industrial "advances" would lead to the demise of religion, religion has grown. It has been stimulated to expand in answer to modernity. Religion offers to restore meaning to individuals and to give them a secure reference point in the midst of fast-moving changes (Hoebler Rudolph 1997). Both the movement allegedly headed by Osama Bin Laden and the U.S.-led 'coalition against terrorism' are transnational. There is no inherent set of values or ideology in being transnational (Howe 2002). What kind of transnational movements do the young people at the centre of this research identify and ascribe to? Can they be said to be transnational or do they attach their affiliations to nationalisms? One of the topics that has been explored with them is their relationship to being 'British' or 'Pakistani' or 'Kashmiri'.

Mandaville uses the idea of translocality, a term borrowed from the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996), as an alternative to the statist notion of political identity that 'where you are tells us something about who politically you are' (Mandaville 2000, p. 1). He links the idea of translocality to diaspora:

Diasporic communities, eminently translocal in nature, practice forms of political identity which clearly incorporate multiple sites of affiliation (Mandaville 2000, p. 6).

He proposes translocality as a better way of understanding the linkage between territory and identity. He prefers to use the term translocal politics rather than transnational politics "in order to make the point that it is often the hegemony of the territorially cohesive nation-state which is challenged by these politics" (Mandaville 2000, p. 1).

In the case of this study's focus we can examine whether this term can be useful for better understanding British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people's political identity in relation to territory and to the hegemony of the British nation-state.

Heritage

ANEESAH (F) I feel proud of my background. It hasn't worn off yet, it's not going to, I don't think

NAZAQAT (M) It's good for me that I know that way of life. I want my children to have that. If I could afford it I'd keep taking them backwards and forwards so that they can know about their culture, their heritage, rather than in this multi-cultural society, lose themselves. Here there is a culture that they're having to fit into, mixed cultures that are not necessarily wrong but I think it's important that they should be kept in touch with their roots/their ancestor's roots. I'm afraid myself that I may be missed out on something, I feel I don't know enough to pass on.

BILAAL (M) You have to go back to your roots and find out what's what sometimes because living in Britain you do tend to lose who you are, or lose your roots sometimes. So I think it's really important to get a good balance.

BILAAL (M) I think basically in Britain, the Pakistani being the culture bit of myself is one thing. I want to marry a Pakistani from here or from there, because getting married across another culture might be too much to learn, too much to take in. You've got to start from scratch and sometimes you just need to be there already, yeah?

ZAHRAH (F) If, God willing, I have children I would like them to know that that's where they come from, that's who they are. I want them to be English and Urdu and Panjabi speaking so that they can have the best of both worlds like me. I have had the opportunity to go back, so I do know where I'm from and who I am, but it's nice to live over here because of opportunities.

FARHANA (F) What I like about Pakistan as a country is the different towns and villages, how one city is so different from another and how people who are poor and traditional in rural areas are really, really genuine. I like the way they dress and they speak and the houses they live in. There's so many different styles of living there. I want my children to experience that rather than negative aspects of it.

BILQEES (F) Once you just go to look round Fazal Masjid you forget everything else, you can only think about the mosque, you don't want to come back out. It's your own country and you just want to stay there. I would like

my kids to know their own country and to be able to say they love it. Just because they're British, you should know about your own country, its history and all that.

IDREES (M) Its tradition, and so that's it. If it's our tradition I'm doing it, whatever anybody else says or thinks.

The idea of tradition is mentioned repeatedly in the interviews. It is evidently an important idea to the respondents, linked to a sense of having a natural right to belong to something; to having been born into a community rather than a void; and to being part of a generation of an ethnic group rather than simply of a multicultural, post modern world. The desire to perpetuate that heritage culture is still strong amongst the young people, but not uncritically. They are aware of culture being complex, contested and changing (Baumann 1996, Eade 1997). They consider themselves to be entitled to participate in that contest and to protect some aspects of culture from change.

Religious and cultural events in Britain have been part of the young people's induction to the traditions of their parents' culture. Through these events the homeland is imagined and enacted by people who do not know or remember it well. Frequently, the occasion of going to Pakistan or Kashmir is an event such as an uncle's wedding or even the young person's own wedding. Some young men and women go over for the first time to marry. Whilst ritualised events preserve tradition they are also subject to modification and change. New practices evolve in the pattern of social exchange both in Pakistan and in the diaspora. The young people's narratives show that they are keen to have a sense of 'roots' but not necessarily to live according to traditional patterns. In order to achieve their ambition to be able to refer to heritage culture, the young people describe listening to elders but also reading books and visiting historic sites that their relatives have never been able to visit. They are aware of some of the influences on the development of the cultures of Pakistan and Kashmir, which their relatives living the traditions are not aware of. For example some of the Islamic teaching in Britain criticises cultural practices in Pakistan as being based on folklore and on Hindu customs. In this way young people are choosing which aspects of culture to identify with and to take pride in. They are reinventing the past to support their sense of pride in heritage and to fashion their own identity in the present. When another ethnic group

in Britain tells a tale of a poet or a hero, they are equipping themselves with poets and heroes to reply with. Faced with particular forms of racism that are cultural antipathy to Asians¹ (Rattansi 2000), young people use tradition as an act of resistance and pride (Lyon 1997, Saeed and Blain 1999). Fashion, music and film can become points of resistance to racism. As a reaction to institutional silence and invisibility of languages, histories, images and art, young people are bringing all of these out into the public arena. In this way they are not so much followers of tradition as guardians and champions of tradition.

The themes of loss and of desire to pass on cultural heritage including language are key themes in their narratives. Many feel a sense of loss when thinking about traditional cultural practices. They are aware that they lack detailed knowledge, let alone experience, of traditional cultural practices such as rituals at weddings. Although most describe themselves as bi-lingual they also express a loss of complete skill in the use of vernacular languages of their kin in Pakistan and Kashmir. One of the main reasons given for wishing to regain intimate knowledge of heritage culture is to pass it on to the next generation. The young people interviewed are concerned with reproduction of culture as well as with re-invention and selective change. This comes through also in the patterns of their consumerism.

Whilst in Pakistan and Kashmir they are keen to buy clothes and traditional goods. As well as cheap copies of Western movie DVDs, they are in the market for distinctively Pakistani and Kashmiri music and drama movies. In Britain the young people of the research shop for traditional goods. They use access to 'Asian' supermarkets routinely for food, cook 'Asian' dishes and buy 'Asian' products such as films and clothing. However, only a minority of them opts for exclusively 'Asian' consumption. The majority are in the market for a wide range of products and are sophisticated, contingent consumers (Gillespie 1995).

¹ Due to the history of colonisation, in Britain the term 'Asian' is often used to mean 'South Asian', which in turn is usually taken to mean of Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi descent. The 2001 U.K. Census form question 8 "What is your ethnic origin?" offers a choice under "Asian" of "Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or any other Asian background". It offers "Chinese or other ethnic group" as an alternative to "Asian"!

FARHANAH (F) I identify with the clothes. I wear them and they are comfortable. I wear them to my Mum's all the time. I would never wear skirt to my Mum's; I would always wear Shalwar and Kameez at my own house too, all the time. If I'm going to work, if I'm going to town or meetings or different places then I'll tend to wear skirt and shirt.

INAS (F) Our own language films there and here, the TV entertainment on satellite, Asian channels, and basically music-wise it's virtually the same. You can get Bollywood everywhere these days.

ANEESAH (F) I like the shops in Pakistan they have loads and loads of cheap stuff. Its fun when my aunty takes us to the bazaar, but it doesn't happen very often.

ASIYAH (F) To go to Pakistan is to shop 'til you drop, first over here to take stuff there and then when you're there to bring stuff here . . . shopping, shopping, shopping!

Young women wear traditional clothing more than young men do. They follow the latest fashions in Pakistani wear as well as in British High Street fashion. Many of those involved with this study wear clothes to suit circumstances. They wear traditional clothing at home, and high street fashions for work or college. Their choice of high street fashions is influenced by traditional cultural attitudes to modesty. Some of the young women interviewed wear a traditional long loose coat and a head covering whenever they go out, others do not wear a scarf at all and others decide according to where they are going. There are fashions in Islamic dress and those who wear religious dress do not necessarily wear a distinctively Pakistani design. Of the young men, only one did not want the women he is close to—wife, sisters, and mother—to wear modest Islamic clothing, he wants them to wear modern high street fashions of their choice.

Young men and women interviewed for the study said that they wanted youth workers who were 'clued up' culturally; aware of different and changing cultures including traditional ethnic and religious cultures as well as youth cultures; aware of the inter-play between cultures in the lives of young people and themselves.

Degrees of belonging

The phrase liminal lives (Purkayastha 2002) can be used to mean lives 'on the edge', lived at the margins with all the vulnerabilities

of being marginal and kept out at the limits or borders of a society. Liminal lives are lives lived with perpetual exclusion from the benefits of inhabiting the space at the core of that society: benefits of power, status, wealth, security and unquestioned belonging. Liminal lives is the expectation of young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people from several adult quarters: from adult kin in Pakistan, adult kin in Britain, community elders in Britain, the British media and many professionals such as teachers and social workers. Added to this is the expectation that they are living through a liminal stage of life. This is a stage at the limit of being a child on the one hand and at the limit of being an adult on the other, a between stage, belonging to neither stage in the life cycle, no longer a child yet not accepted into adulthood. Whilst adults speak of young people in these terms, the narratives of the young people of this research project do not speak so much of being liminal or on the edge so much as speaking of being actively excluded. Far from accepting that it is quite natural to find themselves marginalized given their age stage and ethnicity, the young people name racism, Islamophobia and exclusion from decision making by adults. They are vocal about their right to belong both in Britain and in Pakistan, and their right to belong in their extended families.

The needs of young people are for security and inclusion. This is not just about social cohesion or even anti-racism. The young people's own narratives make it clear that they feel a need for an environment where people can be themselves and be accepted, they can 'blend in' yet have a range of choices and options. To some extent they find this in inner city diaspora space (Brah 1996), however they are still left with unfulfilled need for a place where they can relax and 'be themselves' without effort and without constant negotiation. They have to compromise themselves in order to fit into village life in Pakistan and Kashmir, and they have to struggle for acceptance in British institutions. Whilst they show impressive competence at adjusting in both settings they complain that it is at the cost of truly being 'who they want to be and doing what they want to do', whatever that might be.

Obedying the rules is not as absolute as it sounds; there is constant negotiation about what the rules are, whom they apply to and what counts as breaking or adhering to them. The young people have a pretty sophisticated grasp not only of the cultural rules of their own biraderi and of the wider Pakistani/Kashmiri community

in Britain; but also the cultural rules of the immediate neighbourhood society in which they live, including institutions such as their school but also the rules of being “streetwise”. They are less conversant with the cultural rules of behaviour in Pakistan and Kashmir, in the biraderi circles there. They know a little about alternative interpretations and negotiations of the cultural rules in other biraderis; and have difficulty when negotiating the rules of the game in “white” institutions. Sometimes they know very well what is expected in these “white” institutional settings, but are not willing to pay the price of belonging. The price of belonging here could be no longer belonging at home. Other times they misjudge the more subtle cultural rules, such as the rules of acceptable communication. Awareness of racism is intuitive and perceptive, but the young people interviewed do not articulate their awareness articulately and directly, they can sense and recognise racism but do not name it and pin it down in their narratives. If challenged, proving the racism they are describing within the rules of a bureaucracy would be almost impossible. May be they have learned not to name it because it would be their word against the word of a powerful and articulate maker and obeyer of the “white” institutional rules. The price of naming the racism might be a qualification or a job.

Chain diaspora

On-going chain migration means that rather than being part of a diaspora that results from one historic episode of exodus, these young people are part of a community that is accustomed to displacement being almost routine. Migration is a part of life. For any individual their own migration is a passage and an episode of change, but for their family and community it is treated like many episodes in an individual’s life history. The immigration system of Britain and other countries is a regular village discussion topic as are tales of migration. Within the young people’s narratives, immigration is discussed in three contexts. One is the experience of applying for a spouse to join them in Britain, and then the story of whether or not their partner has been able to join them and what that has been like to live through. Another is their feelings about the stories of their grandparents’ and parents’ migration to Britain. The third is their mixed

reaction of pity and ridicule towards newly arrived migrants to Britain from Pakistan and Kashmir.

Stuart Hall's term translation (Hall 1992a) is a better description for what is happening culturally in the lives of these young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people than assimilation. Assimilation suggests surrender to the hegemony of dominant cultures and suggests inclusion in a 'host' society. The narratives of the young people interviewed show that they have counter hegemonic identifications, they do not feel accepted and included in British society and they claim the right to be part of a mixed multi-racial and multi-cultural society rather than being excluded from so-called "host" whiteness and Englishness. Tradition is a resource for their counter hegemony and anti-racism, translation is a future orientation that allows them to reinvent tradition for new times and contexts. Translation also allows them to be critics and reformers of cultural tradition.

Chain migration has brought change to traditions such as patriolocality and gender roles. Young women had to enter the labour market in Britain to fulfil conditions for their husbands to join them and young men from Pakistan have come to live in their wife's family's home in Britain's inner cities because options are limited when you are a newly arrived migrant and tradition has to take second place to other necessities such as earning remittances to send back and earning enough to afford to set up an independent home.

The metaphor of the ravine between two worlds into which 'second and third generation' young people topple, does not take into account chain migration criss-crossing the ravine with journeys, remittances, letters, tapes, films, photographs, gifts and mementos. Chain migration is a force for change and simultaneously a force for conservatism. Pragmatism about the immigration authorities has led to real changes in the lives of young women, yet marrying cousins from Pakistan continues tradition because, in spite of change in Pakistan, tradition is known to Pakistani villagers more intimately than to British Pakistani young people. The effects of chain migration on diaspora young people in Britain leads me to use the phrase chain diaspora to denote a diaspora that is not the result of a single exodus but is the result of on-going migration.

The young people I interviewed have an on going concern with bi-national legal and financial affairs and very little in the way of advice and support services to assist their decisions. This includes

immigration and asylum matters, detention in countries other than Britain (Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S.A., Iraq, Syria), marriage and divorce, child custody, death, probate/inheritance matters, land and property ownership in Pakistan and Kashmir, remittance arrangements, banking and financial services.

Often these involve whole families or opposing parties within the same family. It is not helpful for these matters to think in terms of generation, it would be more helpful and truthful to target services within the framework of service to diaspora individuals and families. There is a need to acknowledge the on-going connection that diaspora people have with their home villages, and to cater for the support they need for dealing with their own affairs transnationally and translocally.

CHAPTER SIX

UMMAH

'Othering' of the Oriental Islamic World in the West

British Muslim Pakistani people are faced with orientalism, not as an academic discourse but as everyday lived realities with consequences of prejudice, discrimination, exclusion and violence (Conway 1997). The history of Western imperialism and conflict with Islam has implications for their present experiences of living in Britain. Their thoughts, their actions, and their fears are affected by micro-processes of daily identifications (Gillespie 1995).

Edward Said's "Orientalism" highlights and illustrates the complicity of Western literature with European colonialism. Orientalism is essentialist, serves Western political and military interests and is self-perpetuating with little actual contact with its objects (Hourani 1991). It is self-generated ideas of people in the West about the East as 'Other', with little connection to reality (Young 1995). However, these ideas have far-reaching implications for the realities of a minority community regarded as Eastern or Oriental living in the West. "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978) was influenced by Foucault's writings about discourse. According to Foucault, discourse requires social arenas through which to appear, institutions with knowledge and authority and a system of specification by which different examples can be related to each other (Foucault 72). Said explores the discourse of orientalism. This appears in literature, media news and entertainment. It serves the interests of Western governments such as those of France, Britain and the U.S.A. Orientalism is a system for the production of colonial meanings. It can be a tool for understanding meanings affecting the everyday lives of Pakistani Muslims in Britain today because Britain has all the ingredients required for Foucault style discourses. It has a social arena of race relations and community relations, a politics of difference played out in a public sphere. It has institutions such as policy-making and service providing agencies claiming knowledge of the lives of young British Pakistani people and holding authority to take initiatives affecting their inclu-

sion or exclusion. It has a system of specification by which examples of ethnic minorities can be related to each other. The discourse of orientalism appears in the media constantly (Said 1981).

Said identifies three different forms which orientalist ideas have taken: literature about the Orient inherited from the European past, an academic discipline amongst the social sciences with its own paradigms, and a political vision of reality which promotes a division between “the West” and its “Other”—“the East”. The third form is the key one for this research project. Said’s analysis of how the Orient became known in the West as its opposite looks at European depictions of Eastern movements, including Confucianism, but principally Islam.

Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma. (Said, 1978, p. 59)

This was written in 1978 but could have been written now reflecting on the attacks on the twin towers in New York in 2001. He explores the relationship between the world of Islam on one hand and European and American imperialism on the other. What can his study of orientalist discourse about Islam teach us about the complexities of the identifications of people living as Muslims in Europe and maintaining links with the world of Islam, ‘the Orient’?

A process of exclusion and racialisation has taken place in Britain that especially relates to Muslims (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993). This is a new chapter in a long story of orientalism. In the Western imagination and discourse a new enemy has been created ‘the fundamentalist Muslim’. Bhikhu Parekh, then deputy Director of the CRE wrote about the Rushdie Affair:

The widely used and never clearly defined term fundamentalism became a popularly accepted disguise under which racism masqueraded itself. (Parekh 1992, p. 72)

A new threatening ‘other’ was needed with the end of the Cold War, an enemy to unite Europeans against. An old enemy of western Christian Europe was reconstructed. Out of the collective narratives of the Crusades came oriental Muslims to oppose (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 92). Politicians and journalists picked up this theme and reinvented it in modern form.

“Islam is ‘news’ of a particularly unpleasant sort. The media, the government, the geopolitical strategists . . . are all in concert: Islam is a threat to western civilization” (Said 1981, pg. 136)

A term used to specify anti-Islamic orientalist discourse of this modern form is Islamophobia. In 1996 Runnymede Trust, an independent research and social policy agency, established the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia. Its report highlights the consequences of Islamophobia throughout society: consequences including exclusion, violence, prejudice and discrimination. It draws a distinction between closed views of Islam when Islam is viewed as separate and ‘Other’, and open views of Islam. The commission’s stated intention was:

To counter Islamophobic assumptions that Islam is a single monolithic system without internal development, diversity and dialogue (Conway, Runnymede Trust 1997)

Closed views of Islam are: that it is unresponsive to new realities, sexist, irrational and barbaric, violent and supportive of terrorism. These are used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims. Such views were inherent in coverage of the Gulf War, the Rushdie affair and the international war on terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist acts against the U.S.A. on September 11th 2001.

In the Islamophobic imagination Islam is a political ideology that is used for political and military advantage. Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening and supportive of terrorism (Conway 1997). For the Western media during the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein personified this. He was portrayed not only as the arch ‘baddie’ but also as the arch Muslim ‘baddie’. Similarly Osama Bin Laden was portrayed not only as a millionaire, powerful, bitter, terrorist with a personal vendetta against the United States of America but as another arch Muslim or ‘Islamist’ baddie.

Pakistan as a state emerged out of a nationalist movement battling for independence from colonial rule. Issues of the threat of foreign domination remain a topic of popular debate there today (Esposito 1992) and were a strong theme in the reactions of British Pakistanis to the coverage of the Gulf War. This coverage was uncritical of the coalition bombarding Baghdad, played down the loss of life and portrayed the war as very technical, accurate, strategic disablement of dangerous enemy arms installations. However, Independent Television

News did show civilian damage and reported some Iraqi civilian injury and loss of life (Mowlana 1992). In spite of the images of Saddam as an evil tyrant British Pakistanis in Manchester made speeches about him as a hero. If Pakistani Muslims isolated themselves by failing to distance themselves from Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie, they now rendered themselves even less popular by publicly regarding Saddam Hussein as a hero. They praised Hussein because he challenged the West directly. British Pakistanis could have supported Pakistan, which was a member of the International Alliance, instead they criticised the government of Pakistan for helping the 'imperial puppets' in the Gulf States. Their speeches about the Gulf War were a localisation of global events, a locally significant tale of resistance to Western imperialism (Werbner 1994). This history had currency with the war on Iraq by the U.S.A. and Britain, where Saddam Hussein was ousted as dictator.

Anti 'Satanic Verses' street demonstrators' offence at irreverence by Salman Rushdie was compounded with anger at the intolerance of their core values by the historically crusading Christian secularised 'West'. Migrants, faced with rejection and hardship, are understandably defensive and can tend towards conservatism. Bradford Muslims treated as 'the enemy within' are not living in cosmopolitan, mobile, cultural exchange arts circles, but in white working class closed communities threatened by their presence. Media coverage trades on stereotypes of cohesion and single-minded but misguided passion about people in Northern England as well as about Pakistanis (Ali 1992). The street book burners were also labelled with Islamophobic tags of barbarian, irrational, threatening 'Others', and "fundamentalists", because they did not dissociate themselves from Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa. However, to call them fundamentalist is inaccurate; to be a fundamentalist is to be a Qur'anic literalist and this requires education. This is attractive to some Muslim youth but is still rare. The majority of Pakistanis still keep alive Islamic movements that grew in British India amongst descendants of converts to Islam from Hinduism, under a non-Muslim ruling culture. Theirs is an Islam of personalities and they hold dear cultural customs that have no Qur'anic origins. Their devotion to the person of the Prophet led them into street protesting against a doubting Muslim using vulgar language and explicit sexual imagery (Modood 1992).

Different people respond to their experiences of orientalism differently and evolve different strategies of physical and moral survival (Parekh

92). Some resort to cynicism, trusting no one. Some retreat to familiar certainties of the past and fight in defence of inherited traditional values. Salman Rushdie chose the cynical, doubting approach when he wrote 'Satanic Verses'; the 'book burners' chose the opposite (Parekh 1992). They fought him on grounds of his mockery of Holy Text and of the Prophet of Islam. Others distance themselves from the Orientals portrayed by British media, by reinventing themselves as new and associated with the West. One way of doing this is to use humour to satirise and to mock. Another is to convey revised imagery through music and drama. The theme East and West is part of popular British Asian entertainers' material. Amongst references to East and West through new forms of expression is a British born Asian BBC Radio One DJ who became famous for his syncretic Bhangra rapping calling himself 'Apache Indian'. A comedy programme satirising relations between Asians and Others in Britain called 'Goodness Gracious Me' enjoyed good ratings on prime time TV. A feature film shot on location in Southall was called 'Wild West' and starred 3 Muslim brothers dreaming of the U.S.A. whilst their mother longed for Punjab; and one of the most successful British made movies in 1999 was 'East is East'. Young British Asians are busy reinventing their identity, announcing themselves as familiar others with Western credentials as opposed to Eastern Indians connoting orientals, absolute difference, imperial history of strife and hatred (Gillespie 1995). 'East is East' parodies orientalist writers by drawing its title from Kipling. It is about a Pakistani man married to a white Catholic woman and the experiences of their children growing up in Northern Britain in the early 70s. It has proved very popular amongst British Pakistani Youth and is considered to be very funny. Twisting pain into comedy is a characteristic of both British and Pakistani humour. Sitcoms with tragedy close to the surface are part of both cultures. Yet in spite of its popularity and in spite of its autobiographical writing, it is quite orientalist. Orientalism constructs Islam as specifically and peculiarly repressive to women (Dwyer 1993), barbaric, irrational, primitive and inflexible (Conway 1997). It constructs Muslims as having no aims or values in common with other cultures. The Pakistani man in "East is East" is portrayed as very authoritarian, inflexible and cold, almost inhuman. His children have to find many ways of subverting his tight control. Maybe these British Asian film makers, (who incidentally are part of the 'Goodness Gracious Me' team) are distancing themselves from

this man and thereby distancing themselves from being considered oriental by white people in Britain.

British Pakistani young people are currently negotiating a cultural and political position from several strands; among them the cultural heritage of their ancestry, their own daily experiences of life in Britain, everyday conversations amongst peers and media narratives. Faced with orientalism, British Pakistani people have reacted in various different ways. Some have attempted to distance themselves from stereotypical 'orientals' by reinventing themselves through humour, music and drama, as Western Asians or as a new generation adept at coping with the complexities of living with hyphenated identities in a world which is shrinking through globalisation. They have chosen 'translation' (Hall 92a). Others have chosen to defend tradition and, following in a succession of resistance to Western secular hegemony and imperialism, have fought for the rights of Muslim minority communities in Europe. Some have withdrawn into peer groups and neighbourhoods and opted out of participation in institutional life. Others have secularised, Westernised and tried to become accepted by fitting in with more majority lifestyles. Very few are fundamentalist in any sense. Most adopt a pragmatic contingency approach; using whichever of these strategies suits the particular situation they find themselves in at the time.

Muslim subjectivities and Ummah

Tariq Ramadan (2003), in discussing Western Muslims, brings our attention to the distinctions made between 'dar al-Islam' (the abode of Islam) and 'dar al-harb' (the abode of war). He points out that these concepts do not appear in the Qur'an or the Sunnah but that Muslim leaders began the classification of areas into those that could be considered Islamic and those that could not, in the early centuries of Islam, as the basis for deciding about their political and strategic relations with other empires. This binary vision consisted of carving up the world according to the population living in the region, ownership of land, the nature of government and laws applied. Different schools of Islamic law have produced numerous definitions. Tariq Ramadan (2003) argues that these are "old concepts that seem to be neither operational nor relevant in our time". Due to population movement and other effects of globalisation in our time, Muslim countries and

non-Muslim ones do not constitute closed worlds, if they ever did. If this binary division of the world is now untenable, how can Muslims resolve the issue of preservation of a religious and spiritual life, and of Muslim subjectivity living within secularised, plural European societies? Ramadan believes that this is a central question for all Muslims because learning about being Muslim in the face of modernity is needed by all Muslims due to the hegemonic spread of western models of government and of economic and social relationships.

An alternative Islamic term to *dar al Islam* for a transnational Muslim community is *ummah* and, unlike *dar al Islam*, *ummah* is a term used in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Since all of the young people interviewed for this research identify themselves as Muslims, there is a need to introduce this term and thereby make it accessible for analysing their narratives. The *ummah* is a term from the Qur'an, it appears 64 times in the Qur'an and its meaning develops and changes according to different contexts. The term covers a variety of realities (Decasa 1999). It is not only used in the singular but also in the plural 'umam'. The term is used to denote the original, one humankind created by God, but it is also used in reference to particular communities or nations. The Qur'an relates a long history of God's relations with his peoples or *umam*, each *ummah* having been sent a messenger of God, for example Moses and Jesus. The word *ummah* starts to be used to refer specifically to a religious community. Those who believed in the Prophet Muhammad's message and migrated from Makkah to Madinah with the Prophet formed a group, later known as *Ummatul Muslimin*. *Ummah* is used to refer to the *ummah* of Muhammad (known as 'umma wasat') in particular, the Muslim Community or people. This is the way that it tends to be used in modern Islamic discourses. For many Muslims today *Ummah* is an ideal type worldwide religious community of Muslims that they aspire to being part of and to creating. They acknowledge that the Muslim world is far from united in this one *ummah* but they nonetheless identify with the ideal of bringing about such unity. It is used to describe Islam as a world historical movement that all Muslims are members of. Pnina Werbner refers to the way that at certain critical political moments, British Muslims 'invoke the Ummah' (Werbner 2002, p. 153). This research project explores the extent to which the young people interviewed feel part of the Muslim *ummah*, and what this ideal means in reality to their lives. It will reflect on what critical moments these young people 'invoke the Ummah'.

(For) a Muslim, the fundamental attachment is not to the watan (homeland) but to the Umma, or community of believers, all made equal in their submission to Allah (Castells 1997, p. 15)

Sayyid claims that Castell's reading of Muslim subjectivity reproduces orientalist accounts of Islam saying that

he positions Islam as an anachronistic presence in today's world, almost a monolith in a world of flows (Sayyid 2000, p. 34)

According to Sayyid the Ummah is an important part of Muslim subjectivity but is different from the united monolithic body mythologized and feared by Western media, politicians and even academics. He argues that decolonisation in the form of struggles of national liberation among Muslim communities nationalised the ummah, raising doubts about what it is in practice. He asks if it is not a common market, not a nation and not a civilisation, is it merely rhetorical? Sayyid portrays the assertion of transnational Muslim subjectivity presenting a serious challenge to the idea of the nation, as a Muslim diaspora (Sayyid 2000), discussing the diaspora as an anti-nation.

Zat appears to be less important to these young people than it is to their parents or to their Pakistani and Kashmiri kin. They prioritise other aspects of their identity than zat in constructing their sense of self-identity and belonging. By contrast the Ummah is important, they attach great importance to feeling Muslim and being part of the Muslim community locally, nationally and internationally. Muslims are aware that the Muslim world is an ideal and that in terms of the current world order Muslim identity and international community are fragmentary.

Another term used in the Qur'an meaning "people" is qaum. It is a pre-Islamic word that appears much more frequently in the Qur'an than ummah. A person's qaum is their party and their kinsfolk or tribe, it could be said their friends and relations. This term has relevance for this research project because it refers to kin and ethnicity, this will be elaborated on later. As in any society, there are potential conflicts between various collective identities in Muslim society. There are potential conflicts of interest between qaums and competing claims over leadership and development of the ummah. Before Islam tribal identity had always claimed the primary loyalty of the individual. The ummah was supposed to overtake this and to

become the supreme loyalty of all Muslims overcoming inter-tribal feuds (al-Ahsan 1992). The ideal is still being strived for but the same challenges of dissent, conflict, competition and even war are still being faced.

How can the terms *ummah* and *qaum* be understood in relation to the originally Jewish concept of Diaspora? Pnina Werbner, a Jewish author, describes Pakistanis in Britain as being variously part of three diasporas according to the contingency of culture and identity related to specific social situations (Werbner 2002). She refers to a Muslim diaspora, a South Asian aesthetic diaspora and a national Pakistani diaspora. Muslims do not think of themselves as one *qaum* chosen by God and dispersed as a diaspora in the same sense as the Jewish diaspora. Rather they consider themselves people called together from many different tribes and peoples to follow Islam and to become part of a transnational community of all Muslims, the *ummah*. The *ummah* therefore cannot be thought of as a diaspora. The Muslim Community or *ummah* has developed in the process of following Islamic law, another divergence from the concept of a diaspora of displaced people relating to one particular territory or 'homeland'. The traditional concept of the *ummah* was challenged by the emergence of nationalism, particularly nation-states of modern history. Nationalism was a driving force in freeing many people from colonisation by Western powers, including millions of Muslims. Muslim youth were key supporters and activists in independence struggles, including the struggle for the independence of India from the British, and the movement for the creation of Pakistan. The leader of the Pakistan movement in the pre-independence days, Muhammad Ali Jinnah argued that Muslims in India constituted a separate nation with their own culture, heritage and law, and that they needed their own homeland (al-Ahsan 1992). However, *ummah* did not abolish *qaums* or tribes or even nations, it only changed the hierarchy of an individual's identities in society (al Ahsan 1992). A *qaum*, with a common 'homeland', displaced and dispersed to other localities, can be a diaspora within the *ummah*. For the purposes of this research project, we will use the concept of diaspora youth but will be mindful of the higher loyalty claimed by the ideal type *ummah* from Muslim youth including Pakistani and Kashmiri ones. Listening to their narratives presents an opportunity to analyse the place of all of these loyalties in thirty real everyday lives.

Being a Muslim in the West

SAMEERA (F) What's important to me about being Pakistani is just one thing: my religion. I'm not a very strict Muslim, I don't pray five times a day like I'm supposed to, but I try my best.

JAABIR (M) Us lot, Pakistanis, we feel strongly about our religion Islam, it's what makes us different and unites us.

ARIF (M) I had a white girlfriend and, when she told me she was willing to become a Muslim and any children could be brought up Muslim, I told my parents but I would never have let my family in on her existence if I had known that she never meant it and once her 'falling for me' had wore off she would finish with me and take it all back. Now I've shamed up myself and my family for no reason. It was a bad mistake

ZULFAQAR (M) I am religious because I do pray whenever I can and I do the things that the women are supposed to do. I can't claim I follow every word but I do consider myself a Muslim

WALID (M) Muslims shouldn't be fighting each other; they should be fighting kuffar (infidels) like Bush and his mates.

HAROON (M) You take your religion into account: sanctions, observance or whatever

SALMA (F) When it was hard then I turned to religion- praying

FARHANAH (F) I do pray, that's more to do with Islam than with culture. I pray twice a day, I don't eat pork or drink alcohol. I believe in giving zakaat but it's always a problem about where to give it, like finding out who is really the needy. For my part I just give it to Islamic relief because then I feel I've done my bit.

ASIYAH (F) To start with straight after our wedding we're going to Mecca like an alternative to a honeymoon, to set us off on the right footing.

INAS (F) Okay there are some things that are just tradition and they make out that the Qur'an says that but because we're old enough to research for ourselves and that, we know what's right, we know that things like arranged marriages are not by law Islamic. At the end of the day you can't forget that you're a Muslim.

The young people's narratives are rich with references to what it means to them to be Muslim and part of transnational Islamic movements, although they are divided about precisely which movements. They do not explicitly 'invoke the Umma' (Werbner 2002) but rather invoke the general idea of being Muslim and having a religion called Islam. They show signs of being part of the transnationalism of anti-colonialism (Howe 2002), supporting other people's nationalisms such

as Afghanistan, Palestine and Bosnia and Chechnya. Reading the transcripts it is clear that Islam is a primary identification for the young people. They all use the adjective Muslim to describe themselves. It is less clear exactly what they mean and exactly what this signifies (Jacobson 1997, Scantlebury 1995). They are not all praying five times a day or active in Islamic organisations though some of them are. The label Muslim is a social tag, identifying themselves with a vocal and growing minority in Britain, a movement which is bigger in size and representation than any one minority ethnic group (Samad 1998, Alexander 1998). In terms of the politics of recognition (Taylor 1995), they are asserting the rights of a religious minority in the context of secular hegemony (Yuval-Davis 1992).

Whilst the prevalence of identification with Islam amongst those interviewed could be regarded as evidence of following tradition, it can also be understood as a force for change. Islam provides a code for living that is beyond narrow ethnicism. Young people resort to the principles of Islam to support their proposals for change. For example they support the continuing education of women with reference to the injunction upon believers to seek knowledge. They point out that folk traditions of Pakistan, including the all important *biraderi* system, are culture without an Islamic basis.

In a 'post September 11th' world British Pakistani young people haven't wavered from assuming that their first loyalty has to be to fellow Muslims rather than to the British State. In a few, very exceptional cases young British men have fought for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, for pro-Saddam Hussein forces in Iraq, for the Intafada in Palestine or allegedly for "Al-Qaida". Among the prisoners being held by the U.S.A. in "Camp X-ray" in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba were 9 British Muslims. In July 2003 the British media gave particular attention to the case of Muazzam Begg, a British Pakistani man amongst the Guantanamo Bay prisoners and one of two British Muslims to be faced with a military tribunal to decide his fate. His home is in Birmingham and he was arrested in Pakistan. He is not in the age group that is the focus of my research; he is in his thirties and is the father of four young children. However, his plight is of keen interest and concern to local young Muslim people, as was the plight of the three prisoners in their early twenties that originally came from Tipton in the West Midlands, just a few miles from Birmingham. They have subsequently been released after two years of imprisonment without trial.

The transcripts have less discussion about Islamic identity than about the other themes discussed above. Islam is assumed by the majority of the respondents to be a stable identification and less open to dispute than ethnicism and cultural norms. Their emphasis in the interviews is more on sites of socialisation such as family and school than on religious organisations. Whilst they question whether religious groups practice Islam authentically, they do not take the risk of questioning Islam itself. The young people interviewed all wanted to dissociate themselves from acts of terrorism in particular the destruction of the twin towers, emphasising that such acts are not Islamic. However, they articulate their opposition to the war in Afghanistan, highlighting the plight of civilian Afghan victims. Most of them do not accept that the conditions of Camp X-ray can be justified and they are adamant that the prisoners there are not yet proven guilty. Equally, they vocally support British Pakistanis living in Bradford and Oldham and oppose the views expressed in the official reports about the 2001 rioting there, and reported in the popular news media. They claim that separatist lifestyles of minority ethnic groups are not the result of conservatism but of racist and anti-Islamic practices on the part of institutions. The war on Iraq in 2003 was regarded by many as a war on Islam and named as an element of the “fourth crusade” against Muslim countries and peoples. Amongst the millions of British people who actively opposed the war on Iraq by the U.S.A., Britain and their allies, were large numbers of British young Muslims.

Rashida Sharif (2000) reports in her thesis that when questioned about Islam many of the young women that she interviewed in Birmingham, actually knew very little but they did think of themselves as born Muslim, and accepted sanctions purported to come from Islam. On the one hand Islam offered a sense of security and belonging, on the other they sometimes resented the sanctions.

SHAFEEQA (F) Over here I feel dull and kind of shallow, I get sucked into the mood of everyone, just thinking about mundane material things, shopping and television but in Pakistan its like I wake up. Life and death are both closer, everything has meaning more; things that matter are more to the front. Pakistan is more spiritual, I'm more spiritual and interested in spiritual things when I'm there and I just keep asking questions and wanting to experience things over there. They know all about things people here haven't even heard of. To start with I didn't believe any of it but I've seen with my own eyes. I'm not talking

about praying and stuff, I'm talking about "Jadu" (when people do kind of spells on each other). They write special phrases on pieces of paper and put them in places, some are really bad. When they do a bad one on you, you could get ill or even die or bad things can happen in your life. Then other people, like *pirs* give you *taweez*, phrases from the *qur'an* to wear round your neck or swallow, to protect you from *Jadu*. Honestly it really happens, you can see evil and good battling each other. Thank God our family's *pir* is good at giving us protection. I'm too interested in it all.

WALID (M) They're into bad stuff, a kind of black magic. Britain's not very spiritual but Pakistan is very spiritual, good spirits and bad spirits. It's true, they do "Jadu" on people, it means similar to voodoo, cursing you or doing some black magic on you. They write things and put them in your clothes. My brother and sister in England are both in big trouble in different ways and they are not even conscious why. It's because of some people here who did *Jadu* on us, I know who they are now. It didn't start now it's been going on for generations. When you go out at night in Pakistan *Jinns* can get you, its not safe. My uncle was walking in our garden at night and he saw a shadow but it didn't move like one and it wasn't a shadow of anyone or anything, he realised it must be a *jinn*, but luckily it never got him, he ran home praying. It's only because we get the *pir* to give us *taweez* that we are safe from them. When I went to Pakistan I had been ill for some time.

The pir gave me something, and now I'm fine.

FAREED (M) I get scared to go out at night in Pakistan because *Jinns* can get you and you would turn kind of tormented and possessed.

AHMAD (M) In Pakistan they tell you all kinds of scary stories just to stop you going out by yourself. They are just ghost stories to control you. I take no notice. They tell you about *jinn*s one minute and about violent gangsters the next, stories, stories.

A *jinn* in Islam is a being made of fire, distinct from an angel or a human but it is not evil by definition and does not possess or traumatise people. The idea of *jinn*s in popular local mythology is powerful however, as is a range of beliefs that might be termed superstitions, for example that you should never sweep a room at night or cut your fingernails on Tuesday. Clearly several of the young people I interviewed do not consider culturally specific beliefs to be myths or superstitions but spiritual realities worth learning more about. Others are sceptical and a few refer to Islam to decide what they believe in and what they do not in a very textual, literal way. Amongst those who are interested to learn more, there is a tendency to

superimpose horror movie imagery on local customs and beliefs, creating new dramas for themselves.

This confusion over what is culture, what is religion and what is spirituality is an interesting and important exploration for young people who at the same time identify as part of a transnational religion, Islam as a key component of their sense of identity and belonging.

Ummah and the current world order

The ‘Clash of Civilisations’, written about by Huntington (1998) and portrayed as irrefutable by British and American foreign policy spokespeople, is a dramatic backdrop for young British Muslims to grow up against. The zeitgeist (spirit of the times) is antagonistic towards being both “western” and Muslim, yet many young people are just that: European or American Muslims. Britain and America are accused by many of being engaged currently in a further crusade against Islam echoing earlier crusades. Young British Muslims face the challenge of living in the nation that is sponsoring the crusade yet identifying with the other side. They were not alone in Britain in condemning the war on Iraq, the anti-war lobby was huge but disregarded. “9/11” has become a watershed in world history, a trigger for the so-called war against terrorism. Images of young Muslim men in western media discourses are terrorist suspects, dead, injured, tortured, imprisoned or in danger of getting involved in one or all of these. British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people show quite a sophisticated understanding of the impact of these world events on their daily lives and identifications.

Whilst claiming their right to be considered part of the Ummah and enjoying the feeling of belonging to a kind of worldwide idealised solidarity movement, on a day to day basis these young people’s primary allegiances are to family, friends and fellow British Pakistanis and Kashmiris. When the Ummah is contrasted with Kuffar (the collective name for non-believers or the non-Muslim world) being counted in the Ummah is claimed. However, when there is tension between being part of the Ummah and being loyal to family (biraderi) or ‘tribe’, the contest is more difficult to resolve and be categorical about. These young people ‘invoke the umma’ very little; it is not mentioned by name in their narratives. They are concerned to emphasise that ‘being a Muslim’ is important to them. Some of them refer

to God from time to time, using terms like thank God or God willing, but they cannot even be claimed to invoke Allah much. It could be said that they do not invoke Allah, the Ummah or the Qur'an; but they invoke the identity of 'being a Muslim'.

Whilst scholars such as Tariq Ramadan (2003) may be challenging the binary notion of Dar al Islam as the world of Islam contrasted with the rest 'Dar al Harb' (the world of war), there is little evidence that these young people are concerned with any subtlety about this. Loud and clear in the narratives is the division of the world in their minds into Muslims and non-Muslims. They count Britain as a non-Muslim country in which they live as part of an oppressed minority group and they count Pakistan as a Muslim country in spite of the fact that they are able to critique life in Pakistan as falling short of the Islamic ideal. Ramadan's European Muslim perspective challenging this crude division of the world has not reached them yet.

Community: a mixed blessing

HAROON (M) I don't see myself as part of a community, just part of a family. Then the family is some ways part of a community but not by my doing.

FARHANAH (F) I feel very much part of my community. That's probably because I know a lot of them back a long time. I can relate to them. I can see where they're coming from 'cause I've been there.

SAMEERA (F) They're very different there actually. Maybe its because less people are working. If someone's ill people all come down, see you and ask if you need anything, whatever. Over here everyone's just busy with work. Even people here from Pakistan are less caring. That's how I look at it.

SALMA (F) It's just like Pakistan around here. People do look out to see who is moving in and who is moving out. They do care about the neighbours, they want to get to know the new neighbour- at the same time they can be very horrible as well, they fall out over gossip. Gossip is rife and it can hurt your feelings.

These young people are frequently described as members of minority ethnic communities, or of the Muslim community, or of the local community, or of the Pakistani community. However, this is not a strong notion within their self-identity. Family takes primacy over community as the central site of their daily identifications and life experiences. Next come networks of friends and neighbours who have

known each other for a long time and could be relied on for support in hard times and good times. From this perspective Pakistan has stronger, more caring neighbourly relations within village life than British urban neighbourhoods where people are busier with commitments of work or education. The benefits of knowing neighbours are offset by the problem of people discussing each other's affairs and getting into conflicts based on hearsay and gossip. The young people feel that they are not direct members of 'the community' but that their families are part of it and they are by default as members of their families. A focus of community such as a local mosque may be recognised as a community that young people (especially young men) are part of, but equally may be regarded as an organisation providing specific services such as a prayer hall and Qur'an classes. Peer groups of friends met through the mosque or through religious education in homes are recognised as significant by the young people interviewed.

A much more important topic than 'the Asian community' from the point of view of these young people is 'the street'. Familiar territory where people know one another and where there is safety in numbers for British Pakistanis or a British Muslims has far more currency than the idea of 'ethnic minority community'. Some conceptions of 'the local community' fit with their narratives, but only when such conceptions allow for low participation and conflicting sub-groups. The neighbourhood as a place symbolising being part of wider networks of people than the family is strong. In this sense, the narratives weave in the idea of a Muslim neighbourhood, a Pakistani neighbourhood, an inner-city working class neighbourhood quite naturally. Often this neighbourhood is perceived as a very specific geographical set of streets. Young men's concern to be streetwise concentrates on being streetwise in this specific territory and their quest to be safe and to protect their friends and families is located in detailed knowledge of the dangers posed by people within the area and people from 'outside' coming to cause trouble. When these young men find themselves in a village in Pakistan they are not familiar with the territory and are not streetwise.

To live in post 9/11 Britain is to live with increased antipathy towards young Muslims and with continuing racism taking on new polemics and new forms. It would be easy to assume that this means that Muslim minority communities feel besieged and then to jump to the conclusion that feeling besieged leads to conservatism (Modood

1992) but how do we know? Judging from their narratives, these young people are clearly aware of racism in the media and in their own day-to-day encounters. None of them used the term Islamophobia as such but showed an awareness of anti-Muslim discourses affecting them. They showed signs of feeling besieged but this did not necessarily link with conservatism. The group of young people were completely heterogeneous about their attitude to conservatism and change. In many cases they are critical of the conservatism of their parents and religious teachers and leaders.

The young people's narratives reveal concern with feeling safe and with feeling a sense of belonging to a neighbourhood. This is associated with particular familiarity with the territory and reputation of the neighbourhood. However, it would be a leap lacking evidence to go on to suggest that this means that they have a separatist agenda. They actually describe 'mixing' strategies more than they express any desire to be deliberately separatist. Many of them say that they have a Muslim circle of friends and find that supportive and comforting, a 'home' where they feel understood. They also have a mixed friendship group and appreciate the benefits that diversity can offer. Whilst they sound very parochial at times when they speak, they mention being mostly localised and lacking knowledge of other areas as something regrettable and something they wish to change as opposed to something they wish to reinforce.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GENDER

Whilst gender is a demarcation of cultural practice in its particular form of patriarchy, intra cultural change and contestation are particularly intense in this area. The young people's narratives debate gender quite actively, there are few fixed and consistent views expressed. On the one hand the young women like the idea of being prized enough to be defended, even fought over. On the other hand they want to have greater freedom to participate in British institutional life, by studying, working, earning, driving and being part of decision making. They are angry about white stereotypes about Muslim women and the role of women in Pakistani and Kashmiri society, but they also challenge oppression of women and want to see change, particularly to see a reduction of violence towards women. Domestic violence of course is not restricted to any cultural group. Unfortunately it is a global problem. However, there are particular barriers for Pakistani and Kashmiri women to overcome when they want an intervention to be made to stop violence against them. This is even more so in Pakistan because of the lack of legal backing for women. For example if a woman accuses a man of rape in Pakistan she has to find four male Muslim witnesses, or eight women witnesses. If the court finds against her, then she can be convicted of adultery by the same court (Haeri 1995). Most women in Pakistani jails are there for adultery and the sentence can be death by stoning (McCarthy 2003). Both young women and young men interviewed expressed the need for change in relation to these issues and in the way that women are treated generally in Pakistan and Kashmir. However, they did not go so far as to challenge differentiation of gender roles in the division of labour in British Pakistani homes.

Prohibition of dating and extramarital sex is on the one hand recognised as a differentiating and demarcating value of the Muslim community, on the other hand one of the greatest temptations amongst young people to cross the line. Distinctions are made by most of the respondents between going out with groups of friends, dating and going as far as sex. Many would secretly go out with mixed groups

of friends and have friends of the opposite sex. Few would admit to dating and even fewer to being sexually active before marriage. On the whole they find it a matter of honour to be regarded as practising Muslims who would refrain from sex outside marriage, and they take pride in being part of a community that requires and respects this life choice. Homosexuality is so taboo that it was not even mentioned once in all of the narratives, the transcripts are extensive and make no reference to homosexuality, derogatory or positive. Alison Shaw (2000) makes the point that it would be wrong to assume that elopements mean that young adults must have become 'westernised', because in Pakistan too young adults sometimes reject their family's plans for them and run away from home or elope with a partner that their families disapprove of.

Brouwer (1998) suggests that access to Dutch society gives girls a power resource to challenge the formal authority of their father. Girl's strategies include negotiation with parents, secret behaviour, gaining support of others, running away from home, and using support of Dutch laws on compulsory education. Mothers can be important intermediaries between fathers and daughters, advising daughters how to get around their fathers. Regarding meeting boys girls opt for secret behaviour. Such secrets are full of risk due to social control in communities. They risk heated quarrels, possibly ending in beatings. Seeking help from others, often teachers or social workers, without the knowledge of parents is a popular strategy. Almost one third of runaways returned. Some run away several times. By running away girls gain a bad reputation. Some react to stigmatisation by doing everything their parents have forbidden. Others try to prove that they are still 'good'. Moroccan and Turkish boys admitted to secret sexual liaisons even though they are aware of how complicated this could be for Moroccan and Turkish girls . . . they also want a virgin wife (Feddema 1992). This all sounds very familiar and such strategies are echoed in the narratives of the young women I interviewed in Britain and admissions in the narratives of some of the boys.

Direct confrontation is rarely opted for according to the narratives of the young people I interviewed. Sometimes model behaviour is systematically demonstrated for several weeks in order to pave the way for asking for permission for something as a reward, such as enrolment on a college course or taking part in a school trip to

Europe. Withdrawing is another strategy, withdrawing physically into another room, or withdrawing energy and attention so that the father misses the daughter or son's presence and affection and realises that they are unhappy about his decision. The hope is that he will change his mind, for instance about an intended arranged marriage. Turning to religion is a way of simultaneously withdrawing and being a model 'good' young person. Religion can be supportive in that it is comforting for the individual young person, it can also be referred to as a higher authority than a father. Praying may get Allah to influence one's father. Teachings of the Qur'an may offer an answer to his stubborn insistence on something, for example challenging his opposition to the education of women. Secrecy is another common strategy, a risky one sometimes involving lies and deceit, but none the less common practice amongst young people everywhere as a way around parents.

After running away about half of the Moroccan and Turkish girls in a Dutch study (Brouwer 1998) had no contact, half had some contact with their mother. Most girls who lose contact find it very difficult. Although they are ambiguous about their relationship with their own community, contact with Dutch society makes them feel more Turkish or Moroccan and they often form a youth culture with friends of different cultural backgrounds. Three of the young women that I interviewed talked about life after 'running away' and mentioned very similar experiences. They all had some contact with their mother or siblings, sometimes covertly, but no contact with the rest of the extended family or with their father. They all reported real difficulties and intense distress at loss of contact with their families, and told stories about particular moments that triggered pain now, times like knowing that the Eid prayer has just ended and the family will be gathering, but they are excluded from that; or knowing that your Mum has just returned from Pakistan and not being there to greet her. They too are ambiguous about their relationship with the wider Pakistani and Kashmiri communities because they feel branded as 'bad girls', and at the same time there is a sense of relief at no longer being subject to such social control. They too report that contact with British society and participation in mixed groups at work or university or within friendship groups makes them feel more Pakistani or Kashmiri; more like asserting this aspect of their identity.

unlike men, women are affected also by patriarchy and a traditional belief stretching back in time that it is appropriate for men—fathers, husbands, brothers—to control their lives. While many women internalise such oppression and are complicit in its perpetuation, others in both the East and West struggle to control their own lives, with varying success (Khan 1999, p. 1)

Rashida Sharif's thesis (2000) about Muslim Women in Birmingham highlights the tensions faced by young Muslim women in Britain. She endorses the idea that they are living in two conflicting worlds of home and school, each placing different demands on them. They either live dualistically or immerse themselves in their work. Some have secret liaisons with boys at lunchtime, sometimes missing lessons, never daring to tell their parents. Television viewing at home is censored and some parents insist on girls only schools and chaperone girls, leaving girls torn between family loyalties and their own aspirations and self-expression. Reading Sharif's account, I was less struck by how particular the experiences of young Muslim girls were, and how oppressive, than with how many non-Muslim girls have similar sanctions and protective parenting to contend with. Many young women have contests over the issue of freedom as an important point of conflict in their lives. Sharif describes how many girls feel that they have to resort to deceit. I have this experience from my work with young Pakistani women but also from my work with other young women. Sharif also gives an alarming list of the attempts some girls resort to get their parents to listen to them: attempting suicide, self harm, drug abuse, running away. I acknowledge the truth of the list and endorse the need to do as much as possible to improve situations so that these courses of despair do not have to be taken. It would be a mistake to play these tragedies down, but it would be equally a mistake to suggest that this only happens in the British Pakistani community.

In spite of the fact that patriarchy affects women in so many different political and cultural contexts, Asian women and Muslim women are assumed according to Euro-centric stereotypes to be especially oppressed and particularly vulnerable. Haifa Jawad wrote in her introduction explaining the purpose of the book 'The Rights of Women in Islam', that she was troubled by the views of secular feminists on one hand and Muslim 'fundamentalist's on the other, and set out to discover an authentic approach for herself and other Muslim women. She wrote that secular feminists:

declared that the Islamic system is a curse on the status of women under its law, thus portraying Islam as an oppressor rather than as a liberator (Jawad 1998, p. viii).

Furthermore the stereotype suggests passivity and complicity in the perpetuation of this oppression. Pakistani and Kashmiri women are portrayed as living in a hidden world of restriction and subservience. Since this world is less accessible to western academics and journalists, particularly men, all kinds of assumptions and guesses can be made about what happens in that hidden world. However, as a lived-in world, the sphere inhabited by young British Pakistani and Kashmiri women is hardly hidden from them, or from their male biraderi members. What is more, many of them play an active part in the public sphere, in workplaces, schools, colleges, the media and both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic political arenas.

Writing of women within Pakistan, Fareeda Shaheed describes the family as a focal point for women's identity, social interaction and support, but also the site of patriarchal control (Shaheed 1999). Drawing on the data of a regional study carried out in Pakistan by Shirkat Gah women's resource centre, she observes that women easily recognise and describe the power structures operating within their extended family households. They can explain the roles played by men and by older women in exercising control over the limited mobility of younger women, and can weigh their awareness of this control against the cost of rebellion shaking the basis of their main source of emotional, physical and financial support. They feared ostracism or even death for directly challenging the powerful within their families, however they were adept at subversive and manipulative strategies for influencing decisions within the family, as well as ways of earning the listening ear of men and elders. The women within this study did not themselves view their religion as constraining or oppressive, rather they regarded religion as a source of solace, support and legitimated opportunities to meet women beyond the immediate family. It is interesting to compare these descriptions from Fareeda Shaheed's work and research in Pakistan with those of this research amongst British Pakistani young people (Shaheed 1995). For women in Pakistan Shaheed advocates education and networking with women beyond the family as ways for women to expand their reference points and become more able to shape their own lives. Young British Pakistani and Kashmiri women have such opportunities, what do they have

to say about whether this allows them opportunities for making choices and shaping their own lives?

There is a particular practice in most Islamic cultures of some division between the worlds of women and of men. This takes different forms in different settings. *Purdah* and *Hijaab* mean curtain and refer to this division. It can be taken literally or metaphorically (Khan 1999). The idea stems from an incident in the life of the prophet Muhammad and his new wife. Anxious to be alone with his wife and frustrated by the continuing presence of guests the prophet brought down a curtain to separate the private part of his home, where they could be alone, from the public space. This event led to splitting Muslim space into two worlds, the household and the public sphere. Later this turned into segregation of the sexes (Mernissi 1991). Taken literally curtains divide buildings between public areas and private areas, women's areas and men's areas. Taken less literally it is a set of cultural ground rules of conduct considered seemly and appropriate between men and women. Whichever way it is taken, there is marking of the border or threshold between men and women's realms that is tangible and can be complex.

Purdah among young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris in Britain is a spectrum of different degrees of separation and contact with men who are not relatives; and of degrees of covering with clothing from subtle modesty to covering of the head, body and face with burkas. Sometimes dress, rather than bar women from public participation, provides sufficient *purdah* to make segregation less of a pressing concern. Islamic dress code should not bar women from exercising their Islamic rights, such as the right to be educated, to earn a living and to move about safely (Jawad 1998). However, the image of the burka has been used by the Western press as a powerful symbol of the "backward" oppression of women in Islamic communities. For example, during the war when the U.S.A. and its allies were bombing Afghanistan, western media coverage emphasised the Taliban's insistence on women wearing burkas as evidence of its repressiveness. The same journalists were bewildered when Afghani women did not wholesale cast off their burkas when the Taliban was defeated (al-Marayati and Issa 2002) Laila al-Marayati and Semeen Issa argue that Afghan women's priorities are not dress code, but feeding their children, becoming literate and living free from violence, particularly bombing by military forces purporting to support their cause.

In rural Pakistan purdah was traditionally restricted to women of high social standing who could afford to stay in their houses rather than going to work in the fields. Adoption of purdah by Pakistani and Kashmiri women in Britain may be aimed at an increase in social status. It could also be a reaction against a racist society that undermines their culture and religion. In Pakistan and Kashmir many villages consist of biraderi and so a whole village is home territory for the women in which they do not feel they need to wear a Burka but simply wear modest clothing and cover their heads with a large scarf (dupatta), Burkas are used for rare excursions to town. Living in urban Britain presents the problem that nearly all of the neighbours are not relatives and there is a constant flow of strangers on the streets. Some young Muslims in Britain wear a thick scarf, which they consider to be more Islamic than a dupatta, and a Western-style long length coat. Different families have different expectations of the women in the family concerning the way that purdah is observed and different women make different individual choices about it. Some women study Islam in order to decide the stance and behaviour they will adopt, others are influenced by cultural attitudes around them in their family and friendship group. There is also fashion in styles of purdah, for instance in dress, or in the arrangements made at public functions like weddings for purdah to be observed (or not).

Danielle Joly found evidence in her research among young British Pakistanis that parents are more lenient to boys than to girls. Boys' concealed lives of experimental transgressions of the cultural rules are ignored. It is hoped that they will grow up and get over this phase and return to the fold to be sensible adults. On the other hand girls are guarded and expected to follow a moral code of purity. If they transgress the interventions and sanctions are quicker; they are protected and prized as desirable only as virtuous brides, and keepers of the culture for the next generation. If they misbehave parents threaten two particular sanctions, to send them to Pakistan and to get them married off, possibly also in Pakistan (Joly 1995). Sharif (2000) also mentions that parents threaten young women with being sent to Pakistan and married off, as a sanction against behaviour they consider bad. Since my research concerns visits to Pakistan this is significant as a topic to explore with young women and men.

Sally Westwood (Westwood 1995) used a case history of a youth

project in Leicester to analyse the complexities of construction of South Asian masculinities:

These are specific masculinities understood not as finished products but as gender identities in process, a part of cultural configurations that are the products of resistances, appropriations, and accommodations within specific histories (Westwood 1995, p. 209)

She emphasised the contingent nature of masculine identities in different contexts or 'sites' including street style, soccer and public political activities. She mentions other 'sites' such as the home, but this was not the focus of her research. This site of the home and the related sites of the extended family and the homeland are more my focus. Both historically and currently she argues that stereotypes of South Asian men are simplistic and belie the real complexities of men's role performance in life. Orientalist stereotypes, she argues, are of fearless fighting men and of wily, crafty people who could not be trusted by the colonialists. Her own research, which sought to get beyond such negative fixed stereotypes, showed the young men she researched to have strong commitment to locale and to be intensely local in their loyalties. She describes them as visible elements of street life and as putting significant energy into being 'street-wise', living in contested terrain with white organised gangs and with the police. Local reciprocal networks were prized for supply of needed help, support, goods and services. These insights are useful because they echo the situation of British Pakistani young men on the streets of Birmingham. They too display involvement in "the nationalism of the neighbourhood" (Westwood 1995, Back 1996), intense local affinities and determination to be streetwise, in order to be safe. In the more private realm of the home that my study concentrates on, they are cast as providers and as physical defenders of the honour and safety of their families. Young women by contrast are cast as defenders of honour and culture through ensuring that their own conduct is exemplary, pure and honourable. They are encouraged to expect the protection of their brothers, cousins, fathers and uncles.

Pnina Werbner (Werbner 2002) differentiates between the diasporic public sphere where male elders hold power in local political affairs, and the world where young men can gain status and prowess through physical achievement in sport, particularly, in the case of Pakistanis and Kashmiris, cricket. Again this has a bearing on Sparkbrook life; young men are encouraged to actively get physi-

cally fit and to participate in martial arts and in cricket. Such fitness equips them to fulfil the expectation to physically protect their womenfolk, children and elders from violence, but also from shame or insult.

Gender: it's a man's world

BILQEES (F) Boys all go around in gangs, use drugs and show off to each other, beating each other up and all that

WALID (M) My Mum says she's worried to leave me in Pakistan without her. She thinks all kinds of gangsters and druggies could be dangerous for me, she can't trust my judgement. She thinks I'm naïve and not streetwise over there. I told her I've come across all kinds of people in England that she doesn't even know about; and if I can handle myself here, I should be able to there too.

FAREED (M) My uncle in Pakistan is hard, I look up to him. Once some village men and some police were all chasing gangsters out of the village and he told the police not to mess about just shoot them in the arse! He's got a real gun and goes hunting with his friends. I don't know why my Dad won't let me go with him. He stops me, like I'd be in the way or get injured, but I want to be like my uncle . . . "Bad" and not scared of anyone or anything.

ZAHRA (F) Here I work, I'm a lot more independent than I could be over there. There I wouldn't be able to work. Not many families would allow their girls to get a higher education. I would not like to stay home; I'd like to carry on working. I'd prefer to earn my own money. I'm learning to drive. Women over there are treated like they haven't got a mind of their own, they are being told all the time what to do, even how to wear things, how to walk. Here you wouldn't be constantly told

SALMA (F) They don't even let you have any fun. There's a reason to object to everything I want to do. They don't want me to go out, although I do. They don't let me spend my money on what I want. They don't like me treating myself; they think the whole family should have it, or no one. They don't even like me relaxing in my room. They just want me to join in with them and do chores and stuff.

MUMTAZ (F) The area is no good- my brothers are normal here. I grew up more protected from all that, in the house or being taken by my Dad to school and back or by my Mum to visit people. Now I go to town with my sister-in-law and my Mum. Now I go to work as a claims handler. I get out that way.

INAS (F) There you get to go out a bit but not that much. Here you're

always out or about—work or town or college, then come home, eat, sleep, spend time with family. Basically it's a different level of freedom to come and go. There you get family visiting. You're basically locked, whereas here you can do what you want. I go to my Mum's family . . . her brothers and dad (my grand-dad) but I stay at my Dad's family's house when I'm there, even though my dad's died now.

ZULFIQAAR (M) The attitudes to women in Pakistan are unbelievable-terrible. Even me and the other guys, young Pakistanis, couldn't stomach it I can't imagine why any woman from anywhere would ever want to go there. At one point things got rough, we had to escort two women through the bazaar. There was a fight that spilled out into the street, it was a nightmare.

FARHANAH (F) I can relate maybe to having responsibility of a daughter and daughter-in-law. I like my attitude of a caring nature in my family. I think that's me, but it's a Pakistani thing too to be honest. I play the very dutiful daughter in law as well er but there is a limit.

NABILA (F) Women there, some of them live too much by tradition, they just don't think for themselves, just follow stories; looking over their shoulders to the past and to what other people think, instead of seeing the present world around them for themselves. They should let themselves wake up to the here and now. But not everyone over there is like that, some move with the times and plenty has changed over there.

FARED (M) I liked the way all the boys played together there, football and cricket at a sports ground. Once we found a snake under a stone and I killed a lizard.

ASIYAH (F) What can I do? I'm used to making decisions for myself but I'm also used to people making them for me. I know all about people deciding my life for me.

ZAKIYYAH (F) It was difficult for me over there, a woman alone. I was there because my Dad had died, my brothers never came and I'd never been without my Dad alive before. There men do nearly everything outside home but I had complicated things to do in public places without support. I had to sort out taking his body, arrange the funeral, sort out inheritance, reconfirm my ticket to come back, so many things. Even getting transport to get to any of these offices and places is hard as a female, you get hassled when you're out and about and when you try to sort out important family things, people don't take you seriously. They think like, it's not your place, but there was no one else. It was a living hell. I never want to live through that in my life. I managed to live there in the house okay on my own. People were amazed about that. I got a lot of unwanted advances from men but I just had to get harsh with them and tell them where to go. The main thing is I never let them in I just talked to them

through the gate. Downstairs the family of tenants of my Dad helped me when I was at the house. Their men did my shopping and paying bills and that for me. That helped, thank God for them. It means I didn't have to sell the house.

WALID (M) I'll have to keep an eye on her when she's my wife and comes over to the U.K., know what I mean? I'm not my Dad, but even so. I'm going to want to know where she is and what she's doing, most important, who with.

Pakistan and Kashmir are very explicitly gendered societies and it is not surprising that the interviews show sharp differentiation between the experiences of men and of women (Ali 1992, Burlet 1998, Sahgal 1992, Bhachu 1995). Pakistani and Kashmiri cultures are a particular form of patriarchal system. Society in that context is clearly divided along gender lines regarding roles and expectations. Significant change is going on amongst the group of young people interviewed. Several of the young men as well as young women expressed real commitment to changing the pattern. The career ambitions of the young women come through in their narratives. Another interesting development is the fact that young women drive. This came out in comments about being frustrated not to be able to drive and get around when visiting Pakistan and Kashmir. One of the young women is waiting for her husband from Pakistan to join her in Britain. She said:

NABILA (F) God knows what it is going to be like, he has only seen me there. Here I concentrate on my job. I drive everywhere. I just don't know what he'll make of it.

The young women enjoy spending time in the company of women; they are accustomed to doing so in family settings in Britain. They have strong supportive relationships with their female relatives and appreciate the camaraderie of working and living together. Women in Pakistan share emotional times with each other. They literally laugh and cry together. There are specific women's gatherings to mark particular occasions just as there are men's gatherings and these can be great fun for the young women according to their tales of wedding parties and social gatherings, dinners and dancing and singing whilst the men are occupied elsewhere. However, they do find the strict division of genders difficult at times when they are in Pakistan because they are used to a different gender regime. They want to think for themselves and make decisions for themselves. Not

only do they want freedom of movement and of dress, they want freedom of thought and speech. According to their narratives they have greater freedom in all of these ways in Britain.

These British Pakistanis are breaking some of the gender division of their heritage culture by being part of mixed groups of young people at college. However, they each choose varying degrees of doing so. Some young women interviewed worked in mixed settings before marriage but now stay mostly at home, unless accompanied by women of the family to go shopping. Others work in mixed settings but avoid socialising with unrelated men. The young men in the sample all make conversation regularly with unrelated women; several of them go out to young people's social gatherings in clubs and cinema complexes.

Being 'hard' is a recurrent topic in the young men's narratives. They are concerned to appear sufficiently capable of fighting off danger and playing their part in physical defence and protection of family property and honour. During local action research young Pakistani men spoke with youth workers about not feeling safe, travelling in packs, gangs, territories and 'safe' areas. They hold particular men in Pakistan in esteem for their fictitious or real part in dramas such as wrestling a dangerous wild animal or seeing off intruders. Military stories and discussion of the current violence in Kashmir are regular topics of conversation. An urgency to get to know the village like they know the streets of inner city Birmingham leads many young men into adventures and exploits, some real some imagined. These stories include encounters with spirits as well as wild animals and people. Such stories are told and retold and travel back to Britain to be told again, mostly in male circles.

Another prevalent idea amongst the young men is that in Pakistan men are more powerful than women: that they are explicitly supposed to be 'in charge'. Whilst they relish this idea they are also a bit unsure how to put it into practice. Like all societies, life is not always what it seems and is more contested and complex than straight forwardly that 'men rule'. Women have plenty of counter strategies for dealing with men's power. They traditionally have plenty of rights as well as duties and young men may find themselves confronted with strong lobbying for such rights to be given, especially if they marry in Pakistan or Kashmir. In Pakistan and Kashmir gender counts in power relations but so does age and any woman who is older even by a few years will expect to be able to exercise author-

ity over younger brothers, cousins and nephews. Women who are elders such as grandmothers definitely command respect and expect to be listened to by younger men concerning important family decisions. Whilst in public men may issue orders to their wives and be obeyed, behind closed doors there is less compliance. In successful, happy marriages there is plenty of consultation in private, in more turbulent marriages there are rows. These are lessons that young British born Pakistanis have yet to learn judging by their rhetoric. There is a marked difference between the attitudes of those who are not yet married, and those who are. The married ones have lived through some of the subtleties and complexities of gender power relationships more.

One of the young men expressed a central ethical dilemma of this research when he said:

ZULFIQAAR (M) There are serious problems that we shouldn't talk about in public in Pakistan and here in the Pakistani Community, but they are there and they need to be sorted out. If you talk about it you will be a racist bitch, if I do I'll be a traitor. Neither of us is saying it doesn't exist.

He was referring to abuse suffered particularly by young women. In several cases young women have reported not only unease but also harassment and abuse ranging from virtual imprisonment and exploitation of their labour to unwanted sex. There would be a danger of feeding racist discourse in reporting some of the situations that have been disclosed during the research (Collins 1990, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993). Cultural versions differ, but abuse is abuse. Suffering abuse has not led the young women interviewed to reject tradition, in spite of the way that some of their relatives took advantage of traditional means of disguising the abuse. The life stories told by some of the young people include conflict and abuse.

SHAFEEQA (F) My Dad treated me so badly in front of them; they knew I had no support. I had a fight with one of my cousins because he wouldn't leave me alone; he was trying it on with me. My uncle said to me "you're never going to get out of here. I'll break your legs and tie you to the bed." When I got a serious skin infection they didn't get me treatment. There was emotional abuse every day; they swore and spat at me, they treated me like a slave, getting me to do all the dirtiest jobs and laughing about it. I managed to secretly get in touch with my friend; she contacted a judge in Pakistan. The police in

England visited my Dad, he wrote to my uncle saying send her back. They sent me. About the time I was sent back, after I'd already gone the Pakistani police raided the village.

GHAZALAH (F) It was alright when I stuck by my Mum, but one day I remember my uncle taking me for a walk with a friend of his, to some fields, they both started touching me and they got sexually aroused, and then my uncle stood guard and watched while his friend raped me . . . My uncle forced me to swear not to tell anyone by threatening me. I was too scared to tell anyone then, but later I told my brother and he let the story out in anger. No-one in the family will believe me, they treat me as if it is me who is dirty and twisted for suggesting something like that could have happened, especially involving my uncle, their 'Mr Perfect'. They just do everything they can to hush it up to avoid shame on the family and on him. I don't want other girls to go through anything like that and, after what I've been through I want to do social work and maybe support girls in situations like mine.

FARHANAH (F) I think we were trying to distance ourselves from them because the other side of it was er the sons were making unwanted advances toward us one with my sister and one with me. They wanted to get us to themselves, like if they were there first no other guy would have us after that. Well, they wanted to marry us and come to England and they thought that was their chance to do it. It was a really horrible experience. He physically touched me the one time and I didn't know how far he'd go so I told my aunty. She hit the roof with me, swearing her son would never do such a thing. We told our Mum that we felt threatened by the guys and she probably thought 'well they're my nephews, it doesn't really matter', at least she never did anything about stopping it. When we told our Dad, he hit the roof and that's when he sent our brother over. We kind of manipulated our brother and told, I think, exaggerated stories to our parents just to come back. We got away; we are the lucky ones. I'm married happily now. Thank God to a Pakistani guy but from outside the family.

INAS (F) I'd warn other girls about people there, watch out for people there. You get some people like that are just like, you know, 'pervs', that's the way I'll put it, so just watch out for men and stick by your family who you trust like your Mum.

MUMTAZ (F) My brother in law got drunk, even though it is illegal over there he somehow managed it. Whilst my husband was out on a night shift one night, he climbed drunk onto my bed and tried to get on top of me. I had to fight him off. My husband didn't like it but he didn't side with me and teach his brother a lesson enough for me. I rowed with my husband for not kicking his brother out of the house. Eventually we moved out instead to stay in another house within the family circle.

As they recounted this, the young women affected also demonstrated resourcefulness in finding coping mechanisms. One source of support is within the extended family, turning to other women or to trusted men. Several of the older ones have sought support from organisations and have become involved themselves in actively addressing similar issues. They have become volunteers, members or paid employees of organisations that support young people such as advice and information shops.

Women in Pakistan and throughout the world recognise the vulnerability of young women to unwanted sex or sexual advances, so these stories are not unique to journeys to Pakistan and Kashmir. However, the label of being brought up in the West makes visiting young women in Pakistan and Kashmir especially vulnerable and unfamiliarity with the dangers until it is too late also makes them especially vulnerable. There are popular stereotypes of Western women being loose and promiscuous which affect the situation. The young women may behave in ways that can be misinterpreted cross-culturally. Extended family living creates a strange mixture of constraint and opportunity. On the one hand sex outside marriage is taboo and young unmarried people are expected to be chaste, which for many young men creates frustration, especially if they are not married and in their late twenties or early thirties. On the other hand there are attractive young women living and sleeping under the same roof. Several of the young women also suggested that young men may have been motivated by the desire to claim them and to make it difficult for them to marry anyone else by sexually assaulting or even raping them. Sometimes, the young women claim, this is not about desiring the woman but about desiring a visa for Britain, a land of imagined plenty. This could also be a strong factor in the virtual imprisonment by relatives that two young women complained of: parents wanting to keep the young women for marriage to their sons and no one else, although Pakistani and Kashmiri attempts to respect the honour of young women in the family and to protect them may have been experienced as imprisonment by women accustomed to being able to travel around British city streets. Violence, mistreatment and threats cannot of course, be justified by this. Thankfully this was not a recurring disclosure in the narratives of this study and the police in Pakistan did eventually intervene.

ZAHRA (F) When I was there I was told constantly to cover my hair. It's a bit daunting to start off with but after a while you get used to it. It did get on my nerves but I eased in.

SHAFEEQA (F) I stayed in a particular room the majority of the time

FARHANAH (F) I don't cover my hair because I want to fit into society. I don't want to be gawked at—that's not me. I've got a real hang up about hijaab because I feel women wearing hijaab are doing it to please others. If I was going to wear it I would want to do it for myself, and believe the reasons why I am wearing it. I think a lot of them its when their husbands want them to wear it, or family want to wear it. I just can't back them on that.

BILQEES (F) When you go out there, you must cover yourself completely, it would seem alien not to although here I just wear scarf and coat, not full hijaab.

ANEESAH (F) They asked me 'how come you play with the boys and talk freely with them', like they didn't approve of that and my Mum told me to change myself about that, because people would talk bad about me.

INAS (F) Here, the way I see it is, like here we can sit down openly with our uncles and cousins and things like that without anyone, you know, saying anything but there its like if your cousin came and sat beside you or just pinched you or something like that, they'd get the wrong idea, but otherwise everything is alright. Yeah, you have to wear cheela (shawl) or dupatta (scarf); otherwise they're not really strict with us because probably they know how we've been brought up and that. Even the girls over there, as times are kind of going now, they're more modernised.

SAMEERA (F) The purdah thing . . . people over there, even our family in Pakistan, they're more out going. I mean they just pick up their scarves and go to the bandstand as they call it (the bus stop), go off for the whole day and come back at night. In England, we only go out when the men take us out, we don't go anywhere on our own. If we do go out we don't have to cover ourselves like we do in Pakistan but with the men working, we don't go out that much at all.

For all of the young women interviewed, purdah in two respects was within their narrative, dress and separation from men. Going to Pakistan was an interesting encounter with purdah for all of them but in different ways. For some dressing in a sufficiently modest way to please relatives culturally, particularly covering their heads, was behaviour that they decided to learn in order to fit in. For others they were surprised that family in Pakistan and Kashmir were more 'modern' in their attitudes to dress than they expected, for example

cousins wore clothes in Pakistan and Kashmir that they had been forbidden to wear by their parents in Britain. Some felt that in Pakistan and Kashmir they were trapped inside by cultural requirement to keep hidden from unrelated men. However, some discovered that women in Pakistan wear their *hijaab* and travel often and freely, especially married women. This is a reversal of what often happens in Britain where freedom is curbed after marriage. Some found that within the village, their parents were more comfortable with them going out to visit neighbours and friends than they would be in inner-city Birmingham, because their parents are more afraid of the unfamiliar dangers in Britain than the familiar neighbouring households of village life; and because their parents are more relaxed in a relatively mono-cultural setting than in a multi-cultural one, concerning influences on their daughters.

Masculinity, another dimension in Hofstede's model, is clear still in the very gendered relationships in the British Pakistani and Kashmiri community, including amongst the young people interviewed. Masculinity and patriarchy are upheld but critiqued within the young people's narratives.

Freedom for young women is a contentious issue and a site of significant debate and change. Both young women and young men object to restrictions traditionally placed on young women in Pakistan and Kashmir; they also occasionally object to obligations placed on young men.

Purdah is another aspect of life that poses the challenge of personal choices weighed up against competing forces for young people's code of conduct. This is a greater pressure for young women than for young men but young men have choices to make too. Young people have to choose how to dress, to mix with the opposite sex or not to mix, how to greet the opposite sex, what to discuss with them, to date or not to date, to behave consistently in all situations or to be contingent and so on. Whilst they are deciding they face a barrage of messages from parents, religious leaders, friends, teachers, and the media. Power is exercised in the negotiation of whether and how *purdah* is observed. Fathers and husbands have their say about the observance of daughters and wives. Mothers scold sons and sons scold mothers. This is another area of negotiation and change, even fashion. Being a young person is full of negotiations about who to become and how to live, *purdah* is part of that negotiation. Masculinity and femininity are symbolised as opposites divided

by the curtain of purdah or the covering of hijaab. They are much more complex than the symbolism suggests and more far reaching than decisions about purdah. Gender roles and power relationships are subtle and pervasive. They take a particular cultural form amongst young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people.

The Lebenswelt (Heidegger 1962) or 'life world' described in the narratives of the thirty young people interviewed for this research is a gendered life world with marked differences of experience between young women and young men. This does not only come through in descriptions of particular gender role practices in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in descriptions of life in Britain. For all of the binaries of identity that this research has challenged here is a binary that is constructed so effectively that it is experienced with clear polarity. However, this social construction is not a polarity within each person but each person is allocated one side or other of the divide. The social and educational divide is shrinking as more young people mix and young women participate actively in formal and informal education. In fact concern about underachievement in education is currently concentrated towards young Pakistani and Kashmiri men. However, distinction between expectations towards young people according to their gender is strong, although there is a tide of change rising.

Multiculturalism has not helped to address the gender issues raised by these young people. It is a hegemonic discourse in Britain that has reinforced existing power relationships of gender and age by operating a system of consulting 'community leaders' as representatives (Ali 1992). The young people, particularly young women, have a healthy critique of multiculturalism to offer, but are at the same time not free from its influence. They have been schooled in a multicultural system and carry a model of community relations in their mind that categorises themselves and others into cultural groups, competing with one another.

CHAPTER EIGHT

KIN

In previous chapters the strength of continued trans-locality and strength of allegiance amongst 'second and third generation' young people to more than one society have been discussed. According to Alison Shaw:

this dual allegiance would not have been possible to anything like the same extent without the particular form of Pakistani social organisation known as the biradari, which means, literally, kinsmen, brotherhood or relatives. Biradari membership brings with it distinctive patterns of authority and particular ways of thinking about relationships with kin and it invokes concepts such as honour (izzat) and shame, especially as they affect gender roles and sexuality (Shaw 2000, p. 292).

Verity Saifullah Khan (1979) describes how the Mirpuri individual in village life is the centre of a complex network of rights and duties which extend outwards from immediate family to kin and fellow villagers

the individualism and independence so valued in the West appears selfish and irresponsible to a Pakistani who expects and values the elements of dependency and loyalty in a relationship (p. 43).

She describes the village and biraderi system as a system of give and take and discusses the pros and cons of collective life (hierarchical and restrictive but also providing a very secure sense of belonging and practical support). The hierarchical element of this is the moral judgement and social control exercised on individuals by the collective, public deference to men by women and by young people to elders. Both Shaw and Saifullah Khan are anthropologists whereas I am writing from a cultural studies angle so I am not offering comparative data about how any particular cultural practice operates but I am using their work to contextualise the accounts of the young people I interviewed.

Family remains a central reference point for Pakistani youth (Joly 1995) in spite of the upheaval and division of migration. There are a small minority of cases of breakdown of contact after crises such

as girls running away. Even in crises family has strong significance and the crisis is all the more intense for its effects on the wider family. Since the family is so important to Pakistani and Kashmiri young people in many different ways, and family means extended family for all of them, the idea of kinship is important for this research project. In particular the focus of the study is visits to kin in Pakistan or Kashmir, rather than general visits. As a cultural studies student I asked innocently who writes about kinship? The answer was “anthropologists used to!” It was a very fundamental aspect of studying societies to study the system of kinship. A whole language was developed to describe particular patterns and cultural practices of kinship system. However, kinship fell from a position of theoretical centrality to one of marginality for two main reasons (Stone 2001). Firstly it was tainted with eurocentricism. Those societies with extensive kinship systems were portrayed as primitive and contrasted with ‘advanced’, modern Euro-American family patterns. Secondly, in order to make comparative studies, models of kinship made some theoretical assumptions that particular ‘natural facts’ were universal, which were shown to be assumptions that were not shared cross-culturally. Specifically, a central assumption was that kinship is based on procreation. This led to misconceptions about the meaning of kinship in some societies.

Kinship studies is now undergoing a revival, particularly linked to gender analysis. This is in large part due to the work of feminist anthropologists such as Collier and Yanagisako (1987) who argued that kinship and gender are mutually constituted. It has tried to move away from the formalism and eurocentric assumptions of its origins. The relationship between kinship and biology has been debated rather than assumed. Gellner (1960) argued that kinship lies in the connection between kinship systems and human biological reproduction. There was some dispute over this with critics saying that descent is not the same as biology for example fictional ancestry can have important social implications. This is certainly true in the kinship systems of Pakistan and Kashmir, where claims of ancestral connection with various political and religious figures are very significant socially.

Scheffler (2001) defined kinship according to how people themselves understand something to be a genealogical connection. This emphasis on how people draw connections between themselves can be very helpful for this research project with its emphasis on the

narrative study of lives and the meaning people attach to their own social boundary negotiations.

Some of the basic concepts of the old discredited kinship studies are none the less useful for this study, such as descent and alliance. Descent is when social emphasis is placed on the series of links between parent and child that are repeated generation after generation. In Pakistan and Kashmir links through the father are emphasised, making patrilineal descent the norm in kinship patterns. The ideological recognition of descent ties is called descent constructs. Such constructs are held as very important by Pakistani and Kashmiri people; we will discover through this research whether they are also important to young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Traditionally Pakistani couples live in patrilocal households, meaning they live in the natal home and village of the husband. They frequently live in big extended households of parents with their sons, their son's wives and their children. When sons marry they stay, when daughters marry they leave. Although this is the ideal type of household culturally, there are many instances of it being unworkable. Economic circumstances, city living and family conflicts all lead to other realities, but the construct remains. Generation strictly speaking would be stages of the chronology of parent-child links, however this is a complex picture, so the term often in fact denotes people of similar age. In Pakistani and Kashmiri families it is common to be the uncle or aunt of someone who is the same age as you. Endogamy means the tendency to marry within a particular social group. It is common practice in Pakistan to arrange marriages within the kinship group known as the *biraderi*. The most common is cousin marriages. Polygyny is when a man may have more than one wife. Islamically men are permitted to marry up to four wives, provided that they treat all of them equally and deny none of them any of the rights of wives. It is a minority situation, but not uncommon in Pakistan and Kashmir for a man to have more than one wife, particularly if the first marriage did not succeed in producing children.

Kinship groups of people recognised by each other to be of common descent in Pakistan and Kashmir are called *biraderis*. According to Tariq Modood (Modood 1992), there is considerable evidence that British Pakistani young people continue to have a strong sense of belonging to a *biraderi* branch in Britain, the centre of which is still considered to be in Pakistan. Even where association with the *biraderi* is weak this may be a phase during youth that they will grow out

of and come to renewed interest in later. Reciprocal exchange of gifts at life-cycle ceremonies, and a whole range of services, favours and good deeds maintain biraderi bonds in everyday life. This makes the difference between the biraderi of recognition or descent and the biraderi of participation (Lefebvre 1999). Being considered part of the active biraderi, worthy of inclusion in the strong and permanent ties of belonging, requires reciprocity and the playing of one's part. It will be interesting to find out the extent to which the respondents of this research study understand this, wish to be included and actively participate. All the gifts given at family events such as births, deaths and marriages are recorded in a register, which almost every household in rural Pakistan and Kashmir keeps. For many young Pakistani and Kashmiri men playing one's part has meant migrating to earn money and to send remittances home. Many young men continue to arrive in Britain with this incentive, as bridegrooms or illegally with the help of agents. They send remittances back for debts, for house repairs, events and family consumption. Migrant's role in chain migration extends to attempting to secure visas and work-contracts for other biraderi members. Chain migration is now an incorporated feature of village life and biraderi relations in Pakistan, not only in the places migrated to. Young women are expected to fulfil domestic duties and to learn proficiency in all things domestic, they also get initiated into the expectations of gift giving and receiving that is a key feature of biraderi get togethers. The organisation of *lena-dena* (giving and receiving) at family rituals is primarily regarded as the responsibility of women. It includes gift exchange, managing and recording gifts. *Lena-dena* is part of the ritual of coming and going between Britain and Pakistan, even departures and arrivals are ritualised and incorporate gift giving and hosting dinners. In time the young woman's marriage is likely to be to one of their cousins, ideally a patrilineal cousin, within the biraderi and then she will be expected to learn the role of daughter-in-law and wife, then mother. If she marries outside the biraderi, but by the arrangement and approval of her family, the bride becomes a member of her husband's biraderi and their children belong to their father's biraderi, however she retains ties with her original biraderi and ideally, if anything goes wrong they will help her. In some cases her marriage means leaving Pakistan or Kashmir to live in Britain with her husband's household. Although the tradition is patrilocal, bridegrooms arriving in Britain may have to accept living for some

time in the home of the bride's parents, out of necessity. Arranged marriages remain a key way of maintaining the biraderi system and young adults role within the biraderi includes arranged marriage. They are not only practiced in Pakistan and Kashmir but are still a way of life for thousands of British Asians (Bhandari 1993). Many are happy to go along with this tradition, some are breaking away, some are complaining of feeling trapped or obliged to do so against their own free will, and many are willing to go ahead with arranged marriages but with modifications. For example some young British couples are allowed to meet and to take a more active part in deciding about a match than would have been traditional. The respondents in this study discuss this topic in their narratives, so it will be elaborated upon in a later chapter. Sometimes tragic cases of forced marriages hit the headlines but these should not be thought of as the norm. The issue of forced marriage became an issue for the Labour Government and the media and government officials often confuse arranged marriages and forced marriages. They portray all arranged marriages as cruel. They show no understanding of marriage being culturally understood as a meeting and affiliation of families, rather than romantic love between two individuals.

The narratives do not describe just belonging and not belonging but degrees of belonging. Degrees of belonging in biraderi relations are constantly being discussed and negotiated. There are sections of the family who are considered close and trustworthy, those who are close but mistrusted, those who are temporarily fallen out with, long term fallen out with, enemies and those who are completely estranged. There are also individuals who are regarded as having left the family; if these were previously close, individuals within the family may hold onto a desire for the one who is lost and gone astray to return to the fold. "I am not calling that household to my wedding" may sound categorical but if someone else invites them they may well still be there (there but disgruntled because they noticed being snubbed by the gesture of not being invited by the bridegroom). Sometimes British born Pakistanis do not follow the rituals of establishing degrees of welcome or degrees of belonging. Rather than dealing with complex relationships involving conflict but also commitment, many of those interviewed perceived family politics as hypocrisy. They would prefer clearer distinctions between in and out, friend and foe. In fact the cultural system categorises relatives as near or far, respected or in disgrace, approved of or disapproved of, constantly. There is a

game being played of social control using sanctions and rewards all the time. Inclusion and exclusion are shown to people through being invited or not invited, greeted or not greeted, given gifts or not as well as by direct confrontations or alliances. Far from being a dance of enmity between strangers, it is a dance of intimacy including conflicts between the well known. Further more it is no temporary episode; it is a lifelong epic with constant references being made to ancestral history.

Rifts in biraderis, even lengthy and intense ones, are not necessarily total; there are degrees of estrangement. Total estrangement is such a threat that some of the young people described death as preferable; others spoke of feeling suicidal when faced with being cut off by the family. One young man said that he would rather be able to mourn his sister's death than to live with her total estrangement and disgrace after she "ran away from home".

Izzat or honour of a biraderi is a very important social boundary for Pakistanis and Kashmiris to be defended if necessary at great cost. Saving the face of the family is often prioritised over personal desires. Izzat is threatened if a family member's conduct is likely to bring disrepute. This is the case if for instance a girl runs away from home, or a couple are found out to be having an extra marital affair. If a family member is convicted of a crime or even gossiped about for inappropriate or rude behaviour, izzat is at stake. Various strategies are employed to save face. Honourable behaviour, particularly by young women, is stressed and social pressure is exerted to reward good behaviour and to punish bad behaviour. Secrecy is often employed as a strategy; family business is closely guarded as only the business of the family. Ultimately if a family member brings too much disgrace they may be disowned or in some biraderis even murdered. Ruksana Naz's mother and brother murdered her for getting pregnant through an affair with a childhood sweetheart (Gangotra 1999). Different biraderis manage the protection of their izzat in different ways. Some tolerate behaviour that others do not, some resort to violence, others employ much more subtle strategies.

Extended descent groups may be further divided into unilineal descent groups called aals. This is the unit of kin that young British born Pakistanis are most likely to be familiar with. Most of their visits to Pakistan or Kashmir are to the home of their father's parents and brothers. Biraderi specific chain migration and biraderi as a site

of welfare, social organisation, security and social control will be significant for this research study.

A further unit of identification in village life of Pakistan and Kashmir is *zat*. Although Islam does not recognise caste, Muslims living in India and now Pakistan, in spite of the rift of partition, have been influenced by their Hindu predecessors and neighbours. There is an overarching social division between *Ashraf* and *Ajlaf*. *Ashraf* means noble and includes descendants of various tribes and foreigners and converts from higher Hindu castes. *Ajlaf* means common people and includes working people and descendants of local converts. *Ashraf zats* are characterised by identification with real or mythical ancestors who were famous religious, social or military leaders. *Syeds* for instance claim themselves to be descendants of Ali and his wife *Hazrat Fatima*, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. *Ajlaf zats* are based on hereditary professions, such as barber, water-carrier, blacksmith and carpenter. Conversion to Islam did not affect the social status of the forefathers of Pakistanis and they retain a strong awareness of their real or imaginary origins. *Zats* are strictly endogamous. It is regarded as a great transgression to marry someone from another *zat*; frequently the word *caste* is used interchangeably with *zat* in English by British Pakistanis. In Pakistan the word *qaum* is often also used as if it is synonymous with *caste* and *zat*. This is interesting given the repeated reference to *qaum* in the *Qur'an*, (discussed above under *diaspora*) meaning "people". This legitimates the idea of a *caste* as a 'people' in the eyes of many Pakistanis although the stratification based on *caste* is not Islamic. Until recently there was a feudal system in rural Pakistan (known as 'seypi'). This was organised around the division between *zamindar* (landowners) from *Ashraf zats* and *kammis* (landworkers and artisans) from *Ajlaf zats*. This has begun to be complicated by migrant *Ajlaf zat* members sending remittances meaning that workers have been able to become landowners. Landowners or not they still retain their *zat* label. It will be of interest to find out from the narratives of the young people in this research study, whether or not *zat* features in their sense of self-identity and whether the 'seypi' (feudal) system continues to have any practical implications for them.

Another social boundary in Pakistan and Kashmir is ethnicity; this is also connected with the word *qaum*. *Mughals* and *Pathans* trace their heritage to immigrations from *Persia* and *Afghanistan*. In one

village alone in Punjab, village Mohra Bhuttian, villagers say that there are eight ethnic groups (qaums), with ancestry claimed to be from different parts of India and the Middle East. Those from qaums that fled India at the time of partition in 1947 are still referred to as refugees as if they arrived very recently. Ethnicity is connected with regional territories within Pakistan; Kashmir is currently a violently disputed territory. All of the young people interviewed for this project, visited kin in Kashmir, Punjab or Northwest Frontier province. They come from various different zats and qaums. These social boundaries of ethnicity or qaum and region are strong in Pakistan and Kashmir but how do young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris relate to it? They are of course living with another set of racialised and ethnicised boundaries in Britain's multi-racial, multi-ethnic inner cities.

Social anthropology has moved on from studying the structure of kinship systems to giving attention to analysing the processes of the construction of gender, sexuality, personhood and personal identity that are set in the context of kin relationships. Half of the young people interviewed for the study are men, half are women. A very complex set of identifications is already emerging as a backdrop to the young people's narratives and it is criss-crossed with social boundaries of biraderi, gender, qaum, ethnicity, race, class and age. How young people negotiate all of these social boundaries is the central focus of this research and the particular setting for examining this is their visits to kin in Pakistan and Kashmir.

Biraderi/family: 'blood, soil, milk and honour'

BILAL (M) If anything connects me with Pakistan it's my cousins that are there, my family. If I had no family there, I don't know if I'd visit there like at all ever, but the truth is we all do keep in touch family-wise, that has never been cut off. Family is the main thing I mean, at the end of the day. There is a big gap, a communication gap with cousins that are young kids growing up over there that I haven't even met, or cousins have got married and had children that I haven't seen. It's important to have a part in that so I'm missing so much. I feel like their love is slowly going away, well they love me still but we haven't kept contact up.

BILAL (M) My father's house, or my grandparent's house I should say, that's where we mostly lived. Generally speaking whenever any of us go over, I

don't know if it's a Pakistani thing or just the love in our family, but all my cousins took a whole week off to take us on outings, show us hospitality and all that.

OMRAN (M) All the relatives and that is good, meeting family you haven't seen yet, but you've heard about all the time.

ANEESAH (F) First I was shy with relatives, then I got to know them more, but then it was time to come back.

SAMEERA (F) I went when my cousin was getting married. I went with my Dad. We've got a big family in Pakistan; most of them are over there. It was just nice to see how people have grown up. Some people have passed away; I needed to go there to get in touch with that being real (that they weren't there anymore).

HAROON (M) I don't believe in having favourites or concentrating on particular people. The family is a whole thing; it's not good to break it down.

FARHANAH (F) I've got aunties there but don't keep contact with them. I know they're there but that's it. We fell out a few years ago and have become distant over the years, they disapprove of some of the choices I've made, it's easier to keep out of their way. My husband's got family there, we might visit for a day at a time but we don't go to stay with them. I send money to a young widow and her children in my husband's family over there but that's about it.

MAZHAR (M) My role in the family is a bit, well, kind of disputed territory (like where they live in Kashmir!). They take some of the things I've said and done different, like it's a controversy to them, so I'm still with them but there's an atmosphere it's not that comfortable.

ARIF (M) They've got issues with me, choices I've made and that, I've got a daughter with an ex-girlfriend. I'm worried that my life will go like my uncle's. He made a mistake like me, the family 'deft' him out and his life turned out terrible, full of arguments and feeling rejected. I still live with the family, not like him, but I feel seriously on the edge. I really feel pushed out. I'd like to just get on with my own life, look after my daughter and ignore them but it's not that easy, I get emotional about it all.

INAS (F) Well we've got so much family there you know, lots of houses in two villages near each other, loads of people, babies to old people.

ZULFIQAAR (M) We haven't really got close relatives, my father's brother is there and his family but that's it. People kept on telling me this person is this to you or that to you. I just said nice to meet you, see you and I was out of there. They feel they have something to do with me but I don't feel that way, I don't know them.

NABILA (F) We were so overwhelmed with the pure love they showed to us. There you're surrounded by 'the clan' all the time. It can be a pain but

when you come back and find yourself all alone with just a really small family, it's hard to adjust.

SHAFEEQA (F) My Dad's family held me against my will; unless letters were from my sister I wouldn't get them, my uncle kept them. I suffered physical and emotional abuse. My Mum's sisters over there were really good to me, they tried to help me, one of them took me to the doctor. I stayed a lot at my Dad's cousin's house, she was okay, I felt safer there.

FARHANAH (F) There are some things I don't like, I don't agree with like when we go to Pakistan giving out clothes and all that. I refuse to go to weddings because I think they're a waste of time, big crowds, everybody's crammed in. All you do is go there and eat (eventually). I'm really against those weddings.

FARHANAH (F) The reason we stayed with my Mum's side rather than my Dad's side was the facilities. But I think also my Dad thought if anything went wrong my Mum's side would get the blame, cause my Dad's like that.

BILQEES (F) My Mum's family all live there, I miss them and just want to live with them more.

TANWEER (M) It's good you know, when you haven't even seen them for a long time or even not before: you feel happy and you don't want to come back.

FAREED (M) I want to live here, but I want my family from there to come here. They are what I like in Pakistan.

BILQEES (F) It was my first time, a big enjoyable experience. You discover family you never knew you had.

JAABIR (M) I felt a bit nervous. I was kind of looking forward to meeting relatives I didn't know, but nervous of meeting them.

SAMEERA (F) In a way I'm under pressure to keep up Pakistani culture because your relatives really want to keep up their respect (izzat) by you carrying on with it as well. There is pressure yes. Even though we are British born, we're a bit of both cultures really.

WALID (M) They're not even family to us, not real family . . . only by marriage not blood, I only really count blood. Her Mum was my uncles' sister but she married out of the family. We are rajas, they are not. Our grandfather gave them some land, that's when they started to think that they are big people and rajas like us. We really are but they aren't, they are not even our caste, they came from a different village than us too. I know all this because I've listened to family conversations in England and Pakistan when they just forgot I was there and listening and carried on gossiping in front of me. I'm not going to be a hypocrite after what happened between me and their side in England, I don't want to know them there. But family there still deal with them, invite them and that. They say they fall out then you find out that they still go to each other's houses, just hypocritical.

All of the young people interviewed refer to the significance of family to them. By this they mean extended family. Those who are unmarried refer to aunts, uncles and cousins, particularly the children of their father's brothers and sisters. Keeping in touch with family is given as the main reason for going to Pakistan. Those who are happy with their relatives speak of being shown great love and affection. They specially enjoy spending time with their cousins and often this means time spent in single-gender groups. Those who are unhappy report lack of privacy, boredom at spending hours with nothing to do but sit in the company of family members; restrictions on their freedom to go out and discomfort at being in crowded conditions. The married young women talk about their in-laws, again some with affection, and others with criticism. None of the young men mention their in-laws, probably because they would be unlikely to stay at their homes. Young people are following tradition in their preoccupation with family affairs. All, except the ones who have escaped abuse by leaving, wish actively to maintain extended family relationships. Those who have suffered in the family context do not reject the whole extended family; they feel hurt that in order to avoid the offending family members they have to become cut off from others. They succeed in keeping in touch with selected members of the family and are aggrieved that they are the one who is at a distance, rather than the people who mistreated them. Most of the young people express a wish for more freedom, but at the same time want the security of knowing the family's protection and support (Basit 1997). There is a constant tension in their lives between the attractions of individualism promoted as a value in "the West", and the attractions of the collectivism promoted as a value in their extended family.

The price of belonging versus the price of exclusion

All of the young people interviewed had an intense interest in belonging. Whilst a few had broken their ties with their extended families, the majority had not and the main preoccupation they had concerning belonging was belonging to the biraderi and how far they were willing to pay the price in order to remain accepted fully within their extended families within that biraderi. In turn, the biraderi's collective efforts to manage the boundaries of their group with the

wider Pakistani/Kashmiri community in their locality are about honour and ultimately about the acceptance and status of the biraderi in relation to other biraderis. This is also a matter of deciding when and how it is worth paying the price in order to belong and to be recognised as 'in' and respected. The price comes in several forms. The first is obeying the rules. The second is giving and receiving. The third is willingness to defend and stick up for your own.

Examples of the rules of biraderis that the young people debate and weigh up in their narratives are arranged marriage, cousin marriages, purdah and gender role preservation, not drinking alcohol, eating only halal food, dress and media censorship.

It is not a simple matter of plotting the place along the individualism and collectivism on Hofstede's dimensions model (Hofstede 1984), to find the point half way between Pakistani and British. The process is very fluid, shifting and dynamic and these young people use a lot of personal agency to try to get the combination of benefits of individualism and collectivism that they wish. One young woman expressed it like this:

RIFAT (F) I get up in the morning and say to myself let's get up and go and do my own thing, I go to work or to college for the day. Come the evening, I get on the bus and when it reaches our area, I see groups of women wearing Pakistani style coats and scarves, shopping for bargains, and I think hello aunties, familiar scenes, I'm home.

In Pakistan there is a social system of kith and kin called biraderi, similar to a clan system. This has emerged historically from local customs; land ownership patterns, family businesses and trades and the influence of Hindu forebears. The narratives of the young people show a lack of knowledge about the workings of this social system and lack of interest in continuing to live according to it. None-the-less they recognise that it is an influential system of mutual expectations and traditional stratified relationships, which impacts on decisions made by their elders. When it suits them, such as when they want to disown someone in the family after a row, they do refer to traditional credentials for inclusion in or exclusion from the biraderi. For the most part however, they simply concern themselves with their relationships with the family members they know, direct relatives of their parents.

Fathers have a formal decision-making role in families within this

particular cultural form of patriarchy. They manage the interface between the family and the outside world. However, young people and women in families have elaborate ways of influencing and circumventing his decisions. Fathers' power and authority-figure role make them a focus for attention. Young people interviewed often refer to what their father wants them to do and contrast this with what they want to do. In some cases they are in on-going conflict as a result, in other cases they feel restricted. A minority feel secure and safe, protected from the complex decisions that he is making on their behalf. Some of the young men are fathers; some are rehearsing to be. They feel pressure to take on decision-making responsibility and to escort relatives on any ventures into 'the outside world'. Some young men play this role very traditionally.

Protection of family honour (known as "izzat"), 'what other people think' is traditionally very important (Westwood 1995). Several of the young people interviewed express irritation with the degree to which their relatives are controlled by concern for izzat. They are inclined to care less about what other people think and to wish to be true to themselves and have an attitude that other people should mind their own business. On the other hand several of the same respondents express pride in their family's real or imagined history, the family's narrative of its heritage.

ZAHRA (F) I'm getting married to somebody in Pakistan. I'm fine with it. I was asked so it was my own choice, I wasn't forced or anything. If I have a daughter I don't see why she shouldn't have an arranged marriage. If I could find somebody suitable within the family I would obviously go ahead. If not, outside, it would definitely be through me. I don't think my family would agree with me doing anything else but then again neither would I.

BILAL (M) I'm very close to my Mum so we've had some talks about my marriage. I mean I do feel I'll probably have a marriage of my Mum's choice. She doesn't have to be Pakistani as long as she is Muslim. Maybe even if she's willing to convert that would be okay as well. I don't think the Pakistani thing comes into it at all so long as she respects my parents and is a good loving person.

SHAFEEQA (F) My Dad's brother's family tried to marry me to their son, when I said no there were very bad arguments and they started to treat me really badly.

ARIF (M) I don't agree with cousin marriages and all that crap, but I'm not sure, I wouldn't mind going to Pakistan with my Mum to have an arranged marriage as long as it was outside the family. My Mum will consult me I

know she will. Yeah why not, it would be all right. I wanted to go with my brother and my Mum for both of us to get married. My Mum said she'd look for rishtas outside the family so that would be okay. But what's happened is my brother's gone over to my Mum, who was there already, and he's agreed to marry our cousin. I'm still over here worrying about it, unsure which way to go. If I go there now there may be pressure to marry my brother's fiancée's sister all in one big wedding. I know her sister and I know that I'm not even going there, there's just no way.

HAROON (M) My parents want me to marry one of our cousins in Pakistan, but I've told them to forget that idea. I don't want to marry in the family. I want them to arrange for me here or in Pakistan, that doesn't matter, but not my cousins. If they push me I'll tell them really what I think of my cousins and of cousin marriages and they won't like it, but I think they've got the message already. I could go and find someone myself but I'd rather it stayed a family thing; and keep the connection, for the marriage to be bringing the woman into our family not just me and her. From my idea she has to be a Muslim, that's it but my parents will only go for people in our caste and sect. Although I'm not into caste, that's what they'll do for sure.

NABILA (F) I enjoyed it with all my cousins. I couldn't keep away from the warm family ties. Then the idea came up for me to marry my one cousin and I didn't object because I was happy in their house. They treat me so nicely. We were already friends, having good conversations so it was comfortable to go ahead with it.

BILQEES (F) First personality then looks. He must be Muslim. British or Pakistani doesn't come into it. Mostly we marry our cousins and that's best for me.

ZULFIQAAR (M) Take arranged marriages, there are problems of forced marriages. I know girls who would commit suicide rather than go through with it, or some leave their whole family, which is traumatic and shouldn't have to happen, it's all wrong.

WALID (M) I am going to Pakistan and I am happy to go and marry my cousin, not like some people. I'm proud of our ways of doing things, you shouldn't reject your own or fall for what white people think. All my family in Pakistan and my parents will be happy with me and me and my wife can live like 'in' with them all.

HAROON (M) I'd like to just visit everyone but I'm steering clear of Pakistan for now because my grandmother will put me under serious pressure to marry my cousin and there's no way. It's better not to stand in front of her face and insult her granddaughter, best to stay here and say sorry I can't make it right now because of this and that excuse. My Dad said sort myself out with a

qualification and a deposit for a house then he'll approach families here for a *rishta* (engagement), that's what I'm working for. I want an arranged marriage, and soon, but not in our family and not in Pakistan. There would be constant expectations from over there that I can do without, and the sister of the girl in Pakistan that they want me for, lives here. Honestly she does my head in, if her sister joined forces with her it would make my life hell. If you marry someone in the family and it doesn't work out, it can be hell, everyone pokes their noses in and everything is complicated. Anything that happens between you and your wife becomes something between everyone in the family. If your in-laws are separate from your own relatives its better, at least that's what I think. If the worst came to the worst and you get separated or divorced, then it doesn't tear between parts of the same family and mash up everything.

PARVEEN (F) Most of us lot marry our cousins. He probably understands you if he's related especially if he's your cousin. We know their background, everything about them. Someone from college, I don't know their background, they might be just putting on an act. I wouldn't know enough about him.

ASIYAH (F) So I'm getting married over there with all the traditions, all the shopping, all the sitting still for hours on end with everyone staring at you. Never mind, the guy's okay. Mashallah, he's really understanding and a nice person. So once the wedding's out of the way we can come back here and get on with our lives. We'll come to England and probably live at his parent's house, that's how it's usually done. My parents are still discussing with his parents about the details of where we'll live and that.

MUMTAZ (F) I was engaged before I went, when I was about sixteen. I wrote letters and that to him and he sent me clothes and gifts if people were coming. We had each other's photo. When I got there I still had a free choice. I didn't have to go through with it. Me and my Mum and my sister-in-law met him. I thought he was the most decent one there, educated, could speak English, had a job . . . so I thought, "he'll do"!

INAS (F) Most likely it will be an arranged marriage, I mind about that to be honest but I don't feel I can really do anything about it. Whereas you see girls run away and that which is not really right, I wouldn't do that.

SAMEERA (F) I went with my sister, my sister's husband and their children and I got married to the brother of my sister's husband, my cousin. I was very nervous actually before I went from here, I didn't sleep for a few days because I knew what I was about to do. My sister didn't know much because she got married here and didn't really go through all the traditional ceremonies.

WALID (M) My uncle had a good chat with me and filled me in on the traditions of the wedding and all that 'cause like I don't know do I. Although it's all strange, I'm happy with it, I'm happy with my Mum's choice and I

would never have dared ask a good looking girl like her to marry me! It's one of those turning points in life kind of thing . . . intense man!

Some of the respondents have had arranged marriages. Some are in the process of their families seeking a suitable partner for them. Of those with arranged marriages the majority is very content though one regrets her marriage. Most with arranged marriages are married to a relative, usually a cousin. However, several of the young people have discussed with their mothers their wish to marry someone outside the family and have agreed to cooperate with their parents' use of community networks to search for a suitable partner. In some cases they have asked that the partner should be British born and several young men and women specified that the person should be Muslim but did not need to be of the same ethnicity as them.

Three of the women out of a sample of fifteen have married men of their own choice without family consent and with much conflict. One young man threatened his mother that he would leave unless she stopped trying to arrange for him. Two of the young women left home and became estranged from their parents in order to marry men of their choice. Both married Pakistani men. One of them married a cousin who was supposed to marry her sister. The other married a friend of her brother who is lower caste than her family. Another young woman left home in order to get away from pressure to have an arranged marriage. However, she has since come to an understanding with them and has now asked them to arrange a marriage for her but to consult her more about it than they did previously. Several of the young men have talked with their mothers and asked them to allow them to marry outside the biraderi and to consult them. It is common amongst this group of young people for the prospective couple to be allowed to meet each other. Change is coming about in custom and practice; arranged marriage is a changing and developing cultural form. Several of the young people have experimented with dating covertly before they marry within the arranged marriage system.

When asked what relationship they would like their children to have to their heritage culture, all of the respondents were keen for their children to grow up 'being Muslim', knowing language and cultural practices. They are also keen on them having choice and having the ability to succeed in multicultural Britain, which means having ability to mix with confidence. A commonly held view is that

'knowing your roots' is a source of self confidence which equips young people to hold their own in a hostile racist environment and to assert their rights with a sense of cultural pride. Those who are already parents are all teaching their child mother tongue and English. All of them want to offer to arrange their children's marriages, but not all of them are sure how to do so. Only a few plan to insist on arranged marriages for the next generation, and they say that they would follow Islamic practices for this but not necessarily Pakistani cultural practices, for example they will not expect their children to marry cousins.

Many of the interviews included the topic of caste; mostly young people say that they do not understand the caste sensitivities of their parents and do not associate themselves with that way of thinking. However, some of high caste take pride in the family's caste status. It makes them feel higher status than other Pakistanis.

Biraderi is undoubtedly a central reference point for all of the young people's narratives and their negotiations with the family over belonging or marginality, even exclusion, are critical in their lives. Patrilocality is still accepted as the norm amongst these young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris. However, the British immigration system has created a common new arrangement of young women staying with their parents when they are newly married to a Pakistani or Kashmiri man whilst his visa application is being processed. Often then, when her husband arrives they continue to live with her parents or near to her parents until her husband becomes established with a job and they can afford to move on. In a sense this breaks with patrilocality fundamentally because the man has moved from his own homeland to his wife's birth country. He has moved on from patrilineal blood ties of the homeland soil. If he has married a woman from his mother's side of the family, he has moved to matrilineal 'milk' migration diaspora soil. For the young British Pakistani bride, she has stuck with tradition by going to the homeland to marry her cousin, but broken with it by bringing her husband to her parental home in a British city territory. This is such a common occurrence that she is in fact being typical of her community and is part of a newly created tradition. Still a son-in law in the house (Ghar jamai) is looked down upon.

As for honour, izzat is still a strong concern of the young people's life stories. They put a lot of energy into defending their own honour, their family's honour and their communities' honour. There is

still a gendered pattern to the defence of honour. Much of a family's defence of honour is vested in the lifestyle and choices of its young women. Young men still guard their sisters' reputations and protect their sisters from unsuitable predators, in some instances they feel justified in being quite controlling of their sisters. In some cases they are more vehemently controlling and illiberal than their fathers, in others they collude with their sisters. The young people I interviewed, so as to defend izzat or to avoid the disapproval of watchful family members, often resort to secrecy.

Lena-dena, the cultural system of give and take that ritualises the maintenance of biraderi relations, is shifting. Young people have a less intricate knowledge of the traditional patterns of gift practices associated with events such as births, deaths and marriages than their elders. They have not however given up the whole idea. To them there are still important distinctions between people who you give to at life events and people who you do not have that relationship with. Lena-dena extends beyond the biraderi system to close family friends; young people's evolving system extends further to friends and is closing down to a narrower section of the biraderi, more immediate family. Traditional situations for gift giving have been supplemented amongst young people with British customs such as birthdays. Across religions in mixed friendships there is give and take marking each other's festivals for example giving Christmas cards and gifts to work, school and college friends, and receiving Eid cards. Rather than dying, the lena-dena system can be thought of as translating. With this translation comes the extension of relationships beyond biraderi boundaries, and a decreasing maintenance of relationship with farther flung branches of kin.

Generation is not a straightforward concept in the context of British Pakistani and Kashmiri lives. It is complicated by chain migration and by family patterns and age profiles. A so-called second generation young person could marry another second-generation young person and live with him and with her third generation children. However, she could equally be married to a first cousin who is a 'first generation' migrant and live with her 'first-generation' parents and her 'second-generation' siblings. Which generation would her children count as second or third? She could even marry her mother or father's cousin meaning that she is married to someone from her parent's generation in another sense. It is common in big extended

families to have aunts and uncles who are younger than you are. Therefore the term generation is unhelpful for analysing the migration and identity experiences of British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people. The specific contrast between the life experiences of a young person and their parents has more meaning and clarity, this is an axis of meaning within the young people's own narratives.

Endogamy is still normal for these young people, but is increasingly contested and more young people are contemplating marriage outside their kinship group, with a partner of their choice, normally another Muslim. More of the young people I interviewed talk about this option than living it, but a few have married outside their kinship group. Arranged marriages are also still normal but are increasingly contested with young people wanting more control over the decision. This often means amendment of the practice of arranging rather than abandoning the practice completely. For example, young people may ask to meet proposed partners and to be allowed to be actively part of decisions made; or they may ask trusted friends or mosque contacts to arrange for them rather than relying on the traditional practice of leaving it to aunts and parents. Polygamy is not unheard of amongst young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people. Although it is becoming rare amongst young people in Britain it is certainly familiar within their kinship group and, for some, within their household in Britain as well as in Pakistan or Kashmir. Far more contentious in the context of the Pakistani and Kashmiri communities is young people continuing illicit relationships with girlfriends or boyfriends after marriage.

INAS (F) I don't agree with sending lots of money to Pakistan. Your first priority is your family that you're with in the house, your children and your wife. If you've got a house and mortgage, think about that first before building a house over there in Pakistan. When you've cleared all your debts, then think about sending money abroad.

SAMEERA (F) Sometimes it's very tough sending money there. Sometimes there's not enough for us here and we have to keep it up there because there's respect on the line, I suppose. I'd like the children to have some sort of connection with Pakistan but I wouldn't like them to suffer, being completely broke and having to send every penny back. I'd like them to still send a little, but at the same time tell them that this is all we can afford, don't make out we're some sort of bank manager—just tell them the truth really.

NAZAQAT (M) I just wanted to help make the facilities better there for the family, so I do send money I earn back for them to improve living conditions over there.

MAZHAR (M) They've got us but other than the money we send there's only two earners in the family. They're both in the army on the front line in Kashmir so what if they get injured or killed. The family there are poor, especially on my Mum's side. They all have a lot of children to feed and clothe so they need what we send we couldn't just cut them off when we know their struggles.

FAREED (M) I want to invent something and make plenty of money so that I can build nice houses for our family on the family's land in Pakistan.

Sending remittances to family in Pakistan and Kashmir occurred frequently as a theme within the narratives. There was a range of perspectives on it. Whilst some resented the pressure to support relatives financially when they are not well off themselves, others were keen to find ways of making money to send there either for improving shared family facilities or for supporting relatives who face poverty and associated struggles. Most talked about wanting to strike a balance between unrealistic expectations and dependency and support for relatives in genuine need. The sense of obligation of new migrants is reported as being greater than that of British born young people. In particular this was discussed in relation to tension within households about how much earning is for the benefit of the nuclear family in Britain and how much it is for the extended family transnationally. The relative wealth of Britain in relation to Pakistan is acknowledged by British Pakistanis but they are uncomfortable with the level of dependency on remittances and the effect that has on their relationships with kin in Pakistan and Kashmir.

Traditional descent and kinship patterns have not been fully transmitted in the process of migration. The young people interviewed are aware that their parents and grandparents have greater interest and knowledge of wider biraderi and ancestry claims than they do. For them family is a primary reference point but in a narrower more contemporary frame. Their focus is on their cousins and on the extended family network that is active in their British context.

The lena-dena that is practiced in Pakistan has extended to practices of the young people's parents in Britain and is part of the ritual of visiting Pakistan. Their parents feel obligated to visit people who are bereaved, recently married or have a new child in both

contexts. Whilst they have grown up being taken along on these occasions, the young people's narratives suggest that they are less committed to maintaining this ritualised system of mutual support and less knowledgeable about the detailed cultural practices associated. They need guidance from relatives about how to behave at functions such as weddings and funerals. This is not only guidance from elders but also from cousins residing in Pakistan. Commitment is still strong however to the idea of family members practically supporting each other, being in contact and generally helping one another out. This commitment is tested by requests for remittances to be sent to Pakistan from Britain. In particular this can cause tension between British born spouses and their Pakistan born husbands or wives. Some assistance for particular needs is distinguished from regular financial support within several of the narratives; and need is looked at differently. This is a stressful issue because *lena dena* is about your family acknowledging your future amongst them. Charity towards deserving people in unfortunate circumstances outside their control is distinguished from dependency on remittances from abroad on the part of young fit men. Young people who are welfare state dependents in Britain can be disparaging about young men in the village in Pakistan not working to earn and contribute without noticing their inconsistency.

The young people who shared their life histories for this research differ in their attitude to arranged marriages. However, they are likely to have to negotiate their way either into or out of their marriage being arranged, or in some cases they are already married and the marriage was arranged by family elders between cousins one of whom lives in Britain the other in Pakistan or Kashmir. This is a live on-going cultural practice for this particular diaspora. Young people need support and opportunities to talk through their thoughts and feelings, not only about the general idea of arranged marriages, but about their own personal experiences, hopes and fears. Cousin marriages are common practice in this diaspora and the young people interviewed differed in their opinions about whether this is good or not. They would welcome better opportunities to talk about the subject within a non-judgemental, non-prejudiced forum. They place importance on 'being Muslim' yet feel constrained by the ideas of Muslim elders and are unclear what is culture and what is Islam. Frank and open discussion is not easy to find in a setting with prescriptive ideas about what is right and wrong, whether this is at

home or at school. Information is needed and so is a chance to debate ideas and to consider alternative viewpoints. Those young people who are sexually active before or outside marriage certainly conceal their behaviour and are unlikely to disclose their experiences and the issues they face openly in most settings. It would take great trust to seek out chances to discuss sexual relationships outside marriage and as for homosexuality, there is a very strong taboo about it.

CHAPTER NINE

GENERATION AND CHANGE

Youth

In much popular discussion emphasis is placed on incompatibility of Asian and Western culture. Problematic British generalised assumptions are made by Social workers, teachers and others that culture conflict must be the root of the problem. This assumes that cultural values are fixed, and that individuals and families all think and behave in the same way as each other. Catherine Ballard (1979) tries to counteract this by showing how the majority of young Asians are coming to terms with their situation, based on five years of anthropological field-work carried out among Sikh families in Leeds and in their villages of origin in Punjab. Her paper argues that “many of the second generation of Asians in Britain may rebel against their parents’ social and cultural values during their teens. The resulting clashes may lead some of them to seek outside help and support at this time. Yet by their late teens and early twenties the majority of them do largely conform to Asian behavioural norms within the sphere of family and community life” page 110.

It is of particular relevance to this study to analyse discourses constructing the lives of British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people. There are various discourses through which youth and adolescence have been constructed in academic texts, in the media and in political arenas. In other words, there is hegemonic ‘common sense’ about youth and adolescence (Griffin 1993). The nature of hegemonic common sense is to seem natural, universal and to be assumed rather than critically examined. This study will examine some common assumptions by testing them against the statements of young people about specific life experiences. Gramsci’s definition of hegemony concerns power relationships. According to Gramsci hegemony is a means of achieving dominance by achieving consent that existing power relations are natural and inevitable (Gramsci 1971). Illuminating truths about the power relationships in these young people’s lives, rather than settling for hegemonic common sense, is an aim of this study.

Modern British images of youth and adolescence draw upon the creations of the Victorian middle class. A description of a universal stage of individual maturation, characterised by tension over separation and dependence, became popular public discourse reflecting hopes and fears of a middle class afraid of two threats to its future, class conflict leading to unrest and rebellion amongst working class people at home and war abroad (Murdock and McCron 1976). This discourse led to strategies of incorporation to promote national unity in the interests of national and imperial defence and to contain working class militancy. There was a struggle for hegemony of the dominant patriotic ideology over the hearts and minds of the rising generation. This public discourse and the strategies it leads to can be seen in a new guise today. Young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris are regarded as working class militants following the disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford. They are also mistrusted by a ruling class that feels the need to promote national unity in the interests of national and international coalition defence against the threat of “Islamist terrorism”. This has led to recent strategies for social inclusion, citizenship, and social cohesion.

The first major popular psychological study of adolescence published by an American psychologist (Hall 1904) argued that adolescence was a time of ‘storm and stress’ for all adolescents, a time of tension between “primitive” desires and the influence of a civilised society. Although the details of his theory sound strange to modern ears, there is a popular impression that young people do not have enough self control of their urges and desires brought on by all of those hormones rushing around, and that society, through formal and informal education, needs to civilise them, into decent citizens. Sigmund Freud (1923) hypothesised a struggle between the instincts of the id and the moral conscience of the super-ego, arbitrated by the ego, but he did not specifically link this struggle to youth. He regarded problems of this time in life as a continuation of problems unresolved in childhood. However, other subsequent writing in the psychoanalytical tradition explores adolescent trauma, suggesting that puberty strengthens the id leading to storm and stress (Head 1997); for example Anna Freud, his daughter, wrote that the growth of sexual feelings accompanying puberty strengthens the id causing imbalance, storm and stress (Freud 1937). Another idea from this tradition is that adolescence is a time of a second individuation (Blos 1962) meaning becoming more distinct and aware of self than the years

of dependency in childhood. This can mean trauma. The idea of individuation has the significance of suggesting a time of searching, of questioning and looking for a sense of self-identity. This implies a rich opportunity as a researcher to speak with people who are in the process of making choices about who they want to become, whom they want to identify with and whom they want to distance themselves from. Is this really a universal state of youth though? For the majority of young people in capitalist societies the time of dependency is very long, and this age group are rarely secure and confident enough to make choices that take them far from the very familiar. In agricultural societies like rural Pakistan and Kashmir, children help with work as soon as they are able to and become gradually initiated into adulthood. After puberty some change in behaviour is expected, for example boys may be expected to spend less time with women and children, and more time with men. In public functions they are expected to go to the men's section of the Mosque or hall. Girls are regarded as needing particular protection after puberty and before marriage, from unwanted gazes and advances, so they are chaperoned closely. The period of adolescence described as stress, struggle, separation, individuation described above is different in that context. The young people who were interviewed for this research are an interesting case because they are influenced by Pakistani cultural practices but live in a Western capitalist, post-industrial state and go to school, college and work with young people who are thought of as living through classical theory style adolescence. Issues of identity, autonomy and relationships with peers, with parents and with authority figures are said to be characteristic of adolescence. Are they equally characteristic of young British Pakistanis and Kashmiris? Their narratives may shed some light on this.

Erikson, who popularised the word identity in psychology and gave us the often-used term 'identity crisis', postulated an eight-stage psychosocial developmental model (Erikson 1968). He assumed that biological and social determinants combine to ensure that each of the stages will be faced in a particular phase of life. The phase of adolescence is the phase for developing independence from the family, ending compulsory schooling, making vocational choices and coming to terms with sexuality. His model suggests that each stage presents a crisis that has to be resolved before progressing further. Identity versus role confusion is a crisis characteristic of adolescence according to Erikson (Erikson 1968). Identity and role confusion are

central questions for this study. With binary models suggesting that young British Pakistanis are particularly prone to role confusion being tested against the empirical data of young people's own accounts of their experiences, identity will be a focus for analysis. What do their accounts tell us about their sense of intrapersonal coherence and consistency? What do they tell us about the self-defining choices of allegiance to collective identities? How Eurocentric or universal is Erikson's model? British Pakistani young people have the same biological determinants and some of the same social determinants as other British young people; however, they also have other social determinants in life. This study will draw attention to some of these other social determinants such as arranged marriages and cultural perceptions about dependence on families.

Karl Mannheim published influential work on 'the problem of generations' (Mannheim 1928), which formed the foundation of modern generation research. He contended that within each society there can exist a number of differentiated generation units each developing its own style and consciousness of shared experiences. These generation units can be antagonistic to one another. Generation is an important allied idea with youth. It brings in the contrast between youth and their parents and grandparents; it also contains the possibility of youth as parents of the next generation. Another meaning has been added to the construction of British Asian young people, the idea of being second or third generation after immigration to Britain. Compounding these two ideas of generation units in antagonistic relation to one another and generations sequenced after immigration, leads to a picture of British born generations in conflict with immigrant generations. However, this is a misrepresentation of the pattern of migration to Britain and of the relationships between younger and older people within Asian communities in Britain. Chain migration means that not all older people arrived at the same time as each other. On the whole, men from Pakistan and Kashmir arrived before their families joined them. Also young people are still arriving having married British-born young people. There is still an essential relationship between the two worlds of Pakistan/Kashmir, and Britain.

'Youth' as a category appeared as the focus for official reports and interventions in post Second World War Britain. Historian Lewis (Lewis 1978) described the mid 1950s as witnessing a "youthquake"; "an explosive discovery of teenage identity" (Lewis 1978, p. 118). Ever since then it has been difficult to save the word from being

associated with a problem that something needed to be done about (Hall and Jefferson 1986). A range of developments in labour markets accentuated 'Youth', as an identifiable social category, with earning power, for marketing and entertainment provision (Osgerby 1998). Youth became a target group of consumers. A study by Steven Miles, Dallas Cliff and Vivien Burr (1998) of consumer meanings amongst young people in Britain suggested "consumption allows young people to feel as though they fit in whilst simultaneously giving them some semblance of individuality" (p. 81). The authors used the title 'fitting in and sticking out' for their journal article to express this finding.

Youth in the media has often been a concealed metaphor for social change, used by people who wished to resist change. The popular construction of youth is a rebellious generation who go through a phase of rejecting the status quo and vie with the generations older than them for power to decide the future. Associated with this idea there are ideas of activist, dangerous youth and excluded, drop-out youth who are equally dangerous because, being disenfranchised they have nothing to lose by rioting and criminal behaviour. The notion is that youth pose a threat because they are insufficiently socialised and assimilated into mainstream institutional life. Youth are viewed as potentially dangerous and disturbing because they are on the margins between generations. Education is seen as the vehicle for correcting this weakness in the hegemonic 'inclusion' agenda. The negative stereotypical image of youth has regularly been linked to the label of Asian youth. A controversial documentary by "Panorama" was broadcast in 1993, called *A New Underclass* (Herbert 1996). It included journalistic reports of British Pakistani people's lives in Sparkbrook, the neighbourhood where most of the respondents of this research live. This programme provoked much debate and strong objection from Pakistanis in Britain who felt that it was a stigmatising misrepresentation. More recently, coverage of the disturbances in the towns of Oldham and Burnley in Northern England in 2000 represented Asian young men in particular as a mob with a dangerous lack of loyalty to Britain and not enough to lose from turning to violent crime and disorder. When, in September 2001, an international terrorist organisation attacked the World Trade Centre and other targets in the United States of America there was speculation that young British Muslims might be recruited by such organisations and pose an even greater threat as an enemy within.

Following from this idea of youth as threat there have been all sorts of attempts to either recruit youth or to force them to subordinate their lives within key institutions and structures of the dominant social order of power and authority, such as education, law and employment. The current rhetoric for this drawing of youth in from the margins and into adult citizenship is social inclusion. One of the target groups for social inclusion interventions is Asian youth, especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi youth. Such schemes attempt to reproduce existing power relations in the family, the school, the workplace, the local authority and the state.

Early writers linked the question of youth to class struggle. There was then a period with less discussion of class and more of inter-generational conflict. The 1970s saw a revival of interest in the link between youth and class. This was immediately before the Thatcher years that led to a new construction of the “Thatcher generation” or Thatcher’s children. This portrayed young people as individualist consumers lacking any collective consciousness and believing in meritocracy. There was a shift towards leisure and new relations of consumption led to marketing of leisure and entertainment aimed specifically at youth.

Several consistent criticisms have been raised of youth research. One is the absence of girls in much of the popular and sociological literature and public discourse on youth (McRobbie 2000). The second is that research has been concentrated on ‘problem’ young people (Hall and Jefferson 1986). Thirdly, the impression is given that young people are objects of adult activity and not subjects who are active agents in the construction of the meanings that make up their cultures and lifestyles. Last but not least youth is a construction that has been implied by Eurocentric authors to be universal, when it is in fact a culturally specific construction. There are different understandings of childhood, adulthood and the boundaries between them in different cultures. The phase of life between the ages of 11 and 25 years old changes form and character across time and space. Miles argues that:

For too long social scientists have portrayed young people as excluded risk-taking trouble makers motivated by nothing more than their own rebellious self interest. The everyday realities of young people’s lifestyles as an expression or reproduction of the dominant values of society have, in turn, too often been neglected. (Miles 2000, p. 1)

Certainly Muslim young people in Britain are regarded as excluded and potential troublemakers. In their case they are feared not for self-interest but for collective interest and loyalty to Islam rather than to the nation-state of Britain. They stand accused of choosing not to assimilate, where their parents were thought of as unable to do so. It was expected by the ruling parties of Britain that the fault lines dividing communities into segregated ghettos would have subsided by this generation of teenagers. The social cohesion recommendations following public investigation of disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford involving mostly Muslim young men, are specifically targeting the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities as needing to be more integrated and assimilated. This research project focuses on how young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people negotiate the social worlds in which they construct their everyday lives.

Young people are associated with social change and youth research, including this, is partly motivated to research youth by the desire to research social change and to foresee the contribution that these young people will make as adults. Young people are not all on the margins and rebellious; many are adhering carefully to social norms within their cultural setting and are fairly conservative. Currently Asian youth as a category are labelled as on the margins, especially young men. However, many young Asian people are in fulltime education trying to jump through hoops towards a successful career, others are settled, married, bringing up children and working to earn a living.

Some of the most influential work about youth in Cultural Studies was that undertaken by the 'Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies' in Birmingham in the 1970s. This research started within the centre's successor, the department of cultural studies and sociology. A particular topic of the centre's work in the 1970s was youth subcultures as subordinated cultures to dominant elite culture. This was set against a strong intention in Cultural Studies at the time to represent working class, 'Black' and women's perspectives. The young people interviewed for this research are all resident in working class areas of Birmingham's inner city, they all define themselves as Pakistani or Kashmiri, half are women, half are men. However, the notion of subculture has not been associated with their experiences. Whilst young white and African Caribbean working class men's experiences were being examined using the paradigm of subculture, young British

Asians were being described in terms of being torn between two competing cultures. Angela McRobbie and others have criticised the work done at the time on subcultures for the invisibility or sexist stereotyping of girls (McRobbie 2000). Within the discourse of two conflicting cultures girls were believed to be particularly likely to have culture clash problems around expectations of their gender role and to rebel against Pakistani traditional patterns of gender segregation and arranged marriage. Subculture may be an appropriate notion to apply to British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people of the 2000s. They have a sense of identity different from that ascribed to them by school, work or family and are developing their own style, image, values and ideology beyond those taught to them by their teachers or their parents. They are cultural producers and also consumers of a particular brand of music, film and fashion marketed specifically at them.

Another central theme of youth research is transition, transition into adulthood and independence from the dependencies of childhood. Youth is simultaneously linked with transitions that society as a whole is going through.

We are living a period of redefinitions: of changing relationships between public and private, between local and global . . . young people experience this uncertain transition more intensely (McDonald 1999, p. 11)

It is this intensity of experience that makes young people's experiences both rich research ground and informative of wider social processes. Their narratives hold echoes of the era or *Zeitgeist* we are all living through in a particularly direct and intense expression. The powerful tensions confronting them concerning whether and how they will participate in community life hold a special critique of that collective life. As young people they see many issues acutely as if for the first time as they shed childish naiveties on their transition to adulthood. As their awareness heightens to issues affecting their lives, they have very sharp perceptions to offer. During this period of life they are struggling to make sense of their subjectivity and of their relationships with other people and with key institutions. They are not passive in this process but exercise agency and choice. In their struggles for identity and coherence there is a reflection of the struggles of all of us for a secure sense of selfhood and self worth. Just as youth are in transition, society is in transition. Models of youth developed in response to industrial society need to give way

to new models of youth in response to the post-industrial, globalised, information age that we have all been projected into.

Islamic ideas about youth are important for this study alongside traditional British sociological constructions of youth. There is a split between those who consider children to be pure and beautiful and others who consider them to be born sinful and in need of correction (Khan 1998). However, over-riding this, is a general acknowledgement that the Qur'an describes children as a blessing to be cherished, not only a responsibility. The idea of youth is not explicit but there are stages in life that could be thought of as the equivalent. First there is the suckling phase of dependency on a mother's milk. Mother's milk is considered the right of children up to at least the age of two. Even when women are sentenced to death under authorities claiming to be acting according to Shariah law, the sentence is not carried out until her children are weaned. Next there is a time of children being a parent's responsibility; parents are thought of as accountable for their children's behaviour not only to the community but accountable to God. A period of instruction and learning follows, preparing young people for full individual responsibility and accountability for their own actions. This is an important time of preparation to play a full role as a woman or man within the Ummah and to prepare to be future wives, husbands and parents. The wider Muslim community often gets involved in this period of education and instruction in reading the Qur'an in Arabic, and learning about the expectations of a Muslim lifestyle. Then there is greater accountability from puberty onwards to live according to Islam on each person's own choice and conscience. The idea of transition to adulthood however, is not accompanied by the idea of separation from parents in the same way that the Western notion is. Men may stay in the parental home life long whilst for women marriage marks leaving their parents and going to their in-laws. Obedience and respect for parents does not end, it is an expectation that carries on into adult life. The only proviso is that if parents ask their children to do something unIslamic, the children of whatever age may disobey. Even then they are expected to show kindness to their parents. So, the idea of transition to greater responsibility from childhood to adulthood is present in Islamic teaching. However, there is no equivalent to the idea of generation gap or generation unit. Although all people are feared to be rebellious and likely to sin, young people are not singled out as especially likely to

be troublemakers. They are regarded as their parent's responsibility to educate and to instruct in 'the right path' of Islam. The idea of separation is gender specific to women leaving their parent's family and going to her husband's family. Even after this move there is still intense communication and travel to and fro after marriage if she lives near enough.

INAS (F) My uncle like he's getting married so I want to go and see his wedding. Cause like my Nan's passed away and I want to go and see my grandfather because he's not well as well.

ZULFAQAR (M) My father should have emigrated to somewhere with a better climate. He was first generation from Mirpur (Kashmir side). He lived in a house where there were ten men—five on the day shift, five on the night shift. He never learned the language, never saw the need. Just stuck to his own. When you think about it that way there's been a big change him to me, them to us.

NADIM (M) Going there makes me closer to my Mum and Dad, I see them differently and understand them more, and they get happy with me for learning our life over there.

HAROON (M) As you get older you find out about different people in the family, things that have happened and that. You get wise to certain things that have happened and that. You can't really change your relations here or there so you just have to work round them or with them. You just see things in a different light sometimes as you get older, you understand things that when you were younger you never even thought about.

OMRAN (M) My parents get happy over there, more relaxed and I'm glad to go there to see them become more alive and more happy. When they get happy, it's good for all of us.

ARIF (M) My Dad pointed out to me that our generation over here no longer know all the connections between people, like who's related how to who and all that. There's one old man in our village in Pakistan who has carried on the tradition of knowing everyone's lineages, but unless someone takes that up after him we'll lose all our family histories at one go when he dies, none of all that is written down anywhere. It is a traditional role taken on by someone, but no one is stepping into his shoes. Our parents know more than us, but we really don't know. I never used to take any interest, it just all went by me. It was when I had my children that it was a turning point for me. Suddenly I felt a need to have something, some information that I was lacking, to pass on to them.

SALMA (F) There's a lot of old people over there and they still carry on old tradition. I like that but I won't be able to when it's my turn, I don't know about it all enough.

SALMA (F) I didn't used to speak to elderly people before. I never knew how or what to say. After my visit to Pakistan I was more outgoing with them. I knew what things I could say.

Visits to kin in Pakistan are visits to the homes or former homes of grandparents and of parents. The narratives about such visits have a lot of references to the awareness travelling to Pakistan and Kashmir gives young people of the older generations' migration experiences. Not only is Pakistani and Kashmiri village life part of young people's inheritance and heritage; so are the migration stories of their grand parents and parents, uncles and aunts. Some speak of a sense of loss, loss of knowledge of traditional practices. Others of gaining a new sense of understanding and respect for their parent's struggles, a new appreciation of the enormity of the experience of change involved in migrating to Britain from rural Pakistan and Kashmir. Suddenly in Pakistan they see their parents in a new light; their parents as experts about local custom and practice, their parents as happy gregarious people rather than as isolated hard working and often depressed.

Those young people who are parents cite becoming a parent as a turning point in their relationship with Pakistan, a point at which family history, roots and origins suddenly took on a new importance for them.

For some Pakistan and Kashmir are literally graveyards of their ancestors. One of the reasons for travelling there is to accompany the body of a parent or grandparent for burial, another is to attend a funeral, another is to visit the graves of deceased relatives. The soil of Pakistan takes on the significance of being the burial and 'final resting place' of older generations of the family. This gives a specific sense of connection with the soil, a poignant connection, though not joyful. Sometimes this is the main reason for travelling there.

The young people interviewed regard themselves as a new generation of British born Pakistanis and Kashmiris, no longer immigrants but children of that heritage. None of them used the term second generation although several spoke of their parents or grandparents as first generation. Several of them are married to cousins who are 'first generation' immigrants, however they do not use the term first generation for their partners. They call them 'mangetars' (bride-grooms) or brides. Their migration is treated as a different kind of

migration experience than ‘first generation’. They are the same generation but Pakistan or Kashmir born rather than British born, real Pakistanis or Kashmiris who have come to live with ‘valayati’ (British) ones.

Cousins as a trans-local peer group are referred to frequently within the narratives. They are a primary reason for travelling to Pakistan. They show hospitality, pass time with their British urban born cousins, and initiate them into biraderi and village practice, including participation in traditional life-cycle rituals. They accompany the stranger-cousins through weddings and funerals. Amongst cousins there are potential husbands and wives, and life-long peer relations. Cousins are the same generation but living in another space and what feels like another time. Marrying a cousin includes the experience of journeying with them across that space and time.

Differentiated generation units are interrupted by three factors: chain migration, age being dissociated from generation (e.g. having uncles who are younger than you), and cultural constructs of youth that emphasise continuity from childhood to adulthood rather than disjuncture.

Education: missing out

FAREED (M) I didn't go to school over there for almost a year. When I came back, I came into a different school year. Even so, we just were the same as the others. Now I am second cleverest in the class. I would like to live there but not go to school there. I wish I could live there and go to school here because my friends are here and I know my teachers and they are not too harsh like there. In Pakistan there are always power cuts and the computers don't work. All the facilities are better here for school.

PARVEEN (F) I only went for six months and I didn't want to come back but I had to because my education is important to me

HAROON The last time I went I didn't get much attention; everyone was rushing about at a messed up wedding. I missed a month of college and I would far rather have stayed here and got on with that.

NADIM I liked going back to school when we got back because of my friends, but I didn't like the teachers. They were miffed that I had missed school and they never helped me fit back in, they just told off my Mum for taking us in school time. When I came back I couldn't remember how to speak English, school didn't notice that. By writing, the English came back. It didn't matter that I missed school; I'm one of the youngest and one of the top in the class.

ANEESAH (F) I've never been to school in Pakistan except to visit the village school with my cousin sister. There was a big hole in the ground there. I wouldn't like to go to school there, I might get hit. I missed school here, then I just went back into the same class but I didn't have to catch up really. Everyone thought I could speak English but I couldn't understand very well to start with. After a while I understood again.

INAS (F) I don't know to be honest, I would prefer a husband from here but well I don't know it's just education-wise and that, 'cause over there, there are people with education but then it's hard for them to get a job over here and things like that. I would prefer here, but I mean it depends on the family.

All of the respondents have been through the British education system. British educational experiences are not all positive for Pakistani and Kashmiri young people. For some it has led to good employment prospects and to mobility through that employment. For others, it is a struggle which leads to unemployment or to low paid work. Not all of young women complete compulsory education; their parents have withdrawn some from secondary school. Others have done well and are now at university. Whether they have done well in the British education system or not, their years of education do set young people apart from their parents and from newly arrived immigrants who may have arrived as spouses. It also creates an extra difference between them and their cousins in Pakistan. Many families span a great spectrum of degrees of educational experiences and degrees of literacy.

Trips to Pakistan are treated by schools and colleges as disruptive and irresponsible detraction from education. The young people are regarded as being put at a competitive disadvantage by going 'abroad'. The journey and its negotiation with school and with parents leave young people with mixed messages to resolve about priorities and values.

In their stories about school and college, several of them wonder out loud what their life would have been like if they had been educated in Pakistan. They realise that schooling in Britain has been a powerful determining factor in their lives. Several of them recall difficulties in returning to school after a visit to Pakistan, not because of work to catch up but because so little interest was shown in where they had just been and what they had learned by going there. Their journeys are seen as holiday rather than being understood as integral to their life and personal development. Now that they are becoming young adults they are articulate critics of the exclusion experienced

by young people in schools. They are equally critical of traditional teaching methods used in Pakistan and in supplementary schooling done by minority ethnic community organisations in Britain. As they themselves are becoming parents they are active in reforming supplementary educational provision, and selective about where they send their children. For example they will not allow children to be hit, however lightly, or threatened with being hit.

Mixing: diverse friendships

SAMEERA (F) Here I live with a mixture of people definitely.

BILAAL (M) The funny thing is, because I've got mixed friends, I mean I've got Sikh Panjabi friends and I've got friends from other castes, like Afghans, so I pick up little bits and bobs of language from everyone and somehow I've made my own language.

BILAAL (M) I've got a mixed group of friends but I've got a close group of Muslim friends as well. I used to go to a school full of Pakistanis and I've got a lot of friends from there, plus other Muslim friends. The mixed group of friends I've got is through college. I tend to meet them at a distance from family. My mind has never gone 'Oh, you have to be a certain kind, this or that, to be friends with' though.

HAROON It's important to every human being to say they belong to a certain sect or a certain people. It gives a sense of security that our parents had and in a way we've got that less. You're not taught from home how to handle mixing with different cultures; you have to work it out yourself how to go about it. If you're taught from a young age 'stick with Pakistanis', 'stay with our people' then you might not pick up bad things, but you don't get a chance to pick up good things and maybe drop some bad Pakistani thoughts and habits. You can't say I've got a set identity, set identities clash, it's better to be your own person.

FARHANAH (F) I'm part of a women's network, I feel very, very much part of that. Mostly Asian women, a few white, nearly all Asian though, some Pakistani but some Indian or African Asian too.

ARIF (M) My cousin makes me laugh. One minute he's getting into trouble for going out clubbing and that. The next minute, he's laying it on thick about being a Sayed (descendant of the Prophet) going around Sayed this and that, acting the part, he's a designer Sayed yeah that's what he is, hah! I'm going to blaze him about that next time I see him.

Not only can the young people here follow tradition, they can develop new interpretations of tradition, new fashions and forms of socialising that arise out of the diaspora space. They speak hybrid street dialect, text message each other in a language derived from English, patois and Punjabi, and buy clothes inspired by the concept of 'East meets West'. Much of the idea of hybridity that is theorised is based on analysis of products: film, music, lyrics and art (Gilroy 1993, Hall 1992). Apache Indian, a British born Sikh Punjabi DJ and rap artist is an obvious example of this. Very few young people are producers of such fusion products. However, many of the respondents are consumers and appreciators of syncretic arts and imagery (Gabriel 1994). They enjoy 'Asian' satellite television stations, listen to Patel rap and Bhangra Beat music and watch Bollywood movies. There is a whole 'Asian' cinema and entertainment complex called Star City in Birmingham frequented by 'Asian' young people. They are consumers of hybrid goods and entertainment, and producers of hybrid cultural forms of dress, language and communication. More importantly, they are producers of changing values.

The young people interviewed think of themselves in terms of hyphenated identities (Caglar 1997). They do so quite comfortably; to them it is utterly natural to combine a list of descriptive terms to signify who they are. Although they do not use the term diaspora, they do clearly think of themselves as Muslim British Pakistanis or Kashmiris. They consider themselves part of a dispersed ethnic group that continues to relate to a particular, real, geographical region of origin. In the case of Kashmir this is currently disputed territory. Although they think of themselves as Pakistani or Kashmiri, they also think of Pakistanis and Kashmiris who live in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir as 'other'. They are conversant with the idea of *desi*, meaning authentic or original to the home country; and *valayati* meaning those that come from abroad, particularly Britain. They realise that they are *valayati*. They are also aware of stereotypes operating about *desi* and *valayati* people. All of the respondents are bilingual but acknowledge that they are not completely fluent and literate in mother tongue. Several of them express an ambition to learn to write Urdu. Several of them contrast the way they speak with the speed and colloquial detail with which their relatives speak.

The entire sample has mixed friendship groups, by which they mean mixed in terms of ethnicity. They have friends of different

religions and cultures and languages. They also have a specifically Asian friendship circle and a specific friendship group who are Muslim and same gender. Whilst several of them use phrases like 'with multicultural living you could lose yourself if you are not careful', they show little sign of being lost or confused, they have taken care to be clear who they are. This often means living with complexity and making daily decisions about whom to identify with and whom to dissociate themselves from. They display considerable personal agency, and ability to adapt to a wide range of contrasting situations. DeCerteau (1988) suggests that it is important to look at people not only as docile subjects but also as strategists, actively finding ways round and through forms of power. Growing up in multicultural Britain, these young people are aware of alternatives to the way of life of their parents. They have been educated in Britain. However, they are also aware of constraints. In their own way *izzat* and 'what other people think' matter to them. They retain a group affiliation and a strong sense of emotional belonging to an ethnic group. They are less willing to adhere to *biraderi* politics and ideas, but they do worry about the reactions of close relatives and neighbours. They are also aware that they face barriers of racism and social exclusion, which make some options very difficult to attain. Some of them have taken risks such as leaving home in order to disobey their parents' wishes with regard to continuing their education or choosing their own marriage partner. Others exercise personal agency in a less overt way (Hennink 1999). Often cousins support one another in arranging illicit meetings with friends or trips to places of entertainment without parental consent.

Zulfaqaar said: *"I couldn't hack Pakistan for longer than 3 weeks. I visited the village but couldn't stay there with nothing happening for days on end. Mirpur is developing. It's more lively. But even then . . ."* An important topic in the discourse of the young people is enjoyment, going out and entertainment such as film, music and television. They have new and different expectations of leisure time pursuits than their contemporaries in Pakistan or their parents. They are busy carving out "fun spaces" for themselves (Werbner 1996). The British young people's relative wealth means that they are able to be consumers in a way that their parents and contemporaries never have been.

Human Rights

Their experience of 'othering' has made these thirty young people aware of injustice and of particular human rights issues. They are part of communities that discuss violations of human rights. They are exposed to the media's version of news, and form their own opinions from the perspective of British Muslim "others". Racism is a daily reality to these young people that they want to change. Institutional racism is obvious to them and they do not want to have to tolerate it. They are also concerned that change should be brought about to tackle such problems as forced marriages, sexism and abuse, poverty, begging, drug abuse and violent crime. They show support for rights of Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and the Balkans. Some are more actively politically involved than others to represent their views and to work for change, but the agenda amongst them is quite shared. Although it should not be suggested that a group of thirty young people have one political viewpoint, there is considerable agreement amongst this group about certain key issues.

Many of those interviewed have witnessed atrocities and several have been victims of violence and abuse themselves either from close family aggressors in private, or from racist and fascist aggressors in the public realm. Several human rights issues demanding action have been brought out in the young people's stories. This research highlights some particular issues that need responses. It also demonstrates that there is commitment amongst some of the respondents to act on the issues themselves.

The idea of adolescence as a specific period of storm and stress (Hall 1904) is popular in Britain and is behind discourses regarding all youth and 'second generation' youth in particular. The young people who took part in this research are heterogeneous in relation to this. Whilst some report a very turbulent period of conflict and distress, others do not sound as though they are struggling with irreconcilable difficulties of identity formation at all. They sound adjusted to their environment, content and accepting of their lot in life. Being transnational may give more cause for second individuation (Blos 1962) than being part of a national majority would. One of the young men described his relationship with his family as 'disputed territory'. Visiting Pakistan or Kashmir provides a particular opportunity to reflect on where they stand on a range of family, cultural,

political and religious issues and to choose to make up their mind whether to adhere to tradition or to change. Concerning individuation (Blos 1962) these translocal young people have a particularly obvious challenge to make up their own mind about a range of otherwise taken for granted cultural practices and therefore a greater likelihood of second individuation. This means acts of clarification of where they depart from parents' views and where they agree/internalise and take on parents' views. This does not equate with 'leaving'. It is a misunderstanding to equate individuation with decisions to leave the parental home and become 'independent'.

Developing independence from the family, ending compulsory schooling, making vocational choices and coming to terms with sexuality . . . issues of identity, autonomy and relationships with peers, with parents and with authority figures is another process. These young people do not operate on the assumption that they should be developing independence from the family. Many end compulsory schooling with limited qualifications and are faced with limited vocational choices. Coming to terms with sexuality has to be negotiated with family, community and religious value systems constantly in the equation. Choices are made between compliance, secrecy and overt transgression. Arranged marriages is a particular theme within the young people's narratives that brings out attitudes towards being a part of an interdependent collective and complying with its 'rules', or developing independence.

CHAPTER TEN

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL SHIFT

Language: our language

INAS (F) I can speak our language but now and then you do get stuck. They know we're from abroad.

SALMA (F) I'm fluent in our language so I didn't have any problem that way. Sometimes there was one or two words I didn't understand and I'd ask them to explain. I mix English words in with our language quite a lot. I had to be careful because there were people who didn't understand the English words and they felt left out, so I had to use an Asian word instead.

FARHANAH (F) I speak Patwari/Mirpuri and Urdu fully because my Mum and Dad have never spoken English with me

NABILA (F) Even though my Mum taught me to speak it's different over there. I've had to improve my language skills. Our dialect is sweet.

FAREED (M) When I came back my cousin was trying to teach me English again, I wouldn't speak English to anyone, after six months I was out of the habit of it.

PARVEEN (F) You do seem a bit alien because of language.

The narratives of the young people take bilingualism to be the norm and by this they mean being bilingual by competence, attitude, and function and in some cases origin (Skutnabb-Kangas 1984). Very few learned English from one native-speaker parent and another language from the other native-speaker parent. Some have learned at least two spoken languages in the family from the beginning from bilingual parents, others learned a mother tongue in the family first and later learned English at school. Many learned at least two languages in their extended family from a mixture of bilingual relatives and mother-tongue speaker relatives. For example one of the young women learned Patwari from conversations between her grandmother and parents in the home and English from conversations with her older brother and between her older brother and her parents. When she started school her English was reinforced and extended both formally and informally. She became literate in English. Through

supplementary education she became semi-literate in Urdu and Qur'anic Arabic.

In terms of bilingualism as functional, they are proficient at switching from one language to another according to whom they are speaking to and in what context. Equally they are good at mixing language, crossing languages and hybridising language. In so doing they can find shared meanings and symbols in diaspora space, they can also enjoy playing with language to entertain themselves and to foster social relationships between them that acknowledge different influences on their lives simultaneously.

Several of the young people questioned their own competence in their mother tongue. None could write fluently but most speak mother tongues that nobody writes anyway. Many of them had learned a limited amount of written Urdu, the official state language of Pakistan. Several of the narrators express a fear that their mother tongue will not be passed on to their children. Since they associate language with culture, they are worried that loss of language competence will also mean loss of cultural practices, cultural heritage and pride. They are concerned about language shift or drift and rapid extinction. Visits to Pakistan show up some language shift amongst British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people. They are not fully fluent in vernacular mother-tongue village conversations when they first travel to Pakistan or Kashmir. However, the visit itself for many of them improves their competence and younger travellers who stay for several months have adjusted so much to mother-tongue that they experience a loss of English, Nadim described it like *'having a switch in your brain that has three settings, fully English, Panjabi or both'*. He said that after two months in Pakistan his brain had switched to fully Punjabi and he had difficulty switching it back, first to 'both' when he arrived back in family circles, and then to 'fully English' for school.

Chain migration means that there are new migrants arriving from Pakistan and Kashmir with limited English and native-speaker fluency imported direct from rural Pakistan or Kashmir. In order to communicate with new arrivals British born Pakistanis and Kashmiris need to use their mother tongue. This is of particular significance when the new arrival is the young person's wife or husband because it affects which language is used in the household and provides a means by which the couple's children can learn their mother-tongue from a native-speaker parent rather than a bilingual one.

Bilingualism and culture

According to Skutnabb-Kang (1984), there are four types of bilinguals. Elite bilinguals are those who have chosen bilingualism and who progress themselves through their linguistic abilities, such as diplomats and journalists. Children from linguistic majorities often learn another language as part of their education. These first two types do not really affect this study significantly. For the most part British Pakistanis are either 'children from linguistic minorities' or 'children from bilingual families'. The majority of the young people who took part in this study have a Pakistani or Kashmiri mother-tongue learned in the home and within neighbourhood, religious and community contexts; through going to school in Britain, they are also very competent in conversing in English. Some do struggle with English as a formal school subject but fluency in local English colloquial speech is no problem, it is second nature. Some of the young people interviewed live in households where everyone is bilingual and there is no clear distinction between the language of home and the language of education and work, two languages are used at home. All are part of families where most family members are bilingual. Elders in the family are the most likely to use mother tongue most of the time and may struggle to use English. Chain migration means that newly arrived Pakistani migrants to Britain may also have limited use of English or no English at all. Increasingly there are households of young couples one of whom is more competent in English, the other is more competent in a Pakistani or Kashmiri language because one grew up and was educated in Britain, the other in Pakistan or Kashmir. All the young people having parents who belong to a linguistic minority are strongly influenced socially to learn and maintain the language of their parents as well as being under pressure at school, college and work to learn English, as the language of the majority, and the official language of the state (Hoffman 1991). The transcribed interviews include discussion about feared consequences of not maintaining their parents language, such as damage to the ability to participate in social relationships with members of the family and of the wider minority group, and culture shift, rootlessness and alienation confirming Skutnabb-Kang's (1984) findings about children from linguistic minorities. Skutnabb-Kang (1984) also suggests that in the case of children whose parents have different mother tongues, emotional relationships between the child and parents may

suffer if bilingualism does not develop. This will be a challenge faced as some of the young people included in this study bring up their children, especially those who are British born and have married a partner from Pakistan or Kashmir.

A bilingual's linguistic competence is not the sum of two separate parts, one code and the other, any more than their cultural competence is. Bilingualism is a composite ability too and code switching and mixing are very complex and elaborate. Switching from one language to another and choosing appropriate language for the context is complicated, but this is a competence that the young people display at an impressive level of sophistication. They are also very skilled at mixing two or more languages for instance using Panjabi containing English items or English containing Panjabi items. They explained this to me during the interviews but they also displayed it during our whole interactions. Interruptions of the interview for them to speak on their mobile phones were particularly rich examples of this. However, they lack the ability to distinguish between varieties of Panjabi in use in the speech community of their parents and of kin in Pakistan. Different language is used in different domains such as family, friendship, religion, employment, business and education. There are a variety of expectations about the degree of formality or informality, colloquialism or official language use that is appropriate in different situations. Several of the young people had tales to tell of how embarrassing or funny it was when they got the code wrong for the context, and of how this put them off from speaking in certain situations because it is uncomfortable to be the butt of a joke, especially when you don't understand it.

A classic pattern that is assumed in public discourse about bilingualism is that a community goes from being monolingual to being bilingual as a stage on the way to the extinction of its original language (Romaine 1989). Several of the transcripts of interviews for this study include committed statements about maintaining Pakistani or Kashmiri language use and competency and passing on language as a legacy to children, a legacy of heritage, of skill, of the opportunity to communicate with the extended family and community in Britain and in Pakistan and Kashmir. The idea of language shift is associated with generation. The assumption is that transmission of language from one generation to the next is a risky process and is often imperfect and is a significant factor in language shift, even language death.

It is true for all minorities that language maintenance is by no means guaranteed, but there are many forms of (language) life before (language) death (Hoffman 1991, p. 239)

Whilst language maintenance is a concern of young British Pakistanis, they do not worry about language death. Being part of a diaspora, the mother language is safely being preserved and maintained for them by their cousins in Pakistan or Kashmir. They are more concerned with loss of their parents' languages as daily community language practice in Britain, and concerned with language shift creating a rift between members of the extended family here and there.

Conscious efforts are being made to protect Pakistani languages in Britain by the young people's parents but also by them. Language classes are popular and in fact visits to Pakistan to family are partly an aspect of the strategy to preserve both language and cultural competence and to keep the extended family together linguistically. The young people welcome the fact that their language skills improved significantly by visiting Pakistan, even though they felt self-conscious and awkward about their language difference when they first arrived. There is language shift amongst young British Pakistanis towards increased use of English but this is counteracted by chain migration and by continued family and community use of Pakistani and Kashmiri languages. One difficulty for any young person who feels less proficient than they would like to be in their parents' language is that the official written language in Pakistan, Urdu, has a totally different script and construction than English, but it also differs from most family's spoken dialect significantly. None of the young people in this study have high-level skills in Urdu literacy, though many have basic skills. Language is a powerful means of expressing separateness (Hoffman 1991).

The key factors in language shift and maintenance for British Pakistanis and Kashmiris match those identified more generally by Romaine (Romaine 1989): numerical strength, social class, religious and educational background, settlement patterns, ties with the homeland, extent of exogamous marriages, attitudes of majority and minority, government policy and patterns of language use. All of the young people interviewed for this project live in neighbourhoods where there is strength of numbers locally for their community, they live in distinctly Pakistani areas of Birmingham and went to schools with a high proportion of British Pakistani pupils. Although the official language of Birmingham and of schools is English, there are plenty

of opportunities to use Panjabi or Mirpuri informally and socially. However, this numerical strength is very localised and there are not enough British Pakistanis to get their languages taken seriously by local government let alone central government. When the majority of the community had difficulty with spoken and written English the local authority made some efforts to communicate, translating information and employing link workers and interpreters. Increasingly it is assumed that there is less need for these services when the majority of the community is bilingual. Translating resources are being reallocated to other minority language groups (more recent migrants). The purpose of these efforts was never language maintenance, but temporary bridging of a 'language barrier', the shift towards English use removing the barrier. Attitudes of the majority English language community that English is enough to communicate anywhere in the world, and no minority languages are needed are received by the minority community as racist arrogance. Resistance to this arrogance encourages active language maintenance.

Ties with Pakistan and Kashmir help to maintain the language use of young people by affording practice of language immersion and putting pressure on them to overcome shyness and speak to relatives, either on the phone or in person. Guests and newly arrived migrants also present this requirement to keep using the language. Endogamous marriage is still the norm in the local British Pakistani community and it is still common to marry cousins from Pakistan who then come to Britain to join their spouse. New immigration and the possibility of continued home use of Pakistani and Kashmiri languages helps to renew such languages in the neighbourhood. Also when several members of a family are newer immigrants they inject their proficiency in their mother tongue into every conversation. This is extended as a pattern into wider social settings. Social class and educational background have a bearing on the competence in English of newer migrants; English is used in educated circles of people in Pakistan and Kashmir alongside Urdu. More powerful social classes in Pakistan and Kashmir would be more likely to use Urdu and English regularly in official and society settings there. Less educated villagers would be more likely to be monolingual in a local mother-tongue language. Most of the young people in this study have kinship groups that are predominantly the latter, with a few educated city-folk exceptions within the kinship network.

Even though bilingualism sounds like too binary an idea to match

the complexity and possible range of language use involved, definitions that acknowledge this diversity do have currency for describing British Pakistani/Kashmiris' language practices. The idea of biculturalism is less useful and it would be a real error to assume that bilingualism means biculturalism as one of the young people explained to me:

BILAL (M) I'm bilingual yeh, but no you couldn't say I'm bicultural. I've got one culture (British Pakistani) but two languages. I'm better at English than Panjabi but I'm not culturally English, not at all

The idea that he is not culturally English at all could be challenged academically on grounds that he is unaware of the effects of hegemony upon him. However, the point is that whilst he happily embraces the idea of being bilingual, he does not identify with the idea of being bicultural, it sounds too binary to him to fit his experiences and his sense of identity.

English being an international language, it is access to a range of different cultures. In inner city Birmingham neighbourhoods English is used as a common language in a multilingual situation. The young people interviewed mix with a diversity of non-Pakistani young people, many of whom are also bilingual, and use English as their medium. They also play with crossing languages introducing words from various languages into their day-to-day social use of language. They are good at differentiating vernacular forms of English associated with different national or cultural identities that they are in contact with or that they see on television. However, they feel that English culture is alien to them and to most of their friends. Their attitude to dealing with institutional culture such as school curriculum, is that that is dealing with British national culture and they regard themselves as British. This does not mean they see themselves as bicultural but as Pakistanis in a multicultural state.

Cultural practices of the home for British Pakistani young people are British Pakistani and Pakistani. Cross-cultural negotiation happens between these distinct cultural fields. Language use in homes is negotiated between mother-tongue only speakers and bilinguals. Even visits to Pakistan mean a family context that is a mix of bilingual and mother-tongue language practices. There British Pakistanis attempt to use Pakistani cultural practices most of the time but they cannot keep it up twenty-four hours per day, they take respite in English language conversations and eating chips and imported baked

beans! Fear that loss of mother tongue competence would mean loss of cultural practice competence was expressed in the interviews mostly in terms of the young people's parenting of their own children. They expressed a desire that their children should become bilingual and culturally competent in Britain and in Pakistani diaspora society.

These young people display great contingency in their language and cultural practices. All experience conflict and tension but not in the sense of falling down a ravine between two separate lifeworlds. It is a more complex tension than that, just as language use is dynamic rather than binary. Other members of the family place duties on bilingual young people to act as an interpreter and as an interface with English-speaking institutions like hospitals and social services. This can be quite demanding in terms of time and stress. When a young bilingual person marries someone with limited English use, they are again faced with duties of dealing with institutions such as immigration authorities, banks, landlords and local authority departments. When the bilingual is a woman this role is at odds with the traditional gender roles of men and women but need over-rides convention. Competence bilingually is a mixed blessing, it brings its own stresses with it. Sometimes elders or partners mistrust bilinguals because they can have conversations and correspondence that are inaccessible to those with more limited English proficiency. There may be good reason to mistrust young people's use of English for secrets with each other, but for the most part the mistrust is unwarranted and the contents of the conversations mundane.

Bilinguality directly affects relationships between bilingual family members and other family members. It also affects relationships between monolingual and bilingual generations; being bilingual is a significant feature for the young people interviewed of being part of the younger, British-born generation. Inter-ethnic relations in British inner city wards are conducted in English language. Being bilingual gives young people access to inter-ethnic communication and mixed friendships. It also sets them up as interpreters and, in some cases, spokespersons and representatives of their 'ethnic' group (or at least their language group). In turn being bilingual affects the individual's sense of identity and belonging. It affects their integration in British society. The migrant grandparents and parents of British Pakistanis were treated badly by organisations and by racist members of the public on the basis that they 'couldn't even speak English'. Immigra-

tion authorities have often debated the setting of an English proficiency test for people wishing to become British citizens, though no conclusion has yet been reached. Since British born Pakistani and Kashmiri children started school their mother tongue has often been suggested as a reason for poor academic results in local primary school performance in league tables. It is beyond the scope of this research to discuss whether or not this was true. It is bound to influence people's sense of belonging and integration if their mother tongue is treated as secondary, even problematic, in school at an early age.

One of the main challenges facing these young people is bridging the collectivist home culture with the demands of U.K. culture in educational, consumption and employment settings. Although this is a constant tension, they are pragmatists with plenty of subtle coping strategies for, as far as possible, getting the best of both worlds. However, it is a significant factor in explaining social and economic exclusion of British Asian youth. This happens in two ways. The first is the investment of energy required to achieve this bridging; it is an activity in itself competing with other demands on young people's time, energy and mental attention. The second is that institutions rarely fully accept or understand the wish of British Asian young people to retain attachment and allegiance to their non-British heritage and diaspora community involvement. These young people say that professionals frequently do not understand or value their reality and alienate them by responding to them as caricatures rather than individuals.

Shifting future perspectives

Cognitive shift is a term used by Sunier (1998) to describe "the typical rupture in future perspectives between migrants and post-migrants". Young post-migrant people have a completely different position in European societies from that of their parents, which leads to different orientations and motives and points of reference. Sunier (1998) writes, of young Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands, that:

Returning to the country of origin is not a viable option for them anymore. Their future is situated in the Netherlands and not in Turkey, not only practically but increasingly also mentally (Sunier 1998, p. 52)

He suggests that the myth of return functioned for migrants as a psychological survival mechanism that is not available to post-migrants. Rather than dreaming of escape from real or perceived exclusion, stigmatisation and discrimination, young people have to face them without an imaginary way out. Sunier claims that this change of perspective and participation in Dutch society influences the meaning that young Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands attach to Islam. Many “embrace Islam on new terms” (Sunier 1998, p. 53), taking Islam as a matter of individual choice and conviction rather than a community of religious tradition.

Within this research, some of the British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people’s narratives included clear demonstrations of a cognitive shift, for instance:

FARHANAH (F) Move to Pakistan to live—God forbid!

ZULFAQAAR (M) I couldn’t hack Pakistan for longer than three weeks

HAROON (M) I want a marriage of my own choice. She has to be a Muslim or to convert, but she doesn’t have to be Pakistani.

ZAKIYYAH (F) If my children want to go there I’ll take them but I’ll never force a Pakistani identity on them.

TANWEER (M) I don’t feel like it’s my place, it’s better over here where I know everyone . . . to live in the village in Pakistan . . . the idea of that would just freak me out.

Others are closer to the sentiments expected of migrants than to those expected of post-migrants

FAREED (M) I’m planning to stay there for the rest of my life.

NABILA (F) I want to keep up Pakistani culture, feel like I’m back in my own country over there and feel proud of the cultural background. I feel Pakistani because of family. I fitted in and felt normal over there. I’d like to live in Pakistan all of the time.

PARVEEN (F) Our dress and traditions make me happy

AHMAD (M) There life is predictable, here there is great uncertainty. It’s good for me that I know that way of life rather than losing myself in multi-cultural Britain.

Even some of the negative opinions of Pakistan are typically in line with migrant attitudes rather than post-migrant:

SALMA (F) What I hate about Pakistan is corruption, small-mindedness, having to stay home and lack of options . . . then again Pakistanis there hate those things too, so that makes me a typical Pakistani!

Some young people's cognitive shift is laced with ambivalence. They are reluctant to acknowledge Britain as home when they feel that it is a struggle to live in such a racist environment and that life here is very stressful. They see their future as being within Britain; in fact the majority of them see their future as being within the neighbourhoods and certainly within the city that they have grown up in. Some young women are more open to the idea of moving to another city when they marry, in true Pakistani/Kashmiri patrilocal style. However, Pakistan/Kashmir is a constant ingredient in their identity and subtext of their lives. Their narratives show some awareness of ways in which their cultural identity is forming and developing rather than staying static and some desire to be proactive in becoming balanced British Pakistani and Kashmiri people. However, they also spend much of their time just 'being', in an unconscious way. Being Muslim is significant as a marker of identification and belonging, a personal identity tag. This does not mean embracing Islam on new terms. Whilst some are consciously doing so, others take for granted the identity tag as a birthright.

CONCLUSION

Narrative study of lives was chosen as the method of data collection of the study because it was closely in line with the epistemological and ontological standpoint of the researcher. The study was discursive and its analysis used the Freirean method of thematic interpretation. Every attempt was made to be reflexive about the whole research process and a number of ethical considerations shaped the way the interviews were conducted, interpreted and presented. The metaphor of a journey is central to my book about thirty young people's relationships to space and to groups of people. The narrative study of the lives of young British-born Pakistani or Kashmiri people explored in particular their experiences of visiting kin in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir.

The experiences described by these young people centre on relationships. Their relationships to space and to groups of people: the family and communities. Their relationship with their absent village (when they are in Britain imagining the village in Pakistan or Kashmir) is complex and emotive. It throws up a host of possible emotional responses. They can fantasise about the ideal homeland village being loving, caring, safe, rooted, understanding and inspirational. On the other hand they can really resent the occasional, real encounters they have with the absent village for its failure to support, recognise, help and love them; and can feel let down and deeply disappointed at its fallibility even corruption. If the absent village experience includes exploitation and abuse, this is a painful reversal of the idealised homeland and a betrayal of ancestral connection.

Equally their relationship with a particular British neighbourhood is complex. Their adoptive city may claim to have a desire to integrate them and make them fully at home. However, they mention that they always feel different, never quite belong, look different and come from a different genetic and religious line. Within the adoptive city one way of feeling safer and more closely related to others is to stick to certain familiar neighbourhoods that are marked by association with the absent village in the ancestral homeland and inhabited mainly by other adoptees. Another way is to search for the absent 'birth' village, whilst another way is to reject the absent

village and to struggle to fit in as fully as possible in the adoptive city; this may mean distancing oneself from not only the absent village but also its representative: the familiar neighbourhood.

The relationships to space expressed in the transcripts can be characterised as young people operating in a number of arenas; exclusive defined areas with circles of people living within them. Examples of these arenas that frequently are identified in this research project are the home and its household, the walking distance network of extended family homes both in the village and in the neighbourhood and the biraderi, the mosque and the Ummah, the neighbourhood and neighbours within it, the school or college or workplace and peer groups within them. Whilst aware of the boundaries of these different arenas these young people are adept at several ways of maintaining relationships with all of them simultaneously. Sometimes they deliberately separate them, sometimes they juggle competing affiliations and commitments to each and sometimes they cross or challenge the boundaries. This includes the arenas of the absent village, the familiar neighbourhood and the adoptive city. The young people's abilities and habits of managing the complexity of relating to several arenas at once in their lives lead me to suggest the idea that they could be described as 'transarena'. Translocal is useful in analysing their affiliations and political identity to some extent, as argued above. Transarena gives greater emphasis to the multiple identifications with places and people that are complexly interwoven in their lives. At times this may be experienced as fractured identity but much of the time it is being managed in such a well practiced fashion that to the young person it is experienced as "normal".

On the face of it, it would seem to be a major advantage to be transarena and to be able to operate proficiently in a number of different contexts. How can this square with the disadvantage, exclusion and segregation of Pakistani and Kashmiri young people reported in publications such as the Cattle report? Being transarena takes energy, it is a constant juggling act, part of the explanation for segregation comes from the desire for a safe 'homespace' (hooks 1990) to return and retreat to after venturing out for work or consumption or recreation. The familiar village requires less juggling and less arena negotiation energy than other sites do. Facing racism, being misunderstood, being stereotyped, and feeling misrepresented are all alienating experiences. Institutional discourses in Britain about British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people do not help to reduce this

alienation; in fact they appear to exacerbate the situation. If institutions such as schools, colleges, youth services, social services, health services, housing services and the police had a closer understanding of the transarena nature of these young people's lives and understood their associated potential in terms of being reflective and developmental, bringing a fresh perspective, experiences could change for the better for all concerned. The adoptive city could move from the expectation that young people need to adapt and assimilate to the expectation that young people are producers, not merely consumers and that they could potentially transform the future rather than reproducing the flawed present relationships between communities and institutions.

However much we are a patchwork, a crazy paving, a mosaic of intricate form, pattern and colour, however much a filigree of glories and abject failures, false starts and wrong departures, a composite is a whole. We are the *ummah*: the international community of Muslims; the composite of belonging from which one cannot resign. (Sardar 2004, p. 183)

Whilst Sardar is writing about the *ummah*, this conclusion is about each young British Pakistani or Kashmiri person being a 'composite whole'. The book began with an interest in young bi-local citizens with dual nationality. The actual and metaphorical journeys at the heart of the research led away from binary notions of 'bi' and 'dual'; Dar al Islam and Dar al Harb, the 'clash of civilisations' and even hybridity or borders; towards more recognition of the complexity of translocal diaspora living. I contend that binary portrayal conceals subtlety, range of perspectives and complexity of loyalties. The young people's lives that are focused on here are lived as Muslims in the West. Their very existence challenges neat categorisation of people. Furthermore making assumptions about their allegiances is dangerous because it leads to them being labelled as enemies within 'the West'. This demonises them and can lead to violations of their civil liberty, as well as to civil disturbances and even violence and human rights abuses. There is evidence here that a 'between two cultures' discourse is over simplified and does not do justice to the ways in which young people are active in negotiating their identity and their place in British society. Rather than seeking global patterns the book seeks local personal experiences and in doing so reveals the complexity and contingency with which thirty young people journey through their lives as British Pakistani/Kashmiris.

The themes most prominent in the narratives of the young people about their trips to Pakistan and Kashmir have been highlighted. These are about alliances and allegiances, social control and resistance to it, self-identity choices and experiences of being labelled by others.

Whilst some of the young people interviewed feel totally estranged from the 'homeland' in their estrangement from their extended family and kinship group, others feel able to relate to Pakistan and Kashmir on new and less restrictive terms. It is clear from the narratives that young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people recognise their extended family system as differentiating them culturally from the dominant way of life in Britain of nuclear and often fractured families. On the whole they value the extended family and take pride in this different cultural practice, but they are not uncritical. Extended families can be loving, supportive, provide a strong sense of belonging and life commitment. Give and take (*lena-dena*) is expected of any one to be considered fully part of the family and kinship group. For some young people they feel that they give a lot and the benefits they get in return are not worth the level of social control that they are expected to comply with. There is a constant tension between the sense of belonging, of being part of a large family, and loss of individuality and freedom of choice. Whenever they need practical help they find people from their family to help out, in return they can be called upon. However, if they want to go somewhere there is pressure to take a large group of relatives along, or not to go at all.

The concept of diaspora has been a useful tool throughout this research project. It set the general context for the research and emphasised relevant features of the lives of people whose ancestry has a different geographical attachment than their present place of residence. Paul Gilroy's idea of the diaspora as a 'changing same' (Gilroy 1993) is of particular pertinence. The young people's narratives emphasise their relationships to territory, and to groups and communities of people. Translocality and transnationality have also been shown to be useful terms for exploring these young people's experiences. They link themselves with both translocal and transnational political identities.

The complexity of their stories and the aptitude of the young people to express complex relationships to territories, nations, their faith and to groups and communities of people, including biraderi, is a

challenge to binary models of explanation of young people's lives. Their transarena lives are a challenge to the essentialist notions of ethnic minority and to multiculturalism used by British social policy makers and institutions. From their standpoint multiculturalism can be seen as a hegemonic discourse reinforcing existing power relationships of gender and age. There seems to be some truth in the idea that it is a struggle to be a British Pakistani or Kashmiri young person, but an under-acknowledgement of the reflexive opportunity of being transarena; and a misrepresentation and oversimplification of the causes of exclusion and segregation.

Storm and stress is a feature of their narratives. Living in the capitalist West includes these young people into the experiences of second individuation (Blos 1962); it seems to be a feature of their lives too; though it may take culturally specific forms. Developing independence from the family is not necessarily an act of leaving the family home; there are other ways of becoming more independent in acting and thinking. Ending compulsory schooling, making vocational choices and coming to terms with sexuality, dealing with issues of identity, autonomy and relationships with peers, with parents and with authority figures, each of these takes on a specific cultural/sub-cultural form (it would seem from the narratives). Differentiated generation units are disrupted by chain migration and extended family patterns.

Consumer choices are part of conscious construction of identities both new and traditional and are an outward expression of 'identific space' (Hintzen 1999).

As Stuart Hall (Hall 1990) has observed, cultural identity is about becoming as well as being . . . the being and the becoming are both part of the pattern of attachments and behaviours associated with journeys to and from kin in Pakistan and Kashmir. Traditional descent and kinship patterns are also part of the 'changing same' (Gilroy 1993). These young people have not broken with the family or the village, but for much of their lives the kinship group that they know best is British Pakistani or Kashmiri rather than the inhabitants of the absent village. Being British Pakistani or Kashmiri is like being part of a new tribe derived from the original one but relocated and reformed anew.

Although most of these young people are part of 'active biraderi', they are redefining *lena-dena* and arranged marriages. New cultural practices are emerging. *Zat/seypi* system awareness is declining within

the new tribe but it has not vanished fully. There are still frequent references made to being from a particular biraderi that is in turn specific about its *zat* (caste).

Just as the young people have very distinct demarcation of territories in their minds and lives they have very defined notions of insiders and outsiders, ('in' ethnic group and 'out' ethnic group.) This does not mean however, that those boundaries are not for crossing. On the contrary they are constantly exploring the borders and experimenting with boundary crossings in terms of language, fashion, relationships and belief systems. Their narratives reveal complex identifications and constant negotiating of social boundaries. Whilst *qaum* is not a term used in their narratives, the idea of 'our people', or 'us lot' arises frequently and a keen loyalty is expressed to other British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people from the same familiar neighbourhood and from the same absent villages, this is in a sense their new tribe. "Iconographic and cartographic vernaculars" (Hesse 1993, p. 177) and "nationalism of the neighbourhood" (Back 1996) are both ideas from the literature that resonate well with the young people's own accounts of how they relate to territory. Three relationships between the young people and territory have been named above as the absent village, the familiar neighbourhood, and the adoptive city. Beyond these is the feared but tantalising unknown. Their identifications have centred on 'being Muslim', 'being British Pakistani or Kashmiri', 'being from a particular biraderi', living in a particular familiar neighbourhood and being connected with a particular absent village. Age and gender are also powerful identity markers affecting decisions and opportunities, life chances and experiences.

These young people's sense of home is not static. Home is for them a combination of reality and fantasy, of the familiar neighbourhood, and the absent village; sometimes even the adoptive city and its adoptive institutions. Depending on the situation home can be any of these; they are contingent about it. Safe 'homespace' is most commonly identified as a family home within a familiar neighbourhood, and often comes down to their own particular room either alone or with carefully selected company. However, for some young people their stories reveal that home is the least safe place for them and is in fact a site of oppression, even abuse.

Assimilated is not a term that can adequately capture the life-world of these young people. All of their story telling and descrip-

tions of their lifeworlds suggests that they are 'translated' (Hall 1992a), more often simultaneously translating between arenas. The illusion of return has only vanished in terms of permanently migrating; regular returns for visits, sometimes lengthy ones, are still on the agenda. The familiar neighbourhood is significant for identification and a sense of a safe homespace from which to resist racist and islamophobic oppression. The familiar neighbourhood does not necessarily mean a continuation of being 'nurtured over generations in a besieged conservatism' (Modood). Resistance and conservatism are not the same just as homespace (hooks) is not the same as a deliberately separatist agenda. The absent village is a constant subtext of life in the familiar neighbourhood but so is the adoptive city. A new tribe is emerging and culture is 'becoming as well as being' (Hall 1990) at a creative border crossing.

These narratives challenge existing discourses about British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people. Rather than implying that the young people have fallen between two cultures and that their lives constitute a problem, this research describes them as transarena. These transarena young people live in Dar al Islam, Dar al Harb and Dar al Suhl (the abode of treaty) simultaneously. They live in the familiar neighbourhood within the adoptive city, with an ever-present influence of the absent village. They negotiate their own ways through the complexities of a life that cannot fit into essentialisms and bounded categories.

The young people's narratives shed light on the processes of their choices of solidarity and allegiance, their identifications and their new identity constructions as Muslims living in Western Europe and retaining strong on-going links with biraderi villages in Pakistan and Kashmir. According to this narrative study of lives, these British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people are currently negotiating a cultural and political position from several strands; among them the cultural heritage of their ancestry, their own daily experiences of life in Britain, everyday conversations amongst peers and media narratives. Faced with orientalism (Said 1978) and new racism (Barker 1981), British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people have reacted in various different ways. Some have attempted to distance themselves from stereotypical 'orientals' by reinventing themselves through humour, music and drama, as Western Asians or as a new generation adept at coping with the complexities of living with hyphenated identities in a world which is shrinking through globalisation. They have

chosen 'translation' (Hall 1992a). Others have chosen to defend tradition and, following in a succession of resistance to Western secular hegemony and imperialism, have fought for the rights of Muslim minority communities in Europe. Some have withdrawn into familiar peer groups and neighbourhoods and opted out of participation in institutional life. Others have secularised, Westernised and tried to become accepted by fitting in with more majority lifestyles. Very few are 'fundamentalist' in any sense. Most adopt a pragmatic contingency approach, using whichever of these strategies suits the particular situation they find themselves in at the time.

Subculture may be an appropriate notion to apply to British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people of the 2000s. They have a sense of identity different from that ascribed to them by school, work or family and are developing their own style, image values and ideology beyond those taught to them by their teachers or their parents. They are cultural producers and also consumers of a particular brand of music, film and fashion marketed specifically at them. However, although they may have certain life experiences in common, this is in fact a very diverse group in terms of class, gender, caste, religious organisational affiliation, age, marital status, sexuality, ability or disability, place of residence, mother-tongue language and cultural practices.

These young people's narratives show that they are influenced towards conservation of tradition by appeals to real and imagined heritage; however, they are also champions for change in a number of areas and refer to the teaching of Islam not only to support existing cultural practices but also to reject them. Central Government's tendency to address these young people via community leaders shows a lack of awareness that this may be a distorting channel of communication. For young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people their relationship with male elders can be fraught. It is an unequal power relationship in which there are built in tensions and contradictions. When the elders are fathers and grandfathers there is a mixture of love, loyalty, respect, affection with resentment about restrictions placed on their lifestyle choices. When the elders are community leaders there is no love and respect has to be earned. Otherwise young people regard elders as out of touch and unable to improve anything. The advantages of education give young people the edge over their elders when it comes to dealing with white institutions, both in terms of language and political literacy. As young people

they see many issues acutely as if for the first time as they shed childish naiveties on their transition to adulthood. As their awareness heightens to issues affecting their lives of the past and the future they have very sharp perceptions to offer. During this period of life they are struggling to make sense of their subjectivity, of their relationships with other people and key institutions. They are not passive in this process but exercise agency and choice. Models of youth developed in response to industrial society need to give way to new models of youth in response to the post-industrial, globalised, information age that we have all been projected into.

Sparkbrook Birmingham, where most of this research project was centred, signifies not merely a place that happens to have a large number of Pakistani and Kashmiri residents. It has a story and a collective memory of the movement of settlement that is still going on. It has stories of local politics, of religious organisational development, of economic and social struggles and of community activity over the last 60 years. It is more than a postcode; it has an image and meaning as a neighbourhood; it stands for something in local people's hearts and minds. In all of these ways it is a distinctive home, a cultural icon as well as a familiar street map, it is a place of attachment, and in this sense it is home. Young people have a specific attachment to the immediate territory around their homes. Definitions of the neighbourhood that they feel is their patch are a common theme in the narratives. Young people operate a "nationalism of the neighbourhood" (Back 1996), regarding people who live within a named neighbourhood as insiders belonging to that territory and everyone else as outsiders. One neighbourhood is contrasted with another either adjacent neighbourhood or a neighbourhood known to them elsewhere in the map of Pakistani and Kashmiri settlement. Addresses are clear markers of being in or out of the neighbourhood but so is participation in shared collective events and being part of collective memory of childhood. Back suggests that neighbourhood nationalism is a way to shrink the definition of inclusion and exclusion to a size close to their immediate set of social relations.

The nation is thus shrunk to the size of the neighbourhood, resulting in the emergence of a kind of "neighbourhood nationalism" (Back 1996, p. 53)

The current way of looking at ethnic relations, in terms of a relation between localised minorities and majorities is inadequate to

describe British Pakistani and Kashmiri's specific experiences. This study challenges the use made of the notion of ethnic minority by British social policy makers. The findings of this research also challenge the idea of generation in relation to British Pakistanis and Kashmiris, migration and cultural practices. A first generation-second generation gap is a misrepresentation of the pattern of migration to Britain and of the relationships between younger and older people within Asian communities in Britain. Chain migration means that not all older people arrived at the same time as each other. On the whole, men from Pakistan and Kashmir arrived before their families joined them. Also young people are still arriving having married British-born young people. As explored by this research, there is still an essential relationship between the two worlds of Pakistan and Kashmir, and Britain. Their journeys to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir are a physical way of keeping in touch with family networks and many young British Pakistanis still marry people from Pakistan and continue to live in Britain. Time has passed since the parents of the subjects of this study migrated to Britain; however, migration from Pakistan and Kashmir started with chain migration and continues still; there was not one episode of migration. My study involves descendants of immigrants; however, these young people do have relationships with newly arrived immigrants of their own age. Several of the characteristics of diasporas (Safran 1991) appear to fit British-born Pakistanis. Their ancestors dispersed from an original centre to many foreign regions including Britain. They retain collective memories, visions and myths about their original ancestral homeland including its history, territory and achievements. They believe they are not fully accepted in their 'host' society and continue to relate to their ancestral homeland. Some of them sustain a dream of return and feel committed to maintenance of the original family home. On-going connections with their ancestral homeland have an important impact on young people's lives in Britain's inner cities; an impact that this study suggests is misunderstood and underestimated. Young Asian people in Britain live with complex choices of identification to make constantly. This study examines their strategies for coping with being identified as a minority group of "others" in British Society and for surviving in the face of racism. Far from being an isolated incident, a visit to kin in Pakistan has repercussions for daily life experiences in Britain and for intergenerational relationships. It throws a spotlight onto their sense of self/identity.

The interviews illuminate young people's sense of inclusion and exclusion in Britain. Diaspora has been opted for in this book rather than new ethnicities. Diaspora more truly retains the idea of continuity between the past, the present and the future, along with dispersal, movement, development and change. This book has moved away from the idea of hybridity in favour of the notion of diaspora. One of the main reasons for this is that the idea of hybridity implies a binary starting point and it was too easy to fall into the trap of contesting binary models whilst continuing to imply them with choices of language and metaphor.

This book does not evade the dilemmas faced by the young people interviewed or indeed their struggles. However, rather than generalising about community patterns of polarisation at fixed historical moments, it focuses on individual flexibility, movement, choices and changes. In other words agency is a stronger emphasis than structure within this study.

These translocal young people narrated to me the stories of their journeys and through story telling they enlightened me about their sense of who they are. Their journeys are two way (to and from their ancestral homeland) and they signify exploration of identification and sense of home in a globalised world. The research process in itself has been my own journey exploring travelling theory, thinking about 'race', faith, nations and peoples. It has been a journey of exploration and also of personal change and development. The reflexive loop connected their lives with mine. In terms of methodology my journey took me from grounded theory to narrative study of lives and thematic investigation. My difficulty with grounded theory was that it fragmented the transcript data whereas the young people spoke in narratives, whole stories threaded together with a running commentary to make their sense of it all. Fragmenting the data felt to me like mirroring a problem in the young people's lives of being categorised and expected to keep different aspects of their lives in unnaturally discrete compartments. Thematic investigation allowed for whole stories and threads of meaning to be discerned and in so doing gave a better picture of each young person's life as a 'composite whole' rather than a fractured crisis scene.

Analysis of the interviews with the young people generated themes of trans-locality and particular consequences of chain migration leading to the coining of the phrase chain diaspora. Chain diaspora disrupts immigration theories about assimilation and generation. The

concept of diaspora has been tested for its relevance to the everyday lives of thirty young people and compared with other understandings of collectivity both 'Western' and Islamic. Nation and Ummah have been discussed in relation to being both British and Pakistani and being a British-born Pakistani or Kashmiri Muslim in the 'West'. Invoking the ummah (Werbner 2002) is not evident in the transcripts of the young people's interviews and video diaries, nor is invoking Allah. Attachment to 'being a Muslim' as a signifier in defiance of racism and anti-Islamic discourses of the 'West' is much more prevalent. Within the transcripts these young people invoke 'being a Muslim' in association with 'being Pakistani'.

A qaum, with a common 'homeland' (watan), displaced and dispersed to other localities, can be a diaspora within the ummah. Whilst the ummah is transnational, it can be understood as distinct from a diaspora because it has no common homeland. Although all Muslims have Mecca as a constant reference point, this is a different relationship to Saudi Arabia than to a homeland. Muslim people make up the ummah and it is drawn from all qaums (or 'peoples') and nations. Within the ummah are millions of people who have been displaced or dispersed, but also millions who have lived in one place for generations. British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people are like a new qaum of diaspora youth within the global Muslim Ummah. They have a common ancestral homeland. Part of their biraderis (extended families or clans) have been displaced and dispersed to other locations. They have parents or grandparents who relocated to Britain. They have grown up in a familiar neighbourhood in an adoptive city. The myth of return (Anwar 1979) has dwindled, certainly amongst British-born young people; however, connection with the ancestral homeland of Pakistan or Kashmir as "home" has persisted. They are united in being clear throughout that they are not English but British Pakistani or British Kashmiri; always "hyphenated". There is no mention of being European.

Gender is a very explicit hot topic within the findings of the research and emerges as "*disputed territory*"; a series of issues about the roles of women and men within the emerging British Pakistani qaum that involves the negotiation of changes away from some deeply entrenched traditional role patterns and power relations. Both young women and young men find gender a troubling aspect of life that is going through rapid transformation and associated backlash. The large number of marriages between young British Pakistanis and

Pakistan nationals adds a complicating factor to patterns of gender power relations and role expectations.

These thirty young people, regardless of their sentiments towards the village in Pakistan or Kashmir that is home to their kin, find that absent village inescapable. It has ramifications for their lives in Britain whether it figures as a fantasy idealised home or as a nightmare to be avoided at all cost. The absent village is a subtext of their lives and signifies an identity marker and on-going reference point for the biraderi of each young person. It is a connection to a set of relationships, obligations and duties that have a mythic and geographic historic location and a transcendent translocal presence. Belonging to the biraderi entails belonging to the absent village and to its representative within the adoptive city in Britain, the familiar neighbourhood. Belonging is important to these young people, but comes at a price and they make different decisions about how far the price is worth paying. Every 'lena' (take) has its 'dena' (give).

The familiar neighbourhood is space in the streets of a city appropriated by migrated villagers from the absent village, as a new territory, a place to call home from home in Britain. It remains inextricably linked to the absent village through translocal social networking and signifies cultural connection and continuity. It cannot be said to be exclusive because the inner cities of Britain in question are also linked to a myriad of other absent villages across the globe from the Caribbean to Somalia.

In the methodology chapter I stated that "I wish to understand processes of identification underlying the experiences of British Pakistani and Kashmiri youth and to be part of developing knowledge that is pragmatic and representative of young people's voices as a basis for improved action by youth workers and educators to address racism and exclusion."

The "something at stake" (Hall 1992a) of this research is the current pattern of social exclusion of young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people in British society, particularly in the neighbourhood that is the context of the research. Describing people as marginal or socially excluded assumes that there is agreement about where the centre is and where the margin is, it suggests that centrality and marginality have fixed meanings (Werbner 2002). If the centre is Britain as a nation, then British Pakistani young people are regarded as necessary to co-opt for the sake of national cohesion. However, if we imagine a more relativist notion of centres and margins, they are included

in some national, transnational, and global lived worlds and excluded from others. Inclusion and exclusion can also shift according to time, to political events and to individual and collective choices being made.

As referred to earlier in the book, transnational is a term already used by Mandaville (2001) and others to discuss social patterns, networks and relationships that span national and international boundaries and operate beyond the confines of national and regional boundaries. Translocal (Appadurai 1996) is also already used to denote social patterns and connections in the lives of people who relate to more than one locality, for instance inner city Birmingham and a village in rural Kashmir. I toyed with the idea of transparochial, but that is such a Christian term that it seemed inappropriate. As a result of undertaking this five year research I wish to stress in this conclusion the simple need for professionals working with young British Pakistani and Kashmiri people to work with the whole person and to gain a fuller understanding of the experiences, concerns and needs of young people who are juggling the different cultural, financial and time demands of several social 'arenas'. By arenas I mean distinct groups of people such as nuclear family, extended family, school or college, mixed neighbours, Pakistani and Kashmiri neighbourhood networks, mixed peer friendship groups, Muslim peer friendship groups, local Mosque jamaat, and work relationships. To discuss the relationships that these thirty young people have to social arenas and to places intimately associated with these social arenas, I use the term transarena. This has been arrived at through the recognition that the young people's lives are focused on a few very specific places. Rather than being transnational, they are translocal. The young people talked about all sorts of important decisions that they have to make in life about marriage, divorce, bringing up children, financial matters, probate and inheritance, property, immigration and nationality. All of these decisions are affected by being transnational, part of translocal biraderis and transarena. The young adults taking the decisions try to take into account biraderi implications, career implications, financial implications, as well as individual preferences, negotiation of borders and resolving competing solidarities. For the most part they are very skilled at this, but there are certain times when it is all too much to handle individually; so they express a need for support, appropriate advice and guidance, that is not always easy to find from a sufficiently understanding, balanced, non-partisan source.

The media, government and public discourses about young British Pakistani and Kashmiri Muslims, of 'the enemy within' and 'segregated ethnic communities' ghettoised in particular neighbourhoods of particular cities and a generation that has fallen into a ravine between two cultures, are at odds with the findings of this research. The findings give a different picture of transarena young people negotiating a complex set of relationships with different places, groups of people and cultural practices. The young people value the sense of security and identity of familiar neighbourhoods but they demonstrate no separatist agenda. Whilst they have clear allegiances that influence their political perspective on international events such as the 'war on terror' this does not make them a homogenous, unified enemy of Britain to be feared as a threat to national and international security. The thirty young people interviewed vary widely in their degree of political knowledge and literacy and in their points of view. The discourse of 'enemy within' has shaped policies of policing, immigration, formal and informal education. The discourse of separatist ghettos has shaped policies of social cohesion and urban planning. The discourse of 'between two cultures' has shaped social services, police domestic violence units, refuges, youth services, advice and counselling services. The young peoples' narratives challenge all of these discourses and new understandings of the real politics of the daily lives of these young people could have serious implications for policy and practice. Rather than basing policies and practices on the fears Britain harbours about young Muslim Britons, services should be addressing the needs of those young people as 'composite whole' (Sardar 2004) individuals.

There are social policy implications from the findings of this research in fields including social services, education, connexions, citizenship, immigration and nationality, legal support services, equality of opportunities, mental health, counselling and youth services. Examples of specific policy forums that could benefit from re-examination of their understanding of the needs of young British Pakistani and Kashmiri young people are: foreign office interventions in relation to forced marriages, immigration decisions, police and social services dealings with British Pakistani and Kashmiri youth and their families, women's refuge policies, schooling responses to underperformance, and youth services (e.g. include married young people).

Political consequences of the boundaries of belonging negotiated by British Pakistani and Kashmiri Youth include the need for a new approach to social inclusion and to dual citizenship. Currently

institutions are constantly 'missing' or misunderstanding whom they are dealing with and making inappropriate interventions. There is a need for interventions, but for better understanding first; and then for policy framed around a more realistic impression of the young people's needs and concerns rather than persistent stereotypes and dangerously misleading discourses. The findings of this research suggest a need to include Pakistan and Kashmir as locations for support services. Translocal young people need translocal services e.g. schooling, health, advice and support, security and policing and transarena young people need transarena services.

Power distance (Hofstede 1984) refers to the difference in power between parties in relations for example between men and women, bosses and workers, teachers and students, government officials and residents. A feature of the new constructions of the self of the young people interviewed is a determined lessening of power distance. None the less they live constantly with power distance that places them as less powerful than a range of others including white middle class people and older people.

New ethnicities and hybridity are two theoretical attempts to name the processes of development and change that ethnicities go through when they influence one another by living alongside one another in urban Britain. Whilst the term new ethnicities could be used for the way that the young people of this research are reinventing tradition and carving out a new way of being British Pakistani, I prefer the term diaspora because it acknowledges that some 'Black and Minority Ethnic Community' youth in Britain have identifications and active links with their ancestral homelands; and Pakistani and Kashmiri young people are a good example of this. Hybridity communicates the interplay between cultures that leads to innovation. This innovation is certainly evident in the narratives that are the empirical basis of this research. However, again I prefer the term diaspora because the young people are more than hybrid, they remain connected to the homeland as a source of ongoing and developing cultural tradition. This means that they live with hybridity but also, much of the time, can operate in more mono-cultural settings competently. Microprocesses of daily identifications are articulated in their narratives. They do not live in a lifeworld of fixed identifications but use contingency to respond to each incident requiring an identification according to a range of factors.

Hegemonic discourses inevitably impact on our constructions of

the self and this comes out in our personal stories. However, when the hegemony becomes as overt as it is in the case of constructions of Islamic identity in the West or Pakistani identity in Britain, personal stories also articulate awareness and counter hegemony. These young people are on the receiving end of powerful social constructions of who they are; on the other hand they are astute and often contest these constructions. They prize freedom of thought and education, as much as Western politicians claim to prize them. They use their freedom of thought and the capacities that they have developed through their education to critique Western claims to be more progressive concerning education and freedom than Islam or than non Western European and North American states.

Challenges to binary and polar models flow through the narratives of the young people I interviewed. These are clearly no passive victims of circumstance, but active agents in the negotiation of their own social boundaries. They have sophisticated strategies for coping with conflicting expectations towards them. Their particular dislocated subject-position means they have never been able to take their social status for granted but have always had to be creators, not merely consumers.

Rather than concentrating on other people's problems about British Pakistani young people, such as the government's "problem" that they are British subjects but do not have full allegiance to Britain, this research explores the young people's own perspectives on their identifications. The matters of greatest concern to the respondents were family relationships and conflicts over cultural change, particularly changes in practices of selecting sexual partners; and changes in gender roles and expectations. Next they turned their attention to the neighbourhood they live in and to issues of identity arising in daily life there. They contrasted this "diaspora space" experience with the experience of visiting kith and kin in Pakistan and Kashmir, with whom they keep in contact in between visits. One of the main differences they identify between themselves as British Pakistanis and their counterparts in the family in Pakistan or Kashmir is the mixing they do in their friendship groups and the multi-cultural nature of their everyday context. This emphasis is interesting in relation to the debates about too much isolation and segregation of Muslim communities in Britain. Islam is a somewhat taken for granted element of their sense of identity. As most of the respondents are school or college students, or were recently, their experiences of the British

education system are of importance to them, although they do not echo the idea that there is a clear gulf between two cultures of home and school. Mostly their concern about schools is the lack of educational attainment of many British Pakistani and Kashmiri students. They place the blame for the alienation of many of their peers from educational institutions firmly with the practices of the institutions, rather than with family adherence to custom and tradition. The tendency toward hybridity is partly an education effect. More educated young people gain knowledge and skills in relating to others that allow them to articulate their own identity, drawing on many influences. However, hybridity is neither an inevitable consequence of education, nor dependent on education. There are highly educated young people who choose conservatism, and there are other social processes such as media and fashions in consumerism that influence young people to produce hybridity.

In narrating their life events, the young people display attitudes sometimes radically at odds with traditional value systems; however, they also value belonging to a community and they describe how over time they are able to negotiate change without the necessity of leaving that community. Each of their narratives bears witness to the way in which young people are contesting aspects of tradition whilst preserving others. One story from their own life triggers stories of other young people who have opposed the wishes of elders. Much of the conflict that they are detailing is intra community; intra family conflict that has led over time to shifts in the way culture is interpreted and lived out. This intergenerational contest over conserving or transforming social norms is a pattern replicated in many different cultural settings.

Young people's narratives show that they are influenced towards conservation of tradition by appeals to real and imagined heritage; however, they are also champions for change in a number of areas and refer to the teaching of Islam not only to support existing cultural practices but also to reject them. Central Government's tendency to address these young people via community leaders shows a lack of awareness that this may be a distorting channel of communication.

Avtar Brah's notion of diaspora space (Brah 1996) is useful for analysing the responses of these young people. Their sense of identity is heightened by their daily experiences of displacement. They inhabit a neighbourhood marked out as especially associated with the large number of Pakistani and Kashmiri people living there along-

side other ancestors of immigrants. It is a place where culture is constantly contested. Growing up in this context, they have gained skills in negotiating contested cultural codes. They are carving out a temporary new cultural practice that brings together different influences on them, and allows them to benefit from the collective of the extended family whilst enjoying some of the benefits of an individualist society.

“Changing same” (Gilroy 1993) is a good phrase for these young people’s cultural practices. The young people interviewed have evident personal agency and strategies for bringing about cultural change and development. They are courageous bearers of change, at times taking significant personal risks. They are retaining a sense of ethnic identification whilst enjoying consumption of ‘hybrid’ film and music; and are active producers of new cultural expressions of ethnic pride. They are also keen on heritage culture; they are interested in their roots and in forging a clear identity that is distinctive and worthy of recognition. To this end they are rediscovering and reinventing tradition.

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