

Syria and *Bilad al-Sham* under Ottoman Rule

The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage

Politics, Society and Economy


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VOLUME 43



Abdul-Karim Rafeq

Syria and *Bilad al-Sham* under Ottoman Rule

Essays in honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq

Edited by

Peter Sluglett
with Stefan Weber



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Salt Lake City, April 2010

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Stefan Weber is the Director of the Museum of Islamic Art at the Pergamon Museum, Berlin. He was Assistant Professor of Material History at the Aga Khan University in London from 2006 to 2008. He received his PhD in *Islamwissenschaft* at the Free University Berlin. Between December 1996 and November 2001 he was a Junior Research Fellow in the History of Islamic Art and Architecture at the German Archaeological Institute (DAI) in Damascus. Between 2001 and 2007 he was a postdoctoral research fellow for History and Art History at the Orient-Institute Beirut (OIB). He is author of *Damascus, Ottoman Modernity and Urban Transformation (1808–1918). Proceedings of the*

Danish Institute, Damascus (Aarhus 2009), and co-editor of *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the late Ottoman Empire* (Beirut 2002).

Nicola Ziadeh was born in Damascus in 1907, and died in Beirut in 2006 at the age of 98. He obtained his doctorate from London University in 1950, and taught at the American University of Beirut between 1949 and 1974. He was visiting professor at the universities of Amman, Cambridge, Harvard and London. In 1988 he was one of the founders of the University of Balamand, a Greek Orthodox institution in al-Kura in north Lebanon. He wrote some twenty significant works on the history of the medieval and modern Middle East.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The editor of a work by many hands faces daunting problems when trying to make his way through the minefields of transliteration. There are different 'national styles' (for example, when and when not to use capital letters in French); there is the question of when and whether to italicise certain common terms well known to the largely specialist potential readership of this volume, and whether to adopt *-iya* (favoured by Wehr and the Harvard HOLLIS catalogue) or *-iyya* (favoured by IJMES).

I have adopted the following basic policies:

English spelling has been preferred to American (colour, *not* color; traveller, *not* traveler).

When followed by the definite article, the prepositions *bi*, *fi*, *li* etc and the conjunction *wa* are followed by an apostrophe before the 'l', so *bi'l-*, *wa'l-*,

Apart from 'ayn or hamza there are no diacriticals (i.e. no macrons or dots, indications of long vowels or dots under upper or lower case d, h, s, t, z).

Shari'a, 'ulama, 'alim, imam, waqf, Qur'an, are generally not italicised.

Arabic months have been italicised.

Turkish has been reproduced in modern Turkish orthography, including the ğ.

If *al-* comes at the beginning of a sentence, the 'a' remains in lower case. *-iya* has generally been preferred to *-iyya*.

Ta marbuta is rendered *-a*, not *-ah*; in *idafa* constructions it is rendered *-at*.

Consistency *within* articles and in the bibliography has been the main goal.

INTRODUCTION

PETER SLUGLETT

This volume honours Dr. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, the leading scholar of the history of *Bilad al-Sham* under Ottoman domination, whose distinguished career of research and teaching spans a period of more than forty years. As the bibliography of his published work shows, the passing of the years has not diminished his creativity; he continues to produce a stream of path-breaking books and articles in Arabic, English and French. At the same time, he inspires and guides researchers, both young and old, from North America, Europe, Japan and the Middle East as he introduces them to the intricate worlds of the Islamic court records of *Bilad al-Sham*. It is a great honour, as well as a great pleasure, to introduce this collection of essays honouring Dr. Rafeq's achievements. The essays are written by friends and colleagues from different parts of the world, and range widely across the spectrum of his principal interests.

As many of the details of Dr. Rafeq's academic career are recounted in the five essays in the section entitled *Rafeq the Historian*, I will only allude to them briefly here. Dr. Rafeq was born in Idlib in northern Syria in 1931. After completing his secondary education at the American College in Aleppo, he obtained his *license* at the Syrian University in Damascus in 1955, and subsequently wrote his doctorate under Peter Holt at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. The thesis, on the province of Damascus in the middle years of the eighteenth century, was published in Beirut in 1966. It explores the emergence of local power brokers during a critical period in the history of Ottoman Syria, in which political and socio-economic control was slipping out of the hands of the central government in Istanbul and into the hands of local notables, particularly members of the 'Azm family.

After his return from London, Dr. Rafeq taught in the History Department at what had by then become the University of Damascus from 1964 until 1990, serving twice as department chair. He has also held visiting positions at the University of Jordan, the Lebanese University, the University of California at Los Angeles, Chicago University,

and the University of Pennsylvania. Since 1990 he has held the William and Annie Bickers Chair of Arab Middle Eastern Studies at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia and continues to divide the year between the United States and Syria. It was my own good fortune to have met Dr. Rafeq in Damascus in the mid-1980s, and to have had a long and happy association with him, both academic and personal, ever since.

One of Dr Rafeq's principal mentors was George Haddad, one of his teachers at the Syrian University, who was instrumental in directing him towards the professional study of history. Dr. Rafeq also acknowledges the strong influence of the teaching and writings of Eric Hobsbawm (then at Birkbeck College) while he was a graduate student in London. Other important intellectual influences in his early career were Albert Hourani's 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables' (1968), and André Raymond's *Artisans et commerçants au Caire* (1974), published while Raymond was Director of the Institut français d'études arabes in Damascus.¹

Dr. Rafeq's most significant achievement has been his pioneering use of locally generated materials to reconstruct the social history of *Bilad al-Sham* between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The primary sources for much of his work are the *sijillat*, the Islamic court records, and the official correspondence between Istanbul and the Ottoman provincial governors, the *awamir sultaniya*, both of which are abundant for the period from the Ottoman conquest until the early twentieth century.² The utilisation of these hitherto largely unexploited materials has opened up a treasure trove of contemporary information, for the Christian and Jewish as well as for the Muslim communities.

Given the nature and scope of Islamic law, the purview of the courts and the decisions of the judges extended over very broad areas of economic and social life. The qadis adjudicated in all kinds of family mat-

¹ Between 1969 and 1975. As will be described in more detail below, Raymond and Rafeq together can be credited with pioneering a completely new approach to economic and social history. See Rafeq's 'Preface' to Raymond's *La Ville arabe, Alep, à l'époque ottomane (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles)*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes de Damas, 1998, 9-10.

² 'A vrai dire, toute étude de l'histoire du Proche-Orient pendant l'époque Ottomane reste incomplète si elle n'utilise pas ces registres, qui fournissent une illustration concrète des traditions locales et des règlements Ottomanes.' Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Les Registres des tribunaux de Damas comme source pour l'histoire de la Syrie', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, 26, 1973, 219.

ters, ordered debtors to deceased individuals to discharge their debts to the family of the deceased, drew up the foundation documents of *awqaf* and were frequently called to adjudicate on matters arising from them. As well as acting as notaries, judges pronounced, *inter alia*, on matters affecting guilds and markets, prescribed the width of streets, and gave or withheld permission for extensions to houses.

Since legal services were not provided free of charge, it must be assumed that many less well off people did not avail themselves of the courts, and to that extent the historical record is incomplete. However, it has been remarked that in mid-eighteenth century Aleppo, '[w]omen and ordinary people, who barely figure in most other sources, appear on virtually every page of the records.'³ But given the rather terse form in which some of the documents have survived, the court records, like any other archives, do not always constitute 'unproblematic reflections of social reality', as James Reilly has remarked.⁴ Making use of them provides an opportunity to study social history in minute detail, as they deal with various kinds of disturbances in the city quarters, an array of topics involving urban real estate, the fortunes of pious foundations, the activities of the guilds—the list is extremely comprehensive.

One of Dr. Rafeq's particular interests has been the study of guilds and craft corporations, and in particular the fact that members of different religious groups were fully integrated into the occupational guilds,⁵

³ Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1989, 11.

⁴ 'Recent Lebanese Histories of Ottoman Saida'; unpublished paper, Middle East Studies Association, Montréal, November 2007. See also the thoughtful discussion of the nature and use of the *sijillat* by Elyse Semerdjian, 'The Shari'a Court Record and Social History', in 'Off the Straight Path': *Illicit Sex, Law and Community*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2008, 61–72.

⁵ See, for example, 'Craft Organisation, Work Ethics and the Strains of Change in Ottoman Syria', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 111, 1991, 495–511; 'Craft Organizations and Religious Communities in Ottoman Syria (XVI–XIX Centuries)', in *La Shi'a nell'Impero Ottomano*, Rome, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Fondazione Leone Caetani, 1993, 25–56; 'al-Ta'ayush bayna al-tawa'if fi Bilad al-Sham 'abra sijillat al-mahakim al-shari'ya' [Coexistence among Religious Communities in Bilad al-Sham According to the Islamic Law Court Records], in Louis Boisset, Floréal Sana-gustin, and Souad Slim, eds., *Les Relations entre musulmans et chrétiens dans le Bilad al-Cham à l'époque ottomane aux XVII^e–XIX^e siècles, Apport des archives des tribunaux religieux des villes: Alep, Beyrouth, Damas, Tripoli*, Tripoli, Lebanon, Balamand University, 2004, 75–119; 'The Integration of Religious Communities in the Workplace in Ottoman Syria and during Their Stay in Egypt', in Nelly Hanna and Raouf Abbas, eds., *Society and Economy in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean, 1600–1900: Essays in Honor of André Raymond*, Cairo and New York, The American University of Cairo Press, 2005, 99–116.

thus largely confounding stereotypical notions of Islamic exclusiveness. He has also been concerned to chart what were often quite wide discrepancies between prescription and practice both in the judgements handed down by the courts⁶ and the tolerance sometimes exhibited in the opinions of the jurists. For example, he quotes Shaykh 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulsi's authorisation of tobacco smoking in a treatise entitled *al-Sulh bayna al-ikhwan fi hukm ibahat al-dukhkhan* (Peace among friends concerning the legalisation of smoking). 'Nabulsi considers that smoking is like food: if it hurts you, avoid it, if it does not, why not indulge?'⁷

The broad implications of such studies, and Rafeq's advocacy of a much more pragmatic approach to social history than that obtained by viewing it through an idealised prism of religion, have been taken to heart by some of the younger scholars whose work he has influenced. Thus James Grehan has pointed out that 'eighteenth century material culture was incapable of absolute uniformity, which never existed beyond the pages of administrative manuals and law books.... Townspeople were very much distracted by workaday routines, and in the midst of prayers, funerals, and other religious rituals, casually haggled, struck bargains, and prattled about their business.... More than religion, it was this struggle for survival and sufficiency which stood at the center of popular culture.'⁸ Similarly, Elyse Semerdjian's study of Ottoman Aleppo shows that the courts regularly prescribed non-violent

⁶ See 'al-Arādi al-zirā'iya al-waqfiya fi Bilād al-Shām bayna al-fi'at al-ijtima'iya wa'l-madhahib al-fiqhiya fi'l-'ahd al-'uthmani' [*Waqf Agricultural Lands in Bilād al-Shām: between Social Groups and the Schools of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Period*], in *Mélanges Halil Sahillioğlu*, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi, Vol. 1. Zaghuan, Fondation Temimi pour la Recherche Scientifique et l'Information, 1997, 169–185; 'Relations between the Syrian 'Ulama' and the Ottoman State in the Eighteenth Century', in Kate Fleet, ed., *The Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century, Oriente Moderno*, New Series, Vol. 18, 1999, 67–95; 'The Sunni Legal Schools and Land Rental in Ottoman Syria', in Abd El Hadi Ben Mansour and Jacques Frémeaux, eds., *Avec les arabes: puissance de l'amitié, Mélanges offerts au Professeur Dominique Chevallier*, Paris, Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2005, 253–79; 'The Application of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Courts in Damascus: The Case of the Rental of Waqf Land', in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers, eds., *Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments*, Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2006, 411–25.

⁷ Ed. Muhammad Ahmad Dahman, Damascus, al-Maktaba al-Salafiya, 1343/1924. The quotation is from Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'The Economic Organization of Cities in Ottoman Syria', in Peter Sluglett, ed., *The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950*, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 2008, 104–40.

⁸ *Everyday Life and Consumer Culture in Eighteenth Century Damascus*, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 2007, 222, 234.

and non-corporal punishments in cases involving women accused of illicit sexual activity (such as working in a brothel or having children out of wedlock). Such women were usually ordered to move out of the particular quarter where they were living. Semerdjian did not find a single instance of the courts prescribing the 'canonical punishment' of stoning in more than three hundred years of court records.⁹

The great merit of Rafeq's locally focussed approach has been to give a degree of agency to local actors which previous historiography has tended to deny them. Earlier generations of economic and social historians of the Middle East relied almost exclusively on consular reports and travel narratives, the former in particular tending to focus either on external trade or inter-power rivalries, which gave an often partial, and certainly rather distanced, view. While it may not be entirely accurate to describe Dr. Rafeq's work as 'subaltern studies', it can well be characterised as 'history from below'. His books and articles provide access to a densely populated social world to which no other sources can take us. Even accounts by sympathetic contemporary observers such as Alexander Russell¹⁰ cannot guide us so intimately through the thickets of *la vie quotidienne*.

Counter-factual speculation, so beloved of political scientists, is generally considered out of bounds for historians. Nevertheless, ever since I first became aware of the work of Rafeq and Raymond on the court records, I have wondered why these and similar materials from other Ottoman provinces should not have been the object of serious study until the 1960s and 1970s. After all, they had been 'lying around', presumably in the same volumes in which we read them now in the archives, in a steady accumulation that began in the early years of the Ottoman conquest and continued until the end of the First World War. For example, in Nikolai Todorov's *Balkanskiiat Grad*, first published in Sofia in 1972, and translated into English as *The Balkan City, 1400–1900* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1983), which is based principally on the Ottoman provincial registers in the National Library of Bulgaria in Sofia, the author was able to draw on a fair amount of previous scholarship in Bulgarian, Greek, Russian, and

⁹ Semerdjian, "Off the Straight Path".

¹⁰ See Janet Starkey, 'No Myopic Mirage: Alexander and Patrick Russell in Aleppo', *History and Anthropology*, 13, 4, 2002, 257–73.

Serbo-Croatian.¹¹ In contrast, the bibliography of Suraiya Faruqi's *Men of Modest Substance...* (1987), which deals with seventeenth century Anatolia, contains few entries antedating the 1970s, apart from the pioneering work of Ömer Lütfi Barkan, also quoted by Todorov.¹² One answer may of course be that the records were not easily accessible, or were long housed, or even still being used, in the courts from which they originated.¹³

The Contributions to the Volume

The volume has been divided into seven sections, which are broadly representative of Dr. Rafeq's main interests. After this introduction and a bibliography of Dr. Rafeq's published works, compiled by Timothy Fitzgerald, come five short personal pieces (by 'Adnan Bakhit, the late Nicola Ziadeh [1907–2006], Ulrike Freitag, Abdallah Hanna and James Reilly) focussing on Dr. Rafeq as a colleague, teacher and friend. Bakhit, a historian of *Bilad al-Sham* in the Ottoman period, and Dr. Rafeq have been friends for many years. Bakhit studied at SOAS and before that at the American University of Beirut, where Ziadeh taught

¹¹ Although Todorov was certainly the first to synthesise the information in such a comprehensive fashion.

¹² Suraiya Faruqi, *Men of Modest Substance: House owners and house property in seventeenth-century Ankara and Kayseri*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

¹³ See Beshara Doumani's description of reading the Nablus *sijillat* in the anteroom of the court in the 1980s in his *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, xi–xii. Some information about the history of the collection in the Syrian National Archives is provided by Brigitte Marino and Tomoki Okawara in the introduction to their *Catalogue des Registres des Tribunaux Ottomans Conservés au Centre des Archives de Damas*, Damascus, IFEAD/Centre des Archives du Damas, 1999, 51–59. The archives were opened in 1959, but the records of the courts at Aleppo, Damascus, Hama and Homs were deposited at various times in the 1960s and 1970s. This process was taking place when Jon Mandaville was visiting in 1966. In 'The Ottoman Court Records of Syria and Jordan', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 86, 1966, 311–19, Mandaville noted that... 'beginnings have been made on the utilization of the records, especially by 'Abd al-Karim Rafiq of the University of Damascus'. Mandaville also noted that (most of) the records of Aleppo and Damascus had already found their way to Damascus, while those of Hama and Homs were still housed in the Hama Museum and the Homs sharia court respectively. In 1973, the archives were moved permanently to their present location, the former palace of Khalid al-'Azm in Suq Suruja. Marino and Okawara confirm that the material from Hama (64 volumes, 1535–1925) and Homs (21 volumes, 1884–1919) was transferred to the collection 'after 1973', while further material from Aleppo also arrived in 1973.

history between 1949 and 1973. Abdallah Hanna, a near contemporary of Dr. Rafeq, studied in Leipzig at the same time that Dr. Rafeq was studying in London, and has published a large number of books in Arabic on the social and economic history of Syria in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Many younger scholars writing on the history of Ottoman and post-Ottoman Syria have expressed their gratitude in the prefaces to their books to both Abdallah Hanna and Abdul-Karim Rafeq for their kindness and generosity during their research in Damascus. Ulrike Freitag's contribution includes an affectionate description of Dr. Rafeq's classes at the University of Damascus, which she attended in the mid-1980s. Later, she wrote a thesis on modern Syrian historiography, which includes studies of the work of 'Abdallah Hanna and Abdul-Karim Rafeq. Finally, James Reilly, who also acknowledges being guided through the *sijillat* in the Syrian National Archives by Dr. Rafeq, has contributed an evaluation of Rafeq's long article on Gaza, published in 1985. Based on a unique volume of court cases for the period 1857–61, 'Rafeq's *Ghazza*' is probably the most comprehensive survey of that region in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The Economic History of Ottoman Rule in Bilad al-Sham

This section consists of four articles by Thomas Philipp, Farouk Hoblos, Mohammad al-Mubaidin and Daniel Crecelius. Thomas Philipp has written on 'The economic impact of the Ottoman conquest on *Bilad al-Sham*', in which he poses the question of how, if indeed at all, the integration of *Bilad al-Sham* into the Ottoman Empire affected the economy of the region. For instance, contemporary and later Arab chroniclers do not stress 1516–17 as the beginning of a new era but rather as the substitution of one dynasty for another. Thus the historian Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi (d. 1651) continued to divide his biographical dictionary of the tenth/sixteenth century into three thirty-three year 'generations' (*tabaqat*) as if nothing particularly significant had happened in 1516.¹⁴ On the other hand, an earlier generation of Western scholarship suggested that the Ottoman conquest severely curtailed overland trade between *Bilad al-Sham* and lands further

¹⁴ See Astrid Meier, 'Perceptions of a New Era? Historical Writing in Early Ottoman Damascus', *Arabica*, 61, 2004, 419–34.

east,¹⁵ while the Arab nationalist version of history has tended to label the whole Ottoman period as one of unrelenting decline.

The work of Abdul-Karim Rafeq and other studies of the Ottoman economy show a rather different picture. Eliyahu Ashtor shows that there was some decline in trade in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, but that there was a perceptible increase in the trade of Aleppo and Damascus in the last decades of the Mamluk period. Although Portuguese shipping dominated Indian Ocean trade in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Portugal's naval power, and its capacity to become an imperial land power, was greatly constrained by its small population and its general lack of resources. For a while, the Portuguese were able to dominate the Red Sea with their 'round ships', but there were never very many of them deployed at a time, and in the end the Ottomans were able to control both the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade by sheer force of numbers. The general picture of international trade at the time is complex, driven both by political necessity and the presence or absence of certain maritime technologies. However, a major feature of trade in the region in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially after the death of Shah 'Abbas in 1629, was the importance of the overland route between India and Aleppo. 'Abbas had tried to preserve a royal monopoly over the silk trade, but his successor Safi (1629–42) was unable to maintain it, and by the 1630s two thirds of Iran's silk was exported to Europe, mostly through Aleppo.¹⁶ Most of this trade was organised locally by Armenians who lived both in the Isfahan suburb of Julfa and in Aleppo, while the European end (with the silk being despatched from İskenderun) was monopolised by members of the Levant Company, founded in London in 1581 and the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, founded in Amsterdam in 1602. Hence, Philipp concludes, the Ottoman conquest had the effect of transforming the Arab lands into

¹⁵ 'En face d'une Europe toujours mieux outillé, toujours plus entreprenante et plus audacieuse, l'Empire ottoman se présente ainsi comme un État moralement divisé, affaibli dans sa structure économique comme dans son organisation administrative, amoindri dans sa force de résistance et à l'ingérence de l'étranger.' Jean Sauvaget, *Alep: essai sur le développement d'une grande ville syrienne, des origines au milieu du XIX^e siècle*, 2 vols., Paris, Geuthner, 1941, I, 191.

¹⁶ See Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600–1750*, New York, New York University Press, 1988, 24–30.

an extensive free trade zone, with Aleppo becoming the principal gateway to Europe for goods from Iran, the Persian Gulf and India.

In 'Public services and tax revenues in Ottoman Tripoli (1516–1918)', Farouk Hoblos paints a fairly bleak picture of the Ottoman fiscal regime in Syria, concluding that most taxes collected were not spent locally but spirited away to Istanbul. He suggests that the fiscal situation in Tripoli was probably reasonably representative of that of the other Arab provinces. In general, Hoblos wonders whether the Ottoman Empire was an 'Islamic Empire' in which all Muslims were equal, or simply a form of exploitation of Arabs by Turks. His paper is based on the records of the sharia courts in Tripoli and Halba, tax collection records, nineteenth and early twentieth century *salnames*, and a number of reports written by local officials at the end of the nineteenth century.

Hoblos divides taxes into urban and rural, ordinary and extraordinary, the latter being taxes levied for specific and unforeseeable purposes such as military campaigns. He also compares the amount of taxes spent locally in the province with the amount remitted to Istanbul. Local expenditures included payments to lesser *timar* holders (for the management of their property and the provision of soldiers), waqf revenues, and revenues retained by the Ottoman governors to pay local expenses, while the second category, of taxes remitted to Istanbul, consisted largely of *jizya* payments, *dirham al-rijal*, a kind of equivalent of the *jizya* which was levied on Nusayri men,¹⁷ and the revenues from *khass* or 'royal' *timars*.¹⁸ A comparison of the amount of taxes paid by one of the *nahiyas* of the province of Tripoli in 1519 and 1571 shows first, that the amount of tax collected doubled over the period, and second, that while 48 per cent of the tax went to Istanbul in 1519, 76 per cent was remitted in 1571. A survey of the tax taken from the city of Tripoli in the same years shows a somewhat smaller increase, but high overall figures, 75 per cent of it going to Istanbul in 1519, and 90 per cent in 1571.

By the mid-seventeenth century the *iltizam* system, under which the state would contract out the collection of taxes to local notables, had been adopted fairly generally throughout the empire. An examination

¹⁷ I am most grateful to Astrid Meier for her generous assistance in translating and identifying many of the categories of taxation mentioned in Hoblos' article.

¹⁸ That is, those *timars* which were the personal property ('royal domain') of the sultan, his family, and high state officials. Income from other (i.e. non-*khass*) *timars* was not remitted to Istanbul.

of the *miri* revenues of the *muqata'a* of Jubba Bsharri shows that this also involved increases in the amount of tax over time: 8,000 *ghirsh* in 1667, 11,500 in 1775. *Jizya* revenues could also fluctuate precipitously; for example, the figure for Jubba Bsharri doubled between 1815 and 1816. In addition to what might be called 'regular taxes', there was a whole gamut of customary dues. Hoblos estimates that the peasants of the 'Akkar paid an additional 11,900 *ghirsh* in unofficial taxes of various kinds in 1753. A large proportion of this almost certainly went into the pockets both of the *wali* and his staff and of high officials in Istanbul in the form of gifts and bribes.

Although the *Hatt-i Sharif* of Gülhane announced the abolition of *iltizam* as early as 1839, the fact that it was abolished on several occasions in the nineteenth century shows that the state could not easily function without it.¹⁹ In general, it seems that the peasants ended up paying even more than before. Even the '*ushr*', set at 10 per cent, was raised to 12 per cent in the last years of the nineteenth century. Hoblos also shows that many peasants were systematically overcharged for various state administrative services, such as for copies of probate documents. Again, in 1883 and 1904, some 82 per cent of the taxes of Tripoli were remitted to Istanbul and only about 18 per cent was spent locally. Even local expenditures went largely to the salaries of local officials or to the gendarmerie.

Altogether, Hoblos' research reveals a gloomy picture of landlord, tax farmer, and state repression. Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, public services were fairly rudimentary, apart from the provision of public security. For example, between the Ottoman conquest and the Tanzimat (roughly 1516 to the late 1830s) the state did not construct a single new building in Tripoli, although several governors and local grandees built mosques. Again, there were no government-built roads in the 'Akkar; a post office mentioned in the 1906 *salname* is not mentioned in the provincial *salname* two years later, and there were only six schools in the 168 villages in the 'Akkar before the First World War. The record is equally dismal in the poor provision of drinking water or health services. Hoblos considers that the Ottoman state's appropriation of the local surplus amounted to

¹⁹ Cf. 'On the eve of World War I...taxes on cultivation [in Syria] were still being put to public competition, except in the more accessible areas.' Hanna Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables and their Politics*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999, 61.

something very close to full-blown colonialism, and he wonders why there were not more local rebellions like those of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir in Egypt or Fakhr al-Din II al-Ma'n in Lebanon. However, in the late eighteenth century, when the power of the central government was extremely weak, the seizure of power by local notables (or warlords) did not bring about any obvious improvements:

The increase in the power of [the Janissaries and *ashraf* in Aleppo] was actually disadvantageous to most of their fellow Aleppines, who in some respects suffered greater abuse than in the preceding period of effective Ottoman control. Unlike government officials, the local power figures worked from a permanent base in the community and an intimate knowledge of its inner working. They saw in their increased power a license to exploit the public rather than a civic responsibility to serve it.²⁰

Hoblos concludes that while local notables gradually became aware of the negative aspects of Ottoman rule, they also feared the possibility of European colonial encroachment (as had indeed taken place in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) and thus generally remained loyal to the Ottoman state.

Hoblos' statistics are certainly not indicative of a state committed to the welfare of its inhabitants, and it is good to have this demonstrated so unequivocally, but at least two questions come to mind. First, was the Ottoman state more oppressive than its absolutist contemporaries in, say, Spain, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, and second, would an enquiry into tax collection in the Anatolian provinces not yield almost identical results? Given that the administrative arrangements were very similar throughout the Empire, it is difficult to imagine that the Arab inhabitants of Tripoli were subject to any greater exploitation than their Turkish contemporaries in Anatolia, who were also being oppressed by the combined forces of the state and its local partners.²¹

²⁰ Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity*, 94. While some provincial warlords of the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries such as Dhahir 'Umar in Galilee and Ahmad Jazzar Pasha in Tyre have been represented as 'proto-nationalists', seeking freedom from 'Ottoman imperialism', it is difficult to interpret their motivation as other than personal gain.

²¹ Although dealing with a much earlier period, Thomas Bisson's *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship and the Origins of European Government*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008, provides a somewhat comparable account of the pervasive rapaciousness of local lords in situations where centralised public authority had largely broken down.

'Aspects of the economic history of Damascus during the first half of the 18th century' by Mohannad al-Mubaidin shows how the benefits of the revived economy in early eighteenth century Syria were largely confined to a wealthy elite and did not trickle down to the lower social classes; even the increase in seasonal employment generated by the *hajj* caravan was tempered by the sharp rise in prices which almost inevitably accompanied it. al-Mubaidin also confirms one of the themes of Farouk Hoblos' article, to the effect that local notables were only too happy to collude with the Ottoman state and with each other against the interests of both peasants and townspeople.²² The first half of the eighteenth century was a period of renewed prosperity for Damascus after the widespread breakdown in security in late seventeenth century Syria. This was due to a combination of the establishment of greater security, the Ottoman/Safavid wars that adversely affected trade between Aleppo and Isfahan, and the dedication and competence of the 'Azm governors, Isma'il, Sulayman, and As'ad.²³

Until steamships became the preferred means of long distance passenger and commercial transport in the Eastern Mediterranean after the opening of the Suez Canal, one of Damascus' major economic functions was as the starting point of the *hajj* caravan to the Hijaz. Especially for those living far away, the decision to go on the *hajj* implied a major commitment of time and resources, since the pilgrims could well be away from home for months, even years. They would support themselves by buying and selling in the local markets, which always increased in number and volume for the three or four months preceding the departure of the caravan. In addition, significant numbers of Damascenes would find temporary employment in the various provisioning and transport activities associated with the pilgrimage. Contemporary chronicles report on the growth and vibrancy of the markets, especially, in this period, the construction of several wholesale storehouses or *khans* under the patronage and encouragement of the 'Azm family. At the end of the nineteenth century al-Qasatli estimated

²² This *motif* has been developed for the Ottoman Arab provinces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Hidemitsu Kuroki in his article in this volume, James Grehan in *Everyday life and Consumer Culture*, Abraham Marcus in *The Middle East in the Eve of Modernity*, Hala Fattah in *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf 1745–1900*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1997, 139–58, and by many others.

²³ The politics of this period are described in Karl K. Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1980.

that there were as many as five hundred markets in Damascus, some of which had been mentioned in fifteenth century accounts like Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi's *Nuzha al-rifaq 'an sharh hal al-aswaq*.

al-Mubaidin notes that price-gouging and hoarding were commonplace. The barber-chronicler al-Budayri says: 'It reached me that Hamid al-'Imadi, the Mufti of Damascus, hoarded wheat just like the great notables who have no fear of God.' Other chroniclers indicate an attitude of resignation on the face of the artificially high cost of living. The *sijillat* show the involvement of notables, Ottoman officials, and 'ulama in land purchases in and around the Ghuta, where peasant indebtedness rose to such an extent that agricultural production was seriously affected. The debts, recorded somewhat ironically as *qurud shar'iya*, often show extortionate rates of interest, and the peasants would often lose the land they had put up as collateral if they could not make the payments. There is some indication in the sources (and here one might have liked al-Mubaidin to have provided more details) of peasant associations, or at least peasant spokesmen, protesting this state of affairs. The article ends with a useful description of the bewildering variety of copper, silver and gold coinage in circulation in Damascus in the first half of the eighteenth century, and the Porte's attempts both to limit the amount of gold in circulation and to fix exchange rates.²⁴

The last article in this section, Daniel Crecelius' 'Damiette and Syrian-Egyptian trade in the second half of the eighteenth century', discusses the changing conditions of trade in the eastern Mediterranean in the period 'on the eve of modernity', before Napoleon's expedition to Egypt. Crecelius has undertaken extensive research on the history of modern Egypt on such topics as Mamluks, 'ulama, and waqf, basing his work particularly on eighteenth century primary sources. In the course of the eighteenth century the Ottoman government lost control over its major eastern Mediterranean ports to European interlopers and local 'warlords' or adventurers. In the latter part of the century, this was one of the results of the seizures of power in Egypt by 'Ali Bey al-Kabir (1768–72) and then Ibrahim and Murad (1775–98), the rise

²⁴ This topic is discussed in more detail (and over a longer time period) in Şevket Pamuk, 'Money in the Ottoman Empire', in Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 947–85. On p. 948 Pamuk describes the period 1690–1844 as one of 'attempts to establish a new silver standard around the Ottoman *kuruş*; relative stability of the *kuruş* until the 1760s, followed by severe fiscal crises and rapid debasement.'

and fall of Dhahir 'Umar in Galilee, Ahmad Jazzar Pasha in Acre and (though somewhat earlier and in different ways) the period of 'Azm supremacy in Damascus. Although Egypt and Syria are linked by a land bridge, the trade caravans passing between them seem to have been quite small, and very little statistical information about them has survived. On the other hand, there is a good deal of information on sea-borne trade in French, Ottoman and Egyptian sources.

Greek Catholic merchants from 'Syria' dominated this trade, especially under Dhahir 'Umar and Ahmad Jazzar Pasha, the local warlords who made fortunes exporting cotton from Acre. In Egypt, the Greek Catholics began their rise to prosperity in the 1760s, when they were given the *iltizam* of the customs by 'Ali Bey al-Kabir. They enjoyed the protection and favour of the Mamluks, and competed effectively with French and other European traders established in the ports of Egypt and the Levant; they knew local suppliers intimately and could negotiate the best prices. In addition, they gradually built up a substantial trading network of their own, stretching from Italy to the Indian Ocean.²⁵ Daniel Panzac's careful studies of Ottoman maritime trade are invaluable for the study of this period. The main axis of this trade was the Istanbul/Alexandria nexus, but Rosette and Damiette were also important, shallow draught river ports where goods had to be off-loaded onto smaller vessels to cross their harbour bars. Given the lack of security prevalent for most of the eighteenth century, cargoes destined for Cairo were often unloaded at Rosette and then brought along the Nile to the capital. Alexandria remained the main Egyptian Mediterranean port, visited by ships of many nationalities, while Damiette specialised in trade with the ports of the eastern Mediterranean, particularly Syria, Crete, Cyprus and the Greek islands.

Greek Catholic pre-eminence in this period is epitomised by the career of Antoine Phara'un Qassis, who appointed many of his relatives as customs agents in all the ports in Egypt except Suez. By the 1780s he and his associates had begun to tap into the India trade, and their activities had severely weakened French trading houses in Egypt and Syria. In the course of the eighteenth century (as Thomas Philipp's recent study of Acre has shown in detail) several eastern Mediter-

²⁵ For an interesting discussion of 'trading diasporas', see K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 224–28.

anean ports, notably Damiette, Jaffa and Acre, experienced periods of extraordinary growth followed by rapid decline. In Acre, Dhahir 'Umar and Ahmad Jazzar Pasha created cotton monopolies, forcing the French to deal directly with them or with their Greek Catholic agents rather than with the cultivators. Many factors led to the decline of Acre, including the wars of the latter part of the eighteenth century, the competition between Greek Catholic merchants, and the activities of Ahmad Jazzar. In contrast to Alexandria, which is on the edge of the desert, Damiette was located in the middle of a rich agricultural area, with a secure water supply from the Nile. It prospered from its expanding trade with the ports of *Bilad al-Sham* in the second half of the eighteenth century and its population was estimated as between 20,000 and 30,000 in 1777, or about twice the size of Alexandria at the time. But eventually both Rosette and Damiette fell prey to the exactions of the beys in Cairo, who now acted as autonomous rulers of that most important of Ottoman provinces, and many merchants left Egypt in the mid 1780s.²⁶ Ibrahim and Murad audaciously withheld the annual remittance to Istanbul for years, offered commercial treaties to the British and French, condescended to the arrival of European ships from India in the port of Suez, and dismissed Ottoman governors who challenged them. In 1786, Murad's threats against the French led finally to the despatch of an Ottoman expedition to Egypt under Ghazi Hasan Pasha, who temporarily drove the duumvirs from Lower Egypt. In the years between the departure of Ghazi Hasan Pasha from Egypt in 1787 and the arrival of Napoleon's army in 1798, Egypt experienced one of the most chaotic periods in its history. Unremitting political tyranny under Ibrahim and Murad exacerbated the series of human and animal plagues that struck Egypt before the arrival of the French. As a result, Damiette's population shrank to about a thousand in 1801, and when Muhammad 'Ali began to restore Egypt's economic

²⁶ Flight was an alternative always open to merchants. Compare the following description of Kuwait: 'Sabah family rule, though well established, remained limited until well into the twentieth century. This was because the merchants, owing to their financial power, could still check Sabah designs. The financial influence of the merchants came from their control of trade and imports, duties on which sustained the Shaikh.... The ultimate tactic the merchants had at their disposal was secession.... Because rulers knew segments could leave, merchants could use their voice. A large secession could reduce the shaikhdom's economic and military power...' Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1995, 21.

fortunes in 1805, he concentrated on Alexandria, with its deeper and more extensive harbour, with the result that Damiette never regained its former importance or prosperity.

Space, Urban Institutions and Society in Bilad al-Sham

This section contains four chapters by Stefan Weber, Brigitte Marino, Toru Miura and Stefan Knost, dealing with aspects of the history of the built environment of Saida, Damascus, and Aleppo. Stefan Weber's 'The making of an Ottoman harbour town: Sidon/Saida from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries', is based on several years' study of the city that combines archaeological fieldwork with work in European, Ottoman and local archives, a technique pioneered by Weber and his colleagues in Beirut over the past decade. The paper shows how the urban landscape of Sidon was fundamentally transformed by the 'trans-regional activities' of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (Grand Vizier of the Empire from 1565 to his death in 1579) in the mid-sixteenth century, the waqf of Küçük Ahmed Pasha, made up of the confiscated estates of the Druze Amir Fakhr al-Din Ma'n (d. 1633) and finally by the al-Hammud family, local notables in Sidon in the first half of the eighteenth century.

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was famous for his building activities all over the empire, particularly in the Balkans. In Syria, in addition to constructing Khan al-Franj in Sidon, which was used to store goods coming from or going to the harbour, to merchandise them and to host travelling merchants,²⁷ he also rebuilt part of the port of Tripoli, and constructed an entire new city at Payas, which he envisaged would become the port of Aleppo. Incidentally, Khan al-Franj in Sidon was part of the same waqf as Khan al-Jumruk in Aleppo, and thus part of a 'supra-regional network of trading cities'. It also seems to have been Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's plan to create Sidon as the port of southern Syria. In the early seventeenth century the governor of Damascus, Küçük Ahmed Pasha, endowed an enormous waqf made up of the confiscated properties of the Druze Amir Fakhr al-Din, who had built a large number of buildings in Sidon while creating a 'principality' in the region between 1591 and 1611. In spite of being forced into

²⁷ There is a description of it by D'Arvieux in the seventeenth century.

exile, Fakhr al-Din was a major force in the region until his defeat and capture by Ottoman forces (under Küçük Ahmed Pasha) in 1635; the *waqfiya* of his confiscated properties is enormous. It contains commercial and administrative structures including his *saray*, a huge khan, storehouses, shops and prestigious houses.

The third phase in the urbanisation of Sidon came shortly after, and was partly facilitated by, the legalisation of *malikane*, grants of tax-farming for life, in 1695. Various members of the Hammud family became *multazims* for Sidon and used the money generated from these activities to build splendid houses in the first half of the eighteenth century.²⁸ The city continued to prosper until the time of Dhahir 'Umar and Ahmad Jazzar Pasha, both of whom made Acre the centre of the region's economic activity. In this way Weber positions Sidon within the broader framework of Ottoman history, from the great territorial expansion of the state in the sixteenth century through the various crises of the early seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the latter process being interpreted either as evidence of the diminution of central control or of the consolidation of the notables' stake in the state.²⁹

Brigitte Marino's paper, 'Les constructions d'Isma'il Pacha al-'Azm à Damas (1137–1143/1725–1730)' describes the extraordinary number of building projects undertaken by Isma'il al-'Azm during his five year governorship of Damascus. The court records testify to his acquisition of building plots in the vicinity of the Citadel and south of the Umayyad mosque, as well as what seems the remarkably speedy construction of a large variety of buildings, including houses, shops, cafés, *hammams*, a *madrasa* and a *saray*. The records also show details of Isma'il's expenditures: for instance, he spent about 41,000 *ghirsh* between February and

²⁸ Perhaps most notably Dar Debbané, which Weber and his colleagues have excavated.

²⁹ Historians of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century are divided over whether the increasing acquisition of power by local notables (particularly through *malikane*, the granting of a tax-farm-for-life to an individual and his descendants—which formed the basis of the fortunes of the Hammud family) represents, on the one hand, state weakness, or on the other, the closer involvement of more members of the provincial elite, who thus 'became heavily vested in the survival of the Ottoman polity' as small(er) urban-based landed gentry. The creation of something akin to property rights also facilitated the commercialisation of agriculture. See the detailed discussion in Dina Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540–1834*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 75–108 (from which the quotation is taken).

September 1729. In the process, run-down quarters of the city were revitalised and rebuilt. The court records are also a vital source for the vocabulary of building techniques and materials, and for the various trades associated with construction.

Little is known about the urban history of Damascus in the seventeenth century, but in the early eighteenth century Isma'il Pasha made major contributions to the city's urban fabric, in particular by clearing sites whose buildings had become dilapidated and/or uninhabited. The court records are the unique documentary source for this burst of building activity in the early eighteenth century, and they also provide details of the decoration and dispositions of internal domestic space which rarely feature in the real estate transactions of this period. The documents also testify to the participation of skilled Christian artisans in the building trade during this period.

Toru Miura's paper on 'The Salhiyya quarter of Damascus in the mid-Ottoman period: the ambiguous relations between religious institutions and waqf properties' discusses the survey of waqf properties ordered by Sultan Selim shortly after the Ottoman conquest. There are four volumes of *waqfiya* documents relating to sixteenth century Damascus for this period in the Başbakanlık archives, some 15 per cent of them (482 documents) relating to institutions in Salhiyya. According to Ibn Tulun, the government survey met with a fair amount of resistance. Miura thinks that the duplications (about 16 per cent of the total number of *awqaf* were recorded twice in the volumes) may indicate that the survey had to be done several times before it could be completed. Miura divides the purpose of the donations into three categories: charitable purposes only (40.4 per cent of the total), charitable *and* familial purposes (15.8 per cent) and finally familial purposes only (43.8 per cent). As well as listing the purpose of each donation, he lists its date, the type of property endowed (e.g. orchards, vineyards, fields, villages), its location, and the names and rank (e.g. military, 'ulama) of the donors.

Miura draws three main conclusions from his data. First, it emerges that urban development was greatly dependent on income from agricultural or village properties, which form the overwhelming majority of the donations. Second, there is a substantial preponderance of family waqf. Third, the survey lists very few waqf properties donated much before the first half of the sixteenth century, that is, before the survey was undertaken, suggesting that they had either fallen into disuse, or had been illegally converted into private property. While we

know a fair amount about large public donations, we know much less about smaller endowments, a category which Miura considers should be given more attention than it has in the past.³⁰

Finally in this section, in 'The impact of the earthquake of 1822 on the administration of waqf in Aleppo', Stefan Knost discusses aspects of the reconstruction of the city in the aftermath of one of the greatest natural disasters in the modern history of Syria. He examines the frequency of *hikr* and *khulu 'urfi* contracts, making a comparison between the period 1790–1810 and 1824–26. *Hikr* is the long-term rental of waqf property, usually a plot of land on which the tenant may build or plant, acquiring full property rights in the building(s), trees, etc. Only seven cases of *hikr* were recorded for 1790–1810, while there were seven in 1824–25 and fourteen in 1825–26, clearly one consequence of the destruction brought about by the earthquake. The other type of alienation of waqf property is *khulu 'urfi*, the ownership of property built on waqf land, in practice applied mostly to shops. There were twenty-one cases in the earlier period. For example, a tenant built a bread oven in a shop, and the oven became his property while he continued to pay rent for the shop, but there were only seven such cases in 1824–26. As far as new endowments were concerned, 180 were established between 1790 and 1810, and only nine in 1824–26, four by a single wealthy individual, Isma'il Agha Shurayyif Zadeh. Altogether, according to al-Ghazzi, about a thousand buildings were destroyed in the earthquake, and 750 of these were still derelict in 1900. Knost concludes that (unlike Egypt, where a lot of waqf found its way into private hands through the corrupt use of devices like *hikr*), very little 'illegal' alienation of waqf seems to have taken place either before or immediately after the earthquake of 1822.

The Ottoman State and Local Society in Bilad al-Sham

The next section contains six articles by Steve Tamari, Massoud Daher, Astrid Meier, Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual, Martha Mundy

³⁰ See Ruth Roded, 'Great mosques, *zawiyas* and neighborhood mosques: popular beneficiaries of waqf endowments in 18th and 19th century Aleppo', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 110, 1990, 33–38; 'The Waqf and the social elite of Aleppo in the 18th and 19th centuries', *Turcica*, 20, 1988, 71–91, and Margaret Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770–1840*, Austin, TX, University of Texas Press, 1999, Chapter 5, 'Endowment and Family Structure', 178–206.

and Hidemitsu Kuroki. In 'Arab national consciousness in seventeenth and eighteenth century Syria,' Tamari suggests that it is possible that the notion of 'Arab ethnic identity' may have a rather longer ancestry than is commonly thought, basing himself on 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi's *Kitab al-Qawl* (1692), which contains extensive quotations from a treatise by the Damascene Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi (d. 1651). Essentially, both authors stress the primacy of the Arabs in Islam and their sense that their homeland, Syria, is part of *bilad al-'arab*. They are proud of their Arab descent, the presumption of 'chosen-ness' within Islam that this implies, and their innate capacity to understand, and express themselves in, the language of the Qur'an. These three factors combine to make them superior to non-Arabs, and specifically to Turks (and to Persians, although the Persians would have had little immediate resonance for al-Ghazzi or al-Nabulusi). What al-Nabulusi seems to be reacting against in particular is the preaching of the Kadizadeli movement, which had been influential during the seventeenth century, one of whose main complaints was that excessive Sufi influence had caused Muslims to abandon the *sunna*. Given that the Kadizadelis were all of Turkish origin, al-Nabulusi seems to be accusing them of the overzealousness of the recent convert. Of course, his assertion of Arab superiority denies the essentially egalitarian nature of Islam as set out both in *tafsir* and in the main hadith collections.³¹

There is little point in rebuking either author for taking liberties with history and/or theology. There is no reason to doubt that the Syrians quoted here were deeply attached to their land and to their 'Arabness'. Tamari quotes Walker Connor's definition of the nation as 'a group of people who *believe* they are ancestrally related.' I am not quite sure

³¹ Although the superiority was expressed the other way round (non-Arabs claiming equality with, or superiority over, Arabs) the issue here bears some resemblance to the Shu'ubiyah controversy in the early Islamic period. In 'The Shu'ubiyah Controversy and the Social History of Early Islamic Iran,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 7, 1976, 161–82) Roy Mottahedeh stresses that the Shu'ubiyah was more a literary controversy than anything 'overtly political'; it cannot be construed as a project of national liberation. In addition, the weight of Qur'anic exegesis favours an egalitarian interpretation. Thus al-Baydawi says (on Qur'an 49:10): "'The believers are brothers" since they claim common descent (*muntasibuna*) from a single source, which is belief (*al-iman*).' Mottahedeh's discussion then turns to the question of what *sha'b* or *shu'ub* actually means, and the difficulty experienced by the early Arab Muslims in comprehending the notion that peoples could be organised on other than genealogical principles. Partisans of the Shu'ubiyah movement seem to have understood the term in the sense of a people linked by common origins in a land.

what 'believe' means here. Could one, for example, substitute 'who have been told' for 'believe'?³² The main difficulty, as Tamari recognises, is that we are used to thinking of nations and nationalism as phenomena originating in the Treaty of Westphalia, and further elaborated by the experience and aftermath of the French revolution. Again, it is difficult to pinpoint how 'far back' in history the concept of national consciousness can reasonably be posited. While both al-Ghazzi and al-Nabulusi evidently resent some aspects of Ottoman rule, and exhibit pride in their Arabness and their mastery of the Arabic language, it is not easy to see where this takes us. After all, the Ottomans were by no means the first non-Arabs to rule *Bilad al-Sham* when they arrived in 1516. It may well be that both our authors' prime objections were to the 'Turkish' Kadizadeli fundamentalists' denunciations of the more tolerant Islamic practices prevalent in Syria (such as Sufism, smoking, drinking coffee, music, and so on), objections which they expressed in what may be construed as 'nationalist' terms.

In 'The Lebanese leadership at the beginning of the Ottoman period: a case study of the Ma'n family', Massoud Daher charts the rise and fall of the first of the major Lebanese emirates between 1516 and 1697. Fakhr al-Din I (1516–44), the first member of the Ma'n dynasty to serve the Ottomans, may or may not have fought on the side of Selim I at the Battle of Marj Dabiq (and thus have been rewarded for his service with the emirate of the Shuf), but he emerged soon afterwards as a local force to be reckoned with. The Ottomans divided the territories they conquered from the Mamluks into *wilayas*, *sanjaks* and *nahiyas*, and assigned qadis and military governors to the larger administrative divisions. However, they farmed out the task of tax collection to powerful local leaders, who maintained their positions by a combination of bribery of the local Ottoman officials and asserting themselves over less local power-holders/fief-holders/*muqata'jis*. The Ma'n family holdings (*muqata'at*) were originally divided among the three *wilayas* of Damascus, Tripoli, and Sidon. The family had not been prominent under the Mamluks, but was strong enough under the Ottomans to be in charge of dividing the tax-farms assigned to it among a number of lesser local notables.

³² Compare Mottahedeh (p. 179): with the passage of time, '[m]uch of the Near East chose to speak Arabic, and by this token they came to assume that they were descended from the ancient Arabs even if they had lost the intermediate genealogical steps that would explain this descent.'

By the end of his reign, Fakhr al-Din I's authority extended from 'the borders of Jaffa to Tripoli'. He was succeeded by his son Qurqumaz, who was involved in frequent conflicts both with his neighbours and with the Ottomans for reasons almost endemic to the tax-farming system, which involved constant jockeying for power. Qurqumaz' enemies finally succeeded in assassinating him in 1585; he was succeeded by his thirteen-year-old son, who became Fakhr al-Din II, in 1591, after a hiatus of six years, thanks to the vigilance and energy of his mother Nasab al-Tanukhi. Fakhr al-Din II (1591–1635) was the most renowned of the Ma'nid rulers, although in many ways his position was as precarious as that of his predecessors and his successors. In the 1610s he defeated his two principal opponents, Yusuf Sayfa and Amir Mansur ibn Furaykh. This, coupled with his attack on Damascus in 1607 (together with other local lords), evidently alarmed the Ottomans, who sent an army against him in 1613. Fakhr al-Din decided to abdicate (temporarily) in favour of his brother Yunus and his son 'Ali, and spent the next five years in exile in Europe.

In 1618 he returned to Lebanon where he ruled more or less unchallenged over an area generally coterminous with the modern state for the next fifteen years. The Ottomans were probably too engrossed in their wars with the Safavids to give any serious attention to the situation in the Levant. Eventually, however, the *wali* of Damascus, Küçük Ahmed Pasha, was despatched at the head of an army against Fakhr al-Din, who was defeated, captured and taken to Istanbul, where he was executed in 1635 along with Yunus and 'Ali. Greatly weakened, the dynasty continued until the death of Ahmad (r. 1658–1697) when its functions were taken over by the Shihab family. When the Ma'ns came to power in the early sixteenth century, they either overcame other local families or made alliances with them in order to survive. Both Fakhr al-Din I and Fakhr al-Din II greatly expanded the territory of the original Imarat al-Shuf while acting as the principal local tax-farmer (*multazim*) for the Ottoman state. The emirs interacted 'upwards' with the Ottoman state and 'downwards' with the various *muqata'jis* below them. The ultimate precariousness of their position is best illustrated by the fact that over the more than three centuries of the two Lebanese emirates (1516–1840) only two significantly strong leaders emerged, Fakhr al-Din II (1591–1635) and Bashir Shihab II (1788–1840). In general, the tax-farming system meant that the *multazims* always served 'at the sultan's pleasure', and given this degree of insecurity, it is not surprising that, within the limits of the taxpayers' physical ability to

pay, the tax-farmers would try to collect as much tax as they could. The extraordinarily oppressive and unjust nature of this system (as also described by Farouk Hoblos) can easily be imagined.

In 'Patterns of family formation in early Ottoman Damascus: three military households of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', Astrid Meier shows how closely the rise and fall of individual notable family fortunes was related to the political and economic context. Recent scholarship has begun to challenge the notion that the rise of the *a'yan* was linked to the weakness of the central state, and instead has suggested that the relationship was very much more nuanced, an ongoing process of dialogue, negotiation and 'conflict management'.³³ The three families under discussion, the 'Azms, the Kiwanis and the Qurmushis/Mardam Beks show distinctly different patterns of family formation (in the sense of adopting strategies intended to secure the family's future or continuing status and prosperity). The 'Azms had a long history of connections with the Ottoman state. Many of them had tax-farms-for-life in central Syria, whose periodic re-granting required constant lobbying and 'investment' in Istanbul. This did not always work, in the sense that some family members had their properties confiscated, and some were even executed. The sons married into prominent local families while many of the daughters remained unmarried in order to preserve the family patrimony.

The Kiwanis were long associated with the janissaries. Their founder was Kiwan ibn 'Abdullah, a Mamluk in the service of the Ottoman governor of Gaza in the late sixteenth century. He became janissary commander of Damascus at the beginning of the seventeenth century and took sides with 'Ali Junblatt and Fakhr al-Din II Ma'n in their rebellion against the Porte. He subsequently went into exile in Tuscany with Fakhr al-Din in 1613.³⁴ He was assassinated in 1623, but left a large endowment, which was secured for his successors by the payment of an enormous bribe to the appropriate individual at the Porte. One of his descendants became *amir al-hajj*, and members of the family continued to be prominent in the janissaries during the eighteenth century, losing their ascendancy, in Meier's words 'in exactly the same power struggles from which the 'Azms emerged victorious.' The

³³ See Khoury, *State and Provincial Society*, and Jane Hathaway, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1800*, London, Pearson Longman, 2008.

³⁴ See p. 332 below.

third family, the Qurmushis, became prominent after Mustafa Bek al-Qurmushi seized control (from his mother) of the endowment complex of his distant ancestor Lale Mustafa Pasha in Damascus, thus ensuring considerable prosperity for his male descendants. The Mardam Beks, who were evidently related to the Qurmushis, only became prominent in the nineteenth century, but their prosperity was also linked to the Lale Mustafa Pasha endowment that they now controlled. Hence the three families managed to acquire or maintain prominence and/or prosperity in a variety of different ways, generally illustrating very different kinds of relationship with the Ottoman state.

'La société damascène et la campagne analysée à travers les registres de cadis' by Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual is based on two sets of late seventeenth-century documents: the probate inventories of deceased members of the Ottoman military (*mukhallafat*), who came under an administrative jurisdiction separate from that of the civilian population,³⁵ and the records dealing with the guardianship of minors (*muhasabat*). Both groups of documents give extraordinary insights into aspects of contemporary rural society. The paper describes the separate administration of the affairs of the various branches of the military. In the course of the seventeenth century, the *sipahis*, who had formed the majority of the imperial troops, gradually decreased in number, while the number of janissaries rose. However, with the decline of the *devşirme* or 'collection' system of recruitment to the janissaries, which began at the end of the sixteenth century,³⁶ members of the force (in Damascus and elsewhere) began to be recruited locally, and in addition, with the depreciation of the currency at much the same time, they began to live outside the barracks and took up a variety of 'civilian' occupations to supplement their incomes. Pascual's previous research on the 1620s has shown janissaries owning orchards and vineyards in the Ghuta, and flocks, houses and agricultural equipment in villages as far away as the Biqa' and the Hawran.

Over time, the janissaries married local women, and the male descendants of these marriages (*kuloğlu*) came to identify their interests with

³⁵ The affairs of civilians came under the *qassam* 'arabi while those of the military were dealt with by the *qassam* 'askari.

³⁶ See Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1650: The Structure of Power*, Basingstoke, UK, Palgrave Macmillan 2002, 134–40. At the time of their original foundation the janissaries were recruited from the non-Muslim population and educated at the imperial palace.

the local population, often siding with the locals against the *walis* sent from Istanbul. This tendency did not escape the notice of the imperial authorities. Several hundred imperial troops (*kapı kulları*) were sent to the city in 1659 and took over the Citadel and other strongholds then occupied by the 'locals' (*yerliyye*). In the 1680s and 1690s the two factions fought each other on several occasions, the *yerliyye* siding with their 'fellow townsmen' against the governor and the *kapı kulları*. The relevant register of the *qassam* 'askari deals largely with the last decades of the seventeenth century, when the *yerliyye* were becoming increasingly involved with the economy of the city and its hinterland. As well as being politically turbulent, these were also years of plague, poor harvests, infestations of locusts and shortages of basic commodities.

The authors compare the probate inventories of deceased military and civilians, and find that the average value of the estates of both groups was more or less the same. Both groups were owed money by rural debtors, and both owned comparable quantities of rural properties. However, it is clear from the names of many of the civilians that they were the descendants of janissaries, and if this is taken into account, it emerges that very substantial amounts of rural property of various kinds were held either by serving military men or the descendants of those who had once served in the military.³⁷

While the probate inventories, drawn up 'once and for all' after the death of the deceased, inevitably present a static picture, the records of the administration of the estates of minors contain a fair amount of narrative, since the process could continue for several years. The records contain family histories (of the deceased and his heirs), and contrary to the somewhat negative account of such activities given by Linant de Bellefonds,³⁸ reveal a high degree of scrupulous attention to detail, and a real effort on the part of the guardians or administrators to act in the best interest of their wards. Most *wasis* or guardians who were not immediate relatives of the children were high civil servants or senior military men, or members of the judicial and religious establishment of the city. Both the court and the guardians were concerned to

³⁷ Abdul-Karim Rafeq has noted the same tendency (of members of the military buying up village properties and lending money to villagers) for Hama in the 1530s: see 'The Economic Organization of Cities in Ottoman Syria...', 124–28.

³⁸ Yvon Linant de Bellefonds, *Traité de droit musulman comparé*, Paris, Mouton, 1973.

maximise the returns on the children's inheritance, making sure that agricultural estates were properly run and that the interest on debts, and eventually the debts themselves, were collected in a timely manner. The guardians presented their accounts annually, a procedure which continued until the death of the guardian, the attainment of majority by the child or, given the high mortality rates, the death of the child (which would involve a recalculation of the inheritance). Many of these documents offer very detailed information on the management of estates, the amounts paid to various different categories of workers (shepherds, those in charge of rearing silkworms, seasonal workers employed during the harvest—high wages perhaps indicating a shortage of labour—share-cropping arrangements, and so on). The exploitation of these two kinds of document seems likely to yield information on social and economic realities not easily obtainable elsewhere.

Martha Mundy's 'Islamic Law and the Order of State' is a very detailed examination of a particular point in Islamic law discussed by many jurists in collections of *fatwas* dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, namely, whether or not a cultivator is allowed to leave the land he has once cultivated, and following that, whether he remains responsible for the taxes which fell due on that land in his absence. Some of the jurists consider that various instances of *force majeure*, such as Bedouin depredations, permit the cultivator to leave without penalty; none of them consider that 'forced return' or its possible financial consequences are sanctioned by the sharia. Some accept the principle of the exigencies of state (or the orders of the timariot), that cultivation is a crucial element of the state's capacity to provision itself.

The discussion was given greater urgency during the Ottoman period by the (regularly reported) excesses committed by the soldiery in the Syrian countryside, which occasioned constant complaints and a wave of rural to urban flight, especially in the seventeenth century. To some extent, it seems that the Syrian 'ulama came to support the peasantry because they were upholding their 'Islamic legacy' against the Ottomans (see Steve Tamari's paper). The jurist Hamid al-'Imadi (d. 1759) considered that the imposition of a fine on a cultivator who left his village was *bid'a*, and furthermore, that cultivators could not be obliged to return to a village whose lands had been devastated by Bedouin raids. Eighteenth century legal commentators in Syria were generally agreed that a village cannot oblige an absentee to pay an 'absence tax', and that force cannot be used against him. With al-Nabulusi

(d. 1731) this had become generalised to the cultivator having the 'freedom to live where he chooses in God's land,' and '*al-mu'min amir nafsihi*,' the believer is his own lord, a declaration which he extends to *dhimmis* as well. Previous jurists' opinions on this are rejected as simply invalid. The argumentation is extremely rich, and it is not possible to do justice to it in a brief summary.

Hidemitsu Kuroki's 'Account books of oppression and bargaining: the struggle for justice and profit in Ottoman Aleppo, 1784–90' tells a story of state injustice and urban protest, in which, alas, the oppressed were not rewarded with the justice they sought. As described by Bodman and Marcus, Aleppo was the theatre of violent urban politics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a time when the Empire seemed to be losing its hold on many of its further-flung provinces. The people of Aleppo expelled their governor five times between 1775 and 1819 (and again in 1850); as elsewhere in the Empire, the Aleppo governors' period in office was typically quite brief,³⁹ and they tried to extract as much as possible from the city and the province while their appointment lasted. Kuroki's account, which is based on a contemporary chronicle by Yusuf ibn Dimitri al-Halabi and on the *awamir sultaniya* for the period, deals with one of these episodes and its aftermath, the expulsion of the *wali* Keki 'Abdi Pasha in 1784.

The beginnings of 'Abdi Pasha's governorate (July 1784) did not augur well. His militia killed four local janissaries, and he himself arrested the leaders of the principal Christian communities, ordering them to wear special clothing, an ordinance from which they were only released in exchange for a hefty fine. Three months of 'black deeds' followed, during which the citizens tried to avoid trouble by staying indoors most of the time. At the beginning of October the local janissaries (*yerliyye*) began to fight back, ordering shopkeepers to close their shops. They managed to win over the qadi, who ordered the cancellation of the call to prayer. Eventually the *wali*, his aides and some of his militia were blockaded in the *saray* and were only released through the mediation of the qadi, who arranged safe passage out of the city for them. 'Abdi ended up in Raqqa on the Euphrates (where

³⁹ This did not change significantly under the Tanzimat; al-Ghazzi records some 31 governors of Aleppo between c. 1848 and c. 1900. Kamil al-Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab fi Ta'rikh Halab*, 3 vols., Aleppo, al-Matba'a al-Maruniya, 1923–26, vol. 3, *passim*.

he was later appointed governor), and Aleppo was left without a *wali* of its own for some fourteen months.

After these dramatic events the townspeople prepared for what they thought would be the inevitable violent retaliation on 'Abdi's part. One of the janissary leaders appointed a small troop of soldiers to be in charge of security within the city, and fees of 1000 *ghirsh* were collected from the four leading Christian communities to act as a kind of war chest. At the same time, a long petition detailing the *wali*'s crimes was drawn up and taken to Istanbul by a delegation from the city on 15 October. Kuroki's appendices show the details of 'Abdi's exactions from the city quarters, the guilds, and various prominent individuals. For example, he had extorted (and appropriated for himself) a payment greater than the annual *jizya* from the non-Muslim population.

In the end, 'Abdi did not retaliate by attacking the city directly. Instead he seized sheep and camels from a recalcitrant Kurdish tribe, and obliged the Aleppines (by means of a sultan's order to the qadi dated January 1785) to buy them for 72,000 *ghirsh* and send the proceeds to Istanbul. The animals were sent to Bab (about 20 miles from Aleppo), but the numbers and quality of the sheep and camels fell far short of 'Abdi's claims and, eventually, the auction at Bab only raised some 19,000 *ghirsh*. Over the next four years, the Porte pressed its claim for the restitution of the whole 72,000 *ghirsh*. 'Abdi, meanwhile, died in office as *wali* of Diyarbakr in 1790.

Several points emerge from this complicated episode. First, the language of the petition sent to Istanbul was cast in terms of the 'Islamic moral economy',⁴⁰ referring to the various injustices committed by the *wali* as *zulm*, oppression, and asserting the townspeople's entitlement to justice, *'adala*. Second, the townspeople used the qadi as mediator, both during the negotiations leading up to the *wali*'s departure and in the drafting of the petition to Istanbul. The qadi had sided with the 'rebels' against tyrannical rule in 1775, and would do so again in 1804 (but not, interestingly, in similar situations in 1819 and 1850). Third, the Porte appeared utterly indifferent to the sufferings of the towns-

⁴⁰ Compare Edmund Burke III, 'Towards a History of Urban Collective Action in the Middle East: continuities and changes', in Kenneth L. Brown, Bernard Hourcade, Michèle Jolé, Claude Liauzu, Peter Sluglett and Sami Zubaida, eds. *Etat, Ville et Mouvements Sociaux au Maghreb et au Moyen Orient/Arab and Muslim Cities: the State, Urban Crisis and Social Movements*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1989, 42–56, and Sami Zubaida, 'Urban Social Movements, 1750–1950', in Peter Sluglett, ed., *The Urban Social History of the Middle East...*, especially 224–39.

people, and continued to press for the restitution of the money for the livestock for some four years from a citizenry that had already been bled dry, although, in the end, the documents do not indicate explicitly whether or not the money demanded was actually repaid. It is probably too fanciful to describe the organisation of resistance and the security measures taken by the local soldiery as early manifestations of 'institutions of civil society', but it would be interesting to know whether similar arrangements were made during other periods of rebellion against the local representatives of the Ottoman state.

Religion and Society in Bilad al-Sham

The next four papers, by Bernard Heyberger, Bruce Masters, Souad Slim and Dick Douwes, discuss aspects of the history of the Christian, Isma'ili and 'Alawite communities in Syria between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries. Heyberger's *Écrire l'histoire des chrétiens dans les villes de Syrie* welcomes recent historical studies, including those by Abdul-Karim Rafeq, which have shown that it is no longer useful to think of the history of 'the Christians' as being somehow separated from the history of the rest of Ottoman society.⁴¹ In broad and general terms, the Ottoman authorities generally accepted that they ruled a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, and did not expect, still less sought to impose, religious conformity. On a mundane level, as the records of the sharia courts show, Muslims and *dhimmis* lived next door to each other as a matter of course.⁴² *Dhimmis* appear regularly in the sharia court, as both plaintiffs and defendants, not only in cases involving matters of business or other civil actions, such as *mudaraba* contracts between Muslim providers of capital and Christian agents,

⁴¹ See Rafeq's two articles on the guilds, 'Craft Organisation, Work Ethics and the Strains of Change in Ottoman Syria', 1991, and 'Craft Organizations and Religious Communities in Ottoman Syria', 1993, both of which show how the integration of members of different religious communities in the workplace is taken for granted.

⁴² This is evident from the *sijillat*, where a person's 'home address' is normally recorded in terms of the names of his neighbours (in the quarter of X, opposite the house of A and next to the house of B). See also the tables of the mixed residential quarters of Aleppo in Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth, *Aleppo: Historische und geographische Beiträge zur baulichen Gestaltung, zur sozialen Organisation und zur wirtschaftlichen Dynamik einer vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole*, Wiesbaden, Reichert, 1984, 417–34. The tables are based on information derived from al-Ghazzi.

but also marrying and divorcing each other in front of the qadi.⁴³ It is quite clear from the way in which the *dhimmis* were treated in the sharia courts and from other evidence from contemporary sources that they did not think of themselves, and were not perceived, as 'outsiders', and that they were integrated both socially and economically into local society. Heyberger points out that one of the main qualifications of a good dragoman would be his knowledge of the networks which would connect him to the local Ottoman administration and his capacity, in general, to utilise and exploit the system. As far as the religious communities were concerned, in what became a dispute over the succession to the Orthodox patriarchate of Antioch, a delegation of those who favoured the succession of the late patriarch's grandson appeared in court before the chief qadi of Aleppo in September 1678 to assert the superiority of their candidate's claims. By the 1720s, a similar succession dispute had become more overtly symbolic of the wider conflict between 'Greek Catholics' and 'Greek Orthodox', which involved the papacy, the relevant patriarch in Istanbul, and, once more, the local sharia court.

Although Islamic legal tradition did not differentiate between the Christian sects (*kufr milla wahida*) the court was clearly regarded as the place of natural resort for rulings on questions affecting succession to high clerical office and/or the consequences of the defection of substantial numbers of Christians from one sect to another.⁴⁴ In time, of course, particularly by the first decades of the nineteenth century, the effects of Catholic teaching would eventually introduce clearer notions of what distinguished Christians from Muslims, and, if not more important, what distinguished Catholics from other Christians (the *franj* versus the *Rum*). Together with the arrival of Protestant missionaries from the United States in the 1820s, this tendency towards more specific communal definition would lead both to a proliferation in the number of millets and to closer identification with a particular

⁴³ Although it has always been assumed that they had 'perfectly good' courts of their own, '[e]vidence for the existence of full-fledged communal courts appears to be anecdotal and sporadic.' See Najwa Al-Qattan, 'Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 31, 1999, 429–44. In any case, no records of the communal courts have survived.

⁴⁴ Which would obviously affect the number of *jizya* payers in each group. See Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: the Roots of Sectarianism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, 80–95.

millet on the part of the laity and clergy associated with it.⁴⁵ Utilisation of the Ottoman, papal, consular and court archives combines to give a comprehensive picture of local realities.

A more specific aspect of this same theme is discussed in Bruce Masters' 'The establishment of the Melkite Catholic millet in 1848 and the politics of identity in *Tanzimat* Syria'. By obtaining their own millet, the Melkites joined the company of the Orthodox (*Rum*) and Armenian churches, and the more recently constituted Armenian Catholic (1830) and Jewish (1835) communities. By 1900, the number of official millets would rise to twelve. Historically, the Patriarch of Constantinople had exercised religious jurisdiction over the Christians of the East since the Council of Chalcedon in 451. The Arab conquest reduced rather than eliminated this influence, but it began to peter out altogether under the Mamluks. In addition, the Eastern and Western churches had parted company after the Great Schism of 1054. Left largely to their own devices, the Christians of Syria became accustomed to selecting their own leaders (as patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria, and bishops and metropolitans in other cities).

The arrival of Catholic missionaries from Europe in the early seventeenth century encouraged the Orthodox hierarchy (that is, the Patriarchate of Constantinople) to ask the Ottoman authorities to grant it greater powers over the further flung provinces of the church in order to control the activities of, or at least keep a watchful eye upon, the 'Frankish priests.' In the eighteenth century there were still 'only' two millets, so that all Christians were assumed to be under the umbrella of *either* the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate *or* the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate. In practice, non-Orthodox Christians who were not Armenians (Copts, Jacobites, Maronites, Nestorians) fell under the nominal authority of the Armenian Patriarchate, which sometimes did, and sometimes did not, interfere with their internal affairs.

In the Balkans, growing ethno-linguistic nationalism among the Christian population encouraged the emergence of 'national' autocephalous churches with Slavonic liturgies, over which the Patriarch of Constantinople continued to exercise somewhat less authority than

⁴⁵ Some of the consequences of these developments are set out in two studies by Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000, and *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2008.

he had done in the past. In Syria, where Benedict Anderson's idea of the 'nation' would not be fulfilled until the twentieth century, a schism began to develop between the Orthodox on the one hand and the Melkites on the other, with the latter eventually quitting the embrace of the former. The basis of the Melkite claim, partly fictive and partly supported by Catholic missionaries, was that the Melkites had 'always' been Catholics, but that their connection with Rome had been severed after the Mamluk conquest. For its part the papacy was happy to support the claim, as it had been training Syrians for the priesthood for many decades, and these individuals, all Arabs, gradually gained seniority within the church in Syria. In contrast, the higher ranks of the Orthodox hierarchy were always occupied by Greeks (for instance, from the monasteries of Mount Athos), most of whom spoke little or no Arabic and were in this and other ways quite alien to their congregations.

In 1729, the papacy sent the cloak of office (*pallium*) to Kyrillos Tanas, whom the Melkite faithful had chosen as Patriarch of Antioch in 1724. At this stage, Ottoman recognition of the validity of the claims of either the Orthodox or the Melkites evidently depended on which side paid more. By 1818 it looked as if the Orthodox had emerged the victors after an order by Mahmud II forbidding 'Frankish rites' was delivered to Aleppo by an emissary of the Orthodox patriarch who was intent on imposing his superior's will. This led to an outbreak of violence in which eleven Catholics were killed and several priests exiled from the city.

Succour for the Melkites came rather unexpectedly a couple of years later, when the anti-Ottoman revolt that broke out in the Peloponnese caused waves of anti-Greek (and by extension anti-Orthodox) feeling in many parts of the Empire. At this juncture the Melkites could credibly assert that while they may have been *Rum*, they were not *Yunan*. They and their clergy were all Arabic speakers, a point which gained them recognition from the governor of Aleppo as a *ta'ife*, the Rum Katolik. In 1823, a group of Muslims in Aleppo made a deposition in the court on behalf of the Rum Katolik, who, it was claimed, now formed the majority of the city's Christian population,⁴⁶ asking that 'their' churches should be given back to them and urging that measures should be taken to discourage any further flight of Melkite merchants,

⁴⁶ See the article by Souad Slim, p. 474.

which had had deleterious effects both on local trade and on the collection of the *jizya*. They also stressed the loyalty of the Rum Katolik to the sultan, and stated that as far as their rites were concerned they were simply following the traditions of their ancestors.

In 1830, the Armenian Catholic millet was recognised. Three years later Maksimus Mazlum, the new Melkite patriarch of Antioch, began a campaign to have his own flock recognised as a millet. On a visit to Istanbul in 1841 he obtained a declaration to the effect that the Melkites were indeed separate from the Orthodox (*Rum-i atik*), and were now a sub-group of the Catholic millet, headed by the Catholic patriarch in Istanbul. As can be imagined, this proclamation of identity was not quite enough. Mazlum always referred to the new Catholic millet as the 'Armenian millet' in correspondence. Furthermore, there were other matters like vestments to consider, since neither the clergy nor the laity wanted the clergy to dress like Latinis. Eventually, the Melkites agreed to wear a six-sided hat and violet or blue (not black) cassocks. In 1845, Mazlum got his own patriarchate, and the Melkites were given a separate millet in 1848. They were required to submit to the patriarch's authority under pain of prosecution in (where else?) the sharia court. Hence the Melkites gained 'home rule', but not a 'national church', as the nation was not yet 'imagined'. At the very beginning of the twentieth century, fear of poaching by both the Melkites and the Protestants finally prompted the Orthodox Church to appoint an Arab Patriarch of Antioch, but the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem is still in Greek hands. For reasons which are not entirely clear, the Greek Catholics did not play as prominent a role in the Arab national movement as their earlier history might have led posterity to expect. George Antonius, Michel 'Aflaq and George Habash, perhaps the most prominent Christian Arab nationalists, were all Greek Orthodox.

Souad Slim's paper on 'Christian waqf in early nineteenth century Aleppo' discusses the waqf accounts of the Armenian, Greek Catholic, Jacobite and Maronite communities between 1805 and 1832. These documents are filed with other waqf documents in the registers of the sharia courts of Aleppo, now in the Syrian National Archives in Damascus. Waqf income was derived mostly from rents on shops and houses, and at this stage, before the implementation of the reforms of 1856, the accounts were drawn up in the name of the bishop of each community. The early part of the nineteenth century saw intense conflict between Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox, which was eventually

resolved to the general advantage of the Catholics as a result of political developments arising from the Greek War of Independence. By this time the Catholics in the city were very much more numerous than the Orthodox; there were 700 Catholic families and only 35 Orthodox. In addition, the Catholics had long been making a very substantial contribution to the city's economy both from their trading activities and from the amount they paid to the authorities in *jizya*.

Each community's waqf seems to have incurred a small but regular annual deficit, which seems particularly curious given the well-attested increase in the prosperity of the Greek Catholics in particular. Expenses consisted mainly of repairs to properties and the cost of candles and oil for liturgical purposes. The communities were also obliged to pay small amounts of *avantias* (extraordinary or 'non-canonical' taxation levied on the townspeople as a whole). Although these sums were to be paid by the individual communities as collectivities (much like the *jizya*), the amounts in question seem to have reflected either outdated economic information or the inability of the less well off to bribe the collectors, since the wealthy Greek Catholics paid the least and the indigent Jacobites the most. Other administrative expenses included registration fees, payments for *hikr* or subletting waqf property,⁴⁷ various payments to tax collectors and of course disbursements to the poor of each community, in whose name, incidentally, all Christian *awqaf* were founded. Some of the categories of expenditure are quite vague ('necessary expenses', 'community affairs'), which suggests that the communities may have had some degree of latitude in the management of their financial affairs.

The last paper in this section, Dick Douwes' 'Migration, faith and community: extra-local linkages in coastal Syria', concerns aspects of changing attitudes to religion and religious practice among the Isma'ilis and Nusayris in the late Ottoman and early mandate periods, which came into being as part of the dynamic of 'modernity'. Although north-western Syria was fairly remote, the more effective penetration of the Ottoman state in the second half of the nineteenth century ensured that the region was gradually exposed to the mechanisms of the wider world. Douwes is concerned to view these developments through local rather than imperial or colonial lenses, as has been the case in the past.

⁴⁷ Also discussed in Stefan Knost's paper.

Historically, the two communities have been regarded as 'heterodox' by Sunni Muslims, and the attitude of the Ottoman authorities towards them varied between toleration and hostility. One aspect of the state's attitude is symbolised by a sort of *jizya* or head tax imposed on Nusayri men in the early Ottoman period, *dirham al-rijal*.⁴⁸ On the other hand, 'individual Nusayris [served] as Ottoman bureaucrats and sometimes attained high office.'⁴⁹ In the late nineteenth century, the Nusayris found themselves on the receiving end of 'Abd al-Hamid II's efforts to promote himself as a pillar of Sunni orthodoxy, and there were several attempts to 'convert' them to Hanafi Islam.⁵⁰ A further reason for the state's increasing interest in guiding the sect back to the paths of religious orthodoxy was that it had been the target of (admittedly not especially successful) Western missionary endeavour from as early as the 1830s, partly because of some confused notion that Nusayri beliefs contained elements from the pre-Islamic Christian past.

An important aspect of the process Douwes describes is the gradual formalisation of the practices (and perhaps the beliefs) of the Nusayris and Isma'ilis. In the mid-nineteenth century, the practices of both sects were highly localised, reflecting the influence, or 'sanctity', of individual holy men, focussed around shrines, for neither sect had a tradition of communal worship in mosques. The shrines were often tended by families of *mashayikh 'ilm* whose authority often transcended clan borders, and who acted as mediators and judges, apparently in much the same way as Ernest Gellner's 'saints of the Atlas'.⁵¹ In the course of the nineteenth century, some members of the Syrian Isma'ili religious leadership travelled to India in order to establish, or re-establish, links with the hierarchy of the Isma'ili community which was based there.

⁴⁸ '...it remains unclear as to whether the Nusayris were discriminated against by the fiscal authorities on religious grounds...apostates had no legal rights...[and]...[a]ccording to Islamic law they should not be tolerated at all. Yet, society had become accustomed to their continuing presence, including the legal authorities who allowed them access to the Islamic court.' Dick Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: a History of Justice and Oppression*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000, 142–43.

⁴⁹ Stefan Winter, 'The Nusayris before the Tanzimat in the eyes of Ottoman provincial administrators, 1804–1834', in Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, eds., *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon*, Beirut and Würzburg, Orient Institut der DMG, 2004, 97–112.

⁵⁰ These efforts seem somewhat half-hearted, indicative, perhaps, of the general unwillingness of the Ottoman state to force conformity upon its subjects. See Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1998, 83–84.

⁵¹ *Saints of the Atlas*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969.

In 1887, most Syrian Ismaʿilis, now largely concentrated in Salamiya, to which many had emigrated, declared their loyalty to the Agha Khan.⁵² This occasioned considerable alarm on the part of the Ottoman authorities, who found it difficult to countenance the notion that a 'British Indian prince' should be the community's spiritual leader. Over time, especially with the advent of the French mandate, this gradually ceased to be controversial. An important consequence for the community was that since the visiting of shrines and the 'cult of saints' were strongly discouraged by the Agha Khan as heterodox practices in the 1920s, the shaykhly lineages gradually lost their authority.

Similar developments took place among the Nusayris/ʿAlawis in the twentieth century with the movement led by *al-rabb* Sulayman al-Murshid from the late 1920s. Like the Agha Khan, al-Murshid insisted on his own absolute authority and disdained the shaykhly lineages, although, since all his constituents were in Syria, the movement was a purely local phenomenon. He was elected to the Syrian parliament in 1937 and 1943, but was hanged on trumped up charges by the Shishakli regime in 1946. The movement bearing his name, al-Murshidiya, has continued to challenge the authority of the traditional religious shaykhs. Like the Ismaʿilis, the ʿAlawi community has tended to embrace 'modernity' either by becoming increasingly secular or by trying to identify more closely with mainstream Twelver Shiʿism, the transnational equivalent of Nizari Ismaʿilism.⁵³ In the two communities, therefore, both the definition of the sacred and the nature of sacred authority have undergone fundamental changes over the last century.⁵⁴

⁵² Following a challenge to his authority in the Bombay courts by some dissident members of the sect, the Agha Khan was officially declared the head of the 'Shia Imami Ismaʿilis' in 1866. This was Hasan ʿAli Shah, who led the community between 1817 and 1881. A small group, perhaps a fifth of Syrian Ismaʿilis today, living mostly in Masyaf and Qadmus, still support the Muʿmin Shah lineage (the Agha Khans are from the Qasim-Shah lineage). See Farhad Daftary, *A Short History of the Ismaʿilis: Traditions of a Muslim Community*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1998, 198–203.

⁵³ For a series of complex reasons, in 1973, 'the Syrian regime sought religious sanction, a ruling that the Alawis were a legitimate branch of Islam. This was where Sayyid Musa [al-Sadr], then head of the Higher Shia Council in Lebanon, stepped in and provided a fatwa that the Alawis were a community of Shia Islam.' Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1986, 174.

⁵⁴ Compare Nelida Fuccaro, *The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial Iraq*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999.

Europeans in Bilad al-Sham

This section contains two papers by André Raymond and Leila Fawaz, on two very different Europeans in nineteenth century Syria. In 'Aux origines du plan d'Alep par Rousseau: le plan de Vincent Germain de 1811', Raymond discusses the antecedents of one of the principal works of 'modern' cartography, the map of Aleppo attributed to Consul Jean-Baptiste Rousseau (1780–1831). The map was completed in 1818 and published by the Société de Géographie de Paris (established in 1821) with the encouragement of one of the Society's founders, Barbié de Bocage.⁵⁵ An earlier map of Aleppo by Alexander Russell contains some fifty place names, while Rousseau's has 278, clearly a major advance.

Rousseau's own account of the making of the map states that, as Consul-General in Aleppo in 1811, he had ordered a preliminary sketch to be made by 'a young man attached to the consulate,' which he himself then completed on a subsequent visit to the city in 1818. From other diplomatic correspondence it emerges that the 'young man' was Vincent Germain, a long-time resident of the city, who took over his late father's business in 1818.⁵⁶ Rousseau's account suggests that his own contribution to the map was of fundamental importance, whereas Raymond's careful comparison of the two stages of the map shows that Germain had already contributed the lion's share. The 1818 map is essentially Germain's map of 1811, with some additions. The basic outlines of the city are identical in the two maps, with the same successful renderings (the city within the walls and the Mdineh) and the same failures (the arbitrary street plan and the inaccuracies in the northern and western suburbs).

Germain has 161 place names and Rousseau 278; Rousseau has 15 additional place-names in the Mdineh, and another 43 in the city within the walls, presumably because both parts of the city were fairly readily accessible to foreigners. Rousseau added more names in the

⁵⁵ The Society is one of the oldest learned/scientific societies in France. Two of its founders, E.F. Jomard and Joseph Fourier, had been members of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and had contributed to the *Description de l'Égypte*, which included another major contemporary cartographic achievement, the map of Cairo. See Lucien Gallois, 'Le centenaire de la société de géographie de Paris', *Annales de Géographie*, 30, 1921, 374–78.

⁵⁶ The absence of information about Vincent Germain after June 1822 suggests that he may have been a victim of the great earthquake of 1822 (described in Stefan Knost's article).

northern parts of the city mostly inhabited by Christians, which had developed quite strikingly between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Even here, however, while Germain distinguished between the Armenian, Greek Catholic, Maronite and Syriac churches in Saliba, Rousseau was content to label them all 'églises des Maronites'. Rousseau also added several of the textile workshops and small factories which formed the basis of the prosperity of the Christian quarters. In contrast, the eastern part of the city, where the inhabitants were generally poorer and more closely connected with Aleppo's rural hinterland, was not so well covered. Rousseau also left out several of the names of posterns which feature on Germain's version of the map. Part of the difference in emphasis, Raymond suggests, may have been that while Germain was interested in showing how the city might be entered or occupied militarily, such considerations were no longer relevant by 1818. Rousseau, in contrast, was more concerned to display the city's commercial and manufacturing activities and its economic potential. As Raymond concludes, 'Instrument potentiel de conquête, le plan serait ainsi devenu une œuvre de connaissance.'

Leila Fawaz' paper, 'Memoirs of a French woman traveller to the Levant', is based on the unpublished diaries of the Comtesse de Perthuis, who visited the region in 1853–55 and 1860–62. The principal purpose of both these visits was to see her son, Edmond, 'the most powerful foreign resident in Beirut in the second part of the nineteenth century.'⁵⁷ The Countess was evidently a lively and exuberant woman, much interested in what she saw and heard, and her diary provides a window onto a rapidly changing world. Her high status gave her an *entrée* into the upper reaches of both local official and expatriate society at a time when foreigners were becoming increasingly involved in the economy of the eastern Mediterranean. Understandably, she was

⁵⁷ Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: the Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005, 87. As well as being the local agent of *Messageries Maritimes*, Edmond de Perthuis was president of the Compagnie Ottomane de la route de Beyrouth à Damas and later of the Société Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Damas-Hamah et Prolongements. In another part of her memoirs Edmond's mother describes travelling between Beirut and Damascus in May 1862 along the road her son's company was building (it opened on 1 January 1863). See Leila Fawaz, 'The Beirut-Damascus Road: Connecting the Syrian Coast to the Interior in the Nineteenth Century', in Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schaebler, eds., *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Centuries: Integration and Fragmentation*, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1998, 19–28. de Perthuis left Beirut in 1903 after forty years residence in the city; Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 220.

limited by her lack of knowledge of the language and by a somewhat condescending attitude, but she had a keen sense of adventure and a ready enjoyment of simple pleasures, and was obviously moved by the friendliness and hospitality of ordinary people. Her descriptions of chance encounters with families while on picnics, or of *le beau monde de Beirut* are written with great charm, a keen eye for the absurd and the pretentious, and a genuine appreciation of spontaneous decency and generosity.⁵⁸

Bilad al-Sham in the Late Ottoman and Mandatory Periods

The last section on the Ottoman and late mandate periods consists of four papers by Peter Sluglett, Sarab Atassi, Maher al-Charif and Dalal Arsuzi-Elamir. Peter Sluglett's 'Municipalities in the late Ottoman Empire' is a brief survey of the literature on this topic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In general, the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman state was a fairly despotic political structure in which the subjects had duties rather than rights. On the other hand, there was little governmental regulation, and little interference by the state in the lives of its subjects. By the late eighteenth century, as has been mentioned in other papers, the state's capacity to control the provinces and the provincial cities had greatly declined, and urban government was largely in the hands of Mamluk soldiery (in Egypt and Iraq) or powerful local figures. This changed considerably over the first half of the nineteenth century, but ironically, the centre's attempt to rein in the powers of 'over-mighty subjects' often backfired to the extent that the expansion of the bureaucracy in the later years of the Tanzimat gave powerful locals the opportunity to place their relatives in key offices.

As Ma'oz in particular has shown,⁵⁹ the capacity of energetic and reforming provincial governors to implement policy was often blocked by the provincial councils, who could drag their feet, not come to a decision, or otherwise frustrate those of the *wali's* plans to which they might be opposed. For example, the council could decide on the amount of tithes that the province should pay. Again, as was mentioned earlier,

⁵⁸ The diaries have now been published. See Fouad Debbas, ed., *Voyages en Orient: journal de la comtesse de Perthuis 1853–1855/1860–1862*, Beirut, Dar al-Nahar, 2007.

⁵⁹ Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840–1861*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968.

almost all governors had very short terms of office, which meant that it was often easy for the council, all permanent residents, to manipulate them. In 1877 the Municipalities Law ordered each town above a certain size to have an elected municipal council and an appointed mayor. Its duties would be to supervise town planning, the water supply, public health and so on.

Municipal councils had been set up rather earlier in Galata, one of the most Europeanised districts of Istanbul, and in Alexandria, but in spite of the fact that they were almost entirely composed of foreign residents, both bodies 'failed' because the foreigners' diplomatic representatives were determined to ensure that the capitulatory regime was preserved, meaning, essentially, that foreigners should not be taxed. The only obvious success was the Jerusalem municipality, composed of both locals and foreigners, which took charge of paving the streets and collecting garbage, and employed a municipal physician to give free treatment to the poor. On the eve of the First World War it had made elaborate plans for a citywide water supply and the provision of street lighting. It must be assumed that independent municipalities are one of the rungs on the ladder leading to local democracy and the promotion of civil society. Of course, more research will be needed to see whether late nineteenth century municipalities did turn into one of the building blocks of a more democratic society, or whether they merely functioned as yet another means of domination by notables.

Sarab Atassi's 'Dar 'Uthman Nuri Pasha et le développement des quartiers de al-'Affif et de Jisr al-Abyad à la fin de l'époque ottomane' discusses the development of the 'new suburbs' of Damascus adjacent to Salihyya on the lower slopes of Mount Qasyun in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The main focus of the article is a large house on the south western side of Salihyya, constructed by 'Uthman Nuri Pasha in 1884–85. The house was formerly the headquarters of Amir Faysal, King of Syria, between October 1918 and March 1920,⁶⁰ and subsequently the residence of General Gouraud, the first French High Commissioner. Since November 1928 it has been the property of the French state and is currently the official residence of the French ambassador to Syria.

The house and the suburbs around it were built at a time when important changes were taking place in the Ottoman Empire, and

⁶⁰ In March 1920 Faysal moved to the house of Nazim Pasha; see p. 542 below.

when new influences were filtering into the economy and society of *Bilad al-Sham*. After the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha's Egyptian troops in 1841, the reforms of the Tanzimat began to be applied in Syria. In general the Sublime Porte wanted to impose a new urban model on the larger provincial cities and new laws were passed governing town planning. Streets had to be a certain width, and buildings were to be constructed of stone instead of wood. Damascus gradually took on a different aspect, especially after 1860, when much of the Barada river was covered over and construction began on a new administrative complex around Marjeh Square. Other structures, notably the column in the middle of the square and the Hijaz Railway station, would follow at the beginning of the twentieth century. Solid modern buildings were intended to set the state's reforms in stone.

In addition to these changes in the more public areas in the city there were changes in domestic architecture. Many new houses in the suburbs had oriel windows, and windows looking onto the street. Notable families were building summer residences higher up the mountain to escape the summer heat, and by the 1880s and 1890s entrepreneurs were building more modest houses with kitchens, bathrooms and dining rooms in the new quarters along the roads leading out of the city. Dar Ziwar Pasha (now destroyed) and Dar 'Uthman Nuri Pasha were two of the largest modern villas built at the very end of the nineteenth century. The latter, which was built on a slope, is a two-storey house measuring about 2030 square metres. Its first owner was commander of the Ottoman Fifth Army and subsequently twice governor of Syria (in 1889 for six months and in 1892 for nearly three years). The house appears in several documents in the court records. There are details of a mortgage taken out by the owner and of a court case in which 'Uthman Nuri Pasha was unsuccessfully sued for having appropriated property on waqf land.

Several years later, under the twelve year governorship of Nazim Pasha, there were significant extensions to Salihyya and al-'Afif, and the development of new quarters to house Muslim refugees from the Balkans and Crete, many of whom were given building plots free of charge. Nazim built his own house in the middle of a large garden, in which he constructed a silk tent to receive Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898. In 1912–13 the introduction of electricity by a Belgian concessionary company made possible the construction of a tramway linking Marjeh Square and Jisr al-Abyad, with subsequent extensions to Shaykh Muhi al-Din and Muhajirun. Atassi, who is director of the Atelier du

Vieux-Damas at the Institut français du Proche Orient, expresses her dismay at the absence of any official policy on the part of the city authorities for the preservation of buildings from the early modern period until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many of them have been sacrificed quite arbitrarily to various 'development' efforts in recent years.

In 'Comment approcher l'histoire moderne de la Palestine?' Maher al-Charif notes a growing interest in the history of late Ottoman Palestine. One of the first works in the field was 'Adnan Bakhit's study of Haifa; Abdul-Karim Rafeq has made major contributions to the field in his study of Gaza⁶¹ and in a long article in *al-Mawsu'a al-Filastiniya* in 1990. Sixteenth and seventeenth century Palestine has been studied mostly by Israelis, who almost always publish in English. There have also been a number of recent studies based on the court records, including the studies of Nablus by Akram al-Ramini (1979), Bahjat al-Sabri (1986) and Beshara Doumani (1995). 'Adil Manna' and Salim Tamari have made use of diaries and private papers. Charif points to three main areas of controversy among historians: first, when to date the beginning of the modern history of Palestine, second, questions of continuity and change in the late Ottoman period and the debate about the beginnings of Palestinian identity and third, the crystallisation of modern national consciousness.

Dating the beginning of the 'modern period' is quite controversial. Alexander Schölch recognised the importance of the Egyptian occupation under Ibrahim Pasha (1831–40), but believed that real change only began after the Hatt-i Hümayün of 1856, when the Ottoman reforms were largely in place and when European economic penetration began in earnest. 'Adil Manna' thinks that the 'modern period' began much earlier in the nineteenth century, while Beshara Doumani considers that fundamental change was already under way in the early eighteenth century. As far as continuity and change are concerned, it is difficult to pinpoint an obvious break with the past. Societies subject to European colonisation went through a long period of transition, which in many cases is still not complete. Some historians consider that Napoleon's expedition had an adverse effect on transformations which were already taking place, but Charif believes that the pace and nature of European penetration in the late nineteenth century

⁶¹ See James Reilly's article in this volume.

added a new social dynamic which had not been previously present in Arab societies.

Charif has an interesting critique of Beshara Doumani's *Rediscovering Palestine*. One of Doumani's principal emphases is on the relationship between peasants and merchants, and the important linkage between city and countryside, showing that aspects of what may be called the capitalist mode of production existed in Jabal Nablus well before the Egyptian occupation, the Tanzimat, European economic expansion or Jewish immigration and settlement. For his part Charif thinks that the changes introduced in the late nineteenth century were qualitatively different. In the first place, there was a very substantial increase in the population of Palestine during the nineteenth century (from about 280,000 to about 600,000). He also considers that 'money' should not be equated with 'capital', and that capitalist development was only possible with the various Ottoman land laws, after 1858, which permitted a free market in land, and with the transformation of the peasantry into wage labourers. Doumani is aware of these developments but suggests that a 'rural middle class' had emerged before the 1850s and played a key role in the process. Charif attributes much greater importance to the emergence of a class of large landlords: by 1909, 134 landowners possessed some 3.1 million donums (about 766,000 acres) of estates between them.

The third area of discussion is the emergence of identity and modern national consciousness. Palestine was not a single administrative entity under the Ottomans, but its division into several *liwa's* did not mean that each one of them formed a distinct unit. In a review of 'Adil Manna', Butrus Abu Manneh suggests that by 1841 the various administrative changes had planted the seeds of the notion that Palestine was an entity in itself, centred administratively on Jerusalem, partly a result of the creation of the *wilaya* of Syria and the *mutasarrifiyya* of Jerusalem, so 'Palestine' was not simply a colonial invention in 1920.⁶² Charif is not convinced that this administrative unification

⁶² Very much the same kinds of assumption have been made about Iraq, that the British created this 'unwieldy state' in a careless and arbitrary fashion. In fact, 'Iraq', very much as it is now, was a more or less unified political entity under the authority of whoever controlled Baghdad for most of the period between the 'Abbasids and the First World War. See Reidar Visser, 'Historical Myths of a Divided Iraq', *Survival*, 50/2, April–May 2008, 95–106.

was particularly significant;⁶³ in order for national identity to emerge, a social class must be in existence capable of conceiving and developing this unitary idea, which itself requires a formal separation between 'knowledge' and 'religion', a secular educational system, the printing press, and so on. The notion of a fatherland probably developed at the time of the second *aliyah*, between 1904–14, and appears in the contemporary Palestinian press. Clearly, Palestinian nationalism was a part of early Arab nationalism, and went through a number of changes dictated by political circumstances, perhaps most notably the dispositions of the Treaty of San Remo in April 1920 and the overthrow of Faysal's government a few months later. Finally, Palestinian national consciousness, which took root in the 1920s, is only one part of Palestinian identity, which is also composed of ties to the 'Arab nation' and to religious, familial and regional allegiances, which often go back to the distant past.

The last paper in this volume is Dalal Arsuzi-Elamir's 'The uprisings in Antakya 1918–1926: guided by the centre or initiated on the periphery?' Like other national historiographies, the official history of Syria has paid little attention to risings originating far from the centre of nationalist power. In the Syrian case this is partly because such movements had something of a dual character, in the sense that the simple binary opposition of nationalists *vs.* imperialists was more ambiguous, especially during the 'Arab kingdom', the period between October 1918 and July 1920. Of course, given the lack of homogeneity in the late Ottoman Empire, the diversity within the national movement is scarcely surprising.⁶⁴ The main focus of the paper is the various

⁶³ Although it is worth remembering Benedict Anderson's matter of fact approach: 'To see how administrative units could, over time, come to be conceived as fatherlands, one has to look at the ways in which administrative organisations create meaning.' *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London and New York, Verso, 1991, 53.

⁶⁴ '...in post-Ottoman Syria, the nationalist field included a disparate collection of activists, organizations, and constituencies that expressed their nationalisms through discourses that were likewise disparate.' James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997, 141. Cf. also Gilbert Clayton to Sir Mark Sykes, 28 November 1917: 'There is no doubt a very real fear amongst Syrians of finding themselves under a government in which [the] patriarchalism of Mecca is predominant'. (Quoted Gelvin, 153).

risings which took place around Alexandretta and Antakya with varying intensity between 1918 and 1926.⁶⁵

Antakya had been part of the *wilaya* of Aleppo since the early days of the Ottoman conquest, and this continued after the reorganisation following the Law of Vilayets of 1864. The region was mixed both ethnically and by sect, with Arabs and Turks, Sunnis and Alawites, and Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians. By 1920 most of the rural dwellers were Arab Alawites, although some villages were completely Greek Orthodox or Armenian; a common pattern was that of Alawite or Christian peasant sharecroppers working on land held by Sunni landowners. At the very end of the Ottoman period there was a fair degree of disenchantment with Ottoman rule, especially after 1909, and the associations familiar from other Arab provinces had founded branches in northern Syria. Thus Najib al-Arsuzi, father of one of the founders of the Ba'ath party, joined *al-'Ahd* in Aleppo. After the war and the installation of the Arab kingdom in Damascus there were movements in support of Faysal, one of which collected 18,000 signatures on a petition in support of an Arab government. From late 1918, and through 1919 and 1920, there were frequent episodes of armed opposition to the French in northern Syria on the part of guerrilla bands, *'isabat*, and this continued in some places until 1926.⁶⁶ There were also attacks on Turkish forces in the region as well as attempts, most notably on the part of Ibrahim Hananu, to come to some sort of accommodation with the Kemalists against the French.

Although mostly directed against the French occupation, the revolts in the north were clearly not organised from the centre; at least at the beginning, many *'isabat* had ties with similar bands (*chete*) operating in what would soon become southern Turkey. For the most part the guerrilla actions were spontaneous disavowals of the new political arrangements being imposed by the French within Syria, and of the

⁶⁵ Thus '...despite the undoubted popular, anti-imperialist and nationalist character of the Great Revolt [sc. 1925–27], there were certain classes and communities which either did not join the revolt or sided with the French. For example, the revolt did not involve the Alawite territory, which remained well insulated under French protection, or the Sanjak of Alexandretta, with its vocal Turkish minority' Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: the Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1987, 205–06.

⁶⁶ See Nadine Méouchy, 'Le mouvement des *'isabat* en Syrie du Nord à travers le témoignage du chaykh Youssef Saadoun (1919–1921)', in Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett, eds., *The British and French mandates in comparative perspectives/Les mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative*, Leiden, Brill, 2004, 649–72.

new frontier with Turkey, which had the effect of cutting many inhabitants of the region off from their social and economic hinterland. While Arsuzi-Elamir contends that the revolts showed the attachment of the local population to Arabism (and it is clear that many supported the nationalist slogan *al-istiqlal al-tamm*, complete independence), recent historiography cautions against 'idealism' and encourages historians to seek pragmatic, if less noble, rationales. No doubt both elements were present, in varying degrees.

This is a very wide-ranging collection of essays on aspects of the history of *Bilad al-Sham* from the very beginnings of Ottoman rule to the mandate and beyond. Many contributors have drawn attention to those aspects of Dr. Rafeq's work which point to an ecumenical vision of the past, where Christians and Muslims laboured next to one another, lived next door to one another, and tolerated, without embracing, the other's vision of the world. Like Butrus al-Bustani, much of Dr. Rafeq's work has emphasised 'the mutual respect between faiths which should exist and did once exist.'⁶⁷ At a moment in history when some have sought to portray the relationship between Islam and Christianity, or Islam and the West, as perennially confrontational, it is good to have authoritative proof, based on the most rigorous scholarship, that this is not how things always were or need to be. I hope this volume will stand as a worthy expression of our collective gratitude to Abdul-Karim Rafeq, meticulous scholar, gentle humanist, and true 'man of the *nahdha*'.

⁶⁷ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, 102.

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PART ONE

ENCOMIA: RAFAQ THE HISTORIAN

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ, FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE

MUHAMMAD ADNAN BAKHIT

I am delighted to have this opportunity to say a few words about my dear friend and respected colleague Dr. Abdul-Karim Rafeq.

As students at the American University of Beirut, my friends and I would often visit the office of our revered teacher, the late Dr. Nicola Ziadeh, to ask his advice and to check on the new publications which he received from all over the Arab world. One day he told me that a professor from the University of Damascus named Abdul-Karim Rafeq had visited him, and that he had written an excellent book about Damascus during the eighteenth century, published in English by Khayyats in Beirut. Professor Ziadeh asked me to read the book and summarise part of it as a requirement for one of my graduate courses. The book was based on Rafeq's doctoral dissertation, written in 1963 under the supervision of Professor Peter Holt, Professor of Arab History at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, a noted scholar and a man of great modesty and integrity.

From that time onward, I wanted to get to know Abdul-Karim Rafeq. I learned that he was born in Idlib in 1931; that he completed his primary and secondary studies there and then attended the American College in Aleppo, where he learned English and French while continuing to master Arabic. He then became a student at the History Department at the Faculty of Arts at the Syrian University (it became the University of Damascus in 1958). In those days many great scholars from *Bilad al-Sham* were on the faculty of the university, including George Haddad, Nur al-Din Hatum, 'Umar Farrukh from Beirut, Sa'id al-Afghani, Shukri Faysal, the Damascus poet Shafiq Jabiri, and the geography professor 'Umar al-Hakim. Later they would be joined by 'Abd al-Karim Gharayba as well as Nabih 'Aql when he returned to Damascus. During this important stage in Middle Eastern history, the university was known for having students from all over Syria and the rest of *Bilad al-Sham*: Jordan, Lebanon, and especially Palestine, after the *nakba* of 1948 had obliged many Palestinians to come to Damascus. The university also attracted students from North Africa and the rest of the Arab world, as it invited great thinkers to participate in

intellectual events. Following the *nakba*, political thought in the Arab world flowed out of the halls and lobbies of this university.

Abdul-Karim Rafeq attended the Syrian University in this exceptional environment, learning not only historical methodology and Arabic from distinguished teachers, but also research skills and academic ethics. When the university sent him to London, he had to delve deeper into books, manuscripts, and the French archives in Paris and in the Chamber of Commerce in Marseille. Needless to say, he read the reports of the British consuls from Damascus and other cities of *Bilad al-Sham* as well as the reports of the East India Company, the de Redcliffe papers, and other documents and manuscripts. In addition, he enrolled in classes in European history and in Turkish at the University of London.

In my desire to learn more about Idlib, the town of Dr. Rafeq's birth, I checked various geographical sources and the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, and, to my surprise, found nothing. I then discovered that until 1660 it had been a small *timar* (60 km from Aleppo, 300 km from Damascus and 120 km from Latakia) until Muhammad Pasha Köprülü, who was grand vizier between 1656 and 1661 appointed his son, Ahmad Fadhil Pasha—who would eventually succeed him as grand vizier—as governor of Damascus, to put down a rebellion which had begun in Aleppo and Damascus. Muhammad Pasha ordered the establishment of a village in Idlib, which would later become known for its khans, such as Khan Abi 'Ali and Khan al-Ruz, and for its baths and markets. In addition, Muhammad Köprülü decided to divide central and southern *Bilad al-Sham* into the provinces of Damascus, Sidon, Tripoli, and Aleppo. Also of note was Köprülü's transfer of a number of *kapi kul* soldiers from Istanbul to Damascus to replace the Janissaries that had taken part in the rebellion. In the eighteenth century these troops, with the *Yerliya*, would become one of the most powerful forces in the province of Damascus. Hence the geographical area where Dr. Rafeq was born, and where he would later conduct his research, was first mapped out by members of the Köprülü family, who thus unwittingly facilitated his efforts.

A successful university student is the best yardstick for measuring the achievement of a university, as the student is the end product of all that the university has to offer. This is why Dr. Rafeq has always directed his efforts primarily towards students, starting with students from the University of Damascus, then from the University of Jordan, and finally from the Lebanese University. Then he focused on students

of Arabic and Islamic studies in the American universities where he has taught: the University of Pennsylvania, Chicago, California, Los Angeles and the College of William and Mary. In order to reach his noble goal he realised the importance of publishing. His first book, *Studies in Arab History: Bilad al-Sham and Egypt from the Ottoman Conquest to the campaign of Napoleon Bonaparte, 1516–1798*, was published in 1967 and has been very widely read. His second book, *The Arabs and the Ottomans 1516–1916*, was published in 1974 and was reprinted many times. His third book, *The Arab Mashriq in the Ottoman Period*, was published in 1999–2000. He concluded this series with his second to last book, *Economic and Social Studies in the Modern History of Bilad al-Sham and Damascus*, published in 2000. His most recent book is a history of the University of Damascus, a token of affection to his alma mater.

The importance of these books lies in Dr. Rafeq's ability to discuss the history of the Arab world in detail and with complete honesty. He was able to bring students closer to primary sources, references, and the latest publications in the field. In this way he has played a significant role in connecting students with the real world, explaining how to tackle historical topics through reliance upon primary sources such as manuscripts and official correspondence, tracing the main lines of development of the balance of power in the provincial capitals and in the region as a whole, and researching the local causes of events. In Rafeq's own words, 'The important thing is to follow the trajectory of historical development, and always to ask why things happened in the way, at the time, and in the place that they did.'

After he returned from the University of London to the University of Damascus, Dr. Rafeq became aware of the value of the *sijillat* of the sharia courts and the *awqaf* records for historical research. He began to make use of this material at the same time as the late Professor Ahmad 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karim was encouraging academic institutions in Egypt to publish local sources and to study the registers of the office of the Egyptian Notary Public. This led Dr. Rafeq to becoming interested in books of *fiqh* and collections of *fatwas*, and in studying the records of the courts of the various *madhhabs* or more specialised courts, such as the court of the *qassam 'askari*. His studies became well known especially after the foundation of the journal *Dirasat Ta'rikhiya* in 1979, issued under the auspices of the Committee on the Writing of Arab History at the University of Damascus; Dr. Rafeq was a member of the editorial board and one of the founders of the journal. He

also became interested in the history of the guilds and the social and economic structures of the quarters of Bab al-Musalla and Maydan in Damascus. He also began to study the lives of soldiers and their influence in *Bilad al-Sham* and to write articles on agricultural relations in Syria. In addition he gave extensive attention to the economic and social effects of the annual *hajj* caravan. His interests also included the economic and social history of Hama, on which he published articles in *al-Āthar al-Suriya*. Given the importance of the history of Palestine in the Ottoman era—a history which is being looted and dispossessed like Palestine itself—he participated with us in the third International Conference of the History of *Bilad al-Sham* in 1990 organised by the Committee on the History of *Bilad al-Sham* at the University of Jordan. He presented a lengthy piece of research on the town of Gaza, its social structure and the sources of its wealth; he has also contributed two monograph-length studies to *al-Mawsuʿa al-Filastiniya* (The Encyclopaedia of Palestine).¹ In 2000, he contributed three articles to a collection on Ottoman Jerusalem edited by Sylvia Auld and Robert Hillenbrand.²

The years that Dr. Rafeq has spent as a professor and researcher in American universities have provided him with opportunities to work on a number of topics including public morality, sectarian communities and groups in the quarters of Damascus, and Ottoman land legislation under Hanafi doctrine. He also discussed the role of guild masters and craftsmen in Syria, and studied the division and periodisation of Arab history. He has also studied the attitude of the Egyptian *ʿulama* towards marriage and divorce, and before that he was interested in the history of a number of prominent families such as the Abi al-Surur al-Bakri family in Cairo. His publications in other languages have allowed researchers not well versed in Arabic access to the latest research on these topics.

Dr. Rafeq has always been interested in supervising graduate students at the University of Damascus and the Jordanian universities, and more recently in the United States, although it is important to

¹ For full citations, see the bibliography of Dr. Rafeq's publications in this volume.

² 'The Political History of Ottoman Jerusalem', 'The *ʿUlama* of Ottoman Jerusalem (16th–18th Centuries)', and 'Ottoman Jerusalem in the Writings of Arab Travellers', in *Ottoman Jerusalem: The Living City, 1517–1917*, edited by Sylvia Auld and Robert Hillenbrand. Part 1. London, Altajir World of Islam Trust, 2000, pp. 25–36, 45–51, 63–72.

add that he has been extremely generous with both time and advice to colleagues and students from all parts of the world whom he has encouraged to come to Damascus and work in the archives—as the contributions to this volume attest. He has always attended academic conferences in the Arab world: Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Tunis as well as other international conferences on the history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Dr. Rafeq has often been asked to review the promotion and tenure of faculty at Arab universities, and also to write reports on articles submitted to journals and book manuscripts submitted to publishing houses. He has also participated regularly in publications honouring the life and scholarly work of his teachers and colleagues.

Furthermore, Dr. Rafeq has played a major role in changing the direction of research on the socio-economic and administrative history of the Arab world, with his insistence on the use of local records and other primary materials. His work has had a profound influence on colleagues in a number of Arab countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Tunisia. He has always been encouraged and admired by professors of Middle Eastern studies at French universities, especially André Raymond, well known for his path-breaking studies of Cairo and other Arab cities, who has himself had a significant impact on his own students and his colleagues at the University of Aix-en-Provence. Dr. Rafeq's work reflects his modesty, high morals, honesty, and quest for the truth without being influenced by preconceived ideas. He has discussed the topics that have interested him with great diligence, and has not shied away from addressing difficult subjects. The words of the Companion of the Prophet, the poet al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr al-Tamimi can well be applied to him:

I will consider hardship ease until I attain my desire,
For wishes are not attained except with forbearance.

The book of al-Hafiz Shams al-Din Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sakhawi (d. 902 H./1496–97 C.E.) *Proclamation of Censure for He Who Blames the People of History*, transports the reader to an environment of awe and admiration, in which one can read and understand the opinions of the leaders, scholars and jurists of the community—their insistence on speaking the truth, and their search for it, their emphasis on justice and accuracy, arising from their expertise and freedom of expression, and their refusal to accept opinions just because they are widely believed, all combined with purity and chastity. Five centuries

earlier, 'Uthman b. Jinni of Mosul (d. 392 H./1001 C.E.) described a scholar as follows:

A person may be described as having knowledge only after assiduous study and long association, when it becomes part of his nature, in a way that was not so when he first came upon it. In the latter case, he would be a learner, not a scholar. After knowledge becomes part of his nature, he enters into the door of actuality, and becomes a scholar in the true sense of the word. And knowledge is an instrument of wisdom for its owner.

My brother 'Abd al-Karim!
O happy (*karim*) celebration!

There is unanimous agreement that you are a profoundly respected scholar, one who knows the history of *Bilad al-Sham* in the Ottoman period in particular, and the history of the Arab lands and of the Muslim community in general. The Messenger (peace be upon him) says: 'Put people in their rightful place.' Responding to this prophetic command, your colleagues, students, and friends have gathered in Beirut, honouring your illuminating of Beirut's minaret (place of light), in a time of intense darkness, to wish you all grace and increase in your blessedness, and to say to you: Continue to fulfil our trust, in the way that all of us have come to expect and know from you.

This occasion reminds me of 29 April 1927, when delegations of poets from Egypt and the East gathered in Cairo to honour the poet Ahmad Shawqi. Hafiz Ibrahim stood up and recited:

Prince of rhymes, I have come to pledge allegiance.
And these, the delegations of the East, pledge allegiance with me.

All of us become stronger in your presence. You are our great mentor in researching the history of *Bilad al-Sham*, the land so dear to us all.

Peace upon you, and the mercy of God, and his grace.

ĀKHIR AL-‘UNQUD, THE LAST OF THE VINTAGE

† NICOLA ZIADEH (1907–2006)

Abdul-Karim Rafeq and I have pursued two parallel fields: while my interests lie in the classical Greek, Roman, and Islamic civilisations, he has become an authority on the Ottoman period of Arab history. Although we are interested in different periods, our geographical focus has been the same, and it was therefore natural that I should keep myself informed about the subject matter on which he has worked.

The first book that I read on Ottoman history was by Muhammad Farid, who became president of *Misr al-Fatat* after the death of its founder Mustafa Kamil. I do not recall its exact date of publication, but it probably appeared in the mid-1920s. It was a fairly ordinary book, but it pointed me towards an important source, the *Ta’rikh Jawdat*. A little later I came across another book, whose author I do not recall, which also used *Ta’rikh Jawdat* as a main source.

As my research expanded, I found books rich in historical material, whose authors were aware of what had been written in Western languages. My knowledge of English gradually improved, and I found references to useful sources and bibliographical information. My next step was to find books containing documents related to Ottoman history which had been collected and edited by scholars and specialists. These materials dealt with my own field of interest, so their contents were familiar to me.

As research developed in the course of the twentieth century and as interest in primary source materials increased, scholars gradually became aware of the riches of the Ottoman archives. This source has proved immensely valuable, as it contains official government documents, special legislation, administrative orders, and more. It is a mine of information, since it enables historians to reconstruct the history of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century (the Ottoman conquest of the Arab world) to its fall in 1918. It contains not only population censuses, but accounts of the number of animals, of the land and its produce, the location of mills and oil presses and their production. Nothing was left unaccounted for. To my knowledge, the only comparable accounts are the statistics compiled in England some

twenty years after the Norman Conquest in 1066, which appear in the Domesday Book, but the Ottoman sources cover a much more extensive period and give more specific information.

Discovering this treasure was one thing, but gaining access to it was another, at least in the beginning, as the Turkish government made access quite difficult, and tended to treat the material as a state secret. However some parts of the archives were made available to researchers, so that despite the restrictions, a significant quantity of material gradually became accessible. I learned about the Ottoman archives in the 1940s and 1950s when I attended courses given by Bernard Lewis at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, while I was studying for my Ph.D. in Islamic history (1947–1949). My friend Muhammad ‘Adnan al-Bakhit told me more about them when I visited London on later occasions; Bakhit himself was preparing a doctorate on the *liwa* of Jerusalem in the sixteenth century.

When Rafeq published *The Arabs and the Ottomans*, I felt as if I was suddenly feasting on fine cuisine after snacking on stones and bones. Later, I also read some of ‘Isam Khalifa’s work and other articles and books. Rafeq was the first Arab to immerse himself in the Islamic court records of the Ottoman period, and then helped to make them accessible to other researchers. Other friends have also done research in this field, but it requires a good deal of time and effort. Muhammad ‘Adnan al-Bakhit established Āl al-Bayt University in northern Jordan, on vacant land which had some buildings originally constructed for the Jordanian Army, but which had never been used or equipped. Founding a university was a simple matter in comparison with the task of setting up an archive.

Abdul-Karim Rafeq entered the temple of the *mahkama* archives, and prepared himself to work there, in much the same way as the poet ‘Umar ibn Abi Rabi’a prepared himself to pray, without letting himself be distracted by the beautiful woman at the door of the mosque. I have not read all Abdul-Karim Rafeq’s writings, although he has done me the honour of sending me many of his books and articles. I am not qualified to evaluate his work, but I will simply give another quotation from the great poet ‘Umar ibn Abi Rabi’a: *ruddi alayhi siyamahu wa salatahu, la tub’aydihi bi-haqqi dini Muhammadi*. For the sake of our religion and our God, the Creator of heaven and earth, I pray that Abdul-Karim Rafeq lives long and remains a beacon of light among us.

When my dear friend Sarab Atassi asked me for a title, I suggested *Ākhir al-‘Unqud*, the last of the vintage, which contains the very best of the grapes. So here is my contribution, the last of the vintage. All those who praise the work of Abdul-Karim Rafeq have every reason to do so, and I am more than happy to add my voice to theirs.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ, HISTORIAN OF SYRIA:
SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

ULRIKE FREITAG

This paper is not intended as a strictly academic analysis of the work of Abdul-Karim Rafeq. Instead, it is meant as a way of thanking him for his support and intellectual generosity as a teacher, and therefore combines personal reflections with some thoughts on the position of his work in Syrian historiography.

My first encounters with Abdul-Karim Rafeq took place when I was a visiting student at Damascus University in 1984–1985. In spite of being registered in Arabic literature, I attended classes in Middle Eastern history, trying to learn about Mamluks, Ottomans, and modern history. After the confusion of settling in a strange environment and registering at a university whose administrative system I never quite came to understand, I tried to attend these history courses regularly. ‘Ottoman History’, taught by Abdul-Karim Rafeq, quickly became my favourite, even if I would not claim that I understood too much in the beginning. The lectures were always begun in impeccable *fusha*, but Rafeq soon switched to a rather Syrian type of *fusha*. This transition usually marked his departure from his manuscript and a period of much closer interaction with his students—something only very rarely observed among his colleagues at the time. In the second half of the year, the latter part of the two-hour block was often devoted to small student presentations. Here, Professor Rafeq encouraged students to consult original sources from the Ottoman period and to gather and analyse historical information contained in them. I will never forget one session in which a student read out long lists of prices from Budayri’s chronicle, with Rafeq painstakingly encouraging him to interpret this raw data in order to give it historical sense.

I mention this episode because it points to me to a very important issue, namely, that Abdul-Karim Rafeq always tried to instil the same enthusiasm for his subject in his students that has been driving him. I would argue that this was somewhat more difficult in Syria in the 1980s and 1990s than it might have been elsewhere: the overall situation seemed to encourage a particularly large number of weak students

to study a subject which did not promise a high-prestige job. Many of Rafeq's colleagues seemed to have already given up this task, or so it appeared at least to this visiting student. Rafeq persevered, even if his patience seemed rather strained at times. This effort did bear fruit, as could be seen by the fairly consistent attendance throughout the year as well as the students' reactions inside and outside the classroom.

Some years later, in 1987, I approached Professor Rafeq on a different matter. As happens to many aspiring Ph.D. students, I came to Syria only to find out that I had to abandon my initial project due to the recent publication of an important work on the subject. After a few weeks of utter confusion and chaotic reading, I asked Professor Rafeq whether he would consider a study of the development of Syrian historiography to be a worthwhile and feasible endeavour. Moreover, I dared to ask him if he might be willing to answer some of my questions regarding his own work and that of some earlier Syrian historians. At the time, I was delighted by his helpful response and his gentle, continuous help, and I know that many of the contributors to this volume have had the pleasure of enjoying similar encouragement. Admittedly, it was only later that I came to realise that this experience was quite out of the ordinary: which German professor of history would spend half as much time to help a rather confused doctoral student speaking broken German? They would certainly tell her to go away, learn proper German, and only then to return. And this is even without regard for the topic which I had chosen: would a Western professor of history not consider it to be somewhat presumptuous if a relatively ill-equipped foreigner wanted to study the field of historical production, rather than a precise topic? While I have often wondered about Abdul-Karim Rafeq's thoughts about my project, and although I can well imagine that he, too, became tired of the string of half-educated foreign research students who sought his advice, no such feelings and doubts on his part ever came to the surface.

When reflecting about what makes his work stand out—besides Professor Rafeq's own enthusiasm and his encouragement of Syrian and foreign students—there are two aspects. The first is that, as noted elsewhere in this volume, Professor Rafeq has always taken care to publish in Arabic and in Syria, that is, to make his work available to the local audience. This seems noteworthy because he is at the same time perhaps the most internationally respected scholar on Ottoman *Bilad al-Sham*. He studied history at Damascus University shortly after the Faculty of Arts had been established, when the venerable historian

Qustantin Zurayq was its president.¹ His training by Peter Holt at the School of Oriental and African Studies and his subsequent teaching in the US and his integration into the international scholarly community might all have encouraged him to neglect his home audience. Moreover, there is a tendency in the English-speaking scholarly community to neglect scholarship published in foreign languages, so that scholars publishing in Arabic are often ignored, regardless of their work (to some extent, this is also the fate of Europeans and can be correlated with the power differential in international scholarship and Anglo-American hegemony).² Thus, Rafeq's commitment to making his work available locally seems to me to be characteristic of his devotion to Syria and his pedagogic impulse vis à vis the Syrian public. Academically, this is important because it constitutes an important link between historiographical trends emerging in Europe, the US, and the Arab world.

On the Syrian historical scene, Rafeq has contributed to the task of disseminating academic historical information through his involvement with the journal *Dirasat Ta'rikhiya*. Founded in 1980 and originally part of a project to re-write Arab history, the journal has turned into an important forum, notably for younger Syrian scholars. Regular contributions by established authorities like Rafeq have helped it to maintain its weight as a scholarly journal.

The second important aspect is that, because of this double commitment to the local and the international audience, Rafeq has greatly influenced scholars in both communities. If we look at the development of Syrian historiography, it quickly becomes obvious that Rafeq was the first Syrian academic in the modern sense (as opposed to older historians with a somewhat different methodology) who devoted his time and energy to the Ottoman Empire. Before Rafeq, the Jordanian 'Abd al-Karim al-Gharayba taught Ottoman Arab history at Damascus University. al-Gharayba tells us how he encountered feelings of considerable resentment against the Ottomans among his students. In contrast, his own writings reflect the notion of Ottoman-Sunni protection of the Empire's Arab provinces.

¹ Rafeq in Nancy Gallagher, *Approaches to the History of the Middle East*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1996, 172.

² For a discussion of these issues in Chinese scholarship see Mechthild Leutner, 'Die "sozialgeschichtliche Wende" in China seit den 1980ern. Chinesische und westliche/deutsche Historiographie: ein Dialog?', *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte* 4, 2, 2003, 103–20.

Rafeq's approach was different from al-Gharayba's. As was typical of British-trained historians of his generation, Rafeq started off writing a thesis on what was essentially the political history of the province of Damascus, between 1723 and 1786, based on British and French archives as well as printed sources and Arabic manuscripts. As I am sure that most of my readers will be more familiar with this work than I am myself, I would only like to draw attention to those traits that seem to me to reflect Rafeq's particular concerns. The period chosen reflected a change in the structure of Ottoman rule, insofar as a single local family, the 'Azms, managed to retain the governorship repeatedly and for fairly long periods of time. Whether they were or were not of Arab origin, Rafeq's comment on this issue is fairly unequivocal: 'It is to the credit of the 'Azms, however, that they introduced the tendency toward local rule in Syria which strengthened local self-assertion in many ways.'³ Thus, while al-Gharayba stressed the protective role of the Ottomans as Muslims, Rafeq emphasised local society and its self-assertion. I would argue that this is the expression of a strongly-felt patriotism which comes out in many of his articles to this day, an issue to which I will return. In historiographical terms, this particular perspective served a number of very important functions by addressing a series of new topics and using new sources. Let me mention some of the most salient features of Rafeq's influence on scholarship.

First, it gave a new boost to local and regional history in *Bilad al-Sham*. Thus, the larger unit of 'Ottoman History' gained a new focus on the different regions (here notably *Bilad al-Sham*) and their particularities. Rafeq's concerns differ, however, from the production of local histories that was booming in Syria during the late 1980s and 1990s. First of all, his concerns are more academic than folkloric, and secondly he carefully fits his research on local matters into the wider context of Ottoman and world history.

Second, already in its first chapter the dissertation mentions those topics which would preoccupy Rafeq over the next decades, namely the administrative, social and economic foundations of life in Ottoman Syria. In these studies, he was greatly influenced by historians of the *Annales* School, as well as Eric Hobsbawm's work on rebels, and

³ 'Abd al-Karim Rafiq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783*, Beirut, Khayats, 1966, 9.

by others. Rafeq has worked on these topics since the early 1970s, and they form the bulk of his academic output. In their entirety, they have contributed very significantly to our understanding of life in Ottoman Syria. I am thinking here, for example, of his work on the centrality of the annual *hajj* and its organisation both to Ottoman rule and to the economy of Damascus. Also noteworthy is his article on the social history of the quarter of Bab Musalla. If we refer in the context of German and European historiography to a turn to social history in the 1970s, Rafeq certainly carried out such a turn at the same time in Syria. Sadly, the number of his Syrian students remained somewhat limited.

Third, of central importance to this new work is the use of the records of the sharia courts. When the Syrian archives were established in the late 1960s, much effort was spent on consolidating the holdings of Syrian court records, and those from Hama and Aleppo were brought to Damascus.⁴ This hitherto rarely used source gradually became better known, and Abdul-Karim Rafeq played a major role in this process.⁵ I do not think anyone possesses a knowledge of these registers comparable to that of Abdul-Karim Rafeq. He has introduced generations of researchers to this source, and has himself made ample use of them. For example, his important work on the Ottoman urban institution of the guild gives new insights into the sphere of manufacturing in the pre-industrial age in particular and into urban economic and social organisation in general. Similarly, the changing relations between city and countryside can be brought into focus. Finally, his work on the guilds helps to understand the changes introduced by increased international trade and European industrial advancement in the nineteenth century.⁶

Throughout this work, a number of questions appear time and again. The first is linked to the question of the nature of Ottoman rule. Rafeq is fairly clear that the Ottomans were essentially foreigners

⁴ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Les Registres des tribunaux de Damas comme source pour l'histoire de la Syrie', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, 26, 1973, 219–26 and 'The Law-Court Registers of Damascus', in Jacques Berque and Dominique Chevallier, eds., *Les Arabes par Leurs Archives*, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1976, 141–59; Rafeq in Gallagher, *Approaches...*, 178f.

⁵ The records were first described by Jon Mandaville in 'The Ottoman Court Records of Syria and Jordan', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 29, 3, 1966, 311–19.

⁶ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Making a Living or Making a fortune in Ottoman Syria', in Nelly Hanna, ed., *Money, Land & Trade; a History of the Muslim Mediterranean*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, 101–23, which has references to his other articles on this topic.

to the society of *Bilad al-Sham*. This topic appears in a number of different contexts, but he addresses it more specifically in his article 'al-Huwiya wa'l-Intima' fi Bilad al-Sham'.⁷ Questioning the commonly accepted narrative of the development of Arab nationalism by a few intellectuals in the nineteenth century, he points to the views of the 'ulama as a source of *tamassuk bi-hadhihi huwiya wa-hadha'l-intima' al-'arabiyayn*.⁸ While emphasizing the Ottoman contributions to Syria and its history, Rafeq also stresses the distance between the rulers—usually called *al-Rum* or *al-Arwam*—and the ruled. He reiterates a point already made in his dissertation, namely the lack of visits by the Ottoman sultans to their Arab provinces after the initial conquest, as well as their failure to participate in the *hajj*. I will not try to sum up this article, which many of you may know, and in which Rafeq lists many instances of the 'ulama of Syria asserting their own views about appropriate laws (i.e. criticising Ottoman practices) and offering advice on justice to the Ottoman sultan. He also points to seventeenth and eighteenth century criticisms of the *ta'akhhur* caused by inadequate rule and quotes 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulsi's defence of Arabs against the '*ajamis*. The contrast between Ottoman practice and the ideals propounded by these 'ulama and portrayed by Rafeq as an expression of Arab values is stark. Even if one might feel tempted to ask whether the 'ulama might have been simply following the time-honoured practice of advice, there seems little doubt that ethnic difference did not go unnoticed.⁹

On another of Rafeq's major concerns, let me quote a characteristic sentence from this article.

wa-ya'kisu al-Nabulusi fi mu'allafihi hadha afkar al-taharrur wa'l-'aqlaniya fi tafsir al-shari'a, kama yu'akkidu al-tasamuh al-'arabi al-islami tujah al-'arab ghayr al-muslimin.¹⁰

Here, the relationship between the different religions is addressed. Time and again, Rafeq has stressed traditions of tolerance and cooperation (i.e. in the case of guilds). In his articles on the riots in Damascus of

⁷ *Dirasat iqtisadiya wa ijtimaiya fi ta'rikh bilad al-sham al-hadith*, Damascus, Librairie Nobel, 2002, 347–74.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 348.

⁹ Ulrich Haarmann, 'Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the Turk from the 'Abbasids to Modern Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 20, 2, 1988, 175–96.

¹⁰ Rafiq, 'al-Huwiya...', 367.

1860, as well as in his analysis of Bab al-Musalla in the same period,¹¹ he is at pains to point to economic tensions as a source of sectarian conflict. This is particularly true with regard to the Bab Tuma quarter of Damascus.¹² In contrast, he identifies the good integration of the Christians in Bab al-Musalla as the principal reason for their safety during the riots. Such socio-economic deconstruction of apparently religious conflict is quite common among historians as well as among other students of the Middle East who oppose the neo-Orientalist construction of a 'Clash of Civilizations.' In the Syrian context, it has the additional dimension of allowing the diffusion of religious tensions which could threaten the common ground of Arabism.

Interestingly, Rafeq has recently couched this approach in a slightly different terminology. In 'Political power and social networks', he talks about the positive traditions of coexistence and social justice as integral parts of a civil society which was able to survive state oppression for long periods.¹³

I would like to note just briefly that such an interest in particular ordering principles constitutes an inherent part of any reflective historical work. Given the relative nature of historical writings, and the inherent need to select from an infinite past, the German historian Reinhart Koselleck has argued that 'we have to reflect on the political implications of our field of research, and to be clear about the form of expression which we need to develop in consequence'.¹⁴

By the late 1980s, Rafeq had further widened his already considerable interests by addressing novel questions including those which integrate gender-related issues.¹⁵ This is particularly noteworthy because, to this day, this field is still considered to be the almost exclusive domain of female researchers, and little studied by scholars in the

¹¹ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'New Light on the 1860 Riots in Ottoman Damascus', *Die Welt des Islams* 28, 1988, 412–30, and 'The Social and Economic Structure of Bâb al-Musallâ (al-Mîdân), Damascus, 1825–1875', in George N. Atiyeh and Ibrahim M. Oweiss, eds., *Arab Civilization. Challenges and Responses. Studies in Honor of Constantine K. Zurayk*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988, 272–311.

¹² Rafeq, 'New Light on the 1860 Riots...'

¹³ 'Political power and social networks; popular coexistence and state oppression in Ottoman Syria', in *Islamic Urbanism in Human History: Political Power and Social Networks*, edited by Sako Tsugitaka, London, Kegan Paul International, 1997, 22–37.

¹⁴ Reinhart Koselleck, 'Über die Theoriebedürftigkeit der Geschichtswissenschaft', in his *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2000, 298–316.

¹⁵ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Public Morality in 18th Century Ottoman Damascus', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 55–56, 1988, 180–96.

Arab world. Particularly important here is his study of public morality in eighteenth century Damascus as it provides a new insight into social issues which are rarely documented, such as prostitution and drinking, as well as the places where such activities took place. It also served as an inspiration for further studies of related topics, such as the recent study by Elyse Semerdjian of 'Sinful Professions: Illegal Occupations of Women in Ottoman Aleppo'.¹⁶

In the Syrian context, Rafeq's reconsideration of Ottoman history has certainly helped to create a new awareness of the Ottoman past. The older image of their foreignness, which was so alienating to al-Gharayba, was to some extent perpetuated. However, his consideration of local society as a historical actor re-instates what otherwise was considered to be an 'Age of Darkness'.¹⁷ This has also inspired a number of scholars to rethink Ottoman history in wider conceptual terms. The question of Ottoman 'decline' has loomed large in this context. Traditionally, this concept was firmly linked to the state and its fate. The renewed focus on society, so much inspired by Rafeq's studies, has opened new horizons. Thus, Steve Tamari has addressed the question of decline by examining educational institutions in eighteenth century Syria.¹⁸ He concludes that, in fact, the eighteenth century experienced an upsurge in Islamic teaching institutions, 'blend[ing] imperial and local traditions'.¹⁹

Let me conclude by mentioning one of the most controversial recent debates in German scholarship on the Middle East. In 1990, Reinhard Schulze proposed a historiographical reconsideration of the eighteenth century in Islamic history. He argued that this period had hitherto been considered as an Age of Darkness, but that this was largely due to the lack of substantive scholarship on the period. Therefore, he proposed a reconsideration which attempts to trace those elements commonly considered as typically European aspects of enlightenment, suggesting the study, among other issues, of Islamic mysticism and poetry in particular. While I will not bore you with the details of a debate which—to my mind unfortunately—quickly turned extremely personal and thus possibly lost sight of some of the more promising

¹⁶ In *Hawwa* 1,1, 2003, 60–85.

¹⁷ Rafeq in Gallagher, *Approaches...*, 176.

¹⁸ 'Ottoman madrasas; the Multiple Lives of Educational Institutions in Eighteenth Century Syria', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 5, 2, 2001, 99–127.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 127.

avenues of Schulze's project, I would like to mention that here, once again, Abdul-Karim Rafeq's studies of Syria are mentioned among those which have inspired a re-thinking of Islamic history in the context of world history. While these are only a few examples of how the work of Abdul-Karim Rafeq has influenced and inspired many of us, I would like to take this occasion to express my immense gratitude to him as a teacher and colleague.

ABDUL-KARIM RAFEQ; HUMANIST AND MAN
OF THE *NAHDHA*

ABDULLAH HANNA

The Arab *nahdha* began during the reign of Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt and expanded from there to *Bilad al-Sham*. Its characteristics became more apparent during the second half of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth. It was strongly influenced by events in bourgeois Europe and the socio-economic changes taking place within Arab society, especially the gradual move from state control of land to the development of private property in land, which was accompanied by the spread of capitalism and new notions of ownership and investment.

Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, a new ideology with two main branches came into existence, competing with the dominant Sufi philosophy: this was the ideology of the *nahdha* or enlightenment and of bourgeois alienation. This new ideology was divided into two main trends, Islamic renewal, and liberal secularism. Other trends emerged, ranging between Salafism and liberalism, nationalism and Islamism, as well as other trends occupying the middle ground between Salafism and various varieties of secularism.

With the rise of the national and patriotic movements in the 1950s and their concerns with ideas of social justice and socialist principles, it was thought that the age of the *nahdha* had come to an end, that it had achieved its objectives with the fulfillment of the aims of the independence movements and the rise of the modern nation-state.

It was also thought that the concerns of the *nahdha* did not go beyond the literary and scientific sphere, as can be seen in an article in *al-Majmu'a al-'Arabi* published in Damascus in 1924. However, its long-term objectives were not so limited, but included a number of social, intellectual and political goals which had significant influence in the Arab world at the time.

The main principles of the *nahdha* as enumerated by its various leaders were as follows:

- Eradicating illiteracy and ignorance, and attaining scientific knowledge
- Learning from and catching up with Western industry and technology
- Taking and applying positive lessons from Western society
- The liberation of women
- Purifying religion of beliefs and customs that have nothing to do with religion
- Calling for the universal application of rationality and logic
- Fighting oppression in all its forms
- Calling for democracy
- Demanding human rights and equality for all religions and sects
- Fighting tribalism, sectarianism, regionalism, and anything that might lead to divisions within the community (*umma*) or the nation
- Calling for an Islamic League (as had been suggested by al-Afghani and Rashid Rida)
- Calling for Arab nationalism and Arab unity
- Establishing a modern nation state governed by the rule of law
- Secularism (a demand of one of the two wings of the *nahdha*). In this case secularism did not mean the rejection of religion (as some people wanted) but was part of the basic principles of the movement calling for equality and civic rights. The Syrian national movement embodied the core principles of secularism in its struggle against the French mandate with its slogan ‘religion is for God and the nation is for all.’

It was not easy for the pioneers of the *nahdha* to spread their ideas in a political, social, and intellectual environment where their ideas had little resonance. The Syrian historian Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali summarises the situation: ‘people are secretive about three matters: their money, their opinions and their religion (*dhahabihi wa dhahābihi wa madhhabihī*).’ The enlightened Shaykh Muhammad Bahjat al-Baytar described in one sentence his grandfather’s era (1253–1335 A.H) when people ascribed great importance to futile things, and believed in legends and nonsense: ‘It was an era when people clung to the past, and took things as they were without questioning whether they were right or wrong.’¹ This was only natural within such an intellectually stunted

¹ Baytar, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Baytar, ed. Shaykh Muhammad Bahjat al-Baytar, *Hilyat al-bashar fi ta’rikh qarn al-thalith ‘ashar*, 3 vols., Damascus, 1961.

environment, as al-Qasatli wrote in 1879 in *Bida'a al-Ma'arif li-Riwaj Bida'a al-Suyuf wa'l-'Asi*. The Ottoman governor Midhat Pasha's report on conditions in Syria in 1879 reveals a state of widespread intimidation and disorder.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was a historic event and an important step forward for society. Peasants and city-dwellers were liberated from the narrow ideological outlook of the Ottoman ruling class and its exploitation of religion. The fall of the Ottoman Empire encouraged popular movements and helped the Arab independence movement gain strength. It also slowly reversed the balance of forces inside the Arab movement for national liberation in favour of development and patriotism. This contributed to the decline in the appeal of sectarianism and tribalism, both of which have reappeared during the last quarter of the twentieth century because of the faltering of the project of the *nahdha*, or, according to some, its failure.

We shall now look at the attitudes of various contemporary Arab political movements towards the *nahdha*, as follows:

- An ultra-conservative movement that completely rejects the principles of the *nahdha*, on the grounds that it was simply an extension of the West and a call to destroy the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Many books were published in the last third of the twentieth century, especially in the Maghreb, calling for the restoration of an 'Islamic' version of the Ottoman Empire and considering anyone calling for reform, rationality, and equality as either or both an enemy of Islam and an agent of the West. As we will see, Abdul-Karim Rafeq's works have exposed the sheer wrong-headedness of this movement.
- An enlightened religious current that looks favorably upon the *nahdha* and considers the life and work of al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh to be a part of it.
- Various currents that have embraced the *nahdha* and call for the fulfillment of its precepts.
- A movement that recognises that the *nahdha* has progressive social aspects aiming to move society from feudalism towards capitalism. This movement has used the ideas of the *nahdha*, especially its calls for rationality, democracy, and change, in an effort to move Arab societies towards a new *nahdha* appropriate to contemporary circumstances.

However, most of these movements either do not pay sufficient attention to, or ignore, the internal socio-economic circumstances that

contributed to the rise and fall of the *nahdha* in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since the early 1980s, Abdul-Karim Rafeq's works have emphasised the importance of understanding social and economic history in order to gain a proper understanding of the situation at the time.

The *nahdha* went through a number of stages. The first of these ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the British and French occupation of most of the Arab world. The second was the period between the two world wars and is seen by most historians as a continuation of the first. It was marked by the beginnings of the formation of national awareness, the spread of ideas of enlightenment and rationality, and raising the banner of the national struggle against imperialism. Albert Hourani ended his book *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* at this point, although, in the last chapter he mentions that the general philosophy of the *nahdha* continued from 1939 to 1960. The third stage of the *nahdha* came to an end in the late 1950s with the rise of the United Arab Republic, with its agricultural reforms, nationalisations, and the burgeoning role of the state and of the state's internal security services. This stage was virtually a continuation of the mandate, and the result of the impact of secular and progressive thought, especially in the development of the Syrian state in the early years of independence. In spite of the three military coups which took place between 1949 and 1951, the Syrian parliamentary period between 1954 and 1958 is considered an era of democracy and freedom, during which Syria experienced the emergence of some features of civil society, including freedom for political parties, labour unions, syndicates, and professional associations. During this period clan loyalties and sectarianism gradually diminished, and were replaced by nationalism and national loyalties. The *nahdha* reached the peak of its third phase in the late 1950s with the expansion of national and nationalist loyalties, the growing victory of rationality, and the growing erosion of social taboos.

The fourth stage of the *nahdha* was characterised by the application of agrarian reform in a number of Arab countries, and the weakening of large landlordism. Another important feature of this stage was the nationalisation of major enterprises. This was not strictly necessary in economic terms, but was undertaken by the state in order to prevent the owners of such enterprises exerting a disproportionate influence on the governing process. The state replaced them with members of the 'middle class' and people from the lower ranks of society. This

stage is sometimes described as 'revolutionary', as it embodies development in various forms: economic, social and cultural.

The fifth stage began after the general failure of the various economic and social reforms due to a number of internal and external factors, including the increasing threat to the stability of the region posed by the growing strength of Israel. This stage marked a movement away from the principles of the *nahdha*, and a return to pre-*nahdha* notions and fundamentalist values. The fading of rationality was accompanied by the return of irrational thought and belief in myths and superstition.

Abdul-Karim Rafeq was born in Idlib in 1931. He completed his primary, preparatory and secondary studies in the Protestant school in Idlib and then at the American school in Aleppo. He mastered English and French, which enabled him to read widely in Western historiography. He pursued his academic studies in history at the Syrian University, where he received a bachelor's degree in history, at a time when the University was filled with the spirit of nationalism, rationality and enlightenment. There is no doubt that this environment affected a university student who had the trust of his teachers, many of whom were graduates of European universities. In the academic year 1955–1956 he received a teaching diploma from the College of Education. Between 1958 and 1963 he studied for a PhD in modern history at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. After returning to Syria, he taught at the University of Damascus where he was Professor of Modern Arab History between 1974 and 1990. Professor Rafeq has contributed much to the field during his career. Apart from professional service, teaching and various academic activities, he has lectured at many research institutes and universities. Beginning with his first publications in 1967, he has routinely published his books and research in both Arabic and English, as well as a number of studies in French. Here we shall discuss Dr. Rafeq's studies in Arabic and their contribution to the *nahdha*.

Rafeq himself was born during the second stage of the *nahdha*; his education began at the end of that stage, and continued through the third stage, after independence, when the ideas of the *nahdha* gained importance within the country and within society as a whole. His intellectual production began during the fourth phase, which led into the fifth phase, which was characterised by the faltering of the *nahdha* and the resurgence of pre-*nahdha* phenomena such as tribalism, sectarianism, the failure of the state to uphold the rule of law,

arbitrariness and the decline of patriotism. Also, new ideas emerged such as the revival of a kind of Ottomanism which glorified the past of the Ottoman Empire, especially the reign of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II. This also took the form of a 're-Islamisation' of the Ottoman Empire, in which the state is considered infallible and anyone who criticises it is viewed as an enemy of Islam and the Muslims and an agent of the West (which is itself considered to be waging a crusade against the *Dar al-Islam*).

In these circumstances, Professor Rafeq has tried to shed light on two main aspects of Ottoman history. In the first place, many researchers and writers have neglected the role of economic and social factors, and have looked at Islamic history in an Islamo-centric manner as opposed to the Euro-centrism of most European Orientalists. Each of these modes of interpretation considers itself superior to the other. The second aspect is associated with the spread of religious fossilization, rigidity, and intolerance, and exclusion, and a return to irrationality and superficiality, myth-making and superstition. These were associated with the heyday of Sufism, but their prominence diminished after fierce battles with the ideology of the *nahdha*, whose thinking generally prevailed in the middle years of the last century. However, Sufi and Salafi ideology regained ground in social and intellectual life with the faltering and decline of the *nahdha* during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Hence we can see that Abdul-Karim Rafeq's intellectual development took place at the height of the *nahdha*, while much of his scholarly output was produced in the declining years of the *nahdha* and the return of metaphysical ideas, which gained importance in the intellectual and other arenas. So did Abdul-Karim Rafeq, a son of the *nahdha*, of modernity, and of scientific rational thinking, surrender to this environment? Or did he raise the banner of truth based on scholarly research? In fact, he did, as can be illustrated from a comprehensive review of his intellectual production during the decline of the *nahdha*.

Rafeq's principal publications in Arabic, which form the main concern of this paper, begin with *Bilad al-Sham wa Misr min al-fath al-'uthmani ila hamlat Nabulyun Bunabart, 1516-1798*, which appeared in 1967. He wrote in the introduction that 'those interested in the study of (early) modern Arab history will notice that it has not been very solidly researched. There are relatively more writings about the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than there are about the sixteenth,

seventeenth, or eighteenth.' According to Rafeq, this is not due to any lack of documents, as they are scattered all around the world. For his study of the history of Egypt and *Bilad al-Sham* the author relied on primary sources, especially contemporary Arabic manuscripts, Western diplomatic correspondence, and on recently published Ottoman documents. He considered that looking at history simply in terms of sultans, pashas, and dates leads nowhere, and loses the reader in minute details, which is why he decided to focus on the larger structures behind historical development: 'The important thing is to follow the trajectory of historical development and always to ask why something happened in the way, at the time, and in the place that it did.' In the twentieth century this methodology was known only to those who were influenced by the era of the *nahdha*. Rafeq solidified this approach to an 'enlightened' Ottoman history (to which his preparation for a doctorate at the University of London evidently contributed) through his scholarly work, especially in *The province of Damascus (1723-1783)*, published in English in Beirut in 1966.

At the end of his study, the author speculates about the impact which the Ottoman conquest of *Bilad al-Sham* had on the Ottomans, the Arab world, and Arab-Ottoman relations. He also considers that the Ottoman occupation, which lasted four hundred years, was in reality the replacement of one non-Arab regime (the Mamluks) with another non-Arab regime (the Ottomans). The Arab people were more like spectators, or at best played a secondary role, but they did not lose their Arab identity, their language, civilisation and history. The goal of the Ottoman occupation of the Arab world was to keep what became the Arab provinces more or less as they were, as long as they remained obedient and paid tribute to the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul. Rafeq attaches particular importance to the fact that governors would extort money from the people and put pressure on them, while the state would also confiscate their money and that of former governors. This led people to hide their money and caused a scarcity in cash, thus disrupting economic efficiency.

Rafeq's second book in Arabic was *al-Arab wa'l-Uthmaniyyun, 1516-1914*, first published in 1974 and reprinted in 1993. In the introduction, he explains that it is an attempt to study the history of the Arabs in the Mashriq and Maghrib, focusing on the development of relations between rulers and the ruled. It also sheds light on the Arabs' attitude towards their rulers, with the gap between the Arabs and the Ottomans widening during the late nineteenth century, largely through

the spread of the idea of nationalism on both sides. During that same century, the European countries invaded and occupied large parts of the Arab world, beginning a new phase of struggle between Europeans and Ottomans. This book was an innovation in modern Arab historiography: it discusses the establishment of the Ottoman state and its conquest of the Arab world, the uprisings against the Ottomans and the rise of local forces during the eighteenth century. The book's conclusion discusses the secession of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire, and the rise of national and nationalist movements in the Arab world. Rafeq mentions in the introduction that he is indebted to many Arab and foreign scholars for their studies of specific periods and topics in Arab history.

Rafeq's knowledge of English and French has allowed him to transfer Western knowledge to Arab readers, and he has also summarised the writings of Arab historians. He has synthesised these studies in a combination of methodologies based on modern European historiography, a profound understanding of Arab history and heritage, and a balanced liberal intellect infused with the spirit of Arab nationalism. All these factors have been combined in this book and in his subsequent work.

In the early 1980's, Rafeq published a collection of essays on topics in the economic and social history of *Bilad al-Sham*. He explained his approach in the introduction to *Buhuth fi'l-ta'rikh al-iqtisadi wa'l-ijtima'i li-Bilad al-Sham fi'l-'asr al-hadith*, written in March 1985:

Political history is based on an analysis of political events in breadth and in depth, connecting them to each other in a comprehensive and conscious manner, in order to provide a framework through which patterns of economic and social development can be examined. The study of these developments helps to correcting our understanding of political history and its profound causes, and to rationalise it. The economic and social background to political events is key to any understanding of the processes at work beneath the surface.

Much of Rafeq's research in economic and social history has been published in the review *Dirasat Ta'rikhiya*, published by the Committee on the Writing of Arab History at the University of Damascus. Through journal articles and books, Rafeq's methodology and the fruits of his research and analysis have reached a number of readers and researchers interested in Arab history. Most faculty members at Syrian universities are reluctant either to read widely or to engage in research. This is obviously not true of Rafeq, who has been heavily

influenced by two traditions: first, the noble bearers of the tradition of the *nahdha*, who believe passionately in the importance of a proper understanding of history, and desire to comprehend the history of Arab societies both in their heyday and in their decline, and second, on a vision of modernity which borrows from the West the vital keys to unlock the development necessary for the renaissance of the East. Any attentive reader of Rafeq's work will see that it reflects both these trends.

Some of those who read my evaluation of Rafeq's work may consider it excessive. I do not know what Rafeq himself would think, but let us look further into his studies of the economic and social history of *Bilad al-Sham* in the Ottoman period, which were first published as articles in *Dirasat Ta'rihkiya* and then in two collections published in Damascus 1985 and 2002.² These show that his historical research is a breakthrough in the Arab world in terms of drawing attention 'to the study of the infrastructure that forms the foundation for political developments,' as he himself has said. This methodology was introduced to our part of the world somewhat before Rafeq began his research, through Marxist historiography, which had a considerable influence modernity in the 1960s and 1970s. I do not know how much this Marxist school influenced Rafeq as far as approach and analysis are concerned, but it is clear that his emphasis on economic and social studies (which, as he has said, 'form the foundation for political development') tends towards that general conclusion. Rafeq's liberal intellect, his education at the University of Damascus during its glory days in the 1950s, his doctoral studies in London, and his thorough knowledge of English and French have all played their part in creating his brilliant and highly original interpretations of modern Arab history.

Did Rafeq's works result in the creation of a new movement influenced by his approach, which can be developed further by young Arab researchers? This is a difficult question to answer,³ although Rafeq's influence on researchers in Europe and North America is clearly

² *Buhuth fi'l-ta'rikh...*, and *Dirasat iqtisadiya wa ijtimai'ya fi ta'rikh bilad al-sham al-hadith*, Damascus, Librairie Nobel, 2002.

³ See the Ph.D. thesis by Rafeq's student Khadr Ahmad 'Abbas 'Umran entitled '*al-Haya al-ijtima'ya fi wilaya Halab fi'l-nusf al-thani min al-qarn al-sabi*' ashhr 1650–1700 min khilal watha'iq mahakim Halab al-shar'ia' ('Social life in the *wilaya* of Aleppo in the second half of the seventeenth century, 1650–1700, on the basis of documents from the sharia courts of Aleppo'), University of Damascus, 1989; Rafeq

evident from the acknowledgement of his assistance in the prefaces of many recent books and of course from the contributions to this volume. It is to be hoped that his work will be influential in the future, once Arab societies have overcome their present sufferings. Objectivity, the role of rationality and the freedom to publish scholarly research have diminished, while fossilization, and the notion of 'taboos' still dominate, and oppressive thought and censorship is widespread. Such conditions, which hardly favour serious scholarly research, have been revived by the faltering of the project of the *nahdha*, the decline in the influence of liberal and socialist ideas following the collapse and fall of the Soviet Union, the negative influence of the all-pervasive petrodollar, and the desire of the colonial powers (especially the United States) to support obscurantist thought in order to oppose two of the main sources of strength in the Arab world: the vibrant ideas of the *nahdha* and its auxiliary force the Arab liberation movement, and those forces opposed to colonialism and tyranny, the global forces once led by the Soviet Union and what used to be known as the socialist bloc. The weakness which the latter experienced in the 1980s, culminating in the fall of the socialist system, facilitated the rise of obscurantist forces from two directions, local right wing (Arab-Islamic) influences, and influences 'beyond the ocean', which have assisted and nourished dictatorship and despotism in a manner wholly devoid of principle. Before 1990, American policy generally favoured supporting conservative and authoritarian movements in a number of Arab countries and societies against national liberation movements and to resist what was described as communism. Today, contrary to what it advocates in public, the United States carries out policies which contribute to the maintenance of reaction and authoritarianism, although this is a topic which needs further elaboration.

If we look at the current situation in the Arab world, it is clear that recent developments have taken our peoples one and a half centuries backwards, and that we continue in this direction. Whoever reads the flood of books and magazines subsidised by petrodollars, or watches Arabic satellite television, will be surprised to see how much importance we give to nonsense, and the extent to which we Arabs cling to

also supervised two Masters' theses on Nablus (1989) and Palestine (1990) before his departure for the United States.

legends and myths. Intellectually many Arabs continue to live in the same era of stagnation as prevailed before the *nahdha*.

The stagnation and fossilization that make up an important part of present day Arab reality put the importance of Rafeq's studies in their proper context. His work can guide readers towards the goal of rescuing historical investigation from its present state of inertia, and it may well play a leading role in the future, at the dawn of a new Arab *nahdha*, which will lead the way to a more rational approach to understanding both the past and the present. Much of Rafeq's work is based on the documents of the sharia courts, which deal with matters which affected the structure of civil society for some four centuries, and which will engage the attention of many generations of researchers. As Rafeq himself has said, historical research does not come to an end with the writings of a single individual, but is the accumulation of the knowledge and expertise of successive generations.

Dr Rafeq's work has made major contributions to historiography both in and beyond the Arab world. His efforts and the approach that he followed should have made a greater impression in Arab cultural circles than they actually have. The fact that they have not, and the fact that he has left Syria, has everything to do with the state of higher educational institutions in Syria, which has obliged so many of the country's leading intellectuals to go abroad. The selection and promotion of teachers and professors should be based on criteria of scholarly competence and dedication to research and teaching, rather than criteria such as loyalty to the regime and obedience to its interests. This is the reason why so many qualified researchers feel unable to continue their scholarly work or to educate the next generation.

In June 1910, Salah al-Din al-Qasimi wrote in the Damascus newspaper *al-Muqtabas* that intellectuals had two choices in an authoritarian atmosphere: either to remain silent or to leave the country. The emigration of some of our best scholars during the last quarter of the twentieth century illustrates the very problem to which al-Qasimi alluded a century ago. Dr Rafeq's 'departure' to the United States, which has deprived Syria of his expertise and his capacity to educate succeeding the next generation of scholars, is just another example of the continuing emigration of intellectuals, both young and older. However, despite the current Arab and international situation, I am optimistic, believing that the works produced by Abdul-Karim Rafeq and the ones that he will produce in the future (and may God grant

him a long life) will be the building blocks for a new *nahdha* to come. Also, in spite of the fact that history stumbles, it will eventually lead to the progress of humanity, the prosperity of our nation, and the building of a civilisation which will benefit all mankind.

RAFEQ'S GHAZZA: AN EARLY EXPLORATION OF A SECONDARY TOWN

JAMES A. REILLY

The city and region of Gaza loom large in recent and contemporary history, as a search for its name in library databases will reveal. However, Gaza is largely absent from the historiography of the Ottoman Middle East. At a time when increasing numbers of Ottoman urban centres in Syria and Palestine have become the focus of special studies—including articles and monographs that discuss particular neighbourhoods such as al-Salihiyya and the Midan in Damascus¹—historians' silence about Gaza and other centres becomes more noticeable.

In this light, Abdul-Karim Rafeq's study of Gaza in the mid-nineteenth century merits wider recognition.² Prepared 30 years ago, it exploits the serendipitous presence in Damascus of one register of 459 pages from the Gaza sharia court encompassing the years 1857–1861. Rafeq used its information to construct a kind of snapshot of Gaza's physical layout, economic life, and social structure. Much of his work involved careful analysis and comparison of internal data, bringing other historical and secondary sources into the narrative where they could help to illuminate or to contextualise Gazan phenomena. The essay does not try to offer a synthesis. Comparable diachronic materials are lacking, since to the best of anyone's published knowledge this Gaza register stands alone.³ In places (such as its discussion of specie and of weights and measures) Rafeq's work more resembles an inventory or a reference guide than a long article or short monograph. This impression is reinforced by the absence of a summary or a conclusion.

¹ Toru Miura, 'Personal Networks surrounding the Salihiyya Court in 19th Century Damascus', in Brigitte Marino, ed., *Études sur les villes du Proche-Orient, XVI^e–XIX^e siècle: Hommage à André Raymond*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 2001, 113–50; Brigitte Marino, *Le Faubourg du Midan à Damas à l'époque ottomane*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1997.

² Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *Ghazza: Dirasa 'umraniya wa-ijtima'iya wa-iqtisadiya min khilal al-watha'iq al-shar'iya 1273–1277/1857–1861*, Damascus, by the author, 1980.

³ Beshara B. Doumani, 'Palestinian Islamic Court Records: A Source for Socioeconomic History', *MESA Bulletin* 19, 2, December 1985, 167.

Nevertheless *Ghazza* deserves and rewards a close reading. At the time he prepared it, Abdul-Karim Rafeq was already renowned as a trailblazer in the systematic exploitation of Syria's sharia court registers. His deep immersion in the registers and the excitement of discovery are palpable throughout the pages of *Ghazza*. Using its court register, Rafeq gave Ottoman Gaza (previously something of an historical blank slate) texture, depth, and nuance. Although it does not offer an overarching thesis, the monograph is scattered with insights and mini-theses that help to illuminate comparative urban studies.

The monograph begins with a historical précis that places Gaza in its context as a caravan centre on a historic crossroads. Located on the well-travelled route from Egypt to Palestine and Syria, Gaza also served as a support centre for the annual pilgrimage caravans to Mecca in the Ottoman period. Sometimes pilgrimage caravans passed through Gaza when the usual routes were dangerous or inaccessible. More routinely, it was a provisioning point for the Ma'n caravan station east of the Jordan River. From this précis Rafeq moves on to give a detailed physical description of the Ottoman-era town, based largely on internal evidence from the court register. The 'inner' and 'outer' portions of Gaza—evoking memories of former walls—and the limits of the built-up areas adjoining suburban market-garden lands remind the reader of other Syrian towns large and small surrounded by their green belts, such as Saida and Damascus. Like these other places, Gaza's prominence on the same site across millennia derived from its access to trade routes and to a rich agricultural hinterland.

Rafeq embellishes Gaza's physical description with an account of its seven quarters (sing. *mahalla*), where he carefully compares different sources to highlight continuities and ruptures in their identities and their nomenclature. He identifies the quarters, street by street and lane by lane, cross-referencing this information with late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century historians' and travellers' accounts. One salient phenomenon is that most of Gaza's streets were named after mosques, with Sufi lodges (sing. *zawiya*) also significantly represented. In his inventory of Gaza's streets and quarters, Rafeq also identifies the presence of public fountains, public baths, and one *madrassa*, all institutions that were supported by waqf endowments. The ratio of mosques to the estimated size of the town's population leads Rafeq to suggest that Gazans were pious, at least if that can be judged from the plethora of their religious buildings. Significantly—and this is a point to which he returns repeatedly—Christians in Gaza were not

segregated or concentrated into a particular quarter, and the town had no Jewish population of any consequence. Yet within decades, according to accounts published later in the nineteenth century, Gaza had developed a distinctive Christian quarter and a small Jewish population. This contrast raises questions about the development of confessional consciousness in the decades after 1860, and is perhaps the central historical puzzle that arises from the book.

An issue that Rafeq did not specifically address—and that the sharia court register by itself did not reveal—is the degree to which different quarters, their mosques and their *zawiyas* were tied to neighbourhood constellations of influence, power and identity. Rafeq reports scattered references to ‘local notables and spokesmen’ of the town, and he identifies names of muftis and of other local worthies, but the social networks that presumably buttressed them are left unexamined. Nevertheless the material that Rafeq unearths suggests that Gaza, no less than other Syrian-Palestinian urban centers, had a complex social structure that informed local politics, social life and economic networks.

Reflecting the preoccupations and priorities of his source, Rafeq devoted a good deal of attention to the matter of Gaza’s housing stock. Issues include types of residences; physical layout of domestic living arrangements; water rights in homes and the division of property; and property rights including conditional sale (*bayʿ wafaʿ*) and long-term user rights to immovable property. By analyzing the housing data, Rafeq teases out certain social patterns such as the distribution of wealth and poverty in Gaza; relations between Muslims and Christians; and cultural ties between the town and its hinterland. Rafeq’s narrative emphasises the intermingling of rich and poor in all the city quarters, confessional integration, not segregation, on the spatial level, and a close cultural affinity between Gaza and its villages. This affinity is suggested by the large proportion of rural-type housing found within the city, designated as *hawsh* or *bayka*, rather than as *dar*.

Gaza’s *khans* (caravanserais) and its markets illuminate relationships among Gaza, the villages of its hinterland, and its extended commercial networks. With respect to the *khans*, Rafeq demonstrates his usual care by cross-referencing the court register with other sources that he was able to identify. What emerges is a portrait of a town whose long-standing commercial character (going back in history for millennia) was still very much in evidence in the mid-nineteenth century. Significantly, Gaza’s commercial importance in this period derived less from Eurocentric international trade than from its role within

Ottoman trading networks (Egypt-Palestine-Syria, Arabia-Palestine-Egypt). Commercial references in the court register mention Egypt, Jidda, Suez, Jerusalem and Nablus among other places. The presence in Gaza of communities of Indians, Maghribis, and especially of Egyptians further demonstrates the region's ties to other parts of the Ottoman and Muslim world.

Bedouin were politically prominent and of key importance to Gaza's commercial activity. It was they, for example, who set out from Gaza under contract to provision the Mecca pilgrimage caravan at Ma'n. The wealth of the most prosperous Bedouins is demonstrated by a prominent shaykh's purchase of an opulent house in Gaza's *mahallat* al-Khadr. This acquisition is a powerful testimony to the intertwining of urban and pastoralist interests in portions of Ottoman Palestine during the years in question. In addition to agriculture and trade, Gaza hosted a range of manufacturing activities. The signature handicraft of Gaza was pottery, although other trades such as dyeing, soap manufacture, spinning, and oil pressing (olives and sesame) also left their marks. Rafeq's sources hint at the existence of a guild structure without explicitly demonstrating or proving it.

Within the limits allowed by his source, Rafeq raised questions about the lives of families and particularly of women, at a time when sustained work on these topics in Middle Eastern history still was in its early stages. He notes phenomena such as the apparent marginalisation of women in the court register itself; the predominance of monogamy and the low incidence of polygamy in Gazan society; and higher rates of mortality among girls than among boys. The visible economic role of women was mostly concentrated in the spheres of credit and debt, where women (through their inheritances) often featured as lenders. Evidence of women in trades was scanty. Labour patterns in villages did not enter into the Gaza register at all.

The subjects of credit and debt loom large in Rafeq's economic discussion. Indebtedness was commonplace, and lenders could expect a high rate of return. Gaza's greatest fortunes derived from agriculture and commerce, not manufacturing, and these fortunes were employed in the extension of credit. In Gaza, Rafeq asserts, there was 'an active commercial mindset.'⁴ He goes so far as to speak of 'the capitalist nature

⁴ Rafeq, *Ghazza*, 65.

of the wealth of most of the rich in Gaza⁵ based on records of their investment and credit activity, particularly in the countryside.

Another aspect of rural-urban relations appears in the contrast between urban debt, which was individual, and rural debt, which was collective. Villagers undertook to guarantee in common the debts that they incurred from urban lenders. Rafeq characterises the rural-urban economic relationship as one that placed the countryside in debt to the city. Because the 1857–61 register offers only a snapshot of one three-year period, longer term trends and comparison are absent. Rafeq attempted to flesh out the economic portrait of Gaza by analyzing costs and standards of living, and by estimating liquidity based on proportions of moveable to immoveable properties in estate documents. Though not all agree that the sharia court registers are a useful statistical source, given their inherent biases and limitations, our author's early attempt to deploy their statistical data nevertheless anticipates subsequent work (including his own) that has deepened scholars' understanding of urban history in the Ottoman period.⁶

Summing up, readers today may appreciate the significance of Rafeq's *Ghazza* on at least three levels:

The Gaza-centric level

Rafeq's micro-history demonstrates the complexity of life in a smaller commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural centre at a moment when the region was experiencing a major economic—to be followed by political—reorientation. Gaza in the mid-nineteenth century may not have represented the paradigms of impact and response, tradition and modernisation that have dominated much of the historiography of modern Palestine and Syria. Even a sympathetic account published 15 years after Rafeq's work (and apparently unaware of the latter) did not

⁵ Ibid., 66.

⁶ E.g., Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual, *Familles et fortunes à Damas: 450 foyers damascains en 1700*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1994; and the critical review of Establet and Pascual by Zouhair Ghazzal in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28, 1996, 431–32. A later example of Rafeq's use of court register statistics is his 'Registers of Succession (*mukhallafat*) and Their Importance for Socio-economic History: Two Samples from Damascus and Aleppo, 1277/1861', in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Ilber Ortayli, and E. van Donzel, eds. *CIÉPO Osmanlı Öncesi ve Osmanlı Arastirmalari Uluslararası Komitesi: VII. Sempozyumu bildirileri*, Peç: 7–11 Eylül 1986, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994, 479–91.

transcend the binary tropes of stagnation and modernisation in its treatment of the city in the nineteenth century.⁷ A more recent synthesis by French and Palestinian archaeologists published in a popular, coffee-table book format, reflects Rafeq's research although without crediting him. One of its chapters draws *inter alia* on Rafeq's observations for its characterisation of Gaza's physical layout and economic character during the Ottoman period.⁸ Rafeq's Gaza was neither sleepy, nor bucolic, nor simple. Instead, his study gives readers a glimpse of some of the everyday structures that conditioned people's lives and their social roles. The data that he has unearthed allows Gaza to be brought, however tentatively, into a broader discussion of what for lack of a better phrase we might call 'the Middle East on the eve of modernity'.

The philosophical level

A study like this one gives readers additional issues to think about when they consider what modernity and modernisation mean, particularly in the light of Gaza's history during the ensuing century and a half. The kinds of social, political, and economic networks that characterised early modern Gaza were organic in a way that the disruptive and traumatic modernisation process of later decades was not. Without romanticizing the past—and fully acknowledging its illness, disease, transparent exploitation and short life expectancies—one nevertheless can observe that mid-nineteenth century Gaza was embedded in familiar regional networks that were locally comprehensible and had, in one form or another, served Gazans adequately, if not well, for a long time. Gaza's historically rooted social and economic networks were still intact, marked by functional divisions of labour among townspeople, pastoralists and villagers.⁹ War, invasion and oppression could and did cause hardship and suffering (think 'Ali Bey, Napoleon Bonaparte and Muhammad 'Ali Pasha), but the Gaza of the mid-nineteenth century recognisably carried on with the historical logic of its place, location

⁷ Gerald Butt, *Life at the Crossroads: A History of Gaza*, Nicosia, Rimal, 1995, 101–07.

⁸ Moain Sadeq, 'Gaza à l'époque musulman', in Jean-Baptiste Humbert, ed., *Gaza Méditerranéenne: Histoire et archéologie en Palestine*, Paris, Errance, 2000, 83–86.

⁹ Cf. a discussion of this point in the context of Ottoman Palestine as a whole in Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 23–24.

and role. Only the full force of modernisation would eventually sever Gaza from its hinterland, cut its ties to traditional markets, devastate and marginalise its agricultural character, uproot hundreds of thousands of people from its vicinity, and turn its venerable name into a synonym for misery and political violence. Gaza, in other words, may serve as a metaphor for one of the multiple meanings of modernity. By offering us an interpretive snapshot of the town as it may have existed 150 years ago, Abdul-Karim Rafeq allows the metaphor to emerge more clearly and more concretely. The less abstractly we speak of modernity the better we may hope to understand the present state of the world.

The level of sources and historiography

Using the tools of the professional historian, Rafeq in this short work unwrapped the sharia court registers as a source for Syrian and Palestinian history, and was one of the first to use them this way. Parts of the book resemble a how-to guide for using the registers, as Rafeq takes the reader through texts of various kinds and glosses the meanings of phrases and words that appear in the legal formulae. This early study anticipated much of the work that has made the study of Syrian and Palestinian urban history in the Ottoman period so interesting. Economic structures, the use of urban space, family structures, gender, ethnic and confessional identities, urban networks, regional ties, relationships between town and country: all are adumbrated in this work written at a time when, according to the historian Antoine Abdel Nour, historical networks of solidarities and loyalties in Ottoman Arab towns were poorly understood.¹⁰ In the years that have followed *Ghazza's* publication, Abdul-Karim Rafeq himself has done much to illuminate the workings of towns and cities, particularly of Damascus, and in this respect *Ghazza* might be considered something of an hors d'oeuvres whipped up by a master chef before the main course. Rereading it today whets the appetite for more.

¹⁰ Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane*, Beirut, Université Libanaise, 1982, 156.

PART TWO

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF OTTOMAN RULE IN
BILAD AL-SHAM

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST ON *BILAD AL-SHAM*

THOMAS PHILIPP

The question I will try to answer in the following observations is simple: Was the integration of *Bilad al-Sham* into the Ottoman Empire economically advantageous, disadvantageous, or neither, for the region of *Bilad al-Sham*, and was the process of integration into the Empire the only cause of whatever changes took place? Or more modestly, since the answer to this apparently simple question is of daunting complexity, what answers has recent research given to this question? There used to be three standard answers.

The first was that nothing had changed at all. This was the standard answer of traditional Arab historiography, including that of eyewitnesses keeping records of events. The mere title of Ibn Tulun's work on the history of Damascus/*Bilad al-Sham*, 'Eminent people appointed in Damascus as deputies of the Turks',¹ betrays this tendency. The time period covered under this title coincides closely with Ibn Tulun's own lifetime (1475–1546), a period during which Damascus was controlled by 'Turks'; whether they were Mamluks or Ottomans seems to have been of little concern or made little difference.

At least initially, the Ottomans themselves were interested in giving the impression that nothing had changed when they appointed the last governor of the Egyptian Mamluks in Damascus as their first governor in the city. When later on this same Janbiri al-Ghazali rebelled against the Ottomans, neither the Damascenes nor the Aleppines showed any enthusiasm for being dragged into a confrontation with the Ottomans.²

¹ Shams al-Din Muhammad ibn 'Ali Ibn Tulun, *I'lam al-wara bi-man wulliyah na'iban min al-Atrak bi-Dimashq al-Sham al-Kubra*, Damascus, al-Matba'a al-Jarida al-Rasmiya, 1964. See also Henri Laoust, *Les Gouverneurs de Damas sous les Mamlouks et les premiers Ottomans 1260–1744: traduction des Annales d'Ibn Tulun et d'Ibn Gum'a*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1952.

² *Hawadith dimashq al-yawmiya: ghada al-ghazu al-'uthmani li'l-sham...min Kitab mufahkaha al-khillan fi hawadith al-zaman l'Ibn Tulun*, ed. Ahmad Ibish, Damascus, 2003, pp. 119, 122.

Ibn Tulun also sees continuity elsewhere when he insists on calling the Ottoman sultan *Malik al-Rum*, King of Byzantium, the title of the Christian emperor in the *hadith*. Almost incidentally this king, Muslim or Christian, also rules over *Bilad al-Sham: wa'l-sultan 'ala masr wa'l-sham wa-ma' dhalik malik Rum Abu'l-Nasr Sulayman Khan ibn Salim Khan... wa-huwa muqim bi'l-balad al-madhkur*.³ One hundred and eighty years later the enumeration by Ibn Kannan also suggests a rather remote sense of attachment to the Ottoman state, almost denying incorporation into the empire, in formulations like *wa-sultan al-mamalik al-rumiya, wa'al-'arabiya wa ba'd al-'ajamiya al-sultan Mustafa Khan*.⁴

Ibn Tulun reports on the annual *hajj* with great regularity. It was always the major event in the life of Damascus and decisive for the city's economic well-being. Between 1506 and 1512 no pilgrimage could be made, and it was only resumed in 1516, the year when Sultan Selim arrived in Damascus. In that year and the next it could not be carried out, but the reason given, as was the case in the earlier instances, was the insecurity caused by marauding Bedouin tribes, and not the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Syria.⁵

The lives of a great many individuals can be found in the enormous compilation of biographies of Aleppines by al-Tabbakh,⁶ but the results for our concerns are disappointing. Between 900 A.H. /1494–95 C.E. and 957 A.H./1550 C.E. al-Tabbakh lists 188 biographies, but in very few of them is any personal development, action, or reaction attributed to the coming of the Ottomans, particularly as far as economic conditions are concerned. It is too early for me to decide whether this lack of change in individuals' personal lives after the Ottoman conquest was an accurate reflection of reality, or whether it may have had to do with a sense of what was and was not proper for inclusion in a biography.

³ Ibid., 151, 185

⁴ Ibn Kannan (al-Salihi al-Dimashqi), Muhammad b. 'Isa, *Yawmiyat Shamiya (al-Hawadith al-yawmiya)* ed. Akram Ahmad al-'Ulabi, Damascus 1994 (Dar al-Taba'), 7, and for the beginning of the years 1113, 1120, 1129 A.H.

⁵ Quoted Laoust, *Les Gouverneurs...*, 133–45, 149, 153, 165. See also Ibn Kannan's reports on the varying fortunes of the Hajj 180 years later, and also Karl Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708–1758*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980.

⁶ Muhammad Raghib ibn Mahmud al-Tabbakh, *l'lam al-nubala' bi-ta'rikh Halab al-Shahba'*, 7 vols., Aleppo, al-Matba'a al-Maruniya, 1923.

The second standard answer concerning the economic impact comes from Western scholarship, variously expressed in different places but well summarised and argued by Stripling, a student of Lybyer, who argues that the occupation of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea by the Portuguese stopped almost all trade through the Middle East, especially as sea trade was much cheaper than overland trade. Hence he observes a general decline in the Arab economy. He also interprets the whole economic conflict, involving Ottomans, Muslim merchants and the Portuguese as a cultural clash between Christians and Muslims.⁷

The third standard answer comes from Arab nationalist historians, making the same point about general decline but distributing the blame differently. It is the argument of the deleterious impact the Ottomans had on the Arab lands. To the best of my knowledge the argument was presented for the first time in its full form in 1916 in *al-Hilal*, creating the myth in which French and British colonialism are equated with Ottoman rule over the Arabs. It was perceived as a continuation of Mamluk rule of hardship, humiliation, and impoverishment. Initially the Ottomans tried to do better, but it was simply not in their character, and Syria quickly sank back into despotism. 'Looking at the history of *Bilad al-Sham* at this time [i.e. 400 years of Ottoman rule] is like looking at the earliest history of mankind. The Turks have degraded and plundered the country,'⁸ evidently implying that Ottoman rule was an economic as well as a political disaster.

This myth held sway for over two generations and it was due in particular to the efforts of people like Abdul-Karim Rafeq who gave us the first notion that things were not quite so simple. In addition, thanks to his work, the neglect and disregard of *Bilad al-Sham* under Ottoman rule on the part of Arab nationalist historiography has now been largely abandoned; in fact, the study of the region during the Ottoman period has become a flourishing concern. But more has happened: Ottoman studies have devoted greater attention to economic history and the role of the Ottomans in it. Perhaps most importantly, a highly sophisticated school of Indian Ocean studies has developed over the last thirty years. In many ways, the Indian Ocean region is

⁷ G.W.F. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-1574*, Urbana IL, University of Illinois Press, 1942, 30-33.

⁸ *al-Hilal*, 35, Dec. 1916, 182ff.

the key to what happened in *Bilad al-Sham*, whose economic fortunes during this time were as much impacted by developments from the west as they were from the east and south.

Let me try to put some of the results of this research together and try to paint a more coherent picture of the situation. Several serious historiographical handicaps remain:

1. The very rich *tabaqat* literature for the period is of little help for commercial and economic matters. Very few *vitae* of merchants are included and the authors, all pious *'alims*, were more interested in the *waqf* endowments such merchants established than in the sources and ways in which the latter had made their money. How far testaments registered in the *sijills* may help still has to be determined.
2. The inclination of Western scholarship to see change from Mamluk to Ottoman rule as a major turning point resulted in scholars either studying the period until the end of the Mamluks or the period beginning with the Ottomans. The use of different archives makes comparison difficult and emphasises differences.
3. The lack of comprehensive statistical material has made comparisons between the two periods on such issues as the economy extremely difficult. All quantitative information remains anecdotal: all comparison remains hazardous.

Eliyahu Ashtor, one of the major authorities on the economic history of the Eastern Mediterranean in the late Mamluk period, observed a general reversal of economic fortunes in the region after the middle of the fourteenth century. He argued that the Mongol invasions, the Black Death, and bad government had led both to depopulation and the deterioration of agriculture. The decline in the demand for food-stuffs freed land for cash crops, especially cotton, which was exported by the Venetians. In addition, the effects of the medieval mechanical revolution in Europe meant that the roles of the two regions in international trade became reversed. While the Middle East had previously supplied processed agricultural products like sugar and olive oil, and manufactured goods, like textiles, paper, glass and so on, it now became a supplier of raw materials, including silk, cotton and spices in transit. Europe's exports changed from wood, gold, and slaves to high

quality products including paper, textiles, glass, even olive oil, all of which had originally been manufactured in the Middle East.⁹

However, Ashtor also argued that the volume of Venetian spice trade with Egypt and Syria increased greatly in the second half of the fifteenth century. Between 1400 and 1490 the volume of pepper grew from 1,500 *portas* to 2,500 and that of ginger from 2,000 to 6–7,000.¹⁰ These items were picked up on the regular Venetian galley service from Egypt and Syria. In addition, silk from Persia reached Aleppo and locally grown cotton also experienced increasing demand in Venice.¹¹ On the basis of this information, Ashtor suggests the growth of Aleppo and possibly Damascus as trading centres. Basing himself on descriptions of medieval Aleppo, Wirth also concludes that there was considerable economic growth and urban expansion in the fifteenth century: 'In the second half of the 15th century [Aleppo] went through an enormous boom. Everywhere new buildings were erected, the deserted suburbs were populated again, new suburbs were founded and the suqs grew'.¹² Abdul-Karim Rafeq argued that the long periods of warfare between the Ottomans and the Byzantines had already caused the silk trade from Iran to be rerouted via Aleppo, where the Venetians picked it up. He observed the concomitant decline of Damascus.¹³ Others have argued that the Ottomans' war with the Safavids, just before the Ottoman conquest of the Arab lands, had driven the silk trade via Tabriz and Bursa to the south via Aleppo.¹⁴ Hence it seems possible to make a good case for the growing commercial importance of Aleppo *before* the Ottoman conquest.

⁹ E. Ashtor, 'The Decline of the Middle East During the Late Middle Ages—An Outline', *Asian and African Studies* 15, 1981, 253–86; see also his *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages*, London, Collins, 1976.

¹⁰ E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Latter Middle Ages*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983, 470–71.

¹¹ Ashtor, 'The Decline of the Middle East...', 267. He relates this upswing to increased textile production in Europe.

¹² Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth, *Aleppo: Historische und geographische Beiträge zur baulichen Gestaltung, zur sozialen Organisation und zur wirtschaftlichen Dynamik einer vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole*, Wiesbaden, Reichert, 1984, 20, 94, 97.

¹³ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Damas et Alep. Métropoles commerciales des Ayyubides aux Ottomans', in [the exhibition catalogue] *Syrie: Mémoire et Civilisation*, Paris, Institut du Monde Arabe/Flammarion, 1993, 396–401.

¹⁴ Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994, 148.

The Portuguese penetration of the Indian Ocean took place only shortly before the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt, but the Ottomans were keenly aware of developments in the Indian Ocean and the potential danger for trade constituted by the presence of the Portuguese. The Portuguese arrived in the Indian Ocean with vastly superior 'round ships', soon superseded by galleons, which could match—and soon surpassed—any Muslim merchant ship in their cargo-carrying capacity. Using sails and artillery/guns they also were a marvel of military efficiency compared with the Venetian and the Ottoman war galleys, which relied on oars and infantry. From a tactical point of view, artillery attacks and destruction needed much fewer men than ramming and entering. The Portuguese ships were mobile fortresses with enormous fire power, which could cow the ports of the Indian Ocean into submission. On their arrival in the Indian Ocean they created havoc with ordinary commerce. For a while they were even able to establish a monopoly of sorts, especially in the spice trade. But in the end, as both C.R. Boxer and (more recently) Sugata Bose have pointed out, the Portuguese could only insert themselves as an additional element in the Indian Ocean trade. Portugal possessed neither the manpower (Portugal's population was only ca. 1.5 million in 1530) nor the financial resources (the king had a monopoly over all trade, but he also had to finance it) to establish any sort of trade monopoly.¹⁵ The practical and certainly most obvious limit to Portuguese sea power was the sheer vastness of the Indian Ocean in comparison to the minuscule number of ships the Portuguese could send there. Vasco de Gama arrived with just four ships and at no point do there seem to have been more than two or three dozen Portuguese ships in the Indian Ocean at any one time. Chaudhuri makes a similar point, that the Portuguese, powerful as they may have been at sea, never could become a land power. Thus empires around the Indian Ocean did not feel particularly threatened, especially since the flow of trade was never interrupted, it just went through different hands,¹⁶ and, one might add, took different routes. In fact, there could be no talk of the Portuguese monopolizing

¹⁵ C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–1825*, New York, Knopf, 1969, 50ff.; Sugata Bose, 'Space and Time on the Indian Ocean Rim', in Leila Fawaz and C.A. Bayly, eds., *Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2002, 375.

¹⁶ K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 79.

control; the most amazing aspect of it is the tenacity of the myth of this control.

The Ottomans had no means of projecting a naval presence in the Persian Gulf and after having taken Hormuz, the Portuguese could block, and more importantly, control, the flow of trade through it. After the conquest of Egypt the Ottomans made a serious attempt to secure trade routes and trade with the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea, and for this they developed a military as well as a diplomatic strategy.

As early as 1525 an Ottoman fleet of 18 ships with 299 cannons arrived in Yemen from Egypt and forced the Portuguese to retreat. Two years later they supplied the trade emporium Diu in Gujarat with guns to fight off the Portuguese, and in 1538 they sent a fleet of 80 vessels including 10 large and 40 small galleys and 2 galleons to Diu to relieve it from the Portuguese. The latter eventually took the port but, as a collateral result, were driven out of the Red Sea. By 1554 Mocha had become a major Ottoman naval base, and Ottoman galleys continued to show enough presence to keep the Portuguese at bay in the Arabian Sea. The trade of the Gujaratis from Aceh to the Red Sea was developed. In 1561 the Portuguese watched 60 ships entering the Red Sea without being able to intercept them.¹⁷ The Ottomans put down a rebellion in Yemen in 1566 and by 1600 they had 38 fortresses in Yemen. In addition, they opened diplomatic relations with Aceh, which had become a formidable opponent of the Portuguese, and a major pepper producer. A celebrated expedition of two Ottoman vessels brought Ottoman gun-founders, gunners, engineers and heavy bronze guns to Aceh in 1567.¹⁸

These relations did not develop, and the Ottomans did not enter the trade and transport business on their own account. In the end they withdrew from the Indian Ocean altogether and even from Yemen and the southern part of the Red Sea by 1635. It was not, I believe, a deliberate preference for overland trade, as has been claimed, but the lack of the right ships. The Ottomans continued to use galleys in the Mediterranean just like the Venetians, their main enemy. As late

¹⁷ C.R. Boxer, 'A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atcheh, 1540-1600', *Journal of South East Asian History*, 10, 1969, 415-28.

¹⁸ Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 327.

as the battle of Lepanto in 1571, both sides used mostly galleys and after the terrible losses there the Ottomans rebuilt their fleet of galleys.¹⁹ But as we have seen, galleys were not particularly suitable for the open sea, or for many weeks at sea. They had to carry large crews and needed huge supplies of water and food. Even staying close to the coast in the Arabian and Red Sea was problematic, since most of the coast was extremely inhospitable. Although equipped with heavy guns, the galleys were no match for the broad sides of the Portuguese round ships and galleons.²⁰

It is generally agreed that after the measures taken by the Ottomans in the first half of the sixteenth century, trade with the Indian Ocean thrived once more. In 1566, five vessels from Aceh reached Jedda, bringing some 24,000 *quintaux* of pepper.²¹ At the end of the sixteenth century Aceh was exporting between 40,000 and 50,000 *quintaux* to the Red Sea, while the Portuguese were shipping only 10,000 *quintaux* to Europe, down from between 20,000 and 30,000 *quintaux* at mid-century.²² In fact, the volume of Red Sea pepper trade was now greater in value than in pre-Portuguese times.²³ With the rise of Mocha and direct shipping to Suez, Jeddah experienced a decline.²⁴ The fact that the Venetians transferred their consulate from Damascus to Aleppo in 1548 seems to suggest that all the pepper trade was handled via Cairo and that insufficient merchandise came overland by caravan from Jeddah and Mecca. Of course silk, much in demand in Venice at the time, could be bought in Aleppo.

Symbolizing another aspect of continuity in spite of the Ottoman conquest, Venice was still Aleppo's most important European trading partner. The spice trade began to decline in the 1580s, and after 1625 Aleppo supplied only the Ottoman market, all the European markets now being served by the Dutch; the English even re-exported spices

¹⁹ Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion 1400–1700*, London, Collins, 1965, 100.

²⁰ Salih Özbaran, 'Ottoman Naval policy in the South', in Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, eds., *Suleyman the Magnificent and his Age: The Ottoman Empire in the early Modern World*, London, Longman, 1995, 64.

²¹ Boxer, 'A Note on Portuguese Reactions...', 420.

²² Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire...*, 59.

²³ Özbaran, 'Ottoman Naval policy in the South', 64, 65: £1.3 million as compared to £1.15 million.

²⁴ Michael Tuchscherer, 'Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea—Gulf of Aden Region in the 16th and 17th Century', in Fawaz and Bayly, eds., *Modernity and Culture...*, 37.

and pepper from London to the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ The drop in the spice trade was made up for temporarily by the coffee trade. Yemen was abandoned by the Ottomans in 1635, and with the loss of Mocha, Jeddah regained its role as the main emporium for Indian Ocean trade to the Middle East, while trade in the southern part of the Red Sea came under the control of Gujarati merchants.²⁶ In any case, the timing of the changing monsoon winds did not make sailing further up the Red Sea very practical for Indian ships. For commercial as well as religious reasons, the Ottomans were committed to protecting the sea lanes from the north as far as Jeddah and all the overland routes as far as Mecca. As Raymond explains, the Cairene merchants maintained a complete monopoly on trade in the northern part of the Red Sea and no traders from the Indian Ocean were seen in Cairo. All merchandise in Jeddah had to be reloaded for onward shipment to the north,²⁷ which also implies a reinvigoration of the overland route from Mecca to Damascus, albeit without the all-important components of spices and of pepper.

With the occupation of Hormuz, the Portuguese established their control over trade in the Persian Gulf. But again, control did not mean blockage but rather participation—most often in the form of taxation. The Ottomans had established control of the upper part of the Gulf by the middle of the sixteenth century, and after Sulayman's campaigns against Iran in mid-century the times became more propitious for long distance trade through the Persian Gulf. Basra seems to have prospered and experienced a veritable renaissance under the Afrasiyab rulers in the early seventeenth century,²⁸ which may have detracted somewhat from the trade through the Red Sea.²⁹ In view of the dearth of information, it is difficult to estimate the role of this trade and how much of it went further than Mesopotamia itself and on to Aleppo. İnalcık mentions a group of Indian Muslim merchants in Aleppo at

²⁵ Niels Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans, and Companies: the structural crisis in the European Asian trade in the early 17th century*, Lund, Studentlitteratur, 1973, 172.

²⁶ Tuchscherer, 'Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea...', 38.

²⁷ André Raymond, 'A Divided Sea: The Cairo Coffee Trade in the Red Sea Area during the 17th and 18th Century', in Fawaz and Bayly, eds., *Modernity and Culture...*, 46–57.

²⁸ Thabit Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in Eighteenth Century Basra*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001, 10.

²⁹ Tuchscherer, 'Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea...', 37.

the time,³⁰ but they may also have come there overland from India. We can assume, however, that any opening of trade in the Persian Gulf would also benefit Aleppo, although to what extent remains unclear.

The picture of a complex and shifting network of international trade relations, driven by political events and technological innovation (or the lack of it) must be completed by pointing to a third major trade route, the overland route from India to Aleppo via Iran. Steensgaard's work on carracks, caravans and companies has drawn attention to this option. He argues that the costs of maritime transport were higher than transport by caravan until the middle of the seventeenth century. On the other hand, overland caravans could be faced with constant taxes and extortion, which might make them just as expensive.³¹ With the establishment of Safavid power in Iran, which provided increased security and more predictable customs fees at a time when the Portuguese were making shipping from India more hazardous and subjecting it to extra taxes, the overland route from India to Qandahar, Isfahan, Mosul and Aleppo once more became an attractive alternative. According to Steensgaard, this overland route had its boom years just before the fall of Hormuz to the English. Cotton cloth was brought to the Middle East and especially Aleppo, together with silk from Iran: 'expanding trade routes [via Qandahar] in the long sixteenth century are one of the most remarkable examples of the fact that the economic expansion of that century was not a question of guns and sails only'.³²

The displacement of the Portuguese from Hormuz by the Dutch and the English not only resulted in creating a temporary uncertainty over whether Shah Abbas was going to export silk directly to Europe on Dutch and English ships, but it signified the successful arrival of a

³⁰ İncalik and Quartaert, *An Economic and Social History...* Vol. I, 338.

³¹ Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans, and Companies...*, 40.

³² Niels Steensgaard, 'The Route through Qandahar: The significance of overland trade from India to the West in the seventeenth century', in Sushil Chaudhuri and Michel Morineau, eds., *Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the early Modern Era*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 55–73. See also Ben Slot, 'At the backdoor of the Levant: Anglo-Dutch competition in the Persian Gulf 1623–1766', in Alastair Hamilton, Alexander de Groot, Maurits van den Boogert, eds., *Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century*, Leiden, Brill, 2000, 130–33, who claims that the enormous demand for cotton cloth in the Ottoman Empire was only served via Amsterdam in the eighteenth century when the Gulf route declined because of political anarchy.

new sort of European trade, carried out by much larger trading bodies. This did not simply insert itself into existing trade patterns in the Indian Ocean but, with larger ships, and better financing and shareholding companies, it exercised a quite different kind of control and dominance than the Portuguese ever could. The companies succeeded in diverting not only the pepper trade but also the cotton cloth trade from the Middle East to the sea lanes directly to Europe. However, after a short-lived attempt to divert the silk trade from Iran via Bandar Abbas and the sea route to Europe, throughout the seventeenth century Iranian and Armenian traders continued to use the overland route to Izmir and/or Aleppo, where it was picked up by European merchants.

If Aleppo benefited from a vigorous silk trade during the seventeenth century, this had a great deal to do with the economic policies of the Safavid Shahs in Iran. Tahmasp I (r. 1524–1576) freed himself from Kizilbash dependence by filling his administration and military with Mamluks, known as *gholams*, mainly converted Georgians and Armenians, whom he appointed as governors. Gilan and Mazanderan were resettled with Armenian peasants to promote silk production, and Armenian merchants took the silk from those areas and exported it. Transferring a major Armenian merchant group to New Julfa, founded for this very purpose, was another step in the attempt by the ruler/state to monopolise the silk industry. Baghdiantz-McCabe argues that Shah Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) never meant to give a silk monopoly to the Spanish or the English but used this option to get a better offer from the Armenians, whom he believed he could effectively control.³³ The Armenians were obviously also interested in keeping the Europeans out of the trade as far as possible. They developed the most far flung ethnic trade network of peddlers in early modern times, connecting Iran with India on the one side and with Astrakhan, Archangelsk, Antwerp and Aleppo on the other. They maintained the direct overland route from northern Iran to Aleppo for as long as the Safavid state lasted. By 1550 large numbers of Armenians from Julfa resided in Aleppo,³⁴ thus guaranteeing the role of Aleppo in the transit

³³ Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, *The Shah's Silk for Europe's Silver: The Eurasian Trade of Julfa Armenians in Safavid Iran and India 1530–1750*, Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1999, 137.

³⁴ Rudolph P. Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver 1600–1730*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 23.

trade of silk, a commodity in constantly increasing demand in Europe, for the seventeenth century.³⁵

Let me try to reach some conclusions about the research discussed above—research that looks at the situation from different directions (quite literally), puts different emphasis on individual aspects and uses varying methods. Our quantitative base of information is still exceedingly small. Therefore, such conclusions as I can offer in an attempt to give a more coherent picture are necessarily in the nature of a hypothesis.

1. The conquest of the Arab lands by the Ottomans immediately made them part of a huge free trade zone. Products manufactured in Aleppo and Damascus obtained free access to new markets.³⁶ It made Aleppo also more accessible to European merchants who quickly established a presence there under the protection of treaties (Capitulations) with the Ottomans. In the reign of Sultan Sulayman, Aleppo became the terminus for all overland trade from Iran and India and the Persian Gulf. The early building boom which encouraged Ottoman governors and administrators as well as local dignitaries to invest in Damascus and Aleppo reflected both the economic boom and the firm commitment of the Ottomans to the new provinces of the Empire.³⁷
2. The ability of the Portuguese to control trade in the Indian Ocean has long been overestimated, while the Ottomans' understanding of the importance of trade and their efforts to keep the international trade routes through their territory open has not been given its due.³⁸ The Ottomans were also fully appreciative of guns as the up and coming new weapons on ships, but for reasons that are not entirely clear,³⁹ they failed to recognise the importance of the new

³⁵ See the statistical tables and their sources in Edmund Herzig, 'The volume of Iranian Raw Silk Exports in the Safavid Period', *Iranian Studies*, 1992, 61–81.

³⁶ Gaube and Wirth, *Aleppo...*, 6: 'In the Middle Ages and the modern period Aleppo was an important centre of manufacturing'.

³⁷ Stefan Weber, 'The Creation of Ottoman Damascus: Architecture and Urban Development of Damascus in the 16th and 17th century', in *ARAM*, 9/10, 1997–98, 431–70. See also Weber's paper in this volume.

³⁸ For a defence of Ottoman awareness of and interest in commerce in the Indian Ocean see Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy...*, 137.

³⁹ One certainly must have been that their chief enemies in the Mediterranean during the sixteenth century, the Venetians and the Spaniards, were themselves still using galleys, for instance at the battle of Lepanto in 1571.

ships, 'round boats' and galleons. As we have seen, galleys were unfit for the open sea, and their use was limited even in the Red Sea, which explains the Ottomans' failure to establish a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean.

3. On the whole, *Bilad al-Sham* continued to benefit from international trade. The reversal of roles in trade observed by Ashtor continued and became further consolidated. Long distance trade was stimulated by the constantly growing need for raw materials in Europe. Damascus gained political and economic importance by becoming the official collection point for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which always functioned as a commercial caravan. The Venetians were still buying in Damascus in the sixteenth century, especially pepper and spices, and shipped merchandise via the ports of Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli. But toward the end of the century the trade of Damascus had become strictly North-South trade, all East-West connections disappeared, the coastal cities declined, especially after Alexandretta became the official seaport of Aleppo in 1603. In the end, the trade of Damascus only catered to Aleppo. It was certainly Aleppo that benefited the most from integration into the Ottoman realm. Here East-West and North-South routes met, as did Indian, Armenian, Arab, and European merchants. The biographies and names of merchants mentioned by al-Tabbakh show that merchants from the Caucasus, Mar'ash, Khorasan, Baghdad, Antakya, and Egypt settled in Aleppo during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁴⁰
4. Because of the presence of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, the overland route to Aleppo from India via Qandahar, Isfahan and Mosul was revived, and flourished throughout the sixteenth century, with pepper and Indian cotton cloth constituting the main items reaching Aleppo. In this context Iranian silk deserves particular mention. Throughout the sixteenth century the volume traded in Aleppo grew considerably, and it became the most important merchandise during the seventeenth century. The Iranian silk trade is so remarkable because it was not just the haphazard result of changing trade routes caused by war, politics or technical innovations, nor simply the result of growing European demand, but first and foremost the result of a deliberate and wide ranging attempt

⁴⁰ al-Tabbakh, vol. V, 416, 457, 463, 439, 536; vol. VI, 30, 34, 83.

by the rulers of Iran to establish and systematically promote the cultivation of silk worms, to manufacture silk thread, and to export the silk profitably with the help of Armenian merchants.⁴¹ It was a government program that did not just attempt to control the flow and taxation of trade like the Portuguese and the Ottomans, but tried to manage and control production on a very large scale. That example from the East would have a major impact on the economy of *Bilad al-Sham* in the eighteenth century.

5. *Bilad al-Sham* had already been engaged in international trading networks during the Mamluk period. With the arrival of the Portuguese and the Ottomans on the scene, Red Sea trade was indeed disrupted for a while. But trade routes shifted, some merchandise changed and quantities often increased. During the sixteenth century, *Bilad al-Sham* continued and improved its role in a form of world trade which had not yet been torn out of its traditional mode: it had merely become somewhat more complex. But the fortunes of the different coastal towns and the two great inland cities of Damascus and Aleppo varied considerably, and prosperity did not by any means come equally to all.

⁴¹ The construction of New Julfa was part of this project.

PUBLIC SERVICES AND TAX REVENUES IN OTTOMAN TRIPOLI (1516–1918)

FAROUK HOBLOS

A comparison of the tax regime implemented in a given province with the provision of public services by the authorities of that province affords a ready means of examining the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens. Throughout history, these two axes have been crucial to define the authorities' perception of the people over whom they rule and, vice versa, the attitude of the people towards their rulers. How far does the system respect the subjects' rights? How far is it committed to leading society towards progress and prosperity?

Geographical boundaries and time frame, resources and references

This research is based on records in Tripoli, Lebanon during the period of Ottoman rule, and is intended to shed light on relations between Arabs and Turks. It will also give us a picture of the realities of Ottoman rule over the Arab world, and clarify whether the Ottomans regarded this area as part of an Islamic empire in which all elements, whether Arabs or Turks, were equal, or whether it regarded the Arab world as a generally subservient part of the empire, in which the Turks were the rulers and the Arabs were their subjects. Most of the sources come from the records of the sharia courts in Halba and Tripoli, which contain details of tax collection and the payment of both ordinary and extraordinary taxes.¹ For the latter part of the period, I have made use of the *salnames* of the province of Beirut for 1893, 1901, 1906 and 1908, and of the province of Syria for 1883, and some registers of the taxes collected from villages in the province of Tripoli, for example, two registers for the village of Mushmush for 1323 A.H.² I have also made use of a large number of tax receipts, taxation assessments, and

¹ The court records of Tripoli will be referred to by their register number.

² These are the '*daftar 'ushur*' and '*daftar takalif wa-yarku*'.

certificates of wheat sales in Tripoli at various times between 1890 and 1914.

In addition to these sources, and particularly for the late nineteenth century, I have used the reports and memoirs of some senior officials in the province of Beirut, including the book by Rafiq al-Tamimi, the head of the Commercial Office in Beirut, and Muhammad Bahjat, the deputy manager of the Sultan's Office in Beirut, who were commissioned by the *wali* of Beirut, 'Azmi Bey, to report on the circumstances and needs of the province and to conduct a data-based study.³ I also used data collected in 1904 by Hikmat Sharif, the head clerk of the Tripoli municipality,⁴ as well as a book entitled *Samir al-Layali* by Muhammad Amin al-Sukkari, the deputy secretary of the Tripoli administrative council.⁵ Many of my findings are also based on research by Dr. 'Isam Khalifa on the Ottoman tax system in the province of Tripoli in the sixteenth century, carried out in the imperial archives in Istanbul.⁶

Ottoman taxation

The Ottoman fiscal system was based on the collection of taxes on agricultural and pastoral production in the provinces, and on customs dues, sales and market taxes, fines, the commutation of feudal services, bride taxes, revenues from mines, salt pans, and fisheries, taxes on flour mills, oil presses and silk reels, the head tax (*jizya*) on non-Muslims, as well as extraordinary taxes imposed by the administration in particular years to meet special needs (such as major military campaigns) and spending deficits. The amount of taxation imposed and collected varied according to the location of the province, the capacity of the various administrative units to pay, the occupations of the taxpayers, and their places of residence. Taxes on crops affected villages more than cities, while cities were more affected by taxes on

³ See Rafiq al-Tamimi and Muhmmad Bahjat, *Wilaya Bayrut* (1885 or 1886), repr. Judaydat al-Matn (Lebanon), Dar Lahd Khatir, 1979.

⁴ Hikmat Sharif, eds. Muna Haddad Yakan and Marun 'Isa al-Khuri, *Ta'rikh Trabulus al-Sham: min aqdam azmaniha ila hadhihi al-ayyam, wa-qad nushira mukhtasaran fi jaridat Tarabulus al-Sham*, Tripoli, Dar Hikmat Sharif: Dar al-Iman, 1987.

⁵ Tripoli, Matba'a al-Balagha, 1317 (1899 or 1900).

⁶ 'Isam Khalifa, *al-Dara'ib al-'uthmaniya fi'l-qarn al-sadis 'ashr*, Beirut, n.p., 2000.

commerce, crafts, and services. Hence urban and rural taxation will be dealt with separately.

The issue here is not the details of particular taxes, but the levels and amounts and the recipients of the income so generated. This approach divides taxes into two main types: first, revenue destined for the central treasury but spent in the provinces, and second, revenues remitted directly to the treasury in Istanbul and spent there. The first category included payments to members of the military and governing class through the timar system, revenues retained by the provincial governors to pay local expenses, and revenues from *awqaf*.⁷ The second category, which was remitted directly to Istanbul, derived principally from the *jizya*, the most significant source of taxation in the sixteenth century, in addition to various dues, the head tax on Nusayri men (*dirham al-rijal*)⁸ and the income of the timars belonging to the sultan or members of the imperial family (*shahani khass*), or timars belonging to high state officials (*khass*).⁹

Rural taxation under the Ottomans

The timar was the basic economic unit in the countryside under the Ottoman 'feudal' regime, generally consisting of one or two villages, known collectively as an *iqta'*, or *muqata'a*,¹⁰ managed by a timariot or *sipahi* appointed by the state. They were charged with administering the cultivation of the lands of villages and uninhabited farms (*mazra'a*), with ensuring public order, giving some attention to the needs of the cultivators, and with collecting taxes, a portion of which served as compensation for their services as they were not paid from the central treasury. The individual timars were registered in a *tahrir* or *tapu daftar* in Istanbul.

The timar holders had the right to collect revenue and to administer *miri* land in their capacity as the representatives of the administration, although a grant of *iqta'* did not imply a gift or permanent alienation, but simply the temporary assignment of the right to collect *'ushr* and

⁷ Ibid., 34.

⁸ See Dick Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: a History of Justice and Oppression*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000, 142–43.

⁹ Ibid., 17, 19, 31.

¹⁰ This is the term used by Massoud Daher; see his article in this volume.

other taxes from the peasants who worked the land. In contrast to the *iltizam* system, a portion of the tax generated on the timar did not go to the central treasury, but would remain in the hands of the *sipahi* or timar holder to be spent in his *muqata'a*.¹¹ Timars were of three types: the common timar, with an annual income of less than 20,000 *akces*; *zi'amet*, with an annual income of between 20,000 and 100,000 *akces*; and *khass*, with an annual income exceeding 100,000 *akces*. The latter were mostly held only by the sultan, his ministers and pashas.¹²

Since the entire countryside, in the province of Tripoli as in other provinces, operated under the same administrative and fiscal system, whether *iqta'* or *iltizam*, I will take the taxation of a single district as representative of the system as a whole. Let us therefore take the *muqata'a* in the *nahiya* of Jubba Bsharri as an example. We know from the Ottoman registers that large parts of this district were *khass* timars,¹³ whose revenues went straight to the central treasury in Istanbul, including the following taxes: *dimus* (tax assessed as a lump sum on surface area), *mal sayfi* (tax on summer fruit crops) and *kharaj* (tax assessed as portion of harvest), taxes on oil, wheat and barley, the set of fines and fees called 'wind-fall' (*bad-i hawa*), bride tax, taxes on goats, honey, olive and grape presses, flour mills and silk reels, as well as *waqf* dues and the head tax on Nusayri men (*dirham al-rijal*). To be added was the salary of the tax collector. For example, in 1571 the sum of 2536 *akces* was added to the taxation of Ehden as payment to the tax collector.¹⁴

In the year 1519 the total taxation of Jubba Bsharri from all sources came to a total of 175,441 *akces*. By 1571 this amount had doubled, to 339,803, but the amount of taxation remaining in the region had fallen, and the amount going to the central treasury in Istanbul had increased. In 1519, 47.90 per cent the tax collected went to Istanbul; by 1571, the figure had reached 75.68 per cent.

¹¹ Khalifa, *al-Dara'ib al-Uthmaniya*, 13.

¹² A general account of Ottoman state revenue and expenditure can be found in 'Sources of Revenue' in Halil İnalcik and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 55-76.

¹³ Khalifa, *al-Dara'ib al-Uthmaniya*, 49, 54.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

Table 1

Destination type of revenue	1519 amount in <i>akce</i>	%	1571 amount in <i>akce</i>	%
Istanbul		48%		75%
<i>khass</i>	81,272		157,834	
<i>jizya</i>	2,600		8,682	
Province		52%		25%
<i>zi'amat</i>	9,600			
<i>timar</i>	58,661		35,730 ^a	
<i>awqaf</i>	23,308			
Total	175,441	100%	339,803	100%

^a Khalifa, *al-Dara'ib al-'Uthmaniya*, 68–70.

Urban taxation under the iqta' regime

We will take the city of Tripoli as an example of the working of the tax system under the *iqta'* regime. The *daftardar* (head of the financial administration) and the *jizyadar* (collector of the *jizya*) were principally responsible for remitting the taxes to the treasury in Istanbul, as specified in a *qanun-name* of 1519, which introduced some new taxes and cancelled others. Among the taxes and fees that were cancelled were a number of administrative fees collected by officials like the governor (*sarha*, *alia*, *dawra*) or a new timariot (*wusul*, *manshuriya*, *intiqal*) on the occasion of their coming into office or of a visit, administration tax (*idara*), winter clothes tax, taxes on slaves, and other arbitrary taxes (*masaha*, *jaba*) which were never recorded in the Ottoman registers. On the other hand the *qanun-name* retained the following taxes: the tithe (*'ushr*), the head tax levied on Nusayri men (*dirham al-rijal*), port customs (*iskale*), market taxes, transit taxes, the tax on soap and soap factories, weighing fees (*kapan*, *qabban*); taxes on slaves, the various fines and dues called windfall (*bad-i hawa*), bride charges, and the taxation of orchards, which belonged to the sultanic *khass*; market taxes on silk weighing and slaughterhouses, market dues on horse and pack animal trading; taxes on livestock, *dukhan* tax (temporary stay in sipahi's village); the tithe on cereals, dues on fruit sales, and many others.

In 1519, total taxes collected came to 1,047,200 *akces*. About three quarters of the total (786,200 *akces*) were to be remitted directly to Istanbul, while the remainder (252,400 *akces*) remained in the local

treasury in the charge of the governor. The local treasury also received 19,315 *akces* in waqf taxes and revenues.¹⁵

In 1571, the taxes of the city of Tripoli reached a total of 1,464,618 *akces*. This evidently represents an increase on 1519, but in addition, the proportion going to the treasury in Istanbul increased from about 75 per cent in 1519 to 90 per cent in 1571. Finally, revenues of the *khass mir-liwa* declined from 24.3 per cent in 1519 to 9.37 percent in 1571, which meant a decline in the amount of revenue remaining in Tripoli.¹⁶

Tax revenues under the iltizam system

With the decline of the *iqta'* system and the adoption of tax farming (*iltizam*) in the province of Tripoli in the middle of the seventeenth century, revenues were re-categorised and the means of collecting them changed, although the situation of the taxpayers remained the same and even became worse, since the state was only interested in securing the payment of a particular amount to the treasury. Under the new system each source of revenue (such as the weighing of silk, port customs dues, the *jizya*, and so forth), became a tax unit to be farmed out, as did the taxes of each administrative district (*nahiya*), for instance of 'Akkar, Jubba Bsharri or al-Zawiya. The court records of Tripoli show that the state contracted out the collection of revenue to local persons after determining the amount to be paid. Thus the taxes of Tripoli were divided between the following *muqata'as*:

Table 2: Division of revenue between the *muqata'as* of the province of Tripoli in 1186^{17a}

Muqata'a	Tax value in <i>Ghurush</i>	Muqata'a	Tax value in <i>Ghurush</i>
'Akkar	53,291	Tartus	9808.5
Arab Āl Musa	750	al-Zania	8999
Third of Muqata'a of Kura	15231	al-Diyyura	1180
Ghazawiana	125	Baj Khamr	550
Safita and districts	45830	al-Sha'ra	6000

¹⁵ Ibid., 275–77.

¹⁶ Ibid., 289–96.

¹⁷ Register 22, 276.

Table 2 (*cont.*)

Muqata'a	Tax value in <i>Ghurush</i>	Muqata'a	Tax value in <i>Ghurush</i>
al-Zawiya	20036	Third of Kura	12006
Bahnin village	300	Chickpea-khane <i>Basaj khane</i>	5500
Mal subashi	1000	Yawatma Qala'a	330
Bawba Khana (dyers)	700	Jubayl and Batrun, Jubba and Hurmil	30,000
Mal al-Ra's and Ba'albak for the governor of Tripoli	3393	Mal Kharab Askala	1800
Mizan Harir wa Mahsul	20,221	Trading tax between the port of Tripoli and Egypt	15,883.5
ihtisab fees	6467.5		

It is worth noting that the amount of revenue was not fixed, but instead edged constantly upwards as the state's demands and the greed of the *walis* increased, the latter taking advantage of competition among the elite for particular *muqata'at*, thus raising their price. I will give an example of this in the escalation of imperial taxes in Jubba Bsharri over a period of a little more than a century:

Table 3: *Miri* Revenues in Jubba Bsharri *muqata'a* between 1667 and 1775

Year	Tax Value in <i>Ghirsh</i>	Additional Taxes	Total
1078/1667	8000	— ^a	8000 ^b
1097/1686	7000	—	7000 ^c
1150/1737	6500	—	6500 ^d
1152/1740	6500	500	7000 ^e
1165/1752	6500	4000	10500 ^f
1175/1761	6500	3500	10000 ^g
1187/1774	6500	5000	11500 ^h
1188/1775	6500	5000	11500 ⁱ

^a Additional taxes were not always recorded in the *iltizam* registers.

^b Register 1, 11.

^c Register 3, 129.

^d Register 7, 7.

^e Register 7, 197.

^f Register 7, 288.

^g Register 16, 118.

^h Register 22, 31.

ⁱ Register 22, 143.

In addition, documents relating to the *iltizam* show that there were other regular taxes that Tripoli province had to pay. These were taxes of the imperial *khas* and of other timars remaining in existence from the *iqtā'* regime, as well as fines for serious crimes, taxes on *awqaf*, extraordinary taxes,¹⁸ and the *jizya*, all of which increased continuously. As is shown in the following table, the *jizya* revenues doubled between 1230 and 1231:

Table 4: *Jizya* distribution in the province of Tripoli between 1230 and 1231

Muqata'a	<i>Ghirsh</i> 1230 ^a	<i>Ghirsh</i> 1231 ^b
Homs and Hama	480.5	961
Husn al-Akrad	624	1248
Ba'albak	1619	2376
Jubayl	640	1280
'Akkar	2609	5218
Safita	1248	2496
Thulth al-Kura	550	1100
al-Shura	226.5	453.5
Tartus	136	272
al-Daniya	113.5	246.5
al-Maniya	–	1000
City of Tripoli	–	5700
Tripoli & al-Maniya & al-Mina'	5162.5	–

^a Register 41, 77.

^b Register 45, 136.

Due to the huge quantity of regular taxes, it was difficult for the *multazim* to collect the full amount from the inhabitants, especially during lean years, so the shortfalls were simply postponed. In fact the state never exempted individuals from their dues, but made them pay by instalments.¹⁹

¹⁸ The *iltizam* contracts specified the taxes permitted to be collected, namely *amwal amiriya* and some fees and dues remaining from the feudal period. They also specify the taxes which were not to be collected by the *multazim*, since they were the responsibility of other agencies. These were taxes on *awqaf*, timars and *jizya*, taxes on serious crimes and additional extraordinary taxes that the state might impose. This can be seen in any *iltizam* contract for any area in the Tripoli court records.

¹⁹ Register 3, 80–84; register 34, 124.

In addition, the registers mention that the inhabitants were required to pay unofficial taxes known as 'customary dues' such as *al-quḍumiya* (investiture, arrival), *al-mushahara* (monthly dues), *al-husudiya* (tax at the beginning of the harvest season), *al-dhakhra* (provisions), *al-'abudiya* (slave tax), *al-dukhaniya*²⁰ (dues for a temporary stay in a sipahi's village), *al-saliyan* (yearly dues), *al-zarkhaliya* (services), and the *'idiya* levied on feast days.²¹ The total of these additional taxes often exceeded the regular ones because of the absence of any monitoring either by the *wali* or by the *multazim*, and because the *fallahin* were generally not in a position to refuse the authorities' requests. In the year 1166/1753 the amount of unofficial taxes in 'Akkar district was as follows, in addition to the harvest tax that would be charged on every peasant by one to four *ghirsh* according to the size of the crop:²²

<i>'abudiya</i> tax (on slaves)	2500 <i>ghirsh</i>
<i>kapu kharji</i> (governor's household, clothing)	1500 <i>ghirsh</i>
<i>dhakhras</i> (provisions)	3000 <i>ghirsh</i>
<i>fa'id kilar, khidmat, zarkhaliya, jarda</i> (various services) ²³	2400 <i>ghirsh</i>
<i>dhaman zaytun</i> (tax on the olive crop) ²⁴	2500 <i>ghirsh</i>

In addition, the power which officials exerted over some of the wealthier residents was sufficient to force them to pay part of the costs of the administration, as happened when the *wali* obliged a number of craftsmen to pay the expenses of the upkeep of the official guest house in Tripoli.²⁵ Such impositions would occasionally trigger revolts, which would oblige the *wali* to issue some tax exemptions, as happened when the *wali* remitted the olive tax of 'Akkar in 1193 because he got wind of a possible uprising.²⁶

The sources indicate that some of the additional taxes went straight into the pocket of the *wali*, even though they were recorded in the contracts sometimes as a debt to the *multazim*, as is clear from the tax table of Jubba Bsharri. Another part was shared between the *multazim*

²⁰ In 1097, one household in al-Daniya had to pay seven *ghirsh* a year for *dukhaniya* and winter crop tax, register 3, 32.

²¹ Register 2, 50.

²² Letter from the court to the *multazim* of 'Akkar, register 25, 83.

²³ Register 20, 53.

²⁴ Register 27, 135.

²⁵ Register 3, 132; register 7, 140.

²⁶ An order from the *wali* raised the olive crop tax for 'Akkar in 1193. See text in register 25, 83.

and the *wali* while recorded sometimes as 'ancient custom' (*'ada qadima*). An even larger share went to high officials in Istanbul as gifts, presents, and bribes to guarantee the *wali* and the *multazim* another term in office. Hence the taxes paid by the peasants of the *wilaya* of Tripoli not only financed the state treasury but also went into the pockets of the authorities in Istanbul.

Taxation during the Tanzimat period

In theory, the Gülhane decree of 1839 abolished the *iltizam* system and the additional taxes and feudal levies, yet a closer view of the laws and regulations in force shows that the payment of taxes still remained a heavy burden for townsmen and peasants. Thus the *iltizam* regime was not abolished, but rather amended in the general direction of attempting to impose more restrictions on the *multazim* and to limit his powers.²⁷ As far as taxes were concerned, more exactions were added, thus ensuring more money for the treasury. Although the '*ushr*' tax was only supposed to be ten per cent of the harvest, the state raised it to twelve per cent; by 0.5 per cent in 1869 for the education fund,²⁸ by one per cent in 1885 to establish an agricultural bank; by 0.25 per cent in 1878 to pay the indemnity exacted after the war with Russia, and by a further 0.5 per cent in 1897 to pay for military equipment.²⁹ The state also added a military exemption tax (*badal*) paid by those who did not want to complete their compulsory military service. A five per cent education tax was added to the *wirgu* collected from real estate, which was designated for the construction of school buildings.³⁰ The state also issued a roads and bridges regulation in 1866 which obliged individuals aged between 16 and 60 years to serve four days of forced labour every year with their draft animals. It also permitted the

²⁷ A change in the '*ushr*' system was instituted during Rajab 1272/1856 which essentially reintroduced the *iltizam* system. The new regulations listed the various financial guarantees required by the state and stated that the taxes of every village should be put up to auction. Several properties within the same sub-district could be assigned to a single *multazim* for a limited period of two years for customs dues and for the '*ushr*' on olive production and hunting. On the crown estates and fisheries the period varied between two and five years.

²⁸ *al-Dustur*, M2, 185–87.

²⁹ 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Awad, *al-Idara al-'Uthmaniya fi wilayat Suriya, 1864–1914*, Cairo, Dar al-Ma'arif, 1969, 168.

³⁰ Table of expenditures of *wirgu* and other expenses for Mushmush village ('Akkar) for 1324–1325.

provincial council to raise the number of days of *corvée* labour to five each year. Exemption could be obtained for 16 *ghirsh* per year, which was increased to between 20 and 30 *ghirsh* a year.³¹ In addition the state monopolised the sale of salt and tobacco³² and in 1867 the tax on tobacco was increased to a full half of the proceeds of the harvest.³³

There are a number of receipts indicating that taxpayers were paying additional sums not specified in the regulations as well as other illegal exactions. The accounts of 'Akkar district show that unofficial taxes were often added to the basic tax demand. For example, the constitution specified the dues for the settlement of an inheritance as one *para* per *ghirsh* as fee for the division of the estate, 60 *paras* per 1000 *ghirsh* as registration fee³⁴ and 3 *ghirsh* for a copy of the property document.³⁵ On the other hand the court records show registration fees could be as much as two *ghirsh* per 1000 instead of 60 *paras*, in addition to a fee to the clerk of the court³⁶ and four *ghirsh* instead of three *ghirsh* for a copy of the documents.³⁷ All receipts of '*ushr*' in 'Akkar also specify an additional charge of four *ghirsh* for a copy of the receipt itself.³⁸

The budget of *wilaya Suriya* for 1883 shows that taxes collected from the province of Tripoli district amounted to 5,154,146 *ghirsh*, excluding *awqaf* and *jizya* taxes, while the total expenses of the district amounted to 894,016 *ghirsh*.³⁹ Hence 81.63 per cent of the taxes of Tripoli went to the central treasury in Istanbul while only 17.37 per cent of the taxes paid by its inhabitants was actually spent in Tripoli.

In the year 1322/1904 the total amount of tax for this district came to 6,064,995 *ghirsh*, of which 1,619,757 were *wirku*, and 2,264,171 '*ushr*'. Total expenditures were 1,056,322, of which 338,534 were spent on interior affairs and 272,723 went to the central treasury.⁴⁰ Hence what was actually spent in Tripoli district was only 17.4 per cent of total tax revenues, while 82.6 per cent went to the capital. It is also worth mentioning that most of the expenditure in Tripoli itself went

³¹ 'Awad, op. cit., 175.

³² *al-Dustur*, M2, 34.

³³ *al-Dustur*, M2, 85–86.

³⁴ *al-Dustur*, M1, 139.

³⁵ *al-Dustur*, M1, 45–46.

³⁶ Register 63, 242; register 1, no. 64, 152.

³⁷ Deed of ownership records for 'Akkar, 1321.

³⁸ Receipt for payment of '*ushr*', 'Akkar.

³⁹ *Salname of wilaya Suriya* for 1301/1883, 278.

⁴⁰ Hikmat Sharif, *Ta'rikh Tarablus al-Sham...*, 278.

to the salaries of local officials engaged in the collection of taxes or to the gendarmerie, which was an instrument used to oppress the peasants, in addition to large sums paid as bribes by local residents to the high officials of the district, most of whom were outsiders.

Contrary to the provisions of the Gülhane decree of 1839, large landowners continued to impose additional taxes on peasants, for example by forcing the peasant to pay the *'ushr* on the total production of his own share only and adding a *shikara* tax of one bushel per *feddan*.⁴¹ These injustices were not only imposed by the landowners; the peasants also suffered from the practices of state administrators and high officials. Sometimes, when villagers could not pay the *'ushr* to the *multazim* because of poor crop yields, the state would force them to pay the same amount as in more productive years.⁴² High officials in the sub-province of Tripoli would exploit the peasants and their means of transport to ferry them around without payment.⁴³ It is worth posing the question of what exactly Tripoli received from the state in return for all these exactions.

Public Services

The ratio between the expenditures in Tripoli and the amount which went directly to Istanbul proves that the share retained by the sub-province was very modest in comparison with what was sent to the capital, as is shown in the following table:

Table 5: Amount of tax retained locally as a fraction of total taxes

Year	1519	1571	1883	1904
City of Tripoli	24.09%	9.37%	—	—
Muqata'a of Bsharri	52.1%	24.22%	—	—
Province of Tripoli	—	—	17.37%	17.4%

⁴¹ al-Tamimi and Bahjat, *Wilaya Bayrut...*, Vol. 2, 247.

⁴² Yusuf al-Hakim, the public prosecutor in Tripoli court said 30 people from one village were imprisoned because they refused to pay the *'ushr* for their village, see Yusuf al-Hakim, *Suriya wa'l-'Ahd al-'Uthmani*, Beirut, Dar al-Nahar, 1991, 259.

⁴³ Ibid., 242.

Such numbers amply illustrate the low standard of public services and facilities in the area during the Ottoman period. It shows the very small increase in Tripoli's share of the budget during the Tanzimat, which was not spent on public services but again went to the salaries of officials, whose numbers increased in the last decades of the Empire in order to tighten state control over the region. In addition to these figures, other official documents, travel accounts, and the memoirs of high officials in Tripoli assist us to evaluate the investment made by the Ottomans in various public services in the region.

Public security

All the sources agree that prior to the Tanzimat the sole purpose of the services delivered by the state was to create sufficient security to guarantee the payment of taxes. This is why the administration was so eager to repair the military establishments left behind by the Mamluks in order to use them as barracks for the janissaries.⁴⁴ The desire to promote stability and security is evident both from the increased number of troops which the government stationed in Tripoli,⁴⁵ and the relatively rare incidence of robbery or murder in the records of the *mahkama shar'īya*, showing that a fair degree of security prevailed in the region in early Ottoman times. A few incidents of theft or murder took place away from the main commercial routes, for example in Wadi Hadhur, on the road between Tripoli and Homs. If such incidents did take place, the administration would quickly issue orders to the *wali* of Tripoli to pursue and arrest the criminals.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ In 1522, Sultan Sulayman II repaired the fortress of Tripoli, which had been damaged during the revolution of Janbari al-Ghazali, and built a tower near the entrance, as is indicated in an inscription over the main entrance of the fortress on the north side. The Ottomans repaired it again in 1127, spending 1397 *ghirsh*: see register 5, 105. In 1810 it was repaired for the last time by Mustafa Agha Barbar, the *multazim* of Tripoli. See al-Khuri Ignatius Tannus, *Mustafa Agha Barbar: hakim iyalat Tarabulus wa-Jabalāh wa-Ladhiqayat al-'Arab, 1767-1834: Sahafa dafinah khatirah wa-abwab wajihah min ta'rikh Lubnan bayna al-qarnayn al-18 wa'l-19*, Beirut, Matba'a al-Rahbaniyah al-Lubnaniya, 1957, 130.

⁴⁵ Adil Isma'il (compiler), 1975 f. *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l'histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVII^e siècle à nos jours. Documents recueillis sous l'égide de Maurice Chéhab*. Beyrouth, Éditions des œuvres politiques et historiques, Vol. 4, 367.

⁴⁶ On 3 Muharram 1128 the state issued a *firman* to the *wali* of Tripoli to pursue 120 Turcoman and Kurdish rebels who had attacked Wadi Hadhur and looted the

The state charged the local *multazims* with the responsibility for establishing security in the villages and the areas surrounding them, taking guarantees from them for this purpose, sometimes as much as 5000 *ghirsh* which would be forfeited if robberies or other crimes took place in the districts under their supervision.⁴⁷ According to the sources, the security situation was more or less acceptable in the district of Tripoli district until the Committee of Union and Progress came to power. After that it began to deteriorate in the cities and the villages, and incidents of theft increased in 1911.⁴⁸ During the Tanzimat the gendarmes in Tripoli were responsible for public security.⁴⁹

Improvements to the infrastructure

Except for repairs to the fortress of Tripoli and the military barracks, the Ottomans did not construct a single new building in Tripoli from treasury funds before the Tanzimat era. The hospital⁵⁰ and the Sufi *tekke* both date from the Mamluk era and both remained in use throughout the Ottoman period. The Ottoman state did not undertake any constructions or repairs to meet the needs of the increasing population of the city. In keeping with practice elsewhere in the Empire, the state did not build mosques in Tripoli, although some high officials built mosques at their own expense, or perhaps more accurately from the money they stole from the people, in order to appear pious and to gain the approval both of the Sultan and the people.⁵¹ The state built a

crops there whose value was estimated at 14,160 *ghirsh*. The names of all the rebels are included in the *firman*. See register 5, 68.

⁴⁷ Register 13, 132.

⁴⁸ During the visit of the *wali* of Beirut to Tripoli in July 1911 there were clashes between arms smugglers and the local security forces in which a villager was killed and the criminals escaped. In the same month arms smugglers killed the *mudir nahiya* of Arwad, and they found another person killed in his house in Tripoli. There were also incidents involving peasants, *aghawat* and soldiers in the village of Shin, which led to deaths and injuries; for details see Yusuf al-Hakim, *Suriya wa'l-'Ahd al-'Uthmani*, 239–46.

⁴⁹ Beirut *salname* for 1311–1312/1893–1894, 157.

⁵⁰ Built by the Mamluks in 742 AH; see Hikmat Sharif, *Ta'rikh Trabulus al-Sham...*, 150.

⁵¹ Including the mosque of Mahmud al-Za'im, the minaret of al-Uwaysia built by the *wali* Ibrahim Pasha, according to an inscription on a marble stone inside the mosque. Amir Muhammad Sayfa repaired the mosque of al-Tawba after part of it collapsed after the flooding of the Abu 'Ali River, according to an inscription on a stone in the courtyard of the mosque.

guesthouse, known as *al-Manzil* in the local records, to accommodate officials during their stay in Tripoli or while they passed through the city. The maintenance expenses of this building, including its furniture, cleaning, and the provision of meals to visitors, were all borne by the local population.⁵² Any contemporary would immediately recognise the lack of any development during the Ottoman period, and how things generally remained as they had been since the time of the Mamluks, which indicates the lack of interest on the Ottomans' part in developing the country.

During the Tanzimat period the state's only major undertaking was the enlarging of Suq al-Bazirgan, the principal and only market place until the end of the nineteenth century.⁵³ The government subsequently built the *sarai* on the side of the *tall* in 1890,⁵⁴ spending about 8,000 liras on its construction.⁵⁵ In 1902 it erected a clock tower opposite the *sarai*, at total cost of 1500 liras,⁵⁶ followed by the post office, the preparatory school and the municipal building, all in the same area.

Transport

Travellers and chroniclers are all agreed on the poor situation of the highways in the province of Tripoli during the Ottoman period. They could not carry the transit trade of the port of Tripoli because they were not adequately maintained and did not permit the movement of goods. al-Tamimi and Bahjat note that it took fourteen hours in the late Ottoman period to get from Tripoli to Hadhur, a distance of fifty kilometres. In addition, the mountain villages of 'Akkar had no proper roads,⁵⁷ and the only way to reach them was by paths cut through the forests, which were full of mud and rocks and thus impassable by animal-drawn carts.⁵⁸

The state also paid little attention to bridges, even those on the main roads, and left the task of maintaining and reconstructing them to

⁵² Register 7, 140.

⁵³ Hikmat al-Sharif, *Ta'rikh Trabulus al-Sham...*, 153.

⁵⁴ Samih Wajih Zayn, *Ta'rikh Tarabulus qadiman wa hadithan mundhu aqdam al-azminah hatta 'asrina al-hadir*, Beirut, Dar al-Andalus, 1969, 446.

⁵⁵ Hikmat al-Sharif, *Ta'rikh Trabulus al-Sham...*, 151.

⁵⁶ al-Sukkari, *Samir al-Layali*, 104.

⁵⁷ al-Tamimi and Bahjat, op. cit., Vol. 2, 158–253.

⁵⁸ Yahya ibn Abi al-Safa [al-Mahasani] (ed. 'Adnan al-Bakhit), *al-Manazil al-Muhasaniya fi'l-Rihla al-Tarabulsiya*, Beirut, Dar al-Afaq al-Jadida, 1981, 51–57.

merchants and other concerned individuals. In 1814 the bridge of Shaykh 'Ayyash on the coast road between Tripoli and Tartus collapsed, and the state did nothing about it. This prompted the *za'im* of 'Akkar, 'Ali Bey al-As'ad al-Mur'abi, to rebuild it out of his own pocket.⁵⁹ At the beginning of the twentieth century all the bridges in the city of Tripoli were in a state of disrepair.⁶⁰

The state showed some interest in repairing the highways during the Tanzimat. In 1869 a roads and highways law was issued, but Tripoli did not receive any benefit from it for several years. In 1879/1296 the state granted an Ottoman state company a concession to establish a horse-drawn tramway between Tripoli and the port, with a road running parallel to it. Four years later same company was given a concession to build a road between Tripoli and Homs and the right of exploitation for fifty years.⁶¹ The railway line was not built until 1911, despite the fact that Egypt had had a railway system since 1845.⁶² The state opened an office in Tripoli, *Turuq wa Mu'abir Komisyonu*, to supervise these roads as well as a supervisory board for the various construction projects.⁶³ The streets in the city remained dirty and neglected till the end of the Ottoman period and were described by al-Tamimi and Bahjat as being full of sewage, debris and household waste.

Postal Services

Before the Tanzimat, the official mail was delivered by an employee known as *al-Tatar*,⁶⁴ while private mail was distributed by postmen who had established a guild with its own shaykh. The cost of delivering a letter from Tripoli to Damascus was about 3/4 majidi riyals. In 1869 the state instituted regulations for a provincial mail system; the unofficial postmen had been replaced by the end of the nineteenth century, and post offices had been established in the provincial capitals. The Beirut *salnames* record the existence of a post office in Tripoli since 1311/1893, which consisted of a small office with a manager,

⁵⁹ al-Khuri Ignatius Tannus, op. cit., 149.

⁶⁰ al-Tamimi and Bahgat, op. cit., Vol. 2, 176.

⁶¹ Hikmat Sharif, *Ta'rikh Trabulus al-Sham...*, 153.

⁶² 'Awad, op. cit., 272-74.

⁶³ Beirut *salname*, 1311-1312/1893-1894, 165-68.

⁶⁴ 'Awad, op. cit., 278.

two members of staff and a single postman to distribute the mail.⁶⁵ By 1906 the number of employees in the office had increased to five: a manager, two telephonists, and two postmen.⁶⁶ However the existence of this office is not mentioned in the Beirut *salname* of 1908/1326, so we may conclude that it had been closed by then.⁶⁷

Education

Before the Tanzimat, the state did not concern itself with the provision of education. When the Ottomans entered Tripoli in 1516 there were hundreds of religious schools,⁶⁸ but when they left in 1918 there were only 15 dilapidated schools left.⁶⁹ These schools did not cost the state anything, since their expenses (including the teachers' salaries) were financed from *awaqf* revenues,⁷⁰ and the poor state of the schools was the result of the looting of the *awqaf*.

In 1869/1286 the state issued regulations for education specifying compulsory primary education for all males, and the requirement that a primary school should be established in at least every other village.⁷¹ The state imposed a tax of 5.5 per cent for education, but the records of the Inspectorate of Education for 1898/1316 do not indicate the presence of a single government school in 'Akkar,⁷² as if that part of the province did not exist. Six primary schools were reported there in 1917,⁷³ which meant that the vast majority of villages (168) had no government school, despite the fact that the administration collected the education tax from residents throughout this period as is indicated in the tax registers for each village.⁷⁴

The Beirut provincial *salname* of 1311–1312/1893–1894 confirms the existence of an office of education in Tripoli with three employees,

⁶⁵ Beirut *salname* 1311–1312/1893–1894, 158.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 1324/1906, 151.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 1326/1908, 298–312.

⁶⁸ 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, ed. Heribert Busse, 1971. *Tuhfah al-Nabulusiyah fi'l-rihlah al-Tarabulusiyah* (Die Reise des 'Abd al-Gani an-Nabulusi durch den Libanon), Beirut, F. Steiner, 1971, 72–73.

⁶⁹ al-Tamimi and Bahjat, op. cit., Vol. 2, 206.

⁷⁰ Register 1, 2.

⁷¹ 'Awad, op. cit., 254.

⁷² Yearbook of the Department of Public Education, 1316/1898.

⁷³ al-Tamimi and Bahjat, op. cit., Vol. 2, 237.

⁷⁴ Table of *wirku* and other taxes for the village of Mushmush, 'Akkar, 1324–1325/1906–1907.

but there is no mention of the existence of a school in the city,⁷⁵ which leads to the conclusion that the schools must have been established later. The Beirut *salname* of 1901 indicates that the education office had expanded to include eight employees under the direction of the *mutasarrif*, and the existence of one preparatory school and one primary school in Tripoli and another in the port.⁷⁶ Later, the state established one primary school for girls and another for boys.⁷⁷ When al-Tamimi visited Tripoli in 1917 he recorded the existence of a teachers' training college, a boys' secondary school, one preparatory school for boys and another for girls, as well as ten primary schools, five for boys and five for girls.⁷⁸ In the same year the sub-district of Tripoli had nineteen primary schools, and there were 96 schools in the whole province.⁷⁹

Thus the teachers' training college, the three preparatory schools and the secondary school in Tripoli had to provide post-primary education for the whole population of the province, 176,525 people, that is to say one high school for every 58,841 people and one primary school for every 1838 children. According to al-Tamimi and Bahjat the equipment of the schools, the state of the buildings and the salaries of the teachers were so poor and inadequate as to make them almost useless.⁸⁰

Drinking Water and Irrigation

Irrigation was a vital service in a society primarily dependent on agriculture. Hence state involvement was vital for the revival of the economy and the improvement of the conditions of the peasants, but the Ottoman state took no interest and left the peasants suffering from lack of water, obliging them to bring water to their plots themselves. There is no evidence from the official records that the state dug or repaired any canals. The records show that it was up to the peasants to bring the water to their villages at their own expense. In 1730/1143 the inhabitants of the village of Takrit constructed a canal between

⁷⁵ Ibid., 1311–1312/1893–1894, 157.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 1319/1901, 194–95.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1324/1906, 150–51.

⁷⁸ al-Tamimi and Bahjat, op. cit., Vol. 2, 152–61.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 154.

Takrit and the neighbouring village of Mazra'a,⁸¹ and in 1731 the *wali* of Tripoli, Sulayman Pasha built a canal from the Nahr al-Barid to the port of Tripoli to provide water for his own gardens. He forced the owners of the neighbouring gardens to pay an annual tax of 25 *liras* to help to maintain it.⁸² In 1896/1314 the residents of villages of Funaydaq, al-Qurna, Qabi'at, Bayt Yunus, Tasha', Mamna' and Takrit were forced to allow 'Umar Pasha al-Muhammad a share in the ownership of the canal which provided the water for their villages, and were made to pay 100 French *liras* to repair and maintain the canal, a sum which they could not afford.⁸³ They had to do this because the state showed no interest in repairing the canal.

The state was equally uninterested in providing clean drinking water. The watercourse between Rasha'in and the city had been constructed during the Crusades, and until 1917 water was brought into the city through exposed water wheels and distributed to the various city quarters through cracked earthenware pipes that let in raw sewage in several places.⁸⁴ It was delivered to the higher parts of the city through a special system which had to be repaired and maintained by the residents themselves.⁸⁵

Public Health

The Ottoman state set up a quarantine station in Tripoli some time before 1893 and assigned a doctor to it.⁸⁶ Until 1908 there were only two government doctors in Tripoli and al-Mina'.⁸⁷ During the *mutasarrifiya* of 'Azmi Bey, the municipality established a government hospital in Mahalla al-Qubba⁸⁸ which was responsible for the health and vaccination of about 24,000 people. The city's drinking water supply was always polluted and this was the main reason for the poor state of public health and the spread of disease and epidemics in the region which took the lives of thousands of people.⁸⁹

⁸¹ Register 7, 3.

⁸² Register 7, 114–16.

⁸³ Court records of Halba; register of events in 1314, unnumbered.

⁸⁴ al-Tamimi and Bahjat, op. cit., Vol. 2, 177–78.

⁸⁵ Register 26, 30.

⁸⁶ Beirut *salname*, 1311–1312/1893–1984, 157.

⁸⁷ Beirut *salname*, 1324/1906, pp. 151–155; *salname* 1326/1908, 303–07.

⁸⁸ al-Tamimi and Bahjat, op. cit., Vol. 2, 214.

⁸⁹ Ibid., Vol. 2, 180.

The Beirut *salnames* of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mention the existence of other service departments in Tripoli, such as agriculture, the census, the chamber of commerce, and the municipality.

Conclusion

An objective comparison of what the Ottomans took from Tripoli and what they invested indicates that Ottoman rule resembled full-blown colonial occupation. They took as much as they could from the local inhabitants and gave them little or nothing in return, except the privilege of becoming slaves in the Sultan's state.⁹⁰ No productive resource was left untaxed. The Ottomans' mission in the province was to collect its wealth and carry off as much of it as possible to Istanbul, and they were careful not to neglect the maintenance of public security so that these objectives could be carried out. Even the region's human resources were exploited, since the people were forced to work without pay, conscripted into the army and sent to distant provinces to defend the Empire. The region's natural resources were used to develop the capital, leaving Tripoli to stagnate in poverty and ignorance. The Ottomans built palaces for themselves and left local residents living in hovels. They imposed taxes on education which were used to build universities and schools in Istanbul, while building a few inferior schools for their subjects which were little better than literacy centres.

It is quite surprising that this situation lasted for some four centuries without the Ottomans facing revolts that would seek to liberate the Arab provinces from their rule. In fact there were some rebellions, such as those of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir in Egypt, Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n II in Lebanon, and Zahir 'Umar in Acre, but those movements were generally directed towards advancing the personal interests of their leaders. They were not the result of heightened public awareness of the injustices committed by the Ottomans and did not call for separatism, but were simply aimed at stopping over-zealous local governors from interfering with the activities of the leaders.

⁹⁰ The notables of Tripoli asked the Ottoman military commander of the coastal provinces of *Bilad al-Sham* to help them to expel the Egyptian army from Syria. He accepted their request but warned that he would retaliate if they betrayed him. If this was the way that local people were treated in case of crisis, then how would their treatment have been in more 'normal' conditions?

The Ottomans took the wealth of the region from the local inhabitants, who seem to have accepted being enslaved not only by the state and the Sultan but also by the Sultan's governors.⁹¹ We can assume from this that the inhabitants of the province were somehow unaware that they were being colonised, never even discussing it among themselves. It is worth speculating on the reasons for this state of affairs: if we look at the nature of the administration of the Arab provinces in the context of the international situation since the middle of the nineteenth century, we may find some answers.

First, the Ottomans were Sunni Muslims, as were 85 per cent of the population of the Arab provinces. This was an important factor in rallying them behind the Ottoman sultans, whatever the rulers' ulterior motives may have been.

Second, during the periods of feudalism and *iltizam*, the Ottoman state depended on the local notables, who became their partners in looting the wealth of the people. In this way the notables became the guardians of the interests of the state, making every effort to establish its rule on a local level, to the extent that the general public did not know any other representatives of the state. They only knew the name of the Sultan from hearing it in the *khutba*.

Third, the Ottoman administration left the management of *awqaf* in the hands of local religious institutions, which meant that those in charge benefitted from Ottoman rule and sought to perpetuate it to ensure that those benefits would continue. A few local religious leaders were not willing to accept this arrangement and were forced to leave the region to escape punishment.

Fourth, during the Tanzimat period, all the factors that had made Ottoman rule acceptable to the provincial notables came to an end when the state tried to get rid of its collaborators and brought the *awqaf* under the central administration. The Arabs then became aware of the negative conditions under which they were living in the shadow of Ottoman rule, but fear of falling prey to European colonialism—which was just beginning to appear on the horizon—made them remain loyal to the Ottoman state in spite of its many obvious disadvantages.

⁹¹ A group of traders in Tripoli described themselves as 'slaves of the *wali*' in a letter from the early nineteenth century. The text is in al-Khuri Ignatius Tannus, op. cit., 178–79.

ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF DAMASCUS DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

MOHANNAD AL-MUBAIDIN

This study treats various aspects of the economic history of Ottoman Damascus in the period 1121–1172 /1708–1758. The late seventeenth century had witnessed a breakdown in centralised authority and security in Ottoman Syria, one of whose most obvious symptoms was constant bedouin raids on the *hajj* caravans. The imperial authorities in Istanbul sought to address this problem in the early eighteenth century through an aggressive centralisation effort designed to bring the provinces more firmly under its direct control. Damascus benefitted from these efforts and enjoyed a period of economic recovery. This article uses local primary sources to examine both the reasons for and the effects of this growth in prosperity on the people of Damascus and its environs. It begins with an overview of the role that the *hajj* caravan played in the economic and demographic growth of the region. It then examines different social groups in and around Damascus, most notably the ‘ulama and the peasantry, and concludes with a description of the currency exchange reforms undertaken by the Ottomans at the end of the period under discussion.

The Economic Status of Damascus

The Ottoman Empire was not immune from the political and economic changes that affected world markets in the eighteenth century,¹ and Damascus was in an excellent position to profit from the Ottoman response to these changes. Not only was the city a traditional centre

¹ For more information about the effect of these global economic changes on the Ottoman Empire, see Perry Anderson, trans. Badi‘a Amr, *Dawlat al-sharq al-istib-dadiya* (*Lineages of the Absolute State*), Beirut: Mu‘assasat al-Abhath, 1983, 22. See also Z.Y. Hershlag, trs. Mustafa Husayn, *Madkhal ila al-ta’rikh al-iqtisadiya al-hadith li’l-Sharq al-Awsat* (*Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East*), Beirut, Dar al-Haqiqa, 1973, 32.

for local trade, but it was also the starting point for the *hajj* caravan and the western terminus of the Silk Road.²

One of the oldest cities in the world, Damascus had always been influential in the trade and politics of southwest Asia, but its potential for growth was especially great in the early eighteenth century. First, improved security and agricultural innovation meant that local merchandise was reaching Damascus from its hinterland on a more regular basis.³ Second, the Ottoman-Safavid wars of the period effectively closed the east-west trade route between Isfahan and Aleppo and forced trade to shift south to Damascus. Damascus also benefited at Aleppo's expense when Russia briefly occupied the silk-producing regions of northern Iran between 1119/1721 and 1121/1722. The result was that the axis of trade changed from Aleppo-Isfahan to Damascus-Mecca.⁴ Damascus also became a centre for trade with the Mediterranean, thereby improving its status as a regional trading capital.⁵

Abdul-Karim Rafeq and André Raymond have suggested that European influence played a great role in the economic growth of Damascus. To support this they point to Western cultural influences in the northeast and southwest suburbs of the city, which were located along the important road that ran from the northern Hawran, through Palestine, and into the Hijaz.⁶ However, a close look at maps and the legal and financial registers of the period shows that European influence cannot have been the single most important factor in Damascus's prosperity.⁷ Granted, the south-western suburbs had ties to Europe via Mount Lebanon, but demographic development was tied to the increasing shortage of building space within the city walls and, more importantly, to the pilgrimage. These factors should not be ignored.

² *EI*², 'Dimashk'.

³ Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècle)*, Beirut, Université Libanaise, 1982, 338.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *EI*², 'Dimashk'.

⁶ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783*, Beirut, Khayats, 1970, 78.

⁷ Brigitte Marino, *Le faubourg du Mîdân à Damas à l'époque ottomane: espace urbain, société et habitat (1742-1830)*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1997, 95; André Raymond, trans. Latif Faraj, *al-Mudun al-'Arabiya al-kubra fi al-'asr al-'Uthmani (Les grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane)*, Cairo, Dar al-Fikr, 1991, 151.

The economic role of the hajj

The annual *hajj* caravan was probably the most influential event in the economic life of Damascus. Generally speaking, it led to commercial prosperity and demographic growth in and around Damascus, although, as will be mentioned below, it also had some negative consequences for the full-time residents of the city.⁸ The annual caravans not only facilitated the transport of goods to and from Damascus, but they also created jobs for many of the city's inhabitants. In addition, as the security of the pilgrimage route became well established, communities on the outskirts of Damascus and along the road to the Hijaz began to prosper.⁹ The population both of these communities and of the city itself were diverse. For example, Ibn Kannan (d. 1153/1740) reports that large numbers of Uzbek pilgrims were living in Damascus in 1118/1706.¹⁰

This gathering of pilgrims from diverse regions led to the revival of markets that had declined during earlier periods of instability, and many of them grew to become major seasonal markets.¹¹ The *sijillat* of the sharia courts record the kinds of goods that the pilgrims brought with them from their homelands. Upon their arrival in the city, they put their goods up for sale in the various markets that sprang up to accommodate them.¹²

⁸ On the importance of the *hajj* caravan, see Ibn Kannan al-Salihi (ed. Hikmat Isma'il), *al-Mawakib al-Islamiya wa'l-mamalik al-Shamiya*, vol. 1, Damascus, Wizarat al-Thaqafa, 1992, 132; Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Qafilat al-hajj al-Shami wa ahamiyatuha fi'l-'ahd al-'Uthmani', *Dirasat ta'rikhiya*, 2, vi, 1981, 5–28.

⁹ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith al-yawmiya min ta'rikh ahad 'ashar wa alf wa mia* (ed. 'Alam al-'Alami), Damascus, Dar al-Taba'a, 1994; Marino, *Midan*, 90; Raymond, *al-Mudun*, 50.

¹⁰ Ibn Kannan, *Hawadith*, 114–15; for information on the *hajj* caravan, its organization, and its relation to the Ottoman Empire, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans: the Hajj under the Ottomans 1518–1683*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1994, 55–57.

¹¹ For more about the *hajj* route from the Mamluk era through the period under discussion in this article, see Ibn Fadlallah al-'Umari (1301–1349), *Masalik al-absar fi Mamalik al-amsar*, Berlin: Ma'had Ta'rikh al-'Ulum al-Islamiya, 1928, 36. Compare Ibn Kannan, *al-Mawakib*, vol. 2, 112. See also Irena Smilianskaya, trans. Yusuf 'Ata Allah, *al-Buni al-iqtisadiya wa al-ijtima'iya fi al-mashriq al-'Arabi 'ala masharif al-'asr al-hadith*, Beirut, Dar al-Farabi, 1989, 179; Jean Sauvaget, trans. Fu'ad al-Bustani, *Dimashq al-Sham: Lamha Ta'rikhiya* (*Esquisse d'une histoire de la ville de Damas*), Beirut, 1965, 102.

¹² *Sijill* (Mukhallafat), *hujja* 192, 14 *Rajab* 1132 (1719), 14; *Sijill* 68 (Mukhallafat), *hujja* 54, 12 *Safar* 1283 (1866), 62. (The numbers indicate the volumes of the Law Court Registers of Damascus preserved in the Syrian National Archives.)

The *hajj* caravan also provided full-time residents of Damascus with opportunities for work. They pilgrimage contractors eagerly awaited the *hajj* season when they would service and supervise the caravans. Others were involved in the transportation of merchandise, preparing horses, guiding the pilgrims,¹³ securing supplies,¹⁴ preparing food,¹⁵ driving camels,¹⁶ making tents, and many other *hajj*-related services.¹⁷ The amount of profit to be made depended on the contractors' ability to conduct the *hajj* efficiently and without interruption. Above all they had to provide security and peace.¹⁸ At the same time, the disposition and economic status of the pilgrims were factors in the economic success or failure of the *hajj*.

Economic endeavours

The markets of Damascus had existed long before the Ottoman period, and their core structures had survived the rise and fall of countless regimes stretching back far into antiquity.¹⁹ Even today the city still preserves vestiges of these ancient markets. However, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a time of increasing prosperity.²⁰ Some of the markets created then are still functioning and stand as reminders of the cultural fabric and commercial vibrancy of that time.

There were many khans or *qaysariyat* that fulfilled the housing and storage needs of merchants and craftsmen.²¹ Some of them were places

¹³ Muhammad Sa'id al-Qasimi (ed. Dhahir al-Qasimi), *Qamus al-sina'a al-Shamiya*, 2 vols., Damascus, Dar al-Atlas, 1960, Vol. 1, 114, 156, 185, Vol. 2, 319.

¹⁴ Ibid., Vol. 2, 465.

¹⁵ Ibid., Vol. 2, 280.

¹⁶ Ibid., Vol. 2, 319. The camel drivers had a fixed fee for riding the camels, which they also led.

¹⁷ Ibid., Vol. 2, 474.

¹⁸ For a study of the markets of Damascus in the pre-Ottoman period, see Ibn Kanan, *al-Hawadith*, 27, 72, 92, 172; the author gives a full report of the *hajj* caravan at the beginning of each year. For a study of the passage of the *hajj* caravan through Jordan during the Ottoman period, see Ma'mun Aslan, 'al-Hajj al-Shami 'abr al-Urdun', M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, Beirut, 1997.

¹⁹ For a history of the markets of Damascus before the Ottoman period, see Yusuf ibn 'Ad al-Hadi (d. 813/1478), 'Nuzha al-rifaq 'an sharh hal al-aswaq', *al-Mashriq*, 37, 1939, 18–28. See also Faysal Bani Hamad, 'al-Aswaq al-Shamiya fi'l-'asr al-Mamluki', M.A. thesis, Yarmuk University, 1992.

²⁰ Zouhair Ghazzal, *L'Économie politique de Damas durant le XIX siècle: structures traditionnelles et capitalisme*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1993, 81.

²¹ *Sijill* 112, *hujja* 74, 15 *Shawwal* 1158/1740, 32; al-Muhibbi, *Khulasat*, 4, 356; Muhammad al-Arna'ut, *Mu'tiyat 'an ta'rikh Dimashq wa Bilad al-Sham al-janubiya*, Damascus, Dar Abjadiya, 1995; 'Khan' in *EP*.

where foreign merchants lived and stored their goods temporarily, while others were permanent residences and places of business. These khans were built in architectural and engineering harmony. The shops were at street level while the upper floors consisted of roofed rooms with domes on top. Some traders conducted all their business in the khans while others did most of their business in the city and used the khans primarily as central offices.²² Each khan catered to a specific group of merchants and craftsmen, so many of them became markets in their own right. One can conclude from the *sijillat* particular to each market²³ that the real impetus behind the foundation of these khans was provided by the various governors-general such as As'ad Pasha al-'Azm²⁴ and Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm,²⁵ for whom the khans and the markets that sprang up around them were sources of wealth and power.

In addition to the permanent markets and the khans, there were myriad temporary markets that met on specific days of the week,²⁶ to which the registers make frequent reference, for example, the Friday

²² Laurent d'Arvieux, trans. Ahmad Aybashi, *Wasf Dimashq fi al-qarn al-sabi' 'ashra* (*Mémoires du Chevalier d'Arvieux... contenant ses voyages à Constantinople, dans l'Asie, la Syrie...*), Damascus, Dar al-Ma'mun li'l-Turath, 1982, 30. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Rihawi, 'Khanat Dimashq', *al-Hawliyat al-Suriya*, 25, 1975, 32.

²³ *Sijill*, 154, *hujja*, 425, 15 *Sha'ban* 1173/1759, 425; *Sijill* 134, *hujja* 72, *Shawwal* 1164/1750, 37; *Sijill* 56, *hujja*, 52, *Sha'ban* 1138/1725, 23. See also Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual, *Familles et fortunes à Damas: 450 foyers damascains en 1700*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1994, 87.

²⁴ As'ad Pasha al-'Azm ruled longer than any other governor-general of Damascus, between 1156/1743 and 1171/1757. See Ahmad ibn Budayr al-Hallaq al-Budayri (ed. Ahmad 'Azzat 'Abd al-Karim), *Hawadith Dimashq al-yawmiya 1154/1741-1175/-1762*, Cairo, Matba'at al-Jama'iya al-Misriya li'l-Dirasat al-Ta'rikhiya, 1959, 219; Rafeq, *Province*, 75-85; Shimon Shamir, 'As'ad Pasha al-'Azm and Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1743-1758', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 26, 1963, 1-28.

²⁵ Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm was governor of Damascus for five years (1151/1738-1156/1743). See Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 199; Raslan ibn Yahya al-Qari, *al-Wuzara' alladhina hakamu Dimashq*, Damascus, Salah al-Din al-Munajjid, 1949, 17.

²⁶ There were, for example, the Suq al-Sinaniya, built by the governor Sinan Pasha (1004/1605), the Suq al-Darwishiya, built by Darwish Pasha (d. 1063/1652), and the Suq Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm, built by Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm (d. 1185/1771). See also Muhammad Amin al-Muhibbi (d. 1156/1699), *Khulasat al-athar fi 'ayan al-qarn al-hadi 'ashr*, 4 vols., Beirut, Khayyat, 1966, 2, 56; Muhammad ibn Jumu'a al-Maqar (d. 1156/1743), *al-Basha wa'l-Qudat*, original printed in the Ottoman era, reprint Damascus, 1949, 26. See also *Sijill* 32, *hujja* 352, 14 *Jumada al-Awwal* 1120/1708; *Sijill* 41, *hujja* 223, 25 *Safar* 1133/1720, 144.

markets near Hayy al-Yahud²⁷ and the Sunday market in the al-Kharab quarter.²⁸

Nu'man al-Qasatli (d. 1338/1920) estimated that there were as many as five hundred markets in Damascus, located mostly within the city walls.²⁹ This figure is supported by the travel accounts of foreigners, local histories, and the reports of purchases and sales that appear in the registers.³⁰ From these sources one can learn the names of many markets as well as the products they sold: the Dhira'a market (clothing, linen, and silk),³¹ the gold market,³² the silk market,³³ 'Anbaraiyin market (next to the Umayyad Mosque),³⁴ the hat makers' market (where the traditional *kufiya* headgear was manufactured, located near Bab al-Barid),³⁵ the papermakers' market, the bookbinders' market,³⁶ the weapons market,³⁷ the bakers' market, the confectioners' market,³⁸ the soap makers' market, the flour grinders' market, the carpenters' market, and many others.³⁹ There were also open-air markets. For example, there was a camel market near Hayy al-Maydan, the livestock market, and a Friday market close to the citadel.⁴⁰ The locations of these markets seem to have changed little over the years: Muhammad Sa'id al-Qasimi described and pinpointed their locations in the nineteenth century, and his descriptions differ little from those given by Yusuf ibn 'Abd al-Hadi in the fifteenth.⁴¹ The continuity of the markets is also

²⁷ *Sijill* 82, *hujja* 325, 9 *Ramadan* 1149/1736, 172.

²⁸ *Sijill* 113, *hujja* 182, 7 *Shawwal* 1139/1726, 67.

²⁹ Nu'man al-Qasatli, *al-Rawda al-ghina' fi Dimashq al-fayha'*, Beirut, 1879, 117.

³⁰ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 412; J.L. Porter, *Five Years in Damascus Including an Account of the History, Topography, and Antiquities of that City with Travels and Researches in Palmyra, Lebanon and the Hauran*, London: John Murray, 1855, 58; *Sijill* 26, *hujja* 505, 1 *Rabi' al-Awwal* 1112/1700, 323.

³¹ *Sijill* 112, *hujja* 313, 14 *Safar* 1158/1745, 125.

³² *Sijill* 57, *hujja* 114, 16 *Shawwal* 1142/1729, 52.

³³ *Sijill* 82, *hujja* 72, 16 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 1135/1722, 41.

³⁴ *Sijill* 94, *hujja* 58, 14 *Muharram* 1150/1737, 72.

³⁵ *Sijill* 72, *hujja* 31, 2 *Rabi' al-Thani* 1134/1721, 13.

³⁶ *Sijill* 61, *hujja* 120, 9 *Safar* 1142/1729, 55.

³⁷ *Sijill* 64, *hujja* 92, 6 *Shawwal* 1139/1726, 57.

³⁸ *Sijill* 58, *hujja* 113, 14 *Rabi' al-Awwal* 1138/1725, 76.

³⁹ *Sijill* 152, *hujja* 64, 16 *Safar* 1171/1756, 37; *Sijill* 131, *hujja* 221, 3 *Rabi' al-Awwal* 1124/1712, 90; *Sijill* 92, *hujja* 125, 24 *Shawwal* 1135, 1722, 70.

⁴⁰ The Hayy al-Maydan was located in the southwest of Damascus; it was divided into three districts: al-Maydan al-Tahtani, al-Wastani, and al-Fawqani. The area was especially prosperous in the eighteenth century because of the *Hajj* and because of the grain trade with regions to the south. See Marino, *Midan*, 90–95.

⁴¹ Ibn 'Abd al-Hadi, 'Nuzha al-rifaq 'an sharh hal al-aswaq', 33–34.

attested by Alexander Russell, who lived and travelled in the region at the end of the eighteenth century.

As can be gathered from their names, some of the markets specialised in specific goods. They set standards and requirements that insured a degree of standardised production of the items in which they dealt. There appear to have been nearly one hundred fifty trades practised in the various markets, a testament to the commercial vitality of the city and its hinterland. Most of the markets were near the Umayyad Mosque, and had considerable influence in the nearby neighbourhoods. The scholars, jurists, and scribes of the Umayyad Mosque were generally responsible for drawing up the commercial documents pertaining to the activities of the markets. Like the names and numbers of the individual markets, these documents reveal much about the diversity of professions, the exchange of commodities, and general commercial and economic efflorescence. However, what these documents show more than anything else is the great amount of debt accumulated in the markets.⁴²

It seems that only a small elite benefited from Damascus' newly restored prosperity. For the majority, life was a constant struggle to survive the depredations of those with wealth and influence. Diaries and chronicles give us a very clear picture of the activities of the market. As mentioned above, it appears that the success of the markets was clearly tied to specific seasons. Although the *hajj* brought long-term prosperity, in the short term it brought a reversal of commercial activities. As al-Hallaq al-Budayri (d. ca. 1175/1762) writes in his diary, 'great duress befell the common people [during the Hajj season]'.⁴³

al-Budayri, Ibn Kannan, and others describe the strife that afflicted the markets in some detail.⁴⁴ They were especially preoccupied with the effects of price increases⁴⁵ and deprivations caused by sanctions, hoarding goods, and monopolies.⁴⁶ It seems that not only the great merchants but also the governors general took part in fleecing the people. For example:

⁴² Muhannad al-Mubayyadin, 'Ahl al-qalam wa duruhum fi al-haya al-thaqafiyya fi Dimashq khilal al-fitra 1126–1172/1708–1757', M.A. thesis, Jami'a Âl al-Bayt, 1999, 7.

⁴³ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 60.

⁴⁴ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 16, 78, 355, 362; al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 49, 57.

⁴⁵ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 13, 106, 382, 473; al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 4, 10, 25, 35, 37, 41, 63, 74, 81–4, 97–8, 106, 108, 125–6, 129–30, 151–2, 163, 166, 182, 185, 197, 199, 216–7, 229, 232, 233.

⁴⁶ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 185.

The governor general sent for some grain merchants and threatened them. They swore to him that they had nothing. The governor general said, 'I have much grain in Hamah', and he forced them to buy it.... So they received the wheat from Hamah then had to sell it at falling prices. These strains continued.⁴⁷

Sometimes even high ranking 'ulama took advantage of the people: thus al-Budayri reports:

It reached me that Hamid al-'Imadi, the Mufti of Damascus, hoarded wheat just like the great notables who have no fear of God. The wheat measurers came to him and said, 'We will sell wheat for full profit at fifty *qurush*.' He said to them, '[If] the scarcity increases slowly, [then] the price goes up.' So the Muslims suffered. He (the mufti) had no pity for God's creation yet he censured others.⁴⁸

The historical sources are replete with expressions of a sense of resignation such as 'God is the resort of the faithful'.⁴⁹ The following passage is typical:

Trust a thing beyond the limits [of patience], for God is the Judge of His servant. [But] Things continued for seven or eight years, and expanded well beyond the limits [of patience], and the rulers no longer governed the people. Judgment is with God alone. The high cost of living on that level [was unbearable]... [and all of this suffering] from the absence of supervision and care [on the part of the elite].⁵⁰

Clearly not everyone welcomed the *hajj* season, and the economic revival of Damascus in the eighteenth century did not bring wealth and happiness to all. Similar sentiments might have very well been expressed by the peasants, about whom more will be said below.

Trade and wealth

The *sijillat* indicate a brisk exchange of local commodities, services, and land.⁵¹ For example, one group of documents suggests the presence of an organised currency exchange between merchants in Damascus

⁴⁷ Ibid., 47.

⁴⁸ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 13, 106, 382; al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 4, 10. The quotation is from al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 127. See also pp. 404–07 below.

⁴⁹ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 193.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 49, 82, 111.

⁵¹ Ibid., 28.

and Tripoli.⁵² Another set of documents illustrates how local families of notables and Ottoman officials purchased large tracts of agricultural land in the villages around Damascus.⁵³ Of course, the purchase of these lands only augmented the income they received from the caravan trade, their regular commercial activities, and their monopolies over local commodities.⁵⁴ These documents also show the relationships between social classes, especially the ties between the local nobility, Ottoman officials, and some of the families of the religious establishment.

In this context al-Muradi (d. 1206/1791) describes how several 'ulama became involved in commerce and eventually became part of the socio-economic elite of Damascus. In addition to their traditional educational and religious occupations, many 'ulama became craftsmen, merchants, and accountants; they were especially prominent as brokers in real estate transactions. al-Muradi's biographies include several 'ulama who amassed great wealth in the real estate trade, most prominent among whom were Isma'il ibn 'Ali al-Munayri (1192/1178),⁵⁵ Muhammad ibn Mustafa al-Nabulsi (d. 1191/1777),⁵⁶ and Isma'il ibn Taj al-Din al-Mahasani (d. late eighteenth century).⁵⁷

⁵² Abdel Nour, *Introduction*, 245–55; Rafeq, *Province, of Damascus*, 121; Constantin-François Volney, *Travels Through Egypt and Syria in the Years 1783, 1784, and 1785*, London, G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1787, reprint, Westmead, England, Gregg International Publishers, 1972, II, 173–229. In the primary sources, one finds passages such as the following: 'In the presence of our master...came al-Khalil ibn al-Hajj Hamad ibn Ribah, the legal deputy...who owns sixteen *gharar* of sesame from Nablus. He had his slave girl transport it to Damascus where it arrived. He is therefore owed sixty pure silver *ghirsh*.' *Sijill* 48, *hujja* 77, 9 *Jumada al-Thani* 1170/1756, 116. Another passage reads, 'In the presence of our master Salih ibn Sha'ban ibn Mufraj who brought with him Mustafa ibn Hatti and who recorded that Sayyid Husayn ibn Ibrahim al-Nustari, who was in Nablus, was sold goods from Shaykh Mustafa and his sons, and that he (Shaykh Mustafa) will send the goods to his (Sayyid Husayn's) partner, al-Hajj Muhammad al-Qadmaji, resident of Akka, and that he will pay in kind.' *Sijill* 48, *hujja* 296, 11 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 1162/1749, 196.

⁵³ Of all of the *sijillat* relevant to the period under discussion, 1044 out of 4616 (22.8%) deal with buying and selling. Note that these land transactions were taking place a century before the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 effectively created private property in land.

⁵⁴ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 50; Muhammad Khalil ibn 'Ali al-Muradi, *Silk al-durar fi a'yan al-qarn al-thani 'ashara*, 3d ed., Beirut, Dar Ibn Hazm, 1988, Vol. 1, 32, 117, 250, Vol. 2, 112, 243, 414, Vol. 4, 14; Marino, *Midan*, 147.

⁵⁵ al-Muradi, *Silk al-durar*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, 3, 112.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, 155. The Mahasani family evidently had strong ties to the 'Azm family; see Wathiqa 66/16 *Rajab* 1163/1749.

Even without great wealth, the 'ulama had elevated status in society because of their role as the educators and religious guides of the community. 'Ulama who were at least as interested in this world as they were in the hereafter were able to use their position in society as a platform for public social criticism, making use of the threat to censure rulers and other elites as leverage to secure their own financial well being.⁵⁸ Indeed, as the Damascene diaries of the period prove, the 'ulama were even capable of deposing any governor-general whom they thought did not adequately serve their financial interests.⁵⁹

As for the small shop owners and merchants, their wealth was limited and insecure as they were always subject to local disturbances.⁶⁰ The legal documents detailing bequests and legacies provide a great deal of precise information about the contents and locations of small shops, warehouses, and homes. These records provide an accurate view of inventories, varieties of merchandise, and amounts of capital that are not always observable in other sources. They also help map the resources that were available to merchants in various neighbourhoods.⁶¹

The economy of Damascus flourished in the eighteenth century, but this prosperity was not total and not everyone shared in it equally. For example, Damascus was never able to play the same role that Aleppo had once played in regional trade because it was always susceptible to the depredations of the Bedouin,⁶² who not only attacked the *hajj* caravans but also the trade caravans bringing goods from Mount

⁵⁸ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 50; al-Muradi, *Silk al-Durar*, Vol. 1, 32, 117, 250, Vol. 2, 112, 243, 414, Vol. 4, 14; Marino, *Midan*, 147.

⁵⁹ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 18–19.

⁶⁰ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 172; Hasan ibn al-Sadiq al-Dimashqi, (ed. Yusuf Ni'ma) *al-Bada'i wa 'aja'ib al-waq'a'i*, Damascus, Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1989, 92.

⁶¹ These records only show the goods present in the shops at the time of the owner's death and do not include urban real estate and rural land. See *Sijill* 54 (Mukhallafat), *hujja* 2, 18 Muharram 1138/1725, 2; *Sijill* 131, *hujja* 294, 7 Rabi'a al-Awwal 1136/1722, 239.

⁶² al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, Vol. 1, 60; al-Budayri also mentions a trade caravan between Baghdad and Damascus, *Hawadith*, Vol. 2, 114; Ibn Hannan, *al-Mawakib*, Vol. 2, 114; Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 78; Rafiq, *Province of Damascus*, 78; Abdel Nour, *Introduction*, 58; Karl Barbir, 'Getting and Spending in Eighteenth Century Damascus: Wealth at Three Social Levels', in Abdeljelil Tamimi, ed., *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l'époque ottomane*, Zaghuan, Tunisia: CEROMDI, 1988, Vol. 3, 63–76. For evidence of trade between Damascus and Basra, see *Sijill* 61, *hujja* 52, 4 Dhu'l-Hijja 1142/1719, 251.

Lebanon and the Biqa' to Damascus.⁶³ Caravans from as far away as Palestine and Basra were also subject to raids.⁶⁴ Although Ottoman centralisation efforts and the initiatives of several governors-general kept the bedouin in check most of the time, they remained a constant threat to the economy of Damascus.

However, a problem more serious than bedouin raids was debt, which was not infrequently the source of public disturbances. Ibn Kannan was surprised not only by the amount of debt and the public's refusal to pay it, but also by the widespread practice of charging (rather high) interest on these debts.⁶⁵ Levantine peasants were especially vulnerable to debt, and the *sijillat* are full of examples of loans and debts owed by peasants to great proprietors. The consequences were a decline in agricultural production and the gradual degeneration of village society.

In the standard formulation of the documents the word *qard* (pl. *qurud*; loan) is always followed by the adjective *shar'i*, which is how the judges avoided addressing the matter of interest. Islamic law views interest as usury and therefore, in theory, prohibits it. However, these *qurud shar'iya* were really only interest payments under a religiously edifying name. Debts were usually incurred by groups of villagers. For example, in the legal records, one often finds phrases such as *majmu'a min ahl qariya Bani Fulan* (a group of the people of the village of...) rather than an individual. These delegations represented the villages in court cases against the oppression of the lenders and their control over the harvest. Apparently they met little success. Of the lenders themselves, Ibn Kannan says, 'They took the documents from the people and ate their money.' Table 1 gives examples of debt cases from the rural hinterland of Damascus.

⁶³ For information on bedouin attacks on caravans, see al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 182; Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 7, 29, 31, 88.

⁶⁴ Abdel Nour, *Introduction*, 1, 79.

⁶⁵ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 211.

Table 1: Debt Cases from the Legal Register

Village	<i>Sijill</i>	<i>Hujja</i>	Page	Case Description
al-Mazza	43	7	7	witnesses of a group from the village regarding a debt of some of them to one of the notables
Jarmana	43	117	73	Waqf rent of the village of Jarmana
Munnayn	43	133	82	group debt of the people of the village (15 <i>Rajab</i> 1133)
Kafr Susa	43	135	83	rent and debt of a group from the village of Kafr Susa
al-Qadam	43	184	113	debt on the waqf of the mosque of the village of al-Qadam (25 <i>Sha'ban</i> 1133)
al-Qadam	43	225	135	cession of village land because of debt, 17 <i>Ramadan</i> 1133
al-Qadam	43	254	147	general debt of the peasants (22 <i>Shawwal</i> 1133)
Dumar	61	160	180	general debt of the village of Damar and a complaint to the <i>qadi</i>
al-Dalia	61	333	115	debt of various villagers
Dayr 'Atiya	150	17	10	new conditions for the peasants of Dayr 'Atiya relating to the payment of their debt
Munayn	18	37	31	debt of the village of Munayn
group of villages	18	45	35	new fees on a group of villages in the outskirts of Damascus
Sahnaya	18	192	114	selling village land for debt
'Aqraba	18	487	302	new debts and disputes of the people of the village regarding methods of payment
Jurun	56	79	18	debt of the people of the village and complaint about payment
Bint	56	222	55	<i>waqf</i> of the village of Bint Nayim
'Ayta	56	289	78	debt of the people of the village
al-Iftaris	56	472	165	debt of the village of al-Iftaris
al-Til	56	539	196	(debt) management of the village of al-Til

Table 1 (*cont.*)

Village	<i>Sijill</i>	<i>Hujja</i>	Page	Case Description
Kafr Susa	148	61	29	management of the debts of the village of Kafr Susa (8 <i>Rabi' al-Awwal</i> 1170)
Kafr Susa	148	61	29	management of the debt of the village
Kafr Susa	148	67	31	village collaboration in response to debt payment (1 <i>Muharram</i> 1170)
al-Til	148	418	182	group debt and <i>shar'i</i> loan
group of villages	98	4	3	debts and <i>shar'i</i> loans to a group of villages
al-'Ibada	117	162	104	<i>shar'i</i> loan from the village peasants
Baytma	117	165	106	<i>shar'i</i> loan and debt
group of villages	117	173	112	<i>shar'i</i> loan and debt
Munayn	117	200	128	<i>shar'i</i> loan and debt
al-Jadida	117	271	179	<i>shar'i</i> loan and debt
group of villages	117	230	226	debt and <i>shar'i</i> loan to different groups
al-Tayyiba	117	342	236	<i>shar'i</i> loan and general debt
Dayr Makir	117	350	240	<i>shar'i</i> loan and general debt
Jubbanayn	117	361	248	<i>shar'i</i> loan and debt
Franksus	117	364	450	<i>shar'i</i> loan and general debts of the peasants
Darya	29	35	15	lawsuit against the village debts
numerous villages	29	150	95	collective peasant fees of the village and group debts
Bar Ilyas	29	165	98	fees and <i>shar'i</i> loans
Darya	29	185	103	<i>kharaj</i> of the village of Darya
Darya	29	189	105	setting aside expenses on shares of the village land
Darya	29	220	115	fees on the village of Darya
Jabata	29	22	115	fees on the village and the peasants
group of villages	29	261	127	fees on a group of villages

Table 1 (*cont.*)

Village	<i>Sijill</i>	<i>Hujja</i>	Page	Case Description
group of villages	29	325	152	fees on a group of villages
group of villages	29	355	164	fees of the peasants
Dayr Ilyas	29	367	170	<i>shar'i</i> loans from the people of Dayr Ilyas
al-Til	29	386	180	fees of the village of al-Til and their debts
group of villages	29	397	182	investigation of tillage and debts of a group of villages
group of villages	29	408	182	orders to some of the peasants in the villages to pay their regular debts

As this table illustrates, great merchants and Ottoman officials became wealthy at the expense of the peasants, who had no alternative but to mortgage their crops and lands to pay their debts. Foreclosures and bankruptcies facilitated the emergence of a small group of great proprietors who controlled most of the assets of these villages. Along with a disproportionate distribution of wealth came social stratification. The distance between the proprietor class and the peasants increased as the former's exploitation of the latter became ever more aggressive. As the diaries from the period make clear, the villages outside Damascus soon became home to a dysfunctional society.

Currencies in Circulation

The legal registers and personal diaries mention many different kinds of coinage. While the legal texts mention the *dirham* (pl. *darahim*)⁶⁶

⁶⁶ The *dirham* was the equivalent of the Ottoman *aqja* (English: asper), which was the official currency of the Ottoman Empire. The Damascenes referred to the *aqja* as *akhshayah*. al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 111. See also Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, *al-Mujtama' al-Islami wa al-Gharb*, trans. Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahim Mustafa (*Islamic Society and the West; a Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*), Cairo, al-Hay'a al-Misriya al-'Amma li'l-Kitab, n.d., 2, 51; *EP*, s.v. 'Akje'.

and *qirsh* (pl. *qurush*)⁶⁷ most often, the diaries mention other coins that rarely appear in the legal record. The forms, composition, and value of these currencies fluctuated from one period to the next. They fall into three broad categories: copper, silver, and gold.

A. Copper Coinage

a). Para⁶⁸

The *para* was an old currency first minted in 1620,⁶⁹ worth 1/40 of a *qirsh* or 10 *fuls* (pl. *fulus*).⁷⁰ There was also a silver coin, the *misriya*, which was also sometimes referred to as a *para*.

b). Fils

The *fils* was also sometimes called the *qita'*, which was the name of another coin. The value of the *fils* varied widely.⁷¹ A pure *fils* was worth 1/10 to 1/9 of a *misriya* or *para*.⁷² An adulterated coin was worth 1/21 of a *misriya*.⁷³

c). Qita'

The *qita'* was originally a silver currency, but in 1139/1726 it became a copper coin. Ibn Kannan remarks that there were no silver *qita'*s in his time.⁷⁴ It was worth 3 *fulus*.

B. Silver Coinage

Ibn Kannan indicates that there were silver *fils* referred to as *constantiniya*, but they do not appear to have been widely circulated. The most important silver coins were the following:

⁶⁷ The sources refer to many kinds of *qurush*, the most important of which was the *qirsh* made from silver. See *Sijill*, 148, *hujja* 214, 6 *Shawwal* 1133/1720, 120; al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 160.

⁶⁸ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 75.

⁶⁹ Nufan al-Hamud, *Uman wa jiwaruha*, 'Uman, Bank al-A'mal, 1996, 382.

⁷⁰ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 4.

⁷¹ Ibid., 35.

⁷² Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 82; al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 35, 51, 108, 149, 158, 221, 134.

⁷³ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 382.

⁷⁴ Ibid. Regarding efforts to fix currency values, al-Budayri says, 'The ruler warned people not to circulate broken or adulterated *fulus*. Then one day he called for all of the pure *fulus*, at which time each pure *fils* was worth 1/12 *misriya*. After they had all been collected, the *fils* was worth 1/24 *misriya*'. *Hawadith*, 173.

a). Qirsh/Ghirsh

The documents speak of the *al-qirsh al-Asadi* (*Asadi qirsh*), which was made of pure silver.⁷⁵ Ibn Kannan says that one pure *qirsh* was worth four standard *misriya*. There was also *al-qirsh al-maqsus* ('cut' [i.e. adulterated] *qirsh*), two of which were worth three *misriya*.⁷⁶

b). Misriya

The *misriya* was sometimes called the *para*. One *qirsh* was worth forty impure *para*⁷⁷ and one pure *misriya* was worth nine pure *fil*s⁷⁸ or twenty-one adulterated *fil*s.⁷⁹

c). Kis

One *kis* equalled five hundred pure *fil*s.⁸⁰ One source says that one *kis* was the equivalent of five liras (sterling).⁸¹

C. Gold Coinage

Gold coins were not nearly as common as silver and copper. One reason for this was the rising value of gold. Other reasons included problems of supply and the tendency to use gold for things other than currency.

a). Riyal

Budayri says that in 1160/1747 a gold riyal was worth 2 2/3 *qurush* whereas it had originally been worth 1 1/2 *qurush* and 4 *misriyat*.⁸²

b). Rubiya

This coin was not used by Damascenes, but it was common among foreign merchants. One *rubiya* was worth thirteen *qurush*.⁸³

⁷⁵ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 382.

⁷⁶ *Sijill* 3, *hujja* 34, 27 *Rajab* 1121/1708, 47.

⁷⁷ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 4, note 1.

⁷⁸ Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 382.

⁷⁹ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 134, 139.

⁸⁰ *Sijill* 148, *hujja* 214, 6 *Shawwal* 1133/1720, 130. Part of the text reads, 'Our master...called Mustafa ibn Ma'tuq to account for his brother on account of his father... (he paid) the balance by presenting 20 *kis* worth 10,000 *qirsh*.'

⁸¹ al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 11 (note 1), 160; Ibn Kannan, *al-Hawadith*, 577.

⁸² al-Budayri, *Hawadith*, 155, 158.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 161.

Table 2: Exchange Rate Schedule

Currency	Value in <i>Qurush</i>
gold <i>istanbuli</i>	8
gold <i>fandaqi</i>	11
gold <i>misriya</i>	7
<i>al-jaza'irli</i>	12
gold <i>mujari</i>	15
<i>qaramis</i>	14 <i>qurush</i> and 1/3 <i>barah</i>
<i>jihadiya</i>	5
<i>riyal</i>	6.5

Clearly, the Ottoman Empire was in drastic need of currency standardisation and reform at the end of the eighteenth century. Beginning in 1194/1780, the Sublime Porte issued orders that limited the amount of gold in circulation and fixed exchange rates. Table 2 shows the currency exchange rate schedule sent from Istanbul to the governors general of Damascus and Tripoli, the chief *qadi*, the heads of the *'ayan*, and the army officers.

Conclusion

A multiplicity of factors contributed to the economic prosperity of Damascus in the eighteenth century, the most important of which were the centralisation efforts undertaken by the Porte. The *'Azm* family can take much of the credit for implementing these reforms effectively: by encouraging some economic practices and discouraging others, they reversed the negative economic trends that had set in earlier. Most importantly, they protected the caravans, which restored the vitality of markets that depended on transport for their survival. Improved security also led to the stability of communities in the southern quarters of Damascus, especially the Hayy al-Maydan. In addition, smaller communities flourished along the southern routes leading to Palestine and the northern routes leading to Aleppo.

It is clear from the registers that the *'ulama* were heavily involved in commerce. In addition to their traditional religious and educational duties for which they were remunerated through waqf funds, they also engaged in commerce, real estate brokerage, and other trades. Some of them also became craftsmen and joined trade guilds.

Another factor that led to economic prosperity was the concentration of specific goods and services in single markets. Local histories give us a great deal of information about these specialised markets and bear witness to fluctuations in their success. It seems that the success or failure of a given market was dependent in no small part on the presence of the governor-general, who both supervised the markets and guaranteed security. Rising or fluctuating prices always seemed to coincide with the three to four months of the year during which he was away on the *hajj*.

The legal registers record all manner of buying and selling in the city, but they also reveal a great deal about loans and debts in the countryside, which had a generally negative effect on the local economy. Generally speaking, the villages suffered the most from the burden of debt, while the urban notables and rural lords profited from them.

The legal registers not only provide the names of many villages and a record of the debts they incurred, but also suggest that there were organised 'peasant associations' in the villages, which seem to have been responsible for collecting taxes and fees and would represent the villages in the courts. They would go to court to protest the policies of the *timar* holders, the *muqata'ajis*, and other notables, and thereby gave the peasants at least some limited opportunities to express their concerns to third parties, perhaps with greater ease than other social groups. Finally, the exchange rate was a major factor in the city's economic wellbeing. Fluctuations in the rates and the value of currencies were both caused by, and led to, insecurity, hoarding, and monopolies, all major problems that would encourage the Porte to embark upon currency reform in the early nineteenth century.

DAMIETTE AND SYRIAN-EGYPTIAN TRADE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY*

DANIEL CRECELIUS

The conditions of trade in the eastern Mediterranean/Ottoman region, particularly in the maritime Arab provinces, changed noticeably during the course of the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the century the Ottoman central government still had tentative control over the major ports through which domestic trade and commerce with the European states passed in both directions. The administration could still manipulate the economies of the Arab provinces to its benefit, could still shield those provinces from European incursions, whether economic or political, and could still hold back the momentum of the locally based political forces that challenged its rule. It could also still provide general security to the inhabitants of its most important Arab provinces, namely Egypt and Syria. By the end of the eighteenth century the Ottoman government could provide none of the benefits of strong, centralised rule. As a result, conditions of trade in the eastern Mediterranean changed to a significant degree, noticeably affecting the ports engaged in the exchange of goods between Egypt and Syria.

In Egypt, the rise of the Qazdağlı mamluk faction, which was marked by 'Ali Bey's 'rebellion' against the central government (1768–72) and the autonomy of the duumvirs Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey (1775–98, with interruptions) who followed their own foreign policy towards the European states, and in Syria, the rise and fall of Dhahir al-'Umar in Galilee, Jazzar Pasha in Acre, and the 'Azm governors in Damascus, had enormous repercussions on the politics of those two provinces, on the conditions of trade between Egypt and Syria, and between those two provinces and Europe.¹

* This paper is translated by W. Matt Malczycki.

¹ On the rise and effect of the Qazdağlı faction on Ottoman Egypt, see Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The rise of the Qazdağlıs*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the Regimes of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760–1775*, Chicago, Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981; André Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires*, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1995.

Egypt is joined by land to Syria/Palestine, and clearly travellers, armies, and merchants passed with caravans between the two provinces, yet the overland route is the least researched and least understood. André Raymond has remarked that, in contrast to the great pilgrim caravans departing Cairo and Damascus, the North African caravan, or even the caravans moving merchandise from the Sudan to Cairo, goods moved over the Egyptian-Syrian route in a number of smaller caravans, perhaps of a mere one hundred camels each. In the absence of relevant sources that can provide statistical data on overland exchanges between these two provinces,² Raymond could find little other information on this trade in his excellent survey of Egyptian trade routes in the eighteenth century.³ In contrast, a wide range of European, Ottoman and local archival sources permit us to understand much more about the seaborne trade between these two Arab provinces. This trade, and its consequences for the provinces' Mediterranean ports, will be the focus of this paper.

The rise of the Melkite community

Much of the history of trade in the Syrian and Egyptian provinces in the eighteenth century centres on the migration of an adept and aggressive minority of Christian merchants to the coastal ports of the region. Given impetus by a religious conflict within the Greek Orthodox community of northern Syria, the diasporas of the so-called Melkite or Greek Catholic Christians to the Mediterranean seaports of Egypt and the Levant was one of the most important developments affecting trade between Egypt and Syria and between these two provinces and Europe. This small community, driven from inland Syria by the strenuous opposition of the Greek Orthodox clergy, and particularly of the Greek patriarch in Istanbul, quickly established itself in most of the ports along the Syrian-Palestinian coast and in Egypt, where it

² Dick Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000, 55, n. 30, asserts that 'There are no reliable figures at hand for the regional trade conducted in Damascus prior to the 1830s...'

³ George Baldwin, the British vice-consul in Alexandria, estimated the value of this caravan trade with Syria at £50,000 (about 20,000,000 *paras*). See Baldwin, *Political Recollections Relative to Egypt*, London, H. Baldwin and Son, 1802, 231. Raymond cites Baldwin's estimate in his discussion of the overland trade with Syria; see *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIII^e siècle*, Damas, Institut français de Damas, 1973, Vol. I, 171–73.

rapidly achieved phenomenal commercial success.⁴ The activities of these Melkite merchants gave added impetus to the commercial links between Egypt, Syria and the European markets, helped to bankrupt the European trading houses still trying to continue business in the chaotic late eighteenth century, and expanded the reach of Egyptian and Syrian merchants to India and Italy through their establishment of trading companies in India, Livorno, Trieste, and even Marseille.

Melkite merchants served both Shaykh Dhahir al-'Umar, who created a mini-kingdom in the Galilee based on the expansion of the cotton trade, and Ahmad Jazzar Pasha, who transformed Acre into the major port for the export of this commodity from Syria. The Melkite merchant Yusuf al-Qassis had acted as Dhahir's agent in Acre and later, when Dhahir moved to Acre, served as his advisor and vizier. In 1761, worried about his own safety, Yusuf tried to smuggle the fortune he had accumulated to Europe, but was arrested and had that fortune confiscated by Dhahir. Yusuf was succeeded by yet another Melkite merchant, the famous Ibrahim al-Sabbagh, who was born in Damiette around 1715 but moved to Palestine at the age of seven. As the most powerful merchant-customs agent to both Dhahir al-'Umar and Ahmad Jazzar Pasha, Sabbagh worked to defend the monopolies that Dhahir and Jazzar established over the item that was to be responsible for Acre's growing prosperity. His attempts to prevent the French merchants of Sidon and Acre from dealing directly with local producers of cotton often brought him into conflict with them.⁵

The rapid rise of the Melkite merchants in Egypt has been well chronicled. Arriving only in the 1730s–1740s, they settled in the ports of Damiette, Rosette and Alexandria as well as Cairo. Their fortunes skyrocketed in the 1760s and 1770s when the rebellious mam-luk *shaykh al-balad* 'Ali Bey al-Kabir transferred the management of Egypt's customs houses from the Jews, long dominant in their capacity

⁴ On the emergence of this religious minority in Egypt and its impact on domestic and international commerce, see Thomas Philipp, *The Syrians in Egypt, 1725–1975*, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1985; Albert Hourani, 'The Syrians in Egypt in the eighteenth and nineteenth century', in *Colloque international sur l'histoire du Caire*, Cairo, Ministry of Culture, 1972, 221–33; Daniel Crecelius, 'The Attempt by the Greek Catholics to Control Egypt's Trade with Europe in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century', in Abdeljelil Temimi (ed.), *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l'époque ottomane*, Zaghuan, 1988, Vol. 3, 121–32; Bulus Qar'ali, *al-Suriyyun fi Misr*, Cairo, al-Matba'a al-Suriya, 1928, two volumes.

⁵ See Thomas Philipp, *Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730–1831*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001, 101–2, 107–8.

as customs agents, to these newly arrived Melkites.⁶ Soon, Melkites served as customs agents for all of Egypt's major ports except Suez, which was controlled by the leading mamluk bey.

The Melkite chief customs agents enjoyed the political support of the mamluk beys they served as long as they satisfied the growing demands of the beys for increased revenues. As long as these revenues, and gifts, were forthcoming, the beys did not object to the commercial activities of their customs agents. Given freedom of action, Melkite agents soon competed unevenly with the long-established dominant French and other European merchants in Egypt and the ports of the Syrian coast. They obtained monopolies over the sale of both imported and exported goods and forced the European merchants to buy high and sell cheap to themselves. The most famous of these Melkite customs agents, Antun (Antoine) Phara'un Qassis, for instance, was said to have had monopolies over the sale of senna, tobacco, rice, coffee, saffron, drugs, and many other items.⁷

The Melkite merchant community's competition with the French trading houses was particularly intense and high stakes. The Melkites were at least partly responsible for the decline of the French trading houses in particular, and of French trade in general, through their competition with the European merchants and their impositions on them in the name of the mamluk beys whom they served. In other respects, too, the Melkites competed 'unfairly' with the Europeans. They spoke the native languages, could purchase more cheaply the goods they sought directly from the native producers, established monopolies over almost all the primary export products, and required the Europeans to sell their imports wholesale to intermediaries rather than directly in the local markets. The Egyptian customs agents succeeded much better than their Syrian counterparts in keeping the locally based French merchants from purchasing directly from native producers.⁸

⁶ See John William Livingstone, "Ali Bey Al-Kabir and the Jews", *Middle Eastern Studies* 7, 1971, 221–28.

⁷ Archives Nationales (Paris), Affaires Etrangères (subsequently AE), B1, Vol. 112 (Alexandrie), 1779–82, Mure's letter of 13 September 1781. The customs agents themselves came to own and run ships between Damiette and the Levant coast. See Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiya (Cairo), mahkamat Dimyat, *sijill* 282 (1197–1198), 184, and *sijill* 295 (1216–1218), 32.

⁸ On the relations between the local rulers and the French in Sidon and Acre, see Philipp, *Acre...*, 94–114.

The Melkites quickly established a trading network of their own that stretched from India to Italy. As early as 1781 a French report from Alexandria complained that these Syrians had gained control of all the commerce coming to Egypt from Syria, India and Arabia and that they had gained a foothold in the Smyrna trade.⁹ Qassis, for instance, was said to have capital invested in a network of ports from India to Livorno.¹⁰ The French could only protest the ruination of their merchant houses under the exactions of local rulers such as the mamluk beys of Egypt or Shaykh Dhahir al-'Umar and Jazzar Pasha of Acre. The French government occasionally sent representatives to the local rulers to ask for relief from the extra-legal exactions imposed on its merchants. It also would send an occasional warship to lay off the port where French merchants were being abused or threaten military action against the rulers of Egypt and Acre when conditions became intolerable. Napoleon's expedition in 1798 was meant to eliminate these oppressive regimes and re-establish the health of French trade in the region.

Egypt's Mediterranean Ports

Daniel Panzac has provided a wealth of information and analysis of Ottoman trade through his careful studies of shipping in the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹¹ He has shown, for instance, that the route between Istanbul and Alexandria was the most important, and the most heavily trafficked, in the Ottoman

⁹ AE, B1, Vol. 112 (Alexandrie), 1779–82, Mure, letter of 13 September, 1781. They also competed with the French in the market. Qassis and Rosetti, acting together, were said to be purchasing cotton in Syria for shipment to Italy. See AE, B1, Vol. 113 (Alexandrie), 1783–87, Bulletin of 19 August, 1783.

¹⁰ AE, B1, Vol. 113 (Alexandrie), 1783–87, 2 January 1784.

¹¹ See, for instance, 'Négociants ottomans et activité maritime au Maghreb (1686–1707)', in Daniel Panzac, ed., *Les villes dans l'empire ottoman: activités et sociétés*, Vol. I, Paris, éditions du CNRS, 1991, 221–42; 'Affréteurs ottomans et capitaines français à Alexandrie: la caravane maritime en Méditerranée au milieu du XVIII^e siècle', *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 34, 1982, 23–38; 'International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24, 1992, 189–206; 'Négociants ottomans et activité maritime à Istanbul à la fin du XVIII^e siècle', in Abdeljelil Temimi, ed., *Mélanges Professeur Robert Mantran*, Zaghuan, 1988, 187–99; and 'Négociants ottomans et capitaines français: la caravane maritime en Crète au XVIII^e siècle', in H. Batu and J.L. Bacqué-Grammont, eds., *L'Empire ottoman, la République Turquie et la France*, Turcica III, Istanbul-Paris, Isis, 1986, 99–118.

Empire, since Egypt was the source of most of Istanbul's foodstuffs. All other routes were secondary to this sea-lane linking the Ottoman capital to the major port of its most important province. While Alexandria also served as the major port of entry and exit between Egypt and other Mediterranean ports, Egypt's smaller Mediterranean ports of Rosette and Damiette served a more specific purpose and a more limited arc of ports in their immediate economic zones.

None of Egypt's Mediterranean ports provides a natural or secure harbour. While Alexandria has been Egypt's main point of contact with the entire Mediterranean world since its foundation, it does not provide safe anchorage for ships, which have on occasions been destroyed by heavy winds and seas while in its unprotected harbour. Rosette, near the mouth of the western branch of the Nile as it enters the sea, and Damiette, at the mouth of the eastern branch of the Nile, are both smaller ports.

While protected from the sometimes treacherous sea, the shifting bars formed at the mouth of the two branches by the silt brought to the Mediterranean by the Nile reduced the level of the water to 10–12 feet at high tide and 7–8 feet at low tide at Damiette, so only smaller ships could cross the bar safely to reach the port.¹² The situation was the same for Rosette. Larger ships had to anchor off shore and unload their goods onto smaller boats for transfer to these river ports. A unique set of archival documentation consisting of the manifests for ships using Damiette and Alexandria shows the much larger size of ships, hence larger cargoes, sailing from Alexandria. Shipping from Damiette was confined largely to small ships of between 60 and 170 tons while we find ships of 400 tons and more using the port of Alexandria.¹³

Because the land route between Alexandria and Cairo crossed the desert through areas controlled by bedouin, it became customary for cargoes unloaded at Alexandria and destined for Cairo and other inte-

¹² See Daniel Crecelius, 'Damiette in the Late Eighteenth Century', *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt*, 27, 1990, 185–89.

¹³ For a description of two separate sets of manifests of ships using Damiette in the period 1777–81 see Daniel Crecelius and Hamza 'Abd al-'Aziz Badr, 'French Ships and their Cargoes sailing between Damiette and Ottoman Ports: 1777–1781', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 37, 1994, 251–53. The ships' manifests from the French archives were graciously made available to me by Daniel Panzac some years ago. The manifests in Arabic can be found in the *sijills* of the *shari'a* court of Damiette.

rior Egyptian towns to be transferred onto smaller coastal vessels for transport to Rosette, then via the western Nile branch to Cairo. Even incoming Ottoman governors chose this longer river route over the quicker but more hazardous direct desert route. Not just the difficulties of a desert passage, but bedouin threats and strength influenced the choice of the sea and river routes for the passage of goods and personnel between Alexandria (and Rosette) and Cairo. This choice gave an importance to Rosette which it might not otherwise have enjoyed because of its position between Alexandria and Damiette.

Destinations

Alexandria received ships from most of the Mediterranean region and beyond. Ships from Western Europe, including England and Sweden, but particularly France and Venice, from North Africa, and from other Ottoman ports called at Alexandria. The Istanbul-Alexandria axis was the most important single route in the Ottoman Empire, for Egypt was primarily responsible for provisioning the capital with local foodstuffs, the coffee of Yemen, slaves from Africa, and goods from India. While ships sometimes communicated directly between Rosette and other Ottoman ports, this port's major function was to act as a point of trans-shipment for goods and passengers passing between Cairo and Alexandria. Damiette, near the mouth of the eastern branch of the Nile, is the focus of this study, for it specialised in the exchange of goods with the ports of the eastern Mediterranean, especially the ports of the Palestinian and Syrian coast, the southern coast of Anatolia, Cyprus and Crete, and some of the ports in the Greek islands.¹⁴

In his study of Alexandria, Panzac has shown that of 894 French ships sailing from Alexandria between 1754 and 1767, only 23 departed for Syria.¹⁵ Likewise, in the years 1782–85 a total of 1656 arrived in Alexandria harbour, only 23 of which came from Syrian ports. During those same four years, 2117 departures were recorded, only 77 of which headed to Syrian ports. Similar statistics exist for Damiette only for the year 1783. These show that in that year a total of 248 ships arrived, 45 of which were European. There were 250 departures, 210 of which were Ottoman flagged. Of the European flagged ships, only

¹⁴ See Crecelius and Badr, 'French Ships and their cargoes...', 259–62.

¹⁵ Panzac, 'International and Domestic Maritime Trade...', 202.

Arrivals and Departures to/from Damiette in the year 1783

	Arrivals		Departures	
	European	Ottoman	European	Ottoman
Beirut-Sidon	7	16	10	19
Tyre-Acre	0	95	0	18
Jaffa	1	25	2	103
Tripoli-Ladiqiya	4	18	12	27
Others	21	49	4	43
Europe	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	45	203	40	210

12 departed for Europe. The following table drawn from the French archives shows that Damiette was the key Egyptian port for the sea-borne exchange of goods between Syria and Egypt.¹⁶ It was unique among Egyptian and Syrian ports in that it did not engage in international trade, but overwhelmingly in Ottoman domestic trade, particularly with the ports of the Syrian coast.

The above figures from the French archives refer to the movement of ships and demonstrate the preponderance of Ottoman-flagged ships carrying trade between Damiette and various Syrian ports.¹⁷ The collection of ships' manifests from the French and Egyptian archives referred to above offers further verification of the overwhelming connection of Damiette with the Syrian trade. The 35 manifests from the Damiette *sijills* relate to 24 sailings to 11 destinations while the French documentation cites 52 sailings to 15 different ports. The most frequently cited ports in this documentation are Marseille¹⁸ and Tyre (6 times), Cyprus (7 times), Tripoli and Beirut (12 times), Sidon (13 times), and Latakia (31 times). This set of manifests from the Damiette *sijills* does not list any sailings to Jaffa or Tyre, but does confirm Damiette's close association with Beirut and Latakia. The two sets of figures suggest that

¹⁶ See Panzac, 'Commerce et commerçants des ports du Liban Sud et de Palestine (1756-1787)', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 55-6, 1990, 87.

¹⁷ The figures presented in the table appear to register only the last port from which a ship sailed on its journey to Damiette and, for departures, the first port for which a ship sailed on leaving Damiette. This would explain the inflated number of 103 departures for Jaffa, which was the port closest to Damiette. While ships carried cargoes for two, three or more ports, these subsequent stops are not recorded in the table.

¹⁸ French ships heading for Marseille carried loads of rice on their final cruise at the end of their assignment in the Eastern 'maritime caravan' trade.

Damiette's trade was tied to an arc of ports stretching from Cyprus to Jaffa, but was focused on the Syrian coast.

The Captains and their Ships

European, mainly French, ships carried the bulk of the seaborne trade in the Ottoman Empire, although the statistics cited above do not make that entirely clear. French ships carried as much as 90% of the North African domestic trade of the Ottoman Empire and only slightly less in the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁹ Raymond has also noted that in 1787, 1788, and 1789, Alexandria was visited by an average of 528 ships per year, of which 298 were European (carrying 48,015 tons) and 235 were Turkish and Greek ships (carrying 29,486 tons). Ninety European ships and 56 Turkish or Greek ships came from European and Asiatic Turkey. He suggests that the ratio was roughly the same for ships using the ports of the Syrian coast.²⁰

The manifests from the French and Egyptian archives cite only French-flagged ships and, by implication, captains of French nationality.²¹ To date, we do not have data on Ottoman captains sailing Ottoman-flagged merchant ships, but we do know that Ottoman-flagged ships were predominant in the port of Damiette. Panzac points out that only 20 French, Venetian, and Ragusan ships carried cargoes between Damiette and Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Acre and Jaffa in 1783 while 276 Ottoman-flagged ships worked this route.²² The French captains serving Damiette carried goods and passengers between Ottoman ports and are therefore not counted in the statistics of the region's international trade kept by French consuls. Unlike the ports of the Syrian coast that dispatched significant quantities of primary products to

¹⁹ Panzac asserts that the majority of ships using Rhodes and Sfax were European. Europeans carried 78% of the trade between Alexandria and Smyrna, 53% with Salonika, the majority with the Peloponnese and Syria, and practically half with Istanbul. See Panzac, 'International and Domestic Maritime Trade...', 196. The international trade in the Mediterranean was carried entirely in European ships, for Ottoman ships were banned in European ports. Panzac's figures refer to the domestic seaborne trade of the Ottoman Empire.

²⁰ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol. I, 167–69.

²¹ Crecelius and Badr, 'French Ships and their cargoes...' lists the names of all the captains, their destinations, and the cargoes they carried.

²² Panzac, 'Commerce et commerçants...', 88.

Europe, Damiette was almost exclusively engaged in Ottoman domestic trade.

The French captains who brought their ships to Damiette carried an official document authorizing them to engage in this Ottoman domestic trade.²³ The ships using Damiette, invariably referred to as *shaytiya* in the Egyptian documentation but described more fully in the French manifests, were small, usually between 60 and 170 tons, because they had to pass over the bar (see above) that separated Damiette from the sea. Nevertheless, some ships carried around 500 *ardabbs* of rice and other items on their departure from Damiette.²⁴ All the ships carried swivel guns that could be mounted on the bulwark of the ship, or small cannons placed on carriages. This weaponry was especially necessary in the second half of the eighteenth century, not only to fight off attacks by pirates,²⁵ but also to defend the ship against enemy warships during these decades of almost constant war. To provide greater security to their shipping, French merchant ships often sailed in groups (a maritime caravan) and were sometimes accompanied by a French warship.²⁶ For this and other reasons, traders preferred to send their merchandise on French ships, except during times when France was at war with England.

There were no French merchants resident in Damiette since this port did not have a direct link with Europe other than the few ships

²³ For an explanation of this practice and a description of the French captains' authorization from the Ottoman government to engage in Ottoman domestic trade, see Daniel Panzac, 'Le contrat d'affrètement maritime en Méditerranée: droit maritime et pratique commerciale entre Islam et Chrétienté (XVII^e–XVIII^e siècles)', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 45, 2002, 342–63.

²⁴ Ships sailing from Alexandria could carry more than twice that load because of their larger size.

²⁵ Maritime commerce was particularly hazardous in the eastern Mediterranean waters because of the many pirates that infested the region. Haifa, for instance, which was not subject to regional control, provided a friendly haven for Maltese pirates. Both Dhahir al-'Umar and Jazzar Pasha purchased small vessels to patrol the coast between Ladiqiya and Damiette. Jazzar's fleet eventually numbered seven. 'This fleet was not capable, as was the British fleet under Smith, of holding back Bonaparte's ships, but for the purposes for which it was established—i.e. coastal patrol, the safeguarding of commerce, and prevention of piracy—it was sufficiently efficient'. Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century: Patterns of Government and Administration*, Jerusalem, Magnes Press, 1973, 290–91.

²⁶ The term 'maritime caravan' also referred to seaborne trade between two ports within the Ottoman Empire to distinguish this trade from the long distance trade between the Middle East and Europe. See Panzac, 'Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire...', 197.

that carried loads of rice on their homeward journeys at the completion of their 2–3 year service in the Ottoman maritime caravan trade.²⁷ The unsupervised French captains engaged in transporting cargoes and passengers between Damiette and other Ottoman ports frequently used the occasion of their visits to Damiette to unload personal loads of French cloth and other valuable items that competed directly with the French trading houses operating out of Alexandria and Cairo. There were so many complaints by the French merchants against the illegal trade carried on by these French captains that in 1779 it was decided to place a vice-consul in Damiette to put a stop to it.²⁸

The French captains (and their crews) were not generally given permission to come on shore. Nevertheless, they still managed to get into occasional trouble with the local authorities, such as when they established contact with local women or got drunk on shore. These captains and their ships carried the bulk of domestic trade in the Ottoman Empire, but not from Damiette. Hence it is often difficult to obtain reliable statistics on the number of sailings and the volume of goods they carried, as most of the statistics we have were recorded for the international trade between Ottoman ports and Europe. Nevertheless, the patterns of exchange within the Ottoman Empire are coming into focus.

The Exchange of Goods between Damiette and the Syrian Ports

A few major items provided the bulk of exchanges between the Syrian ports and Damiette in the eighteenth century. The hinterland of Damiette was a rich agricultural zone that produced rice, fruits, and other agricultural products. Rice was clearly the major export of Damiette to the Syrian markets and beyond.²⁹ It was also near the Delta towns that produced woven fabrics, which were frequently exported to the Syrian markets. A good deal of Yemeni coffee also transited Damiette

²⁷ Each of the French ships heading from Damiette to Marseilles arrived in ballast and carried a full load of rice on departure. See the Appendixes in Crecelius and Badr, 'French Ships and their Cargoes...'

²⁸ AE, B3, Vol. 233 (Mission de Tott: Visite des Échelles du Levant, 1776–1779), 3.

²⁹ The *Mémoire sur l'Échelle de Damiette* of 10 December 1777, folio 23, states that Damiette exports about 100,000 *ardabbs* of rice, each of about 775 *livres*, and 5,000–6,000 ballots of cloth. See Quai d'Orsay (Paris), Correspondance consulaire et commerciale (subsequently CCC), Damiette (sans numéro), 1777–1818.

on its way to Syrian markets. Items such as animal skins, sugar, sal ammoniac, dates, mats, henna, and saffron are also frequently cited in the Damiette manifests, but not in the same quantities as rice, coffee, or cloth.

The manifests of the ships visiting Damiette from Syrian ports mention tobacco, from Cyprus, Tripoli, Sidon and above all Latakia, wood, from Cyprus, Tripoli and Latakia, and silk, from Sidon, Tripoli and Latakia. Raymond mentions soap as a major import item and remarks that the principal merchants of this product in Cairo were from Nablus, Jerusalem, or Gaza.³⁰ Egyptian and French merchants also purchased large quantities of cotton from Syria. Panzac remarks that cotton and silk represented 90% of exports from Syrian ports to Marseille, but quantities of raw cotton and silk were also exported to Egypt to be spun into cloth in Delta textile factories.³¹ He also notes the greater value of the products (silk, Damascus goods) shipped from Beirut and Sidon over the items (raw cotton, wheat, soap) shipped from Acre, Tyre and Jaffa, mainly to Damiette.³² During its brief heyday Jaffa exported wheat, tobacco, and soap to Damiette and maintained a lively trade with ports in the Aegean (see below).

In 1783, the year for which we have the only reliable statistics for shipping and commerce in the port of Damiette, the ports of southern Syria accounted for 6,943,125 *livres tournois* (67.5%) of a total of 10,565,125 *livres tournois* in value imported at Damiette that year. Of this sum, Jaffa accounted for 642,750 *livres*, Acre for 1,133,500 *livres*, Tyre for 568,125 *livres*, and Beirut and Sidon for 4,598,750 *livres*. As Panzac points out, most of the difference in values can be attributed to the greater value of the products (silk, Damascus cloths, cotton) dispatched by Beirut and Sidon over the products (tobacco, soap, charcoal, and other items) sent from the other ports.³³ Panzac's statistics

³⁰ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol. I, 190.

³¹ Panzac 'Commerce et commerçants...', 79. Raymond remarks that while Egypt maintained a huge trade imbalance in its favour with Istanbul and Smyrna, surpassing its commerce with Europe in the period 1776–81, it imported from Syria more than it exported (210,543,600 *paras* imported against 131,349,000 *paras* at the end of the eighteenth century, based on Girard's figures) explained largely by the import of primary products for its textile factories. See *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol. I, 190.

³² Panzac, 'Commerce et commerçants...', 88–89.

³³ Panzac, 'Commerce et commerçants...', 88. See also Quai d'Orsay (Paris), CCC, *Mémoires et Documents-Turquie*, Volume 9 (1718–1824), folio 60 (Tableau General-Port d'Alexandrie et Damiette).

demonstrate the extremely close economic ties between Damiette and the southern Syrian ports.

Control of the port of Damiette generated significant profits, more, potentially, than the combined *iltizam* for Alexandria and Rosette, for the customs agent and the mamluk bey who was its *multazim* (tax farmer). Between 1786 and 1798, for instance, the combined Alexandria-Rosette customs averaged 12,884,882 *paras* per year, of which 5,500,000 (approximately 45%) were paid to the Ottoman treasury.³⁴ In those same years, however, the Damiette customs averaged 11,548,104 *paras* per year, but its *iltizam* cost only 1,100,000 *paras* annually (approximately 10%) while another 1,075,177 *paras* were paid to the governor.³⁵ Yet Alexandria exported much more than it imported, while Damiette did not show much of a favourable trade balance. In 1783, for instance, the French emissary Truguet wrote that Alexandria exported goods valued at 23,761,902 French *livres* and imported goods valued at only 16,029,540 French *livres*. Damiette, he asserted, imported goods valued at 10,565,125 French *livres* and exported roughly the same amount, 10,500,000 *livres*.³⁶ It would appear that Alexandria imported and exported twice the value of Damiette's imports and exports. It has been shown that the overwhelming bulk of Damiette's trade was internal trade between Damiette and other Ottoman ports, particularly those along the Syrian coast. Raymond has also made the point that Alexandria's trade with Istanbul alone was greater than its trade with Europe.³⁷ Panzac has made the same point for the ports of the Syrian coast.³⁸ Internal trade with other Ottoman ports was more important, and of greater value, than the international trade towards Europe for all of these ports. Panzac notes that the Syrian ports of Sidon, Acre, Beirut, Tyre, and Jaffa on average exported to Europe between 1.5 and

³⁴ These figures from the official records of the *ruznama* must be viewed with some suspicion, for during this period the beys controlled Egypt and frequently failed to pay any of the money owing to the central government or its administration in Egypt.

³⁵ See Stanford J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, 109–11. But the ruling beys Ibrahim and Murad withheld all customs payments from the treasury for many years.

³⁶ Archives de la Guerre (Vincennes), MR 1677, *Mémoire sur l'Égypte et les Indes*, Vol. A, pp. 151–52.

³⁷ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol. I, 188.

³⁸ Panzac, 'Commerce et commerçants...', 88–89.

2 million *livres tournois*, but sent to Damiette alone goods valued at 5 to 6 million.³⁹

The Merchants

After 'Ali Bey's dismissal of the last Jewish chief customs agent in 1768 and his assignment of this responsibility to a Syrian Melkite, the rapidly expanding Melkite community in Egypt quickly took control of Egypt's foreign trade and its members established themselves as serious rivals to the long dominant French trading houses in Egyptian and Syrian ports. The fate that befell the French merchant companies in Egypt in the next decades was similar to what occurred in several Syrian *entrepôts*, particularly Acre and Sidon, during the same period.

The chief architect of this Melkite success in Egypt was Antoine Phara'un Qassis. Qassis was born in Damascus and brought to Egypt at an early age. In 1774, at the age of 25 or 26, he succeeded Yusuf Bitar al-Halabi⁴⁰ as chief customs agent and won the confidence of Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab by successfully managing the logistics for his second military campaign into southern Syria. Thereafter, Qassis remained the chief customs agent under both Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey until he fled Egypt with his fortune in early 1784 for Livorno, where he set up a trading house to rival the French merchants operating in the ports of the eastern Mediterranean. Qassis appointed Melkites, often family members, as customs agents at all the Egyptian ports except Suez, which remained under the control of the ruling bey.⁴¹

³⁹ Panzac, 'International and Domestic Trade...', 202.

⁴⁰ Bulus Qar'ali remarks that when Yusuf Bitar died, the Italian merchant Carlo Rosetti married his widow (*armilla*). Rosetti, whom both the French and George Baldwin claimed worked in partnership with Qassis to undermine their commerce, therefore had very close ties to this emerging Syrian community which, according to Qar'ali, already numbered 3,000 in Cairo at the end of 'Ali Bey's reign. See Qar'ali, *al-Suriyyun fi Misr*, Vol. I, 85–86. Damiette was estimated to have 1,000 Melkites out of a total population of between 20,000 and 30,000 in 1777. See Quai d'Orsay (Paris), CCC, Damiette (sans numéro), 1777–1818, Mémoire sur l'Échelle de Damiette, 10 Decembre 1777.

⁴¹ Qassis' own family members were able to maintain important positions even after his flight to Livorno. The Mu'allim Yasif, the son of al-Mu'allim Ibrahim Qassis al-Shami, is cited as *mutahaddith* for the *diwan al-kumruk* in Damiette in 1792. Ibrahim Qassis is cited as the brother of Antoine and his agent. See Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiya (Cairo), mahkamat Dimyat, *sijill* 276 (1192–93), 270.

By the 1780s Qassis and members of his community had broken into the rich trade of the Red Sea and had established links with the trade coming from India.⁴² Qassis and Rosetti were blamed for the 1779 bedouin attack on the caravan transporting Indian goods which the British had brought to Suez, defying Ottoman bans. This attack put an end to European attempts to open a direct trade route between India and Suez for many years. Qassis and other Syrian customs agents worked closely with the leading mamluk beys, who had been convinced that the expansion of Egypt's foreign trade, particularly with the European nations, would translate into greater customs revenues, as well as extortions. 'Ali Bey had first encouraged the Europeans to ignore long-standing Ottoman bans against bringing their ships directly from India to Suez, but Muhammad Bey, Ibrahim Bey, and Murad Bey offered treaties to the British and French guaranteeing the security of their trade in Egypt and encouraging their use of the port of Suez despite the disapproval of the Ottoman central government.⁴³ There are numerous complaints in the European consular reports, not just from Egypt, but from the Levant ports as well, against the increased extortions that bankrupted many of the French trading houses in the 1780s and 1790s. The Melkite customs agents are frequently accused of being the initiators of these extortions that were imposed not just to provide greater income for the ruling beys, but as a means of weakening the French merchant houses.

Trade between Damiette and the Syrian ports fell under the supervision of the Melkite community, whose representatives served as directors of the customs houses, holders of monopolies over key products, or as individual merchants. A survey of the available ships' manifests illustrates the activities in Damiette of this group.

Trade between Damiette and the ports of the Syrian coast was shared among Jewish, Christian and Muslim merchants. The Damiette manifests not only give us the names of many of the individual merchants from a narrow period, but also demonstrate that the various religious groups traded freely with each other. On a June 1779 sailing, for instance, Mikha'il 'Anjuri ('Anhuri)⁴⁴ dispatched 27 *ardabbs* of rice

⁴² See Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol. I, 155.

⁴³ See Daniel Crecelius, 'Unratified Commercial Treaties between Egypt and England and France, 1773-1794', *Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine* 12, 1985, 65-104.

⁴⁴ Although the *sijill* records Mikha'il's name as 'Anjuri, Professor Abdul-Karim Rafeq informs me that this Syrian family is actually rendered 'Anhuri.

to two Muslim merchants in Sidon. On that same departure Antun Lutfallah shipped to Shaykh Ibrahim al-Azhari 20 *ardabbs* of rice, and Dimitri Ilyas shipped 14 *ardabbs* of rice to Alexandrus Basiliyus and another 5 *ardabbs* to Gabriel Ilyas. In April 1780 the *yaziji*⁴⁵ Matta Jabbur al-Nasrani contracted with al-Hajj Muhammad Manla Yusuf al-ʿAlayili to ship 429 $\frac{2}{3}$ *ardabbs* of rice and other products to the port of ʿAlaya.

Not all of the consignments of rice were for resale, for many of the quantities listed were of just 1–7 *ardabbs*. In a June 1779 sailing to Sidon, for instance, Mustafa Odabashi Jiridli accompanied his own consignment of 7 *ardabbs* of rice while a single *ardabb* was shipped to Si Qasim Maʿn Hashim.⁴⁶ Hence in addition to the large consignments of rice or coffee to some established merchants in the Syrian ports, smaller amounts of foodstuffs and goods were dispatched to individuals, apparently for their personal use. Some merchants dealing in small quantities undertook round trips, taking Syrian goods to Damiette for sale and returning with the products of Damiette. For instance, al-ʿAntakli, the son of the deceased Yusuf, brought silk to sell in Damiette and bought white rice for the return journey with the money.⁴⁷

The ships' manifests verify that, in comparison with shipments from Alexandria, the cargoes destined for Syrian and Anatolian ports were much smaller. Alongside the larger quantities of goods, particularly rice or coffee, sent to merchants in the Levant ports, a sizable trade was carried on by lesser merchants, who would consign orders of between five and twenty *ardabbs* of rice to correspondents in Syria. Merchants also did business across religious lines. One also notices that in times of war the merchants split their consignments among several departures instead of placing their entire inventory on a single ship.

We have yet to identify the largest merchants operating out of the port of Damiette, other than, perhaps, the Melkite customs agents. But alongside any group of dominant merchants a larger group of small merchants drawn from most of the ports served by the ships sailing from Damiette sent small quantities, some rather insignificant in size, to their homelands.

⁴⁵ The *yaziji* acted as agent between the captain and the merchant. On his role in the harbour, see Crecelius and Badr, 'French Ships and their Cargoes...', 268–70.

⁴⁶ See Crecelius and Badr, 'French Ships and their Cargoes...', Appendix II.

⁴⁷ Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiya, mahkamat Dimyat, *sijill* 279, 1194–96, 241.

The impact of trade and political events on Damiette and select Syrian ports

As Egypt and Syria were drawn into the world market in the course of the eighteenth century, several of the ports mentioned experienced spectacular growth, followed by a period of rapid decline:⁴⁸ Damiette, Jaffa, and Acre, in particular, illustrate this pattern. But while the growth of Jaffa and Acre was the result of their increased exports to Europe, Damiette's prosperity, as we have seen, was due to the exchange of products with other Ottoman ports, largely in the arc between Cyprus and Jaffa.

Thomas Philipp notes that the plague of 1760 reduced the population of Acre by roughly one-third. But Acre grew rapidly thereafter under the attention shown to it by Shaykh Dhahir al-'Umar and later Ahmad Jazzar Pasha, who made it his seat of power. Acre became the main port for the export of all the cotton grown in south-western Syria.⁴⁹ Although this trade peaked at mid-century, increased prices meant that the value of the trade was greater than previously attained in the 1770s-1780s. The city was significantly modified by Jazzar's many constructions, to the extent that its walls were able to withstand Napoleon's determined assault in 1799.

Jazzar followed roughly the same policy initiated by Dhahir al-'Umar and one that was implemented by the Melkite customs agents in Egypt, creating personal monopolies for the purchase and sale of cotton. This forced the French to deal directly with him rather than

⁴⁸ A number of authors have studied the impact of European economic penetration of the Middle East in the 18th and 19th centuries. See, in particular, Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750*, New York, New York University Press, 1988. The effects of these changing conditions on three Ottoman cities are discussed in Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West, Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. The city of Aleppo itself is the subject of a substantial analysis by Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989. Some of the older studies of French trade in the eastern Mediterranean are still useful: see in particular Paul Masson's *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVII^e et au XVIII^e siècle*, 2 vols., Paris, Hachette, 1896 & 1911, and R. Clément, *Les Français d'Égypte aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1960.

⁴⁹ Thomas Philipp, 'The Rise and Fall of Acre: Population and Economy between 1700 and 1850', in *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 55-56, 1990, 127.

purchasing the raw cotton directly from the producers as they had done previously. He extorted great sums from their trading houses, and even threatened them with violence. Tensions grew even more intense between Jazzar and the French after the transfer of their consulate from Sidon to Acre in 1785, although there were years in which the French turned an acceptable profit.⁵⁰ Caught between the pressure of Jazzar and the chaos engendered by the events of the French Revolution, which split French merchant communities throughout the Mediterranean region into pro- and anti-revolutionary groupings, the once well-organised and prosperous French merchant houses disintegrated, particularly after the revolutionary government proscribed the Marseille Chamber of Commerce in 1791. Philipp remarks that Jazzar seems responsible for the rapid decline of Acre in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, but one should also remember the plagues and epidemics, wars (between the Ottoman Empire and neighbouring states, between England and France, and between revolutionary France and virtually the whole of the rest of Europe), and the competition from local merchants, particularly the Melkites, who established their own trading houses in Italy as rivals of the French. Moreover, Syrian cotton came to be challenged by cheaper consignments from Salonica, Smyrna, and the United States. Philipp remarks that Acre went into rapid decline after 1785 and that by 1836 its trade was dead.⁵¹

Jaffa also experienced spectacular growth, and rapid decline, in the second half of the eighteenth century. As Panzac's statistics on shipping from southern Syrian ports demonstrate, Jaffa took on a temporary importance for the export of tobacco, soap, and grains.⁵² Defensive constructions made by the Ottoman authorities gave the

⁵⁰ For the year 1785, for instance, the French in Acre reported a profit of 182,375 pounds which they used for a letter of exchange at Istanbul and to pay off their debts. See AE, B1, Vol. 979 (Acre), 1782–86, Fol. 177, March 1786. In 1786 Marseille sent 721,800 pounds of merchandise to Acre and received 659,528. See folios 229–31 of the same box. For 1787 Marseille sent to Acre goods valued at 881,179 pounds and received on the return 483,167 pounds, so it enjoyed a favourable balance of trade during the mid-1780s. See AE, B1, 980 (Acre), 1787–89, folios 60–63. Yet the French were about to abandon Acre because of Ahmad Jazzar's tyranny.

⁵¹ Philipp, 'The Rise and Fall of Acre...', 133.

⁵² Panzac, 'Commerce et commerçants...', Table 8, page 85, shows that for the years 1756–72, of the 116 sailings noted between Chios and the Syrian coastal ports, 40.6% arrived from Jaffa and 64.2% departed for Jaffa. For the year 1783 alone, Panzac cites Jaffa as a major trading partner of Damiette. Most of the ships serving these two ports were Ottoman flagged. See Table 11, page 87.

town sufficient protection against both bedouin attacks and the depredations of pirates. In 1753 the French consul in Sidon estimated Jaffa's population at around 5–6,000 inhabitants, but it was severely damaged by Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab's conquest and by 'Ali Bey's later siege. A traveller in 1777 estimated its population at barely 1,000 inhabitants, yet Panzac's figures for Jaffa indicate a continuing trade with Damiette in 1783. Jaffa's importance was not to last long, however, as further damage was done to the city and to its battered population by plague and by Napoleon's attack on the town in 1799.⁵³

Damiette also experienced rapid growth, and startling decline, over the last decades of the eighteenth century. Its location closer to the Syrian coast than Rosette or Alexandria gave it a distinct advantage over these two ports. Unlike Alexandria, which is backed up against the desert and dependent for most of its water supply on a canal from the Nile, Damiette is situated in one of Egypt's richest agricultural areas while the Nile offers a secure water supply. Moreover, Damiette enjoyed a degree of autonomy from the ruling beys in Cairo. Its better climate also made it a pleasant place to reside. Its port, and the connections that merchants had with an extensive range of eastern Mediterranean ports, gave it an international flavour. The names of its residents found in the *sijills* of the Damiette court identify them as coming from such places as Cyprus, Antalya, Latakia, Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli, and other Syrian and Anatolian towns. The population of Damiette was of great geographical diversity.

Damiette's expansion was based largely on the vitality of its trade with the ports along the arc extending from Jaffa to Cyprus. In 1777, a 'Mémoire sur l'Échelle de Damiette' estimated Damiette's population at around 20–30,000 inhabitants and added that Damiette's port was better than that of Alexandria.⁵⁴ Writing after his visit to Egypt that same year, the Abbé de Binos estimated the population of Rosette at 30,000 and that of Damiette also at 30,000.⁵⁵ Both Rosette and Damiette were estimated to be almost twice the size of Alexandria at that time, for Alexandria had fallen on hard times after the bedouin cut the canal bringing the city water from the Nile. Still, Alexandria received

⁵³ Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, 153–55.

⁵⁴ Quai d'Orsay (Paris), CCC, Damiette (sans numéro), 1777–1818, folios 16–39.

⁵⁵ Abbé de Binos, *Voyage par Italie en Egypte au Mont-Liban et en Palestine*, Paris, Year VII, Vol. I, 257; Vol. II, 36.

many more ships and handled a much greater quantity of goods than Rosette and Damiette combined.

Neither Rosette nor Damiette could sustain its growth or defend its autonomy against the extortions of the ruling beys of Cairo. Although we find far more complaints by the European merchants in the French and English archives, it should not be forgotten that the beys were just as demanding of local Christian, Jewish, and Muslim merchants. At the height of his tyranny in 1785, Murad Bey was making so many demands for extraordinary gifts, loans and payments (extortions) against the broad spectrum of merchants operating in the northern provinces under his control that many merchants, even Muslims, were abandoning Egypt.⁵⁶ Antoine Qassis himself became so unsure of his ability to protect his own wealth that, when extorted by another of the beys, he fled to Europe with his fortune in January 1784. Some French trading houses in Egypt were made bankrupt, other French merchants transferred to Alexandria for greater security from Murad's threats, while others tried to leave Cairo but were threatened with violence if they did so. It was Murad's threat of physical violence against the French and the hospice in which the French worshipped, and the subsequent veiled threat by the European powers to deal militarily with him if the Porte did not act to curb his tyranny that finally provoked the Ottomans to send an expedition to Egypt under the command of Ghazi Hasan Pasha in 1786.

Egypt's Mediterranean ports suffered a serious decline between the withdrawal of Ghazi Hasan Pasha in 1787 and Napoleon's expedition of 1798. It was a difficult period during which Egyptians endured almost constant armed conflict among the beys and their incessant demands for greater taxes. A series of plagues, especially the great plague of 1791, in combination with a series of pestilences and famines, left the population battered and worn. These events had a devastating impact on the towns and trade of Egypt.

By 1795 Rosette was reported to be in ruins, having lost half its population. The French observer Olivier noted that the famines of 1784 and 1793, the plague of 1783 (and 1791), and the tyranny of the beys had reduced its population to about 12,000.⁵⁷ Damiette suffered

⁵⁶ See Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Türkei II, 85, letters of 1 October and 9 October 1784.

⁵⁷ G.A. Olivier, *Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, l'Égypte et la Perse*, Paris, 1804, Vol. II, 51.

an even worse fate. It was also in ruins and the lack of attention to its infrastructure had permitted the sea to reclaim some of its planted areas.⁵⁸ The French occupation only made matters worse.

Data collected by the French during their occupation paint a picture of rapid decline. In his *Mémoire sur les finances de l'Égypte*,⁵⁹ Estève reported that between 1786 and 1798 the value of Damiette's imports averaged 10,565,190 *medins* (the Ottoman *para*) and its exports only 982,914 *medins*. Suez, meanwhile, imported goods of 36,842,876 *medins*, or 3½ times as much as Damiette. For 1796–97 he states that Damiette imported goods valued at 14,633,728 *medins* and exported goods valued only at 2,031,456. Then for the year 1797–98, the year of the French invasion, it imported 10,737,488 *medins* of goods but exported (if we are to believe the figure) only 645,232 in goods. Raymond, citing Girard, writes that in 1777 Damiette exported approximately 100,000 *ardabbs* of rice, but that in the period 1791–98 only an average of 28,000 *ardabbs*, of which 8,000 went to France.⁶⁰ These statistics alone paint a picture of continuing decline in Damiette's conditions of trade.

Damiette's degradation was almost complete by the end of the French occupation in 1801. More than a decade of plague, pestilence, famine, tyranny, and war had hit the city and its hinterland extremely hard. A survey taken after the French occupation claimed that Damiette's population was reduced to 1,000 and that 27 villages in its vicinity were in ruins.⁶¹ Once Muhammad 'Ali had established himself in Cairo in 1805 and began the regeneration of the country, he naturally chose Alexandria as the port to be Egypt's window on the Mediterranean world. Damiette would not regain the prominence it had enjoyed in the exchange of goods with the Syrian markets.

⁵⁸ Quai d'Orsay, Correspondance Politique, Mémoires et Documents—Turquie, Vol. 9 (1718–1824), *Mémoire sur l'Égypte* (1795).

⁵⁹ In *Description de l'Égypte, État Moderne* (1882 edition), Vol. 12, 179.

⁶⁰ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, Vol. I, 186.

⁶¹ Stanford J. Shaw (ed.), *Ottoman Egypt in the Age of the French Revolution*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964, 128.

PART THREE

SPACE, URBAN INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIETY IN
OTTOMAN *BILAD AL-SHAM*

THE MAKING OF AN OTTOMAN HARBOUR TOWN: SIDON/SAIDA FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

STEFAN WEBER

The city of Sidon (Arabic: Sayda) underwent a remarkable boom during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which was closely related to the regional and supra-regional history of *Bilad al-Sham* in the same period. But the fourteenth, fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, whose architecture is so visible in cities such as Tripoli or Damascus, did not put a similar stamp on Sidon. The Eastern Mediterranean shares a common history, but its cities do not always share similar patterns of urban development. Why was the fate of Sidon so different from that of Acre or Beirut? Was it based on geopolitical and regional factors, the different waves of external change breaking over the Eastern Mediterranean, or should it be seen in the context of the kinds of power struggle in the regional capitals like Aleppo and Damascus or Cairo and Istanbul? This article elaborates the main principles and steps in the urban development of an Ottoman provincial harbour town and attempts to identify the town's key agents by combining a study of the written records with that of its material culture.¹

¹ The material for this article is based on a study of the city of Sidon (history, urbanism and architecture) for the History Museum of the Debbané Foundation (www.museumSayda.org) in co-operation with the German Orient Institute in Beirut. During 2002–04 a building archaeological survey of the eighteenth century Dar Debbané, which will house the museum, was carried out, accompanied by a study of the city of Sidon (Team: Stefan Weber, Ralph Bodenstein and Beshr al-Barry: Marianne Boqvist joined us during our first seasons). During the 2004–05 seasons Nathalie Chahine, Youssef el-Khoury, Roland Haddad, Fouad Ghousseyn and Lana Shehadeh were working with us. I am especially grateful to Stoyanka Kenderova, Akram al-'Ulabi, Marianne Boqvist and Astrid Meier for their generous help in providing source material and Stefan Knost for opening an important window to Aleppo. A publication detailing the major buildings of Sidon is in preparation and will be published as the second volume of: Stefan Weber and Ralph Bodenstein, *Ottoman Sidon, The Changing Fate of a Mediterranean Port City*, Beirut Texts and Studies 122, Beirut. I am indebted to Astrid Meier, Ralph Bodenstein and Gege Zimmermann for their critical reading of this article.

The area that forms the modern states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel/Palestine once formed an integrated region with multiple urban centres, each with its own distinctive configuration. The major cities of inner Syria, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Jerusalem show many similarities in their heritage, especially in their antique, late-antique and medieval patterns of urban development. On the other hand, the city of Hama, with its more scattered quarters and many open areas, has an urban structure quite different from that of Aleppo or Damascus. With its extreme density of commercial and public buildings, the main *suq* in Aleppo is unparalleled in the region, whereas the commercial district of Damascus was especially highly interspersed with residential buildings until the late nineteenth century. If we move from the cities of the Syrian interior to the coast, the picture becomes more kaleidoscopic. Cities like Acre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, Tartus and Latakia developed quite differently, especially after the Crusades. During the Mamluk period and the four centuries of Ottoman rule, centres of economic and political strength moved repeatedly and left their marks on urban development. The singularity of Tripoli in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, or the shift from Sidon to Acre and then to Beirut as the regional centre and harbour town of southern *Bilad al-Sham* during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, illustrate this well.² There are several different reasons for these shifts on the coast. This case study focuses on social agents, their shaping of, and reaction to, specific temporal and environmental developments, and assesses the impact of these developments on Sidon's urban form.

² The period under discussion, the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, is still a desideratum for the Mediterranean coast of *Bilad al-Sham*. Research on harbour cities of the region has concentrated so far on the late Ottoman period; on Acre: Thomas Philipp, *Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730–1831*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001; on Beirut: Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1983; Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut, The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005 and Eyüp Özveren, *The Making and Unmaking of an Ottoman Port-City: Beirut in the Nineteenth Century*, Ph.D. thesis, Binghamton University, 1990; on Haifa: May Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995; Mahmud Yazbak, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864–1914: a Muslim Town in Transition*, Leiden, Brill, 1998.

Evidence of the architectural heritage of Sidon before the Ottomans

Although the city of Sidon is an ancient foundation with a history dating back to the early Bronze Age, no physical vestiges of the more famous periods of its history from Antiquity to the Middle Ages are visible today,³ largely because they are buried under many layers of more modern urban fabric. The oldest standing structures are the Land Castle (Qal'at al-Mu'izz) and the Sea Castle (St. Louis), both of which date back to the Crusader and Mamluk periods. We fare only slightly better with the surviving buildings from the Mamluk period; after al-Mansur Qala'un captured Latakia in 686/1287⁴ and Tripoli in 688/1289, Acre, the last Crusader bastion, was conquered by Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil in 690/1291. After Acre, many other coastal cities fell into Mamluk hands, including Beirut, Tartus, Tyre and Sidon. For almost two centuries of wars and sieges, the cities in *Bilad al-Sham*, especially those on the coast, suffered extensive damage and needed considerable repairs. In the case of Tripoli, the Mamluks actually re-founded the city in a new location on the foothills some two kilometres from the sea, and established an entire new city around the Great Mosque (Jami' al-Mansur/al-Kabir) that was opened in 693/1293. Tripoli became the seat of the governor (*na'ib*) and was soon the most important coastal city in *Bilad al-Sham*. This followed a pattern characteristic of Mamluk defence strategy. The Mediterranean was the edge of the empire and thus constituted the border where enemy attacks were expected. Therefore, cities on the coast were neglected, or, in the case of Tripoli, relocated, whereas cities in the hinterland, like Safad, became administrative centres. And while Tripoli is filled with small jewels of Mamluk architecture, evidence of Mamluk and other pre-Ottoman building activity is very scanty in Sidon (Fig. 1).⁵

³ Ongoing excavations by the British Museum and the DGA are focusing on the old moat *extra muros* of the Ottoman city. Cf. the reports on the campaigns, among others: Claude Doumet-Serhal, 'Excavating Sidon, 1998–2003', *Archaeology and History in Lebanon* 18, 2003, 2–19 (cf.: http://www.sidonexcavation.org/ht/ht_excavation.html).

⁴ Dates will be given in the Hijra calendar, followed by the Gregorian calendar. If the first is not known to me, it will not be indicated.

⁵ Michael and Victoria Meinecke's comprehensive survey of Mamluk architecture in Syria and Egypt in sources and of standing architecture does not mention any building that was erected under the Mamluks in Sidon. See: Michael Meinecke, *Die mamlukische Architektur in Ägypten und Syrien (648/1250) bis 923/1517*, Glückstadt, J.J. Augustin, 1992. For the Mamluk policy of neglecting the coast as the potential




Fig. 1: Identifiable Mamluk period buildings in Sidon (Weber 2007)

An early Ottoman source, the *tapu defterleri*, can provide us with some insight into what could be Mamluk or early Ottoman architecture, since the latest entry was made in the late sixteenth century. The *defter* of 1002/1593–94 mentions 18 waqfs in Sidon and two towers (*burj*) in the city's vicinity, of which only four are dated. There is also a *tahrir defter* from 990/1583 that gives us an idea of waqf-owned buildings in existence in the late sixteenth century.⁶ Many of these buildings are no longer known and cannot be clearly identified as Mamluk foundations. However, some of the buildings mentioned in these documents still exist, and their architectural characteristics show that they can be dated to the Mamluk period. Examples include the undated Great Mosque (al-ʿUmari) and the Bahri Mosque (Fig. 5/No. 6), which are also mentioned in the *tapu*,⁷ both most probably dating back to the Mamluk period. The main mosque of the city, al-ʿUmari, has a rather complicated building history. The courtyard contains remains of Crusader buildings (most probably a church), while the minaret and portico aisle were added during Ottoman rule (sixteenth/seventeenth century?). The Bahri Mosque has an inscription dating it to 775/1373–74, but this inscription panel is not *in situ* and therefore we cannot be sure of the structure's actual date. However, the building does not fall in line with Ottoman concepts of space, so that it is most likely a structure from the Mamluk period, as the inscription suggests. Another mosque, the Masjid al-Battakh in the quarter al-Dakkakin, is mentioned in the *tapu defterleri* and does not have an Ottoman layout.⁸ As appears in the sources and judging from the material evidence, Sidon was only of minor importance during the Mamluk period. The

frontline see Albrecht Fuess, *Verbranntes Ufer—Auswirkungen mamlukischer Seepolitik auf Beirut und die syro-palästinensische Küste (1250–1517)*, Leiden, Brill, 2001.

⁶ Başbakanlık Arşivi: *Tahrir Defterleri* no. 602, Evkaf Maliye 990 h/1583 (496 p.), in *Şam, Sayda, Kudüs, Halil ül-Rahman, Gazza, Ramla, Safed, Nablus evkaf ve emlakın mufassaldefteri*. See also the *tapu defterleri* 5810111, 5810212, 6020476–86, 6020641, 6020652, 6020677, 6020830, 6020845, 6020846, 6020848, 6020849–52, 6020900. I thank Astrid Meier and Marianne Boqvist for hints and information.

⁷ Cf. Jami' Kabir in Mahallat al-Qal'a, Sayda, Tapu No. 6020484 and Masjid al-Bahr, Sayda, Tapu 6020485.

⁸ Sayda, Tapu No. 6020482. If we only consider construction techniques, one bath (Saba' Banat) and the Maqam al-Shaykh 'Umar al-Jaylali could belong to an earlier period as well. But since local construction techniques from the Mamluk period continued into the Ottoman period and some types of buildings, like *hammams*, mausoleums or houses incorporated new concepts of spatial layout much more slowly, such buildings may also have been constructed in the sixteenth or even seventeenth centuries.

appearance of the old city today, and the remaining mosques, *hammams*, *khans*, *suqs* and houses, suggests that it was more or less rebuilt during Ottoman rule (Fig. 2, Fig. 3).

Sidon after the Ottoman conquest

Much of the spatial configuration of the city of Sidon between the two castles originates from the first two centuries of Ottoman rule, beginning in 1516. The street patterns, with four clearly defined axes from north to south and the smaller west-east axis, show a surprising regularity and could be of antique or late-antique provenance. However, no antique material was found during the survey that would suggest the existence of an ancient grid as a substructure (like in Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem etc.).⁹ Most of the public buildings (mosques, *zawiyas*, *suqs*, *khans* and *hammams*), which were erected during the first hundred and fifty years of Ottoman rule, follow the layout of the streets (Fig. 2). Many of them are located on the edges or corners of the street blocks or *insulae*, and the street layout may follow Ottoman city planning.¹⁰ The commercial district developed in the very north of the city, while a new public and administrative centre appeared around the *saray-square*. The city obviously flourished during the Ottoman period: in the late sixteenth century it had a population of 2,500 to 3,000 inhabitants. This number doubled from 6,000 to 7,000 in the middle of the seventeenth century, while around 9,000 to 11,000 people lived in Sidon a hundred years later.¹¹

⁹ *Insulae* in Seleucid cities, like Latakia, Apamea, Antakya, and in cities like Damascus, Aleppo and Homs measure 96 × 144m and follow the ratio of quoin to long side 2:3 with a module of 48m. If one reconstructs such a grid of streets and *insulae* in Sidon the units are much smaller (about an average of 78 × 93m). For this grid pattern, see Stefan Freyberger, 'Das kaiserzeitliche Damaskus: Schauplatz lokaler Tradition und fremder Einflüsse', *Damaszener Mitteilungen* 11, 1999, 125f.

¹⁰ In some Syrian cities the axiality of the street patterns corresponds to the settlement patterns of later periods. The inner axis of courtyard houses before the late nineteenth century is orientated north-south for climatic reasons as evidenced by the symmetry of the antique *insulae*. For Ottoman street planning in Aleppo and Damascus following regular patterns see André Raymond, *Les Grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane*, Paris, Sindbad, 1985, 217ff. and my *Damascus, Ottoman Modernity and Urban Transformation (1808–1918)*, Proceedings of the Danish Institute in Damascus, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2 vols. 2009.

¹¹ Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane (XVI^e–XVIII^e siècle)*, Beirut, 1982, 352.




Fig. 2: Sidon, buildings between 1516 and 1650 (Weber 2007)



Fig. 3: Sidon, buildings between 1700 and 1750 (Weber 2007)

The reasons for these developments are manifold. As a gateway to southern Syria, Sidon had an important strategic location for political and economic reasons. However, it was some decades before this process really started. After the Ottoman conquest in 1516, *Bilad al-Sham* was initially divided into three provinces (*iyala/iyalat, pashalik*) in 1529: Aleppo (*Halab*), Damascus (*al-Sham*), and Tripoli (*Tarabulus*). The city of Sidon gained political importance for the first time in modern history when Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n II (980/1572–1045/1635), the powerful prince from the Druze mountains and a rebellious official in Ottoman service, made it his base, starting in the 1590s and ending with his exile in Italy in 1020/1611. In 1614, for the first time, Sidon was made the capital of a province containing the *sanjaqs* of Sidon, Beirut and Safad. This was not the case for long however: after Fakhr al-Din's return in 1027/1618, Beirut as well as Dayr al-Qamar and Sidon became centres of his activities. With the issue of a Sultanic *ferman* Sidon was re-made the capital of a fourth *pashalik* of Syria in 1072/1660. Most likely the province of Sidon was created to control the unruly emirs of the Shuf Mountains.¹² Sidon became the second town in southern *Bilad al-Sham* after Damascus and was closely connected to it. As the port city of Damascus and its hinterland, the *wali* of Sidon became dependent on the *wali* of Damascus. Many important families, including the Bizris, the Hammuds and the Sulhs, had branches in both Sidon and Damascus.

However, the newly gained importance of the city did not come as a direct result of its political function: the city's gradual promotion to the status of Ottoman provincial capital did not produce any visible increase in building activities, either in 1614 or in 1660. Furthermore, urban development had begun before Fakhr al-Din made Sidon his residence in 1591. It thus appears that Sidon's re-urbanisation started after the middle of the sixteenth century. It was probably the city's function as a harbour town that was the most likely reason for its reconstruction; after the massive expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the early sixteenth century that also made Sidon part of the Empire, the Eastern Mediterranean turned into an Ottoman 'lake', integrating the adjacent provinces into a huge trading zone. It now served as a platform inside the Empire between Algiers and the Balkans on

¹² Compare Brigitte Marino, 'Les territoires des villes dans la Syrie ottomane (XVI^e–XVIII^e siècle): une esquisse', *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales*, 52, 2000, 263–77.

the one hand and for trade with Europe on the other. Sidon was no longer on the border, but was now in the centre of what would become a nodal point in the newly developing network of trade routes. Sidon's new role as the harbour city of Damascus resulted in major construction works for commercial buildings. The *suq* of Damascus, the capital city of the province of al-Sham, also underwent enormous changes in the course of the second half of the sixteenth century. The investments in the commercial infrastructure of both cities, and in fact—if one takes the impressive new Ottoman *suqs* and *khans* of Aleppo into consideration—of the whole region, were interrelated.¹³

All the *khans*, and, as far as one can judge, all the *suqs*, in Sidon date back to the Ottoman period. They are located close to the harbour (Fig. 4) and underline the importance of the harbour for the commercial life of the city. To mention the most important (Fig. 5): the famous Khan al-Franj (c. 1560, donated in 1574), the Khan al-Ruzz (c. 1600), the Qaysariya (c. 1600), the Khan Dabbagha (c. 1640s/50s, no longer in existence) and the Khan al-Hummus / al-Qishle (1134/1721–22). Integration into the Ottoman Empire and its implications for the Mediterranean as a main conduit for inner Ottoman trade provided the crucial momentum for the city's development.

As with the shifting of political borders, however, while this economic momentum may provide the basis of Sidon's re-urbanisation, it does not explain it completely. Not all harbours along the coast developed according to the same dynamic. Sidon's fate was connected to people who invested in the city for various reasons. Three individuals or families and their donations are of special importance and provide

¹³ On Aleppo in this period see Jean-Claude David, 'Domaines et limites de l'architecture d'empire dans une capitale provinciale, Alep', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 62, 1991, 169–94, and 'Le patrimoine, architectures et espaces, pratiques et comportements. Les souks et les khans d'Alep', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 73–74, 1994, 183–205; Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth, *Aleppo, Historische und geographische Beiträge zur baulichen Gestaltung, zur sozialen Organisation und zur wirtschaftlichen Dynamik einer vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole*, Wiesbaden, Reichert, 1984; Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpugh, *The Image of an Ottoman City: Imperial Architecture and Urban Experience in Aleppo in the sixteenth and seventeenth Centuries*, Leiden, Brill, 2004. For an account of the architecture of Damascus in the sixteenth century see Stefan Weber, 'The Creation of Ottoman Damascus. Architecture and Urban Development of Damascus in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', *ARAM* 9 & 10, 1997–98, 431–70 and Stefan Weber, 'Changing cultural references, Architecture of Damascus in the Ottoman period (1516–1918)', in Attilio Petruccioli, Maurice Cerasi, Adriana Sarro, Stefan Weber, eds., *The Multicultural Urban Fabric*, BTS 102, Beirut, 2007, 189–223. Further references are given in the articles.



Fig. 4: Map of bazaar shops in Sidon 2003 (Weber / al-Barry 2003)



Fig. 5: Location of important endowments up to the early 18th C

the best examples of social agents at trans-regional, regional and local levels and their particular impact on Sidon's urban form.

- I. The trans-regional level: A waqf of the Grand Vezir Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was a key investment by an important politician whose activities resonated across the Empire. It was a major impulse for the development of Sidon in the late sixteenth century.
- II. The regional level: The *waqfiyya* of Küçük Ahmed Pasha dating from the seventeenth century is critically important for understanding the history of Lebanon. After capturing the rebellious Fakhr al-Din Ma'ni in Jazzin 1042/1633, this Damascene governor expropriated several estates and incorporated them into his waqf.
- III. The local level: The third focus is on the history of the Hammud family, who were the most important family in the city during the first half of the eighteenth century, and donated several estates, of which only the *waqfiya* of Mustafa Agha al-Hammud is known.

I. *The khan of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha: a trans-regional investment*

The 'recreation' of Sidon as the harbour for southern Syria was not just a side effect of its new strategic position on the Lebanese coast, but seems to have been an outcome of conscious planning on a grander scale. The city's most impressive new building from that period, the Khan al-Franj, was founded by the prominent Ottoman statesman Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (c. 1505–1579), Grand Vizier from 1565 to 1579.¹⁴ Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was one of the most powerful Mediterranean politicians of the late sixteenth century and one of the best-connected Ottoman dignitaries of his time. Married to Ismihan Sultan (d. 993/1585) the daughter of Sultan Selim II, he played a crucial role in the enthronement of his father-in-law. His *khan* in Sidon is generally wrongly attributed to Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ni (ruled 1000/1591–1042/1633). Its present name Khan al-Franj—'the caravanserai of the Franks'—derives from its long-time occupants: French merchants had settled here and the French consul lived in the *khan*, probably around 1616, before renting a neighbouring house (the Dar al-Musilmani

¹⁴ On Sokollu Mehmed Pasha: Gülrü Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan, Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire*, London, Reaktion, 2005, 40ff.; 331ff.; Gilles Veinstein, 'Sokollu Mehmed Pasha', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*², IX, 706–711.

(Fig. 5/No. 7, Fig. 15–Fig. 17, discussed below), one of the properties of the Ma'n family, and turning it into the French consulate, probably in the late 1630s. The house next door was connected to the *khan*.¹⁵ However, in the court records the large caravanserai is known by the name Khan Ibrahim Khan. There is no building inscription, and the limited decorative elements do not allow a dating of the building by style. Abdel Nour suggests the year 1560 for the *khan* without further references.¹⁶ Recently, Rawwaz suggested the patronage of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha for the *khan*, neglecting however to identify Ibrahim Khan and the connection to a famous waqf in Aleppo—which includes the vast and impressive complex of Khan al-Jumruk in that city—with the Khan al-Franj in Sidon.¹⁷ The founder of this waqf, known as the waqf of Muhammad Pasha ibn Jamal al-Din Sinan, has recently been identified as none other than Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (i.e. Muhammad Pasha), son of Jamal al-Din Sinan, the name his father took on after his conversion to Islam.¹⁸ The family connection is also the key to the former 'official' name of Khan al-Franj, Khan Ibrahim Khan. Ibrahim Khan (d. after 1031/1621–2) was the only surviving son of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's marriage to Ismihan Sultan, and he served as the *mutawalli* of his parents' waqfs. As for the date of construction of the *khan* in question, the *waqfiya* from Aleppo—dated 982/1574 and partly translated and published by al-Ghazzi—explicitly mentions 'a new khan on the shore in the quarter of the sea in Sayda' as part

¹⁵ In the early seventeenth century the Khan al-Jumruk in Aleppo (see below) also became the French consulate, established in Aleppo in 1562. Cf.: Jean-Claude David, 'Le consulat de France à Alep sous Louis XIV. Témoins architecturaux, descriptions par les consuls et les voyageurs', *Res Orientales*, VIII, 1996, 13–24. For an account of the French consuls in *khans* in Tunis see Jacques Revault, *Le fondouk des Français et les consuls de France à Tunis 1660–1860*, Paris, Éditions Recherche sur les civilisations, 1984/5 and for Sidon, Randi Deguilhem, 'Le Khan des Français à Sidon: un waqf ottoman loué par la France', in Daniel Panzac, ed., *Histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman et de la Turquie (1326–1960)*, Leuven, Peeters, 1995, 133–44. For the house of the French consul in Sidon see Stefan Weber, 'An Egyptian *qa'a* in sixteenth ct. Damascus. Representative halls in late Mamluk and early Ottoman residential architecture in Syria and Lebanon', in Kjeld von Folsach, Henrik Thrane, Ingolf Thuesen, eds., *From Handaxe to Khan, Essays presented to Peder Mortensen on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday*, Aarhus, 2004, 272ff.

¹⁶ Cf.: Abdel Nour, *Introduction*, 351; Deguilhem, *Le Khan des Français*, 138.

¹⁷ Muhammad Hasan Hilmi al-Rawwaz, *Ta'rikh Sayda al-Uthmani*, Sidon, 2003, 163f.

¹⁸ See: Stefan Weber, 'An Āghā, a House and the City: the Debbané Museum Project and the Ottoman City of Sayda, first report', *Beiruter Blätter* 10–11, 2002–03, 133f., extensively and more effectively discussed shortly after by Watenpaugh, *Image of an Ottoman City*, 94f., but first suggested by David, 'Le consulat de France', 13.

of the waqf.¹⁹ Thus Khan al-Franj was a new edifice, and not an older purchased building, when it became part of the waqf in 982/1574. The somewhat earlier date of 1560, which Abdel Nour mentions for its construction, needs to be verified. However, it may be possible, given that Sokollu Mehmed Pasha wintered in Aleppo in 1560/61 and knew of the importance of coastal infrastructure as a former *kapudan* (head of the navy).

In addition to his macro-economic policy Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's belief in the importance of infrastructure and trade was expressed by his extensive real estate investments. Veinstein summarizes his building activities as follows:

The most well known, as well as most durable, of his activities were those as builder. The Don-Volga canal and the dream of a Suez Canal... are in one sense the most visionary expressions of this activity.... But he established numerous pious benefactions all across the empire, especially in those regions particularly connected with his life and career: at Sokolovic; in the Banat; at Belgrade, where his *wakf* of 1566 comprised a vast caravanserai, covered market, etc., necessitating the destruction of three churches and some synagogues of the city...; at Edirne and Lüle Burgaz; and as far away as Aleppo and Medina. He was especially concerned with such utilitarian structures as caravanserais and bridges which would facilitate traffic and communications in Rumeli, such as the bridge at Višegrad on the Drina and other lesser known ones, e.g. at Trebinje in Herzegovina.²⁰

The most famous of his buildings was his own and his wife's main mosque in Istanbul (dated 979/1571–72), a masterpiece created by the architect Sinan. However, many of his investments were made to stimulate commerce. Parallel to Sidon was a large investment in Payas (982/1574–75) to build a harbour for the northern part of *Bilad al-Sham* in the vicinity of İskenderun (which at that time was insignificant).²¹ Payas was located on the site of an older settlement that had regained importance as a naval post on the eve of the Cyprus Campaign (1570–71) due to the development of its *iskele* (landing place), an imperial arsenal for the construction of ships, and two castles.²²

¹⁹ Kamil al-Ghazzi, *Nahr al-dhahab*, II, 415ff.

²⁰ Veinstein, *Sokollu*, 709.

²¹ For the complex and the city of Payas, see Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, 355ff. and M. Fatih Müderrisoğlu, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Doğu Akdeniz'deki İskelesi Payas ve Sokollu Mehmed Paşa Külliyesi', in 9. *Milletlerarası Türk Sanatları Kongresi*, Ankara, 1995, II, 513–24.

²² Like Sidon, Payas has one land castle and one castle at the harbour, which is more recent: the latter was built in 1577, whereas the land castle was rebuilt in 1568.

Here, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha founded a large complex comprising a mosque with a convent, a bathhouse, an elementary school, guestrooms with private courts, a caravanserai, a hospice, and public fountains (Fig. 7–Fig. 9). Most merchants landed at Tripoli, which was some distance away, to travel to the commercial centre of Aleppo, the most important centre for international trade in the region. The new facilities in Payas allowed travellers to follow the shortest and most direct pass (the Belen pass near İskenderun) through the Amanus Mountains (Davur Dağları) to Aleppo. Payas became quite a busy harbour town, but despite imperial patronage, this settlement of 800 tax-exempt households never developed into a proper city, for several reasons. It was never of supra-regional importance: it was not the administrative centre of a regional unit, and it did not enjoy the support of local or regional players as Sidon would do later. Another reason for the settlement's failure to acquire the status of a regional centre was the competition from Tripoli and from İskenderun, founded in the 1590s. Several large commercial structures were built in Tripoli during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the old location on the coast was redeveloped as the port (called accordingly al-Mina) of Tripoli. Merchants coming to do business in Tripoli could easily visit Aleppo, Homs and Hama.²³

The complex in Payas is much larger and multifunctional, based on architectural concepts and design from the Ottoman core region by Mimar Sinan, which is not the case for Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's *khan* in Sidon. The Khan al-Franj, the largest and most impressive commercial building in the old city of Sidon, had no buildings adjacent to it, and was not part of a complex. Even if the *khan* is impressive in size, with regard to its layout and décor it is a basic, typical *khan*. Chevalier Laurent D'Arvieux, who lived in Sidon between 1658 and 1665, describes it as follows:

Tout ce khan est bâti de pierres de taille et couvert en terrasse. Le bas en rez-de-chaussée est partagé en magasins grands et commodes, dont les portes donnent sur un vestibule voûté, qui soutient une galerie couverte qui communique à toutes les chambres. Ce vestibule n'était point partagé autrefois, ou s'en servait pour aller à couvert d'un magasin à l'autre. Les Marchands y ont fait des cloisons pour leurs commodités et l'ont ainsi partagé en plusieurs pièces, qui ont augmenté la grandeur de leurs magasins.

²³ For merchants travelling to Tripoli to reach Aleppo, see Hans Ulrich Krafft (1550–1621), ed. K.D. Haszler, *Reisen und Gefangenschaft Hans Ulrich Kraffts*, Stuttgart, 1861; Johann Christoph Tayfel mentions in 1598 that Payas is the port of Aleppo after Tripoli, where most European merchants resided. Cf.: Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 362.



Fig. 6: Khan al-Franj, commissioned by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha
(Weber 2002)




Fig. 7: Payas, complex of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, 982/1574-75
(Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 357)




Fig. 8: Payas, *suq / çarşı*, 982/1574-75 (Weber 2007)




Fig. 9: Payas, *suq / çarşı* and caravanserai, 982/1574-75 (Weber 2007)



Fig. 10: Aleppo, Khan al-Jumruk, 982/1574 (Weber 2007)

Ce khan a une grande porte qui regarde le Nord. Il y en avait une au Sud. Elle est à présent bouchée par un bâtiment que les gouverneurs ont fait devant pour leur servir d'écuries. La face Orientale est percée d'une grande porte qui donne entrée dans une cour presque aussi grande que la première. Elle est accompagnée d'un grand vestibule voûté, plus bas de beaucoup que le rez-de-chaussée, porté sur des colonnes, à cause de la grande largeur de la voûte. Les gens du pays l'appellent Bekké. Il sert à retirer les chameaux et les mulets des Marchands qui viennent en caravane pendant l'hiver.

L'aile du Midi est occupée par un bâtiment qui sert d'Auberge. Il y a une longue table. La plupart des marchands y vont pendre leurs repas et y sont fort bien traités et à un prix raisonnable. Il y reste pourtant encore un petit corridor qui conduit à la chapelle. [...] La première chambre à gauche de l'escalier est couverte en dôme, aussi bien que le cabinet qui est à côté et l'escalier qui conduit à la terrasse. Elle est bien plus grande que les autres et bien plus commode, aussi avait-elle été faite pour le logement du Consul et qui y a demeuré jusqu'à ce qu'il ait fait l'acquisition d'une maison joignant le khan, où il demeure à présent.²⁴

²⁴ Laurent D'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier D'Arvieux*, 6 vols., Paris, 1735, vol. I, 313, 314, 318.

Today, after its restoration by the Hariri Foundation, the building is empty apart from a small café, and awaits a suitable use. Originally it was used to store goods from or to the harbour, to merchandise them and to host travelling merchants. The courtyard provided a vast storage area, as did some of the ground-floor rooms, while the upper floor rooms and apartments would host the guests. The domed chamber described by D'Arvieux still exists today and was probably originally the room for the guard (*khanji*) of the *khan*. However, the part of this urban caravanserai eventually became a French commercial establishment with permanent dwelling units and a chapel. The large stables, adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the *khan* and called *bekké* by D'Arvieux, are unusual for an urban caravanserai and their existence may be explained by the limited extent of the ongoing re-urbanisation process in the 1560s.²⁵

In architectural terms, the *khan* gives no evidence of its imperial patronage. It is constructed according to local techniques and with local materials; unlike the contemporary Bab al-Saray Mosque (see below) it does not exhibit any specifically Ottoman architectural features. Supra-regional patronage does not normally manifest itself in architectural style except when the office of the imperial master architect (*ser mi'maran-i hass*), like Sinan and his assistants, were behind the planning of several buildings. But the *khan* in Sidon belongs to a completely different category from its younger siblings in Payas or the complex in Lüleburgaz (near Edirne: 977/1569–70, Fig. 11), endowed as it was by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and designed by Sinan as an analogous 'urbanisation unit'.²⁶ The differences are clearly visible in size, composition, layout, techniques and execution. But even in this case, construction techniques show evidence of local workshops being in charge, despite the fact that the plans for Payas and Lüleburgaz were drawn up in the capital. Elements of the mosque in Payas, like the steep rising tambour and the portals to the courtyard and prayer hall as well as many other details, follow north Syrian patterns.²⁷ However, the spatial lay-

²⁵ In urban settings caravans unload their goods generally on squares *extra muros* which are then carried by rented mules to the inner-city caravanserais. Beasts of burden are not supposed to be accommodated inside the city. This urban infrastructure was probably not yet in place when Khan al-Franj was built. None of the later *khans* of Sidon have stables.

²⁶ Cf. for this complex between Edirne and Istanbul: Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 348ff.

²⁷ Cf. Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 360. She cites documents for the neighbouring castle, where Aleppine architects and master masons were employed. But along with



Fig. 11: Lüleburgaz, *çarşı*, 977/1569-70 (Weber 2006)

out of the mosque (central hemispheric dome, domed portico) and the adjacent courtyard follow Ottoman principles of space. Also, the spatial arrangement of the shopping street (*arasta*), despite its unusual cross vaulting, and the overall layout of the *khan* and the adjacent buildings, shows a typical Ottoman appearance; the well-planned, multifunctional, city-like complex is the grand work of Sinan's master mind. Reflecting on these complexes with bathhouse, bazaar, caravanserais, schools, outbuildings etc., and the policy of settling families who had been granted tax exemption, the compact plans of Lüleburgaz and Payas symbolise the vision of a supra-regional network of trading cities conceived by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. Khan al-Jumruk (Fig. 10) in Aleppo, which was endowed as part of the same *waqf* as the *khan*

the craftsmanship there was also a degree of local involvement at the level of architectural planning: the unusual layout of the prayer hall with four cross-vaulted *iwans*, giving in the North access to two side rooms, makes it unlikely that this mosque was planned by Sinan. These side rooms are on two floors and recall exactly the layout of side rooms and *iwan* in Aleppine *qa'as*. The overall plan of the mosque just variegates cross-shaped *qa'as*, frequently found in Ottoman upper-strata residential architecture in sixteenth century *Bilad al-Sham*. See below for this room type.

in Sidon, is part of this materialised vision, even though it was not planned by Sinan.²⁸ The Grand Vizier's complex was set in the heart of an already flourishing city.²⁹

The same vision was probably behind the construction of the Khan al-Franj, which had played an important role in the re-urbanisation of Sidon. But Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was not the only patron in the 1560s and the late sixteenth century. A religious dignitary, Shaykh Abu al-Yaman ibn Shaykh al-Islam Abu Ishaq Ibrahim,³⁰ donated a mosque in 968/1561, today called the Bab al-Saray Mosque. It closely followed Ottoman concepts of provincial mosques and for the first time in Sidon, it featured a vast, single chamber, covered by a hemispheric, central dome with low pendentives, a portico (with two reused antique columns) and a minaret with a round shaft (Fig. 18 / No. 5). While the concept was imported, the building techniques and the limited decoration are of local origin. Three decades later we find a very similar mosque, built by Shaykh 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Qutaysh in 1001/1592–93. Building techniques show local hands at work, but Shaykh 'Ali invested large sums to import a very finely decorated *minbar*, *dhikka* and *mihrab* of white marble, as well as several panels of good quality tiles from abroad. These buildings, as well as the small *zawiya* of Abu Nahla (the mausoleum is dated 1008/1599–1600, Fig. 18/ No. 7)³¹ offer evidence of a growing urban population for whom the already existing mosques (Great / 'Umari Mosque, Bahri Mosque and maybe the Battakh Mosque) were not sufficient anymore. Sidon had become a city once more—and the starting point, as far as written records and material evidence show, was provided by the investment of a 'global' agent and thinker: Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.

However, although he stands out as an important patron of buildings and is well remembered for his investments in many places, like

²⁸ The *khan* shows an interesting blend of local decoration (mainly on the portal) and Ottoman layout (cross-shaped *qa'a* first floor and the mosque with its Ottoman central dome covered with lead). See for this *khan* and its architecture with further references: Watenpaugh, *Image of an Ottoman City*, 102ff.

²⁹ The combination with a *suq* (here two *suqs*) and an elaborated dome over the entrance to the *khan* recalls the *arasta* setting as seen in Payas or Lüleburgaz.

³⁰ Name and date are given in the building inscription. The title of his father, Shaykh al-Islam, probably reflects his religious scholarship and not the prestigious position in Istanbul, since no Abu Ishaq Ibrahim held the position in that part of the sixteenth century.

³¹ According to an inscription the *zawiya* was restored in 1153/1740–41 and 1159/1745–46. The vanished fountain was built in 1083/1672–73 by Mustafa Agha Ishaq Mihrdar Pasha and restored in 1161/1747–48 by Muhammad bin 'Ali Uz.

Lüleburgaz and Payas, one has to keep in mind that Sokollu Mehmed Pasha's buildings were part of a larger wave of construction that passed through the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab provinces. This is evident if we consider Sultan Süleyman's and Hasseki Hürrem's activities in Jerusalem and along the Hajj route with the *takiya* in Damascus, the many mosques and commercial structures in other cities in the region initiated by Ottoman officials, as well as the large and impressive *waqfs* in Aleppo and the spacious *khans* of Tripoli. Investments in smaller places like Qunaytra by Lala Mustafa Pasha or Ma'arat Nu'man by Murad Pasha offer further evidence of wider interest in the development of the area in the second half of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. Through the patronage of many high officials in the capital, a renewed network of public buildings, trade routes and commercial hubs developed; the revival of Sidon, started by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, can be included among such developments.

II. Sidon in the early seventeenth century: the *waqfiya* of Küçük Ahmed Pasha and the Ma'n properties

The patronage of the imperial capital, by governors and high officials, has been studied to a certain extent.³² However, we have little information about any of the high-ranking local dignitaries who were to play important roles later in the eighteenth century. How were they investing in urban structures? With the buildings of Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n II, Sidon has preserved the material heritage of an interesting if exceptional regional agent. During his reign Sidon developed into a centre of regional importance, and many buildings were erected. Like his father and grandfather before him, Fakhr al-Din became chief of the Druze Mountains in 1000/1591.³³ The young Druze emir managed to establish good relations with Murad Pasha, governor of Damascus (1001/1593) and later Grand Vizier (1015/1606–1020/1611), who gave him the port of Sidon in 1001/1593. Ruling from Sidon, Fakhr al-Din gradually extended his territory at the expense of the chiefs of

³² In addition to the works of David and Watenpugh, see Amy Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem*, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2002, and Jean-Paul Pascual, *Damas à la fin du XVI^e siècle d'après trois actes de Waqf Ottomans*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1983.

³³ On Fakhr al-Din and his time, see Abd al-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leadership in Syria 1575–1660*, Beirut, 1985, and *Lubnan wa'l-Imara al-Durziya fi'l-'Ahd al-'Uthmani*, Beirut, 2005.

other regions along the Lebanese mountains and coast into the Biqa'. Clashes with the governor of Damascus and the expectation of a punitive campaign from Istanbul forced Fakhr al-Din to seek refuge in Tuscany in 1020/1611, where he established contacts with the Medici, signing a treaty with them for military help in 1017/1608. The 'capital' of the Druze *imara* moved with his brother Yunus to Dayr al-Qamar.³⁴ After his return in 1027/1618, Fakhr al-Din continued his policy of regional expansion, reaching the *sanjaqs* of Nablus and 'Ajlun in the south in the late 1620s, eventually gaining control of large parts of the province of Tripoli in the north to Palmyra in the east. Finally the Ottoman state took firm action and ordered the governor of Damascus, Küçük Ahmed Pasha (d. 1046/1636–37), to march against him. In 1042/1633 Fakhr al-Din's army, led by his son 'Ali, was defeated and his son killed. Fakhr al-Din fled into the caves of Jezzin, where he was captured by the armies of Küçük Ahmed Pasha and brought to Istanbul, to be executed in 1045/1635.

The *waqfiya* of Küçük Ahmed Pasha represents an outstanding document for the history of Sidon, concerning 'all the properties of the offspring of the Ma'n family (*awlad Ma'n*) in Sayda, Sur (Tyre), Baniyas and elsewhere'... in two *waqfs* dated 1044/1634–35 and 1047/1637–38 and '...became property of the *wazir* and his *waqf* by imperial order in late Dhu'l-Hijja 1046 (May 1637).'³⁵ The document is posthumous (Küçük Ahmed Pasha is referred to as *al-marhum*—i.e. the deceased), probably as a confirmation of an older document.³⁶ Küçük Ahmed Pasha had made this endowment for the benefit of Mecca and Medina (*waqf al-haramayn*); it was administered from Damascus, which is why the records of repairs and restorations of the properties of this endowment can be found in the Damascus court records.³⁷ The document opens a unique window into Sidon's history and gives an extensive

³⁴ Giovanni Martini, *Ta'rikh Fakhr al-Din, Amir al-Durzi al-Kabir*, Beirut, 1985, 107.

³⁵ Asad Library, Zahirriyya No. 8518, 14 folios, with notes of a survey of the properties from 1268/1852.

³⁶ Küçük Ahmed Pasha was twice governor of Damascus 1039/1629–30 and 1042/1632–33. Cf.: Muhammad Amin al-Muhibbi, *Khulasat al-Athar fi A'yan al-Qarn al-Hadi 'Ashar*, 4 vols., Beirut, 1970, I, 385ff.

³⁷ For example for the repairs for 16,000 *ghirsh* in 1258/1842 see *Mahakim Dimashq* S374/W228, 92 (1258/1842). The Hammam al-Amir and the mill (*tahuna*) al-Amir, which was outside of the city at the Awwali River, are mentioned: both buildings were part of the *waqf*. In 1309/1892 the buildings from the *waqf* of Küçük Ahmed Pasha were restored by al-Shaykh Mulhim ibn Sa'id Afandi ibn Sa'id al-Din Afandi Hamdan from the Shuf mountains (Bashir village) for 39,000 *ghirsh*. *Mahakim Dimashq* S961/W220, 177 (1309/1892).

view of Fakhr al-Din's patronage, always a matter of much speculation, especially in the course of the mystifications of nation-building.

The properties of the family were many: 69 entries for properties of very different sizes are mentioned, ranging from half a mill to 40 shops (Fig. 12). The real estate includes:

- 34 houses, 4 upper floors (*tabaqa*), 2 vaulted spaces (*qabu*), 1 collective low cost housing (*hawsh*)
- 2 caravanserais (*khan*), 56 shops (*dukkān*), 2 storehouses (*makhzan kabir*), 9 storerooms (*makhzan*), 1 warehouse (*bayka*), 3 selling platforms (*mastaba*)
- 1 *hammam*
- 3 mills (*tahuna*) and parts of five mills, 1 oil mill (*ma'sarat zayt*), 1 roaster (*mahmas*), soap works (*masbana*), 1 bakery (*firn*),
- 1 coffee house

The properties mentioned above were all located in Sidon, but they were only a part of the family's property, and the estates in Dayr al-Qamar (known as the houses of Yunus and Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ni) or Beirut had different destinies. No lands, gardens, waterworks, or ships are mentioned.³⁸ The legal status and patron of each estate before they became waqf is not clear. The houses are named after the family who lived in them, not by the former investor and in many cases one cannot distinguish which member of the family was responsible for their construction. Three persons are of great importance in the *waqfiya*, and many houses and shops appear with their name: Ibn Ma'n (=Fakhr al-Din), his son al-Amir 'Ali and his brother al-Amir Yunus. The description and the location of each building provide details of parts of the city's topography. Through this source, we learn that there was a moat (*khandaq*) protecting the east of the city (see below), and the southern flank of the vanished Bab al-Zaytuna. A defence tower

³⁸ According to two records from Damascus, Küçük Ahmed Pasha gave the order in 1043/1634 to the *daftardar* of the city to sell all properties of Fakhr al-Din and Yunus al-Ma'ni in the 'village' (*qariya*) of Tyre/Sur (a large orchard planted by Fakhr al-Din with mulberries and figs, a large house, three mills and a mulberry nursery) and the house of Mulhim al-Ma'ni in the village of al-Jazira in the Biqa'; *Mahakim Dimashq* S4/W250, 251, pp. 122, 123 (1043/1634). al-Muhibbi reports that Küçük Ahmed Pasha endowed two villages, formerly the property of Fakhr al-Din, in the vicinity of Sidon and Baalbek for his own *takiya* in Qadam, south of Damascus. Other properties became part of the waqf of the Umayyad Mosque. Cf. al-Muhibbi, *Khulasat al-Athar*, 388.

Part of the *waqf*, but not located:

- 18 houses
- 2 vaulted spaces (*qabū*)
- 3 upper floors (*ṭabaqa*)
- 8 mills (*ṭāhūnā*)
- 1 oil mill (*ma'sarat zayf*)
- 1 roaster (*maḥmaṣ*)
- 1 soap works (*maṣbana*)
- 3 selling platforms (*maṣṭaba*)

Mentioned sites (not part of the *waqf*) :

- a) tower (*burj*)
- b) customs (*kumruk*)
- c) Süq al-'Arş
- d) Süq al-Ḥarīr
- e) Khān al-Franj
- f) Süq al-Ḥaddādīn ?
- g) Sāhat Kiwān
- h) court (*maḥkama*)
- i) Qurṭaysh Mosque
- j) Hammām al-Ward
- k) Big Mosque
- l) Bāb al-Zaytūna

Important sites of the *waqf*
(by number of entry) :

- 10 'Imārat Ibn Ma'n
- 11 Dār al-Amīr 'Alī Taḥtā
- 12 Uwwad al-Amīr 'Alī
- 13 Dār al-Amīr 'Alī
- 14 Dār al-Amīr Yūnus
- 15 Khān al-Ruzz
- 16 Khān al-Qaysariyya
- 18 Hammām al-Baḥr
- 29 Maṣbanat al-Baḥr
- 32 Qahwat al-Baḥr
- 38 Dār al-Musilmānī
- 58 Dār al-Amīr 'Alī
- 64 Dār Wālidat al-Amīr 'Alī
- 75 Dār Surūr Āghā Mamlūk ibn Ma'n
- 76 Ḥawsh Ibn Dalāl

- houses (*bayt, dār*)
- vaulted space (*qabū*)
- bathhouse (*ḥammām*)
- caravanserai (*khān*)
- shop (*dukkān*)
- warehouse (*bayka*)
- storeroom (*makhzan*)
- soap factory (*maṣbana*)
- bakery (*fīr*)
- café

Buildings Waqfiyyat
Küçük Aḥmad Pasha




Fig. 12: Sidon, buildings of the Ma'n family according to the *waqfiya* of Küçük Ahmed Pasha 1046 / May 1637 (Weber 2007)



Fig. 13: Khan al-Ruzz, commissioned by the Ma'n family (Weber 2001)

(*burj*) is mentioned as being situated in the north eastern corner of the city. A proper city wall is not indicated. The customs (*kumruk*) of the early seventeenth century were closely situated next to the modern custom house and we learn of the location of the court (*mahkama*) and of Suq al-ʿArs and Suq al-Harir, neither of which exist today.³⁹

Many houses and commercial buildings figure prominently among the endowed edifices. The largest commercial structures consist of two caravanserais adjacent to each other which are still standing today. The larger one, the Khan al-Ruzz or 'Rice Khan' (Fig. 13, Fig. 5 / No. 4), follows the typical pattern of commercial structures and the *waqfiya* enumerates 21 storerooms on the ground floor and 28 rooms on the first floor. The style of the building is very plain and neither its gate nor its interior shows any decoration or building inscription. In contrast to the Khan al-Franj, the rooms on the ground floor are closed and are not accessible through an open gallery. D'Arvieux describes the *khan* around 1660:

³⁹ The tower, which has disappeared completely and the customs are both mentioned by D'Arvieux as being at this location: 'La Douane est sur le bord de la mer à cinquante pas de cette Tour. C'est là que l'on décharge toutes les marchandises, soit qu'elles viennent du pays ou de dehors. Les droits que l'on paye sont réglés par un tarif, qui est assez modéré et c'est en partie ce qui y attire les marchands et le commerce'. *Mémoires*, vol. I, 300.

Le premier [*khan*] est sur le bord de la Mer et voisin de la Douane. Les Égyptiens et les Marchands des pays s'y retirent et même les Français quand ils ne peuvent trouver de place dans le grand khan.

Il y a de grands magasins au rez-de-chaussée, où l'on met le riz et les autres marchandises, et une galerie couverte au-dessus, où sont les portes des chambres. La Cour est assez grande. Il y a une petite mosquée au milieu, où les Mahométans vont faire leurs prières, quand ils ne peuvent pas aller aux autres.⁴⁰

The mosque that D'Arvieux had indicated has been replaced by a modern construction and its *khan* is in a generally bad state. Typical of the modern re-use of *khans* is the presence of a number of small workshops on the ground floor, while the upper floor has been transformed into permanent housing, sheltering 12 families from Sidon and Palestine, the latter being refugees since the middle of the twentieth century.

In addition to its unusual name, Khan al-Qaysariya (Fig. 5 / No. 5) has a remarkable layout. The term *qaysariya* was used in the Mamluk period for urban caravanserais instead of *khan*, but changed its meaning in the Ottoman period, especially in the later centuries, to refer to a commercial building for offices and lodging, often without a courtyard as the main storage space.⁴¹ The Khan al-Qaysariya can be seen as an early step towards the distinction between the two. The *waqfiya* mentions 5 storerooms on the ground floor and 12 rooms on the 1st floor. Much has changed today and several units have been divided up and altered, but two of the very large storerooms are still intact and function as shops. The sizeable spaces on the upper floor allow for quite comfortable living units; here, too, families have been living for several decades and have adapted the space to their needs. The courtyard has been built up and the occupants have changed the building to such an extent that it is not easy to recognise its original structure, which has been conveyed to us by D'Arvieux who lived there for several years:

Le second [*khan*] est le plus petit. Il est joignant les magasins du riz. La porte est sur la grande rue, vis-à-vis une mosquée [al-Bahri]. La cour qui est petite et carrée a quatre magasins et douze chambres au-des-

⁴⁰ D'Arvieux, *Mémoires*, vol. I, 309.

⁴¹ For the slightly different Aleppine context, see Watenpaugh, *Image of an Ottoman City*, 103, note 179. In Damascus the term *qaysariya* was still applied to *khans* in the eighteenth century, for example by Ibn Kannan (d. 1153/1740).

sus, avec une galerie couverte, qui y donne entrée. Les marchands du pays s'y logent, quand il n'est pas occupé par les Francs. C'est le plus joli et le plus commode des trois. J'y avais établi ma demeure, j'avais toute la face qui regarde la mer, et j'avais fait de la défense pour m'y accommoder. J'avais une grande chambre et un cabinet pour moi, une chambre pour mes amis, une autre pour mes domestiques, un balcon sur la Cour, une salle à manger. Une cuisine, et les autres lieux nécessaires à un ménage.

J'étais là fort en repos et très commodément, éloigné du bruit continuel que l'on entend dans les autres khans, où les muletiers logent leurs bêtes dans les cours et crient jour et nuit en chargeant ou déchargeant les marchandises; car la coutume de ces peuples est de ne pas charger une paille sur leurs épaules sans crier à pleine tête. J'étais le maître de mon petit khan, le portier était à ma disposition. Je pouvais régaler mes amis, étudier et travailler sans être interrompu. Deux grands magasins me servaient de serre, de cave et d'écurie; en un mot, j'étais logé aussi bien que je pouvais le souhaiter.⁴²

Lying parallel to its older brother next door, the Khan al-Qaysariya has no building decoration and is constructed of brownish sandstone; the building inscription has been removed. Like Khan al-Franj, the two *khans* of the Ma'ns family were located directly on the shore: these three *khans* were the only large caravanserais in the city around 1600. The *suq* of Sidon developed around them, and one can assume much private entrepreneurship in building shops on the part of merchants who settled in the city. The Ma'ns added much to the commercial centre and the many shops which form part of the *waqfiya* are concentrated in three locations. Several have been documented immediately next to the Khan al-Ruzz in the Suq al-'Ars, and east of the Khan al-Franj in the Suq al-Harir. However, most of the shops (40) were endowed at the same time as the newly constructed *saray* of Fakhr al-Din, and some are still standing today, as integral parts of the western enclosure of the *saray* building (Fig. 14). Yet this extension of the mercantile district south of the Saray Square was not followed up in the succeeding decades (despite the local *suq* of the quarter around Kikhiya and Qutayshiya Mosque). The harbour district continued to develop as the commercial hub of the city during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is still a very popular shopping district (Fig. 4).

⁴² D'Arvieux, *Mémoires*, vol. I, 310f.



Fig. 14: shop at saray, commissioned by Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ni
(Weber 2002)



Fig. 15: Dar al-Maʿni / French Consulate and Khan al-Franj in 1937 (IFPO)

The 34 endowed houses were of quite a different kind and it has not been possible to locate all of them. The houses of Fakhr al-Din, his brother Yunus and his son ʿAli stand out prominently among them (see Fig. 12). The *waqfiya* informs us of the location of the house of a wife of Fakhr al-Din (Walidat al-Amir ʿAli) and of his Mamluk, Surur Agha, as well as of a collective low cost housing complex, the Hawsh Ibn Dalal, featuring 16 rooms and the adjacent houses belonging to Jewish families. Some houses can be identified, among them a house that the *waqfiya* calls Dar al-Musilmani, located to the east of the Khan al-Franj and currently used as premises for a school (Fig. 15, Fig. 18 / No. 3). Chevalier D'Arvieux attributed this building directly to Fakhr al-Din al-Maʿn, arguing that it served for his wives and as his (old) *saray*; perhaps the rooms entered and described by D'Arvieux had been the Dar al-Harim at one time.⁴³ After becoming part of the waqf of Küçük Ahmed Pasha in 1046/1637, the house was rented out to the French consul—the reason for D'Arvieux's visit around 1660. In the early eighteenth century, the French consular records show that this house was administered by the provincial treasury in Damascus and was rented out to the French consuls by Mustafa and ʿAli

⁴³ 'l'Emir Fakherdin l'avait fait bâtir pour y loger les femmes, c'était son sérail. Il y allait prendre l'air car il est bien plus élevé que le grand khan: il a des vues sur la mer, sur une grande partie de la ville et sur la campagne'. D'Arvieux, *Mémoires*, vol. I, 319.

Agha al-Hammud on behalf of the treasury. It was Mustafa who gave permission to do so in 1712 and on later occasions to repair and change the building.⁴⁴

The courtyard of the house is directly attached to the Khan al-Franj with a door leading to the *khan*. On the other three sides of the courtyard the rooms are divided between two floors with an open arcade on the northern side and a grand reception hall (*qa'a*) on the southern side of the upper floor.⁴⁵ The *qa'a* surmounts the entire building; it is not a single room but a whole set of rooms. The hall proper forms a cross with a central dome and a small room in each of the four corners of the cross (Fig. 17). This layout is reminiscent of important Ottoman pavilions, like the Çinili Köşk (877/1473) in Istanbul, which were based on Persian models and became very prominent in the Arab provinces as well. They are known for example in Aleppo, and two other examples in Tripoli from the turn of the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries have recently been identified: on top of the Khan al-ʿAskar and on the Bayt Kastaflis-ʿAdra.⁴⁶ Another domed *qa'a* with two arms (*iwān*)—not four—is featured in the house of Amir ʿAli south of Khan al-Franj (Fig. 18 / No. 4). Here, many decorative elements are still visible, but the compound has undergone great changes; the dome has collapsed and the very high *qa'a* has been subdivided into two floors to provide space for the families occupying the building.

The Saray

The *saray* of Fakhr al-Din stands out among the many houses in the *waqfiya* by its very name 'the edifice Ibn Ma'n' (*imara*, not house, *dar*). It is briefly described as consisting of an *iwān* on the ground floor, a court yard, a fountain, a garden and several rooms and *qa'as*...⁴⁷ Fakhr al-Din had built his *saray* directly south of a large square in the middle of the city, known today as Saray Square (Sahat al-Saray). The city plan drawn up by Gaillardot in 1864 shows a large structure with

⁴⁴ AE/B1/1019, 1712–15, 169. For Mustafa and ʿAli Agha al-Hammud, see below.

⁴⁵ The *waqfiya* mentions an *iwān* and three rooms on the ground floor, one on the shops, the *qa'a* and five rooms on the upper floor. Cf. Waqfiya Küçük Ahmed Pasha, folio 8, right side.

⁴⁶ Cf. on the architectural feature of the *qa'a*: Weber, *Egyptian qa'a*, 268ff.

⁴⁷ 'Imarat dar al-jadida al-ma'rufa bi-'imarat ibn Ma'n', Waqfiya Küçük Ahmed Pasha, 10th entry, folio 4, left side.




Fig. 16: Dar al-Ma'ni / French consul, section *qa'a* (Chahine / Khoury / Weber 2003)




Fig. 17: Dar al-Ma'ni / French consul, plan *qa'a* (Chahine / Khoury / Weber 2003)



Fig. 18: Saray Square, around 1650 (reconstruction Weber 2005)

a courtyard and quite a large inner fountain or water basin, of which only the gate complex, the apartments behind and some shops have survived. At the beginning of the twentieth century one of Sidon's many coffeehouses was built in front of the entrance gate of the *saray*, so that it is not directly visible from the square. The floor on top of the structure was completely rebuilt in the late nineteenth century, when the complex was turned into a school. The previous courtyard of the *saray* serves as the schoolyard, while the garden has been transformed into a playground. The original inscription of the portal on the building entrance has been lost and was replaced in 1225/1809–10 by a secondary one. However, the portal is a fine example of regional architecture, with its striped masonry (*ablaq*) and *muqarnas* consoles as abutments of the arch of the portal niche.

Most of the *saray* has disappeared over time and only descriptions can help us to draw a picture of Fakhr al-Din's palace beyond the entrance. Munir al-Khuri mentions 'a traveller' who visited the city in 1598 and described the *saray* of Fakhr al-Din as being constructed as the seat of the administration (*Dar al-Hukuma*) with a garden of many plants; it was taller than any other building in the city.⁴⁸ But again Laurent D'Arvieux gives us a more detailed impression:

Ce Sérail est vaste et tout bâti de pierres de taille; les appartements du rez-de-chaussée sont tous voûtés, et ceux de dessus sont enrichis de peintures à l'arabesque, avec des fleurs et des passages de l'Alcoran en lettres d'or. Les murs sont épais et bâtis solidement. Les fenêtres sont grandes et grillées de fer. Il est couvert en terrasses, sur lesquelles on peut se promener, et jouir de la vue de la mer et de la campagne. Les escaliers qui conduisent aux terrasses, sont grands, bien éclairés et fort commodes. [...] On y trouve l'escalier de l'appartement du Kiachia, et à quelque distance une autre porte plus grande et plus ornée, qui donne entrée dans une grande cour, dont le milieu est occupé par une pièce d'eau de dix toises de longueur, sur quatre de largeur, sur laquelle il y a un kiosque, ou cabinet fort enrichi de peintures et de dorures, avec des tapis et des carreaux magnifiques. C'est là où le pacha se repose pendant les chaleurs de l'été. Les côtés de la pièce d'eau sont ornés de terrasses, sur lesquelles il y a de gros orangers, des citronniers, et des arbustes, dont l'ombre joint à celui des murailles des bâtiments qui environnent cette cour, et qui sont fort hauts, répand une fraîcheur des plus agréables dans ce lieu...[...] Le jardin est derrière la face du milieu, il a trente toises de largeur, sur quarante à cinquante de longueur. Il est rempli

⁴⁸ Munir al-Khuri, *Sayda 'abra al-Ta'rikh*, Beirut, 1966; 235f.

de fleurs et de toute sorte d'arbres fruitiers, comme orangers, citronniers et autres. Quoique ces arbres soient plantés sans ordre, il ne laisse pas d'avoir de l'agrément. Il y a des kiosques, ou cabinets en plusieurs endroits, avec des fontaines qui servent arroser les plantes. C'est un plaisir de s'y promener le matin avant la chaleur, et le soir quand elle est passée, lorsque ces arbres sont en fleur.⁴⁹

Several houses, many shops, the two *khans*, and the main bathhouse of the city were commissioned next to the *saray*. The Hammam al-Bahr, mentioned in the *waqfiya*, is undoubtedly identical to Hammam al-Mir (Fig. 18 / No. 1), which was destroyed during the Israeli invasion of 1982. The famous Damascene scholar 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, who visited Sidon at the end of the seventeenth century, has left a detailed description. In his report, he mentioned three *hammams* belonging to the city: Hammam al-Suq (Sab' Banat), Hammam al-Shaykh and the Hammam al-Mir. But Hammam al-Mir received special attention due to the fact that it was the most prestigious and important bathhouse of the three. Whereas only the name is given for the others, he goes into details for the Hammam al-Mir:

...it is facing the seaside, it is very large, it has plenty of water and is paved with marble. In the *mushallah* there is a large high fountain of octagonal shape made of white marble. It is composed of 16 rooms and every room is as nearly as large as a *qa'a*. The paving around the fountain consists of four pieces of marble. There is a piece each side [of the fountain] nearly 5 cubits long. Inside this bathhouse are two large fountains which the people call plunge pools (*maghtis*). The water of the first one is hot and the water of the second one cold. The inside of this *hammam* is very spacious and there are many small separate bathrooms (*khalwa*) of which the best one has a smaller and fine marble fountain (*fisqiya*). Its air is good and mild.⁵⁰

Thus a public square with the *saray*, upper class dwellings, *hammam*, mosques, shops and *khans* developed directly south of the harbour in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Many of these buildings were commissioned by the Ma'n family. With his *saray* on

⁴⁹ D'Arvieux, *Mémoires*, vol. I, 303ff. The reconstruction of the *saray* and its square around 1650 (Fig. 18) is based on this description, old maps and the remains of the *saray in situ*.

⁵⁰ 'Abd al-Ghani ibn Isma'il al-Nabulusi (ed. Heribert Busse), *al-Tuhfa al-Nabulusiyya fi l-Rihla al-Tarabulsiya*, Beirut, 1971, 34, my translation. D'Arvieux mentions it as well: 'Il y a un grand bain à étuve assez proche le khan des Français, il est grand, bien bâti, fort propre. On y est bien servi et à fort bon marché.' D'Arvieux, *Mémoires*, vol. I, 303.

the square, Fakhr al-Din followed a new trend that appeared in the region with the arrival of the Ottomans. The layout of this square in Sidon is quite exceptional among the larger cities in *Bilad al-Sham* and the Arab provinces, since the Ottomans normally built a *saray* in connection with a public square on the periphery of the city, as in Damascus or Tripoli.⁵¹ Fakhr al-Din's *saray* in Beirut was situated on the eastern edge of the city, although its location was probably determined by a previous building which the Druze emir had redeveloped.⁵² As for the *saray* in Sidon, not only is the location in the middle of the urban fabric rare, the distribution of the central functional sectors of the entire city is also highly unusual. Often—and the Mamluk city foundation of Tripoli is a good example—the centre of the city was created around a ceremonial mosque, surrounded by schools and a chain of markets. Many other cities followed this model, but Sidon did not: the main mosque of the city was located on the south-western sea shore and quite far from the commercial and administrative centres around the Saray square and the main commercial building directly north of it. Dayr al-Qamar differs as well; the *sarays* (of Yunus, Fakhr al-Din and later of the Shihabs), the main caravanserai, the *suqs* (most of which have disappeared), the church, the synagogue and the mosque are all situated around a square. But the Druze 'capital' is unique in its setting in the Shuf mountains and can hardly be called a real city. Given the 'saray-with-square' module, prominently visible at the old Hippodrome in Istanbul (At Meydanı) with the major mosque (Hagia Sophia) and the palaces of senior politicians—like that of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha—directly on the square,⁵³ we may assume a similar concept at work in Sidon. Sidon, as a city reconstructed from its ruins, allowed the building of a *saray* and square in the middle of the city, and did not require that they be built on the periphery, as was the case in other towns. It seems in Sidon that local and regional factors followed new concepts of urbanism that arrived in *Bilad al-Sham* during Ottoman rule, which would parallel trends in architecture. As seen in the Bab al-Saray Mosque and the Qutayshiya Mosque, late sixteenth and early seventeenth century mosques followed Ottoman concepts of

⁵¹ See for other examples, with the exceptions of Algiers and Aleppo, Raymond, *Grandes villes Arabes*, 170f.

⁵² Michael F. Davie, 'Maps and the Historical Topography of Beirut', *Berytus* 35, 1987, 158ff.

⁵³ On Sokollu Mehmed's palace, see Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 41, 332f.

space and often of decoration—and so do some dwellings, as we have seen in one of Fakhr al-Din's houses (the cross-shaped *qa'a*). The representation of power by means of a *saray* square, *qa'as* and of mosques made use of an Ottoman architectural language adapted to vernacular tastes, materials and techniques. In contrast, the often-claimed Italian influence cannot be confirmed from the many remains from the period still visible in Sidon (and in Dayr al-Qamar).⁵⁴

The administrative centre at the Saray Square and the commercial centre at the port, to which Mulhim bin Yunus ibn Qurqumaz al-Ma'ni (1635–58) added another caravansary, the Khan al-Dabbagha, remained the centre of the city until the very late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵⁵ Taking all the above mentioned buildings of the Ma'n family and the other documented buildings of that time (Fig. 5, Fig. 12, Fig. 18) into account, it becomes clear that the commercial and the administrative centre with its public buildings and prestigious houses dates back to the period of activity of the two major agents in the history of the town: Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and the Amir Fakhr al-Din. After the impetus of a supra-regional player, Sidon developed as the seat of a regional dignitary in the 1590s and in the first half of the seventeenth century. Unlike Payas, it did not suffer a decline in the face of regional competition. This process continued and was accelerated when Sidon became the base of the regional players of the Ma'n family and later an administrative provincial capital. In the early eighteenth century local agents and their role in the previously established urban structure became responsible for the next significant wave of construction. Hence the rise of the Hammud family was closely connected to the commercial life of the city with its *khans* and *suqs*.

III. *Sidon in the eighteenth century: the waqfiya of Mustafa Agha and the Hammud properties*

The eighteenth century, known in Ottoman historiography as the 'Age of the A'yan', is a significant period in the history of the Middle East,

⁵⁴ Nearly every guide book or local history book tries to establish a link to Italian renaissance architecture to claim a specific Lebanese style. This was already questioned some three decades ago by Friedrich Ragette in *Architecture in Lebanon, the Lebanese House during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries*, American University of Beirut, 1974, 177f.

⁵⁵ D'Arvieux, *Mémoires*, vol. I, 326. According to D'Arvieux, the Barrani Mosque (Fig. 5 / No. 1, 2), featuring an Ottoman central dome, domed portico and pencil shaped minaret, was also built by Mulhim.

especially for the city of Sidon. Even though local notables had played and would play an important social role both before and after the eighteenth century, the epithet is not inaccurate. The particular trajectory of the eighteenth century was the rising economic and political power of an urban and rural elite within the Ottoman Empire. In Sidon, the Hammud family served as tax collectors in the course of the first decades of the century, and their increasing wealth and remarkable influence left a strong imprint on the city's appearance. The base of their financial strength was a result of the fiscal reform of 1695, when the right of lifelong tax farming (*malikane*) was legalized in the Empire. Tax collectors were now managing and exploiting tax units (*muqata'a*), lands and customs offices, not on a short-term basis, but for many years into the future. Judging from the material evidence, enormous wealth was being accumulated in the hands of local notable families through this new policy. In many cities the patronage of major construction projects shifted from non-local Ottoman officials to local (or assimilated) social agents and families. Newly acquired wealth was invested in large houses, schools and commercial buildings that indicated the patrons' role in the local context. For rural Lebanon, the date of the fiscal reform denotes a more symbolic value, as various families had already claimed tax farms as their own, even before the legalisation of *malikane*.

As far as the urban context is concerned however, the year 1695 is of considerable importance. In the early eighteenth century a local family gained enormous wealth due to their role as tax farmers of the harbour and as a result, left material evidence on a scale not comparable with any other family originating within the framework of Sidon. The Hammud family seems to have arrived in Sidon sometime during the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Material evidence indicates that one family member, Mustafa Katkhuda, had already held an important position during the first half of the seventeenth century. Furthermore, French consular reports⁵⁶ allow us to get an idea of the patriarch of three generations of the Hammud family between the early eighteenth century and the middle of the eighteenth century, when most of their buildings were constructed.

Mustafa Agha al-Hammud is the first of his family who can be traced in records and through the visual landmarks of his extensive

⁵⁶ Archives Nationales Paris, Affaires Étrangères (henceforth AE) B¹ 1020—years 1712–15 to B¹ 1025, years 1740–41.

building campaign. His name starts to appear in the consular reports when his buildings (see below) were under construction. The French consul refers to him in January 1712 as 'Aggi Mustafa Hamoud, turc de Seyde'—'turc' being in his terminology a word for an official.⁵⁷ Mustafa's role can be easily confused with a namesake, since the consul refers to two different Mustafas: 'Moustapha Aga douanier de Seyde' and 'Moustafa Aga du château de Seyde' or 'Moustafa Aga, gouverneur de la forteresse de Seyde' respectively.⁵⁸ A document of 1129/1717 refers to Mustafa Agha as warden (*dizdar*) of the castle of Sidon.⁵⁹ Hence this must be the Mustafa Agha (ibn Ahmad Agha al-Zafiri), from whom Mustafa Agha (al-Hammud) had bought several estates a few years before the transaction was recorded in his *waqfiya*.⁶⁰ It cannot be definitely established how Mustafa Agha al-Hammud came by his positions, but since his namesake had already assumed the most important military position, this aspect of his background seems to have been less important.

We can follow up on his position as tax farmer (douanier de Seyde)—a position that stayed in the family for the next two generations. In 1132/1720, Muhammad Qadi of Sidon reports that Hajji Mustafa al-Hammud will receive 4,030 *ghurush* and 64,170 *aqche* from French merchants for 730 *qintar* of olive oil, exported from the ports of Acre, Sidon and Beirut.⁶¹ Thus the wealth and the properties

⁵⁷ AE / B¹ 1020—years 1712–15, 43.

⁵⁸ AE / B¹ 1019—years 1712–15, 16, 18, 146.

⁵⁹ Stoyanka Kenderova, *Inventory of the Documents in Arabic Language kept in the Oriental Department of Cyril and Methodius National Library in Sofia*, Sofia, 1984, 117.

⁶⁰ His position as *gouverneur de la forteresse*, gives him a military function and he could have been an Agha of the local Janissaries. On several occasions the French reports mention the Agha of the Janissaries; since it seems clear to them which Agha this is, it may be pointing to Mustafa Agha ibn Ahmad Agha al-Zafiri (for example Archives AE / B¹ 1021—years 1719–25, 29).

⁶¹ Called in the report 'Hammud-zade'. Kenderova, *Inventory*, no. 119. *Zade*, the Persian-Ottoman form of *ibn / banu* (the descendants) is used in Ottoman *Bilad al-Sham* as a social marker for the upper strata, a use that intensified during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It might be understood as denoting noble status (close to aristocracy) and attributing a value to a family through its importance in the system. Another report deals with a very similar matter: The French merchant Gustave, belonging to the French community (*ta'ifa*) in Sidon, bought 35 *qintar* of olive-oil (*zayt*) in Sidon. The tax (*rasm*) for this olive oil butter is 26, 250 *sagh aqche*. According to a sultanic order (*firman*), this amount was to be handed over totally (*taslim bi'l-tamam*) to Hajji Mustafa al-Hammud and his son 'Ali Agha. Bulgarian National Archives: F. 285 A, a.u. 252. *I'lam* by the judge (*qadi*) of the town of Sidon, dated 5 *Jumada II* 1133/3.04.1721. Here Mustafa Agha is called '...fakhr al-amathil

of the Hammud family (discussed in detail further below) seem to be a direct result of the legalisation of *malikane* in 1695. Mustafa's power in the city is clearly visible. He was certainly controlling waqfs, since the consul refers to him as 'Mustafa el-Mouvelly de la ville de Sayda'.⁶² A *mutawalli* is a trustee, mainly of waqfs, although the reference could be to other financial responsibilities. The consul talks about 'Aggi Moustafa, procureur du trésorier de Damas' to whom he paid the rent for the house he was living in—the above-mentioned Dar al-Musilmani from the waqf of Küçük Ahmed Pasha (Fig. 15, Fig. 18 / No. 3). Thus Mustafa Agha, like his son 'Ali later, was the *mutawalli* of this important waqf and maybe of other endowments, administered at the court in Damascus as well.⁶³ He was involved in several affairs relating to real estate. The consul, the *qadi* and the governor were in conflict with each other over building undertakings for which Mustafa had taken money to finance repairs (most probably in his function as *mutawalli*). Mustafa was not on good terms with the French consul Poullard, who called him '...un abominateur, un traître...'⁶⁴

Mustafa must have died shortly after April 1721, the last time that his name appears in the consular reports. From that time onwards we have evidence of 'Ali Agha, Mustafa's son, who inherited the two positions that would subsequently be inherited by his own son Ahmad. He was the tax farmer of Sidon and the trustee of various financial affairs emanating from Damascus (like the *tawliya* of the waqf Küçük Ahmed Pasha). In the endowment deed of his father dated 1127/1715 (see below), he is the only one among his siblings addressed as Agha, and, by then he must already have been of a certain age. 'Ali Agha appears in the French reports quite often. In 1720 the consul mentions that '...notre frère Ally Aga qui est ici présent vous salue',⁶⁵ and in 1727 he speaks of '...Aly Aga le douanier mon très intime ami...' who '...

wa'l-aqran Hajji Mustafa Hammud zade', one of the a'yan of the city. This material has been kindly provided by Stoyanka Kenderova.

⁶² AE / B¹ 1019—years 1712–15, 16, 18, 146.

⁶³ AE / B¹ 1019—years 1712–15, 498.

⁶⁴ According to consul Poullard, Mustafa Agha committed several offences against the Turks and had some unfair dealings with a person named Abdallah. Several cases are mentioned in AE / B¹ 1019—years 1712–15, 16–18: '...un abominateur, un traître dont la calomnie évidente est très connue en faisant l'avanie auprès du gouverneur et est seigneur des avanies contre la nation française et aussi contre les musulmans...est un traître un calomniateur un fripon et un malin à outre mesure dans les traces de l'avanie en caution des dommages à la nation française et aux musulmans.'

⁶⁵ AE / B¹ 1021—years 1719–25, 177, also 204b.

possède presque tout le gouvernement...'⁶⁶ On another occasion in 1731 the consul calls him '...Aly Agha, notre douanier, amy très affectionné de la nation.'⁶⁷ The French consul Lemaire makes explicit mention of his great friendship with 'Ali Agha.⁶⁸

Ali Agha's outstanding importance in the life of the city is often documented in the records. He played a crucial role in everyday affairs, and took over the responsibilities of the governor during his absence—on one occasion he was officially asked by Abdullah Köprülü Pasha to do so until the Pasha's arrival.⁶⁹ After the death of the ex-wali of Sidon, 'Uthman Pasha, in 1139/1726 'Ali Agha was in charge of settling some of the financial affairs concerning his properties.⁷⁰

'Ali Agha was the most influential person in town, especially during governmental transitions. Not surprisingly, the French consul was interested in the local Catholic community, where 'Ali Agha helped him several times by mediating between the consul and the Pasha to support the Catholics and the various missionaries in the region.⁷¹ For instance, one such case was the consul's wish to receive the newly reigning Pasha's permission for baptisms by the Capuchin monks in Beirut, which was only achieved through the mediation of 'Ali Agha.⁷² For the consul himself, 'Ali Agha played a key role. He noted on several occasions in 1729 and 1730 that he had asked 'Ali Agha to protect himself and his interests against the Pasha (governor / *wali*). 'Ali Agha was responsible for arranging audiences with the Pasha, to which he went in person to put in a good word for the consul or gave the latter advice on how to deal with the governor.⁷³ Yet we do not know much more about 'Ali Agha—his date of birth and death remain unrecorded. Since his house (see below) was under construction in 1720 and the

⁶⁶ AE / B¹ 1022—years 1726–30, 49.

⁶⁷ AE / B¹ 1023—years 1731–35, 8b.

⁶⁸ AE / B¹ 1023—years 1731–35, 49b.

⁶⁹ AE / B¹ 1022—years 1726–30, 23b.

⁷⁰ His heritage, described in a register, was confiscated by the state. In March 1727 the outstanding taxes from his *muqata'a* in Sidon and Beirut amounted to 72,108.5 *ghirsh*, half of which were collected by 'Ali Agha directly. The rest was to be collected by the end of that year. Bulgarian National Archive, F. 285 A, a.u. 80, f. 11. *I'lam* by the *qadi* of Sidon, dated 21–29 *Jumada II* 1139/13–21.01.1727 and F. 285 A, a.u. 91. *talkhis* of the Grand Vezir, dated 18 *Rajab* 1139/11.03.1727.

⁷¹ AE / B¹ 1022—years 1726–30, 25a.

⁷² AE / B¹ 1023—years 1731–35, 15a.

⁷³ AE / B¹ 1022—years 1726–30, 163, 168 b, 173 b, 177ff., 184, 192, 279, 342.

French consul refers to '...feu Aly Aga...' in 1738 (see below), he must have been in office from about the late 1710s until around 1735.

In the late 1730s two of the Hammuds found themselves in the same powerful position. Ahmad al-Hammud was the tax farmer of Sidon, while his uncle Yusuf al-Hammud held the same position in Acre. The French consul mentions '...les deux Agha de Seyde et d'Acre, oncle et neveu...' and '...l'Agha de la douane ou par son oncle qui est aussi douanier à Acre...'.⁷⁴ On October 29, 1738, the consul remarks about an estate problem '...présentée à Ahmed Aga fils de feu Aly Aga...',⁷⁵ which indicates that 'Ali Agha's son Ahmad had followed his father's footsteps in office. But the star of the Hammuds had already started to wane. From the very beginning, Ahmad seemed to have had to deal with numerous financial problems judging from the French consular reports, including an apparently unresolved financial transaction.⁷⁶

The consular reports indicate that the Hammuds started to have major financial and legal disputes among themselves as well as being at odds with the governor of Sidon. The French consul states that the pasha wanted to remove the Hammud family from office—due to problems with foreigners and the 'douaniers'.⁷⁷ He complains about the Agha and his uncle in Acre and the way they were collecting money and making great fortunes that allowed them to build 'nice buildings'. Those Aghas, he goes on, were trying to sell the French lands, gardens and houses. These properties must have been part of a waqf, because the consul states that he refused to buy these properties since their revenues were meant to be for Mecca.⁷⁸ He gives a further detailed description of the conflicts between Ahmad al-Hammud Agha and his uncle Yusuf al-Hammud in Acre, which ended in Yusuf al-Hammud being forced to sell all his properties while in prison.⁷⁹ The trouble continued: in the same year (1741) the consul mentions a Hammud Agha from Sidon (most probably Ahmad), who escaped from the Pasha and claimed the Sultan's revenues. With the help of his uncle in Acre, Hammud Agha and his family were arrested. During his

⁷⁴ AE / B¹ 1025—years 1740–41, 127, 193.

⁷⁵ AE / B¹ 1024—years 1736–39, 340.

⁷⁶ AE / B¹ 1025—years 243ff., see for a later case 417f.

⁷⁷ Several letters in AE / B¹ 1025—years 1740–41.

⁷⁸ AE / B¹ 1025—years 1740–41, 127.

⁷⁹ Because of the mediating role played by the French consul, Ahmad Agha had already given his word to the consul that the French could buy these properties—which they did. AE / B¹ 1025—years 1740–41, 193. 30/6–202.

detention, the Agha agreed with the Pasha to sell him a *khan* he had built for the navy, for 40 bourses.⁸⁰

Yusuf was finally sent to Istanbul and the fortunes of the Hammuds seem to have suffered a major setback. Only Ahmad Agha appears to have continued in high office; he remained tax collector for Sidon in 1739 and was later appointed *mutasallim* (deputy governor) of Sidon.⁸¹ For the rest of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, no document or building inscription referring to the Hammuds was found. It seems that with the rise of Dhahir 'Umar (see below) in Acre and the change of the political centre of the province from Sidon to Acre and later to Beirut, the Hammuds lost contact with their previous sources of wealth.

The buildings of the Hammud family

The prominent status of the Hammud family that shines through the records is clearly reflected in the city's physical appearance, especially in the eastern part of the city, where they commissioned many buildings; nearly all these buildings date from the early eighteenth century, and there are only two constructions from an earlier period. We have evidence that al-Shaykh Mustafa Katkhuda, who had commissioned the spacious Kikhiya Mosque in 1044/1634–35 (Fig. 18 / No. 8), had endowed the Khan al-Yahud and a soap factory to the waqf of his mosque.

Two buildings can be attributed to Mustafa Agha al-Hammud. Building inscriptions identify him as the patron of the Hammam al-Jadid and of the annex to the Bahri Mosque, both dated 1126/1713–14. Two inscriptions in the Bahri Mosque mention him, the first as being

⁸⁰ AE / B¹ 1023—years 1731–35, 428. 6 fév. 1741.

⁸¹ AE / B¹ 1024—years 1736–39, 507, and Bulgarian National Archive, F. 285 A, a.u. 257. *I'am* by the substitute judge (*muwalla hilafatan*) of the town of Sidon, dated 1–10 *Ramadan* 1177/4–14.03.1764. See also F. 285 A, a. u. 270. Summary (*khulasa*) of document sent by the *mutasallim* of Sidon, Ahmad Hammud Agha. A document in the Tripoli court records from 1166/1753 mentions Ahmad Agha ibn Ali Agha in connection with the delivery of the outstanding taxes of Sidon (9318 *ghirsh*) to the governor of Tripoli Sa'd al-Din Pasha al-'Azm. Ahmad Agha's son Hasan Agha together with 'Abd al-Qadir Agha Qutaysh and his son Salih Agha were imprisoned in the citadel of Tripoli until the sum was delivered. *Sijillat Mahakim Shar'iya bi-Tarablus* No. 13, page 203, year 1166/1753. The numbering refers to the copies available in the municipal documentation office (Qasr al-Nawfal).

responsible for the enlargement of the Bahri Mosque, while the second appears at the new gate installed by his descendants in 1329/1910–1911, referring to repairs of the building carried out with funds from the endowment of Mustafa Agha. The endowment deed of Hammam al-Jadid was completed only one year after the construction of the mosque in 1127/1715. Mustafa Agha probably made his investments at an early stage in his career (he is mentioned in the French consular records between 1712 and 1720). Thus he must have been responsible for at least two waqfs, as the *waqfiya* for his *hammam* does not record the Bahri Mosque.⁸² According to the *waqfiya*, ‘al-Hajj Mustafa Jalabi, the son of the late al-Hajj Mustafa known as Hammuda-zada’, endowed the following properties:

- Half a garden with various fruit trees next to the bridge of Nahr al-Awwali.
- An entire garden with various fruit trees along the irrigation channel, which he had bought from Mustafa Agha ibn Ahmad Agha al-Zafiri, who was by then the *dizdar* of the citadel of Sidon.
- Half a garden with various fruit trees along the irrigation channel, which bordered another garden of Mustafa Agha al-Hammud, known by the name Bustan Bani Hammud, on the south side.
- Three large store rooms (*makhzan*) near the sea, which were constructed from stone and mortar and covered with wooden beams. Mustafa Agha al-Hammud had bought these shops from the above mentioned Mustafa Agha al-Zafiri.
- Three rooms, built from stone and mortar, covered with wooden beams, which were attached to the back of al-Mallaha (salina?) by Mustafa Agha al-Hammud. The ground floor of the three rooms was rented from the waqf of Küçük Ahmed Pasha.⁸³
- Two rooms, built from stone and mortar, covered with wooden beams, which were constructed on top of the large storeroom (*makhzan*) of the waqf of Küçük Ahmed Pasha. After completion the rooms were rented.

⁸² *waqfiyat* al-Hajj Mustafa Hammud, uncatalogued record, *Mahfuzhat Dairat al-Awqaf al-Islamiya fi Sayda*, 1 folio.

⁸³ It was quite common that the building plot did not belong to the owner of the building, but was rented from another owner, in many cases from a *waqf* to which this land belonged.



Fig. 19: Bab al-Saray, commissioned by Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ni (Weber 2002)

- A *hammam* located close to the soap factory (*masbana*) of the waqf of Mustafa Katkhuda and the Zawiya al-Mushbasiya.

The *hammam*, known today as Hammam al-Jadid, was one of the earliest buildings to be built on the far eastern edge of the city (Fig. 20 / No. 4), where the walls must once have been, located directly on the former moat. Recent excavations have uncovered parts of the moat, but the city walls have totally disappeared. The moat is mentioned in several sources and seems to have been turned into gardens, which were gradually built over.⁸⁴ According to the endowment deed, Mustafa Agha had bought a garden there which was then incorporated into the waqf.⁸⁵ The information from the sources and the Gaillardot plan of 1864 indicate that Hammam al-Jadid formed the eastern border of the city until the late nineteenth century. The main traffic route along the Lebanese coast bypassed the city of Sidon on its eastern edge. Everybody travelling by this route would pass by and spot the 'new' (*jadid*) bathhouse on the city's skyline. The visual quality of its location is also enhanced on the western side of the *hammam*, as it is situated on one of the most important intersections of the city. Today, however, it is quite difficult to spot the building, as many houses have been constructed on top of it. The *waqfiya* provides a glimpse of the baths in eighteenth century Sidon (Fig. 22):

The *hammam*, built by the *waqif* [e.g. Mustafa Agha al-Hammud], includes four sections (*buyut*): the *mushallah*, the outer part (*barrani*), the intermediate part (*wustani*) and the inner part (*juwwani*). The *mushallah* has four *iwans* and a fountain of white marble. This is followed by a corridor (*dihliz*) which has a small fountain (*fisqiya*) of white marble and a rostrum which is covered by coloured marble, and a cold water

⁸⁴ The *waqfiya* of the waqf Bir al-Khandaq mentions in 990/1584 the moat of the city (*khandaq*) and a gate. Başbakanlık Nr. 602: Evkaf Maliye, *Şam, Sayda, Kudüs Halil ül-Rahman, Gazza, Ramla, Safed, Nablus evkaf ve emlakın mufassaldefteri*, 142. Also other sources and maps mention the *khandaq* and gates. The Mutraniya street, which runs outside the eastern border of the city, is in 1319/1901 still called Shari' al-Khandaq. *Mahakim Sayda, Sijill* 29, p. 78f.

⁸⁵ The eastern border of the bath is given in the *waqfiya* as '...a garden, which was bought by Mustafa Agha and belongs to the *hammam*...' A court record from the year 1288/1871 mentions a garden of the Hammud family eastwards to the bath. *Sijill* 14, p. 70 (1288/1871). Cf. for the neighbourhood of the *hammam* as well: *Sijill* 6, p. 37 (1264/1847). This is most probably the same one mentioned as a garden of waqf Bani Hammud in another record, *Sijill* 21 (1316/1898). Also compare *Sijill* 29, p. 138 (1319/1901) mentioning the waqf Bani Hammud in the quarter called the city moat (*khandaq*).



Fig. 20: Map of the distribution of property by the Hammud family in the 17th and early 18th century




Fig. 21: Hammam al-Jadid, *mushallah* (Khoury 2003)




Fig. 22: Hammam al-Jadid, plan (UNESCO 2003)



Fig. 23: Dar 'Ali Agha al-Hammud / Debbané (1134/1721–22)



Fig. 24: Khan al-Hummus / al-Qishla (1134/1721–22), sea castle in the background

pool (*hawd*). From here one reaches the *wustani*. The *wustani* has a hot water basin (*jurn*) and a chamber (*khalwa*) with a hot water basin. From here one reaches the *iwan* with two hot water basins, and two chambers with two hot water basins each. And from there one reaches the *juwwani*, which is also the place where the water is heated (*bayt al-nar*). The *juwwani* includes a chamber with a hot water basin (*jurn*), a hot water pool (*hawd*), and five bowls of hot water. There are two basins for the collection of hot water with large copper bowls and the hearth (*qimim*). All the *hammam* are fitted with coloured marble.⁸⁶

The Hammam al-Jadid is slightly larger than the Hammam al-Mir of Fakhr al-Din and the *mushallah* in particular displays its grandeur (Fig. 21), making it an attractive rival for the other bathhouses of the city. The money generated was—according to the *waqfiya* a family endowment (*waqf dhirri / ahli*)—to be distributed among Mustafa's children 'Ali Agha, Sulayman Jalabi, Yusuf and their sisters Hawad, Fakhira,

⁸⁶ I have translated *jurn* as basin and *hawd* as pool. The basin serves for the collection of water to fill the bowls used for bathing. A *hawd* served similar purposes and was not the kind of plunge pool found in large bathhouses in Bursa and Istanbul.

Khadija, and Rabi'a. But the endower had included a general charity request among the stipulations (*shurut al-waqf*). Every Friday, five *ratl* (1 *ratl* = 3.202 kg) bread of wheat flour (regardless of the price) had to be distributed among the poor of the Muslim community from the income of the *hammam*. This *shart* is also repeated in the inscription above the door—the only one in Sidon that gives details of a waqf.⁸⁷ Today, the old entrance is blocked by a shop and the inscription is in a very bad state, but in the period of its construction, Mustafa's charity was clearly displayed in a public place. The *hammam* is the most prestigious of Mustafa's properties and it began the development of the eastern edge of the city which was continued by his son.

ʿAli Agha was the most active patron of the Hammud family. He commissioned two of the largest and most beautiful houses of the city (the present-day Dar Debbané⁸⁸ and the building known as Madrasat al-ʿA'isha), the Khan al-Hummus (al-Qishla/al-Ishle), and the Hammam al-Ward in two waves of construction activities; the first in 1134/1721–22 and the second in 1143/1730–31 (cf. Fig. 20). He had built his first house (Dar Debbané) and the nearby Khan al-Hummus at the very beginning of his career as tax collector, while the second house and the Hammam al-Ward were built shortly before his death. ʿAli Agha certainly owned several gardens and shops as well, and we believe that the *suq* that runs from underneath his first house to the Khan al-Hummus must have been at least partly his property, although there are unfortunately no records pertaining to it.

Khan al-Hummus (Fig. 5 / No. 3, Fig. 24, Fig. 25) is a typical commercial structure, characterised by a central courtyard and a simple row of rooms for storage and habitation on all four sides. It was built in the north-eastern part of the city in the direct vicinity of the city gate Bawwabat al-Tahta, possibly but not necessarily as part of a larger waqf. Its modern name, al-Qishla (al-Ishle), goes back to a change of function, most likely in the nineteenth century, when it was turned into an army barracks. The inscription of the building is prominently

⁸⁷ Like the *waqfiya* the second line of the inscription mentions that every Friday—for now and forever—five *ratl* of bread should be given (to the poor).

⁸⁸ During the nineteenth century this house became the property of the Debbané family and was remodelled several times. The most important changes were made in 1902 and in the 1920s, when several rooms were added, the courtyard was converted into a splendid hall and the overall appearance was redesigned in the Neo Oriental/Art Nouveau style fashionable at the time. The Debbané Foundation has turned the house into a museum whose concept and contents have been developed by Ralph Bodenstein and myself.




Fig. 25: Dar 'Ali Agha al-Hammud / Khan al-Hummus / al-Qishla, reconstruction 1134/1721–22 (Bodenstein, Chahine, Weber 2007)



Fig. 26: Dar 'Ali Agha al-Hammud / Debbané / Madrasat 'Aisha (Chahine, Ghousayn, Haddad, El Khoury 2003)

positioned above the gate. It states that the patron, ‘Ali, scion of the Hammud family, had built a *khan* in the middle of Sayda.’ His self-confidence is displayed on the richly decorated gate (the most elaborate one in the city), which prominently features two lions with neck chains as a relief decoration—a symbol of power often used in the regional context, mainly to decorate the entrance gates of the houses of the lords of the mountains. His pride is also expressed through two houses located on top of the *suq* of Sidon, both of which redefine the eastern borders of the city (Fig. 27). The first house was exceptional in Sidon for its richness and style, displaying ‘Ali Agha’s taste with an imported interior design and layout of reception halls from Damascus. The second house even exceeded it in splendour.⁸⁹ It was slightly altered in the eighteenth century (the open *iwan* was changed into a closed room) but remained very similar to its original layout.⁹⁰

The decoration and plan of his houses expresses ‘Ali Agha’s desire to distinguish himself by employing a distinctive taste representative of the upper strata of society. He turned to Damascus as the geographically closest regional centre and was inspired by the many urban palaces there. But style is not a question of decoration only; ‘Ali applied also other elements of prestigious forms of dwelling. Besides needing plots of land for his large houses, their location on the edge of the city between the densely built-up area and the gardens reflects two further considerations. The main rooms (*qa’a*) of both houses of ‘Ali Agha faced eastwards towards the gardens (not, as it would be typical, towards the north of the courtyard). Comparing other palaces of the eighteenth century, for example the ‘Azm Palace in Hama or that of Yusuf al-Shihabi in Dayr al-Qamar, one can observe a direct link between the main reception room and the outside space (gardens).

⁸⁹ For a discussion of this house: Weber, *House and the City*, and Stefan Weber and Ralph Bodenstein, ‘A House and the City, The Debbané Palace and the Ottoman City of Sayda’, *Archaeology & History in the Lebanon* 20, 2004, 66–74.

⁹⁰ Like nearly all of the buildings presented here, its dates and patronage were not or wrongly attributed so far. The identification of the house as Dar ‘Ali Agha al-Hammud comes from the inscription on the wall above the entrance of the *qa’a*, which is dated 1143/1730–31. It must have served as the seat of the local administration in the nineteenth century, since it is mentioned in the court records of 1871 as a *Saray* and in 1901 as *Dar al-Hukuma al-Qadima*. *Sijill* 14, p. 70 (1288/1871), *Sijill* 29, p. 78f. (1319/1901).

The direct link to nature and gardens, with their fresh smell (especially during orange blossom time), verdant green, and singing birds, seems to have been a major objective in the arrangement of a well-designed living space. Spatial layout and positioning close to nature formed a crucial element of a very complex system of elite dwellings. Good taste was expressed in several ways. For example, guests sat in the ornate *qa'a* and had coffee while reciting poetry, and enjoyed views of the orchards of Sidon. The shift towards the very edge of the city provided a wonderful view and at the same time avoided being overlooked by outsiders. Given the fact that 'Ali Agha, like his father Mustafa Agha, was the most powerful person in the city after the governor, we can easily imagine how passing travellers, or those who came from the orchards and entered the city from the northern or the southern gates, would be able to look up and see the reception rooms of the Agha standing out proudly from the body of the city. The houses of 'Ali Agha were highly prestigious works of architecture designed as visual confirmation of his important position in the city, a fact which determined the choice of their location and layout.

Another house, which serves today as the Resthouse Restaurant, also originally belonged to the Hammud family. Court records from the nineteenth century prove that this house belonged to a certain Yusuf Agha al-Hammud.⁹¹ It is a typical courtyard house from the early eighteenth century, but its present location is not the original one. Originally, the house was built in the upper Shari' quarter in the old city of Sidon (cadastral number 335-1, Fig. 20 / No. 11).⁹² For our discussion it is important to realize that in the eighteenth century this house with its domed *qa'a* formed—like the other Hammud houses, the Khan al-Hummus and the Hammam al-Jadid—an integral part of the city's eastern border. Architectural studies of all the buildings in question have shown that the early-eighteenth century building phase is indeed the oldest one. None of the edifices integrated any kind of older structure; they were all new constructions, built during

⁹¹ *Sijill* 5, p. 14 (1260/1844); p. 41 (1260/1844); *Sijill* 6, p. 65 (1264/1848); *Sijill* 10, p. 60f. (1275/1858); *Sijill* 17, p. 138 (1282/1865).

⁹² The house sheltered a missionary school for a long time (École des Sœurs de St Joseph). It was moved to its present location in the 1950s or early 1960s. The reason for its relocation was probably the excavation planned by the archaeological department in the moat of the old city, which started after the destruction of the neighbouring American school (Gerard Institute) between 1961 and 1963.

a period of reshaping the city's eastern edge.⁹³ Once more, individual agency—imbedded and enabled through the specific circumstances of the age—led to a new boom in the city's development.

Conclusion

Sidon, along with Tripoli, was the most important harbour town of Ottoman *Bilad al-Sham* during the sixteenth, seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries. Its decline began in the late eighteenth century and was probably connected with the waning stars of Ahmad and Yusuf al-Hammud and the rise of a new regional centre. Dhahir al-'Umar (d. 1775), who rose to regional power from the late 1740s in Acre, shifted the centre of the province from Sidon to Acre in the 1770s and took over the city in 1771. Under Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (1775–1804) this change became irreversible. His successors, Sulayman Pasha and 'Abdullah Pasha, were also based in Acre until the rise of Beirut, which began in the 1820s and especially in the 1830s under the Egyptian interregnum of Ibrahim Pasha (1831–1840).⁹⁴ Like his father had done in Egypt, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha (1805–1849) began in *Bilad al-Sham* with a broad program of reforms. Modern times became more present in the region. In the 1830s the first steamboats arrived in Beirut and foreign trade with Europe—and the cultural exchange which this involved—was greatly

⁹³ In a number of recent short publications, May Davie suggests the existence of an older medieval tower inside the Hammud / Debbané house. However, this claim seems untenable and is one of many shortcomings in her study. Archaeological research, available source material and the logic of the building clearly demonstrate the eighteenth century origin of this structure. The somewhat medieval-looking crenellated towers on the northern and southern sides are additions of the early twentieth century. Also the '*burj*' mentioned in the building inscription (third frame, lower middle cartouche reads: '*najma al-sa'ada halla fi burj'aliy*') is in the context of the inscription to be interpreted as a zodiac sign and the verse can be loosely translated as 'the star of his Excellency is at its zenith'. Davie has published much the same article several times, see for example: May Davie, 'Le Bourj 'Ali: D'une tour de garde à un palais damascène turquisant de Saïda du XVIII^e siècle', *Archaeology & History in Lebanon*, no. 18, 2003, 129–37.

⁹⁴ For the rise and decline of Acre see Philipp, *Acre*, 30ff., 78ff. and Thomas Philipp, 'The Empire and Europe in Arab Provincial Capitals: Acre, the First Instance of Changing Times', in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber (eds.), *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*. BTS 88, Beirut, 2002, 77–92. On Beirut, see Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants*, 28ff., 61ff. and especially Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 29ff.

intensified.⁹⁵ When Beirut opened a quarantine station, conservative forces in Sidon refused to follow and the new maritime trade bypassed the city, with the result that the European governments transferred their consulates to Beirut during the 1820s and 30s. There are many possible reasons why the city was not a part of the developments of the nineteenth century. As a cause or consequence, after the Hammuds' fall from power, Sidon failed to attract or to produce individuals or families that were able to understand or adapt to the changing climate of Mediterranean trade and thereby make Sidon relevant. Unlike other cities of the region (such as Beirut, Damascus, Tripoli) there was no considerable building activity in Sidon during the Tanzimat period. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century were developments taken up and the city finally awoke from its hibernation.

Judging from the material and archival evidence, Sidon flourished between the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. From a historiographical perspective, the city matches the model of Ottoman periodisation for this period quite well. The classical rule of the Empire during the sixteenth century saw a large commercial-infrastructure investment in Sidon from the capital, based on the vision of an extraordinary personality, re-integrating it into a supra-regional network of trade. This mirrored a construction policy from the capital for the newly conquered areas and an interest in the development of the region. Thus, actions by single personalities were embedded in a wider phenomenon. Nevertheless, one place was favoured over another as a result of personal preference, and this personal choice probably provided the jump start for Sidon's re-urbanisation. As seen with Payas, personal vision, interest and engagement, geographical setting and regional developments are not enough to decide the fate of a place. Sidon had developed a momentum, leading—if we can judge from the surviving architecture—to the settlement of a new population that built places for dwelling, commerce and worship. As a power base of local rule under the Ma'ns it became the platform for a regionally ambitious policy, which took shape in a

⁹⁵ The British were the first to set up steam navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean from 1835 onwards. The link between Beirut and Alexandria—and from there to Liverpool—became faster and more regular. The French and Austrians followed soon afterwards. By 1841, 76 steamships served the Mediterranean. Cf.: Dominique Chevallier, *La société du mont Liban à l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe*, Paris, Geuthner, 1971, 183.

number of new constructions in the city. The momentum allowed for Sidon's version of the age of *a'yan*, when local notables were the main forces of urban economy and politics during the eighteenth century. With regard to urban politics, economy and urbanism, Sidon was controlled by its most influential *a'yan* family.

The city's development was based on maritime trade, its geographical setting, new political entities and perhaps above all on the activities of distinctive social agents: Sokollu Mehmed Pasha in the sixteenth, the Ma'ns in the seventeenth and finally the Hammuds in the eighteenth centuries. All these agents used and formed urban space according to their framework of action. The scale of the framework under discussion here changed from supra-regional to regional and local levels, often closely intertwined and materialised in the neighbourhoods of the city. In particular, the houses and commercial buildings of some residents reflect their strategy of using space on different layers (from the urban quarter to the Mediterranean) and acting on the various spaces according to the currents and borders of geography and time. Regional change and personal social experience came together in the parlours of Fakhr al-Din and 'Ali Agha al-Hammud, places which can still be visited today.

LES CONSTRUCTIONS D'ISMA'IL PACHA AL-'AZM À DAMAS (1137–1143/1725–1730)

BRIGITTE MARINO

Introduction

Dès la conquête ottomane de la Syrie, en 1516, Damas connaît d'importantes transformations. Plusieurs constructions monumentales sont édifiées, d'abord par les sultans Salim et Sulayman qui dotent la ville de deux grandes mosquées, puis par les différents gouverneurs ottomans qui entreprennent divers travaux d'aménagement aussi bien à l'extérieur des remparts que dans la ville intra-muros.

Parmi les constructions les plus importantes réalisées à cette époque, signalons celles d'Ahmad Shamsi Pacha (958–962/1551–1555) qui, dans la ville *intra-muros*, édifie, au sud de la citadelle, un complexe religieux (mosquée, *madrasa*, *khanqa*, *takiyya*) et un *suq*, le Suq al-Sibahiyya/Suq al-Arwam, ainsi qu'un *khan*, le Khan al-Jukhiyya, dans le Suq al-Khayyatin. Lala Mustafa Pacha (971–975/1563–1567) construit quant à lui une mosquée et un *khan* au nord de la citadelle. Trois importantes mosquées sont ensuite édifiées à l'extérieur des remparts, sur la route du pèlerinage : la Mosquée de Murad Pacha (nommé en 976/1568), la Mosquée de Darwish Pacha (979–982/1571–1574) et la Mosquée de Sinan Pacha (m. 1004/1596). Deux *khan*, un *suq* et un *hammam* sont par ailleurs bâtis dans la ville *intra-muros*, au sud de la Mosquée des Omeyyades : Darwish Pacha (979–982/1571–1574) y construit le Khan al-Harir et le Hammam Qishani, et Murad Pacha (nommé en 1002/1593–1594, m. 1020/1611) un *suq* et un *khan*.¹

¹ Sur cette question, cf. Jean-Paul Pascual, *Damas à la fin du XVI^e siècle d'après trois actes de waqf ottomans*, Damas, IFÉAD, 1983; Stefan Weber, 'The Creation of Ottoman Damascus: Architecture and Urban Development of Damascus in the 16th and 17th Centuries', *ARAM* 9–10, 1997–98; Çiğdem Kafescioğlu, '“In the Image of Rum” : Ottoman Architectural Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Aleppo and Damascus', *Muqarnas* 16, 1999, 70–96 ; Marianne Boqvist, *Architecture et développement urbain à Damas de la conquête ottomane (922 h./1516–17) à la fondation du waqf de Murad Pacha (1017 h./1607–08)*, thèse de doctorat, Université Paris-IV Sorbonne, Paris, 2005.

Au XVI^e siècle, le secteur situé au sud de la Mosquée des Omeyyades connaît donc de profondes transformations, avec la construction de trois *khan* et d'un *hammam*. On connaît peu de choses sur l'évolution de ce secteur de Damas au XVII^e siècle ;² si l'on en juge par l'abondance des terrains en friche et les nombreux biens qui, au début du XVIII^e siècle, sont en ruine, il semble avoir été négligé pendant de nombreuses années. D'importants travaux y seront à nouveau entrepris au XVIII^e siècle par Isma'il Pacha al-'Azm, puis ses successeurs : d'abord son frère Sulayman Pacha, puis son fils As'ad Pacha.³

Isma'il Pacha est le premier gouverneur de la famille 'Azm à Damas ; après avoir été gouverneur de Ma'rra, Hama et Tripoli dans le premier quart du XVIII^e siècle, il y prend ses fonctions le 23 *jumada II* 1137/ mars 1725 et les conservera jusqu'à la première moitié de *jumada I* 1143/novembre 1730. Isma'il Pacha est surtout connu pour ses activités dans la commercialisation des moutons—qu'il possède en grande quantité sur les terres dont il dispose dans la région de Hama—et pour l'oppression qu'il exerce sur les populations des villages situés à proximité de Damas, mais aussi de Jérusalem.⁴ Nous nous intéresserons ici aux nombreuses constructions qu'il a édifiées à Damas en nous fondant essentiellement sur les actes juridiques consignés dans les registres de divers tribunaux de la ville.

Comme le signalent trois auteurs du XVIII^e siècle, Mustafa Tarazi, Muhammad Ibn Kannan et Mikha'il Brayk, les opérations urbaines entreprises par Isma'il Pacha à Damas se situent d'une part à l'extérieur des remparts, à proximité de la citadelle et d'autre part, dans la ville intra-muros, au sud de la Mosquée des Omeyyades. D'après Tarazi, il construit un café et des boutiques à proximité de la citadelle, dans le secteur de Taht al-Qal'a ;⁵ un acte consigné dans un registre d'un tribunal de Damas indique qu'il constitue ces biens en *waqf* au mois de *shawwal* 1138/juin 1726.⁶ Selon Ibn Kannan, il entreprend des travaux

² Les rares réalisations monumentales que connaît Damas au XVII^e siècle sont le *khan* et le *suq* construits en 1055/1646 par Bahram Agha dans le secteur occidental de la ville intra-muros, à proximité de Bab al-Jabiya; Colette Establet et Jean-Paul Pascual, *Familles et fortunes à Damas. 450 foyers damascains en 1700*, Damas, Institut français d'études arabes, 1994, 84.

³ Sur les constructions de Sulayman Pacha al-'Azm, cf. Brigitte Marino, 'Les investissements de Sulayman Pacha al-'Azm à Damas', *Annales Islamologiques* 34, 2000.

⁴ Sur Isma'il Pacha al-'Azm, cf. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus (1723-1783)*, Beyrouth, Khayats, 1966, 94-111.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁶ Registres des tribunaux de Damas (RTD) 56/51/212. Les documents consignés dans les registres sont identifiés par trois numéros : registre/page/document.

dans le Khan al-Laymun—au nord de la citadelle—où il aménage dix abattoirs (*masalikh*) ; il construit par ailleurs une *madrassa* et un *hammam* dans le Suq al-Khayyatīn, ainsi qu'un *hammam* dans le quartier de Kharab et une résidence (*dar*) à l'ouest de la Madrasa Jawziyya qu'il continue d'ailleurs à occuper après sa destitution.⁷ Mikha'il Brayk évoque quant à lui la construction d'un sérail réservé aux femmes (*saraya makhsus bi'l-harim*).⁸

Isma'il Pacha entreprend des travaux dans le Khan al-Laymun au mois de *rabi' I* 1139/octobre-novembre 1726. Situé au nord de la citadelle, à l'extérieur de Bab al-Faraj, ce *khan* est, avec les abattoirs localisés dans les faubourgs de Salihiyya et du Midan, le seul endroit de Damas où est, à cette époque, autorisé l'abattage de la viande.⁹ Quelques mois avant qu'Isma'il Pacha n'y entreprenne des travaux, une délégation d'experts se rend dans ce *khan* qui est alors délabré et recueille des

⁷ Muhammad Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat shamiyya min 1111 h. hatta 1153 h.-1699 m. hatta 1740 m.*, Damas, 1994, 422, 425. Sur le Hammam al-Khayyatīn, cf. Michel Ecochard et Claude Le Coeur, *Les bains de Damas. Monographies architecturales*, Beyrouth, Institut français de Damas, 1942-43, II, 111-12 ; Munir Kayyal, *al-Hammamat al-dimashqiyya*, Damas, Yusuf Ayyubiyya, 1986, 111-15. Sur le hammam de Kharab, cf. Ecochard et Le Coeur, *Les bains de Damas*, II, 106-07 ; Kayyal, *al-Hammamat al-dimashqiyya*, 117-18. Notons qu'il existe deux hammam dans le quartier de Kharab, l'un construit par Isma'il Pacha, et l'autre, quelques années plus tard, par son frère Sulayman Pacha, situé à l'est du premier. Pour la localisation de ces deux hammam, cf. la carte établie par Karl Wulzinger et Carl Watzinger, *Damaskus. Die Islamische Stadt*, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1924 (G5, 6/H5, 6). Pour le texte de l'inscription attribuant la construction de ce hammam à Isma'il Pacha, cf. Kayyal, *al-Hammamat al-dimashqiyya*, 117 ; Akram Hasan al-'Ulabi, *Khitat Dimashq. Dirasa ta'rikhiyya shamila*, Damas, Dar al-Tabba', 1989, 509. Sur le hammam construit dans le quartier de Kharab par Sulayman Pacha, frère d'Isma'il, cf. Marino, 'Les investissements de Sulayman Pacha', 209-11.

⁸ Mikha'il Brayk, *Ta'rikh al-Sham (1720-1782)*, Harisa, 1930, 7. Ce sérail ne figure pas parmi les différents palais des gouverneurs pouvant être identifiés dans les sources narratives ; cf. à ce sujet 'Abd al-Qadir al-Rihawi, 'Qusur al-hukkam fi Dimashq, II', *al-Hawliyyat al-Athariyya al-'Arabiyya al-Suriyya* 23, 1973.

Bien que le terme 'sérail' désigne généralement un bâtiment où se déroulent des activités politiques et administratives, cela n'est pas systématiquement le cas à cette époque. Ce terme apparaît dans les sources damascènes de la fin du XI^e/XVII^e siècle pour désigner le bâtiment officiel qui se trouve à l'extérieur de la ville, à proximité de la Mosquée Darwishīyya (Rihawi, 'Qusur al-hukkam', 85-87). Au XVIII^e siècle, il est par ailleurs aussi utilisé pour désigner une résidence personnelle (Ahmad al-Budayri, *Hawadith Dimashq al-yawmiyya (1154-1175/1741-1762)*, Le Caire, Matbu'at al-jam'iyya al-misriyya li'l-dirasat al-ta'rikhiyya, 1959, 141 ; Brayk, *Ta'rikh*, 7).

⁹ Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat*, 376. Selon une décision prise en 916/1510, le charbon ne peut se vendre à Damas que dans le Khan al-Laymun ; Shams al-Din Muhammad Ibn Tulun, *Mufakhat al-khillan fi hawadith al-zaman, ta'rikh Misr wa'l-Sham*, Le Caire, al-Mu'assasa al-misriyya al-'amma li'l-ta'lif wa'l-anba' wa'l-nashr, 1962-64, I, 345. Sur les incendies qui se produisent à proximité du Khan al-Laymun en 904/1498 et 905/1499, cf. Ibn Tulun, *Mufakhat*, I, 205, 224.

témoignages selon lesquels il est devenu un repaire de brigands et de voleurs (*ma'wa li-l-lusus wa al-surraq*), un lieu de rassemblement pour les marginaux (*majma' al-khadhalat*) et un asile pour des militaires, les *sakbaniyya* (*manzil li-l-sakbaniyya*).¹⁰

Dans la ville intra-muros, la chronologie des travaux entrepris par Isma'il Pacha est la suivante : la construction du Hammam al-Khayyatīn, commencée au mois de *jumada I* 1139/décembre 1726–janvier 1727, est achevée le 18 *muharram* 1140/septembre 1727.¹¹ Au début du mois de *muharram* 1141/août 1728, est ouvert le *hammam* qu'il a construit dans le quartier de Kharab.¹² Au mois de *shawwal* 1142/avril-mai 1730, la construction de la *madrasa*, entreprise en 1141/août 1728–juin 1729 dans le Suq al-Khayyatīn, est, quant à elle, terminée.¹³

Les archives des tribunaux permettent de connaître la nature des travaux réalisés pour la construction des divers bâtiments mentionnés par les témoins de l'époque et dévoilent l'existence d'autres travaux qui, en dépit de leur importance, ne sont, à notre connaissance, mentionnés dans aucune autre source.

Outre un acte de *waqf* portant sur des biens situés à proximité de la citadelle, nous disposons actuellement d'une trentaine de documents nous renseignant sur les biens acquis par Isma'il Pacha dans la ville intra-muros, au sud de la Mosquée des Omeyyades (Suq al-Khayyatīn, quartiers de Kharab et de Nur al-Din, Suq al-Buzuriyyin) et sur les travaux qu'il y fait réaliser par divers artisans (tailleurs de pierres,

¹⁰ RTD 52/156/445, document daté du 5 *jumada II* 1138/février 1726. La mauvaise fréquentation des *khans* délabrés est souvent mentionnée dans les expertises de ces bâtiments ; cf. par exemple RTD 52/156/446, 64/56/102, 71/33/70. Nous en rencontrons d'autres exemples plus loin, dans le Suq al-Khayyatīn (RTD 59/88/218) et dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin (RTD 56/155/455). Pour des exemples de *khan* dans lesquels sont pratiquées des activités répréhensibles, cf. Habib Zayyat, 'Khanat Dimashq al-qadima', *Majallat al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* 36, 1938, 68. Sur la moralité publique à Damas au XVIII^e siècle, cf. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Public Morality in 18th Century Ottoman Damascus', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 55–56, 1990, 180–96.

¹¹ Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat*, 378, 385. Ce *hammam* aurait donc été construit en huit ou neuf mois.

¹² Ibid., 378.

¹³ Ibid., 400. Sur la Madrasa d'Isma'il Pacha, cf. 'Ulabi, *Khitat*, 269–270. La *madrasa* d'Isma'il Pacha est citée dans un document juridique daté du mois de *muharram* 1142/août 1729 (RTD 63/389/993) mais sa construction n'est sans doute pas encore complètement terminée à ce moment-là. Pour un acte de nomination d'enseignants dans cette *madrasa*, cf. RTD 64/168/300 (16 *shawwal* 1144/avril 1732). Sur divers personnages ayant exercé des fonctions dans cette *madrasa*, cf. Muhammad Khalil al-Muradi, *Silk al-durar fi a'yan al-qarn al-thani 'ashar*, Beyrouth, Dar Sadir, 2001, I, 78 ; II, 61, 323 ; III, 104 ; IV, 179, 250.

maçons, chauxfourniers, charpentiers, peintres, verriers, égoutiers, etc.). Dans ce secteur, Isma'il Pacha édifie plusieurs bâtiments (deux *hammam*, une *madrasa*, une *dar* et un sérail, ainsi que deux *qaysariyya* et un *suq*).

Si les deux *hammam* et la *madrasa* sont désormais identifiés ou localisés grâce aux sources narratives ou aux enquêtes topographiques, il n'en est pas de même pour les autres bâtiments qui, en dépit de leur importance, n'ont laissé aucun indice permettant jusqu'à présent de les attribuer à Isma'il Pacha. Les registres des tribunaux constituent donc à cet égard une source particulièrement précieuse. Nous nous pencherons d'abord sur les acquisitions du gouverneur à proximité de la citadelle puis dans la ville intra-muros, et nous examinerons ensuite les travaux réalisés dans ce dernier secteur.

Pour accomplir ses démarches juridiques dans les divers tribunaux de Damas, Isma'il Pacha a recours à des intermédiaires : certains, comme Zakariyya Efendi, semblent agir pour le gouverneur en leur propre nom, d'autres sont officiellement mandatés par lui. Le mandataire (*wakil*) auquel Isma'il Pacha a le plus souvent recours est Hasan Celebi b. al-Hajj 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khalifa, *mutawalli* du *waqf* des égyptiens (*waqf al-Misriyyin*)¹⁴ et *nazir* du *waqf* des Lieux Saints de La Mekke et de Médine (*waqf al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn*),¹⁵ avec qui il semble entretenir des relations très étroites.

L'acquisition des biens

Les opérations foncières réalisées par Isma'il Pacha à proximité de la citadelle d'une part, et dans la ville intra-muros d'autre part, reflètent deux types de stratégies : à proximité de la citadelle, c'est une opération globale qui lui permet de constituer en *waqf* plusieurs biens achetés la

¹⁴ Hasan Celebi b. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khalifa est nommé *mutawalli* du *waqf* des égyptiens par un décret sultanien daté du 17 *muhammad* 1139/septembre 1726 (RTD 60/208/466). À ce titre, il assiste à certaines transactions opérées par d'autres mandataires d'Isma'il Pacha sur des biens liés à ce *waqf* ; il en est ainsi, par exemple, pour une boutique (*hanut*) dont Isma'il Pacha fait l'acquisition dans le *Suq al-Khayyat*, le terrain sur lequel est construit cette boutique étant rattaché au *waqf al-Misriyyin* (RTD 63/389/993).

¹⁵ En tant que *nazir* du *waqf* des Haramayn Sharifayn, Hasan Celebi b. al-Hajj 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khalifa loue à Isma'il Pacha un terrain situé à l'ouest de la citadelle et de l'hippodrome (*mal'ab al-khayl*) (RTD 60/345/736) ; il lui loue également un terrain situé au nord de Damas, dans Mahallat al-Abbarin (RTD 60/106/217).

veille à un tiers et probablement bâtis par celui-ci ; dans la ville intramuros, ce sont des acquisitions successives qui lui permettent de construire divers édifices sur des terrains vagues autrefois occupés par des bâtiments laissés à l'abandon.

Une opération urbaine à proximité de la citadelle (Taht al-Qal'a)

Le 7 *shawwal* 1138/juin 1726, soit un peu plus d'un an après sa prise de fonctions à Damas, Isma'il Pacha fonde un *waqf* au profit de 'ses enfants vivants à ce jour' (*awladi-hi al-mawjudin yawma'idhin*) : Ibrahim Beyk (m. 1746), As'ad Beyk (1705–1757), Sa'd al-Din Beyk (1717–1762), Ahmad Beyk et Nasla Khan Khatun.¹⁶ Ce *waqf* comprend des biens situés à proximité de la citadelle (Taht al-Qal'a), au nord du Barada :¹⁷ quatre terrains, deux *suq* mitoyens—l'un méridional et l'autre septentrional—et deux locaux faisant partie d'un grand café, le Café du Pont (Qahwat al-Jisr). Le *suq* méridional est composé d'un four et de 45 *hanut* (20 sur le côté méridional et 25 sur le côté septentrional), et le *suq* septentrional est composé d'un four et de 48 *hanut* (25 sur le côté méridional et 23 sur le côté septentrional).¹⁸ Chacun de ces deux *suq* est équipé d'un arc en pierre sculptée à chacune de ses extrémités (*qawsayn min al-hijara al-manhuta ahadu-huma fi awwali-hi wa al-thani fi akhiri-hi*) et recouvert d'un toit de bois en batière (*saqaf jabalun musaqqaf*

¹⁶ Il semble que la famille d'Isma'il Pacha ne tarde pas à s'agrandir : en effet, en 1140/1728, une autre fille d'Isma'il Pacha, Zulaykha Khatun, est mentionnée dans un acte juridique avec Sa'd al-Din Beyk et Naslakhan Khatun (RTD 60/311/670). En 1142/1729, un autre fils, Mustafa Beyk, est à son tour mentionné dans un acte juridique, avec Sa'd al-Din Beyk et Zulaykha Qadun (RTD 63/271/719). Zulaykha est donc sans doute née entre 1138/1726 et 1140/1728, et Mustafa entre 1138/1726 et 1142/1729.

¹⁷ RTD 56/51/212. Ce *waqf*, dont Isma'il Pacha est le propre *nazir*, est le seul *waqf* que nous connaissons jusqu'à présent pour ce gouverneur. Le 23 *muḥarram* 1142/août 1729, Isma'il Pacha, en tant que *nazir* de son *waqf*, achète, pour le compte de celui-ci, un *hanut* situé sur le côté oriental du Suq al-Khayyatīn, à proximité de sa *madrasa* (RTD 63/389/993) ; nous ignorons s'il s'agit du même *waqf* ou d'un autre qui aurait été constitué à un autre moment.

¹⁸ Au sud de ces deux *suq* se trouve le Khan al-Bürünjükiyya dont nous savons qu'il était consacré, en 1142/1729, au tissage d'une étoffe désignée par le terme *bürünjük* (*mu'add li-nasij al-bürünjük*, RTD 56/179/495). Le *bürünjük* est une 'espèce d'étoffe de soie écrue mélangée d'un peu de coton' ; il est aussi défini comme 'gaze, étoffe très claire, crêpe' ; Colette Establet et Jean-Paul Pascual, *Des tissus et des hommes. Damas vers 1700*, Damas, Institut français du Proche-Orient, 2005, 319, d'après M. Küttüoğlu et R. Dozy.

bi'l-khashab).¹⁹ Chaque *hanut* est quant à lui équipé d'un arc en pierre (*qaws min al-hijara*) et doté d'un plafond voûté fait de pierres et de mortier (*wa saqaf qabw ma'qud bi'l-ahjar wa al-mun*). Ce *waqf* comprend également, au sud de ces deux *suq*, deux locaux—l'un pour l'hiver (*shitwi*), l'autre pour l'été (*sayfi*)—spécialisés dans la préparation et la vente du café (*makan mu'add li-tabkh al-qahwa wa bay'i-ha*) et faisant partie du Qahwat al-Jisr situé au nord du Barada.²⁰

Isma'il Pacha a acheté ces biens la veille à un certain Zakariyya Efendi, personnage qui avait par ailleurs agi quelques mois plus tôt comme mandataire (*wakil*) du gouverneur pour acheter²¹ ou louer²² plusieurs biens situés dans divers villages. Ici, Zakariyya Efendi n'agit pas, juridiquement, comme mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha mais semble toutefois jouer un rôle d'intermédiaire pour permettre au gouverneur de mener à bien ses projets.

En effet, dans l'acte de *waqf*, il est indiqué que Zakariyya Efendi dispose, pour les biens qu'il a vendus à Isma'il Pacha, d'un *kitab ihtiram* daté du 29 *ramadan* de l'année en cours/juin 1726. La notion d'*ihtiram*, qui figure généralement dans l'expression *ihtiram wa baqa'*, fait référence à la possibilité, pour le locataire d'un terrain rattaché à un *waqf*, de devenir propriétaire de tout ce qu'il construira sur celui-ci.²³ La notion d'*ihtiram* est au centre d'une procédure qui se déroule en deux temps:²⁴ dans un premier temps, un individu loue un terrain appartenant à un *waqf* et obtient l'assurance, de la part des administrateurs du *waqf*, que tout ce qu'il construira sur ce terrain sera sa propriété;

¹⁹ Le terme *jamalun* (ici, *jabalun*) désigne un toit en bâtière. Deux siècles plus tôt, en 932/1525–1526, le *qadi* Wali al-Din Ibn al-Furfur entreprend de construire un *suq* recouvert de coupoles en briques, ce qui constitue une innovation architecturale tout à fait remarquable ; Jean-Paul Pascual, 'Nushu' *suq wa idmihlalu-hu fi al-qarn al-sadis 'ashar*, *al-Hawliyyat al-Athariyya al-'Arabiyya al-Suriyya* 35, 1985, 237, 240 ; Weber, 'The Creation of Ottoman Damascus', 443. Comme le suggère l'exemple des deux *suq* construits par Isma'il Pacha deux siècles plus tard, les toits de bois en bâtière ne sont donc pas complètement abandonnés pour autant.

²⁰ Pour une description des cafés de Damas par les voyageurs occidentaux du XIX^e siècle, notamment ceux situés sur les rives du Barada, cf. Brigitte Marino, 'Cafés et cafetiers de Damas aux XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 75–76, 1995, 277–79.

²¹ RTD 5m/67/184 (12 *jumada II* 1138/février 1726).

²² RTD 5m/69/186, 5m/70/190, 5m/72/194, 5m/73/196 (*jumada II-rajab* 1138/mars 1726).

²³ Sur cette notion, cf. James Reilly, 'Rural *waqfs* of Ottoman Damascus: Rights of Ownership, Possession and Tenancy', *Acta Orientalia* 51, 1990, 34.

²⁴ Je remercie Astrid Meier pour les informations qu'elle m'a données sur cette procédure.

dans un second temps, les administrateurs du *waqf* engagent, contre le locataire du terrain appartenant à leur *waqf*, une procédure destinée à confirmer que celui-ci est bel et bien le propriétaire des biens qu'il a construits sur le terrain en question.

Ce sont vraisemblablement les documents issus au cours de ces procédures qui sont désignés par le terme *kitab ihtiram*. Le fait que Zakariyya Efendi dispose d'un *kitab ihtiram* concernant les biens qu'il a vendus à Isma'il Pacha laisse donc supposer qu'il aurait lui-même construit ces biens pour les vendre au gouverneur. Quelques documents indiquent d'ailleurs qu'au début du mois de *rajab* 1138/mars 1726, Zakariyya Efendi a loué, dans le secteur de Taht al-Qal'a, plusieurs terrains en friche appartenant à des *waqf*, notamment celui du Bimaristan Nuri et celui de la mosquée de la citadelle.²⁵ Ces terrains ont donc été loués trois mois avant la vente des biens à Isma'il Pacha ; durant cette courte période, Zakariyya Efendi peut avoir fait construire une centaine de boutiques et deux locaux spécialisés dans la préparation et la vente du café.²⁶

Comme cela est généralement le cas en pareille circonstance, le bailleur a autorisé le locataire à édifier sur ces terrains des constructions qui deviendraient sa propriété.²⁷ Rien n'indique avec certitude que Zakariyya Efendi—qui détient déjà dans ce secteur plusieurs terrains mitoyens—a construit les biens qu'il a vendus à Isma'il Pacha sur ces terrains-là. Mais le fait qu'il agisse d'une part comme locataire de terrains en friche et d'autre part comme vendeur de biens construits sur des terrains en friche qu'il a loués suggère le rôle d'intermédiaire qu'il a joué dans cette opération foncière.

²⁵ RTD 5m/66/182 ; 5m/68/185.

²⁶ À titre comparatif, d'après les témoignages du chroniqueur Ibn Kannan, le Hammam al-Khayyatīn, dont l'architecture est sans doute beaucoup plus complexe, aurait été construit en huit ou neuf mois ; Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat*, 378, 385. Quelques années plus tard, le frère d'Isma'il Pacha, Sulayman Pacha, fait également construire en quelques mois un *hammam* à proximité de Bab al-Jabiya, dans le Suq al-Bahramiyya, en face du Suq al-Maradiniyya : le 22 *jumada I* 1147/20 octobre 1734, il loue le terrain sur lequel sera construit ce *hammam* ; quatre mois plus tard, le 4 *shawwal* 1147/27 février 1735, il loue ce *hammam* qui sera ouvert trois mois plus tard, au début du mois de *muḥarram* 1148/fin mai 1735 ; Marino, 'Les investissements de Sulayman Pacha', 210, 222 (n. 80).

²⁷ *adhina al-mu'ajjir li'l-musta'jir an yu'ammir al-ma'jur fi al-mudda ma ahabba wa akhtara min al-'ama'ir wa yasrif 'ala dhalika min mali-hi wa mahma yu'ammir-hu yakun milk la-hu.*

Des interventions dans le Suq al-Khayyatin

À l'époque où Isma'il Pacha commence à intervenir dans le Suq al-Khayyatin, ce secteur de la ville semble délabré depuis longtemps : d'après Ibn Kannan, le gouverneur construit son *hammam* sur l'emplacement d'un *khan* qui est en ruine depuis au moins 200 ans,²⁸ et cette impression d'abandon est par ailleurs suggérée dans plusieurs documents juridiques.²⁹

Un document daté du 5 *rabi' II* 1139/décembre 1726 évoque deux expertises réalisées dans une *qaysariyya* située au sud du Khan al-Jukhiyya, à l'est du Suq al-Khayyatin.³⁰ Dans un premier temps, le juge de Damas s'était rendu en personne, avec une délégation d'experts et sur la demande du *mutawalli* des *waqf* de la Mosquée des Omeyyades, pour inspecter cette *qaysariyya* qui était en ruine et détruite (*al-kharab al-muhaddama*) et qui se résumait à un tas de terre (*al-mushtamila 'ala kawm turab*) ; selon le témoignage des commerçants du *suq*, elle était devenue un repaire de brigands (*sarat ma'wa li'l-lusus*), ce qui constituait un préjudice (*darar*) pour les gens du quartier (*ahali al-mahalla*), pour les gens du *suq* (*ahali al-suq*) 'et pour tous les musulmans' (*al-muslimin ajma'in*). Quelques jours plus tard, le *mutawalli* demanda au juge de faire expertiser les deux portes de la *qaysariyya* ; le juge confia cette tâche à un inspecteur (*kashshaf*) qui se rendit sur place avec quelques autres personnes ; ils constatèrent que les deux portes de la *qaysariyya* étaient chacune obturées par un *dukkan* et retournèrent en informer le juge.³¹

Quelques jours plus tard, le 14 *rabi' II* 1139/décembre 1726, avec la permission du juge, et en vertu de l'expertise évoquée plus haut, le *mutawalli* de la Mosquée des Omeyyades vend, pour 225 *qursh*, le tas de terre (*kawm turab*) se trouvant sur l'emplacement de ce bâtiment.³²

²⁸ Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat*, 378. Au XVI^e siècle, une *qaysariyya* en ruine est déjà signalée dans ce secteur ; Muhammad al-Arna'ut, 'Mu'tayat jadida 'an Dimashq fi muntasaf al-qarn al-sadis 'ashar (waqfiyyat Ahmad Pacha)', *Dirasat ta'rikhiyya* 51-52, 1995, 209.

²⁹ RTD 60/100/202 ; 60/310/668 ; 60/311/670.

³⁰ Cette *qaysariyya* porte le nom de Qaysariyyat al-Azrariyya.

³¹ RTD 59/88/218. Sur la fermeture des portes de *qaysariyya* abandonnées, cf. Sylvie Denoix, 'Topographie de l'intervention du personnel politique à l'époque mamelouke', in Sylvie Denoix, Jean-Charles Depaule et Michel Tuchscherer, eds., *Le Khan al-Khalili. Un centre commercial et artisanal au Caire du XIII^e au XX^e siècle*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1999, 40.

³² RTD 60/94/112.

Bien que cela ne soit pas explicitement exprimé dans le document, nul doute que les expertises de ce bâtiment et la vente de ses décombres s'inscrivent dans la série de démarches entreprises par Isma'il Pacha pour mener à bien ses projets dans le Suq al-Khayyatin. Le 7 *jumada I* 1139/janvier 1727, Isma'il Pacha fait l'acquisition d'un terrain en friche et de plusieurs *hanut* détruits situés au sud du Khan al-Jukhiyya, donc à l'emplacement sur lequel il édifiera son *hammam* ; ces biens avaient été acquis par un tiers grâce à trois transactions datées du 14 *rabi' II* 1139/décembre 1726, soit peu de temps après les expertises évoquées plus haut.³³ Au début du mois de *jumada II* 1139/janvier 1727, le mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha et les bénéficiaires de l'eau acheminée jusqu'au Suq al-Khayyatin s'entendent (*tasadaqu*) sur les droits du gouverneur dans ce domaine.³⁴ À la même époque (*jumada I* 1139/décembre 1726–janvier 1727) commence, selon Ibn Kannan, la construction du *hammam*.³⁵

Outre ce *hammam*, Isma'il Pacha construit dans le Suq al-Khayyatin une *madrassa* sur laquelle nous ne disposons d'aucun acte juridique ; elle est simplement mentionnée au mois de *muharram* 1142/1729 près d'une boutique (*hanut*) dont Isma'il Pacha fait l'acquisition dans ce *suq*.³⁶

Quelques acquisitions dans le quartier de Kharab

Isma'il Pacha construit son second *hammam* dans le quartier de Kharab et continue, après son achèvement, à acquérir des biens à proximité de ce bâtiment. Le 10 *rajab* 1141/février 1729, soit six mois après l'ouverture du *hammam*, il achète en effet dans ce quartier, à divers membres de la famille Safarjalani,³⁷ et par l'intermédiaire de son mandataire, Husayn Agha b. Hijazi Beyk al-Suqiyya,³⁸ plusieurs biens mitoyens du

³³ RTD 60/100/202.

³⁴ RTD 60/132/284.

³⁵ Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat*, 378. Pour une description sommaire de ce *hammam* en 1171/1758, cf. RTD 152/29/65.

³⁶ RTD 63/389/993.

³⁷ Pour une allusion aux liens unissant Isma'il Pacha à la famille Safarjalani, cf. L.S. Schilcher, *Families in Politics. Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Stuttgart, Steiner, 1985, 32.

³⁸ Sur les divers membres de la famille Suqiyya, cf. Brigitte Marino, 'Le Hawran et la Bekaa, deux régions céréalières du *Bilad al-Sham* à l'époque ottomane', in Muhammad Afifi, Rachida Chih, Brigitte Marino, Nicolas Michel et Isik Tamdogan, eds., *Sociétés rurales ottomanes*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 2005, 191–93.

'nouveau bain' (*lasiq al-hammam al-jadid*) et de biens lui appartenant déjà.³⁹

Des investissements résidentiels dans le quartier de Nur al-Din

Outre quelques acquisitions qu'il y fait pour le compte de ses enfants,⁴⁰ Isma'il Pacha possède lui-même dans le quartier de Nur al-Din plusieurs biens résidentiels. Sa présence y est surtout marquée par celle de son sérail (*saraya*) pour lequel il entreprend, comme nous le verrons plus loin, d'importants travaux en 1141–1142/1729.⁴¹ Il possède aussi, à proximité du Mahkamat al-Bab, une maison (*dar*), mitoyenne de son sérail du côté occidental et qui, en 1141/1729, est qualifiée de 'nouvelle' (*jadida*).⁴²

Une autre maison (*dar*) est par ailleurs mentionnée dans plusieurs documents : d'abord dans l'acte d'achat qui la concerne (22 *jumada I* 1140/janvier 1728),⁴³ puis dans l'acte de location d'un mur qui lui est mitoyen (22 *jumada II* 1140/février 1728)⁴⁴ ainsi que dans une démarche liée à la vente des décombres se trouvant sur un terrain mitoyen (15 *rabi' I* 1141/octobre 1728),⁴⁵ puis dans l'acte de location de ce terrain (16 *rabi' I* 1141/octobre 1728).⁴⁶ Voici quelques informations sur cette maison et son environnement.

Le 22 *jumada I* 1140/janvier 1728, Isma'il Pacha achète une maison mitoyenne du Khan al-Harir, dans le quartier de Nur al-Din, près de

³⁹ RTD 63/37/99.

⁴⁰ RTD 60/311/670 ; 63/271/719.

⁴¹ Les différentes parties du sérail—extérieure et intérieure—peuvent être désignées comme des 'maisons' (*al-dar al-barraniyya min al-saraya*, *al-dar al-juwwaniyya min al-saraya*, RTD 63/118/314) et le sérail est lui-même parfois défini comme étant une 'grande maison' (*dar kabira*, RTD 199/168/253, 199/230/291).

⁴² RTD 63/101/267. Les divers biens résidentiels que possèdent Isma'il Pacha al-'Azm et ses enfants dans le quartier de Nur al-Din semblent se situer entre le Suq al-Khayyatin, à l'ouest, et le Suq al-Buzuriyyin, à l'est, au sud du Khan al-Harir, soit à l'est de la Madrasa 'Abd Allah Pacha al-'Azm. Là se trouvent d'ailleurs des vestiges, en particulier un grand *iwan*, laissant imaginer l'existence d'une ou de plusieurs grande(s) demeure(s). Selon la carte établie par Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher (*Families in Politics*, carte n° 4), la famille 'Azm possède d'ailleurs un (ou plusieurs ?) bien(s) résidentiel(s) à cet endroit.

⁴³ RTD 60/307/663.

⁴⁴ RTD 60/309/664.

⁴⁵ RTD 64/20/25.

⁴⁶ RTD 64/71/126.

Suq al-Silah.⁴⁷ Cette maison comprend une cour, un bassin, un *iwan qibli*, un *murabba' gharbi*, un *qasr*, une *mashraqa*, un *murtafaq*, une cuisine (*matbakh*), un escalier en pierre (*sullam hajar*), un *murabba' sharqi*, une *tabaqa sharqiyya*, un *qasr*, une *mashraqa kabira*, un autre escalier en pierre, une autre cuisine (*matbakh*), un *kilar*, un *murtafaq* et des *manafi'*.⁴⁸ Évaluée à 1 100 *qursh*, elle se situe dans la catégorie supérieure des maisons que nous connaissons dans la ville de Damas intra-muros à cette époque.⁴⁹

Durant plusieurs mois, Isma'il Pacha entreprend ensuite diverses démarches pour inscrire juridiquement cette maison dans l'espace foncier de ce quartier en se préoccupant tout particulièrement des questions de mitoyenneté avec deux *khan*, le Khan al-Harir⁵⁰ et le Khan du Qadi Taj al-Din.⁵¹

Le 22 *jumada II* 1140/février 1728, soit un mois après avoir acheté sa maison, Isma'il Pacha loue au *mutawalli* du *waqf* de la Mosquée de Darwish Pacha, le mur se trouvant entre l'écurie du Khan al-Harir et la rue, ainsi que le dessus des pièces prenant appui sur le mur (*zahr al-uwad al-rakiba 'ala al-jidar*) au dessus de l'écurie. Au sud, de l'autre côté de la rue, se trouve la maison d'Isma'il Pacha. Ce contrat stipule que le gouverneur sera propriétaire de tout ce qu'il construira à cet

⁴⁷ RTD 60/307/663.

⁴⁸ Pour une définition de ces diverses pièces, cf. Jean-Paul Pascual, 'Du notaire au propriétaire en passant par l'expert : descriptions de la 'maison' damascène au XVIII^e siècle', in *L'habitat traditionnel dans les pays musulmans autour de la Méditerranée*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1990, II ; Brigitte Marino, *Le faubourg du Midan à Damas à l'époque ottomane. Espace urbain, société et habitat (1742-1830)*, Damas, Institut français études arabes, 1997, 223-38.

⁴⁹ Brigitte Marino, 'Le "Quartier des Chrétiens" (Mahallat al-Nasara) de Damas au milieu du XVIII^e siècle (1150-1170/1737-1757)', *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 107-110, 2005, 335-42. Cet investissement est toutefois beaucoup moins important que ceux réalisés quelques années plus tard dans le même quartier, à l'ouest de ce secteur, par le frère d'Isma'il Pacha, Sulayman Pacha ; Marino, 'Les investissements de Sulayman Pacha', 217-18.

⁵⁰ Dans les documents dont nous disposons, ce *khan* est désigné sous le nom de Khan Suq al-Harir. Sur le Khan al-Harir, construit par Darwish Pacha en 981/1573, cf. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Rihawi, 'Khanat madinat Dimashq', *al-Hawliyyat al-Athariyya al-'Arabiyya al-Suriyya* 25, 1975, 61 ; Fu'ad Yahya, 'Jard athari li-khanat Dimashq', *al-Hawliyyat al-Athariyya al-'Arabiyya al-Suriyya* 31, 1981, 91-92.

⁵¹ Les informations dont nous disposons sur le Khan du Qadi Taj al-Din sont très sommaires ; nous savons seulement qu'il existait déjà en 1058/1648 ; Fouad Yahia, *Inventaire archéologique des caravansérails de Damas*, Thèse de doctorat, Université d'Aix-en-Provence, 1979, 399.

endroit.⁵² Ce document laisse présager des travaux qui ont sans aucun doute été entrepris par la suite pour agrandir la maison en question.

Quelques mois plus tard, Isma'il Pacha entreprend des démarches concernant un autre mur mitoyen de sa maison, celui du *khan* du Qadi Taj al-Din. Le 15 *rabī' I* 1141/octobre 1728, son mandataire fait comparaître les *nazir* du *waqf* du Qadi Taj al-Din. Il déclare que le mur oriental séparant la maison du gouverneur du *khan* rattaché à ce *waqf* est détruit dans sa moitié supérieure (*tahaddama nisfu-hu min jihat a'la-hu*) et que l'autre moitié est sur le point de s'écrouler et de disparaître (*wa al-nisf al-thani a'il ila al-suqut wa'l-idhmihlal*), de même que les voûtes (*qabw*) des huit locaux (*udah*) du *khan* s'appuyant (*rakiba*) sur ce mur. Or, les défenseurs refusent de reconstruire le mur avec le gouverneur. Le mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha demande donc au juge de nommer une délégation d'experts pour enquêter *in situ*. Dans le *khan*, les experts constatent la nécessité d'une restauration et sont informés que, depuis dix ans, personne ne veut ni habiter, ni louer ces locaux. Ils retournent en informer le juge qui ordonne aux *nazir* d'effectuer les restaurations nécessaires mais ces derniers signalent que le *waqf* ne dispose pas d'argent pour cela ; la vente des décombres (*anqad*) pourrait en revanche, être bénéfique au *waqf*. Le juge autorise donc la vente des décombres des huit locaux en question. C'est un maçon, al-Hajj Husayn al-Mi'mari, qui achète pierres (*ahjar*), briques (*ajur*) et deux petites fenêtres en fer (*shubbakayn saghirayn min al-hadid*) pour 90 *qursh*.⁵³

Le lendemain, le 16 *rabī' I* 1141/octobre 1728, Isma'il Pacha loue, dans Mahallat Nur al-Din, ce terrain en friche dont les décombres ont été vendus la veille. À l'est et au nord de ce terrain se trouve la maison d'Isma'il Pacha ; à l'ouest, se trouve le *khan* du Qadi Taj al-Din et au sud, l'écurie de ce *khan*. Les bailleurs autorisent Isma'il Pacha à annexer le terrain à sa maison en lui certifiant que tout ce qu'il y construira sera sa propriété.⁵⁴ Là encore, ce document laisse présager des travaux qui

⁵² RTD 60/309/664.

⁵³ RTD 64/20/25. Le fer d'une de ces fenêtres pèse 4 *ratl* et l'autre 2 *ratl*. La valeur communément admise pour le *ratl* de Damas est 1,85 kg ; Walther Hinz, *al-Makayil wa'l-awzan al-islamiyya wa ma yu'adilu-ha fi al-nizam al-mitri*, Amman, 1970, 30–37. Sur le *ratl*, cf. également Establet et Pascual, *Des tissus et des hommes*, 40–42.

⁵⁴ RTD 64/71/126. Cette démarche, de même que la précédente (RTD 64/20/25) est effectuée par un mandataire dont la procuration est authentifiée par deux personnes, dont al-Sayyid Fathi Efendi b. al-Sayyid Muhammad Efendi al-Falaqinsi, responsable des finances (*al-daftari*). Muhammad al-Falaqinsi (m. 24 *jumada I* 1134/mars 1722)

ont sans aucun doute été entrepris par la suite pour agrandir la maison en question.

Dans Mahallat Nur al-Din, Isma'il Pacha opère aussi des investissements pour le compte de ses enfants mineurs. Le 20 *jumada II* 1140/ février 1728, il y achète, en tant que tuteur de Sa'd al-Din Beyk, Naslakhan Khatun et Zulaykha Khatun, deux terrains sur lesquels se trouvaient des décombres qui ont été vendus quelques jours auparavant.⁵⁵

Quelques mois plus tard, le 16 *rabi' I* 1142/octobre 1729, le mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha comparaît au tribunal pour représenter le gouverneur en tant que tuteur de ses enfants mineurs, Sa'd al-Din Beyk, Mustafa Beyk et Zulaykha Qadun. Le *mutawalli* du *waqf* de la Mosquée Darwish Pacha accuse Isma'il Pacha de s'être approprié pour eux non seulement le mur méridional se trouvant entre l'écurie du Khan al-Harir et la rue, mais aussi le dessus des pièces prenant appui sur ce mur (*zahr al-uwad al-rakiba 'ala al-jidar*) au-dessus de l'écurie, de même que la construction (*'imara*) prenant appui sur le mur (*rakib dhalika kullu-hu 'ala al-jidar*). Interrogé, le mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha reconnaît les faits et rappelle que le gouverneur, agissant comme tuteur de ses enfants mineurs, a loué ces biens appartenant au *waqf* et que le bailleur l'a autorisé à construire ce qu'il voudrait en lui certifiant que ses enfants seraient propriétaires des biens construits.⁵⁶ En vertu de cela, le gouverneur a édifié à cet endroit pour ses enfants une construction (*'imara*) comprenant un *iwān*, quatre *qasr* dotés de plafonds peints avec des décors *islambuli* et *'ajami*,⁵⁷ des renforcements à étagères (*kuttabi*), des niches (*musabbat*) et des placards (*kharastin*).⁵⁸ Le mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha exhibe un acte confirmant ses propos et dont le contenu est authentifié par des témoins ; le juge ordonne alors au plaignant de ne pas l'importuner à ce sujet. Les droits des enfants mineurs sur ce bien sont ainsi établis.⁵⁹

devint *daftardar* au mois de *rajab* 1120/octobre 1708 ; Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat*, 142, 335. Fathi al-Falaqinsi sera quant à lui nommé *daftardar* en 1148/1735-1736 ; sur ce personnage, cf. Rafeq, *Province of Damascus*, 149-54.

⁵⁵ 60/311/670.

⁵⁶ Cette affaire rappelle l'acte de location établi le 22 *jumada II* 1140/février 1728 (RTD 60/309/664). Dans ce document, Isma'il Pacha, par l'intermédiaire de son mandataire, agissait toutefois en son propre nom et non comme tuteur de ses enfants.

⁵⁷ Les décors *islambuli* sont composés de motifs floraux alors que les décors *'ajami* sont composés de motifs géométriques ; Pascual, 'Du notaire au propriétaire', 400.

⁵⁸ Sur ces termes, cf. *Ibid.*, 396.

⁵⁹ RTD 63/271/719. Sur les questions juridiques concernant les murs, cf. al-Marji al-Thaqafi, *Kitab al-hitan. Ahkam al-tariq wa'l-sutuh wa'l-abwab wa masil al-miyah wa*

Des interventions dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin

Isma'il Pacha entreprend également des opérations foncières dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin qui comprend à cette époque, comme le Suq al-Khayyatin et le quartier de Nur al-Din, des bâtiments abandonnés depuis plusieurs années. Le Khan al-'Attalin, que nous n'avons trouvé mentionné dans aucune source mais qui, d'après les actes juridiques, est localisé dans la partie orientale du Suq al-Buzuriyyin, se situe au centre des travaux entrepris par Isma'il Pacha dans ce suq.

Un document, vraisemblablement établi le 12 *rajab* 1141/février 1729,⁶⁰ relate l'expertise du Khan al-'Attalin. Sur la demande des administrateurs des trois *waqf* auxquels est rattaché ce *khan*, une délégation va, avec l'autorisation du juge, expertiser la construction et évaluer les décombres qui s'y trouvent. Ils constatent que les murs et les plafonds du *khan* sont délabrés et sur le point de s'écrouler (*jami' judur al-khan al-mazbur mutaqatti'a mutahaddima a'ila ila al-suqut wa jami' asqifi-hi mutakassira al-akhshab mutahaddima yukhsha suqutu-ha*) ; les décombres sont évalués à 250 *qursh*. Selon le témoignage des gens du quartier et des commerçants du *suq* (*min ahali al-mahalla wa min sukkān*

al-hitan fi al-fiqh al-islami, Beyrouth, Dar al-fikr al-mu'asir, 1994 ; Akera Kahera and Omar Benmira, 'Damages in Islamic Law : Maghribi Muftis and the Built Environment (9th–15th Centuries C.E.)', *Islamic Law and Society* 5, 2, 1998, 142–44 ; Jean-Pierre Van Staëvel, 'Savoir faire et le faire savoir : l'expertise judiciaire en matière de construction, d'après un auteur tunisois du 8^e/XIV^e siècle', *Annales Islamologiques* 35, 2001, 643–45. Sur la construction d'un bâtiment prenant appui sur un bâtiment voisin (*rukub*), cf. Nelly Hanna, *Habiter au Caire aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1991, 144–45.

⁶⁰ Ce document (RTD 56/155/455) porte la date du 12 *rajab* 1142/février 1730 mais cette date nous semble erronée. Comme nous le verrons par la suite, au mois de *sha'ban* 1141/mars 1729, Isma'il Pacha entreprend des travaux dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin, 'sur un terrain autrefois occupé par le Khan al-'Attalin' ; il est alors question d'y déblayer de la terre (RTD 63/118/313). Logiquement, ce déblaiement ne peut intervenir qu'après l'expertise du *khan*, sa destruction et la vente de ses décombres, opérations qui sont évoquées dans le document dont il est question ici. Par ailleurs, les documents consignés dans la deuxième partie du registre 56 (84–212) sont datés de 1141 ou 1142 et ne sont pas classés selon un ordre chronologique très strict, comme cela est d'ailleurs toujours le cas dans ces registres ; deux documents consignés dans les deux pages précédentes (RTD 56/152/451, 56/153/452) sont datés du mois de *rajab* 1141 ; il n'est pas improbable que le scribe, consignait une longue liste de documents établis en 1142, ait aussi inscrit, par inadvertance, cette date sur le document en question. Pour ces deux raisons, liées d'une part à la chronologie logique des démarches juridiques et, d'autre part, à la configuration du registre, la véritable date de ce document est vraisemblablement le 12 *rajab* 1141 et non le 12 *rajab* 1142. À moins que les actes relatant les expertises de bâtiments délabrés en vue de leur destruction puissent être établis plusieurs mois après les expertises dont ces bâtiments ont été l'objet...

hawanit al-suq), ce *khan* est devenu 'un asile pour les marginaux et les débauchés, un refuge pour les dépravés et les voleurs, et les femmes de mauvaise vie le fréquentent régulièrement' (*manzil li'l-khadhalat wa'l-fussaq wa ma'wa li-arbab al-fujur wa'l-surraq wa an al-nisa' al-khati'at la tufariqu-hu fi ghalib al-awqat*) ; la vente des décombres servirait les intérêts des *waqf* auxquels il est rattaché. La délégation d'experts retourne informer le juge de cette situation et celui-ci autorise la destruction du bâtiment et la vente des décombres au prix évalué.⁶¹ Sans que cela soit explicitement indiqué dans le document, cette expertise est sans aucun doute liée aux projets d'Isma'il Pacha dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin.

Le 22 *ramadan* 1141/avril 1729, Isma'il Pacha loue dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin plusieurs terrains en friche.⁶² Certains d'entre eux, sur lesquels se trouvaient des décombres qui ont été vendus quelques jours plus tôt, appartiennent au *waqf* de Tanam qui construit dans ce secteur une *qaysariyya*, la Qaysariyya Tanam,⁶³ située à l'est du Khan al-'Attalin.⁶⁴ Sur ces terrains, Isma'il Pacha obtient du juge l'autorisation d'édifier des constructions dont il sera propriétaire.⁶⁵

La réalisation des travaux

Les appropriations foncières d'Isma'il Pacha au sud de la Mosquée des Omeyyades, réalisées pour la plupart sur des terrains en friche,

⁶¹ RTD 56/155/455.

⁶² RTD 63/144/387 ; 63/147/397.

⁶³ Tanam, représentant du pouvoir mamelouk à Damas à la fin du XIV^e siècle (795–802/1392–1399), est aussi connu sous le nom de Tanbak al-Hasani ; Rihawi, 'Khanat madinat Dimashq', 55–56. Vers 1700, des entrepôts sont loués dans le Khan Tanam par des marchands d'épices et de drogues, des teinturiers et des commerçants exerçant leurs activités dans le domaine du textile ; Establet et Pascual, *Familles et fortunes*, 84. Pour plus d'informations sur un de ces commerçants, cf. Establet et Pascual, *Des tissus et des hommes*, 161–65.

⁶⁴ Les caravansérails de Damas sont désignés tantôt par le terme '*khan*', tantôt par le terme '*qaysariyya*', tantôt par le terme '*wikala*' ; sur l'utilisation de ces termes, cf. Zayyat, 'Khanat Dimashq', 66. Comme nous le verrons plus loin, un même bâtiment peut, dans les actes juridiques dont nous disposons, être parfois qualifié de *khan* et parfois de *qaysariyya* ; cela est aussi le cas dans les inventaires après décès établis vers 1700 ; Establet et Pascual, *Familles et fortunes*, 83. Sur la signification de ces termes à Alep au XVIII^e siècle, cf. Jihane Tate, *Une waqfiyya du XVIII^e siècle à Alep. La waqfiyya d'al-Hajj Musa al-Amiri*, Damas, Institut français d'études arabes, 1990, 70–72. Pour Le Caire, cf. Michel Tuchscherer, 'Evolution du bâti et des fonctions à l'époque ottomane', in Denoix, Depaule et Tuchscherer, édés., *Le Khan al-Khalili*, 67–68.

⁶⁵ RTD 63/147/397.

s'accompagnent d'importants chantiers. Nous ignorons qui supervisait leur coordination et leur réalisation⁶⁶ mais plusieurs documents établis entre les mois de *rajab* 1141-*safar* 1142/février-septembre 1729, rendent compte des travaux effectués par divers artisans dans les quartiers de Kharab et de Nur al-Din ainsi que dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin. Nous disposons ainsi d'informations sur les travaux entrepris dans :

- le sérail (Nur al-Din) : (14 835 *qursh*)
- le *hammam* (Kharab) et le sérail (Nur al-Din) : (16 080 *qursh*)
- la maison mitoyenne du sérail (Nur al-Din) : (500 *qursh*)
- le Suq al-Buzuriyyin : (9 125 *qursh*)

En quelques mois, Isma'ïl Pacha consacre donc au moins 40 540 *qursh* à ces diverses constructions. Deux documents datés du mois de *sha'ban* 1141/mars 1729 concernent par ailleurs des sommes payées par Isma'ïl Pacha à des scieurs de bois (1 756.5 *qursh*)⁶⁷ et de marbre (420.5 *qursh*)⁶⁸ dont le travail n'est pas directement mis en relation avec les constructions entreprises par le gouverneur

C'est Hasan Celebi b. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khalifa, mandataire d'Isma'ïl Pacha, qui gère la quasi-totalité des relations avec les artisans ayant entrepris ou devant entreprendre des travaux pour le compte du gouverneur.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Seul un *mu'allim* est vaguement évoqué par Ibn Kannan pour la construction du *hammam* situé dans le Suq al-Khayyatin ; Ibn Kannan, *Yawmiyyat*, 385. Sur cette question en Égypte, cf. Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Muhandis, Shad, Mu'allim*—Note on the Building Crafts in the Mamluk Period', *Der Islam* 72, 2, 1995; Nelly Hanna, *Construction Work in Ottoman Cairo (1517–1798)*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1984.

⁶⁷ Ces scieurs (*nashsharin*) ont notamment coupé du bois dans un café situé au nord de la citadelle, sur les rives du Barada, Qahwat al-Manakhiliyya (RTD 63/13/37). Sur les *nashsharin*, cf. Muhammad al-Qasimi, *Qamus al-sina'at al-shamiyya*, Damas, Talas, 1988, 481–82.

⁶⁸ Il s'agit de quatre chrétiens qui ont notamment scié du marbre à Bosra (RTD 63/118/312). Le document ne précise pas s'il s'agit de marbre récupéré dans les monuments de cette cité antique située dans le sud de la Syrie ! Une vingtaine d'années plus tard, en 1163/1750, As'ad Pacha, fils d'Isma'ïl Pacha, fait également venir de Bosra du marbre—plus précisément des piliers en marbre (*a'mida min al-rukham*)—pour construire son sérail ; Budayri, *Hawadith*, 143–44. Tous les matériaux (bois, pierre, marbre, etc.) récupérés par As'ad Pacha dans divers lieux pour réaliser cette opération sont alors mentionnés par le chroniqueur.

⁶⁹ Sur ce personnage, cf. notes 14 et 15.

Travaux effectués dans le sérail

Dans les actes juridiques dont nous disposons, le sérail d'Isma'il Pacha est mentionné dans quelques documents concernant les travaux qui y ont été entrepris en *sha'ban* 1141-*safar* 1142/mars-septembre 1729.⁷⁰ Près d'un demi-siècle après le décès d'Isma'il Pacha, ce sérail fera l'objet, en 1190/1776, de deux transactions dans lesquelles il est décrit très précisément.⁷¹

D'après ces deux documents, ce sérail est une grande maison (*dar kabira*) comprenant une partie extérieure (*barrani*) et une partie intérieure (*juwwani*). Avec ses quatre cours—dont une réservée aux chevaux et une autre au service—ses trois *iwān*, ses cinq *qa'a*—dont certaines sont à trois *iwān*—ses six *murabba'*, ses onze *qasr*, ses deux *diwankhanah*, ses deux cuisines, ses deux pièces réservées à la préparation du café, son *hammam* et ses quatre escaliers, le sérail d'Isma'il Pacha, aujourd'hui disparu, semble aussi prestigieux que celui construit quelques années plus tard dans le même quartier par son fils As'ad Pacha, alors gouverneur de Damas.⁷² Outre le grand nombre de pièces qu'il comporte, ce sérail semble avoir bénéficié d'un soin tout particulier pour sa décoration, et le scribe chargé d'en consigner la description évoque à maintes reprises les bassins dont il est équipé, les plafonds en bois dont il est doté, les magnifiques peintures dont il est revêtu et les diverses sortes de pierres et de marbres qui recouvrent son sol et ses murs. Ce sont ces divers matériaux—mais aussi le verre—que nous retrouvons dans les documents juridiques concernant les travaux entrepris dans ce bâtiment par Isma'il Pacha.⁷³

Entre les mois de *sha'ban* 1141-*safar* 1142/mars-septembre 1729, quelques documents concernent des travaux réalisés exclusivement dans le sérail par divers artisans, notamment un peintre, des tailleurs

⁷⁰ RTD 60/392/825 ; 63/13/38 ; 63/14/39 ; 63/118/314 ; 63/223/600 ; 63/224/601 ; 63/224/602 ; 63/224/603 ; 63/224/604 ; 63/224/605 ; 63/225/606.

⁷¹ RTD 199/168/253 ; 199/230/291 ; je remercie Stefan Weber de m'avoir indiqué la référence de ces deux documents.

⁷² Pour une description du sérail d'As'ad Pacha al-'Azam, établie par Muhammad Khalil Beyk al-'Azam au début du XX^e siècle, cf. Iskandar Ma'luf, 'Qasr Āl al-'Azam fī Dimashq', *al-Mashriq* 24, 1926.

⁷³ Pour une description plus complète du sérail d'Isma'il Pacha, cf. Brigitte Marino, 'Le sérail d'Isma'il Pacha al-'Azam à Damas', in Ghislaine Alleaume, Sylvie Denoix, Michel Tuchscherer, éds., *Histoire, archéologies et littératures du monde musulman: Études réunies en l'honneur d'André Raymond*, Cairo, Institut français d'archéologie orientale 2009, 39–56.

de pierre, un charpentier et un égoutier, pour un montant global de 14 835 *qursh*.

Le 2 *sha'ban* 1141/mars 1729, un peintre, Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Dahhan, atteste avoir reçu 2 100 *qursh* pour avoir peint les parties basses et hautes (*al-amakin al-sufliyya wa'l-'ulwiyya*) du sérail. Il s'agit plus précisément des *qa'a*, des fermetures en bois (*aghlaq*), des renforcements à étagères (*kattabi*), des placards (*kharastin*), de l'*iwan*, des fenêtres (*shababik*) et des balustrades (*darabzinat*).⁷⁴

Le même jour, un autre artisan, al-Hajj 'Abd al-Qadir, atteste quant à lui avoir perçu 725 *qursh* ; outre 5 *qursh* consacrés à l'aménagement des foyers (*ujaqat*), 515 *qursh* correspondent à la fourniture de plâtre (*jibsin*) et 205 *qursh* à l'équipement des *qamariyya/qumriyya* (?) (pl. *qamari*), ouvertures vitrées situées en hauteur et destinées à laisser passer la lumière dans les pièces.⁷⁵ Des milliers de plaques de verre (*lawh ballur*)—ainsi que du verre de couleur (*ballur mulawwan*)—ont été fournis par cet artisan pour équiper ces lucarnes.⁷⁶

Le poste budgétaire le plus important concerne le marbre et les pierres : le 16 *dhu al-qa'da* 1141/juin 1729, deux tailleurs de pierre (*nahhat*) chrétiens, Sulayman, fils de Ya'qub, et Ilyas, fils d'Ibrahim, attestent avoir perçu 8600 *qursh* pour fournir des matériaux et réaliser divers travaux :

⁷⁴ RTD 63/13/38. Sur le *dahhan*, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 148–149. Selon la description qui est faite de ce sérail en 1190/1776, la quasi-totalité des pièces (*iwan*, *qa'a*, *murabba'*, *qasr*) sont équipées de renforcements à étagères (*kattabi*), de placards (*kharastin*) et de niches (*musabbat*). Les fermetures en bois (*aghlaq*) sont quant à elles signalées pour les portes des trois *murabba'* situés dans le *barrani*, mais aussi pour la porte reliant le *barrani* au *juwwani* (RTD 199/168/253 ; 199/230/291).

⁷⁵ Les sources consultées proposent diverses vocalisations de ce terme, tantôt mis en relation avec la lumière de la lune (*qamar*), tantôt avec la présence de pigeons (*qumri*). Sur cet élément architectural, cf. Bernard Maury, 'La maison damascène au XVIII^e et au début du XIX^e siècle', in *L'habitat traditionnel dans les pays musulmans autour de la Méditerranée*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1988, 9, 12 ; Tawfiq Canaan, 'The Palestinian Arab House : its Architecture and Folklore, II', *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* 13, 1933, 9. Pour les *hammad*, cf. Adrien Barthélémy, *Dictionnaire Arabe-Français. Dialectes de Syrie : Alep, Damas, Liban, Jérusalem*, Paris, Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1950, 681 ; Ecochard et Le Coeur, *Les bains de Damas*, 37 ; Kayyal, 'al-Hammamat al-Dimashqiyya', 227.

⁷⁶ RTD 63/14/39. Sur le *qamarji/qumarji* (?), artisan spécialisé dans l'équipement des *qamariyya/qumriyya* avec du plâtre et du verre, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 363. Selon la description qui est faite de ce sérail en 1190/1776 (199/168/253 ; 199/230/291), les *qamariyya/qumriyya* sont situées dans les *qa'a*. Sur les *qamariyya/qumriyya* du sérail d'As'ad Pacha, cf. Ma'luf, 'Qasr Âl al-'Azim', 12–15.

- paver le sol du sérail (*barrani* et *juwwani*) avec du marbre (*rukham*) et diverses sortes de pierres (*qari*,⁷⁷ *mizzi*,⁷⁸ *latun*,⁷⁹ etc.) (3 350 *qursh*)
- construire quatorze bassins (325 *qursh*)
- fournir du schiste (*qari*) pour les pièces (*masakin*) (470 *qursh*)
- procurer 32 000 pierres *ablaq* (4 160 *qursh*)⁸⁰ pour construire le *barrani* (18 000 pierres, 2 340 *qursh*) et le *juwwani* (14 000 pierres, 1 820 *qursh*).⁸¹

Le 18 *dhu al-hijja* 1141/juillet 1729, un charpentier (*najjar*), al-Hajj Muhammad al-Mawardi, atteste quant à lui avoir perçu 2 550 *qursh* représentant son salaire et celui de ses ouvriers pour la construction de tous les plafonds ainsi que tous les travaux de menuiserie dans le sérail.⁸²

Le 17 *muharram* 1142/août 1729, un autre artisan, al-Shaykh Yusuf b. al-Shaykh Isma'îl, atteste avoir perçu 390 *qursh* pour de petites pièces de bois (*bawari*) qu'il a vendues et qui ont été installées sur les plafonds du sérail,⁸³ et le 29 *safar* 1142/septembre 1729, un égoutier (*qanayati*) chrétien, Musa, fils de Ni'ma, atteste avoir perçu 470 *qursh* pour la construction de canalisations d'eau pour le sérail, notamment pour les bassins.⁸⁴

⁷⁷ Le *qari* est du schiste provenant du village de Qara situé au nord de Damas, aux environs de Nabak ; Ecohard et Le Coeur, *Les bains de Damas*, I, 36.

⁷⁸ Le terme *mizzi* désigne une qualité de pierre très robuste dont il existe différentes teintes ; Canaan, 'The Palestinian Arab House, I', 232–34.

⁷⁹ Le terme *latun* désigne une qualité de pierre à bâtir provenant des carrières de Tell et Mnin ; Jean Sauvaget, 'Notes lexicographiques sur le vocabulaire de la construction à Damas', in *Mélanges William Marçais*, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1950, 309.

⁸⁰ Sur le terme *ablaq*, qui fait référence à un décor composé de pierres de différentes couleurs, cf. Boqvist, *Architecture et développement urbain*, 279–282. Une centaine de pierres *ablaq* coûtent donc 13 *qursh*, comme cela est d'ailleurs noté dans l'acte.

⁸¹ RTD 63/118/314. Sur le *nahhat*, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 479.

⁸² RTD 63/224/603.

⁸³ RTD 63/224/604. Sur les *bawari*, cf. 'Isa Abu Salim, *al-Asnaf wa'l-tawa'if al-hira-yya fi madinat Dimashq khilal al-nisf al-awwal min al-qarn al-thamin 'ashar*, Amman, Dar al-fikr li'l-tiba'a wa'l-nashr wa'l-tawzi', 2000, 272.

⁸⁴ RTD 63/224/602. Comme nous venons de le voir plus haut, selon un document établi quelques semaines plus tôt, ces bassins seraient au nombre de quatorze (RTD 63/118/314). Sur le *qanayati*, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 365–66.

Travaux dans le hammam (Kharab) et dans le sérail (Nur al-Din)

Plusieurs documents établis entre les mois de *rajab* 1141 et *safar* 1142 (février–septembre 1729) concernent le paiement des travaux réalisés par les mêmes artisans dans le *hammam* situé dans le quartier de Kharab⁸⁵ et dans le sérail situé dans le quartier de Nur al-Din. Pour ces travaux qui semblent avoir été réalisés de manière concomitante, 16 080 *qursh* ont été dépensés au cours de ces quelques mois. Il s'agit à la fois du prix des matériaux (marbre, pierres), du coût de la main d'œuvre pour la construction (*ta'mir*), le dallage (*tablit*) des sols et le revêtement (*tatyin*) des terrasses, et de la vente de cendres (*qasrmill*) par neuf membres de la corporation des tenanciers de *hammam* (*hammamin*).⁸⁶ Voici le détail des différentes sommes perçues par ces artisans.

Le 3 *rajab* 1141/février 1729, deux tailleurs de pierre (*nahhat*) chrétiens, Sulayman, fils de Ya'qub, et Ilyas, fils d'Ibrahim, attestent avoir perçu une somme de 7 725 *qursh* pour la fourniture de divers matériaux (marbre, schiste, *mizzi*, *latun*) utilisés pour le *hammam* et le sérail, sans que le bâtiment en question soit toujours systématiquement désigné dans le document.⁸⁷

Le 18 *dhu al-hijja* 1141/juillet 1729, deux maçons (*mi'mari*) chrétiens, Hanna, fils de Musa, et Ni'ma, fils de Mansur, attestent avoir perçu 4 300 *qursh* pour la construction (*ta'mir*) du *hammam* et du sérail dans leur totalité (*min al-asas ila al-ra's*) : 3 200 *qursh* pour le *hammam* et la partie extérieure (*barrani*) du sérail, et 1 100 *qursh* pour la partie intérieure (*juwwani*) du sérail.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Dans les documents suivants, le *hammam* est localisé à proximité de Mi'dhanat al-Shahm, quartier contigu à celui de Kharab. Pour une description sommaire de ce *hammam* en 1150/1737 et 1154/1741, cf. RTD 87/50/94, 104/75/126. Notons qu'il existe des règles particulières concernant la construction des *hammam* ; sur cette question, cf. Muhammad 'Uthman, 'Fiqh 'imarat al-hammamat fi al-'asr al-'uthmani. Dirasa tatbiqiyya 'ala thalatha min al-hammamat fi Sa'id Misr', *Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies* 23, 2001, 277–347.

⁸⁶ Mélangées à de la chaux et du chanvre, ces cendres sont utilisées pour le revêtement des terrasses ; Qasimi, *Qamus*, 296 ; Abu Salim, *al-Asnaf wa'l-tawā'if al-hirafiyya*, 276. Sur l'utilisation des cendres (*ramad*) dans le domaine de la construction en Égypte à l'époque médiévale, cf. Moshe Gil, 'Maintenance, Building Operations, and Repairs in the Houses of the Qodesh in Fustat. A Geniza Study', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 14, 1971, 152, 155. Cf. également Canaan, 'The Palestinian Arab House, II', 24.

⁸⁷ RTD 60/392/825.

⁸⁸ RTD 63/224/601. Sur le *mi'mari*, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 458.

Par ailleurs, le 28 *dhu al-hijja* 1141/juillet 1729, neuf membres de la corporation des tenanciers de *hammam* (*hammamin*)⁸⁹ attestent avoir perçu 1 140 *qursh* pour le *qasrmill* qu'ils ont fourni au gouverneur :⁹⁰

- 1 000 *qursh* correspondent à 54 700 paniers (*quffa*) de *qasrmill*⁹¹
- 140 *qursh* correspondent au *qasrmill* fourni pour les canalisations des deux *hammam* que possède le gouverneur, ainsi que pour la construction d'un pont enjambant le Barada, le pont de Sadr al-Baz.⁹²

Le 18 *muharram* 1142/août 1729, un chauxfournier (*kallas*) atteste avoir perçu 500 *qursh* pour le revêtement du sérail et du *hammam* (toits, murs et sols).⁹³

Le 11 *safar* 1142/septembre 1729, trois artisans (deux musulmans et un chrétien) attestent avoir perçu 2 415 *qursh* pour l'achat de briques (*ajur*) et de chaux (*kils*) destinées à la construction du *hammam* et du sérail.⁹⁴

Travaux de peinture dans la résidence mitoyenne du sérail

Nous disposons d'un seul document, daté du 29 *dhu al-qa'da* 1141/juin 1729, concernant les travaux entrepris dans la maison située à proxim-

⁸⁹ Sur le *hammami*, cf. Ibid., 107–12.

⁹⁰ Parfois, des conflits surgissent au sein de la corporation des tenanciers de *hammam* concernant le paiement du *qasrmill* qu'ils ont fourni pour la réalisation de certains travaux. Ainsi, le 19 *safar* 1145/août 1732, soit deux ans après la fin des fonctions d'Isma'il Pacha comme gouverneur de Damas, près d'une cinquantaine de tenanciers de *hammam* accusent trois personnes, dont le *shaykh* de leur corporation, de ne pas leur avoir transmis la somme de 370 *qursh* qu'ils ont perçue de la part du gouverneur en contrepartie du *qasrmill* qu'ils ont fourni lors de la construction des deux *suq* à proximité de la citadelle (RTD 64/197/384).

⁹¹ 41 000 paniers pour la construction du sérail (750 *qursh*) ; 13 700 paniers pour la construction du *hammam* (250 *qursh*).

⁹² RTD 63/223/600. Isma'il Pacha a entrepris de construire (*ansha'a ta'mira-hu*) ce pont avant le 4 *shawwal* 1140/mai 1728 ; mentionné dans un acte de location portant cette date, il est situé à l'ouest de Damas, près de la citadelle et de l'hippodrome (*mal'ab al-khayl*) (RTD 60/345/736). Sur Sadr al-Baz, cf. Qutayba al-Shihabi, *Mu'jam Dimashq al-Ta'rikhi*, Damas, Manshurat wizarat al-thaqafa, 1999, II, 70.

⁹³ RTD 63/224/605. Sur le *kallas*, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 392.

⁹⁴ RTD 63/225/606. Ces artisans sont des '*atuniyyin*' ; sur ce terme, désignant des personnes qui vendent de la chaux et des briques, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 34. Des travaux pour lesquels nous disposons simplement d'une allusion dans ce document, ont été également entrepris pour un moulin (Tahun 'Ayn al-Lu'liyya), des abattoirs (*masalik bi-Mahallat al-Abbarin*), des ateliers/boutiques (*hawanit*) et le *hammam* de Suq al-Khayyatin, ainsi que pour les canalisations reliant les deux *hammam* au Qanawat.

ité du Mahkamat al-Bab, mitoyenne du sérail d'Isma'il Pacha, du côté occidental, et qui, comme nous l'avons déjà signalé, est qualifiée de 'nouvelle' (*jadida*). Il s'agit de travaux pour lesquels un peintre, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Ibrahim al-Dahhan, déclare qu'il a loué ses services et ceux de ses peintres à Hasan Agha b. Dhi al-Fiqar Agha, *qa'imaqam* d'Isma'il Pacha al-'Azam. C'est ce même artisan qui, quelques mois plus tôt, le 2 *sha'ban* 1141/mars 1729, avait reçu 2 100 *qursh* pour peindre le sérail du gouverneur.

Dans cette maison, les travaux, évalués à 500 *qursh*, sont effectués dans toutes les pièces prestigieuses : la *qa'a gharbiyya*, l'*iwan*, le *murabba' gharbi*, le *murabba' sharqi*, le *qasr gharbi*, le *qasr sharqi*, l'*iwan 'ulwi*, le *diwan khanah* et le *qasr sharqi* situé au-dessus de la rue.⁹⁵ Il est question de peindre des plafonds '*ajami*' avec un type de décor particulier, des 'tours stambouliotes' (*burj islambuli*) dont le nombre est précisé pour chacune des pièces (5 dans l'*iwan*, 14 dans chacun des deux *qasr*, 6 dans l'*iwan 'ulwi*) et 18 dans le *qasr sharqi* situé au-dessus de la rue.⁹⁶

Notons que, parmi les pièces évoquées ici, la *qa'a*, l'*iwan 'ulwi* et le *diwankhanah* ne figurent pas dans la description de la maison qu'achète Isma'il Pacha au mois de *jumada I* 1140/décembre 1727 dans Mahallat Nur al-Din, à proximité de Suq al-Silah. S'il ne s'agit pas de deux maisons différentes, il se peut, comme le laissait entrevoir la location d'un terrain en friche mitoyen de la maison au mois de *rabi' I* 1141/octobre 1728, que des travaux d'agrandissement aient été entrepris dans celle-ci.⁹⁷

Travaux réalisés dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin

Trois documents nous informent par ailleurs qu'Isma'il Pacha envisage d'entreprendre des travaux dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin.

Le 20 *sha'ban* 1141/mars 1729, un certain Ibrahim b. al-Hajj Ahmad atteste qu'il a reçu 600 *qursh* de la part du mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha pour l'accomplissement de plusieurs tâches : évacuer, sur ses bêtes de somme, la terre 'noire' d'un terrain autrefois occupé par le Khan al-'Attalin et la terre dégagée du mur et des dépôts (*makhazin*)

⁹⁵ Pour une définition de ces diverses pièces, cf. Pascual, 'Du notaire au propriétaire'; Marino, *Le faubourg du Midan*, 223-38.

⁹⁶ RTD 63/101/267.

⁹⁷ Cf. *supra* 'Des investissements résidentiels dans le quartier de Nur al-Din'; RTD 60/307/663, RTD 64/71/126.

septentrionaux du Khan al-Fuwwa,⁹⁸ jeter la terre 'noire' dégagée du mur méridional de la Qaysariyya Tanam,⁹⁹ et apporter de la terre 'rouge' en quantité suffisante pour construire une nouvelle *qaysariyya* sur le terrain autrefois occupé par le Khan al-'Attalin et plusieurs boutiques/ateliers (*hanut*) à la place des murs du Khan al-Fuwwa et de la Qasariyya Tanam.¹⁰⁰

Trois mois plus tard, le 5 *dhu al-qa'da* 1141/juin 1729, le mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha loue, pour 8 000 *qursh*, les services de cinq maçons chrétiens qu'il charge de construire deux *qaysariyya* et un *suq* de vingt *dukkan* sur deux terrains appartenant au gouverneur, près du Suq al-Buzuriyyin, à la place de la Qaysariyya al-Fuwwa, au sud, et du Khan al-'Attalin, au nord. Il s'agit notamment de construire soixante entrepôts (*makhzan*), de plain-pied (*sufliyya*) et à l'étage (*'ulwiyya*), ainsi que quatre coupoles (deux dans chaque *khan*) ; paver le sol des deux *khan* (*tablit ard al-khanayn*) ; construire deux bassins (*bahra*) et leurs canalisations (*siyaq ma'*), ainsi que quatre toilettes (*murtafaq*) et un égout (*tariq al-awsakh*) ; construire, en face des deux *qaysariyya*, un nouveau *suq* comprenant vingt *dukkan*, chaque *dukkan* étant doté d'une voûte (*qabw*) et d'un arc en pierre (*qaws hajar*) ; construire le toit du *suq* et, pour celui-ci, deux portails dotés chacun d'un arc en

⁹⁸ Le Khan al-Fuwwa est consacré à la vente de la garance, plante dont on extrait une teinture rouge. Le 10 *dhu al-qa'da* 1140/juin 1728, soit quelques mois seulement avant les travaux entrepris par Isma'il Pacha dans ce secteur, le Khan al-Fuwwa est toujours en activité : un militaire, Mustafa Beshe b. Sha'ban Beshe, y détient la ferme de la pesée (*malikana qabban*). Une plainte est déposée ce jour-là par plusieurs personnes dont le *shaykh* des teinturiers (*shaykh al-sabbaghin*)-contre le locataire de ce *khan*. Ils rappellent que depuis longtemps (*qadim al-zaman*) la garance est, selon une habitude ancienne (*al-'ada al-qadima*), apportée et pesée dans le Khan al-Fuwwa et achetée par les membres de la corporation des teinturiers (*ta'ifat al-sabbaghin*) qui la font broyer par des 'meuniers' (*tahhanin*) spécialisés dans cette activité sans que quiconque exerce un quelconque monopole (*ihlikar*) dans ce domaine. Or, selon eux, le locataire du *khan* et un de ses parents achètent la garance et la revendent ensuite aux teinturiers à un prix plus élevé ; le juge fait alors savoir au locataire du *khan* qu'il ne doit pas empêcher les teinturiers d'acheter la garance et lui interdit de s'en arroger le monopole (RTD 59/312/663). Dans le quartier de Kharab se trouve, à la même époque, un local spécialisé dans le broyage de la garance (*makan mu'add li-tihn al-fuwwa*) (RTD 66/115/260 ; 66/115/261 ; 66/121/275). Sur la garance, cf. Establet et Pascual, *Des tissus et des hommes*, 99.

⁹⁹ Le 3 *ramadan* 1141/avril 1729, les décombres dégagés du mur méridional de la Qaysariyya Tanam sont achetés pour 125 *qursh* par un chrétien, Hanna, fils de Niqula, aux descendants de Tanam qui assurent la gestion de son *waqf* ; RTD 63/252/675.

¹⁰⁰ RTD 63/118/313. Sur les vendeurs de terre 'rouge', cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 67-68. Sur l'utilisation de la terre 'rouge' dans le domaine de la construction, cf. Qasimi, *Qamus*, 296.

pierre (*bawwabayn bi-qawsayn li'l-suq*) ; construire deux portes pour les *qaysariyya* ; évacuer la terre 'noire' du Khan al-Fuwwa et apporter de la terre 'rouge'. Tout cela est à la charge des maçons ; le gouverneur doit, quant à lui, fournir divers matériaux : briques (*ajur*), chaux (*kils*), chanvre (*qinnab*), cendres (*qasrmill*), plâtre (*jibsin*), fer (*hadid*), etc.¹⁰¹

Le mois suivant, le 16 *dhu al-hijja* 1141/juillet 1729, neuf tenanciers de hammam (*hammamin*) attestent avoir perçu du mandataire d'Isma'il Pacha 525 qursh ; en contrepartie de cette somme, ils s'engagent à fournir les cendres (*qasrmill*) nécessaires à l'achèvement de la construction des deux nouvelles *qayasariyya* (*tatimmat 'imarat al-qasariyyatayn al-jadidatayn*) près du Suq al-Buzuriyyin, à la place de la Qasariyya al-'Attalin et de la Qaysariyya al-Fuwwa, et à la construction des nouveaux *hanut* situés entre les deux *qaysariyya* et la Qaysariyya Tanam ; tout cela sera transporté sur leurs bêtes de somme jusque dans les lieux mentionnés.¹⁰²

D'après les documents dont nous disposons actuellement, nous ignorons si tous ces travaux ont été achevés à l'époque d'Isma'il Pacha mais il semble qu'ils aient été réalisés, du moins en partie, car, un quart de siècle plus tard, au mois de *rabi' I* 1166/février 1753, la *qaysariyya* et le *suq* d'Isma'il Pacha sont signalés dans ce secteur.¹⁰³

Conclusion

Après un dix-septième siècle au cours duquel l'histoire urbaine de Damas demeure quelque peu obscure, Isma'il Pacha renoue donc avec le dynamisme de ses prédécesseurs du XVI^e siècle en opérant notamment des aménagements à proximité de la citadelle et, dans la ville intra-muros, au sud de la Mosquée des Omeyyades. Les informations fournies par les actes juridiques sur les constructions édifiées par Isma'il Pacha dans ce secteur de la ville, qu'il transforme en un vaste chantier, sont particulièrement importantes car elles nous renseignent

¹⁰¹ RTD 63/240/643.

¹⁰² RTD 63/117/311.

¹⁰³ RTD 139/43/54 ; 139/98/112 ; 139/134/148. D'après les indications topographiques données dans les divers documents dont nous disposons actuellement, la *Qaysariyya* d'Isma'il Pacha pourrait être le Khan al-Ruzz, situé au sud du Khan As'ad Pacha, et son *suq* pourrait être le Suq al-Saqqalin, situé entre ces deux *khan*. Sur le Khan al-Ruzz, cf. F. Yahia, *Inventaire archéologique*, 456–59. Sur le Suq al-Saqqalin, cf. Qutayba al-Shihabi, *Aswaq Dimashq al-qadima wa mushayyadatu-ha al-ta'rikhiyya*, Damas, Manshurat wizarat al-thaqafa, 1990, 242–43 ; Shihabi, *Mu'jam*, II, 43.

sur des bâtiments qui, en dépit de leur importance, ne sont, à notre connaissance, mentionnés dans aucune autre source.

Quelques décennies après le décès d'Isma'il Pacha, ces édifices étaient connus sous le nom du gouverneur mais celui-ci s'est peu à peu effacé de la mémoire collective. Dans le cas du sérail situé dans le quartier de Nur al-Din, cela peut s'expliquer par le fait que ce bâtiment—dont il ne reste aujourd'hui que des vestiges à proximité de la Madrasa 'Abd Allah Pacha al-'Azm—a été racheté, relativement tôt, par d'autres membres de la famille 'Azm. Quant aux bâtiments à vocation économique situés dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin, ils semblent avoir connu le même sort que d'autres bâtiments de ce type qui ne sont pas spontanément désignés par le nom de leur constructeur (comme le Khan al-Jukhiyya édifié par Ahmad Shamsi Pacha, le Khan al-Harir par Darwish Pacha, ou le Khan al-Jumruk par Murad Pacha). Mais, à la différence de ces gouverneurs dont les édifices ne portent pas le nom mais qui sont connus comme leurs fondateurs, Isma'il Pacha n'a jamais été identifié, à notre connaissance, comme le constructeur de bâtiments dans le Suq al-Buzuriyyin.

En tant que gouverneur de Damas, Isma'il Pacha modifie profondément, au sud de la Mosquée des Omeyyades, la configuration d'un secteur qui, si l'on en juge par la quantité de terrains en friche et de bâtiments détruits évoqués dans les documents, comporte alors de nombreuses zones laissées à l'abandon depuis longtemps. C'est ce que montrent, notamment, les inspections de bâtiments par des délégations d'experts envoyées sur place par le juge.

De nombreux artisans chrétiens ont étroitement collaboré aux divers travaux entrepris par Isma'il Pacha, ce qui illustre leur rôle dans le domaine de la construction à Damas à cette époque.¹⁰⁴ Ils se distinguent notamment comme tailleurs de pierres (*nahhat*),¹⁰⁵ maçons (*mi'mari*),¹⁰⁶ égoutiers (*qanayati*),¹⁰⁷ ou vendeurs de briques et de chaux (*atuni*).¹⁰⁸

Si les travaux entrepris par Isma'il Pacha pour son sérail, sa maison, son second *hammam* (celui de Kharab), ses *qaysariyya* et son *suq*

¹⁰⁴ Sur la participation des chrétiens aux travaux entrepris quelques années plus tard par Sulayman Pacha al-'Azm, cf. Marino, 'Les investissements de Sulayman Pacha', 220.

¹⁰⁵ RTD 60/392/825 ; 63/118/312 ; 63/118/314.

¹⁰⁶ RTD 63/240/643 ; 63/224/601.

¹⁰⁷ RTD 63/224/602.


¹⁰⁸ RTD 63/225/606.

sont relativement bien documentés, certaines zones d'ombre subsistent toutefois sur la nature des travaux entrepris pour la *madrasa* et le *hammam* du Suq al-Khayyatin. Par ailleurs, nous ne connaissons jusqu'à présent que le *waqf* qu'Isma'il Pacha constitua en 1138/1726 à proximité de la citadelle. Des documents postérieurs indiquent qu'Isma'il Pacha constitua d'autres biens en *waqf*: des actes de location concernant le *hammam* du quartier de Kharab dans les années 1150–1154/1737–1741¹⁰⁹ et celui du Suq al-Khayyatin en 1171/1758¹¹⁰ indiquent en effet que ces bâtiments font partie de son *waqf*. Mais nous ignorons s'il s'agit de biens rajoutés au *waqf* que nous connaissons ou bien d'un autre *waqf* qui aurait été constitué à un autre moment.¹¹¹ La découverte de nouveaux documents permettra, nous l'espérons, de compléter nos informations sur les stratégies et les réalisations d'Isma'il Pacha al-'Azm à Damas.

¹⁰⁹ RTD 87/50/94 ; 104/75/126. À cette époque, le *nazir* du *waqf* d'Isma'il Pacha est son fils Sa'd al-Din.

¹¹⁰ RTD 152/29/65. À cette époque, le *nazir* du *waqf* d'Isma'il Pacha est son petit-fils Mustafa.

¹¹¹ On peut noter l'ajout de biens au *waqf* que nous connaissons ou l'existence d'un autre *waqf* dès 1142/1729 (RTD 63/389/993).



THE SALIHIYYA QUARTER OF DAMASCUS AT THE
BEGINNING OF OTTOMAN RULE: THE AMBIGUOUS
RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND
WAQF PROPERTIES

TORU MIURA

It is widely accepted in the field of urban studies that *waqf* foundations played a crucial role in the development of Middle Eastern cities. The famous traveller, Ibn Battuta, visiting Damascus in 726/1326,¹ reported that the people of Damascus vied with one another to build and endow mosques, Sufi convents, colleges (*madrasas*), and tomb-shrines, and that the various historical and topographical sources for Damascus from the sixth/twelfth to the fourteenth/twentieth centuries provide us with rich information on the religious institutions founded by *waqf* endowments, as well as the *waqf* properties donated to support them. Table 1, 'Religious and Economic Institutions in Damascus', shows that the number of mosques increased by one and one-half times in two periods, first from the twelfth to the thirteenth century, and then again from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. The number of *madrasas* and Sufi convents doubled between the thirteenth and the sixteenth century. By the end of the Mamluk period (1250–1517), 152 *madrasas* had been founded in Damascus, 72 of them (47.7 per cent) founded in a short period of 80 years under the Ayyubid dynasty (1174–1260).²

Studying *waqf* endowment activity in the cities of Syria is difficult because of the scarcity of surviving endowment deeds. No deeds have been found for Ayyubid or Mamluk Syria, whereas the small number of endowments made by sultans and emirs in medieval Egypt are well known and have been used for study. Although documents relating to *waqf* endowment in Ottoman Syria are rare in comparison with those

¹ Ibn Battuta, *Voyages d'Ibn Battoutah*, G. Defrémery and B.R. Sanguinetti (eds.), 4 vols, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1874, 1, 237–40.

² Toru Miura, 'The Salihyya Quarter in the Suburbs of Damascus: Its Formation, Structure, and Transformation in the Ayyubid and Mamluk Periods', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, 47, 1995, 139 and Table 2. I should correct the number of *madrasas* founded in the Ayyubid period to 72, instead of 71 in my previous paper.

Table 1: Religious and Economic Institutions in Damascus

	The Latter Half of the 12C		The Latter Half of the 13C		Beginnings of the 16th Century	Increase in Rate				
						12c→13c	13c→16c			
Religious	Mosques	242	178	420	280	380	660	1000	1.57	1.52
	Jami's	1		1	1	4	5	31		
	Madrasas	x	x	23	63	36	89	152	3.87	1.71
	Sufi Convents	x	x	x			38	76		
	Churches			15			30	x	2.00	
	Tombs			x			x	81		
Economic	Markets			x			x	162		
	Public Baths	40	17	57			117	157	2.05	1.34
	Caravansarais			x			x	64		

of Ottoman Egypt and Turkey, some pioneering studies have been done on the urban development of Damascus using *waqf* endowment deeds found at the Zahiriyā Library and other documents recorded in the shariʿa court registers.³ Since the sources are so limited, most studies have concentrated either on the development of religious institutions in particular cities, based on geographical and historical narrative sources, or on case studies of major institutions, based on *waqf* foundation deeds. The spread of *waqf* investment among ordinary people, as Ibn Battuta described it, has rarely come under scholarly scrutiny.

I have already published on the urban development of a suburban quarter of Damascus, al-Salihiyya, during the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods in 1995,⁴ based mainly on such narrative sources. This quarter was founded by a Hanbali family, the Qudamas, who had migrated to Damascus from Palestine in 551/1156 after its occupation by the Crusaders. During the Mamluk era, a large number of religious institutions were constructed in the Salihiyya quarter, including 7 *jamiʿs*, 30 *madrasas*, 155 mosques, 49 Sufi convents, and 65 personal tombs. The quarter's 30 *madrasas* represent about 20 per cent of all the *madrasas* in Damascus and have notable features. First, 70 per cent of them (21) were constructed during about under the eighty odd years of Ayyubid rule in Damascus (570/1174–658/1260). Second, 63.0 per cent of the founders were from the military. Such rapid development was due to the activity of the Hanbali ʿulama, who attracted sufficient sympathy and support to overcome differences between the ʿulama and the military, and between the various law schools. This study, however, also depends on an analysis of the foundation of major religious institutions and therefore will not present the complete scope of *waqf* activities in the Salihiyya quarter.

After the Ottomans conquered Syria and began to rule, they conducted several land surveys and left many land survey registers. Some registers recorded existing *waqf* properties in the province of Damascus, including numerous small endowments made by ordinary people.

³ Jean-Paul Pascual, *Damas à la fin du XVI^e siècle d'après trois actes de waqf ottomans*, tome 1, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1983; Randi Deguilhem (ed.), *Le Waqf dans l'espace islamique: outil de pouvoir socio-politique*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1995; Richard van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures; The Case of Ottoman Damascus*, Leiden, Brill, 1999.

⁴ Toru Miura, 'The Salihiyya Quarter...'

In this paper, I shall attempt to analyse waqf endowment activity and its effect on urban development in the Salihiyya Quarter, thus extending our horizon to the smaller endowments listed in these registers.

Waqf Survey by the Ottoman Government in the sixteenth Century

After defeating the Mamluk army led by Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri at Marj Dabiq in Shaʿban 922 / June 1516, Sultan Selim entered Damascus with some 200,000 soldiers, and the citizens of the city surrendered on 1st Ramadan / July 1516. He distributed about 100 dirhams per person to the personnel of various mosques and *madrasas*. In Dhu'l-Qa'da he visited the tomb of Ibn al-ʿArabi in the Salihiyya Quarter and dispersed dirham coins to its inhabitants. He then left Damascus to conquer Egypt with his army, arriving there in Muharram 923 / January 1517 and returning to Damascus in Ramadan / September 1517. He then ordered a survey of the inhabitants and *waqf* properties and also began to construct a new congregational mosque at the site of Ibn al-ʿArabi's tomb in Ramadan 923. The minbar was erected in Muharram in the following year and a celebration was performed.⁵

The chronicle of Ibn Tulun gives a detailed report of the conduct of the *waqf* survey. The new Ottoman qadi, Zayn al-ʿAbidin, was in charge of this survey using local Damascene staff. First, they ordered the superintendents of *waqf* properties to appear and to submit their accounts for the previous two years for examination. Some of them appeared before the qadi and his staff, who then took the *waqf* documents, after which the some of the superintendents fled. Next day the investigators sent a letter to al-Nuʿaymi⁶ to bring his book (*al-Daris*) to them, for they wished to survey the waqf (institutions and properties) by getting information about the religious institutions in Damascus from his book. al-Nuʿaymi criticized them, saying it was customary to make up the list by surveying *waqf* properties under the names of the individual founders one by one. They asked him to show them his book, but he refused and instead wrote the names of the *madrasas*

⁵ Ibn Tulun, ed. Muhammad Mustafa, *Mufakahat al-khillan fi hawadith al-zaman*, 2 vols., Cairo, 1962–64, 2: 65, 68, 79–80. Ibn Tulun (d. 953/1546) was a Hanbali scholar living in Damascus who wrote the chronicle of Damascus during the transition from the Mamluks to Ottomans and a local history of the Salihiyya quarter.

⁶ Shafi'i jurist of Damascus; wrote a famous urban geography of Damascus titled *al-Daris fi ta'rikh al-madaris* (d. 927/1521).

on a piece of paper. Furthermore, al-Nu‘aymi and Ibn Tulun, who abridged al-Nu‘aymi’s book, sent their agents to the qadi, as he wished to know the names of the founders of the *madrasas*. They told him the names in order to give evidence about the *waqf* to the qadi. The following month, the qadi Zayn al-‘Abidin and his local staff went to the Salihiyya quarter to make an inventory of the *madrasas* there. They began at the Maridaniya Madrasa and moved to the Jadid Jami‘, where they met Ibn Tulun. He told them it was still active, and they registered it in the list of existing *waqf* institutions.⁷

This report has three noteworthy points. First, an Ottoman administrator like the qadi needed assistance from local Damascene staff and the local ‘ulama to conduct a *waqf* survey, for the Ottoman qadi had no information about the institutions or their properties. Second, both al-Nu‘aymi and Ibn Tulun hesitated to cooperate with the Ottoman survey, but finally they gave information about the *awqaf*, whether founder or institution, as evidence of existing rights. Third, the topographical sources such as those noted by al-Nu‘aymi and the knowledge of the ‘ulama were both of practical use, and did not serve simply as historical records.

Four registers recording existing *waqf* properties in Damascus in the sixteenth century remain at the *Başbakanlık Arşivi* (Archive of the Prime Minister’s Office) in Istanbul. They are:

Tapu Tahrir Defteri No. 127 recorded in 932/1525–26, 188 pages

Tapu Tahrir Defteri No. 393 no date, 954/1547–48, 259 pages

Tapu Tahrir Defteri No. 602 recorded in 990/1582–83, 496 pages

Tapu Tahrir Defteri No. 656 recorded in the reign of Sultan Murad III (1574–95), 348 pages⁸

Register No. 127, was used to record the income and expenditure of the religious institutions in Damascus, as well as the other three registered *waqf* properties in the first section and the *millk* properties (private properties) in the latter section. The aim of the Ottoman land survey

⁷ Ibn Tulun, *Mufakahat al-khillan fi hawadith al-zaman*, 2: 73–75.

⁸ My research on TTD was first conducted in 1994–95, with supplementary research in 2003–04, with financial support from the Japan Foundation and the Toyo Bunko in Japan. These registers have not been studied until now, but Michael Winter mentioned them as important sources on *waqf* donation in the province of Damascus in his paper ‘Mamluks and their Households in late Mamluk Damascus: A Waqf Study’, in Michael Winter and Amalia Levanoni, eds., *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, Leiden, Brill, 2004, 297.

was to assess the tax revenues in each province to assign them to the Ottoman military. Registers of *waqf* and private properties were listed separately from those of state land, for the tax rates on *waqf* and private properties were smaller, and the *waqf* properties actually might be exempt from taxation. Registration was therefore required for owners of private property and the superintendents of *waqf* property. Indeed, Ibn Tulun reported in Safar 938/1531 that the Ottoman inspector had called upon the owners of *milk* and *waqf* superintendents to pay tax on the plants in their gardens.⁹

The registers recorded the *waqf* endowment deeds in a summary with the following items: name of founder, purpose of endowment, year of documentation, and *waqf* property information such as category, location, share, and income. The deeds seem to have been registered when they were submitted by the superintendents or beneficiaries of *waqf* properties. Another method of registration was to record *waqf* properties by submitting the document listing them under the names the various officers of the religious institutions; for example, superintendent (*nazir*) and scribe (*katib*). Private properties are recorded showing when and how they were obtained. It appears that owners could submit contracts of sale to certify ownership.

Through the process of registration described above, the *waqf* survey registers established a list of 'existing' properties at the time of registration.

Compilation of the Waqf Registers

We have no documentary or narrative source showing how these three registers were compiled, and we must therefore examine the issue by collecting information on the contents and registration procedures followed in the registers.

Table 2 shows the composition of *waqf* registers 393, 602, and 656. About two-thirds of the register record properties in the province of Damascus, while the rest record private properties in Damascus, in addition to some pages recording properties in Jerusalem, Hebron, Gaza and Ramla (Register 602) and in Safad (Register 656). The registers have between three and five documents per page, and there

⁹ Ibn Tulun, *Hawadith Dimashq al-Yawmiya*..., ed. Ahmad Ibish, Damascus, Dar al-Awa'il, 2002, 246–47.

Table 2: *Waqf* Registers

Register	Pages	Date of compilation	<i>Waqf</i> deeds of Damascus	<i>Milk</i> deeds of Damascus	Number of <i>waqf</i> deeds	Average number/page	Relating to Salihiyya	Percentage	Latest date
393	259	no date	1-193/193 p	198-242/45 p	981	5.08	95	9.70%	954
602	496	990/1582-3	2-344/343 p	345-420/76 p	1316	3.84	232	17.60%	937
656	348	1574-95	2-300/299 p	314-332, 335-347/32 p	930	3.11	155	16.70%	966
TOTALS					3227		482	14.90%	

are between 900 and 1300 documents in Registers 602, 656, and 602 respectively. The *waqf* documents relating to the institutions in the Salihiyya quarter make up between 10 and 18 per cent of the individual registers and about 15 per cent (482 documents) for the three registers as a whole. If we assume that each document records about five *waqf* properties according to the average number of the Salihiyya documents, the total number of such properties in the three registers is probably in excess of 15,000.

The documents are recorded in neither chronological nor geographical order and seem to follow no particular rule. Documents by the same founder (*waqif*) appear in sequence, which suggests the registration must have been achieved by the presentation of *waqf* documents. When were they compiled? The *Başbakanlık Arşivi* catalogue gives us that information: 990/1582–83 for Register 602, the reign of Murad III (1574–95) for Register 656, and no date for Register 393. This seems neither sufficient nor reliable, for we cannot find such descriptions in the registers. The latest dates of *waqf* documents relating to the Salihiyya quarter are 954 A.H. for Register 393, 937 A.H. for Register 602, and 966 A.H. for Register 656. Hence these three seem to have been compiled in the middle of the sixteenth century. There are 78 duplicate entries of the same *waqf* documents (that is, about 16.2 per cent of the total Salihiyya documents). Why was there so much duplication? As Ibn Tulun explains, the Ottoman government strove to conduct a survey of *waqf* and *milk* properties for tax administration, but the people were fearful and resisted.¹⁰ The local government in Damascus could therefore not complete the survey and instead was forced to repeat it in an incomplete form. Given that Register 602 is the largest and gives such rich information as details of expenditure and income from *waqf* properties (Registers 393 and 656 have no details of income), it might be the oldest archetype. Though each register is incomplete in itself, we can combine the three to make a database of documents showing the scope of *waqf* activity in Damascus, especially in the Salihiyya quarter. My goal is to analyze the relationship between the religious institutions in the Salihiyya quarter and their *waqf* properties. In Registers 393, 602, and 656, we find 482 documents relating to the religious institutions in the Salihiyya quarter, or 404 if the duplicate entries are omitted.

¹⁰ Ibid.

The purposes of donation

We can classify the purposes of donation into three categories (see Table 3): Category A is for purely charitable purposes, where the income from the properties (agricultural lands, shops, mills, rental houses, etc.) was first used for the religious institutions and their staff, as provided for by the founder. Category A has 136 documents (32.9 per cent of all the documents) and 917 properties (40.4 per cent of all the properties).

Category B is for both charitable and familial purposes, where the income was divided, partly for benefit of the family of the founder (first for the founder, next for sons and daughters, and finally for their descendants) and partly for particular religious institutions. This category has 81 documents (19.6 per cent of the gross) and 358 properties (15.8 per cent).

Category C is solely for family purposes, where the income generated was intended for the founder and any descendants and could only be used for religious purposes if all the descendants had died out. This possibility was of course unlikely, and the properties were typically used only for the family. This category has 196 documents (47.5 per cent of the gross) and 994 properties (43.8 per cent). Some documents, however, mention that the family line had already died out, and that the properties had thus 'reverted' to the religious institutions. This expression shows that the ultimate purpose of *waqf* donation must be charitable, even if it was in Category C, so that the properties would ultimately revert to religious institutions. When adding to Category A the number of properties returned to religious institutions after the family line had died out (5 documents in Category B and 39 in Category C), it reflects the conditions of *waqf* properties in the sixteenth century. Category A has increased to 180 documents (43.6 per cent of the net total) and 1020 properties (45.0 per cent of the net total). Category B has decreased to 76 documents (18.4 per cent of the net) and 350 properties (15.4 per cent of the net), and Category C has 157 documents (38.0 per cent of the net) and 899 properties (39.6 per cent of the net).

The numbers and percentages in each category indicate a strong commitment to familial purposes. Although the Category A proportion is greatest, at 43.6 per cent of the net total of the current conditions, Category C is at the top with 196 documents, 47.5 per cent of the gross total, showing the circumstances under which the properties were first

Table 3: Object of Donation

Category	Purpose	Starting conditions/Gross			Transfer	Cases	Number of Properties	Current Conditions/Net		
		Documents	Number of Properties	Percentage (Documents)				Documents	Number of Properties	Percentage (Documents)
A	Charitable	136	917	32.9%		44	103	180	1020	43.6%
B	Charitable & Familial	81	358	19.6%	B,C → A	5	8	76	350	18.4%
C	Familial	196	994	47.5%	B → A	39	95	157	899	38.0%
ALL	TOTALS	413	2269		C → A	88	206	413	2269	

If a single case includes two or three categories of donation it is counted two or three times. Hence the totals for cases and properties may differ.

donated. Furthermore, as the properties of Category B were also used partly for the founders' families, the intention of the donation can be seen as being to reserve the income for the descendants for a long time by naming them as beneficiaries. In other words, those who wished to donate for their families needed to appoint a religious institution as the final goal of the endowment, even if only nominally, and the religious institutions did indeed provide this useful connection to charity.

As for the particular religious institutions for which endowments were intended, most documents and properties relate to the 'Umariyya Madrasa, the oldest and largest *madrassa* in the Salahiyya quarter (founded in about 600/1200–1 by the head of the Qudama family, Abu 'Umar). This *madrassa* is mentioned in 250 documents (61.9 per cent of the total), including 109 documents in Category A (60.6 per cent). (See Table 4 and Graph 4.) Next are the Muzaffari Jami', the oldest congregational mosque in the quarter, with 65 documents; Jadid Jami', 23 documents; and the Qaymari hospital, 14 documents. Many documents also mention institutions and inhabitants in Mecca and Medina (the *Haramayn*).

Period of donation

In order to date the documents, we must classify them into three types that reflect the timing of the registration. The first type records the date of the waqf endowment deed (*ta'rikh al-waqfiya*) designating the year. We can regard this as the original date of endowment and suppose that the document was recorded in the register summarizing the existing original waqf deed. The second type (47 documents) records the date when a *waqf* deed was copied/registered (*sijill*). Some have the date on which the deed was certified (*sijill thabut al-waqfiya*) or the date of the claim and certification of the deed (*ta'rikh al-da'wa wa thabut al-waqfiya*). These show that the original deeds were copied on new paper (to produce a copy) or recorded in a kind of register, to certify the rights of *waqf* properties and beneficiaries. In some cases the copies survived after the original deeds were lost or broken, for we find some documents in the registers with two dates—one for the original deed and another for its copy, the former being 656 A.H. and the latter 901 A.H.¹¹

¹¹ TTD 602, 132, no. 2.

The third type lacks any date (90 documents); some are like this for technical reasons (for example, loss of the dates of the original documents, or a mistake in registration), and others only record the properties and their use (beneficiaries) without a date, based on registers that remained in the hands of superintendents (*nazir* or *katib*), based on the *daftar nazir al-awqaf*. One conspicuous example is the document for the 'Umariyya Madrasa itself (TTD 602, 24–34), listing 225 *waqf* properties based on the old register (*daftar 'atiq*) which lacks any date. This register of the 'Umariyya Madrasa was made by registering the *waqf* properties reverting to it after all descendants of the donor had died out (that is, the move from Category C to A, described above). These different ways of dating demonstrate the three types of documents related to the endowments: the original deed written at the time of donation, its copy, and the register listing the properties that belonged to the institution under the control of a superintendent. This information helps us to understand the way in which *waqf* properties were administered, which was not known previously because of the absence of sources.¹²

Table 4 shows the number of documents registered during each of the fifty *hijri* years from 600/1200 to 966/1558–59 (the latest year of the documents). We notice first that the ninth/fifteenth is the century with the most documents, with its first half accounting for 25.5 per cent and the second half, 29.6 per cent. *Waqf* foundation continued to be active in the tenth/sixteenth century during the transition from the Mamluks to the Ottomans, despite a fair amount of socio-political disorder. In contrast, there are very few documents before the seventh/thirteenth century, even though we know that many religious institutions were constructed in the Ayyubid period (1174–1256). The reason for the rarity of documents for the earlier periods is unclear, but we should consider the possibility that some of the religious institutions in the Salihiyya quarter had begun to deteriorate at the end of the Mamluk period in the early sixteenth century, due to the embezzling of *waqf* properties and the institutions themselves. The *waqf* properties became transformed into private property and the buildings of the

¹² On the registration of *waqf* deeds in Iran, see, Nobuaki Kondo, 'The *Waqf* of Ustad 'Abbad: Rewrites of the Deeds in Qajar Tehran', in Nobuaki Kondo (ed.), *Persian Documents: Social History of Iran and Turan in the Fifteenth-Nineteenth Centuries*, London, Routledge Curzon, 2003, 106–28.

Table 4: Chronological Distribution of *Waqf* Endowment

Year	Total	/total	Category A	/total	Umariyya	/total	Umariyya - A	/A total
601-700	10	3.2%	8	80.0%	1	10.0%	1	12.5%
701-750	15	4.8%	7	46.7%	10	66.7%	6	85.7%
751-800	24	7.6%	10	41.7%	19	79.2%	8	80.0%
801-850	80	25.5%	35	43.8%	58	72.5%	23	65.7%
851-900	93	29.6%	23	24.7%	58	62.4%	18	78.3%
901-950	81	25.8%	10	12.3%	50	61.7%	5	50.0%
951-966	11	3.5%	2	18.2%	2	18.2%	2	100.0%
unknown	90	—	85	94.4%	52	57.8%	46	54.1%
Grand Total	404	100.0%	180	44.6%	250	61.9%	109	60.6%

institutions were sold.¹³ The *waqf* properties donated in earlier periods might already have been embezzled and turned into private property by the end of the Mamluk period.

Types of Waqf property

Table 5 shows how many documents list any particular number of donated properties, from 1 property per document to 21 or more. In what is by far the most common situation (180 cases, 44.7 per cent of the total), one property per document is donated. The next most likely situation is two properties per document (51 cases, 12.7 per cent). Two of the larger listings, more than 80 properties in all, are not actual endowment deeds or copies, but instead a list registered and submitted by the superintendent of the 'Umariyya Madrasa.

The frequency of one- or two-property endowments shows the prevalence of *waqf* endowment throughout society. It was evidently an activity not restricted to the wealthy but extended to ordinary people who owned smaller immovable properties, which they would dedicate for family purposes.

Table 5: Number of Donated Properties in Each Document

Number	Cases	%
1	180	44.7%
2	51	12.7%
3	34	8.4%
4	26	6.5%
5	13	3.2%
6–10	51	12.7%
11–20	32	7.9%
21–	16	4.0%
unknown	1	—
	404	

¹³ Miura, 'The Salihyya Quarter...', 158–60.

Table 6 shows the kinds of *waqf* properties and the numbers in each category. The total number of properties is 2349, which averages about 5.8 properties per document. Many terms are used to designate the properties donated. I have classified them into three divisions: agricultural, urban, and common.

The most frequent agricultural properties are orchards (*bustan*, *junayna*), 385 (16.7 per cent of the total); villages (*qarya*), 210 (9.1 per cent); and small villages (*mazra'*), 127 (5.5 per cent). Smaller farms are identified by various terms, such as farm (*qit'a*), vineyard (*karm*), and field (*haql*). Orchards, villages, and farms designate a property complete with both land and plants, but endowments can also separate land ownership (*ard*) and plants (*ghiras*). The total number of agricultural properties is 1737, representing 75.3 per cent of the total, indicating their prominence in *waqf* endowment.

The urban properties total 346 (15.0 per cent), about one-fifth of the number of agricultural properties. Most of them are houses for rent (*dar*, *bayt*), totaling 164 properties (7.1 per cent), while shops (*dukkān*, *hanut*) only account for 91 (3.9 per cent). The small number of urban properties is a mystery, considering the urban development of Damascus and the Salahiyya quarter. Damascus had 163 markets (approximately 3000 shops can be assumed), and in the Salahiyya quarter there were 9 markets, the largest of which had 120 shops.¹⁴

The third category encompasses properties such as mills, oil-press factories, baking ovens and lease properties. These cannot be categorized as either agricultural or urban, for they are found both in agricultural villages and in city centres. When we take note of the properties in Category A (charitable purpose only), which primarily support religious institutions in the Salahiyya quarter, there are 738 agricultural properties (67.2 per cent), and 238 urban properties (21.5 per cent).¹⁵

¹⁴ Miura, 'The Salahiyya Quarter', 150.

¹⁵ In contrast to this high percentage of agricultural properties in the Salahiyya-related documents, Prof. Hayashi shows the prominence of urban estates (cash, dwelling, commercial) in comparison with rural ones in the *waqf* survey register of Istanbul in 1546. However, this does not necessarily contradict the results of my study, for the Istanbul register did not include the *waqf* endowments by the Ottoman sultans who donated mostly rural estates. (cf. Kayoko Hayashi, 'The Vakıf Institution in 16th-Century Istanbul: An Analysis of the Vakıf Survey Register of 1546', *The Memoirs of the Toyo Bunko*, 50, 1992).

Table 6: Kind of Properties

Properties	<i>ard</i>	<i>qit'a</i>	<i>qarya</i>	<i>mazra'</i>	<i>bustan</i>	<i>junayna</i>	<i>karm</i>	<i>ghayta</i>	<i>haqr</i>	<i>ghiras</i>
	land	farm	village	farm	orchard	orchard	vineyard	field	field	plant
Total	299	335	210	127	232	153	55	10	108	208
	13.0%	14.5%	9.1%	5.5%	10.1%	6.6%	2.4%	0.4%	4.7%	9.0%
Category A	124	106	106	69	117	81	26	32	45	32
1130	11.3%	9.6%	9.6%	6.3%	10.6%	7.4%	2.4%	2.9%	4.1%	2.9%
	<i>dukkān,</i>				<i>khan/</i>					
	<i>hanut</i>	<i>hammam</i>	<i>bayt</i>	<i>dar</i>	<i>qaysariyya</i>	<i>imara</i>	<i>qa'a</i>			
Properties	shop	bath	house	house	caravansarai	building	room	Urban		
Total	91	11	88	76	18	23	39	346		
	3.9%	0.5%	3.8%	3.3%	0.8%	1.0%	1.7%	15.0%		
Category A	61	8	75	39	13	6	34	236		
1130	5.6%	0.7%	6.8%	3.5%	1.2%	0.5%	3.1%	21.5%		
			<i>makhzan/</i>							
	<i>mi'sara</i>	<i>tahun</i>	<i>baika</i>	<i>furn</i>	<i>mulhakara</i>	<i>mahsul</i>	unknown	others	Salihiyya	
Properties	oil-press	mill	barn	oven	property	revenue	common			
Total	3	78	9	17	71	9	187	42	26	175
	0.1%	3.4%	0.4%	0.7%	3.1%	0.4%	8.1%	—	1.1%	7.4%
Category A	1	48	8	9	68	9	143	31		106
1130	0.1%	4.4%	0.7%	0.8%	6.2%	0.8%	13.0%	—		9.4%

Location of Waqf Properties

The location of each property is shown by the name of an administrative unit such as city or district (*nahiya*), then by the name of a city quarter or village/small village, and finally by the name of a street or adjacent public building. Information on the present condition of the properties is given by mentioning both the old and the present names of properties, or the names of the current occupiers. Such information was not a part of the past deeds or documents, but instead was added by the superintendents of the *waqf* or the administrative staff of the land survey.

Location varies: for example, Damascus inside the city wall, in the Salahiyya quarter (175 properties, 7.4 per cent), and in the villages near Damascus such as al-Ghuta. Taking an example from the old register of the 'Umariyya Madrasa listing 225 properties, 86 of them were located in the city of Damascus (51.8 per cent); 73 in the Ghuta district (a radius of about 10 kilometers from the city), (44.0 per cent); and 7 in the districts of Duma, Marj, Zabadani and the Biqa'—all relatively far from the city (see Table 7 and Map 1). The properties are dispersed in many directions in the city's hinterland, which means the religious institutions in the Salahiyya quarter collected revenues from many different regions.


Founders

The *waqf* deed usually shows the names of the founder(s), but there is little information on their social status in these registers. Other than King or Sultan, no official position is given.¹⁶ The military were 60 per cent to 70 per cent of the founders of the *madrasas* in Damascus and in the Salahiyya quarter before the Ottoman period, and they often had Turkish, Persian, and Mongol names, since they were Mamluks, bought in Central Asia and the Caucasus and then brought to the Arab countries. In the registers, such non-Arab names are rare, which suggest that most of the founders were Arabs working as 'ulama or engaging in other civil occupations. Apart from the names of their

¹⁶ These registers do not include endowments by the Ottoman sultans (for example, of Jami' Shaykh Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi by Sultan Selim I), as the sultans' *waqfs* were administered separately in the Ottoman period.

Table 7: Location of *Waqf* Properties listed in the Old Register of the 'Umariyya Madrasa

(Waqf Register No. 656, pp. 24–30)					
Location/City, Nahiyya)	Sub Location/Quarter, Village	Number	Percentage	Percentage	
Damascus City		16	9.6%		
Damascus City	inside the city wall	10	6.0%		
Damascus City	outside the city wall	26	15.7%		
Damascus City	Salihiyya	34	20.5%	86	51.8%
Ghuta	'Arabayn	6	3.6%		
	'Ayn Tarma	3	1.8%		
	Barza	1	0.6%		
	Hamura	1	0.6%		
	Jawbar	8	4.8%		
	Kafr Batna	11	6.6%		
	Kafr Susa	3	1.8%		
	Maytur	2	1.2%		
	Mizza	7	4.2%		
	Nayrab	6	3.6%		
	Qabun	6	3.6%		
	Yalda	5	3.0%		
	Zamulka	4	2.4%		
	Ya'qub	5	3.0%		
	Others	5	3.0%	73	44.0%
Biqa'		2	1.2%		
Duma		1	0.6%		
Marj		1	0.6%		
Zabadani		3	1.8%	7	4.2%
Location Unknown		46	xxx		
Name Unknown		13	xxx	59	xxx
Totals				225	



Drawing is based on the Map of the Ghūṭa District, in Aḥmad Waṣfī Zakariyā, *al-Rif al-Sūrī Muḥāfaẓa Dimashq*, vol. 2, Damascus, 1957.

Map 1: Location of *Waqf* Properties listed in the Old Register of the 'Umariyya Madrasa

villages of origin, there is almost no information telling us where the founders live. Presumably founders without such notation were residents of Damascus, including Salihiyya. Thirty-seven of the founders were female.

Concluding remarks

Through the analysis of these three registers, we can develop several conclusions about the relationship of urban development and the *waqf* system in the Salihiyya quarter until the sixteenth century. First, urban

development depended greatly on agricultural properties located in villages, as about 75 per cent of the *waqf* properties (67 per cent of the properties in Category A) supporting religious institutions in the Salihyya quarter were agricultural. The following statement of an 'alim, Zayn al-Din Muflih al-Dimashqi, appears in the preface of al-Nu'aymi's book *al-Daris*.

Allah has located knowledge ('ilm) and tyranny (*jawr*) mostly in the city, and revenue (*rizq*) and ignorance mostly in the villages. Allah gives the revenue of the villages to the knowledge of the 'ulama, and in exchange He gives to the ignorance of the villagers the tyranny of the cities. In this way, it is knowledge that brought revenue to the 'ulama and also to the Turkish military and other inhabitants in the cities.¹⁷

As stated above, revenues from agricultural resources in the villages were in fact brought to the quarter of Salihyya, as is obvious from the analysis of the registers. What were the urban resources? Markets and caravanserais must have been founded as *waqf* properties, but the rarity of their appearance in the survey registers suggests that they probably became private property.

Second, we note the preponderance of family *waqf*. About one-third of the total was endowed for the family of the founders, and used for and by them. Such familial use attracted ordinary people with one or two immovable properties to donate, and this caused the endowment boom in Damascus as described by Ibn Battuta. Thus religious institutions may have competed for founders who would appoint those institutions as beneficiaries of the properties, whether direct or indirect if the descendants died out.

Third is the scarcity of details on *waqf* properties donated in the earlier periods. About eighty per cent of the documents were issued during the previous 150 years, that is, since the ninth/fifteenth century. The act of making a *waqf* automatically put an end to any future transfer of ownership, and a donation could not be cancelled once it had been certified by witnesses and a judge. *Waqf* properties were supposed to continue in that same legal status forever. In spite of these legal principles, most of the properties donated before the eighth/fourteenth century did disappear from the registers, while some old donations survived until the Ottoman period, when their status was confirmed by copying and registering the original deeds. Two kinds


¹⁷ al-Nu'aymi, *al-Daris fi ta'rikh al-madaris*, 1, 5.

of assumptions can explain their disappearance: properties either fell into disuse as a result of natural disasters, or they might have been embezzled and transformed into private property. Smaller properties would be more susceptible to natural disasters and embezzlement, and more apt to disappear than larger ones. If so, the religious institutions would presumably strive to obtain new *waqf*, to enable them to maintain the income required to cover expenditure. In fact the 'Umariyya *madrasa*, where the Hanbali law school was located, began to accommodate all the four Sunni law schools in the fifteenth century, presumably in an attempt to get new endowments from a broader range of people.¹⁸ This open door policy seemed successful, as the school gained new properties in the fifteenth century and held or monopolised about 60 per cent of the total (see Table 4), vying with the largest institutions such as the Umayyad mosque in Damascus. A fairly complex administrative organization was required to control a large number of *waqf* properties from different origins, existing in different locations.


These remarks are necessarily tentative conclusions deduced from the examination of documents related to the religious institutions located in the Salihyya quarter. To elucidate *waqf* activity in Damascus as a whole, I should broaden the scope to greater Damascus and compare the Salihyya *waqfs* with those of Damascus as a whole. However, the material presented above shows that we should pay more attention to smaller endowments at the grass-roots level, because studies of larger endowments have tended to over-emphasise their public character.¹⁹

¹⁸ Miura, 'The Salihyya Quarter', 156–58.


¹⁹ After submitting this paper, I found another *waqf* survey register, entitled *Mısır Vakıfları*, published in Istanbul in 2005. It was preserved at the Muallim Cevdet Collection in the Atatürk Library and named 'Fetihten Önce ve Fetihten sonra Mısır Vakıfları'. Despite its name, it is in fact a *waqf* register of the province of Damascus compiled in the middle of the sixteenth century (after 936/1530). It contains 442 documents of *waqf* and *milk* properties, and includes documents related to the Salihyya quarter, some of which are not recorded in the three registers examined in this paper.




Graph 3-1: Current Conditions/Cases



Graph 3-2: Current Conditions/Properties



Graph 4: Chronological Distribution



Graph 5: Number of Donated Properties

THE IMPACT OF THE 1822 EARTHQUAKE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF WAQF IN ALEPPO*

STEFAN KNOST

On 13 August 1822 (25 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 1237)¹ the whole of northwestern Syria was struck by a strong earthquake with an estimated magnitude of about 7.4, whose epicentre was near the small town of 'Afrin about forty-five kilometres north of Aleppo.² That town was also particularly affected and a large number of buildings were destroyed. Contemporary observers reported that a quarter of the city was in ruins. The British consul John Barker informs us:

at half past nine in the evening, Aleppo, Antioch, Idlib, Reehah, Derkoush, Armanas, every village and every detached cottage in the Pachalic, and some towns in the Pachalic of Damascus and in Mesopotamia, as far as Bagdad, were in ten or twelve seconds entirely ruined by an earthquake, and became heaps of stones and rubbish.³

Consul Barker's description—although probably exaggerated, because destruction as far as Baghdad seems unlikely—tells us that the earthquake was felt over a very wide area. For example, widespread destruction is attested in the court records in the small town (*qasba*) of Ma'arrat al-Misrin, some fifty kilometres south of Aleppo, where a

* Professor Abdul-Karim Rafeq, whom I met for the first time in the '*Markaz al-Watha'iq*' in Damascus in the late 1990s, has greatly influenced my research. This study owes a lot to his numerous works, especially the way in which they demonstrate that sharia court records can be exploited as a historical source, particularly in the ambivalent relation between what are assumed to be sharia norms and the actual application of the law in the Ottoman courts.

¹ al-Ghazzi mentions that the earthquake occurred on the 28 *Dhu'l-Qa'da*, but I have decided to follow the western sources placing the event on the 13th of August (25 *Dhu'l-Qa'da*) because they were written closer to the event (al-Ghazzi wrote his history of Aleppo at the beginning of the twentieth century). Also, 25 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* (see below) corresponds more accurately to the data found (Kamil ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzi, *Nahr al-dhahab fi ta'rikh Halab*, eds. Mahmud Fakhuri and Shawqi Sha'th, Aleppo, Dar al-Qalam al-'Arabi, 1991–93, vol. 3, 255ff.).

² N.N. Ambraseys and Muawiya Barazangi, 'The 1759 Earthquake in the Bekaa Valley: Implications for Earthquake Hazard Assessment in the Eastern Mediterranean Region', *Journal of Geophysical Research*, 94, B4, April 10, 1989, 4010.

³ John Barker, *Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey*, ed. Edward B.B. Barker, London, Samuel Tinsley, vol. 1, 1876, 321f.

hammam and walls in a farm (*çiftlik*) were damaged.⁴ Estimates of the number of victims in the city of Aleppo alone run from 15,000 (the local historian al-Ghazzi)⁵ to 30,000 (John Barker),⁶ between 15 and 30 per cent respectively of an estimated population of about 100,000.⁷ The earthquake destroyed a significant number of buildings in the heart of the city, mainly in the quarters of Bahsita and al-ʿAqaba to the west and northwest of the central *suq*, in the *suq* area itself and around the citadel. The citadel itself was also badly damaged and not subsequently inhabited. But there are indications in the court records of destruction in other parts of the city as well, such as the northern quarters *intra muros* and the northern suburbs. The earthquake took place on a hot summer evening, when the people were sitting on the roofs or in the courtyards of their houses, and so a good number of them escaped being buried under their houses; the number of victims might otherwise have been considerably higher.

The *Bilad al-Sham* lies within an active seismic area. Various separate fault lines lie beneath it in the west, running from the Gulf of ʿAqaba and the Dead Sea to the Sea of Galilee, and beneath the Biqāʿ valley to the Ghab depression in northwest Syria, where they merge with the East Anatolian fault that runs from the Antakya area to the northeast near the present Syrian-Turkish border.⁸ Over the centuries, huge earthquakes were recorded by historians and often left apocalyptic destruction behind them. Historical seismology studies these earthquakes. Several important ones were recorded during the Ottoman period, for example the earthquake of 1759 with its epicentre in the Biqāʿ valley that caused serious destruction in Damascus and whose magnitude is also estimated at about 7.4.⁹

In addition to the immediate destruction of the earthquake, there were other results which perhaps had even more disastrous effects. The earth continued to shake for another forty days and the frightened inhabitants gave up their houses in the city and settled in the

⁴ Law Court Registers (LCR), Aleppo, 204:70, case dated 26 *Shaʿban* 1240 (15 April 1825).

⁵ al-Ghazzi, 1991–93, vol. 3, 255ff.

⁶ Herbert L. Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760–1826*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1963, 136.

⁷ Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, 341.

⁸ Ambraseys and Barazangi, 1989, 4007.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 4010.

surrounding gardens in wooden huts, tents, and in some cases even without any shelter. The governor and the judge left the city as well, exposing it to thieves and bandits. As a result, almost all public life ceased to function.

The city's different sharia courts played an important part in public life. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were five different courts in Aleppo, but it seems that not all five were operating simultaneously. The registers from Aleppo in the period under study refer to the judge as *qadi* or *hakim shar'i*. He was sent from Istanbul for a term of office which normally lasted one year. His seat was the main court (*Mahkama al-Kubra*), located in a sumptuous Mamluk house (*dar*) in the Suwayqat 'Ali quarter. This *dar* consisted of three courtyards: one, equipped with a *hammam*, served as his personal residence; the middle courtyard was for the *qadi*'s court sessions; and in the third courtyard, a deputy judge decided on less important cases.¹⁰ Local deputy judges (*na'ibs*) recruited from the 'ulama families of Aleppo presided over the other four courts that were scattered throughout the city. The courts not only adjudicated on lawsuits, but also exercised notarial functions; judges would commonly attest many kinds of transaction, including sales, rent, or marriage contracts. The cases were registered in the records (*sijillat*) thus creating an ever-growing archive that judges might consult in the future. Already a couple of years before the earthquake, the minor courts had stopped working (the last one in 1228/1810), so at the time of the earthquake in 1822, only the main court, *Mahkama al-Kubra*, was functioning in the city.¹¹

The activities of the court were also affected by the earthquake. It is not definitively known whether the *Mahkama al-Kubra* itself was destroyed or damaged by the earthquake, but at least one house (*dar*) just beside it was destroyed.¹² The chaos that followed the earthquake which has already been described certainly harmed the work of the court. The earthquake took place on 25 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 1237 (13 August 1822), and the last document registered in the court records before the earthquake is dated 24 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* (12 August 1822) and deals

¹⁰ al-Ghazzi, 1991–93, vol. 2, 155.

¹¹ Brigitte Marino and Tomoki Okawara, *Catalogue des registres des tribunaux ottomans conservés au Centre des Archives de Damas*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes de Damas/Centre des Archives de Damas, 1999, 23.

¹² LCR, Aleppo, 199:52, case dated 15 *Rajab* 1238 (28 March 1823).

with a case concerning craft corporations.¹³ After that, the records remain silent for more than a month. Court activity began again with two documents on agriculture in the vicinity of Aleppo dated the 29 *Dhu'l-Hijja* 1237 (15 September 1822) followed by documents from *Muharram* 1238 (September/October 1822). Among the documents dated *Muharram* 1238, there are some dating to the time before the earthquake, mainly from the second half of *Dhu'l-Qa'da*, which shed some light on the functioning of the courts: the scribes evidently collected the minutes of the different court sessions together with all other documents, including written testimonies, *fatwas*, and so on. After the judge had issued his verdict, the scribes produced a final document that was also registered in the records. Probably all the cases that were dated before, but registered after, the earthquake were at that moment still in the scribes' possession. The court records confirm al-Ghazzi's statement that immediately after the earthquake the authorities, including the judge, left the city. It took about a month for them to return to work, which corresponds closely with the forty day period of aftershocks mentioned by al-Ghazzi, among others.¹⁴

How was the reconstruction of the city organised? Most transactions involving *waqf* property needed the consent of the qadi, so that information on the reconstruction of destroyed *waqf* property can be found in the court records. Reconstruction did not start immediately after the earthquake, as might have been supposed. After a period of chaos lasting approximately a month, in which most public institutions ceased to function (for example the *mahkama*), it seems to have taken a while for reconstruction to begin. The first document in the records relating to the destruction caused by the earthquake comes four months after the event, and concerns the restoration of a number of buildings in different parts of the city belonging to the *Waqf al-Haramayn*.¹⁵ For that reason, I have not taken the period immediately after the earthquake into consideration, but have chosen instead to study a two-year period beginning roughly two years after the incident (1240/1824–25 and 1241/1825–26). I have compared my findings with activity in a reference period before the earthquake, the twenty years between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11. I have analysed two differ-

¹³ LCR, Aleppo, 197:126, case dated 24 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 1237 (12 August 1822).

¹⁴ al-Ghazzi, 1991–93, vol. 3, 258.

¹⁵ LCR, Aleppo, 197:233, case dated *ghurraṭ Rabi' al-Akhir* 1238 (15 December 1822).

ent types of transactions both quantitatively and qualitatively. First, two types of contracts that created private property rights on *waqf* assets, the *hikr* and the *khulu* 'urfi contracts will be examined. This will lead me to a revaluation of these contracts and their role and efficiency in *waqf* administration. Second, I will analyse endowment activity during that period.

The hikr contract

To generate an income for an endowment, the endowed property in question has to be rented out. To prevent fraud, Islamic law developed strict rules for renting out *waqf* property, generally to the effect that as real estate it must be rented on a one year contract. Only exceptionally and when it cannot otherwise remain profitable, other methods, like long-term rent (*ijara tawila*) or exchange (*istibdal*), are acceptable. *Hikr* is a special form of long-term or permanent rent contract, where the proprietor, usually a *waqf*, rents out a plot of land to a tenant, in which case there should be no remains of buildings left on the plot (referred to in the documents as *khaliya* 'an al-bina'). Whatever the tenant builds or plants on the plot becomes his own property (*milk*). He has to pay a fair rent (*ujrat al-mithl*) for the land, which should reflect its market value and develop according to market values, but which generally remains very low. As long as the buildings (or plants or trees) remain on the plot, the tenant remains in possession of the land. Any new *hikr* contract has to be authorised by a judge, who can only give this authorisation when no other form of contract more advantageous for the *waqf*, like long-term rent (*ijara tawila*) or property exchange (*istibdal*) are possible.¹⁶ These facts are often established by an inspection (*kashf*) of the asset. Gabriel Baer has expressed a rather negative attitude towards the *hikr* contract: 'Moreover, in all periods *hikr* and similar practices have been used by dishonest *nazirs* [*waqf* administrators] as a convenient means of fraud.'¹⁷

The way this contract was employed in Aleppo is revealing: Between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11, eight cases of *hikr* were registered in the court records of Aleppo (an average of about one case every two and a half years). During the same period, 186 endowments were

¹⁶ Gabriel Baer, 'Hikr', *EP*, Supplement, 1982, 368.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 369.

newly established with a total of 484 assets, most of them (428) urban property (houses, shops, etc.). Thus, eight assets partly lost their *waqf* status, while 484 assets were transformed into *waqf*. Given such small numbers, fraud seems unlikely. It is not surprising that this situation changed after the earthquake: in 1240/1824–25, seven and, in 1241/1825–26, as many as fourteen, cases of *hikr* were registered (an average of a little more than ten cases a year). This significant rise (twenty-five fold) most definitely originates in the destruction caused by the earthquake. This reason is, in fact, mentioned in most of the documents. The difference becomes even more striking with regard to the number of objects involved in these cases. In the period between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11, each case registered in the court involved a plot of land corresponding to one former building, usually a *dar* or a *dukkān*. The twenty-one cases in 1240/1824–25 and 1241/1825–26 involved plots of land with, formerly, at least thirty-three different entities (18 *dukkāns*, 10 *dars*, 2 *madars*, 1 *akhur*; two documents do not mention the type of building once built on the plot). The administrators of the endowments were obviously no longer in a position to find sufficient numbers of tenants willing to invest in other types of contract, such as *ijara tawila* or *istibdal*.

In the case of the *hikr* contract, we can observe a rise in the number of such contracts in times of crisis, but there is no change in the form of the contract or in the concept of *hikr* as it is used and described in the documents. However, were all these plots of land really without any buildings (*khaliya 'an al-bina'*), as the law requires? It is difficult to imagine, even after serious destruction, that there were no traces of constructions. In one case, this led to a remark of the inspectors who went to the site to examine the facts: they found the remains of a wall next to the former entrance of the house and stated that this wall did not enter into the *hikr* contract and consequently remained the full property of the *waqf*.¹⁸

¹⁸ LCR, Aleppo, 203:23, case dated 27 *Ramadan* 1238 (7 June 1823).

Khulu 'urfi arrangements

The second type of contract involving alienation of *waqf* property to be discussed here is called *khulu 'urfi* in the documents from Aleppo.¹⁹ Abraham Marcus describes it:

The term indicated those ownership rights in a shop which applied to the structure but not to the land. This type of ownership existed in cases in which private property was built on endowed land with the permission of the charitable foundation. The use of the building in return for an annual ground rent (*hikr*). In this sense, the owner was a tenant. The shop itself, however, was considered the private property (*mulk*) of the owner, who was free to sell, rent and even endow it.²⁰

The jurists discuss a contract called *khulu al-khanut* that seemed to be widespread in the markets of Cairo and cite as an example the *waqf* of the Mamluk Sultan al-Ghuri.²¹ *Khulu 'urfi* evidently existed in Aleppo before the earthquake. All the documents that I found for that period relate to non-residential property (mainly *dukkans*, shops and workshops), not to residential buildings. *Khulu 'urfi* appears in the documents from Aleppo as a kind of full property right that is, for example, a feature of new endowments. Between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11 twenty-one of these assets were endowed. In one document, the establishment of a new *khulu 'urfi* is described: in 1225/1810 Amina bint Ibrahim, the *mutawalliya* (administrator) of her father's endowment, authorises Hasan Beshe and Hajj Ahmad to build an oven in a *dukkān* of the *waqf* to bake and sell bread. What they had built inside the shop (the oven, probably other equipment) became their property (*milk*) as *khulu 'urfi*. The tenants continued to pay rent for

¹⁹ The term *khulu* is understood as 'emptiness', meaning, according to one explanation 'the empty space between the walls and the roof which belongs to the tenant' (Gabriel Baer, 'The Dismemberment of Awqaf in Early 19th Century Jerusalem', *Asian and African Affairs* 13, 1979', 222, after J. Abribat, 'Essai sur les contrats de quasi-aliénation et de location perpétuelle auxquels l'institution du habous a donné naissance', *Revue algérienne et tunisienne de législation et de jurisprudence* 17, 1901, 134). The adjective '*urfi*' indicates that it is considered part of customary law.

²⁰ Marcus, 1989, 363, n. 54.

²¹ e.g. Muhammad Amin Ibn 'Abidin, *Radd al-muhtar 'ala al-durr al-mukhtar sharh tanwir al-absar*, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 1994, vol. 7, 37–39; Khayr al-Din al-Ramli, *al-Fatawa al-Khayriya li-naf' al-barriya*, Cairo, Matba'at Bulaq, 1273/1856–57, vol. 1, 164.

the shop; the document reads *ujra*, not *hikr*.²² At least in cases such as these, the *khulu* was restricted to specific installations that were necessary to exercise a certain profession (like the oven) together with the right to exercise this profession. This contradicts Marcus' notion that the building itself became the private property of the tenant. In fact, Marcus' definition is of the *hikr* contract as it is understood in the documents from Aleppo.

After the earthquake, there was a change in the form of some *khulu* 'urfi contracts. They were now used in relation to residential structures as well. One example: at the end of the month of *Safar* 1241 (October 1825) the *mutawalli* of the *waqf* 'Abd al-Rahim Jalabi Muqayyid-Zada which consisted of a house (*dar*) in the quarter of al-Farafra registered a *khulu* 'urfi contract based on the restorations that the tenant had undertaken after being authorised by the *mutawalli* of the *waqf*. The parts of the building that were destroyed by the earthquake are described in detail in the document, as well as the restorations of the tenant:

The *iwan* and the two alcoves (*al-qubbatan*) were destroyed, the *murabba*' (in Aleppo, a small square room on the upper floor) collapsed, as well as half of the wall where the door of the house is located. Some of the other walls became weak. Left in this state the whole building would fall apart.

The *waqf* obviously did not have enough income to restore the building, nor was it possible to borrow enough money (*istidana*) for the purpose. Therefore, the tenant undertook the restoration, rebuilt the destroyed parts and even dug a new cistern (*sahrij*), making an investment of 4,636 *ghirsh*. The parts of the house that he had rebuilt became his property: 'li-yakuna ma ya'miruhu...milkan lahu 'ala 'l-dawam w'al-istimrar bi-tariq al-khulu al-'urfi 'ala 'l-dar...' He had to pay an annual rent of 54 *ghirsh* that corresponded to a 'fair rent' (*ujrat al-mithl*) for the 'old' parts of the house. No inspection (*kashf*) was sent to the place to confirm these facts, as in cases of *hikr* or *istibdal*, but a *fatwa*, requested by the tenant, confirmed the legality of the transaction. In this *fatwa*, the *mufti* was a little more cautious about the status of the property. He stated that what the tenant had rebuilt was a *khulu* 'urfi, and he owned the right of use as if it were his full property: 'yakunu ma 'amarahu khuluwan 'urfiyan yamliku al-tasarruf fih

²² LCR, Aleppo, 168:209, case dated 3 *Safar* 1225 (9 March 1810).

k'al-milk'.²³ The choice of this expression reflects a juridical discussion that criticises this contract for doing harm to the *waqf*, assuming that the tenant of a shop with a *khulu* contract would not pay the fair rent.²⁴ These arrangements were certainly in some cases the only solution to ensure the restoration of a building and keeping the *waqf* profitable, but above all, to ensure that the asset remained the property of the *waqf*, although it was now shared with another owner. In the court records, these contracts are not very numerous. In 1240/1824–25 and 1241/1825–26 there are seven cases in the *sijillat* where necessary restoration work was executed with a *khulu* contract (three *dars*, the rest are commercial buildings, like *dukkan*, *furn*, *qasariya*, and *hammam*).

Such an arrangement might lead to a quite confusing property situation. In a case registered in 1241/1826, a *dukkan* in the central *suq* next to the Khan Khayr Bek was destroyed; there was only 'a wall inside the *dukkan* with half a vault' standing. A certain Sharifa Amina wished to reconstruct the shop as a *khulu* 'urfi. After the restoration work was finished, we find three different owners: the ground belonged to the *waqf* Khayr Bek and was rented out in the form of *hikr* (for the yearly rent of one *ghirsh*) to the *waqf* of Hajj 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Ayni. The wall with the vault was the property of that latter *waqf* and was rented out to Sharifa Amina (for four *ghirsh* a year). The rest of the shop was Sharifa Amina's property, or more correctly, her *khulu* 'urfi.²⁵

It is interesting to note that in Aleppo this type of contract was adapted to changing circumstances and profited from the flexibility the law evidently offered. The *fatwa* in the example above gives the impression that the solution was perfectly legal. The modified contract obviously helped to find investors to restore many of the destroyed buildings. The *hikr* contract could not be applied because the assets were not entirely free of previous constructions. Other contracts such as *ijara tawila* or *istibdal* were not attractive enough for the tenants in that situation. For an investor, it was more desirable to acquire full property rights over the asset than a simple rent contract. The new contract was therefore an adjustment to new market conditions.

In some cases at least, the earthquake led to a redistribution of property. *Waqf* property was retransformed into private property (*milk*),

²³ LCR, Aleppo, 208:2, case dated 29 *Safar* 1241 (12 October 1825).

²⁴ Ibn 'Abidin, 1994, vol. 7, 37–39.

²⁵ LCR, Aleppo, 208:39, case dated 23 *Jumada al-Ula* 1241 (1 February 1826).

as in a case from 1240/1824–25: the Hammam ‘Ashiq Taymur had three different owners: the ground belonged to the mosque of ‘Ashiq Taymur and produced a *hikr* rent of 38 *ghirsh* a year. One half of the *hammam* belonged to the *waqf* of the Zawiya al-Hilaliya, the other half was the private property of two individuals, Sayyid ‘Ali Beyazid ibn Hajj ‘Abdallah and Sayyid Hajj... (unreadable) Jalabi ibn Ahmad al-Tabib. The *waqf* of the Zawiya al-Hilaliya did not have enough capital to undertake its share of the restorations that became necessary after the destruction caused by the earthquake. The two other owners therefore repaired the whole *hammam* and the renovated part became their property as *khulu ‘urfi*. They paid a monthly rent of $8\frac{1}{3}$ *ghirsh* to the *waqf* of the *zawiya* for its share in the old parts of the bath.²⁶

It is not surprising that other kinds of contracts like long-term rent contracts or exchanges of property were also concluded more frequently after the earthquake, as can be seen in the table below. Twenty cases of *ijara tawila* were recorded in 1240/1824–25 and 1841/1825–26 (ten a year) compared to 76 cases between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11 (an average of 3.8 a year). Seven cases of *istibdal* were authorised in 1240/1824–25–41 (3.5 a year), compared to nineteen between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11 (a yearly average of 0.95). Finally, in five cases the *waqf* was authorised to borrow the necessary money (*istidana*) in 1240/1824–25 and 1841/1825–26 (2.5 a year), compared to 34 between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11 (an average of 1.7 a year). For *istidana* the rise is less significant, probably because not many tenants were willing or able to agree to such an arrangement in the new circumstances.

Table 1: Number of contracts of partial alienation, long-term rent and exchange of *waqf* property before and after the earthquake

	1205–1225 H		1240–1241 H		growth rate
	Number	yearly average	number	yearly average	
<i>hikr</i>	8	0.4	21	10.5	26.25
<i>istibdal</i>	19	0.95	7	3.5	3.68
<i>istidana</i>	34	1.7	5	2.5	1.47
<i>ijara tawila</i>	76	3.8	20	10	2.63

²⁶ LCR, Aleppo, 205:280, case dated 18 *Safar* 1240 (11 October 1824).

New endowments

Is a population still under the shock of a terrible event like the 1822 earthquake and busy reconstructing and re-organizing practically all aspects of its life, able and willing to establish new endowments? Do the psychological effects of the crisis (the feeling of insecurity, or the crisis being perceived as a divine punishment) lead people to think of establishing more, or alternatively less, endowments? As already mentioned, in the reference period between 1205/1790–91 and 1225/1810–11, 186 new endowments were established with a total of 484 assets, mainly urban property (428) with a yearly average of about nine (9.3) endowments. Many of these endowments were quite small (one or two objects) and about half of them were *awqaf khayriya*.²⁷

Only nine newly created endowments with 22 assets were registered in the court records of Aleppo during the years 1240/1824–25 and 1241/1825–26. This is half the number of endowments and about half the number of assets of the reference period, and four of these nine endowments were established by one single person, Isma'il Agha Shurayyif Zada.²⁸ The first of these *waqfs* was registered on the 6 Sha'ban 1240 (26 March 1825) with nine assets concentrated in the quarter Dakhil Bab al-Nasr. In the months of *Dhu'l-Hijja* 1240 (August 1825), *Jumada al-Ula* and *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 1241 (December 1825 and June 1826), he added eight assets to his endowment, making it a typical 'mixed' (*mushtarak*) *waqf*, established for his own and his brothers' descendants with significant payments to a mosque in Dakhil Bab al-Nasr (Jami' al-Qarnasiya), thus creating a link between his family and the mosque.²⁹ A good part of the endowment activity in the two years was undertaken by a single individual who certainly had planned this project for some time. The earthquake did not make him change his mind, probably because most of the assets were not situated in the

²⁷ For a discussion and analysis of these endowments, see my Ph.D. thesis, 'Der "heilige Raum" in Aleppo. Die Rolle der islamischen religiösen Stiftungen (auqâf) in der Gesellschaft einer Provinzhauptstadt des Osmanischen Reiches', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 2003.

²⁸ The Shurayyifs were one of the wealthiest merchant families in Aleppo in this period. Isma'il was *mutasallim* and held the title of *kapicibashi* (*ra'is al-bawwabin*). See Margaret Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count. Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770–1840*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1999, 40–43.

²⁹ LCR, Aleppo, 204:7, case dated 6 Sha'ban 1240 (26 March 1825); 207:146, case dated 27 Dhu'l-Hijja 1240 (12 August 1825); 208:21, case dated 11 Jumada al-Ula 1241 (21 December 1825); 208:329, case dated 3 Dhu'l-Qa'da 1241 (9 June 1826).

area most affected. He could even profit from the situation, because in Ramadan 1238 (June 1823), one year after the earthquake, he acquired through a *hikr* contract a plot on which he then built the *masbana* (soap factory) that became part of his *waqf* in Shaʿban 1240 (March 1825). He also managed to acquire, through property exchange (*istibdal*), a house (*dar*) that had suffered from the earthquake in Dakhil Bab al-Nasr for another in the northern suburb Turaba al-Ghurabaʾ, thus augmenting his property in the Dakhil Bab al-Nasr.³⁰ In the end, the earthquake even helped the Shurayyif family to concentrate their property in one particular quarter and to develop a connection with one of the neighbourhood mosques.

Four of the five remaining endowments established in 1240/1824–25 and 1241/1825–26 were *awqaf khayriya*. They were of modest proportions—one *dar*, or parts of it (between one quarter and one half)—and established in favour of neighbourhood mosques and a *takiya*.³¹ Only one endowment, founded by a certain Saliha and her two daughters Amina and ʿAisha, was a pure family *waqf* (*waqf dhurri*).³² According to the information in the court records, the earthquake led to a decrease in endowment activity. It seems that the insecurity and destruction resulting from the crisis created an atmosphere less favourable for endowments, particularly family endowments.

Conclusion

The relatively small number of cases found in the *sijillat* in the context of probably more than a thousand destroyed buildings (the houses in the most affected quarters of Bahsita, Jubb Asad Allah, al-Masabin and ʿAqaba alone numbered about 750)³³ suggests that going to court and registering a *hikr* or *khulu ʿurfi* contract would only have been one way

³⁰ LCR, Aleppo, 203:23, case dated 27 *Ramadan* 1238 (8 June 1823) and 203:138, case dated 25 *Dhuʿl-Qaʿda* 1238 (8 August 1823).

³¹ LCR, Aleppo, 204:57, case dated 8 *Shaʿban* 1240 (28 March 1825); 204:91, case dated 28 *Shaʿban* 1240 (17 April 1825); 206:253, case dated 7 *Jumada al-Thani* 1240 (27 January 1825); 208:195, case dated 20 *Shaʿban* 1241 (29 March 1826).

³² LCR, Aleppo, 207:119, case dated 15 *Dhuʿl-Qaʿda* 1240 (2 July 1825).

³³ al-Ghazzi, 1991–93, vol. 2. He gives us the number of houses in the different quarters of Aleppo around the year 1900. These figures are most probably comparable to the years around 1822, because the population and the number of houses in the old city of Aleppo did not fluctuate significantly in that period.

of dealing with the reconstruction, but it is the only one on which we have some information.

I have tried to show that, at least in Aleppo during the period that I researched, the much-criticised contracts of partial alienation of *waqf* property do not seem to have indicated a massive manipulation of that property by *waqf* administrators or judges. The very low number of *hikr* contracts featuring in the court records before the earthquake shows this quite clearly. The huge amount of *waqf* property tied up in *hikr* contracts that Gabriel Baer and others found in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century can only be the result of an accumulation of these types of contract over a long period of time, accelerated in times of crisis, as confirmed by the documents from Aleppo. Sometimes these contracts led to complex property situations with up to three different owners for a single entity, which could, presumably, create the potential for future property disputes.

At least in Aleppo, there is every indication that the limits imposed by the law on the misuse of these contracts seemed efficacious, as is clear from the very low number of such contracts in 'normal' times. A comparison with contracts of *ijara tawila*, *istibdal* and *istidana* shows that in times of crisis the number of these contracts also rises, although less significantly than the number of *hikr* contracts. This reflects the destruction caused by the earthquake, but at the same time the market situation: fewer tenants were willing to agree to these contracts and profit from the situation to obtain property rights to the assets. *Hikr* increased the most, then *istibdal*, *ijara tawila* to a lesser degree and *istidana* even less.

On the other hand, contracts like *hikr* and *khulu 'urfi* proved effective tools, especially in the aftermath of a crisis like the earthquake of 1822, when the *waqf* was forced to agree to such contracts in an attempt to save itself as an institution. Once again, it seems that Islamic law could adjust to changing circumstances.

PART FOUR

THE OTTOMAN STATE AND LOCAL SOCIETY IN
BILAD AL-SHAM

ARAB NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN SEVENTEENTH- AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SYRIA

STEVE TAMARI

In 1966, Abdul-Karim Rafeq published his landmark study of the politics of eighteenth century Syria, *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783*.¹ At the time, he was one of only a handful of students of Arab history interested in the dynamism and complexity of politics in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.² For most historians, the attraction of this period was no match for the religious significance of the classical period of Islam, or for the intellectual stimulation of the ‘golden age’ of Arab science and letters, or for the political passion of such nineteenth- and twentieth-century phenomena as Islamic reform, modernization, and nationalism. Some dated the onset of Arab decline to as early as the tenth century with the fragmentation of the ‘Abbasid Empire, although more generous accounts extended the period of Arab glory a few more centuries to include more of the major innovations of medieval Arab civilization. In any case, in the conventional narrative of the time, the Ottoman period was the final phase in a story of steady decline that lasted until the renaissance in Arabic letters and the birth of Arab nationalism in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. The eighteenth century was simply the bleakest phase in an already lengthy history of decline.

Now, forty years after the publication of Rafeq’s first book, this dismal assessment no longer holds. In the meantime—and thanks in no small measure to Rafeq’s own research and to the guidance he has offered to countless younger scholars—the ‘Arab dark ages’, particularly in terms of Ottoman Syria, are no longer so dark. Rafeq’s pioneering use of court records and the collected opinions of Muslim jurists, *fatawa*, have contributed to the cultivation of a rich historiography with

¹ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783*, Beirut, Khayats, 1966.

² In the same year that Rafeq’s monograph appeared, one of his mentors, Peter Holt, produced a survey of the internal political dynamics of the region, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922: A Political History*, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1966, in which he notes the paucity of studies of Ottoman Syria (317–18).

prospects for even more bountiful scholarly harvests in the future.³ Research has moved from the political to the economic, social, and cultural realms. The use of court records has allowed historians to bring to the fore classes of people (women, merchants, craftsmen, the urban poor and peasants) who are barely represented in the traditional literary and biographical sources.⁴ Studies of *fatawa* have demonstrated the high degree of independent reasoning exercised by legal scholars at the time.⁵ In terms of *Bilad al-Sham* (geographical Syria), book-length studies of Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, and Nablus have recently been complemented by histories of Hama and Acre.⁶

One area in which Rafeq has been a pioneer but where few have followed his lead is in the field of identity studies, specifically Arab ethnic identity in Ottoman *Bilad al-Sham* prior to the rise of an explicitly political nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁷ The theme of Arab ethnic identity runs through much of his work, beginning with his observation in *The Province of Damascus* that some local contemporaries were proud to see an Arab family, such as the 'Azms, come to such political prominence in their midst.⁸ However, Rafeq's most explicit treatment of the topic comes in an article written in 1995 entitled 'Social Groups, Identity and Loyalty, and Historical Writing in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Syria'.⁹ Using legal treatises, advice literature, biographies and chronicles from the sixteenth,

³ Collective efforts by scholars of Ottoman Syria in the last decade testify to the continuing vitality of this area of research. Special editions of *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* (3, Fall 2003) and of *Arabica* (51, 4, 2004) were devoted to Ottoman Syria.

⁴ See here James Grehan *Everyday Life and Consumer Culture in 18th Century Damascus*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2007.

⁵ Judith Tucker, *In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine*, Berkeley, University of California, 1998.

⁶ James Reilly, *A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Bern, Peter Lang, 2002; Thomas Philipp, *Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730–1831*, New York, Columbia, 2001.

⁷ Layla al-Sabbagh is Rafeq's only counterpart in this effort. Her study of Muhammad Amin al-Muhhibi, *Min a'lam al-fikr al-'Arabi fi'l-'asr al-'Uthmani al-awwal: Muhammad Amin al-Muhhibi al-mu'arrikh wa-kitabuhu* Khulasat al-athar fi a'yan al-qarn al-mi'a al-'ashar, Damascus, al-Sharika al-Mutahhidah li'l-Tawzi', 1986, is a clarification call for a reassessment of the decline thesis as it applies to early Ottoman-era Arab intellectual and literary activity. See also Donald Quataert, 'Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes Towards the Notion of 'Decline', *History Compass*, 1, 2003, 1–11.

⁸ Rafeq, *Province*, 88–89.

⁹ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Social Groups, Identity and Loyalty, and Historical Writing in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Syria', in Dominique Chevallier, ed., *Les Arabes et l'histoire créatrice*, Paris, l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1995, 79–93.

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries representing the Sunni Muslim 'ulama of the cities, Rafeq makes a convincing case for the existence of a deep-seated Arab consciousness among this sector of the population of Syria before the rise of Arab nationalism. He demonstrates that members of the Syrian 'ulama understood Syria as being part of *bilad al-'Arab*, 'land of the Arabs'. They thought of themselves and their Arab contemporaries as *abna'* or *awlad al-'Arab*, 'sons of the Arabs'. Even though they were loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire¹⁰ and identified with their fellow Muslims, their sense of Arab identity contrasted and often conflicted with *al-dawla al-Turkiyya*, 'the Turkish state'.¹¹

In what follows, I will use Rafeq's insights on the phenomenon of Arab ethnic identity in Ottoman Syria as a point of departure for two questions, one more specific and empirical, the second more general and theoretical. First, what were the constituent elements of Arab identity as understood by the 'ulama of this period? What, in the final analysis, distinguished Arabs from others? Secondly, what are the theoretical implications of the existence of Arab ethnic consciousness prior to the rise of nationalism for our understanding of concepts like 'the nation' and nationalism itself? Was there an Arab nation before the rise of nationalism? To answer the first question, I will explore in depth one of the seventeenth-century sources Rafeq cites in his article on identity and loyalty. The text is a polemic by the Damascene Sufi scholar 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1731) entitled *Kitab al-qawl al-sadid fi jawaz khulf al-wa'id wa'l-radd 'ala al-Rumi al-jahil al-'anid* (The Correct Teaching Concerning the Possibility that God will not [Punish Christians and Jews]: The Response to the Ignorant and Stubborn Turk).¹² The insights derived from this text contribute, I believe, to a critique of modernist interpretations of nationalism, part of a historiographical debate which will be examined in the latter part of this discussion. To return to the status of the Ottoman period within the broader scheme of Arab history writ large, and to the enormity of

¹⁰ And mostly remained so until the First World War.

¹¹ Rafeq, 'Social Groups...' 79–80.

¹² Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (Mq 1581, ff. 29a–46b). The bulk of this text concerns the concept of the 'promise and the threat' (*al-wa'd wa'l-wa'id*) in which God promised paradise to believers and hell to non-believers. This aspect of the treatise is not the focus of this article; for a full discussion, see Michael Winter, 'A Polemical Treatise by 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi against a Turkish Scholar on the Religious Status of the *Dhimmis*', *Arabica*, 35, 1, 1988, 92–103. Hereafter, Nabulusi's text will be referred to simply as *Kitab al-qawl*.

Rafeq's contributions to the writing of Syrian and Arab history, these observations—empirical and theoretical alike—could have some bearing on at least one important aspect of continuity between pre-modern and modern Syrian history.

Of all the rulers of Syria during the Islamic period, the Ottomans were the most effective in creating a bureaucratic system that integrated the 'ulama—including Turks and Arabs as well as other non-Turks—into the ruling institutions of the state. That said, members of the Arab 'ulama of the Empire were conscious and proud of their identity as Arabs. The three key ingredients of this sense of a shared Arab identity were: a) a presumption of spiritual chosen-ness; b) a myth of common origins; and finally c) an innate capacity to understand Arabic, the language of God. These components are so elemental that they underscore an unequivocal sense of a separate and distinct identity even though it coexisted with attachment to the wider Islamic world and with loyalty to the Ottoman state. Nabulusi's 1692 composition, *Kitab al-Qawl*, is a disarmingly explicit expression of this sense of separateness.

'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi was one of the foremost Syrian scholars of the early modern period. A recent biographer says he wrote more original works than any of his contemporaries, including books on Sufism, *fiqh*, a variety of secular subjects, and several travelogues not to mention a four-volume *diwan* of poetry.¹³ In *Kitab al-Qawl*, Nabulusi quotes at length from a separate treatise by the seventeenth century Damascene historian Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi (d. 1651) titled *Husn al-tanabbuh lima warada fi'l-tashabbuh* (The Importance of Being Alert to Appearances). Ghazzi was the Shafi'i mufti of Damascus and is best known to historians as author of a biographical dictionary of prominent Muslims who died in the sixteenth/tenth century. Because both Nabulusi and Ghazzi were so prominent, it is not unreasonable to think their ideas resonated with their contemporaries, particularly among elite members of the Arab 'ulama of Syria.

In this treatise, Nabulusi argues against an unnamed Turkish writer who claimed that even if Christians and Jews pay the *jizya* (poll tax), they will not avoid punishment in the afterlife. Nabulusi's defense of

¹³ Barbara von Schlegell, 'Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World: Shaykh 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi', Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1997, 8–9. Two recent biographies of al-Nabulusi are: Elizabeth Sirriyeh, *Sufi Visionary of Ottoman Damascus: 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, 1641–1731*, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2005, and Samer Akkash, *'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi: Islam and the Enlightenment*, Oxford, Oneworld, 2007.

the spiritual status of non-Muslims came at the tail end of a seventeenth-century 'culture war' that raged throughout the Ottoman world and pitted an austere, literalist, and reformist (in today's parlance, 'fundamentalist') interpretation of Islam against prevailing ideas and practices, particularly those associated with popular Sufi orders and with the ideas of the medieval mystic and philosopher Muhi al-Din Ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 1240). The Kadizadelis, as the reformists are generally known, were especially active in Istanbul but, by the time Nabulusi wrote *al-Qawl*, the movement had become widespread in Damascus.¹⁴ Nabulusi expended great efforts to defend many of the practices, such as listening to music, drinking coffee, and visiting tombs, which came under attack by the Kadizadelis. At one point, he felt so embattled that he retreated into his home for seven years. Later, he moved to the outskirts of town and frequently set off on long trips into the Syrian countryside to visit sacred sites and refresh his spiritual energies. The anger and resentment he often felt is palpable in the text under discussion here.

Kitab al-Qawl is distinguished by its vociferous ethnocentrism, as the book's subtitle 'The Response to the Ignorant and Stubborn Turk' makes clear from the outset. In the introduction, Nabulusi is explicit about his anti-Turkish and pro-Arab sentiments and loses no time in attacking the ethnicity of his antagonist. He takes aim at this 'uncivilized and sinister man' from 'the land of the Turks (*bilad al-Rum*)' who accuses

the Arab and the son of the Arab of unbelief. He does this even though he is a non-Arab and a son of a non-Arab and even though the 'ulama have established that the Arabs are masters of the Turks and Persians in matters of religion and that it was they who brought the Turks into Islam in the first place. Perhaps this unfortunate soul who rejects the truth forgets that not long ago he was probably a Christian fighting Muslims, worshipping Jesus, eating pork, drinking wine, and prostrating himself before idols. Now, he wears the white turban of the religious scholar and dons the apparel of a Muslim. However, only God knows what is in his heart. He has the audacity to charge a believing Muslim with unbelief.¹⁵

¹⁴ For the origins and significance of the Kadizadeli movement in Istanbul, see Madeline Zilfi, 'The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in 17th-Century Istanbul', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 45, 4, 1986, 251–69. For the movement's presence in Damascus, see von Schlegell, 'Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World', 64–72.

¹⁵ Nabulusi, *Kitab al-Qawl*, 29b.

In this short passage, Nabulusi introduces many of the key components of his sense of ethnic identity. For one, he sees the world—specifically the world of Islam—as divided among ethnic groups. He singles out for special mention the traditional rivals to the Arabs in Islamic history, the Turks and the Persians. In this regard a recurring theme is the special role of the Arabs in introducing Islam to other nations. By pointing to his antagonist's ancestry, 'a non-Arab and a son of a non-Arab', he begins to uncover the central role of genealogy in his definition of ethnic identity. Finally, he remarks on the deceptiveness of appearances, an idea to which he returns when discussing the Arabs' intuitive understanding of sacred texts in contrast to their non-Arab counterparts.

At the core of Nabulusi's ethnocentrism is the notion that Arabs are spiritually superior to other nations. Nabulusi and Ghazzi and some of their cohorts often make this assertion, as had many of their predecessors going back to the earliest days of Islam. I want to focus on the three specific aspects of the sense of Arab spiritual superiority briefly outlined above: Arab 'chosen-ness', a myth of common descent in which Arab and Abrahamic genealogies are fused, and Arabic as the language of God.

According to Ghazzi, as reported by Nabulusi, God chose his prophets deliberately from among the nations and tribes. His final message was delivered by an Arab prophet, a choice that demonstrates their superiority over other nations. Ghazzi relates several *hadith* to this effect:

God [says Ghazzi] chose (*istafa*) Isma'il from the children of Ibrahim and Bani Kinana from the children of Isma'il...it follows, then, that Isma'il and his descendants are the best of Ibrahim's progeny and they are, therefore, better than the descendents of Ishaq who form Bani Isra'il. Finally, that one group is preferred to another demonstrates that both of these are better than the non-Arabs (*al-'Ajam*). If this was not what was meant by the *hadith*, then there would have been no need to mention the choice of Isma'il if his selection did not point to the selection of his descendants.¹⁶

According to Ghazzi, another *hadith* relates that the Prophet said, 'God chose the Arabs from among other human beings, and chose from among the Arabs Mudar, and from the Mudar Quraysh, and from Quraysh Bani Hashim and chose me [Muhammad] from Bani Hashim'.¹⁷ Ghazzi musters all kinds of evidence, embroidering it with

¹⁶ Ibid., 30b. Bani Kinana is the tribe from which Quraysh descended.

¹⁷ Ibid., 30b–31a.

additions of his own, to demonstrate that Muhammad himself believed in the special status of the Arabs. Such *hadith* (which are of dubious origin) include, 'He who loves the Arabs loves me and he who disdains the Arabs disdains me' and 'The Arabs are loved for three reasons: because I am Arab, the *Qur'an* is in Arabic, and the language of Paradise is Arabic.'¹⁸ In an act of clear embellishment, Ghazzi refers to the *hadith* 'I do not prefer Arab over non-Arab or black over red except in piety' and then adds 'however, if they are equal in strength of piety, then the Arab comes before the non-Arab as suggested by a series of *hadith* in which Muhammad indicates God's preference for the Arabs.'¹⁹

Ghazzi's notion that the Arabs are superior to non-Arabs flies in the face of the fact that the message of Islam is universal and places submission to God above the multitude of linguistic and ethnic groups that make up the worldwide community of Muslims. One of the most well known *Qur'anic* passages that speaks to this principle is from *sura al-Hujurat*, which reads: 'We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you' (49:13).²⁰ But the fact that the *Qur'an* was revealed in Arabic, that Muhammad was an Arab, that the earliest converts to Islam were Arabs, and that Arabs dominated 'Islamic politics' during the first Islamic century all contributed to the persistent power of Arab ethnic pride and solidarity throughout the course of Islamic history. Conversely, Arab pride of place in Islamic history has fueled the tenacity of ethnic solidarity among other groups of Muslims, notably Turks and Persians. Full blown ethnic conflict broke out during the eighth and ninth centuries CE and took shape in the form of an anti-Arab movement known as the *Shu'ubiyya*, which came into being as a result of tensions between Persians and Arabs and their rival expressions of ethnic pride. Our seventeenth-century polemicists drew upon this ready-made reservoir of myth and unreliable *hadith* to make their claims of Arab superiority.

As suggested by the examples above, the sense of a shared genealogy is closely allied to the notion of Arab 'chosen-ness'. This is made

¹⁸ Ibid., 31a.

¹⁹ Ibid., 30a.

²⁰ The translation is by Yusuf Ali: *The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, Washington DC, Islamic Center, 1978, 1407.

possible by the assumption of a convergence between pre-Islamic Arab genealogies and the Abrahamic genealogy. The Prophet Muhammad and his followers recognized the prophets and figures of the Judeo-Christian tradition and saw Muhammad as following in their wake. In the course of the first generations of Islamic history, classical Arab genealogies were combined with the biblical genealogies to link the Arabs and Muhammad to Abraham.²¹ According to the pre-Islamic Arab tradition, the Arabs were divided into two groups, those of the south who descended from Qahtan and were known as 'true Arabs' (*al-'arabu al-'arabiya* and *al-'arab al-'araba*) and those of the north who descended from 'Adnan and who were 'Arabized' (*muta'arriba* or *musta'riba*). The Islamic version of this genealogy holds that 'Adnan was the son of Isma'il, the son of Abraham and Hagar. According to the eighteenth-century Yemeni lexicographer Murtada al-Zabidi, the Arabs are a nation (*jil min al-nas*) divided into two groups, those of Qahtan who are thought to be pure and those whose lineage goes through Mu'add and 'Adnan to Isma'il whose wife (but not himself) was descended from Qahtan, the 'pure' Arabs.²² The convergence of Arab and Abrahamic genealogies allowed Arab Muslims to maintain ethnic separateness even within a spiritual framework that emphasized the universality of its message.

Our Arab members of the 'ulama also use the special status of the Arabic language in Islam to promote their sense of ethnic separateness and superiority. According to Ghazzi:

Humans are the best of the animals, as God blessed humans by bestowing on them speech and logic and the Holy Book born of the two. The more one's speech is clear and understood, the stronger one's intellect and the wiser one is. There is no doubt that the Arabs are the most eloquent of peoples and that of all the languages, their language allows for the finest distinctions between meanings. The *Qur'an* itself is proof of this excellence.²³

Not only is Arabic the language of the *Qur'an* and, thus, the language of God, but only Arabs can fully master it. This is particularly important to members of the Arab 'ulama, like Nabulusi and Ghazzi, who

²¹ I. Eph'al, "Ishmael" and "Arab(s)": A Transformation of Ethnological Terms, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 35, 4, 1976, 234.

²² Muhammad Murtada al-Husayni al-Zabidi, ed. 'Abd al-Karim al-'Izbawi, *Taj al-'arus min jawahir al-qamus*, Kuwait, 1967, vol. 3, 332–34.

²³ Nabulusi, *Kitab al-Qawl*, 29b.

saw themselves in a struggle with non-Arab members of the same body of religious scholars. This point is made abundantly clear by Nabulusi's attack on a Turk who, in his eyes, is only masquerading as a scholar. Nabulusi distinguishes between learning Arabic and being an Arab. Non-Arabs can learn Arabic but they cannot become Arabs and can never master the language the way a native speaker can. Nabulusi writes,

As for those who really know the language, their number is limited to the Arabs... Many Persian, Turkish and other 'ulama learn Arabic to the extent that they appear perfectly fluent on the surface but, in fact, it takes them great effort to speak thus.²⁴

Nabulusi concludes 'the non-Arab is fundamentally different from the Arab whether he is a Persian or a Turk, even if he is a scholar of the Arabic language'. Nabulusi implies that something akin to 'natural speech', not simply knowledge of Arabic, is the criterion for Arabness and, by implication, the test for a thorough understanding of the sacred text.

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century manifestations of Arab ethnic consciousness and the specific ways in which they were articulated in such texts as *Kitab al-Qawl* have important implications for our understanding of such phenomena as the nation and nationalism, particularly Arab nationalism. Furthermore, they point to an important avenue of continuity between the pre-*Nahdha* period of Ottoman rule (the once maligned 'Arab dark age') on one hand and the modern period of Syrian history on the other.

Though his area of focus is late twentieth-century ethno-nationalism, Walker Connor suggests the application of some much needed clarity for the use of the terms that are relevant to our discussion and that are often confused. The study of the origins of nations and nationalisms is plagued by confusion over the terms 'nation' and 'nation state'. Connor emphasizes the subjective and socio-psychological aspects of the nation. In his words, the nation is 'a group of people who *believe* they are ancestrally related. It is the largest grouping that shares such a belief'.²⁵ The important lesson here is that, in instrumental terms, belief is more important than objective reality, myth is more important

²⁴ Ibid., 32b.

²⁵ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: the Quest for Understanding*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, 212.

than fact. Whether the Arabs descended from 'Adnan or Muhammad from Abraham is irrelevant; the fact that Nabulusi, Ghazzi, and their ilk believed so is. Most nations, Connor says, are not coterminous with states: thus the nation state is a historical rarity, although most scholars and the public at large use the terms interchangeably. Drawing on a host of examples from medieval, early modern, and modern European history, he argues convincingly that most nations are based on a mythical sense of shared kinship.²⁶ This is why nationalism, which is rooted in the nation, is always more powerful than patriotism, which is based on the abstractions of a state. Generally, argues Connor, scholars have missed this distinction by refusing to describe the nation as a kinship group.²⁷ He distinguishes 'nation' from 'ethnic group' in terms of consciousness. The members of a nation consciously identify themselves as such while an ethnic group is identified as such by outsiders and is, at best, a 'potential nation'.²⁸

Of course, our seventeenth century Syrians were not 'nationalists' and all the evidence suggests that the Arab 'national sentiment' which they expressed was limited to a small group, namely members of the Arab Sunni Muslim educated elite. Nabulusi and his cohorts did not feel a unity of purpose with the Arab masses. Using the Arabic language as a standard, Nabulusi distinguishes between the Arab 'ulama and the Arab 'awwam, or masses:

What is meant by the Arab now, in the past, and in the future is one who can speak Arabic without butchering it. . . . As far as those who really know the language (*al-fasih*), their number is limited to the Arabs . . . and the 'ulama among them. . . . Thus, he who finds himself talking with the common people (*al-awwam*) among the Arabs in this time and others will hear them depart from the rules of the language.²⁹

But, even given these limitations on the scope of Arab ethnic consciousness, Nabulusi's sentiments contain the key elements that make for a nation: the perception of shared kinship and national consciousness. That these were fueled by a sense of divine chosen-ness and spiritual superiority makes them all the more powerful. Thus, it is perfectly plausible to hold that Nabulusi's sentiments as revealed in *Kitab al-Qawl* amount to Arab national consciousness. Why, then, have scholars

²⁶ Ibid., 211–26.

²⁷ Ibid., 197.

²⁸ Ibid., 103.

²⁹ Nabulusi, *Kitab al-Qawl*, 32a–32b.

so adamantly avoided discussing the existence of an Arab nation prior to the emergence of nationalism in the late nineteenth century?

The main obstacle seems to be the domination of modernist interpretations of nationalism and of Arab nationalism in particular. The modernist interpretation of nationalism holds that it is a purely modern phenomenon. According to this view, nationalism is tied inexorably to the dramatic transformations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the French Revolution, the expansion of industrial capitalism, and the emergence of the bureaucratic nation state and its appendages, the conscript army and mass education. For Ernest Gellner, the foremost 'modernist' theoretician of nationalism, history is divided into two main periods, the agrarian and the industrial.³⁰ During the former period, religious institutions and family structures held societies together. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the subsequent decline of religion and the toppling of monarchies, nationalism became the new 'social glue'. The hallmarks of the modernist approach to nationalism are its emphasis on socio-economic change and the stark distinction it draws between pre-modern and modern history. There are many variations of the 'modernist' paradigm, including the view that nations and national traditions are 'imagined' and in some sense 'invented', but these approaches also hold fast to the notion of a sharp dividing line marking modern from pre-modern history.³¹

The most important critic of modernism in the study of nationalism is Anthony Smith who places myth, symbolism and culture upfront and center and argues for the pre-modern origins of modern nations.³² Smith uses the term 'ethnic communities' (as well as the more awkward *ethnie*) and 'ethnic nationalism' to characterize pre-modern sentiments of cultural solidarity. Ethnic communities are 'named human populations with shared ancestry, myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.'³³ The cultural and symbolic power of ethnic communities are key to our

³⁰ For a thorough review of Gellner's ideas and his influence on the study of nationalism, see John A. Hall (ed.), *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

³¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1983 and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

³² Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986. Smith acknowledges the pioneering work of John Armstrong: see *Nations before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1982.

³³ Smith, *Ethnic Origins*, 32.

understanding of conflicts between nations today because they reflect 'the antiquity of modern nations, their rootedness in a past...that expresses their uniqueness.'³⁴

Historians of Arab nationalism have generally stuck to the modernist paradigm.³⁵ They have trained their sights on the first ideological stirrings in the mid-nineteenth century and the gradual spread of nationalism as an explicit demand for Arab political independence in the twentieth. In terms of periodization, their debates have revolved around whether the origins of Arab nationalism lie in the mid or late nineteenth or early twentieth century.³⁶ They have shown little interest in the pre-modern indications of Arab national consciousness. Rafeq's initial forays into this area combined with Connor's understanding of the importance of consciousness in the creation of nations, and Smith's emphasis on the pre-modern myths and symbols for the creation of modern nationalisms are a welcome antidote to the modernist reluctance to look for continuities between pre-modern and modern history.

The next step is to proceed to a more thorough exploration of the connections between pre-modern Arab national consciousness and its modern and explicitly political incarnations. This is not the place to identify precisely which myths and symbols modern Arab nationalists drew upon as they created a new political ideology, but some of the insights provided by a text like Nabulusi's help to clear the way. Almost two hundred years before the earliest articulations of Arab nationalism, members of the Arab 'ulama of Syria felt the emotional and psychological power of a nation tied together by blood, chosen by God to spread his final message, and uniquely endowed with an innate ability to master the language of that message. It should come as no surprise if their intellectual descendents drew upon the same reserve of myths and symbols.

³⁴ Ibid., 212–14.

³⁵ In a seminal review article Rashid Khalidi wrote, 'Arab nationalism, like so many other Middle Eastern nationalisms, was a child of the intellectual atmosphere of the nineteenth century and one of many responses to the process of incorporation of the world into a single system with Europe at its center which the century witnessed.' 'Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature,' *American Historical Review*, 96, 5, 1991, 1364. For a more recent appraisal, see Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2003, especially 1–48.

³⁶ Khalidi, 'Arab Nationalism...', 1363–73.

This suggestion could be taken one step further to integrate the Ottoman period more fully into the more general scheme of Arab history as a whole and to avoid the tendency to view Arab nationalism primarily as a response to European pressures and influences. Nablusi's seventeenth-century ethnocentric outburst in the context of the spread of the Kadizadeli movement may be a sign of the perennial ebb and flow in national consciousness. In the context of his diatribe against non-Arabs, Ghazzi reveals a sense of historical consciousness that fuels a feeling of perpetual national grievance:

When 'Umar set up the *diwan* to divide up booty, claims were made on the basis of genealogy beginning with those most closely related to the Prophet and only when the Arabs had been accounted for were the 'Ajam mentioned. The *diwan* was drawn up in this manner during the period of the *khulafa' al-rashidun* and the rest of the *khulafa'* from the Bani Umayya and Bani al-'Abbas until the *umma* changed hands (*ila an tughayyar al-umma*) and it became known that preference was given to the 'Ajam and no one was allowed to protest this.³⁷

The implication is that the *umma* changed hands with the rise to prominence of non-Arabs and, since that time, the Arabs have been deprived of their rightful due. These memories are probably not always at the forefront but the perception of discrimination reinforces them and sparks the defensiveness that permeates *Kitab al-qawl*. Perhaps the *Shu'ubiya* movement of the eighth and ninth centuries and the Arab reaction to the Kadizadelis in the seventeenth represent two periods of spiking ethnic consciousness in a long history during which ethnic pride may be dormant but always survives under the surface. The modern nationalist movement, then, may be a different formulation of the same sentiment, and is thus both rooted in and draws from a shared wellspring of powerful and ancient antecedents. These are perhaps overly ambitious suggestions for further research, but our ability to pose them at all is a measure of the great strides that have been made in the study of Ottoman Syria since Abdul-Karim Rafeq began to blaze new trails in this territory forty years ago.

³⁷ Nablusi, *Kitab al-Qawl*, 31b.

THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OTTOMAN PERIOD: A CASE STUDY OF THE MA'N FAMILY*

MASSOUD DAHER

It is difficult to find generally acceptable terms and concepts to describe Lebanon and the Lebanese leadership in the sixteenth century. After all, the term 'Lebanon' in its current political sense only came into use in 1920 when the French mandate authorities created the state of Grand Liban, Greater Lebanon. Its geographical boundaries were established by the French shortly before the official announcement of the new state on 1 September of that year, and in 1922 the boundaries between Syria (then under French mandate) and Palestine (then under British mandate) were set permanently.

Contemporary Ottoman documents do not suggest a strong Lebanese military presence at the Battle of Marj Dabiq near Aleppo in 1516. The Lebanese chronicles claim the opposite, albeit without reference to verifiable sources. This discrepancy between the documents and the chronicles raises some questions. Did Fakhr al-Din I (r. 1516–1544) really participate in the Battle of Marj Dabiq? Did he have advance knowledge of the movement of Sultan Selim I's armies?

These and other methodological problems cast long shadows of doubt over the veracity of the Lebanese chronicles describing the rise of the Ma'n family based in Jabal al-Shuf (later known as Jabal al-Ma'n and then Jabal Lubnan). I do not want to comment on the reliability or otherwise of these chronicles, which, again, are not supported by the Ottoman documents. Instead, I will take the narratives that describe the historical reality of local leadership in the Lebanese *muqata'at* as my point of departure.

The Ottoman authorities viewed the assignment of local lords to the administration of the affairs of the Lebanese *muqata'at* as a way of guaranteeing the functioning of the imperial revenue system. It was left to local leaders to seize the chance to demonstrate their personal powers over their enemies, both within and outside their families, in order to earn their commission to collect taxes from local sources of revenue. Once appointed, the emir pocketed what he wanted, when he

* This paper is translated by W. Matt Malczykcki.

wanted it. The Ottoman political-administrative focus was based on one principle: force submission and then collect taxes. Hence the state supported the local lords in their centres of power for several centuries to ensure that it would receive income in a timely manner. Of course, not everyone benefited from the arrangement: in times of drought, pestilence, plague, war, local conflicts, inflation, and crop failure, the suffering of the peasants and local craftsmen was extreme.

As the state continued its tyranny through forced taxation, it became imperative for the local leader to pay the taxes regularly so that he would not risk removal or replacement. In consequence, the local lord collected many times the revenue that his commission required, since he needed a surplus to be able to afford the costs of administrative and financial corruption. Bribery was common in the *muqata'at* as well as within the governorates and in the central administration in Istanbul. Complaints from different districts weakened the ruling emir who became an obedient tool in the hands of the *wali*. For his part, the *wali* would often put a detachment of soldiers at the disposal of the local emir, which he could use to terrorize the local population into paying taxes. The Ma'n period provides a useful illustration of how this system evolved, representative of the changes that took place in the tax-farming system in the Lebanese *muqata'at* during the height of Ottoman power. Some features of this system were still in place during the period of imperial decline at the end of the eighteenth century.

*The political significance of the promotion of the Ma'n family to the
Emirate of the Lebanese muqata'at*

The Lebanese chronicles paint the history of the Ma'n emirate in broad strokes, and do not go into the specific details of how the family came to power. The traditional account begins with the Battle of Marj Dabiq and the subsequent Ottoman take over of Lebanon and Syria. On 15 August 1516 the Ottoman armies came face to face with the Mamluk forces near Aleppo. On 24 August the Battle of Marj Dabiq took place, which Ivanov describes as 'one of the most important battles in world history.'¹ No sooner had news of the Mamluk defeat begun to spread than a great uprising broke out in Aleppo, in which the

¹ N. Ivanov (trs. Yusuf 'Atallah), *al-Fath al-'uthmani li'l-iqtar al-'arabiya, 1516-1574*, Beirut, Dar al-Farabi, 1988, 63-66.

citizens attacked and executed the Mamluks' supporters. The city greeted Sultan Selim I with cries of joy, and he was proclaimed *hami al-haramayn* (protector of the two sanctuaries [of Mecca and Medina]) in the presence of the 'Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil III (d. 1543) in the main mosque.² Previously that title had been reserved for the caliphs, but the Mamluk sultans had appropriated it for themselves. For his part, Selim took the title 'sultan of the Muslims' or 'padishah of the Muslims.'

Building on his victory at Marj Dabiq, Selim marched toward Damascus, which he reached on 9 October 1516. There he toured the streets, some of which were decorated in silk in preparation for victory celebrations. After he had assumed all of the responsibilities that had belonged to the Mamluk leaders, and after he had assumed the honorific titles of the caliphate, he asked the local leaders to take an oath of allegiance to him, in a manner reminiscent of the *bay'a* which leaders had given to the caliphs in earlier times as proof of their submission to the Ottoman state. Before long, the new ruler was recognized throughout the Levant. With the exception of a few Bedouin chiefs who launched raids on the fringes of the Syrian Desert, all the local leaders complied. Selim accepted delegations from Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and other northern Lebanese cities at his court. He also received a delegation from Jabal al-Shuf headed by the emir Fakhr al-Din I Ma'n who had sided with the Ottomans at Marj Dabiq. The sultan marked him out for distinction and put him in charge of the rest of the lords of Jabal al-Shuf, which from that time became known as the 'Emirate of Mount Lebanon' (and also as the Ma'n emirate and the Shuf emirate) a title it would retain throughout the Ma'n and Shihab periods.

The basic unit of Ottoman administration was the *wilaya*, which was subdivided into *sanjaks* (Arabic *liwa'*), emirates, and finally individual *muqata'at*, 'fiefdoms'. The sultan appointed two personal representatives, a military commander, and a qadi drawn from the ranks of the 'ulama, to supervise the administration of the Lebanese and Syrian *wilayas*. In theory, the military governor could not implement any order without obtaining the approval of the qadi, while the qadi was free to hand down sentences without any interference from the military governor. However, since the qadi had no police force at his disposal, he was generally dependent on the governor to enforce his

² Halil İnalcik (trs. Muhammad al-Arna'ut), *Ta'rikh al-dawla al-'uthmaniya min al-nushu' ila al-inhidar*, Beirut, Dar al-Madar al-Islami, 2002, 55.

verdicts. The qadi received judicial ordinances and imperial instructions directly from the sultan, and he had the prerogative of hearing complaints without consulting the governor. The Ottomans considered this direct delegation of judicial power from the centre to be of the utmost importance because it ensured a degree of justice for the sultan's subjects and also put limits on corruption. The regions of the Ottoman state were further divided into *sanjaks*, which could denote either an administrative unit or a geographical area. A military governor, the *sanjak bey*, was entrusted with the affairs of the sanjak. He received a banner from the sultan as a symbol of his appointment, and ruled with the assistance of several *sipahis* and other military leaders.

The Ma'n emir Fakhr al-Din I was not the only emir to retain control over his *muqata'at*, or for that matter, the only one who feared being replaced by another who could outdo him in showing loyalty to the new ruler. In fact this was the case in most of the *muqata'at* in the Levant. The chronicles indicate that the Ottomans reconfirmed the positions of most of the emirs who had held power in the Mamluk era:

Selim I appointed governors general over Aleppo, Hama, and Homs, and then arrived in Damascus, where his name was mentioned in the Friday sermon. Most of the emirs of Syria went to him there and submitted to him and his government, whereupon he confirmed them in their (land) holdings.³

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful state in the world. Its armies laid siege to Vienna and its navy was a constant threat to the navies of the European states. In addition, its social and economic policies were considered among the most advanced in the world at that time. Once the Ottomans had securely established their position in the Levant, Selim I appointed military governors over the *wilayas* of the region. These governors carried the title of *beylerbey* or bey of beys, the equivalent of the Arabic *amir al-umara'*. The *beylerbey* entrusted the affairs of the sub-districts known as *liwa'* to an officer known as the *sanjak bey* or *amir al-liwa'*.⁴

³ Muhammad Anis, *al-Dawla al-'uthmani w'al-sharq al-'arabi, 1514-1914*, Cairo, Maktaba al-Anglo-al-Misriya, 1965, 111.

⁴ Sati' al-Husri, *al-Bilad al-'arabiya w'al-dawla al-'uthmaniya*, Cairo, Jam'iat al-Duwal al-'Arabiya, 1957, 30. See also 'Abd al-Karim Rafiq (Abdul-Karim Rafeq), *Bilad al-Sham wa Misr min al-fath al-'uthmani ila hamlat Nabulyun Bunabart 1516-1798*, 2nd edn., Damascus, 1968, and the same author's *al-'Arab wa'l-'uthmaniyyun*, 1st edn.,

The Ottomans initially divided the Levant into two large *wilayas*: Aleppo, which had five *liwa's*, and Damascus, which had eleven. In 1519 they created the *wilaya* of Tripoli, where some of the Ma'n *muqata'at* were located, the others being in the *wilaya* of Damascus. Sidon became a province a little later in order to oversee Mount Lebanon, and Beirut became a province at the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, the history of the local lords became intertwined with the history of the Levant for the rest of the Ottoman era, first during the rule of the Ma'ns (1516–1697) and then under the Shihabs (1697–1842). The Ma'n *muqata'at* on the edge of the Bika' were part of the *wilaya* of Damascus, those in the north were part of the *wilaya* of Tripoli, and those in the south were part of the *wilaya* of Acre-Sidon. In order to understand the political struggles within and among the local families it is necessary to examine the struggles among the *walis* in the Levant in the Ottoman period.

Apparently, the Ma'n family had not played a particularly important role in the Mamluk period and their leaders were subordinate to their relatives, the Tanukh family. Fakhr al-Din I al-Ma'n first rose to power when Selim I appointed him over all the other influential local *muqata'at* holders. Some of the chronicles indicate that Selim granted the Jabal Shuf emirate special status when he granted its *muqata'at* to Fakhr al-Din and his descendants for as long as there were male heirs. As it turned out, the last of the Ma'n line was the Emir Ahmad who died in 1697 with no male heirs.⁵

The Role of the Ma'n Leadership in the Shuf Emirate and its Environs

The Ma'n family owed its rise to power at the beginning of the Ottoman period to its close relations with the Tanukh-Buhturi family, which controlled the area west of Beirut. This family was on good terms with the Ma'n princes and entered into marriage alliances with

Damascus, Maktabat Atlas, 1967; Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane XVI–XVII^{ème} siècle*, Beirut, Librairie Orientale, 1982. For a more detailed chronology of the various administrative divisions, see Andreas Rieck, *Die Provinzen des Osmanischen Reiches*, Wiesbaden, Reichert, 1976.

⁵ 'Adil Isma'il, 'Le Liban au temps de Fakhr al-Din II 1590–1633', in *Histoire du Liban du XVII^e siècle à nos jours*, vol. 1, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1955, 54; 'Adil Isma'il, (comp.), *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à la histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVII^{ème} siècle à nos jours*: Beirut, Éditions des œuvres politiques et historiques, 47 vols., (1975–present).

them, thereby securing a place for themselves in Jabal al-Shuf. Subsequently the Ma'ns forged friendly relations with the Shihab family who ruled Wadi al-Taym.

Elsewhere, the Sayfa family ruled 'Akkar and Tripoli, the Harfush family ruled the Biqā', and the Bedouin Tarbih, Qansuh, and Furaykh tribes held sway over the plains of the Biqā', Palestine, and Jordan, especially around Safad and 'Ajlun. These families enjoyed influence and authority on a par with that of the Ma'n and Shihab families in their respective districts.⁶ The Hamada family controlled the towns and districts of al-Batrun, Bsharri, Jubayl, al-Thaniya, al-Zawiya, and the northern Biqā'. They were contemporaries of the Ma'n emirs, and they continued to rule until they were subjugated by the Shihabs. Jabal 'Amil, located south of the Shuf emirate, was ruled by the Nassar, Saghir, Sudun, Munkar, and other local families. There were perpetual conflicts both within families and among neighbouring families due to the struggle for influence and the competition for tax farms throughout the Mamluk and the Ottoman periods.⁷

After obtaining a tax farm from the emir of Jabal al-Shuf and an appointment from the Ottoman *wali*, the main task of the *muqata'ji* (the ruler of the *muqata'*) was the collection of taxes. The *muqata'jis* had almost unlimited authority over the affairs of the *muqata'at* provided that they met the satisfaction of the Mamluk and later the Ottoman governors of the Levant. The Lebanese people suffered terribly as a consequence of the struggles among the *muqata'jis*, both before and after the establishment of the emirate of Jabal Shuf.⁸

⁶ Abd al-Rahim Abu Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria 1575–1650*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1985, 11–199; 'The Ottoman Invasion of the Shuf in 1585: a Reconsideration', *al-Abhath* 33, 1985, 13–21; 'The Korkumaz Question: a Maronite Historian's Pleas for Ma'nid Legitimacy', *al-Abhath* 34, 1986, 3–11; Kamal Salibi, 'The Buhturids of the Garb: Medieval Lords of Beirut and Southern Lebanon', *Arabica* 8, 1961, 74–97; 'The Muqaddams of Bsharri: Maronite Chieftains of the Northern Lebanon 1382–1621', *Arabica* 15, 1968, 63–86; 'The Sayfas and the Eyalet of Tripoli', *Arabica* 20, 1973, 25–52; 'The Secret of the House of Ma'n', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4, 1973, 272–87.

⁷ Mas'ud Dahir, 'Adwa' ala jughrafiya al-tawattur al-tarikhi li'l-muqata'at al-lubnaniya', *Dirasat*, 1, Beirut 1975, pp. 55–95.

⁸ Mas'ud Dahir, 'Ba'd al-simmat al-asasiya al-tawattur al-nizam al-muqata'ji al-lubnani', *Majjalat kulliyat al-adab fi al-jam'ia al-lubnaniya* 1, 1975, pp. 37–74; Ibid., 'al-'Sira'a al-markaziya dakhil al-nizam al-muqata'ji al-lubnani', *Dirasat 'Arabiya* 3, 1977; 'al-Ta'ifa w'al-manhaj fi dirasat ta'rikh lubnan al-hadith w'al-mu'asir', *al-Fikr al-'arabi*, 2, 1978; *Judhur al-ta'rikhi li'l-masala al-ta'ifiya al-lubnaniya*, Beirut, Ma'had al-Inma' al-'Arabi [3 editions] 1981, 1984, 1986.

Fakhr al-Din ibn 'Uthman al-Ma'n traced his origins to the Emir Ma'n al-Ayyubi, who had been sent to the region in 1120 and soon gained control over it. He made the town of Ba'qillin his administrative centre with the help of the Buhturi-Tanukh family, which ruled the Gharb. The Ma'n family was connected by marriage to the Tanukh family: the Tanukh princess Nasab became the wife of the Ma'n prince Qurqumaz ibn Fakhr al-Din I and the mother of the Emirs Fakhr al-Din II and Yunus.⁹

The boundaries between Fakhr al-Din's emirate and those of his neighbours were not well defined. The emir occasionally called on the Ottoman armies for help, sometimes to establish his authority in his own emirate and sometimes to demonstrate his power over his neighbours. Eventually, he gained great power within his emirate as well as the submission of the neighbouring leaders to his centralised authority. No sooner had he done this than he began to expand into other Lebanese *muqata'at*. As a result, the chronicles have given different names to the emirate: the Shuf emirate, the emirate of Jabal Druze, the emirate of Mount Lebanon, as well as the Ma'n emirate. It was also at this time that almost all the Lebanese *muqata'at* were placed under the jurisdiction of the *wilaya* of Damascus. The Shuf emirate, the emirate of Wadi al-Taym, the emirate of the Biqa', and the sanjak of Tripoli, as well as the *muqata'at* of Jabal 'Amil were parts of this *wilaya*. Fakhr al-Din's successors moved the administrative seat of the emirate from Ba'qillin to the nearby town of Dayr al-Qamar, the capital of the emirate of Mount Lebanon during the Ma'n and Shihab periods.

The files of the Ottoman land registers for the year 1523 and the accounting records for 1530, 1543, and 1569 indicate that there were thirteen *nahiyas* in the Ma'n emirate. These were Beirut, al-Gharb, Iqlim al-Khurnub (al-Khurub), Iqlim al-Tufah, Iqlim al-Shumar, al-Jard, Kisrawan, al-Matn, Sidon, Shuf al-Bayad, Shuf al-Haradhayn, Shuf Ibn Ma'n/al-Hayti/al-Suyjani, Jizzin.¹⁰

⁹ Nadim Hamza, *al-Tanukhiyun ajdad al-Muwahhidun (al-Duruz) wa dawruhum fi Jabal Lubnan*, Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1984, 217–18; Sami Mukaram, *Lubnan fi 'ahd al-umara' al-Tanukhiya*, Beirut, Dar Sadr, 2000, 293–94; Salih ibn Yahya, eds. Francis Hurus al-Yaswa'i and Kamal al-Salibi, *Ta'rikh Beirut wa huwa akhbar al-salaf min dhuriya Buhtur ibn 'Ali Amir al-Gharb Bayrut*, Beirut, Dar al-Mashriq, 1969.

¹⁰ Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century*, Beirut, Librairie du Liban, 1982, 68–81.

Relations between the Ma'n and Tanukh families were extremely close. For example after the Ottomans defeated the Emir Qurqumaz in 1585, the Tanukh emir Sayf al-Din took over the affairs of the emirate. He did not face any serious opposition from the Ma'ns until Fakhr al-Din II came of age in 1591. Thereafter, the Tanukhs lost power, and the Ma'ns were able to absorb the Tanukh *muqata'at* without any opposition from local leaders.

The chronicles describe the Ma'n emirate as having originally consisted of the following seven *muqata'at* and districts:

1. The *muqata'a* of al-Shuf, divided into two parts:
 - a. al-Shuf al-Hayti whose centre was al-Mukhtara which became and is to this day the seat of the Junblatt family.
 - b. al-Shuf al-Suyjani, whose centre is Ba'qillin, currently one of the largest cities in the Shuf.
2. The *muqata'a* of al-Munasif, whose centre was Dayr al-Qamar. This was the Ma'n and then the Shihab centre of administration until Emir Bashir II (d. 1850) moved the capital to his palace in nearby Bayt al-Din.
3. The *muqata'a* of al-Shihar, with its centre at 'Abayh, which has been important in recent history.¹¹
4. The *muqata'a* of al-Gharb, which was divided into two sections.
 - a. The Upper Gharb, whose seats were 'Ayatat and then 'Aley. This is now one of the principal tourist areas in Lebanon.
 - b. The Lower Gharb, the seat of which was al-Shufiyat. al-Shufiyat was and still is the seat of the Arslan family. They have been in the region since the 'Abbasid era, and continue to have great influence there.¹²
5. The *muqata'a* of al-Jard, whose centre was Batatir. It was divided into two parts.
 - a. The Northern Jard, centred on Batatir.

¹¹ Many works based on the original documents have been published recently. See 'Abayh fi'l-ta'rikh', *Documents from the First History Conference for the Town of 'Abeyh* (November 1999), Beirut, Matba' Sarfi Burs, 2000, 20–21. The first American school was founded in 'Abeyh; this eventually became the American College and finally the American University in Beirut.

¹² Shakib Arslan, *Silsilat nasib al-a'ila al-arslaniya bi-hasab sijil nasab al-a'ila al-arslaniya al-muhfuza 'andahu wa al-ma'ruf bi'l-sijil al-arslani* 1st edn., 1925; repr. with corrections and indices by Muhammad Khalil al-Basha and Riyadh Husayn Ghanam, Beirut, Dar Nawfal, 1999.

- b. The Southern Jard, centred on Rashima, where the first European factory for natural silk was established. The silk trade played a fundamental role in the birth of the Lebanese bourgeoisie who became intermediaries in world trade.
6. The *muqata'a* of 'Arqub, which was divided into two parts:
 - a. Upper 'Arqub, centred on 'Ayn Zahlta.
 - b. Southern 'Arqub, centred on al-Baruk.
7. The *muqata'a* of al-Iqlim, centred on Shihim, which is now an agri-cultural centre specializing in olives and carob beans.

Some of the chronicles classify the districts and *muqata'at* under the heading 'the two districts of Lebanon and their *muqata'at*'. According to Tanyus al-Shidyaq they paid their taxes to the Ma'n and then the Shihab emirs. These two districts were Tripoli and Sidon. Under this system, Tripoli had eight *muqata'at*: al-Batrun, al-Futuh, Jubbat Bsharri, Jubayl, al-Kura, Munaytrah, and al-Zawiya. Sidon had sixteen *muqata'at*: al-'Arqub, Beirut, Lower Gharb, Upper Gharb, Iqlim Jizzin, Iqlim al-Kharub, Iqlim Tufah, Jabal al-Rihan al-Jard, Kisrawan, al-Matn, al-Munasaf, al-Qati', al-Shihar, al-Shuf, and al-Shuf al-Bayadi.¹³

However, a new study by 'Isam Khalifa based on the sixteenth century Ottoman archives presents a more accurate picture of the *nahiyas* of Lebanon in the period under discussion. According to Khalifa, the *nahiyas* were as follows: 'Akkar, 'Arqa, 'Arqub, Ba'albak, al-Batrun, the city of Beirut, Bsharri, Futuh Bani Rihail, Gharb, Hamarra, Husn al-Akrad, al-Jard, Jabal Kisrawan wa'l-Jaradayn, Jira, Jubayl, Jizzin, Iqlim al-Bilan, Iqlim al-Kharnub, Iqlim al-Tufah, Iqlim Shumar, Krac Nuh, Kura Anfa, Matn, Munasaf, Munaytra, Qurna, Shaqif, Shuf al-Bayad, Shuf al-Haradayn, Shuf Ibn Ma'n, Shuf Shuwayzani (Shuwayjani?), the city of Sidon, Tabanayn Bani Bisharra, the city of Tripoli, Wadi al-Taym, al-Zawiya, and al-Ziniya.¹⁴

When the Ottomans created the *wilaya* of Tripoli in 1579, they attached some *muqata'at* to it from the area between the Shuf emirate and the borders of the modern town of Jounieh. They also attached

¹³ Tanyus al-Shidyaq (ed. Fu'ad Afram al-Bustani), *Akhbar al-'ayan fi Jabal Lubnan*, vol. 1, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-Sharqiya, 1970, 19–29.

¹⁴ See the index of 'Isam Kamal Khalifa's *Atlas ta'rikhi: nawahi Lubnan f'il-qarn al-sadis 'ashar: al-taqsimat al-idariya, al-dimugrafiya, al-adyan w'al-madhahib*, Beirut, 2004, 232–34.

some *muqata'at* from 'Akkar, al-Batrun, al-Harmal, Jubbat Bsharri, Jubayl, al-Kura, Zaniya, and al-Zawiya. The *nahiyas* of Lebanon were divided among the *liwa's* of Beirut, Damascus, Safad, Sidon, and Tripoli. The famous Mu'amilatayn (Two Districts) Bridge near the town of Jounieh was the boundary between the *liwa's* of Sidon and Tripoli.

Most of these *nahiyas* and their *muqata'at* paid their fixed or intermittent taxes directly to the Ma'n emir, who controlled many *muqata'at* to the north and south. The exceptions were al-Batrun, Jubayl, al-Kura, al-Zawiyya, and a few others that did not become part of the emirate until later, some of them not until the middle of the Shihab period.

The Ma'n era witnessed a substantial broadening of the powers of the local emir. By virtue of the power that Selim I invested in him as *sultan al-barr* (lord of the land), Fakhr al-Din I became responsible for administering the affairs of the *muqata'at* attached to his emirate. His authority stretched from 'the borders of Jaffa to Tripoli, and he built buildings, erected great castles, attended to the welfare of the people and subjugated the Bedouin under his rule.'¹⁵

Fakhr al-Din I was succeeded by his son Qurqumaz (1544–85), the father of the future Emirs Fakhr al-Din II and Yunus. Qurqumaz' reign was marked by conflicts arising from disputes between local families over power and tax revenue. In order to maintain control of the *muqata'at* that his father had governed, Qurqumaz had to engage in battles with the Sayfa family of Tripoli and 'Akkar and the 'Assaf family of Kisrawan. The Ottoman authorities had to send numerous disciplinary expeditions to the Levant to ensure order and stability in this period.

The initial expeditions against the Shuf emirate failed. At the battle of 'Ayn Dara in 1565, the Druze defeated the Ottoman army because their muskets were more modern than those of the janissaries. In 1570 the Ottoman general was forced to retreat to the town of Kafr Silwan for much the same reason and also because of the mountainous terrain. By that time the Druze were quite well armed, and muskets had become commonplace in the Shuf, Wadi Taym, Kisrawan, the Biqa', and Palestine. In an imperial edict, the *beylerbey* of Damascus demanded:

¹⁵ Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat al-Sham*, vol. 2, Beirut, Matba'a al-Turqi, 1927, 238.

...from every abode a musket, for that is necessary.... [He demanded] from the *muqaddam* [local officer] Mansur al-Assaf 2,000 muskets, many of which he had obtained in Cyprus before 1574. [He demanded] from Qurqumaz Ma'noğlu (i.e. the Ma'n prince, Qurqumaz), Shihab al-Din, and Sharif al-Din Qaytbay 1,000 muskets each. Still, the local officers tried to keep from the beylerbey of Damascus what he wanted for the armoury. When they persisted in their recalcitrance, he ordered them arrested and then sent a disciplinary expedition to the groups that persisted in rebellion and sedition. In that way, he improved concord and unity.¹⁶

In consequence, taxes increased and new ones were added. The files of the Ottoman tax archives from this period give many of their names: *waqf* revenue, *'ushr* (tithe) on *waqf* money, bee tax, silk tax, warehouse tax, quartering tax, *kharaj* (land tax), defense tax, mill tax, tax on streams, bride tax, bazaar tax, and others.¹⁷ According to the chronicles, the enemies of the Emir Qurqumaz hatched a plot against him in 1585 with the support of the *wali* of Tripoli, Ja'far Pasha al-Tushi, and the *wali* of Egypt, Ibrahim Pasha. The plot was successful, and he was strangled in a cave in 1585. The Emir Fakhr al-Din II was thirteen years old when his father died. His mother was Sitt Nasab, sister of the Emir Sayf al-Din al-Tanukh, one of the cleverest women in the emirate. With her great knowledge and wisdom, and with the help of her brother, she promoted her son to the head of the emirate. He came of age in 1591 and became emir with the help of his brother Yunus.

The Ma'n emirate was the scene of great violence between 1585 and 1591 as the leaders of local families rushed into the neighbouring *muqata'at* hoping to take advantage of the youth of the new emir. He showed great aptitude in juggling management of the emirate while confronting two main opponents, Emir Yusuf Sayfa of Tripoli, 'Akkar, and later Beirut; and Emir Mansur ibn Furaykh, lord of the Bika', Safad, and 'Ajlun. Both of them had direct support from the *wali* of Damascus and from Istanbul. Emir Fakhr al-Din II (1591–1633) developed and put in motion a long-term plan for survival. First, he created a strong and well-organized army. Second, he arranged

¹⁶ Jean Sharaf, *al-Idiulujiya al-mujtama'iya: madkhal ila ta'rikh Lubnan al-ijtima'i*, Beirut, al-Jam'ia al-Lubnaniya, 1996, 178–9.

¹⁷ 'Isam Kamal Khalifa, *Abhath fi ta'rikh shamal Lubnan fi'l-'ahd al-'uthmani*, Beirut, 1995; *al-Dara'ib al-'uthmaniya fi'l-qarn al-sadis 'ashr*, Beirut, 2000, 151–262. The latter work contains maps and tables.

marriages between his own family and those who opposed the Sayfa and Furaykh families, such as the Arslan family in al-Gharb, the Shihab family in Wadi al-Taym, the Harfush family in Ba'albak, the 'Assaf family in Kisrawan, the Junblatt family in Aleppo, and others of lesser note.

Fakhr al-Din's plans succeeded to the extent that he eventually made the Porte suspicious of his intentions. The Ottoman authorities realized the dangers that the conflicts among the emirs of the Levant posed both to the overall security of the Empire and to the regular remission of taxes to the central treasury. Fakhr al-Din was, of course, at the centre of these struggles. The threat reached a high point in 1607 when some of the emirs, Fakhr al-Din among them, attacked Damascus itself at the instigation of 'Ali Junblatt Pasha, the rebellious leader of Aleppo. The Ottoman authorities became profoundly concerned at the rise of overly powerful local leaders such as Fakhr al-Din, who was clearly intent on expanding his holdings at the expense of other local lords. In addition, he was not only threatening the Ottoman *wilayas* directly but was also engaged in extensive correspondence with European powers, especially Spain and the principalities of Italy. He also went beyond the bounds of his emirate and launched wide-scale attacks on the *muqata'at* of northern Lebanon, the Biqa', northern Palestine, Palmyra, and other tax farms attached to the *wilayas* of Tripoli and Damascus.

Fakhr al-Din and other ambitious emirs had become a source of real concern for the Porte. Therefore, after the death of Grand Vizier Murad Pasha (a friend of Fakhr al-Din), the Ottomans ordered the deployment of disciplinary expeditions to the Levant. The commander of these expeditions was Nasuh Pasha, the former *wali* of Aleppo and now the Grand Vizier. His policies in the Levant were driven by personal enmity toward Fakhr al-Din and his allies. The year 1613 was known as 'the year of Hafiz Pasha' (Hafiz Pasha was *wali* of Damascus) because of the many atrocities committed during the expeditions. When Hafiz Pasha approached the administrative centres of the Ma'n emirate, Fakhr al-Din abdicated in favour of his brother Yunus and his son 'Ali and went into exile in Europe. In 1614, Dayr al-Qamar, the seat of the Ma'ns, was set on fire, looted, and pillaged by the Ottomans and by Fakhr al-Din's local enemies.

However, Nasuh Pasha was deposed in the same year and his supporters scattered. Yunus and 'Ali seized this opportunity to take revenge on the traditional enemies of the family, defeating them soundly at the

Battle of al-Na'ima near Beirut in 1616. In the meantime, many local leaders had been severely dealt with by the Ottomans, most notably 'Ali Junblatt Pasha, who had been executed in 1607. Some of the survivors fled to Beirut and the Shuf where they awaited the return of Fakhr al-Din.¹⁸ When Yunus and 'Ali had secured the emirate, Fakhr al-Din rushed back to the Levant, arriving at Dammur near Beirut in 1618, and wasting no time in deciding to resume his position as emir. His allies welcomed him warmly, and he repaid their fidelity and loyalty by bestowing fortresses on them. Thereafter, he bound himself to other local emirs through marriage and shared interests while at the same time gradually killing off those who obstructed his designs. He took over the interests of Ibn Furaykh in the Biqa', and then moved to destroy his most powerful enemy, the Emir Yusuf Sayfa, whom he attacked relentlessly in an attempt to take Tripoli and Beirut from him. Disaster befell Yusuf Sayfa in 1620 when Fakhr al-Din took Tripoli and 'Akkar, as well as many extensive *muqata'at* in Beirut, Sidon, and the Biqa'.¹⁹

¹⁸ Some of the chronicles report the arrival of Shaykh Junblatt Junblatt and his family in Beirut in this period (1607–8) after the disastrous defeat of 'Ali Pasha Junblatt at Aleppo. The shaykh spent some time as the guest of the Nasrullah and Sulaym families, after which he went to the Shuf, where he joined forces with Fakhr al-Din. When Fakhr al-Din decided to flee from Hafiz Pasha and go to the Medicis in Tuscany, he entrusted Junblatt Junblatt with the garrison at al-Shaqif 'Arnun, which controlled Jabal 'Amil and 'Ajlun. The shaykh retained control of this fortress and its environs until his death in 1640. His son Rabah moved to an agricultural estate in the Shuf and from there to al-Muhktara. Rabah's son 'Ali went to the town of Ba'dran al-Hasina, where he built a castle and married Khawla al-Qadi, daughter of the Druze leader Shaykh Qabulan al-Qadi, known for his learning, piety, and asceticism. When the only son of Qabulan al-Qadi died in 1711, he bequeathed all his wealth to his son-in-law, 'Ali Junblatt. 'Ali gathered political leaders around him, amassed great wealth and much property. He earned the honorific *shaykh 'aql al-ta'ifa al-duruzya* (shaykh of the conscience of the Druze people). He was the first Lebanese leader who was both a religious and a political leader. The Junblatt family played key roles in both the Ma'n and Shihab eras, and continue to have considerable influence in contemporary Lebanon. See Selim Hichi, *La Famille des Djoumblatt du VII^e siècle à nos jours*, Beirut, 1973, 56–60.

¹⁹ Ahmad al-Khalid al-Safadi, *Lubnan fi 'ahd Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n al-Thani*, Beirut, Rustam and Fu'ad al-Bustani Press and al-Jam'ia al-Lubnaniya, 1969, 93–105. For more on Fakhr al-Din II, see Michel Chebli, *Fakhreiddine II Maan prince du Liban 1572–1635*, Beirut, Imprimerie catholique, 1946, and his *Une histoire du Liban à l'époque des Emirs 1635–1841*, Beirut, Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1984; 'Isa Iskandar al-Ma'luf, *Ta'rikh al-amir Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n al-Thani*, 1st edn., Beirut, 1938, repr. Beirut, al-Matba'a al-Kathulikiya, 1966; al-Khuri Bulus Qar'ali, *Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n al-Thani hakim Lubnan wa dawla Tuskana 1605–1635*, vol. 2, Harisa, Lebanon, 1938.

That same year the new Ottoman *wali* of Damascus, Mustafa Pasha, moved to confront the growing power of Fakhr al-Din, but he was decisively defeated at 'Anjar where he himself was taken captive. The emir treated the defeated governor general with honour and returned him to Damascus weighed down with gifts, after which the two men enjoyed cordial relations. After his old rival Yusuf Pasha Sayfa died in 1624, the path was clear for Fakhr al-Din II and he enjoyed almost unlimited power until 1633. Indeed, the period 1624–33 was the golden era of the Ma'n family. Georges Charaf describes Fakhr al-Din II's policies as follows:

The domestic policy of Fakhr al-Din II focussed on ensuring social and economic welfare. His foreign policy hinged on expansion at the expense of his neighbours and furthering the ties to Europe that he had forged during his forced exile.²⁰

New Lebanese Leadership in the Face of Strong Ottoman Authority

The Ottoman Empire was keen on preserving its place as the strongest political entity in the world in the seventeenth century, and it was quick to confront any major threat to its status. The Ottomans had originally attempted to curb the growing influence of Fakhr al-Din by supporting his local enemies such as the Furaykh, 'Assaf, Qansuh, Sayfa, and bedouin Tarbih families. However, the emir defeated them with his well trained, well armed, and well-disciplined army, and when Ottomans despatched an army against him it was defeated at 'Anjar in 1623. For ten years thereafter, he had no peer in the Levant. The Ottoman state was too absorbed in its wars against the Safavids to deal with him, but it continued to keep a watchful eye on him.

Between 1623 and 1633, Fakhr al-Din II embarked on a series of modernization projects in many parts of Lebanon. He opened the region to Europe and encouraged commercial ties between the Levant and the West. He also set agriculture and manufacturing on new foundations. A historian who has examined Fakhr al-Din II's modernization plans says the following:

²⁰ Georges Charaf, *Communautés et Pouvoir au Liban*, Beirut, Centre Libanais de Documentation et des Recherches, 1981, 88–95.

Fakhr al-Din II expressed a demonstrable appreciation for the architectural accomplishments of Europe that he had observed during his stay in Italy. It was this experience that inspired his work in the areas of construction, architecture, agriculture, and commerce. In the field of architecture, Fakhr al-Din called on foreign experts. Florentines came from Italy, and Frenchmen resided in Sidon and Beirut.²¹

The years 1623–33 were characterized by a degree of stability in the Lebanese *muqata'at* and their neighbourhoods. Fakhr al-Din fostered amicable relations both with the Porte and with the local *walis*, and was careful to make regular tax payments to the Ottoman authorities. He also dedicated himself to architectural, economic, and cultural projects, and continued to maintain close diplomatic relations with Spain and the Italian states.

However, before long the Porte began to see Fakhr al-Din's growing power as an increasing threat. It found his links with the European principalities and their exchange of military and economic expertise especially alarming. As a result, the Ottomans sent the *wali* of Damascus, Küçük Ahmad Pasha (d. 1636), on a military expedition against him in 1633.²² After his capture and extradition to Istanbul, the Sultan ordered the execution of Fakhr al-Din and his male family members on 13 April 1635; only his youngest son, Emir Husayn (d. 1697) was spared. Husayn grew up schooled in the ways of the Ottoman court, serving the Porte in several capacities, including ambassador to India, but when he returned from India the Grand Vizier Mehmet Köprülü (d. 1661) stripped him of his post, after which he devoted himself to asceticism and literature. He composed *Kitab al-Tamyiz*, one of the great works of Arabic literature of the period.²³

After Fakhr al-Din's death in 1635, 'Ali 'Alam al-Din took over the Shuf emirate for a short time. However, Fakhr al-Din's nephew, Mulhim, took up arms against him and defeated him at 'Arna in 1635, thereby restoring the emirate to the Ma'n family; Mulhim governed until his death in 1658. After the Ottomans established the *wilaya* of Sidon in 1660 to keep an eye on the troublesome Shuf region, the Ma'n family fortunes declined rapidly. The last ruler of the line was Emir

²¹ Khalid Ziyadeh 'Lubnan fi'l-'ahd al-Ma'n', in 'Adil Isma'il, ed., *Lubnan fi ta'rikhihi wa turathihi*, vol. 1, Beirut, Markaz al-Hariri al-Thaqafi, 1993, 304.

²² See the article by Stefan Weber, in this volume, p. 204.

²³ An edition has been published recently: see Husayn ibn Fakhr al-Din ibn Qurqumaz al-Ma'n, eds. Muhammad 'Adnan al-Bakhit and Nufan al-Hamud al-Siwarihi, *Kitab al-Tamyiz*, 'Uman, Dar al-Shuruq, 2001.

Ahmad (r. 1658–97), whose reign was marked by constant turmoil; he died on 15 April 1697 leaving no male heirs. The only Ma'n who might have had a right to the throne was Fakhr al-Din's son, Husayn, but as has been mentioned, he had been reared at the Sultan's court, and, after discharging many responsibilities for the Porte, retired to a life of piety and asceticism. In any event he too passed away in 1697.

The Shihab family took over from the Ma'ns with the implicit approval of the local lords and the blessing of the Porte. This kind of continuity was typical of the Ottomans, who themselves had perpetuated the system of administration that they had inherited from the Mamluks. Yasin Suwayd says of this trend:

When they took over the Levant in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans inherited the well-known *iqta'* system from their predecessors the Mamluks. This system was the product of social interactions that had begun with the crumbling of 'Abbasid power in the early eleventh century followed by the appearance of the Crusaders later that same century.²⁴

During the Shihab era, the robe of honour, the symbol of the emir's power, became a commodity for sale to whoever could pay the most and thereby satisfy the greed of lesser leaders. In that period, the new emir had to pay all the taxes at the beginning of his reign rather than at the end of the year as had been the case before; thus he became an obedient tool of the *wali*, who used him to plunder the resources of the Lebanon *muqata'at*. The *iltizam* system was a source of strife throughout the Ma'n and Shihab periods, but under the Shihabs the problems were exacerbated by tax increases, oppressive methods of collection, and constant struggles between the local lords. Dozens of peasant revolts broke out in this era.²⁵ Eventually, this situation gave rise to the *qa'immaqamiya* and *mutasarrifiya* administrations, both of which showed signs of heavy European influence in the affairs of the Empire, and ultimately led to its breakup.

²⁴ Yasin Suwayd, *al-Ta'rikh al-'askari li'l-muqata'at al-lubnaniya fi 'ahd al-imaratayn*, 2 vols., Beirut, al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiya l'il-Dirasat w'al-Nashr, 1980–1985, vol. 1, 64.

²⁵ Mas'ud Dahir, *al-Intifadat al-fallahiya didda al-nizam al-muqata'ji*, Beirut, Dar al-Farabi, 1988.

Some Concluding Remarks

When the Ma'n family assumed power over the Lebanese *muqata'at* in the early sixteenth century, they moved quickly to secure the allegiance of the other local families. The politics of the ruling emir depended on alliances with strong families in order to subdue weak ones. Through this fundamental principle the emir was gradually able to bring all the local families under his control. The great families from inside the emirate and from the neighbouring *muqata'at* participated in these struggles, although the subjugation of the great Bedouin clans that roamed the edges of the Biqā' was never fully completed. The *walis* of Damascus, Tripoli, Sidon, and Acre took advantage of these disturbances to force their authority over the Shuf emirate and exploit its resources through bribery, the *corvée*, extortion, and the sale of offices. However, the *walis* themselves were not immune from the consequences of such tactics, and more than one of them was removed before even having finished a year in the *wilaya* due to his failure to collect taxes from mutinous lords. Nevertheless, at that time the Ottoman authorities were still capable of forcing the Shuf and its environs into submission. The strongest *walis* could bring even the most rebellious emirs into the imperial fold.

The Ma'n emirate reached the peak of its power and territorial extent during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II. Its boundaries corresponded roughly to the borders of modern Lebanon as defined by the French in 1920. Either through alliances or by force, Fakhr al-Din enlarged his original domain of seven *muqata'at* to include 'Akkar, al-Batrun, the Biqā' al-Shuf, Jabal 'Amil, al-Jard, Jubbat Bsharri, Jubayl, Kisrawan, al-Kura, al-Matn, al-Safita (now in Syria), Tripoli, Wadi al-Taym, al-Zawiya and al-Ziniya.²⁶

After the Ottomans had gained experience with the previous administrative system, they gradually replaced it with methods better suited to the changing international situation throughout their long reign. In both the old and new systems, the local lords played a central role in the shaping Ottoman governing structures, laws, and decision-making. Qasim al-Samad describes it as follows:

What distinguished the *iltizam* system from other systems that the Ottoman state pursued for the collection of royal revenues, such as the tithe,

²⁶ Yasin Suwayd, *al-Ta'rikh al-'askari*, 47, has a map of the Ma'n emirate.

kharaj, and other fees, was that it was of a limited duration. It was a one-year appointment between the governor-general and the *iltizam* holder or holders. In contrast, in the *iqta'*, *zi'amat*, *khassa*, and other systems, the right to collect taxes was given for the length of the appointee's life.²⁷

The local lords were divided among several confessions and *muqata'at*. One leader would establish himself as the head of a family through force of personality and then bequeath that authority to his descendants. The right to direct the affairs of an area came through alliances with other powerful families and, of course, satisfying the local Ottoman authorities. Usually, the Ottomans gave a strong local leader responsibility for collecting taxes. However, weak leaders were not a problem for a *wali* who had decided to rid himself of the nuisance of strong personalities through removal, transfer, or the sale of office. Indeed, in the entire 326-year history of the Ma'n and Shihab families, there were only two truly strong leaders, Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n II (1591–1635) and Bashir al-Shihab II (1767–1850, r. 1788–1840). The *walis* of Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon were strong enough to stave off any attempt at rebellion by the Lebanese lords throughout the Ottoman period.

The local lords kept a large portion of the taxes they collected for themselves, sometimes as much as five times the amount that they paid to the Ottoman administration. Of course, it was also incumbent upon them to bribe and give costly gifts to the *walis*, in addition to pledges to increase annual tax revenues, which they sometimes had to pay in advance. Lesser lords to whom the ruling emir had given the responsibility of tax collection prospered, provided that they paid the annual taxes on time. Once these lords had paid him, the emir in his turn presented the taxes, bribes, and traditional gifts to the *wali*, who of course kept a large percentage for himself. If the lords refused to

²⁷ (Although *malikane*, the right to collect taxes for the duration of the appointee's lifetime, was officially permitted after 1695). Qasim al-Samad, 'Nizam al-iltizam fi wilayat Tarabulus fi al-qarn al-thaman 'ashr min khilal watha'iq sijilat mahkamatiha al-shar'iya', in *al-Mu'tamar al-awwal li-ta'rikh wilayat Tarabulus iban al-hiqba al-'uthmaniya 1516–1918*, Tripoli, al-Jam'ia al-Lubnaniya—Kulliyat al-Adab wa'l-'Ulum al-Insaniya, 1995, 77. See also Frederick Ma'tuq, Amr al-Tadmuri, and Khalid Ziyadeh (eds.), *Min ta'rikh Lubnan al-ijtima'i wa'l-siyasi: al-sijill al-awwal min watha'iq al-mahkama al-shar'iya bi-Tarabulus 1077–78 AH/1666–7 AD*, Tripoli, Lebanon, al-Jam'ia al-Lubnaniya—Ma'had al-'Ulum al-Ijtima'iya, al-Furu' al-Thalath, 1982. See also Khalid Mir'ab, *al-Imara al-mar'ibiya: Imtidaduha al-jughrafi was tatawwuruha al-siyasi hatta sinna 1840*, vol. 1 Tripoli, Lebanon, Dar al-Bukhari, 1992.

pay taxes, the ruling emir would call on the *wali*, who would dispatch a military unit to discipline the mutinous districts. The Ottoman army always brought ruin to the Lebanese countryside. The soldiers would confiscate livestock, agricultural goods, and anything they could lay their hands on. The local lords dreaded the prospect of an Ottoman expedition, and there were many in this period. Hence they usually paid the taxes promptly to the emir in order to keep their struggles local and prevent direct Ottoman involvement.²⁸

In addition to peasants, craftsmen, and the poor, men of religion also had to pay taxes. The emirs and lords donated land to the monasteries on the understanding that the monks would put the land to good use. The monks made the land arable and turned it into gardens and wheat fields. The reclaimed lands generated revenue, which the monks paid to the local lords who then passed the money up to the ruling emir.²⁹

As for the *muqata'at* next to the Shuf emirate, especially those attached to the *wilayas* of Tripoli and Sidon, the struggles within them became so intense that it became necessary to split large *iltizams* into smaller ones so that the entire local administrative structure did not collapse. To quote Qasim al-Samad:

The *iltizam* holders fought within their own families as well as with other ambitious families over individual *iltizams* and *muqata'at*. This is part of the reason why some *muqata'at* were subdivided until they amounted to only a single village. In the best scenarios, and these were infrequent, two, three, or four of the powerful notables would share a half, a third, or a quarter of an *iltizam*. Family solidarity, great vigour, and economic and military aptitude were essential tools for drawing close to the *walis* and the sources of power. The ability and ambition to take advantage of political circumstances was a necessary skill for anyone who wanted to possess and exert power over a *muqata'a*. These were the tools required for anyone who wished to preserve his *iltizam* through the regular collection of imperial revenue.³⁰

²⁸ Toufic Touma, *Paysans et Institution féodales chez les Druze et les Maronites du Liban du XVII^e siècle à 1914*, Beirut, Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 2 vols., 1971–2. Touma's work is still the best treatment of the foundations of the *iqta'* system among the Druze and the Maronites between the seventeenth century and 1914.

²⁹ Souad Slim Abou el-Rousse, *Le Métayage et l'Impôt au Mont-Liban, XVII^e et XIX^e siècles* Beirut, Université Saint Joseph, Dar al-Mashriq, 1987, 44–45.

³⁰ Qasim al-Samad, *Nizam al-iltizam*, 70–71.

The most powerful emirs of the Ma'n and Shihab families had these skills, and were therefore able to expand their authority into neighbouring districts. Their history and the history of the Shuf emirate are intertwined with the history of modern Lebanon. However, the Ma'ns and Shihabs were not the only powerful local rulers. The leaders of the other *muqata'at* also subjugated the tax farms, collected taxes, and fostered relationships with the *walis* of Tripoli, Damascus, and Sidon just like the Ma'ns and the Shihabs. These families, also produced great leaders such as Yusuf Pasha Sayfa who traced his origins to a great Turcoman family and who ruled 'Akkar and the *wilaya* of Tripoli. Indeed, his authority extended to Beirut which he ruled more than once. He also fought bitter wars with Fakhr al-Din II. The two great emirs eventually entered a marriage alliance, but the contest for power was stronger than the ties of kinship, and eventually Yusuf Pasha Sayfa lost all his power.

The emirate of the Shuf was not a completely sovereign administrative unit nor was it one whose *de facto* borders were officially acknowledged either by the *walis* or the Porte. It was not formally separate from the Ottoman administrative system, but nominally under the control of the administration in Istanbul. For a time the Porte pretended not to notice the difficulties the *walis* had in collecting taxes. Finally, however, the *walis* entered the struggle in order to safeguard Ottoman political objectives in the areas that had submitted to the Porte. The activities of the *walis* were the chief means of ensuring that tax revenue continued to reach the capital. When some of them overstepped the bounds of local struggles and pursued regional alliances, it threatened the security and greater interests of the entire Empire. Therefore, military expeditions were sent to discipline *walis* and emirs, and to enforce the most severe sanctions upon local leaders who supported them, including the Ma'n and Shihab families.

In conclusion, if the chronicles are accurate regarding Selim I's investiture of Fakhr al-Din I at the Battle of Marj Dabiq as emir over the rest of the local Lebanese lords, this marks the beginning of the forced unity of the Lebanese *muqata'at*, which lasted for more than three centuries. It was established in the reign of the Emir Fakhr al-Din II and reaffirmed in the reign of Bashir al-Shihab II.³¹ Many aca-

³¹ Ilya Harik, 'The Iqta' System in Lebanon: A Comparative Political View', *Middle East Journal* 19, 1965, 405–21; *Ibid.*, *Politics and Change in Traditional Society*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1968.

demic studies based on Ottoman documents as well as Lebanese and European sources indicate that the local leadership played a crucial role in the establishment of modern Lebanon; indeed, the current borders of Lebanon more or less coincide with the Ma'n emirate as it existed at the time of Fakhr al-Din II. The Lebanese lords were not mere collectors of taxes; rather, they were key players in the politics of the *muqata'at* and the region throughout the Ottoman period. At the same time, they participated in the local struggles that led to the utter annihilation of some families, such as the Nakd, Harfush, 'Assaf, Furaykh, 'Imad, 'Alam al-Din, and finally the Ma'n itself. Even after the family had lost all its power, local struggles for the lands of the former Ma'n emirate continued, the most prominent of which was the Yazbak-Junblatt feud.

Appendix: Geographical centres of power of the principal Lebanese families under the Ma'ns and the Shihabs

In the beginning, local notable families had wide influence in the region under Ma'n control. After the end of the sixteenth century they were able to establish themselves to the extent that they were able to pass on the rights of tax farming from generation to generation. I have merged the Ma'n and Shihab periods to highlight the most eminent families between the sixteenth century and the end of Ottoman rule. Most individual members of the great families such as the Ma'ns, the Sayfas, and the Harfushes are unknown. Their families were small, and many, sometimes almost all, their male members were killed in struggles for power. These families ruled parts of the Ma'n emirate for a while, but then lost their power and other families took their place.

Ma'n: The Ma'ns ruled the Shuf emirate, first from Ba'qillin and then from Dayr al-Qamar. Under Fakhr al-Din II (1590–1633) their power spread to its furthest extent. Fakhr al-Din controlled all of modern Lebanon as well as an area extending to Palmyra and Safita in modern Syria and south into modern Palestine. Beirut and Sidon were the centres of his government.

Shihab: The Shihabs originally ruled only Wadi al-Taym, but then inherited the Ma'n emirate in Jabal Shuf. Their greatest leader was Emir Bashir II (r. 1788–1840), who allied himself with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt during the first half of the nineteenth century. He was deposed in 1840, and his son Bashir III ruled for two years before the family disappeared from the political scene.

Hamada: Harmal, Jubayl, al-Batrun, al-Kura, Jubbat Bsharri, al-Zawiya, Akkar, al-Diniya.

Fadl: al-Diniya.

Sayfa and Mir'abi: Akkar and sometimes in Tripoli.

'Asaf al-Turkman: Tripoli and Kisrawan.

Mustafa Agha Babir: Tripoli.

Dandashi: Iqlim al-Shu'ara' in 'Akkar.

al-Hanash/al-Harafush/al-Qansuh: Biqa'.

Junblatt: Shuf, Jizzin, east Sidon, Biqa'.

Saghir-Bishara-Shukr-Sudun: Jabal 'Amil.

Sa'b: Shaqif region of Jabal 'Amil.

Munkar: Iqlim al-Shumar and Iqlim al-Tufah in Jabal 'Amil.

Dahir: al-Zawiya and Jubbat Bsharri.

Shadiyaq: Jubbat Bsharri.

al-'Azar: al-Kura.

al-Ayubbi: Ra's Nihash in al-Kura.

Abu al-Lama': al-Matn.

Jamil: Bikfaya.

Salih: Rashima.

al-Khazin: Kisrawan.

Habish: 'Aziz-Kisrawan.

al-Dihdah: Futuh Kisrawan.

al-Hashim: al-'Aqura.

Mazhar: Hamana.

Abu 'Alwan: Baruk.

Talhuqi: Aley

'Abd al-Malik: Upper Jard.

al-Qadi: Jizzin.

Nakd: Munasif al-Shuf.

'Imad: Dayr al-Qamar.

Khatib: Iqlim al-Kharub.

'Alam al-Din: al-Gharb, al-Jard, and al-Matn.

PATTERNS OF FAMILY FORMATION IN EARLY OTTOMAN
DAMASCUS: THREE MILITARY HOUSEHOLDS IN THE
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

ASTRID MEIER

The rise of the *a'yan* as an important paradigm in the historiography of the Ottoman provinces is usually regarded as part of a broader notion of the decline of the central state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. New research suggests that we may need to rethink the linkages between capital and provinces and to conceptualise them more as an ongoing process of dialogue, negotiation, conflict, and conflict management between different actors and interest groups. In this article, I would like to explore this relationship in three case studies of military households belonging to what Abdul-Karim Rafeq has called the 'local forces in Ottoman Syria' to learn more about patterns of family formation in early Ottoman Damascus and their linkages with politics.¹

Some years ago, Ehud Toledano proposed a framework for inquiry with respect to the history of the Ottoman provinces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which is based on the dual process of the localisation of the Ottoman elites and the Ottomanisation of the local elites.² What follows focuses mainly on the provincial side, and as such it should be complemented by a more thorough investigation of the role of the central state and its representatives both at the centre and in the province.³ However, we also need to start looking beyond the 'long' eighteenth century to include earlier periods of Ottoman rule

¹ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'The Local Forces in Syria in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, 277–307; see also Nawfan Raja al-Hamud, *al-'Askar fi Bilad al-Sham fi l-qarnayn al-sadis 'ashar wa-l-sabi' 'ashar al-miladiyyayn*, Beirut, Dar al-afaq al-jadida, 1401/1981.

² Ehud R. Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700–1900): A Framework for Research', in Moshe Ma'oz and Ilan Pappé, (eds.), *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1997, 154–56.

³ Although the centre's interest in the Syrian provinces might have been quite limited, see Linda T. Darling, 'The Syrian Provinces in Ottoman Eyes: Three Historians' Representations of Bilad al-Sham', *ARAM* 9–10, 1997–98, 347–55.

if we want to come to a better understanding of elite formation. One possible reason why we tend to dismiss rather too easily the profound transformation of the local elite in the early Ottoman era, which was an Ottomanisation of its own, is how visible these changes were. In the eighteenth century, the self-image of the Ottoman-local elite was displayed in splendid mansions, colleges, and the famous 'cathedrals of commerce' (*khan, qaysariya*) which we can still visit today.⁴ Yet the cityscape of Damascus had already been significantly transformed during the sixteenth and to a lesser degree the seventeenth century, mostly, but not exclusively, by projects sponsored by representatives of central government,⁵ and, as we shall see, some of these individuals would forge long-lasting ties with the local elite.⁶

Household, lineage, and family in Ottoman provincial societies

The rise of new families, households or lineages in different political contexts has been a prominent theme in Ottoman historiography for the last forty years. The eighteenth century in particular has been identified as the 'heyday of the politics of households',⁷ when the 'rise of the *a'yan*' led to the emergence of new local elites who played a prominent role in the political and economic life of the Ottoman provinces. This field of research owes much to Albert Hourani's paradigm

⁴ The notion of *visibility* was brought up at the conference in an intervention by Stefan Weber; for the 18th-century visibility of notables in terms of houses and other urban infrastructure, see the articles by Weber and Brigitte Marino in this volume and Marino's article, 'Le sérail d'Isma'il Pacha al-'Azm à Damas,' in Ghislaine Alleaume, Sylvie Denoix, and Michel Tuchscherer, (eds.) *Histoire, archéologies et littératures du monde musulman, Études réunies en l'honneur d'André Raymond*, Le Caire, Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 2009, pp. 39–56.

⁵ Stefan Weber, 'The Creation of Ottoman Damascus: Architecture and Urban Development of Damascus in the 16th and 17th Centuries', *ARAM Journal* 9–10, 1997–98, 431–70; Çiğdem Kafescioğlu, 'In the Image of Rum': Ottoman Architectural Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Aleppo and Damascus', *Muqarnas* 16, 1999, 70–96; Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh, *The Image of an Ottoman City: Imperial Architecture and Urban Experience in Aleppo in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, Leiden, Brill, 2004.

⁶ Karl K. Barbir, 'From Pasha to Efendi: The Assimilation of Ottomans into Damascene Society, 1516–1783', *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1, 1979/80, 68–83. I. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983.

⁷ Kenneth M. Cuno, 'The Reproduction of Elite Households in Eighteenth-Century Egypt: Two Examples from al-Mansura', in Brigitte Marino, ed., *Études sur les villes du Proche-Orient, XVI^e–XIX^e siècles: Hommage à André Raymond*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 2001, 237–61, here 238.

of the 'politics of notables'.⁸ Recent studies no longer approach this topic from the top down, from the perspective of the state and central administration, but also try to focus on individual notable families and households. Among the first to enquire into the political role of specific households were historians working from the capital. They emphasised how, in the sixteenth century, viziers and other grandees started to model their households after the sultan's own palace, which in the process is said to have lost much of its prerogatives in monopolising political power.⁹ Historians of the provinces took up this line of investigation, and in the last few years the number of detailed studies has increased significantly.¹⁰ Egypt in particular has elicited a lot of scholarly attention which has resulted in a few stimulating new studies of so-called neo-Mamluk households.¹¹

Already early on, some important contributions to this discussion came from the Syrian context. There is of course the study by Abdulkarim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus...*, in which he analysed the

⁸ Albert Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', in William R. Polk and R.L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1968, 41–68; for a reappraisal of the paradigm see Philip S. Khoury, 'The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited', *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée* 55/56, 1990, 215–28; for the notion of *a'yan* see Dick Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000, 64–65.

⁹ Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-el-Haj, 'The Ottoman Vezir and Pasha Households, 1683–1703: A Preliminary Report', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 94, 1974, 438–47; Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants...*; Madeline C. Zilfi, 'Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mollas of the Eighteenth Century', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 26, 3, 1983, 318–64; Madeline Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–1800)*, Minneapolis, Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988; Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-el-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, 2nd ed., Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2005 (1st ed. 1991).

¹⁰ Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994; Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540–1834*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites...'; Tal Shuval, 'The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, 2000, 324–44; Beshara Doumani (ed.), *Family History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2003.

¹¹ Gabriel Piterberg, 'The Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite in the 18th Century', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, 1990, 275–89; Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Cuno, 'The Reproduction of Elite Households...'; Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann, eds., *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

rise of the 'Azm family in the context of eighteenth-century regional politics.¹² Other important groundwork for the study of the transformation of the elites in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been carried out by Adnan Bakhit and Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn.¹³ Another milestone is the work of Linda Schilcher, most prominently her *Families in Politics...*¹⁴ Since then, because of a steadily growing number of studies, we have come to know a lot about a growing number of households and families from different backgrounds.¹⁵

For a long time the paradigm of the rise of the *a'yan* in the provinces was intimately linked with the notion of the decline of the Ottoman state. Changes in bureaucratic procedures at the centre or the periphery were often seen as signs of weakness or corruption or as deviations from the perfect, 'classical' model. In this mode of explanation, state and society were generally considered to have been separate entities, and their relationship is often depicted exclusively in terms of conflict and confrontation, especially in the case of the local societies of the Arab lands.¹⁶

¹² Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783*, Beirut, Khayats, 1966.

¹³ Karl K. Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980; Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century*, Beirut, Librairie du Liban, 1982; Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575–1650*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1985.

¹⁴ Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1985.

¹⁵ E.g. Muhammad 'Adnan Bakhit, 'Dawr usrat Al Hanash wa'l-mahamm allati ukilat ilayha fi rif Dimashq al-Sham (dirasa watha'iqiya)', *Dirasat ta'rikhiya* 13, 1983, 88–138 (for an English version, see 'The Role of the Hanash Family and the Tasks Assigned to it in the Countryside of Dimashq al-Sham, 790/1388–976/1568: A Documentary Study', in Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1984, 257–89); Barbir, 'From Pasha to Efendi...', 68–83; and Karl K. Barbir, 'All in the Family: The Muradis of Damascus', in Heath W. Lowry and Ralph S. Hattox, eds., *IIIrd Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton University, 24–26 August 1983*, Istanbul, Isis Press, 1990, 327–53; Margaret L. Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770–1840*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1999; Suraiya Faruqi, *Herrscher über Mekka: Die Geschichte der Pilgerfahrt*, Düsseldorf, Artemis & Winkler, 2000, 80–89; Thomas Philipp, *Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730–1831*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001.

¹⁶ E.g. see Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'The Syrian 'Ulama', *Ottoman Law and Islamic Shari'a*, *Turcica* 26, 1994, 9–32 and his 'Social Groups, Identity and Loyalty, and Historical Writing in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Syria', in Dominique Chevallier, ed., *Les Arabes et l'histoire créatrice*, Paris, Presses de la Sorbonne nouvelle, 1995, 79–93; for a brief summary see also Barbir, *Ottoman Rule...*, 5–8.

The nature of the Ottoman state was and will surely remain a key question of Ottomanist historiography. New research suggests the need to re-conceptualise the linkages between capital and provinces as more of an ongoing process of dialogue, negotiation, conflict and conflict management between different actors and interest groups from the imperial through the regional and provincial down to the local levels.¹⁷ In embarking on such an inquiry, researchers have to address a number of problems. The first are the terms used to refer to the basic units of analysis. In the foregoing remarks, I have used concepts like 'family', 'household', 'elite' and 'a'yan' rather indiscriminately.¹⁸ Although it seems to have been generally accepted as one of the key notions to describe Middle Eastern societies, 'family' is a concept which is difficult to define unambiguously. Arabic terms like *usra*, 'iyal/'a'ila or *bayt* convey a rather vague notion of belonging together and are by no means always equivalent. As Yanagihashi Hiroyuki has shown in a seminal article, this dilemma was already addressed in early Islamic jurisprudence and solved to a certain degree by using more precise terms and notions to position an individual in the groups defined by different degrees of relatedness.¹⁹ The most important concepts are the lineage-based model of agnate kinship referred to as 'asaba, and the more restricted unit sharing a common source of livelihood, expressed in terms of obligation to pay *nafaqa* to wives, children and slaves. These social entities will be addressed in the following paragraphs as *lineages* and *households*. The terms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but constitute rather different modes of looking at various aspects

¹⁷ Ariel Salzmann, 'An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Politics and Society* 21, 4, 1993, 393–423; Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994; Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites...'; Shuval, 'Ottoman Algerian Elite...'; Jane Hathaway, 'Ottoman Responses to Çerkes Mehmed Bey's Rebellion in Egypt, 1730', *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8, 1–2, 2002, 105–13; Gabriel Piterberg, 'The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasha: Historiography and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth Century', *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8, 1–2, 2002, 13–24; Şevket Pamuk, 'Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, 2, 2004, 225–47.

¹⁸ For a concise discussion of the diverging concepts of family and household see Cuno, 'The Reproduction of Elite Households...', 240–43; and Doumani, 'Introduction', in his *Family History in the Middle East...*, 1–19.

¹⁹ Yanagihashi Hiroyuki, 'Solidarity in an Islamic Society: 'Asaba, Family and the Community', in Yanagihashi Hiroyuki, ed., *The Concept of Territory in Islamic Law and Thought*, London, Kegan Paul, 2000, 51–68.

of being related: Whereas 'lineage' stresses consanguinity (both agnate and sometimes cognate), and time depth, household is more focussed on moments in time and on other forms of relatedness like slavery or patronage etc. 'Family' will be used loosely to address the sense of belonging together that can be expressed for instance by using the same 'family' name (*bayt, banu*).

The second problem is the time frame for any inquiry into Ottoman elite formation. For a long time now, research has concentrated on the 'long' eighteenth century and the 'rise of the *a'yan*' as a sort of prelude to nineteenth-century developments without paying much attention to earlier periods. Hence Gabriel Piterberg's opening remarks that the Ottoman Egyptian elite was the result of a process of elite formation 'which had begun by the mid-17th century and was complete in the closing decades of the 18th century and should be understood in the wider Ottoman context.'²⁰ Even Ehud Toledano's 'framework for research' refers only to the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Yet, in my view, the process of elite formation or at least elite 'transformation' began the moment the Ottomans took control of the Arab lands. The change initiated by the transfer of power from the Mamluks to the Ottomans significantly altered not only the political environment of the existing elites, but also the economic and social contexts in which they operated. It certainly opened new avenues to obtaining power on different levels.²¹

A third problem is related to the exact nature of what we mean by elite or family formation; in particular, the concept of 'familial strategies' has become rather contested over the last few years.²² Critics argue that the broad notion of 'agency' is sufficient to approach the performance of the social groups called 'families' because it has to be understood on the base of the decision-making of its individual members.

²⁰ Piterberg, 'Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite', 275.

²¹ Bakhit, *Ottoman Province...*, 164–191; Barbir, 'From Pasha to Efendi...', 68–83; see also Muhammed Altonji (al-Tunji), 'Social Interaction in the Aleppo Governorship (wilayat) between the Arabs and the Ottomans', in Abdeljelil Temimi, ed., *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l'époque ottomane*, Zaghuan, Publications du Centre d'études et de recherches ottomanes, morisques, de documentation et d'information, 1988, 258–59; and Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, 'Aspects of the Legitimation of Ottoman Rule as Reflected in the Preambles of Two Early *Liva Kanunnameler*', *Turcica* 21–23, 1991, 371–83.

²² For a succinct introduction to the discussion, see the debate 'Family Strategies': A Contested Concept', in *International Review of Social History* 47, 2002, 421–85. I am grateful to Bernard Heyberger for a perceptive question in this regard.

This is not the place to enter fully into this debate, but the following paragraphs will try to identify significant moments in the trajectories of the 'well-founded fiction called family' (Pierre Bourdieu), insofar as individuals make decisions that include and affect other members and future generations of their familial units.

In what follows I shall try to trace the history of three households who settled in Damascus, focussing not only on their relationship to the Ottoman state and its central administration, but also on some important aspects of family formation like endogamous or exogamous marriage strategies. For the sake of a concise argument and in *hommage* to the research of 'Abdul-Karim Rafeq on the 'Local Forces in Ottoman Syria in the 17th and 18th centuries', I have chosen my examples from military households or at least from families with military backgrounds.²³ First, I shall present a short sketch of the 'Azm lineages in the eighteenth century, because they have been used so often as a model for the rise of an *a'yan* family. I shall then go on to two other examples from an earlier and a later time period, first the Kiwani household and then the Qurmushis, or, as they were later known, the Mardam Beys, in order to show that diverging patterns of family formation can be found even in the rather limited setting of a provincial military elite. These differences can be explained among other factors by the changing political circumstances of the formation periods.

The following is an attempt by a social historian of endowment practices to connect with political history. In this, I am drawing on the source material I collected for another study on the role of endowments in early Ottoman Damascus. This source material consists of court records and contemporary historical writings, most importantly chronicles and biographical collections.

The 'Azm family as model?

The 'Azms are often cited as one of the most eminent examples of the rise of a locally based elite family in the eighteenth century, and because they are so well known I shall only emphasise a few points in their collective history that are important for my argument.²⁴ In the late

²³ Rafeq, 'Local Forces...'

²⁴ For 'Azm family histories see 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm, *al-Usra al-'Azmiya*, Damascus 1951; Rafeq, *Province of Damascus...*, *passim*; Barbir, *Ottoman Rule...*,

seventeenth century, a man of an unknown ethnic background named Ibrahim Bey entered the political scene of central Syria at Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. Subsequently his three sons and their descendants dominated it for at least half a century till the execution of As'ad Pasha in 1757 (see table 1).²⁵ Though the centre of power shifted more to the south after that, members of the family still served as governors. From early on, the family profited from its strong connections to the central administration and its members made their careers as administrative officials and military leaders. These links on the imperial level become manifest in the grant of life-long tax-farms (*malikane*) in different locations in central Syria, Hama, Hims and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man in particular, but foremost in the repeated appointment to the post of governor, culminating in five cases in the governorship of the province of Damascus.²⁶ At that time the duties of this office also included responsibility for the organisation and the safe conduct of the yearly pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca, an undertaking of imperial significance not only in economic terms, but also as a major symbol of Ottoman rule and good governance. These imperial ties had to be maintained by intensive lobbying in Istanbul, which often required, among other things, the investment of large sums of money.

Yet being part of the political establishment of the empire also had its negative side: Ottoman officials, whether successful in their tasks or not, were exposed to threats of deposition, of confiscation of their fortunes, and in the worst case of execution.²⁷ It is well known that

41, 56–66; Schilcher, *Families in Politics...*, 27–35, 136–44; and Schilcher, 'The Lore and Reality of Middle Eastern Patriarchy', *Die Welt des Islams* 28, 1988, 496–511; Douwes, *Ottomans in Syria...*, *passim*; James A. Reilly, *A Small Town in Syria. Ottoman Hama in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Oxford/Bern, Lang, 2002, 32–45; Brigitte Marino, 'Les investissements de Sulayman Pacha al-'Azm à Damas', *Annales islamologiques*, 34, 2000, 209–26, and her contribution to this volume.

²⁵ The ethnic background of the 'Azms has always been a contested question, for a discussion of the different statements see Rafeq, *Province of Damascus...*, 87–90 and Douwes, *Ottomans in Syria*, 45–48.

²⁶ The 'Azm governors of Damascus were Isma'il Pasha (in office 1725–1731), Sulayman Pasha (1734–1738; 1741–1743), As'ad Pasha (1742–1757), Muhammad Pasha (1771–1772, 1774–1783), and 'Abd Allah Pasha (1791–1798; 1799–1803; 1804–1807), see Ruslan b. Yahya al-Qari, 'al-Wuzara' alladhi hakamu Dimashq', in Salah al-Din al-Munajjid (ed.), *Wulat Dimashq fi L-'asr al-'uthmani*, Damascus, 1949, 73–90.

²⁷ See Brigitte Marino, 'Richesses individuelles et finances publiques à Damas à l'époque ottomane (XVIII^e–XIX^e siècles)', in Jean-Paul Pascual (ed.), *Pauvreté et richesse dans le monde musulman méditerranéen*, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003, 119–32; Klaus Röhrborn, 'Konfiskation und intermediäre Gewalten im Osmanischen Reich', *Der Islam* 55, 1978, 345–51.

Table 1: The Eighteenth-Century ‘Azms

Ibrahim Bey										
Faris		<u>Sulayman Pasha</u> d. 1743 m. <i>Kaylani</i>				<u>Isma'il Pasha</u> d. 1732-3 m. <i>Haraki</i>				
Mustafa Pasha m.+		<i>Amina</i> m.+	<i>Rahma</i>	<i>Ruqayya</i>	<i>Najisa</i> m.+	Ahmad m.+	<i>Zulaykha</i> m.+	Ibrahim P. d. 1746	Mustafa Ahmad d. 1762	<u>As'ad P.</u> d. 1757
'Abidin		<u>Muhammad Pasha</u> d. 1783		Muhammad		<i>Zaynab</i>	<i>Layla</i>	others	Nasuh Pasha d. 1808-9 m. <i>Kaylani</i>	<i>Asma'</i> m.+
others				<i>Khadija</i> m. <i>Kaylani</i>				(Hama)	(Hama)	Ahmad Mu'ayyad d. 1888 m. <i>Muradi</i>
(Damascus)								(Egypt)		

Governors of the Province of Damascus

females

m.+ endogamous marriage within the 'Azm lineage

several members of the 'Azms did not escape such drastic measures on the part of the central administration.²⁸ Such periods of disgrace were often only temporary in that they could be remedied by the payment of fines and bribes. Even when a family member was executed, others remained in office or were called upon to serve again shortly afterwards. In 1730, for instance, all 'Azm governors were collectively deposed, only to be reinstalled in 1731.²⁹

Simultaneously with this more imperial orientation, the 'Azms developed connections on the local level and became part of the communities they lived in. These settings were as different as Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, Hama, Damascus, the port cities on the Lebanese coast like Tripoli and later on Beirut, and Egypt. The local links manifested themselves in tax farming and other commercial activities like the famous sheep business of Governor Isma'il Pasha in the countryside around Hama, but also in the marriage patterns of the male members. In the early phase of family formation, two sons of the founder, Isma'il Pasha and Sulayman Pasha, married into two prominent families in Hama, the Kaylanis and the Harakis respectively,³⁰ and these ties remained important even when their descendants settled elsewhere.

On the other hand, the 'Azms showed a strong tendency to maintain the unity of their family: this becomes manifest in the marriage patterns of the female members. According to Linda Schilcher, a high proportion of them remained unmarried, and those who did marry took spouses from within the patrilineage.³¹ The strength of this corporate identity is attested also by the interesting cases of two daughters of two different generations, Layla bt. Ibrahim Pasha and Khadija bt. Nasuh Pasha. Both of them married outside the patrilineage, but their offspring were assimilated into the growing family on their mothers' side, even retaining the 'Azm family name.

Other signs of this cohesiveness can be found in the cooperation of family members in different spheres, the most visible of which was the coordination between the various governors of Damascus, Tripoli, Hama etc. as commanders of the pilgrimage and commanders of the

²⁸ Rafeq, *Province of Damascus...*, 107–19.

²⁹ Douwes, *Ottomans in Syria...*, 50.

³⁰ See Reilly, *Small Town in Syria...*, 26–45.

³¹ Schilcher, 'Lore and Reality...', 502; Reilly, *Small Town in Syria...*, 40–42.

caravan to bring supplies to the returning pilgrims (*jarda*). After the loss of its political influence the cohesion of this large family seemed to wane and it broke up into several branches.

The Kiwan household

The Kiwan or Kaywan family is a typical example of what Rafeq has described as the 'local forces' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: their family history is marked by their affiliation to the janissary corps of Damascus which interacted intensively with its non-military environment. The founder himself, however, was a person rather out of the common order. Kiwan b. 'Abd Allah is one of the few historical figures who are depicted in truly black terms in the chronicles and biographical dictionaries of the time. In these texts, he is often surnamed the 'tyrant' (*taghiya*), and he is given a quite distinctive double identity as a rebel ('*asi*, *Turk. şaki*) and as an oppressor, perpetrator and wrongdoer (*zalim*), as well as the source of *fitna*, *i'san* and *zulm*.³²

Fitna and *i'san* refer to Kiwan's activities on the imperial level to which I can allude here only rather summarily.³³ Kiwan b. 'Abd Allah was a *mamluk* of Ridwan Pasha (d. 993/1585), an Ottoman governor of Gaza. When Kiwan came to Damascus in the second half of the sixteenth century, he entered the janissary forces which at that time consisted of one corps, referred to as the *jund al-Sham*. He rose through the ranks to a high position, but his leadership was not uncontested and the biographies speak several times of factional strife within the corps. As one of the military commanders of Damascus, he played a pivotal role in the rebellions of 'Ali Janbulad and of Fakhr al-Din II b. Ma'n, on whose side he fought and with whom he later went into exile

³² For these distinctions see Hathaway, 'Ottoman Responses...', 106, 109; Piterberg, 'The Alleged Rebellion', 17–19.

³³ For biographies see Najm al-Din Muhammad al-Ghazzi, *Lutf al-samar wa qatf al-thamar min tarajim a'yan al-tabaqat al-ula min al-qarn al-hadi 'ashar*, ed. Mahmud al-Shaykh, 2 vols., Damascus, Manshurat wizarat al-thaqafa wa'l-irshad al-qawmi, 1981–82, vol. 2, 612–26; and Muhammad Amin al-Muhibbi, *Khulasat al-athar fi a'yan al-qarn al-hadi 'ashar*, 4 vols., Beirut, Dar Sadir, s. a., vol. 3, 299–303. See also Bakht, *The Ottoman Province...*, 169–174; Jean-Paul Pascual, 'The Janissaries and the Damascus Countryside at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century According to the Archives of the City's Military Tribunal', in Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1984, 357–70, esp. 360; Hamud, *al-'Askar...*, 105–06, 134–36.

to Tuscany. On his return he regained at least some of his standing as an Ottoman official and was active in securing an amnesty for Fakhr al-Din. In the end, however, it was the latter who killed Kiwan in Ba'albakk in 1033/1623 during the second phase of their rebellion.³⁴

Seen from a local perspective, Kiwan was not so much a rebel, but a *zalim*, an oppressor of the local population. He was notorious for the ruthless ways by which he acquired his fortune and forced his adversaries to do his bidding. The entries by Ghazzi and Muhibbi dwell extensively on this aspect.³⁵ In this way, Kiwan came to accumulate a considerable fortune. A large part of it consisted of lands situated to the north-west of Damascus, in Rabwa and al-Mizza, a location later on known as Wadi Kiwan. Some ten years before he died he had transformed most of these properties into a very large endowment for the benefit of his descendants.

After his violent death the position of his family appears to have been rather fragile. Having died in a state of rebellion, his fortune was again under threat of being confiscated. Even his endowment was in danger of being dissolved. But again, the rebel status proved temporary and could be lifted by the payment of money. A court document attests to the fact that by a very large 'bribe' (*rashwa*) as the payment is called even in the attached *fatwa*, the *waqf* could be preserved for his descendants.³⁶ The expert of law authorised this exchange as the 'lesser evil' than the dissolution of the *waqf*.

This document makes it also clear that Kiwan's only son must have died shortly after him, leaving in his turn at least two minor sons. The orphans were at that time put under the authority of a certain Ibrahim Agha b. 'Uthman Ketkhuda. According to 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qadiri and Muhibbi, this man was the son of the foster son of Kiwan (*rabib* Kiwan). 'Uthman had been also the son of one of Kiwan's wives, so it is possible that these events precipitated the joining of two different Mamluk households.³⁷ In the following generations both the lin-


³⁴ Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province*... 169–74.

³⁵ Ghazzi, *Lutf al-samar*..., vol. 2, 612–26; Muhibbi, *Khulasat al-athar*..., vol. 3, 299–303.

³⁶ LCR, Damascus, 2:194, no. 281, case dated 6 *Jumada II* 1036 (22 February 1627).

³⁷ Muhibbi, *Khulasat al-athar*..., vol. 3, 299, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qadiri al-Dimashqi, *Ta'rikh 'Abd al-Qadir*, Ms. 9729, Berlin, Staatsbibliothek (see Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, 2nd ed., Leiden, Brill, 1949, vol. 2, 299), fol. 48r. It would be interesting to know something about the ethnic or regional origin of these

Table 2: The Beginnings of the Kiwan Lineages




eages of Kiwan's son and of his foster son are known as Ibn Kiwan or Kiwani. All this fits in with the Mamluk background of Kiwan and his foster son. Mamluk client relations (*intisab*) were in many cases reinforced by marriages with female members of the households and this kind of integration of non-kin is a characteristic of the neo-Mamluk model.³⁸

In the short term, 'Uthman's line was even more successful than that of Kiwan's son (see table 3): Muhibbi's entries allow us to follow the military careers of Ibrahim Agha (d. 1075/1664) and his brother Khalil Pasha, who became *amir al-hajj* in the turbulent times before

men, see Metin Ibrahim Kunt, 'Ethnic-regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, 1974, 233-39.

³⁸ Mary Ann Fay, 'The Ties that Bound: Women and Households in Eighteenth-Century Egypt', in Amira al-Azhari Sonbol, ed., *Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic history*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press 1995, 155-72; Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households...*; Cuno, 'The Reproduction of Elite Households...'.

Table 3: The Lineage of ‘Uthman al-Kiwani



this post was assigned *ex officio* to the governor of Damascus.³⁹ Khalil Pasha died during his fourth pilgrimage in 1092/1681. His nephew 'Ali Pasha, to whom he had transferred his posts in the local Janissaries, served for several years as *amir al-jarda* (d. 1095/1683). The military excellence of this lineage seems to have come to an abrupt end with the death of 'Ali's son Mustafa Bey in 1103/1691–2.⁴⁰ He and several other local janissary leaders were executed on orders from the capital. They were accused of the murder of a former commander, which evidently was caused by tensions within the janissary corps.

In *The Province of Damascus*, Abdul-Karim Rafeq has already pointed to the year 1103/1691 as marking a pivotal moment in the city's history. After this year, the local Janissaries were no longer appointed to command the pilgrimage and were put under the supervision of the governor.⁴¹ From 1708 onwards, this prestigious function was attached permanently to the governorship of Damascus, and the 'Azm governors in particular made good use of the new opportunities that came with this charge.⁴² After this, we know only very little about the activities of this branch of the Kiwani family, although the genealogical table shows an uninterrupted line of Ibrahim's descendants well into the nineteenth century.

For the eighteenth century on the other hand, Muradi provides us with some information about the other branch of the family (see table 4). Two of its members, again a father and a son, were also prominent members of the local Janissaries of Damascus.⁴³ Husayn Pasha, the father, held the title *amir al-umara'* and acted as governor of Jerusalem and 'Ajlun.⁴⁴ His son Ahmad Bey was not only a soldier but also

³⁹ Muhibbi, *Khulasat al-athar*..., vol. 1, 30–31; vol. 2, 133–34; see also Isma'il b. Taj al-Din al-Mahasini, 'Safahat fi ta'rikh Dimashq fi'l-qarn al-hadi 'ashar al-hijri, mustakhraja min kunnash Isma'il al-Mahasini', ed. Salah al-Din al-Munajjid, *Majalat al-Makhtutat al-'arabiya* 6, 1960, 77–160, 109 (no. 53), 126 (no. 69), 135 (no. 85), 136 (no. 89).

⁴⁰ Muhammad b. 'Isa b. Kannan al-Salihi, *al-Hawadith al-yawmiya min ta'rikh ahad 'ashar wa-alf wa-mi'a*, ed. Akram Hasan al-'Ulabi, Damascus 1994, 22–27.


⁴¹ Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus*..., 52–59, esp. 57; Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*..., 45–56.

⁴² Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*..., 13, 56–64.

⁴³ Muhammad Khalil al-Muradi, *Silk al-durar fi a'yan al-qarn al-thani 'ashar*, 2 vols., Beirut, Dar Ibn Hazm, Dar al-Basha'ir al-Islamiya, 1988, vol. 1, 97–107.

⁴⁴ For the importance of these posts in the 17th century see Faroqhi, *Herrscher über Mekka*..., 80–89.

Table 4: The Lineage of Muhammad b. Kiwan



a renowned *adib* who was even invited to Istanbul to please a Grand Vizier. Under 'Azm rule, he seems to have led rather a secluded life, but later on he appears again in the retinue of another governor of Damascus.

Except in the earliest generations, the two lines of Kiwanis do not seem to have shared more than their name and their military calling: for instance, their various endowments were administered separately, the 'Uthman lineage having no share in Kiwan's *waqf*.⁴⁵ Moreover, there are to my knowledge no intermarriages between the two lineages, only within them. The little we know about other marriages show a tendency to choose spouses from within the military milieu (judging from the titles appearing in their names).⁴⁶ Only in the middle of the eighteenth century do we learn of a marriage with another prominent Damascene family, the Ustuwani.⁴⁷

The formation of the Kiwan family shows some distinct dissimilarities to the 'Azm model, especially in the matters of inner cohesion and marriage policies. Yet they were not completely different as far as their dealings with the Ottoman state were concerned. Like the 'Azms, the Kiwanis were able to secure some lucrative and prestigious administrative posts beyond the local level over several generations, even surviving grave setbacks including execution and deposition. Yet their political fortunes were the opposite of those of the 'Azms, probably because of their affiliation with the local Janissaries, and they seem to have lost their ascendancy in the same power struggles from which the 'Azms emerged victorious.

⁴⁵ LCR, Damascus, 2:194, no. 281, case dated 6 *Jumada II* 1036 (22 February 1627); 32:110, no. 274, case dated 2 *Jumada II* 1124 (7 July 1712); 56:80, no. 294, case dated 7 *Jumada II* 1138 (10 February 1726); 43:332, no. 562, case dated 16 *Muharram* 1134 (6 November 1721); 7m:148, case dated 5 *Rajab* 1150 (29 October 1737); 235:84, no. 84, case dated 28 *Rajab* 1210 (7 February 1796); 235:95, no. 97, case dated 1 *Sha'ban* 1216 (7 December 1801).

⁴⁶ LCR, Damascus, 56:125, no. 394, case dated 24 *Muharram* 1142 (24 August 1729).

⁴⁷ LCR, Damascus, 169:41, no. 402, case dated 11 *Muharram* 1177 (22 July 1763), 170:85, no. 133, case dated 12 *Rabi' II* 1177 (20 October 1763); for a sketch of the Ustuwani family see Schilcher, *Families in Politics*..., 181–84.

From Lala Mustafa Pasha to the Qurmushis and Mardam Beys

The third example in this context is the Qurmushis or the Mardam Beys, as they were known later. Interestingly enough, this family is characterised by Linda Schilcher as 'newcomers of the mid-nineteenth century',⁴⁸ but for the twentieth-century local historian al-Hisni it belonged to the 'old families' (*min al-usar al-qadima*).⁴⁹ This is evidently based on the rather vague genealogical connection of this patri-lineage with the sixteenth-century Ottoman Grand Vizier and former governor of Damascus, Lala Mustafa Pasha (d. 1004/1595). Because of the large endowment complex of Lala Mustafa Pasha and his wife,⁵⁰ we get to know something about the Qurmushis before they became prominent in the nineteenth century. Their entrance onto the judicial stage was marked by an extraordinary event: in the year 1142/1729 a man named Mustafa Bey b. Yahya Bey al-Qurmushi appeared before the Chief Judge of Damascus and demanded that his mother be relieved of her duties as the administrator of the endowments of Lala Mustafa Pasha and his wife Fatima Khatun. Though he had served as her trustee (*wakil*) for years, Mustafa Bey now claimed that his mother was mentally ill and could no longer fulfil her functions appropriately.⁵¹

There is not much information about the Qurmushis before this. Judging from the titles *bey* or *agha*, which are recorded for the father and the grandfather of Mustafa Bey, we can only assume that they came from a military background. A military background fits also very well into the marriage policies of the descendants of Lala Mustafa Pasha (see table 5). When Mustafa Bey took control of the endowments in 1142/1729, he was not the only candidate for this post, but he succeeded by skilful manoeuvring in establishing a firm hold over them not only for himself, but also for his male descendants. It is worth noting that in order to do that Mustafa Bey not only had to oust his mother, who seems to have survived the coup for several years, but


⁴⁸ Schilcher, *Families in Politics*..., 211–15, citation 211.

⁴⁹ Muhammad Adib al Taqi al-Din al-Hisni, *Muntakhabat al-tawarikh li-Dimashq*, ed. Kamal Sulayman al-Salibi, 3 vols., Beirut, Dar al-afaq al-jadida, 1399/1979, vol. 2, 891.

⁵⁰ Both endowment deeds can be found in Khalil Mardam Bey (ed.), *Kitab waqf al-wazir Lala Mustafa Pasha wa yalihi kitab waqf Fatima Khatun bint Muhammad Bey ibn al-Sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri*, Damascus, Matba'a al-'umumiya, 1955.

⁵¹ LCR, Damascus, 56:125, no. 394, case dated 24 Muharram 1142 (24 August 1729).

Table 5: The Lala Mustafa Pasha Lineages



Sources: see fn. 53.

also had to compensate his sister and her descendants, thus setting a precedent whose consequences affected all succeeding generations.⁵² From this moment on, the women in the Qurmushi line (see table 6) were no longer active in the administration of the endowment in the way that the female descendants of Lala Mustafa Pasha had been.⁵³

The control of the vast fortunes of these endowments made the male Qurmushis into important players on the local scene. Yet if we accept at face value Budayri's comment on the occasion of Mustafa Bey's death in 1168/1754–5, they were not implicated in the political struggles of these times, because they kept themselves away from the ruling circles (*la yuqarib al-hukkam*).⁵⁴ To my knowledge, this is the first mention of the future family name, as Budayri speaks of Mustafa Bey b. Mardam Bey.⁵⁵ The Mardam Beys rose to prominence only during the Tanzimat era in the middle of the nineteenth century, a period that lies beyond the scope of this paper.⁵⁶ They made use of the

⁵² LCR, Damascus, 56:180, no. 498, case dated 25 *Rabi' II* 1142 (17 November 1729); 56:182, no. 502, case dated 24 *Rabi' II* 1142 (16 November 1729); 56:148, no. 439, case dated 1 *Rabi' II* 1142 (24 October 1729).


⁵³ For the different administrators of the Lala Mustafa *waqf* see e.g. LCR, Damascus, 11:19, no. 47, case dated 19 *Muharram* 1092 (8 February 1681); 18:81, no. 127, case dated 1 *Safar* 1101 (14 November 1689); 27:40, no. 104, case dated 25 *Rabi' I* 1114 (19 August 1702); 31:284, no. 431, case dated 4 *Dhu al-hijja* 1123 (13 January 1712); 72: 22, no. 51, case dated end of *Rabi' II* 1147 (end of September 1734); 77:15, no. 23, case dated 10 *Shawwal* 1148 (23 February 1736); 101:285, no. 429, case dated 19 *Dhu al-qa'da* 1153 (5 February 1741); 133:177, no. 349, case dated 24 *Rajab* 1164 (18 June 1751); 136:28, no. 64, case dated 21 *Rabi' II* 1165 (8 March 1752); 139:158, no. 170, case dated 27 *Jumada I* 1166 (1 April 1753); 159: 61, no. 133, case dated 1 *Muharram* 1174 (13 August 1760); 168:168, no. 375, case dated middle of *Muharram* 1176 (beginning of August 1762); 172:195, no. 457, case dated 1 *Dhu al-hijja* 1178 (22 May 1765); 175:300, no. 601, case dated 6 *Muharram* 1180 (14 June 1766); 186:249, no. 460, case dated 22 *Muharram* 1185 (7 May 1771); 245:281, no. 417, case dated 26 *Dhu al-hijja* 1216 (29 April 1802); 328:44, no. 142, case dated *Jumada II* 1249 (October–November 1833). For Lala Mustafa Pasha's son Muhammad Bey (Mehmed Bey/Pasha), see also Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants...*, 48–49.

⁵⁴ Ahmad al-Budayri al-Hallaq, *Hawadith Dimashq al-yawmiya, 1154–1175*, ed. Ahmad 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karim, Cairo, Matbu'at al-Jam'iya al-misriya li'l-dirasat al-tarikhiya, 1959, 234.

⁵⁵ The origin of the name is still an enigma. *Mardam* (Persian 'man') was widely used in the 17th century to indicate an *intisab* relationship in Ottoman tax farm registers, similar to 'follower' (*tabi*) in Arabic sources, see Yuzo Nagata, Toru Miura and Yasuhisa Shimizu, eds., *Tax Farm Register of Damascus Province in the Seventeenth Century: Archival and Historical Studies*, Tokyo, The Tokyo Bunko, 2006, for instance S. 290, 198/288; S. 302, 183/303; S. 313, 166/320; S. 336, 134/352.

⁵⁶ See Hisni, *Muntakhabat al-tawarikh...*, vol. 2, 891–92, Schilcher, *Families in Politics...*, 211–15; Ghazal Harir and Tamim Ma'mun Mardam Bey, eds., *Tarajim Al-Mardam Bey fi khamsat qurun 906–1419/1500–1998*, Damascus 1998.

Table 6: The 18th-Century Qurmushi/Mardam Bey Lineage



opportunities that came with their endowments, and it was because of this that they finally found themselves in conflict with the central state.⁵⁷ At that point the state presented itself in a new form, more bureaucratic and centralising, claiming the right to control all the spheres that it defined as public. In these confrontations, the Mardam Beys proved quite able to defend their position.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to contrast the model based on the rise of the 'Azms with two other case studies of family formation in early Ottoman Damascus. The Kiwans were a military household that established itself on the political stage in the province of Damascus at the turn of the seventeenth century. Like the 'Azms later on, they were able to reach beyond the local sphere by controlling various posts in the administration both on sanjak and provincial level. At least during the seventeenth century, they seemed very successful, given their roles in the organisation of the pilgrimage. At the turn of the eighteenth century, however, their position suffered from the tensions and struggles that resulted in a re-definition of the relationship between the local forces and the provincial governors, in contradistinction to the 'Azms, who profited from those struggles. The Qurmushis on the other hand went through their formation phase in the middle of the eighteenth century. They seem to have held themselves apart from the political struggles of the time and cannot, as far as can be seen, be identified as belonging to any of the factions of the period. Only much later, as a well-established lineage and under the new circumstances of the Tanzimat period, did they appear on the political scene.

With respect to patterns of family formation, the three examples show distinctive differences. The early phase of the Kiwan family corresponds to a high degree with patterns of neo-Mamluk household formation, showing the importance of *intisab* relationships and the potential conflict lines resulting from the integration of clients and sons into the same households. The two Kiwani branches do not seem

⁵⁷ For the documentation of these legal conflicts about the control of the Lala Mustafa Pasha waqf complex see Khalil Mardam Bey, ed., *Watha'iq wa-mustanadat tata'allaq bi-waqfay al-wazir Lala Mustafa Pasha wa-zawjatihi Fatima Khatun*, Damascus, 1931.

to have co-operated very closely except at the very beginning. This puts them apart from the 'Azm and the Qurmushi families, which both show a high degree of cohesiveness, also manifested in a similar pattern of female marriages. Yet these two cases are quite dissimilar if we examine them under the aspect of matrilineal kinship ties. As a young and strong lineage, the 'Azms were able to integrate the descendants of some of their female members, giving them also their family name. Mustafa Bey al-Qurmushi, on the other hand, retained his father's name, even though the latter had married into the much more prestigious Lala Mustafa Pasha family. Yet at this time that unit was not identified as such by a shared name and no longer showed the cohesion that often marked the formation phase of families. Thus the large fortune that this lineage still controlled came to form the basis for the rise of a newcomer family.

Although chosen from a similar background, the three cases studied in this paper are too dissimilar in terms of family formation to allow drawing general conclusions. Therefore I would like to conclude with a plea for more detailed studies of single families, households, or lineages, not only to know more about Middle Eastern family history, but also to come to a better understanding of the Ottoman state as viewed from the provinces.

LA SOCIÉTÉ MILITAIRE DAMASCÈNE ET LA CAMPAGNE ANALYSÉES À TRAVERS LES REGISTRES DE CADIS*

COLETTE ESTABLET ET JEAN-PAUL PASCUAL

Dans un article sur les problèmes de l'exploitation de la terre et leur impact social en Syrie, vers le milieu du dix-neuvième siècle, Abdul-Karim Rafeq notait: 'The local archives, notably the qadi records, contain much information on various aspects of land tenure which makes possible a study of the earlier period'.¹

Notre ouvrage *Familles et fortunes à Damas, en 1700*, consacré à l'étude de la société damascène, était certes fondé sur ces registres de cadis. Les principaux clivages qui sont la base d'une société musulmane *reaya* à cette époque y ont été évoqués et décrits. Une lacune de taille grevait cependant la connaissance de l'ensemble de cette société urbaine: échappait à l'analyse une partie importante, sinon en nombre, du moins en pouvoir, de la population damascène, par laquelle s'exprimait en partie la volonté sultanienne. Les militaires, les 'fonctionnaires', les gens du pouvoir, ce que l'on pourrait nommer 'appareil d'État' dépendaient en effet non pas du *qassam* 'arabi mais d'un autre juge, le *qassam* 'askari, juge des 'militaires'.

C'est donc à cette partie de la société damascène qu'est consacré ce travail, plus particulièrement à la place qu'occupe à la campagne ce personnel d'État, fondé sur deux types de sources, les inventaires après décès et les comptes de gestion de patrimoines d'orphelins. Nous ne pouvons présenter ici que des informations encore partielles, destinées à être complétées ultérieurement.

* Nous remercions tout le personnel du Centre des archives historiques de Damas qui nous a facilité avec grande gentillesse la consultation des registres. Nos pensées attristées vont à la regrettée Da'd al-Hakim, ancienne directrice de cette institution, disparue prématurément en 2006, qui nous avait toujours accordé son soutien.

¹ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Land tenure problems and their social impact in Syria around the middle of the nineteenth century', in Tarif Khalidi (ed.), *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1984, 371; v. par exemple sa contribution plus récente, 'City and countryside in a traditional setting. The case of Damascus in the first quarter of the Eighteenth Century', dans Thomas Philipp (ed.), *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th century*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992, 295-332.

L'environnement politique

L'administration provinciale repose, comme ailleurs dans l'Empire ottoman, sur trois piliers essentiels: le gouverneur militaire, le juge et les corps armés. Les attributions du gouverneur sont multiples et touchent aux domaines civil et militaire. Il est chargé du maintien de l'ordre, de la collecte des impôts et de l'administration générale, mais il est également tenu de participer aux campagnes militaires menées par l'Empire; son autorité est cependant limitée par l'étendue de ses taches et par les obstacles que le gouvernement central a élevés pour réduire les effets d'un pouvoir trop excessif. L'administration des finances est ainsi dirigée par un fonctionnaire nommé par Istanbul. Les affaires judiciaires relèvent de l'autorité d'un grand juge dépendant également de sa hiérarchie dans la capitale, avec laquelle il entretient une correspondance directe et qui contrôle les activités des divers tribunaux de la ville, dont les deux cours chargées des partages des héritages. Troisième pilier de l'ordre sultanien, les forces militaires, janissaires qui perçoivent une solde et cavaliers (*sipahi*) qui bénéficient de revenus de terroirs agricoles, sont placées sous l'autorité du gouverneur pour assurer la sécurité publique. L'évolution de ces forces militaires a ailleurs été constatée et décrite.²

Le nombre des sipahis, qui formaient le gros des troupes sultanienes, décroît considérablement dans la province au dix-septième siècle.³ Le corps des janissaires acquiert au cours de temps, en revanche, un rôle de plus en plus important dans la politique locale durant ce siècle. Ce corps de troupe connaît dès la fin du seizième siècle, à Damas comme dans d'autres régions de l'Empire, de profondes modifications dans son système de recrutement; ses membres, levés à l'origine dans des populations non musulmanes et formés dans le sérail, vont se recruter largement dans la population locale qui cherche à jouir des privilèges qui leur sont reconnus. Les membres de ce corps en garnison dans la ville exercent, pour compenser la réduction de leur solde entraînée par les dépréciations monétaires de la fin du seizième siècle,

² Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'The local forces in Syria in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries', V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, 277-307; Nawfân Raja al-Hamud, *al-'Askar fi Bilad al-Sham fi'l qarnayn al-sadis 'ashar wa'l-sabi' 'ashar al-miladiyya*, Beyrouth 1401/1981.

³ v. Karl Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708-1758*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980, 34.

des activités 'extra-militaires': outre le rôle qu'ils jouent dans la collecte des impôts, ils deviennent artisans ou commerçants, pratiquent l'usure et vont progressivement accaparer les richesses urbaines: 'Like their fellow members elsewhere, the janissaries of Damascus lived outside their barracks, joined the crafts, and became merchants and money-lenders', écrivait Rafeq.⁴ Pascual, se fondant sur des inventaires après décès établis par les cadis à la fin des années 1620, relevait que les janissaires possédaient jardins et vignes dans la riche oasis de Damas, terres, maisons de villages, troupeaux, outillage agricole dans des régions plus lointaines comme le Hauran et la Bekaa.⁵ Étudiant les années 1743–1771, Rafeq notait: 'The Damascene upper classes (which included the governor, the daftardar, the higher ulema, the high-ranking military officers [...], who among themselves disposed of the wealth of Damascus) played an important role in the exploitation of the countryside'.⁶ Ce corps de troupes en raison de sa composition sociale et ethnique nouvelle confortée par des alliances matrimoniales avec des familles locales, a tendance à identifier ses intérêts à ceux des Damascènes: il va s'opposer aux gouverneurs, affronter dans des conflits souvent sanglants les autres forces militaires envoyées d'Istanbul, pour défendre les habitants de la ville mais aussi ses propres intérêts économiques.⁷

Le gouvernement central s'inquiète à tel point de leur influence dans la ville et la province qu'en 1659 il expédie, après avoir écrasé la révolte du gouverneur d'Alep soutenu par les janissaires, des troupes impériales: plusieurs centaines de *Kapý Kulu* (ou *qapíqul* dans ce texte) sont envoyés à Damas où ils s'installent dans la citadelle et prennent le contrôle des portes de la ville et d'autres services publics qui étaient entre les mains des janissaires 'locaux'. Plusieurs de leurs chefs sont exécutés et le pouvoir de ce corps paraît provisoirement neutralisé: un contingent participera au siège de Vienne en 1683. Mais en 1687–88, les Damascènes, avec l'appui des janissaires locaux, se soulèvent contre la tyrannie du nouveau gouverneur Hamza Basha et les exactions

⁴ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The province of Damascus 1723–1783*, Beirut, Khayats, 1970, 26.

⁵ Jean-Paul Pascual, 'The Janissaries and the Damascus Countryside at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century according to the Archives of the City's Military Tribunal', in Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1984, 357–69.

⁶ Rafeq, 'Economic relations...', 674.

⁷ Rafeq, *The province of Damascus...*, 30 sq.

commises par ses troupes dans la ville.⁸ L'année suivante, l'homme fort de la révolte, un chef des janissaires locaux, est assassiné par les *qapi qul* et ses biens confisqués. Les conflits entre les corps locaux et le gouvernement provincial se poursuivent et des mesures radicales décidées depuis des années sont alors appliquées : par firman du pouvoir central, plusieurs membres importants des janissaires locaux sont arrêtés et exécutés en juin 1691 et leurs têtes envoyées à Istanbul. D'autres s'enfuient et trouvent refuge auprès de l'Emir Ibn Ma'n dans la montagne libanaise.⁹ Ce corps désormais fortement affaibli ne va plus guère, pendant des années, se manifester sur la scène politique damascène.

À la fin du dix-septième siècle, à Damas, le corps des janissaires comprend donc janissaires locaux et janissaires impériaux. Pour les différencier des janissaires impériaux (*qapi qul* ou *dawlat al-qa'a*), dans les chroniques les janissaires locaux sont dénommés, *yerliyya*, et plus souvent *dawlat Dimashq* ou *al-jund al-shami*. Selon un rôle des soldes daté de 1693–1694, une dizaine d'années après la date de la majorité des documents sur lesquels se fondera notre recherche, ces janissaires locaux comptent 1004 membres ; et une inspection conduite en 1708 constate que, dans ce corps qui compte 1231 janissaires, nombreux sont inaptes au service : ils sont trop âgés, trop jeunes, malades ou ont été admis parce que leurs pères étaient déjà janissaires et les deux tiers, précise le document, sont des 'locaux', des Turcomans, des Kurdes ou des 'Arabes' (des tribus nomades ?), de potentiels fauteurs de troubles aux yeux du pouvoir ottoman!¹⁰ Leur nombre est alors réduit à 913 dont 35 pensionnés. Face à eux, les janissaires impériaux comptent, selon un autre rôle de solde de 1701–1702, 268 membres,¹¹ qui seront portés à 413 en 1709.

⁸ Ibn Kannan, Muhammad al-Salihi, *Yawmiyyat Shamiyyah: wa-huwa al-ta'rikh al-musamma bi'l-hawadith al-yawmiyyah min ta'rikh ahad 'ashar wa-alf wa-miyah: safahat nadirah min ta'rikh Dimashq fi al-'asr al-'Uthmani bayna sanat 1111 H wa-sanat 1153 H* (1699–1740), éd. Akram 'Ulabi, Damas, Dar al-Tabba' li'l-Taba'a wa'l-Nashr wa'l-Tawzi', 1994, 23 n. 1 où l'éditeur du texte cite un passage d'une autre source.

⁹ Ibidem, 24–27 qui décrit avec emphase l'ampleur de leur puissance.

¹⁰ Barbir, *Ottoman rule*, 95, 146.

¹¹ Ibidem, 95.

*Nos premières sources: les inventaires après décès autorisent
quelques conclusions sur le rôle que jouent les militaires dans la
campagne damascène*

Nous avons choisi d'exploiter méticuleusement le registre X, recensant des successions dépendant du *qassam 'askari* dont les dates précèdent de peu les actes qui ont permis de dresser une image de la société *reaya* damascène vers 1700. En effet, si seulement six de ces actes, datés de 1690, correspondent exactement aux dates des inventaires civils déjà analysés, la date des 110 successions de militaires (1680, 1681, 1682) ne précèdent que d'une dizaine d'années les enregistrements des successions. Les actes de succession du registre X du tribunal *'askariyya* se situent donc à ces moments de trouble pendant lesquels la puissance des janissaires locaux, encore bien engagés dans la vie économique de la cité et des campagnes environnantes est en rivalité permanente avec les janissaires impériaux envoyés du centre de l'Empire. Ces conflits politiques sont exacerbés par la situation économique difficile propre à la fin du dix-septième siècle syrien: peste, disettes, invasions de sauterelles, mauvaises récoltes s'abattent au même moment sur le pays.¹² C'est donc ce personnel d'Etat lié à la justice, l'administration et les forces armées que les actes de succession permettent d'approcher. En aucun cas, ces documents n'autorisent l'approche d'une histoire ou d'une évolution de ce personnel, en particulier du personnel militaire: ils font le point sur leur patrimoine et leur famille.

Les actes de succession sont consacrés à une trentaine de militaires étrangers à la région, pèlerins que le hasard a fait mourir à Damas sur le chemin des Villes Saintes, et à 80 défunts damascènes, dont dix-neuf femmes et soixante-et-un hommes. La partie 'utile' pour la connaissance de la société militaire masculine damascène de ce registre X est donc un peu frêle. Le tableau suivant présente les clients masculins du tribunal militaire:

¹² Voir plus loin.

Les clients masculins du juge 'askari

	Les hommes damascènes
sipahi à Chypre <i>tajir</i> à Damas	1
administration	8
janissaires	35 et un militaire sans doute janissaire
qul oğlu	2
qapi qul	8 (dont un pèlerin)
sipahi (dont 2 za'im)	7

Le nombre relativement faible d'actes de succession masculins interdit le calcul de pourcentage. On peut cependant affirmer en premier lieu que, au sein de ce personnel d'Etat dépendant du juge 'askari, les Damascènes occupés à seconder l'administration du gouverneur et le personnel judiciaire sont peu nombreux par rapport aux forces militaires. Deuxième constatation: les différentes forces militaires sur lesquelles s'appuie le pouvoir sultanien sont toutes représentées, *sipahi*, *qapi qul*, janissaires; les *qul oğlu* sont des fils de *qapi qul* et de femmes syriennes, dont on ignore la fonction exacte, mais dont le sort *post mortem* dépend du tribunal militaire. Troisième conclusion: les janissaires sont nombreux, malgré la présence des *qapi qul* récemment envoyés par le sultan, une proportion de 5 pour un, proportion analogue aux propositions chiffrées de Barbir.

Le juge a enregistré le détail des patrimoines de ces défunts d'État avec précision, plus minutieusement encore que ne l'avait réalisé son collègue du tribunal 'arabi. Nous avons étudié la société civile damascène à travers les actes de près de 500 personnes, dont 277 hommes. Le registre X du tribunal n'autorise donc pas l'approche d'un échantillon aussi important. Cependant, l'attention apportée par le juge à l'enregistrement permet d'aborder avec confiance le montant et la composition du patrimoine des défunts.

Le tableau suivant présente une première ébauche de la structure comparée du patrimoine de la population militaire et civile de Damas:

Tableau comparé de la composition du patrimoine des 'askar et des reaya (en pour cent)

	Militaires	Civils
biens domestiques	17	9.7
biens ruraux (dont revenus en nature)	8.70	6.1
bijoux	0.50	1.2
biens du commerce ou de l'artisanat	3	22.3
ensemble des créances	38	38.4
créances recouvrées	14.40	21.3
créances non recouvrées	23.60	17.1
immeubles	6.40	13.7
numéraire	23.90	8.6
revenus d'emploi	0.10	
moyenne de l'actif individuel	1089	1159
	piastres	piastres

- La moyenne de l'avoir individuel est à peu près la même.
- Les créances occupent la même proportion dans le patrimoine.
- Les biens domestiques, chez les militaires, consistent avant tout en armes et en montures.

Les militaires possèdent beaucoup plus de numéraire que les *reaya*. Cette importance des espèces dans leurs avoirs est peut-être tout simplement liée à l'effet de solde, que touchent les janissaires. Par ailleurs, les janissaires ne restent pas en poste fixe à Damas, mais sont affectés à tour de rôle dans les forteresses de la province : posséder de l'argent liquide, quand on voyage, est alors une nécessité. S'ajoute une dernière hypothèse : faut-il relier cette importance des espèces à la campagne d'Autriche et à l'approche du siège de Vienne (1682–1683) ? Presque la moitié du contingent y participe, 500 janissaires de Damas qui, de différentes manières, auraient pris soin de se munir d'argent monnayé ? Plus tardivement, en 1691, 300 hommes collaborent également à la nouvelle campagne d'Autriche.¹³

Il était un peu plus difficile de comparer le montant des biens ruraux, inclus dans *Familles et fortune* dans l'ensemble des biens immobiliers.

¹³ Barbir, *Ottoman rule*, 35.

Dans cet ouvrage, la proportion des biens immobiliers estimés était relativement faible: le juge avait noté la présence de biens fonciers et immobiliers sans en proposer une estimation systématique. Pour ne pas manquer cependant la part qu'occupaient les biens immobiliers, maisons, boutiques et biens ruraux, dans le patrimoine des civils, on avait réussi à proposer une estimation globale des valeurs immobilières détenues par chacun. Huit défunts seulement possédaient dix-neuf biens ruraux, dont il était possible d'estimer la part dans les patrimoines totaux de ces hommes, 6.1 pour cent.

À première vue, le montant des avoirs ruraux des *reaya* se situe en dessous de celui des militaires. Mais cette différence s'amplifie si l'on considère que, bien que leurs successions soient enregistrées par le tribunal '*arabi*', la moitié de ces propriétaires ruraux, classés dans la population 'sujette' de Damas, ont un rapport avec le personnel militaire: leurs noms affichent des liens avec les *qapi qul*, les *beshe* (soldats du rang), les *agha*. À eux seuls, quatre sur les huit personnages évoqués, plus ou moins liés à la société militaire de la ville, détiennent 70 pour cent de tous les biens ruraux possédés par les *reaya* damascains. L'héritage de parents militaires a donc été déterminant dans la composition du patrimoine de fils qui se sont détournés de la carrière militaire et se sont intégrés à la vie des sujets. Les *reaya* n'ont guère investi dans la campagne.

Une première analyse de ces actes révèle donc que les militaires sont beaucoup plus impliqués dans des activités rurales que les simples tableaux proposés ne semblent l'indiquer: dix-sept des défunts dont le patrimoine relève du *qassam 'askari*, plus du quart, possèdent des biens à la campagne. Une brève analyse des créances, recouvrées ou non recouvrées, souligne également l'emprise de cette partie de la population damascène sur la campagne environnante: quatre de ces propriétaires ont prêté de l'argent à des villageois; et dix personnages, qui ne possèdent rien à la campagne, détiennent des créances dues par des villageois. Près de la moitié donc de ce 'personnel d'État', occupé à des fonctions administratives ou militaires qui justifient solde et avantages, propriétaires et /ou créanciers, sont en relation avec la campagne damascène.

Un peu déçus par le faible nombre (en chiffres absolus) d'inventaires consacrés à la partie 'militaire' de la société damascène, nous avons voulu élargir nos connaissances en interrogeant un autre type de sources, les *muhasaba*.

Les comptes de gestion des biens des enfants mineurs, ou muhasaba, permettent d'élargir et de compléter ces informations

Dans les mêmes registres, du moins à Damas à la fin du dix-septième siècle et au début du dix-huitième, et aussi bien dans les tribunaux affectés aux *reaya*, (*mahkama 'arabiya*) qu'au personnel d'État, militaires ou administrateurs (*mahkama 'askariya*), les cadis inscrivent d'autres actes que les *mukhallafat*, dont la plupart rendent compte de la gestion des patrimoines des enfants mineurs, réalisés quelque temps après le décès de leur père ou de leur mère, les *muhasaba*. Dans le même registre X, soixante-huit comptes de gestion, dont la plupart sont datés de 1680, 1681, 1682 et 1683 (quatre correspondent à l'année 1690), apportent ainsi des compléments aux seules données de ces inventaires.

Présentation des sources

Pour qui a travaillé les *mukhallafat*, inventaires après décès, ces comptes de gestion, les *muhasaba*, sont à première vue, sinon décevants, du moins problématiques. La richesse du préambule de l'inventaire présentant toute la famille du défunt héritière de ses biens, enfants mineurs et majeurs, conjoints, ascendants et collatéraux variés, autorisait certaines conclusions démographiques; la description du patrimoine destiné à être transmis, la définition de l'ensemble des avoirs, la structure de la fortune, dont il était possible de définir les différentes composantes, permettaient une analyse économique et sociale précise de la société damascène. Cette globalité, d'ordre aussi bien démographique qu'économique, disparaît par définition dans la *muhasaba* consacrée à la gestion des biens des seuls enfants mineurs par leurs tuteurs, des *wasi*, ou parfois par les représentants des tuteurs, les *wakil*. Cependant les comptes de gestion sont riches d'autres enseignements.

Des documents fiables

Pouvait-on accorder d'autre part à ce nouveau type d'actes la confiance qu'inspiraient les *mukhallafat*, transmetteurs sérieux du patrimoine? Milliot est en effet sceptique sur la qualité de la gestion effectuée par les tuteurs: 'Lorsque la tutelle est gérée par le père, le cadi ne contrôle jamais. Lorsqu'elle est gérée par un tuteur testamentaire, en fait, le

cadi ne contrôle pas davantage. Il n'exerce de surveillance que lorsque la tutelle est gérée par son 'mandataire', et, encore, cette surveillance est-elle rien moins que pointilleuse'.¹⁴ Linant de Bellefonds exprime la même méfiance: 'La reddition des comptes a lieu, soit que le tuteur cesse ses fonctions, soit que le mineur ait atteint la majorité. La reddition n'implique l'intervention d'aucune autorité administrative ou judiciaire et même pas la présence de témoins. Elle peut avoir lieu verbalement'.¹⁵ Il ajoute même: 'quand on songe au nombre de tutelles, peu, ou pas du tout contrôlées, la règle hanéfite laisse, on le devine, la porte ouverte à bien des abus dont pâtissent les mineurs'.¹⁶

Des redditions de compte se sont peut-être faites oralement échappant ainsi et pour toujours à la vérification et à l'analyse. Mais, du moins à Damas, à cette époque, et pour cette société d'État, l'étude des *muhasaba* enregistrées laisse plutôt une impression de sérieux. Les actes sont tous datés et authentifiés par la présence d'un juge: Rida efendi, Husayn efendi et Rajab efendi, pour les années 1680 et 1681, Abu al-Safa Muhammad efendi pour 1682, As'ad Efendi al-Saddiqi, dit 'juge hanéfite' pour les quatre cas datés de 1690. Si l'on avait compté les occurrences des termes utilisés par les scribes, seraient arrivées de loin, en toute première position, certaines expressions se référant à la légalité du document fondé sur des actes authentifiés. Ces termes sont 'hujja', souvent précédé d'un *bi mujib*, soit *bi mujib hujja*, que l'on peut traduire 'acte authentifié auquel on se conforme par obligation'.¹⁷ Les références que font les juges à ces actes, qu'ils datent, concernent plusieurs domaines: la nomination des *wasi* et des *wakil*, qui s'appuie non seulement sur ces *hujja*, mais aussi sur des *wakala* et *wisaya* documents de 'représentation' ou de 'tutorisation' datés et officiels, mais aussi l'estimation du capital hérité par les mineurs, du gain procuré par ce patrimoine et de divers revenus touchés par les enfants.

¹⁴ Louis Milliot, *Introduction à l'étude du droit musulman*, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1953, 198.

¹⁵ Ibidem, 427.

¹⁶ Yvon Linant de Bellefonds, *Traité de droit musulman comparé*, Paris, La Haye, Mouton, 1973, 201.

¹⁷ Pour les traductions des termes apparaissant dans ces documents, nous avons utilisé un certain nombre de dictionnaires; afin de ne pas multiplier les notes, nous donnons leurs références en bibliographie.

*Les tuteurs et les représentants (wasi et wakil) sont très
officiellement investis de leur mission*

Le patrimoine et les revenus des enfants mineurs du défunt sont gérés par des tuteurs, *wasi*, et des *wakil*, souvent mais pas uniquement, représentants de la mère, elle-même *wasi* de sa progéniture. Ces personnes ne sont pas choisies au hasard. Linant de Bellefonds décrit le processus de la nomination des gestionnaires: 'C'est le père wali qui gère les biens de son enfant et, à défaut, son grand-père [...], puis le *wasi* ou tuteur testamentaire, désigné par le père; en fin de compte, c'est le cadi qui sera investi de la tutelle sur les biens. Celui-ci se verra confié par le *fiqh* une double mission: il est tuteur, à proprement parler, en l'absence du tuteur légal, wali, ou du tuteur testamentaire, *wasi*, mais il est aussi chargé en tout état de cause [...] de contrôler les fonctions des tuteurs légaux et testamentaires [...] A défaut de père, de grand-père et de tuteurs testamentaires nommés par chacun d'eux...c'est au cadi qu'est attribuée la tutelle'.¹⁸ Aussi, 'on verra alors le mineur dépendre d'un parent, pour le gouvernement de sa personne, et d'un autre parent, ou même d'un étranger, pour la gestion de ses biens'.¹⁹ Lorsque le parent n'a pas désigné de *wasi*, le cadi est chargé de cette mission de tutelle: dans ce cas, le terme de *wasi* est qualifié de 'légal'.

La loi distinguait la gestion de la personne et la gestion des biens du mineur qui, seule, est ici prise en compte. Dans le préambule de l'acte sont détaillés les noms et fonctions de tous les responsables de cette gestion. Au moins dans cette société militaire, des précautions semblent avoir été prises pour que les biens des mineurs soient défendus par des personnes 'choisies' ou 'légales' reconnues, sérieusement investies de leurs charges comptables par les actes qui ont été décrits.

Les *wasi*, chargés de la lourde responsabilité de gérer des patrimoines et des revenus ne semblent pas être recrutés au hasard. Ils appartiennent tous, à quelques exceptions près, au milieu de ces gens d'État, les militaires ou le personnel judiciaire et religieux de la cité. Dans seulement trois cas, les *wasi* sont des personnes engagées dans les activités artisanales de la ville, un fabricant de '*aba* (*abawi*), un cordonnier (*qawwaf*), un fourreur (*farra*'). Ils sont, en principe, choisis pour leurs qualités personnelles: 'Le *wasi* doit être nécessairement

¹⁸ Linant de Bellefonds, *Traité de droit musulman*... 197-99.

¹⁹ Ibidem, 179.

être *'adl*, c'est-à-dire d'une parfaite honorabilité'.²⁰ Ainsi, les noms des *wasi* sont-ils presque toujours précédés d'une prestigieuse titulature qui va des tout simples *Fakhr al-Aqran*, *Qudwat al-Aqran*, ou *Fakhr al-A'yan* jusqu'à un très long *Qudwat al-Amajid wa'l-Akarim al-A'azz al-Amjad*, qualifiant dans quatre *muhasaba* différentes le même Mustafa Agha b. Ishaq al-Halwaji.

La famille tient une importante place dans la prise en charge des comptes d'orphelins: les femmes, épouses des défunts, et mères des mineurs, à onze reprises instituées *wasi*, jouent un rôle essentiel. Ces femmes sont représentées par des *wakil*, souvent des membres de la famille, les nouveaux époux, les frères, le père. Près du tiers des quarante-et-un défunts dont les *wasi*, choisis ou désignés, ne sont pas des épouses et mères, ont des liens de parenté proche avec les défunts: trois grands-pères, *wasi* 'prioritaires', un oncle, quatre frères, deux fils majeurs, trois neveux enfin, géreront les biens de leurs parents mineurs.

La gestion du patrimoine suit certaines règles

Si les personnages qui s'occupent de la tutelle des mineurs sont ainsi légalement désignés, les sommes d'argent auxquelles ils ont à faire n'échappent pas à cette officielle et bureaucratique authentification.

Les mineurs héritent en général d'un capital laissé par le défunt, *asl mal*, somme dont le montant repose toujours sur une preuve légale fixée le plus souvent par l'acte des comptes de gestion de telle ou telle date (*bi daftar al-muhasaba*), ou par un acte d'authentification légal, également daté (*bi mujib hujja shar'iyya*). Les gains qu'ont engendrés ce capital (*rabh*), mentionné dans tous les actes, sont toujours clairement indiqués, selon la même formule (*bi mujib hujja*); le scribe précise même le nom des personnes qui assurent ces 'intérêts', le *wasi*, le *wakil*, ou d'autres personnages ne jouant pas de rôle officiel: la formule la plus souvent utilisée est 'gain sur capital, dans les mains du *wasi*' (*an rabh mal bi yad al-wasi*). Les créances non recouvrées qui constituaient souvent une partie importante du patrimoine du défunt et que le *wasi* a pour mission de récupérer, apparaissent à maintes reprises dans les *muhasaba*. Quand le *wasi* arrive à ses fins, le montant et l'origine de ces créances font allusion à un premier acte d'in-

²⁰ Ibidem, 238.

ventaires après décès daté (*daftar al-mukhallafat*) qui les a établies, ou mentionne que ces créances ont été exigées après l'établissement de l'inventaire, à l'initiative du *wasi*. Lorsque ces créances restent à récupérer, au bout d'un nombre variable d'années, le montant de la dette, et le nom des débiteurs apparaissent: deux formules authentifient la créance, soit le *bi mujib hujja*, parfois daté, déjà évoqué, soit une nouvelle formule authentifiant le fait qu'il y ait créance, le nom du débiteur, et le montant de la somme qui reste due, une 'reconnaissance de dette' (*bi mujib tamassuk*).

La période couverte par les comptes des tuteurs paraît obéir à un certain nombre de contraintes

L'analyse des *muhasaba* du registre X ne confirme pas toujours les remarques de Linant de Bellefonds soulignant le caractère presque 'privé' de la gestion de tutelle et des obligations de reddition de comptes liées, disait-il, à l'arrivée à la majorité du mineur ou à la mort du *wasi*.

Le juge a clairement indiqué la durée de la période couverte par les comptes du *wasi*. Ces redditions de compte semblent être à la fois régulières et irrégulières. La comptabilité est annuelle dans plus de la moitié des cas: le juge a inscrit nettement la durée de la gestion du compte, 'pour une année complète' (*muddat sana kamila*), qui commence à telle date et finit un an après dans trente-quatre cas. Cette régularité annuelle de la gestion des biens d'orphelins n'est évoquée ni par Milliot ni par Linant de Bellefonds. Mais cette périodisation n'est pas une règle: à huit reprises, le *cadi* a enregistré des comptes pour des termes de quelques mois; d'autres *muhasaba* couvrent des périodes qui vont de plus d'un an jusqu'à douze ans. Quelles situations, quels événements poussaient-ils les tuteurs devant le tribunal?

On ne peut attribuer au hasard des sources l'observation du caractère annuel de la moitié des comptes rendus de gestion. Il était sans doute souhaitable que les tuteurs expliquassent chaque année leur gestion des biens des mineurs.

Il semble même qu'il y ait une période privilégiée pour la présentation de ces comptes: dix-neuf *muhasaba* sont enregistrées les deux derniers mois de l'année lunaire, *dhu'l-qa'da* et *dhu'l-hijja*, treize en *muharram*, au tout début de l'année, comme si le *wasi* avait pris quelque retard dans sa venue au *mahkama*, retard incontestablement

attesté treize fois, lorsque le *wasi* dit rendre des comptes pour la durée de l'année entière (1679, 1680, 1681), alors que le document porte une date postérieure de plusieurs mois à cette fin d'année. Les comptes se sont bien faits sur l'année, mais, pour une raison inconnue, négligence du *wasi*, ou du juge, l'acte a suivi de quelques jours, voire de quelques mois, le moment de l'arrêt de la gestion.

S'il était préférable que la reddition des comptes fût annuelle et même donnée en fin de l'année hégirienne, le *wasi* rend aussi des gestions pour quelques mois ou pour des durées qui dépassent l'année. En l'absence de règle juridique clairement exprimée, seule l'analyse des documents eux-mêmes peut donner quelques pistes d'explication. Une partie des *muhasaba* couvrant quelques mois semblent bien être ainsi des 'premières' qui suivent de près la mort du défunt et l'enregistrement de son inventaire. Cependant, la *muhasaba* semble obéir également à d'autres lois, liées au temps qui passe et engendre des perturbations variées et aléatoires. Au nombre de celles-ci, la majorité acquise par un mineur, qui amène le *wasi* à présenter sa gestion.

Plus fréquemment, ce sont les décès d'un ou plusieurs enfants mineurs tutorisés par le *wasi* qui obligent à de nouveaux partages de l'héritage du père défunt, donc à de nouvelles *muhasaba*. Milliot remarquait: 'À l'expiration de sa mission, laquelle prend fin par le décès du pupille, par la constatation de sa majorité, par le décès ou la destitution, il y a lieu, pour le tuteur à reddition de comptes. Si la reddition de compte de tutelle est motivée par le décès du pupille, c'est à ses héritiers que le compte sera rendu'.²¹ La plupart des *muhasaba* (dix-sept) qui ne couvrent pas la période fixe d'un an sont des comptes rendus de gestion liés à la disparition d'un héritier.

Mais le temps qui passe n'entraîne pas que des décès. Les successions d'hier et d'aujourd'hui sont rarement simples et acquises. Les *wasi*, d'eux-mêmes, ou incités par les juges, sont également appelés à soumettre leur comptabilité au tribunal pour d'autres raisons que la disparition précoce des héritiers mineurs. Dans dix cas, c'est sur sollicitation (*iltimas*) d'une personne que le *wasi* explique sa gestion. Les nouveaux époux,²² les fils majeurs, peut-être inquiets ou méfiants sur la façon dont le patrimoine des enfants mineurs a été tenu, appellent l'ancien *wasi* à rendre ses comptes.

²¹ Milliot, *Introduction à l'étude du droit musulman*, 427.

²² Voir l'exemple de *muhasaba* donné plus loin.

L'analyse des *muhasaba* révèle donc que la comptabilité annuelle, et même en fin d'année est privilégiée. La règle est loin d'être absolue : l'arrivée à la majorité d'un enfant, le décès d'un ou plusieurs mineurs, les remariages des épouses, les conflits de succession interviennent également, qui obligent les responsables, tuteurs ou représentants, à proposer au juge, avec un luxe de détails inespéré, la gestion des biens dont ils étaient les responsables.

Les comptes de gestion, antithèse et complément des inventaires

Les inventaires après décès, construits selon un plan semblable, constataient un ensemble cohérent. Les *mukhallafat*, dans les registres civils étudiés dans *Familles et fortunes* ou dans ce registre X consacré à des militaires, sont des inventaires concernant un unique défunt. Un inventaire fixe l'état de la famille et du patrimoine au moment précis de la mort du défunt.

Aux ponctuels inventaires après décès, s'opposent les comptes de gestion, documents certes fiables et détaillés, mais qui s'étalent sur la durée, obéissant ainsi à une logique inverse. À la différence des inventaires, les *muhasaba* se présentent sous des formes fluctuantes : la gestion s'inscrit dans le temps qui passe, compliquant les situations familiales, engendrant des revenus qui entrent dans le patrimoine des enfants mineurs, mais également des dépenses qui en grèvent le montant.

Dans le plus simple des cas, le tuteur rend compte du gain hérité par des enfants mineurs et en explique la gestion sur une ou plusieurs années, revenant parfois, dans des actes postérieurs, sur le devenir des biens des mêmes enfants : récapitulatif du capital hérité, calcul du gain rapporté, créances récupérées, revenus supplémentaires tirés des boutiques ou des biens ruraux hérités, exposé des dépenses liées à l'entretien des enfants, aux impôts et différentes taxes, aux frais nécessaires à la bonne administration des biens immeubles et fonciers.

Cependant, dans près de la moitié des cas, le tuteur, et le juge qui enregistre les données, suivent un plan qui épouse les aléas de l'existence : de nombreux actes comprennent ainsi plusieurs parties, divisions successives d'héritages à la suite de la disparition d'un ou plusieurs enfants mineurs.

Un autre élément complique également l'exposé des redditions de compte. Les *muhasaba* prennent en compte prioritairement les biens des mineurs. Mais ces enfants mineurs appartiennent à une famille,

dont souvent la succession, à la mort d'un défunt, n'a pas été complètement close dans l'inventaire après décès, en général parce que le capital du défunt comportait des créances non recouvrées. Dans de nombreuses *muhasaba*, le juge, sous la dictée du *wasi*, est obligé de tenir compte de cette situation.

Ces *muhasaba*, contrairement aux inventaires, ne présentent donc pas un plan uniforme. Quelques rares actes même, que l'on ose à peine appeler *muhasaba*, ne se consacrent pas à la gestion du patrimoine d'enfants mineurs, mais sont de simples compléments de *mukhallafa*.

Les *muhasaba* sont donc impliquées dans les aléas du temps qui passe, les morts, les naissances, les remariages, et tout ce qui s'ensuit. Des enfants mineurs disparaissent. Certains *wasi*, ou *wakil*, changent, meurent, sont remplacés, sont surveillés par les nouveaux époux. Mais les comptes de gestion tiennent compte également du temps passé, notant tous les problèmes non encore résolus lors de la succession, impliquant d'autres membres de la famille que les seuls mineurs. Aux comptes-rendus clairs et précis des juges fixant dans les inventaires l'état d'un patrimoine transmis à des héritiers, s'opposent les méandres d'une comptabilité réalisée en plusieurs temps, le mode d'exposition sinueux du tuteur et du juge reflétant les avatars irréguliers de la vie, les turbulences du temps, enregistrant, non pas un état, mais le devenir des différentes composantes du patrimoine des mineurs. Par un heureux hasard, les *muhasaba* introduisent ainsi un élément qui manquait aux rigides *mukhallafat*, le mouvement.

Les difficultés de lecture, d'interprétation de ce nouveau type de documents, obligent à ne proposer ici qu'un stade intermédiaire des travaux. Nous nous bornerons donc d'abord à confirmer brièvement par le survol des *muhasaba* l'emprise des militaires sur la campagne damascène. Nous proposerons ensuite la lecture de deux comptes de gestion, susceptibles d'apporter quelque tribut à la connaissance le société militaire damascène.

Une brève note: militaires et personnel d'Etat à la campagne à la lecture des muhasaba

Le *wasi* ne se borne pas à conserver un capital hérité (dont la composition échappe totalement) et à le faire fructifier pour des enfants mineurs. Souvent il recouvre des créances non encore payées et note le montant et l'origine de revenus qui s'ajoutent au capital des enfants.

Quarante-neuf *muhasaba* consignent ces créances et ces revenus, parfois pour les mêmes héritiers et à quelques mois ou années de distance. Dans trente-sept actes, le *wasi* signale l'existence de propriétés terriennes, soit soixante-quinze pour cent, les trois quarts. Sept de ces propriétaires sont également des créanciers à qui des villageois doivent de l'argent. Neuf autres personnes, sans posséder de terres à la campagne, attendent de villageois des remboursements aux avances qu'ils leur ont consenties. Parmi ces propriétaires et créanciers ruraux, certains possèdent également des biens urbains. Rares sont les militaires qui attendent de la ville, par la propriété de maisons ou de boutiques, quelque supplément aux revenus de leurs seules fonctions. Cette écrasante emprise militaire sur la campagne damascène ne provient pas seulement de l'existence de *timar*, autrefois attribués aux *sipahi* ou aux *za'im*, concessions devenues plus ou moins héréditaires comme l'a constaté Mantran.²³ Les janissaires, les *qapi qul*, participent aussi à l'exploitation des terres syriennes. Il faudra bien sûr revenir, dans une étape ultérieure de notre analyse, sur le type d'exploitation exercée, sur la localisation des propriétés, dont la plupart occupent la Ghouta et la Bekaa, et sur la nature des liens qui existent entre villageois et militaires.

Deux exemples de muhasaba

Le 29 *rajab* 1091 (23 août 1680), en présence du juge du tribunal *'askari*, Husayn efendi, Fakhr al-A'yan Husayn bek b. Muhammad al-Sipahi, *wasi* légal, par *hujja* légale (acte écrit), rend compte de la gestion, pour une année complète, de la fortune que deux enfants mineurs ont héritée de leur père, Muhammad Agha al-Za'im à Damas. Le capital qu'a laissé le père, à une date non déterminée, s'élevait à 664 piastres. Le montant du gain (*rabh*) a été enregistré dans un acte (*bi mujib daftar muhasaba*) le 23 *rabi' I* 1090, (4 mai 1679) : 76 piastres. Les enfants ont également touché les revenus du *timar* détenu par leur père *za'im* : 12 piastres et demie pour 2.5 *ghirara* de blé (*hanta*), 12 piastres et demie pour 5 *ghirara* d'orge (*sha'ir*) ; et 5 piastres pour 90 chèvres (*ma'iz*), soit 30 piastres tirées du *timar*. Mais le *wasi* n'a pas seulement géré des actifs ; il a été tenu à certaines dépenses. L'entretien

²³ Robert Mantran, ed., *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman*, Paris, Fayard, 1989, 281 et 325.

des enfants était à sa charge : 42 qursh pour l'alimentation, (*nafafa*), 14 pour l'habillement (*kiswa*) et 6 piastres pour la location d'une pièce (*ujra tabaqa*) sans doute destinée au logement des enfants ; un *badal safar*²⁴ de 5 piastres a été payé pour ne pas joindre les troupes conduites par Husayn Basha chargées de protéger la caravane du pèlerinage en 1679, service que devait fournir le timariote ; une contribution de 6 piastres pour l'année 1680 a été versée pour une campagne menée contre Ahmad Ibn Rashid (*masraf safar bi sabab* Ibn Rashid), puissant chef de tribu bédouin du Hauran qui représentait une menace constante pour la caravane du pèlerinage ;²⁵ 5 qursh sont prélevées sur les avoirs des enfants, valeur de diverses taxes d'enregistrement ; une piastre, enfin, pour avoir payé du café à un bey (*taman qahwa li'l-bey*), à rapprocher de cette taxe illégale *qahwajiya*, contre laquelle s'élève al-Ramli pour la Palestine.²⁶ Ces sorties d'argent représentent 79 piastres. Le solde est positif, 770 moins 79.

Malgré sa simplicité, malgré ses lacunes—la date et la cause de la mort du père, la composition de la famille entière et du patrimoine global de ce *za'im*, la situation géographique du *timar*—malgré ses mystères, ce petit texte, court de quelques lignes, autorise quelques enseignements.

- La transmission du timar, sans doute aucun, est devenue héréditaire : les enfants, même mineurs, héritent du *timar*, de ses charges et de son rapport.
- le gain sur capital ne suscite aucune réprobation : il est simplement constaté par le terme *rabh*, inscrit dans un document officiel établi par un juge hanéfite.

²⁴ V. l'article 'Badal', *EP*, I, 878–79.

²⁵ Ibn Rashid, mentionné dans d'autres *muhasaba*, est cité à deux reprises dans Brigitte Marino, *Traduction commentée du carnet d'Isma'il al-Mahasini : chronique damascène (1073/1663–1116/1705)*, mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Provence, 1986, 46 et surtout 84, où le chroniqueur Mahasini note en effet le retour de Husayn Basha, gouverneur de Damas, à la mi-août 1680, de sa campagne contre le 'mauvais Ibn Rashid' ; v. aussi Rafeq, *Province of Damascus*, 55 : ce chef bédouin est l'auteur d'une désastreuse attaque de la caravane du pèlerinage en 1671.

²⁶ Samir Seikaly, 'Land Tenure in 17th Century Palestine: The Evidence from the *al-Fatawa al-Khayriyya*', in Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1984, 397–408 ; Khayr al-Din al-Ramli, *al-Fatawa al-khayriyya li naf al-barriyya*, 2 vol., 2ème éd., Beyrouth, Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1974, 98, mentionne cette taxe non-canonique sans préciser en quoi elle consiste exactement.

- de ce timar, les enfants recueillent la valeur de chèvres et de céréales dont le prix de la *ghirara*, et en 1680, s'élève à 5 piastres pour une *ghirara* de blé, et 2.5 pour une *ghirara* d'orge.

L'analyse d'autres documents permettra d'étudier l'origine de cet 'intérêt', ses fluctuations, la nature des récoltes, les variations de prix d'une année sur l'autre, voire d'un mois à l'autre.

Un autre exemple de *muhasaba* donne une idée plus ample du fonctionnement d'une importante exploitation détenue par un militaire. Par un document du 15 *muhartram* 1092 (4 février 1681), le juge enregistre les comptes de gestion du patrimoine commun de trois orphelins mineurs, héritage de leur père, un certain Shahin *beshe* b. Mustafa janissaire à Damas décédé à une date antérieure, non précisée. Le patrimoine hérité est composé de terres agricoles du terroir d'un village, 'Adiliyya, situé à une vingtaine de km au sud de Damas dans le bassin de l'A'waj. La gestion a été tenue par un certain Rajab *bulukbashi* b. 'Ali du corps des *Bulukbashiya* de Damas qui était le représentant légal (*wakil shar'i*) de Zaynab bt Mustafa *beshe* tutrice légale (*wasiy shar'i*) des trois enfants, dont le défunt Shahin *beshe* était le père. La veuve s'est remariée et le nouvel époux, Husayn Agha, militaire de son état, reconnu comme représentant légal de Zaynab par *hujja* légale établie devant le tribunal, datée du même jour, demande par sollicitation (*iltimas*) que l'ancien *wakil* Rajab éclaircisse l'état de la gestion, couvrant la période du 12 *rabi' I* 1091 (12 avril 1680) à la fin de 1091 (20 janvier 1681). Les formules utilisées par le juge insistent sur l'intérêt que porte le nouveau *wakil* aux comptes de ses beaux-enfants mineurs; la *muhasaba* se fait par sollicitation (*iltimas*) de Husayn Agha qui en prend connaissance avec attention (*ittila'* et *ma'rifa*): Husayn Agha entérine donc le rendu de la gestion, au nom de son épouse.

Cet acte, qui est peut-être la suite d'une précédente *muhasaba*, ne fait aucune allusion à un capital hérité (*asl mal*), ni aux 'intérêts' que ce capital a engendrés. Il est consacré à détailler les comptes d'une exploitation agricole et à récupérer des créances dues aux enfants du défunt.

Le juge enregistre tout d'abord les rentrées, qui s'élèvent à 621.75 piastres, présentées par le premier *wakil*, le *bulukbashi* Rajab. Elles sont essentiellement composées des revenus tirés des *faddan* du village de 'Adiliyya. Ce terroir a fourni des productions diverses: de la soie pour 77.5 piastres, des céréales, du blé, *hanta* (123.5 p.), de l'orge,

sha'ir, (12 *ghirara*, 60 p.), du millet, *durra*, (2.5 *ghirara*, 16.5 p.), une petite quantité d'ail et de fèves, *tum wa ful*, (2 p.) et du bois, vraisemblablement des arbres plantés sur ces terres, abattus et vendus en deux fois, 61 pour 28.5 piastres et 65 pour 16. À cela s'ajoutent des revenus obtenus de ventes de récoltes pendantes ou récoltes sur pied, négociées avant la cueillette, les *daman*: d'imprécises productions de jardins, *daman basatin*, récoltes des jardins, pour 17.5 p., de pastèques, *battikh* (30 p.), et de coton, *qutn* (122 p.).

À ces récoltes sont venus s'ajouter d'autres types de revenus: deux pièces de terre (*qit'at ard*) dans le village (55 et 33 p.) ont été vendues; la seconde cession est effectuée le jour même de l'établissement de l'acte de gestion par 'acte légal'. L'accord de la tutrice et du juge ont vraisemblablement été nécessaires pour que le *wakil* puisse vendre des biens appartenant aux mineurs, sans doute pour équilibrer recettes et dépenses.

Enfin, Rajab *bulukbashi* a recouvré des créances dues individuellement par 5 habitants du village pour une somme totale de 39.75 p.

Dans la partie suivante, le juge consigne les nombreuses dépenses effectuées par le *wakil* qui présente au cadi une liste détaillée dont le montant s'élève à 542.5 piastres. Aucun ordre apparent ne semble diriger cette énumération: probablement le relevé suit-il l'enchaînement chronologique des débours, estimés en argent monnayé, durant la période de 9 mois couverte par la comptabilité. Les sorties d'argent peuvent être regroupées en quatre ensembles: rémunérations de personnes diverses, achats d'instruments agricoles et de semences, dépenses alimentaires et vestimentaires pour les orphelins, frais d'intervention.

Rémunérations diverses

Certaines de ces rémunérations sont octroyées à des personnes attachées à l'exploitation, d'autres sont des règlements pour des travaux occasionnels ou saisonniers. Le *wakil* a rémunéré le 'métayer au quart' (*murabi'*) chargé des jardins (16 piastres) et le *murabi'* chargé de l'éle-

vage des vers à soie (4 piastres).²⁷ Un autre personnage a été employé sur l'exploitation : un 'apprenti' (*ajir*) chargé de la surveillance²⁸ de 5 bovins a reçu en salaire (*ujra*) la somme élevée de 38 piastres.

Aux époques de grande activité agricole, on a eu recours à des saisonniers auxquels ont été versés des salaires (*ujra*). Des journaliers (*hassadin*),²⁹ recrutés pour faire les récoltes ont reçu du *wakil* une somme étonnamment élevée, 80 piastres. Les cultures d'été (*sayfi*) ont fait apparemment l'objet d'un travail particulier puisque 18 piastres ont été réglées à des personnes appelées *musayyifin*.³⁰ Il en est de même pour le coton : une opération dénommée *naksh*, qui signifie 'piocher', a coûté 12 piastres. S'agit-il du travail de buttage des plants de coton ou plutôt de l'enfouissement des graines dans le sol déjà préparé à l'aide d'un instrument désigné sous le nom de *minkash*?³¹ Deux petites sommes ont été réglées à un berger s'occupant des chèvres (1 piastre) et à un gardien (*natur*) maghrébin des récoltes (4.5 piastres).³² Le *wakil* a pris en charge les frais de transport des produits agricoles (*naql ghilal*) revenant à la Takiyya du sultan Sulayman à Damas, 9 piastres, et les déplacements (*tasafir*) des gens (*tawabi'*) du *mutawalli* de la fondation qui les ont vraisemblablement convoyés. Le terroir de

²⁷ André Latron, *La vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban, Etude d'économie sociale*, Beyrouth, Mémoires de l'Institut français de Damas, 1936, 61–62, décrit les contrats d'élevage du ver à soie entre un propriétaire et des paysans. L'un, 'le métayage du mûrier qui comporte tout ensemble l'entretien des arbres et l'élevage des vers', l'autre, uniquement l'élevage. Dans ce dernier, les paysans reçoivent 'les vers éclos, [doivent] installer les plateaux et claies d'élevage, couper les branches de mûrier et les effeuiller, nourrir et surveiller les vers, poser les brindilles pour la montée, récolter les cocons et les nettoyer. Il livre au propriétaire les cocons frais. Son travail dure environ cinquante jours. En paiement, il reçoit une part des cocons, un quart, un tiers ou la moitié, suivant le rendement de l'élevage'. Latron notait que l'association pouvait être modifiée par un paiement en numéraire.

²⁸ M.S. al-Qasimi, *Dictionnaire des métiers damascains*, 2 vol., Paris, La Haye, Mouton, 1960, I, 96, précise qu'un apprenti spécialisé était engagé pour préparer la nourriture des attelages de labour.

²⁹ Ibidem, I, 98; Latron, *La vie rurale*, 112.

³⁰ La lecture semble bonne—le terme apparaît dans d'autres documents—mais les dictionnaires consultés ne proposent pas de sens. Il s'agit d' 'ouvriers agricoles', engagés pour les travaux sur les cultures d'été (*sayfi*).

³¹ Saffuh Khayr, *Ghuta Dimashq: Dirasa fi'l-jughrafiyya al-zira'iyya*, Damas, Wizarat al-thaqafah wa'l-irshad al-qawmi, Mudiriyya al-tarjamah wa'l-ta'lif wa'l-nashr, 1966, 439.

³² al-Qasimi, *Dictionnaire*, II, 477–478, précise que ce métier était exercé dans les villages et les jardins en été pour la surveillance des récoltes par des hommes courageux, consciencieux et de confiance, paysans pauvres ou, à la fin du XIX^{ème} siècle, des 'Afghans'.

‘Adiliyya est à l’évidence lié à cette prestigieuse institution richement pourvue en *waqf*: il fait sans nul doute partie des 40 villages dont des revenus sont assignés à la fondation pour assurer la restauration des indigents et des derviches hébergés dans la Takiyya mais également rémunérer les personnels administratifs, religieux et domestiques attachés aux bâtiments. Enfin, le *wakil* a noté qu’il a remis à des nomades non identifiés (*‘arab*) à quatre reprises des sommes d’argent (4.75, 5.25, 4.75 et 18.5 piastres, soit une somme totale de 33.25 piastres, incluant le prix d’une quantité de café) pour bénéficier de leur ‘protection’ (*ghafara*):³³ la pression bédouine apparaît bien présente et pesante sur le monde sédentaire dans une zone située à une vingtaine de kilomètres au sud de la capitale et même les militaires-propriétaires sont contraints de la subir.

Achats d’instruments agricoles, de semences et entretien des bâtiments

Le *wakil* a ainsi effectué un certain nombre d’acquisitions destinées soit à renouveler l’outillage agricole soit à renforcer celui déjà possédé: une grande faucille (*zubar*), un soc d’araire (*sikka hadid*)³⁴ et une pioche (*qazma*), 4 piastres, une planche à dépiquer (*lawh li’l-dras*), 1.5 piastre, une *misha*,³⁵ une bêche (*marr*) et des cordes pour 2.5 piastres, des clous, des jougs (*anyar*) et des couffins (*qufaf*) pour 1.25 piastre; une piastre a été dépensée pour la réfection de murs (*mirammat hitan*) et 0.5 piastre, pour un ensemble hétéroclite comprenant un boisseau (*‘ulba*), une hutte pour le veau (*khuss al-‘ajl*),³⁶ des chaussures d’enfants (*akhfaf*) et des provisions (*zakhira*).

Le *wakil* a fait l’achat de semences: des graines de soie, *bizr harir*, probablement les œufs qui vont donner naissance aux vers à soie,³⁷ pour 15.5 piastres, des graines de pastèques ‘et autres’ pour 3.5 piastres.

³³ Corruption de *khafara*; le terme est peut-être synonyme de *khuwwa*, ‘impôt de fraternité’, plus connu.

³⁴ Pour al-Qasimi, *Dictionnaire*, II, 95, le terme *sikka* sert à désigner l’araire, le soc étant dénommé *nasl*.

³⁵ Large bêche munie d’une poignée; deux cordes relient la lame à une traverse que tire à lui un homme tandis qu’un autre tient le manche et donne le bon angle d’attaque à la lame. Le tireur amène vers lui la terre pour former une butte régulière.

³⁶ Le terme *khuss* désigne généralement une hutte de roseaux destinée à l’élevage des vers à soie, mais elle peut également être élevée pour abriter un âne, v. Butrus al-Bustani, *Muhit al-muhit*, Beyrouth, Librairie du Liban, 1977, à la racine *khss*.

³⁷ Ces ‘graines de soie’ sont très probablement les œufs qui vont donner naissance aux vers à soie, v. Dominique Chevallier, *La société du Mont Liban à l’époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe*, Paris, Geuthner, 1971, 138, 140, et Michel Feghali,

tres, et une *ghirara* de blé (14.25 piastres) destinée à l'exploitation (*lil-filaha*). Pour l'alimentation ('*aliq*) des bovins, il a dépensé une fois 12 piastres pour du fourrage (*kirsanna*)³⁸ et à nouveau 1.75 pour une récolte du même produit, et pour celle de chevaux, probablement hérités du père décédé, 13 piastres pour 2 *ghirara* d'orge; il a réglé le prix d'un 'réservoir' (*sabil*) pour un khan non identifié et le transport de fumure (*naql zabal*) nécessaire aux champs cultivés (2.5 piastres).

Dépenses alimentaires et vestimentaires

Le *wakil* a effectué nombre de ces dépenses; certaines concernent clairement les enfants mineurs (*qasirin*) ou la maison (*li'l-bayt*), en sus de la pension même. Ainsi ont été réglées la pension (*nafaqa*) des trois orphelins, 50 piastres, 2 *ghirara* de froment, réserve (*muna*) pour les enfants, 30 piastres, et 3.25 piastres de riz et de *samn* pour la maison; et des vêtements, des *saya*, des *jantyan* et des *qunbaz* pour 5.2 et 2 piastres. D'autres dépenses de bouche et de vêtements sont notées. La qualité des produits acquis suggère que les enfants en étaient les bénéficiaires: des gombos ou cornes grecques (*bamya*) et du riz (*aruzz*), 2 piastres, de la viande, des œufs, de la mélasse (*dibs*), de l'huile, des olives et des cuillères, 2.25, du beurre clarifié, *samn*, du burghul, du *kishk*, pâte de farine et de lait caillé séchée et broyée, et des œufs, 3.25; à nouveau de la viande, des poulets, du sel et des olives, 1.75, du *samn*, de la mélasse et de l'huile, 3, du riz, de la mélasse, de la viande, du *idam* (tout ce que l'on mange avec du pain pour en relever le goût, olive, fromage, huile...) et du café, 11 piastres, une mesure (*qadah*) d'oignons, 2.5, des sucreries (*halawa*) associées à des chandelles (*qandil*), 1 piastre; et, pour à la fois cuire et se réchauffer, 4.5 piastres prix réglé pour une quantité non précisée de charbon de bois (*fahm wa hatab*).

Des habits et des chausses ont été acquis pour des sommes relativement élevées: une serviette (*maqrana*), des *saya* et des *jantyan* pour 7.75 piastres, des bas de cuir (*musud*), des pantoufles (*bawabij*) et des bottes (*jazmat*), 6 piastres. Le *wakil* a également réglé 1.5 piastre, prix

Proverbes et dictons syro-libanais, Paris, Institut d'ethnologie, 1938, 503, proverbe n° 2141, où le terme utilisé est 'bezzara'.

³⁸ 'Ervil, lentil vetch (*vicia ervilia*)' que l'on cultive pour sa graine que l'on donne à manger aux bovins, *Chihabi's Dictionary of Agricultural Terms and Allied Terminology*, 2ème éd. Beyrouth, Librairie du Liban, 1982.

d'un tapis de feutre (*labbad*) et d'une *qatifa* (?) et 3 piastres d'autres biens énumérés ensemble : de solides chaussures (*madras*), des couffins, de la toile écrue (*kham*), du coton (*qutn*). Enfin, une seule dépense de ce type a été effectuée pour une personne attachée à l'exploitation : le berger déjà mentionné a reçu une paire de solides chaussures et apparemment aussi des gants (*kufuf*), de l'huile et de la graisse de queue de mouton (*liyya*), le tout pour une somme de 3.5 piastres. Un objet ou plutôt un service payé 11 piastres n'a pu être déchiffré.

Le *wakil* a déboursé 4.75 piastres pour les provisions (*zakhira*) destinées aux troupes du gouverneur de la province et 83.5 piastres de contributions sultaniennes affectées à l'entretien de la Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya. Enfin, l'intervention du juge a nécessité le paiement de 3 piastres pour l'établissement de l'acte (*kharj daftar*) et 3 autres pour divers frais non précisés.

Le juge établit alors en déduisant les dépenses des recettes qu'il reste un solde positif de 79.25 piastres auxquelles sont ajoutées 15.25 piastres dues par le *wakil* selon un acte de gestion précédent. C'est une somme de 94.5 piastres qui revient aux enfants : 82.5 piastres sont dans les mains de la tutrice comme le reconnaît son nouveau *wakil* et 12 piastres sont dues par le premier.

Le document, si riche soit-il en informations pratiques sur le déroulement de la vie quotidienne, sur le fonctionnement d'une exploitation, sur les liens qui existent entre un propriétaire et les exploitants, soulève de nombreuses interrogations.

Nulle information, d'abord, sur le mode d'acquisition de l'exploitation par le défunt père, janissaire à Damas. Les autres *muhasaba*, de même que les *mukhallafat*, se révèlent également muettes à ce sujet. Seule la mention de *timar* révèle que, dans un temps passé sans doute lointain, un sipahi a reçu, pour prix de son service, une concession fondée sur les revenus fiscaux de terres villageoises, dont le document précédent établit qu'à la fin du dix-septième siècle, la 'propriété' en était devenue héréditaire.

Les '*faddan*' (utilisation du pluriel *afдина*) détenus par les mineurs évoquent une superficie insaisissable : il semble qu'il y en ait ici beaucoup parce que les récoltes sont importantes. Mais le *faddan* est une unité de mesure variable, difficile à évaluer.³⁹ Ces *faddan* apparaissent dans nombre d'autres actes, dans d'autres régions, procurant des revenus variés. Une comparaison tenant compte de la localisation des terres

³⁹ Latron, *La vie rurale*, 12 sq et Rafeq, 'Economic relations...', 672-73.

et des récoltes obtenues, permettra peut-être de supputer la superficie de la mesure, et, par là même, d'estimer des rendements.

Le fonctionnement même de l'exploitation repose sur le travail fourni par des *murabi'*, habituellement traduit métayers, et leur famille, et par des journaliers, au profit du propriétaire du fonds.

Le terme utilisé à deux reprises qualifiant la rémunération du *murabi'* est ici *muna*, exprimé en espèces, et non en nature. Le terme signifie généralement 'réserve' de la maison ou 'mortier' liant les matériaux dans une construction; mais il est également attesté dans les dictionnaires avec le sens assez courant de 'salaire et nourriture' octroyés à un apprenti. Or, différents auteurs remarquent que le travail du *murabi'* est rémunéré en nature et non pas en espèces. Ainsi, dans la notice consacrée au *murabi'*, Qasimi précise,⁴⁰ évoquant une situation précédant son enquête, que le paysan engagé par le propriétaire d'une terre agricole recevait en contrepartie de son travail le quart, d'où vient le nom, de toutes les récoltes données par la terre qu'il avait cultivée. Il ne mentionne pas le terme '*muna*', mais il est probable que les contrats négociés étaient variés et pouvaient porter sur des parts moindres.⁴¹ Ainsi 'Abd al-Majid Sha'ban donne, pour le début du dix-huitième, un seul exemple de *murabi'in* d'un *waqf* rémunérés au sixième de la récolte sur pied d'oliviers, et au quart pour les autres récoltes sur pied dont des vignes.⁴² Pour une description de ce type de contrat durant la période mandataire, Latron propose une analyse semblable: 'l'ouvrier payé à part de fruit [...] à la récolte et après déduction des semences, s'il s'agit de cultures annuelles, a droit à un quart des produits'.⁴³

Doit-on comprendre que ces deux *murabi'* reçoivent des sommes en argent, des 'salaires', ou le terme *muna* est-il utilisé dans le sens 'part de la récolte' revenant au paysan? Dans le cas des jardins, la vente des récoltes pendantes ayant été négociée, il est raisonnable d'avancer que le métayer a reçu en numéraire sa part des produits vendus. L'étude d'autres actes permettra peut-être de cerner avec un plus de certitude les rapports de 'métayage' qui existent entre le propriétaire de la terre et les gens qui la travaillent.

Les dépenses du propriétaire, déduites de l'analyse de ce compte de gestion, incluent la fourniture de semences, l'acquisition ou le renou-

⁴⁰ al-Qasimi, *Dictionnaire*, II, 427-28.

⁴¹ Latron, *La vie rurale*, 84 sq.

⁴² 'Abd al-Majid Sha'ban, *Rif Dimashq min khilal sijillat al-mahakim al-shar'iyya 1700-1725*, Mémoire de doctorat, Université de Tunis I, 1997-1998, 197.

⁴³ Latron, *La vie rurale*, 84.

vement de l'outillage, l'entretien du bétail, le transport du fumier. Ces remarques ne sont pas conformes aux conclusions ultérieures de Latron : 'le propriétaire fournit le sol ou la plantation ; le métayer doit fournir les semences et le bétail de trait, payer les frais de fumure et de récolte, supporter une partie des impôts'.⁴⁴ La participation du propriétaire à l'entretien de l'exploitation au dix-septième siècle paraît donc plus importante que ne le soulignent les géographes : les observations de Latron et Weulersse, sont certes bien postérieures aux descriptions des *muhasaba* de cette fin de dix-huitième siècle. La condition du métayer se serait alors dégradée au cours des deux siècles suivants.

L'importance des salaires versés aux *hassadin*, aux *musayyifin* ou au 'piocheur' de coton laisserait-elle supposer que les récoltes avaient été abondantes, le travail effectué, moisson, cueillette, considérable et le personnel engagé nombreux ? Une interprétation inverse est toutefois possible, reflétant une situation démographique particulière, dépressive : la rareté de la main d'œuvre, conséquence de mauvaises récoltes ou/et d'épidémies, entraînant automatiquement une amélioration des conditions de rémunération du travail.

Aucune source ne mentionne des difficultés climatiques entraînant, dans ces années, de mauvaises récoltes. Seules sont signalées, sous le gouvernement apprécié de Sari Husayn Basha (1680-83 ?) des invasions de criquets pendant trois années consécutives, qui ont pu occasionner des dommages aux cultures.⁴⁵ En revanche, la peste a sévi : en août 1679, il y eut une grande peste à Damas. À la mort de son fils 'Abd al-Baqi (en août 1676), Isma'il al-Mahasini rapporte qu'il recueille ses enfants et son épouse. Quand le petit-fils cadet atteint l'âge de 5 ans, 'il y eut à Damas une grande peste et la nuit du mercredi 8 *rajab* 1090 (15 août 1679), il en fut atteint. Il resta vivant jusqu'à l'aube du samedi 11 *rajab* (18 août) [...] Il avait une esclave brune nommée Salima ; elle mourut environ une semaine avant lui. Une esclave brune m'appartenant et se nommant Halima mourut un jour après lui. Deux jours après sa mort mourut une esclave blanche m'appartenant et se nommant Ziba ; elle était sans égale. Avant lui mourut une esclave brune nommée Hadra'.⁴⁶ Cette peste est peut-être responsable aussi de la haute mortalité infantile justifiant que les *wasi* aient été dans

⁴⁴ Ibidem, 49 sq.

⁴⁵ Muhibbi, Muhammad Amin, *Khulasat al-athar fi a'yan al-qarn al-hadi 'ashar*, 4 vol., Beyrouth, [s. d.] II, 124-25.

⁴⁶ Marino, *Traduction commentée*, 81.

l'obligation signalée plus haut de repartager à maintes reprises le patrimoine des mineurs privés brutalement d'un frère ou d'une sœur dont ils deviennent les héritiers.

Conclusion

Les inventaires après décès sont précieux : documents complets, eux seuls permettent de faire le point sur l'état du patrimoine de membres du personnel d'État présent à Damas à la fin du dix-septième siècle : militaires et jurisconsultes ou enseignants titulaires d'un diplôme sultanien. Nous avons utilisé un autre type de sources, les *muhasaba*, comptes de gestion d'orphelins réalisés quelque temps après le décès de leurs parents. Ces actes, sources peu utilisées dans la recherche jusqu'à présent, affichent une toute autre logique que les *mukhallafat*. Les documents que de multiples authentications officielles rendent fiables, s'inscrivent dans une durée, dont la périodicité, souvent annuelle, échappe cependant à une régularité absolue. Cette durée, le temps qui passe, enregistre pour les individus les mouvements de la vie, décès, naissances, remariages. Le passage du temps est également responsable des variations du patrimoine des enfants mineurs : le capital hérité fructifie ; les créances rentrent, avec plus ou moins de régularité ; les fermes de la campagne, mises en valeur par des métayers ou des salariés, rapportent céréales, fruits, coton, soie, tout en nécessitant des dépenses concernant l'entretien, les semences, les outils, les fumures, les réparations en tous genres ; les maisons que les enfants habitent doivent être entretenues. Le *wasi* et le *wakil*, placés dans l'obligation de rendre des comptes précis, et vérifiables, proposent la lecture des occupations quotidiennes, matérielles, indispensables à l'entretien des personnes, du bétail, des cultures, du vivant. Le déchiffrement de ces actes est long, la saisie n'en obéit à aucune loi : la richesse des deux exemples proposés invite cependant au dépouillement complet et systématique de cette source nouvelle, les comptes de gestion, qui enregistrent le mouvement, l'évolution.

Au terme de cette double et complémentaire recherche, il sera alors possible de cerner avec plus de précision la place occupée par ce personnel d'État dans la campagne damascène, d'en étudier l'implantation géographique, d'aborder la vie des propriétés rurales : la gestion humaine, l'entretien matériel, la nature des cultures et de l'élevage.

ISLAMIC LAW AND THE ORDER OF STATE: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE CULTIVATOR

MARTHA MUNDY

This paper returns to a question which Abdul-Karim Rafeq addressed in a paper entitled ‘The Syrian *‘ulamā*, Ottoman law and Islamic *shari‘a*.’¹ My remarks here are indebted to Professor Rafeq, but far more deeply than the mere reference to a published paper would suggest. When I was struggling to gain some historical understanding of the terms of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code, as part of a project on the transformation of property relations in the *Kaza* ‘Ajlun, *Liva* Hauran, *Vilayat* Suriye during the Tanzimat period, Professor Rafeq suggested that I examine the *fatwa* collections of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Hanafi *muftis* of Damascus.² This I proceeded to do, as well as to read such related epistles (*risala*) and compendia as I could find in the *Zahiriya* collection in Damascus and, to a lesser extent, in the *Süleymaniye* collections in Istanbul. In short, this paper owes its genesis, as well as its substantive foil, to the intellectual generosity of Professor Rafeq.

My efforts to read the Land Code against the background of juristic debate concerning Ottoman ‘land law’ revealed that some of the terms of sixteenth-century legal doctrine were to continue through to the mid-nineteenth century, whereas others were to disappear before the Tanzimat recensions. The legal principles examined here belong to the latter category. They concern the obligation of a cultivator to farm the plot of land he holds, notably the administrative right to return the cultivator forcibly to his plot, and, failing that, to oblige him to pay for ‘breaking the plough lot’ (*al-nakl jabran* and *kasr al-faddan*;

¹ *Turcica*, 1994, vol. 26, pp. 9–32.

² See M. Mundy and R. Saumarez Smith, *Governing Property, Making the Modern State: Law, administration and production in Ottoman Syria*, London, IB Tauris, 2007. The present paper draws on Part I of that work but corrects the identification of Taqī al-Dīn al-Husnī (see *ibid.*, 251, f.n. 109) and the description of the relation of Ibn ‘Abidin’s *al-Uqūd al-durriyya* to Hamid al-‘Imādī’s *Mughnī al-Mustaftī* (see *ibid.*, 27, where the denunciation of excessive taxation is in fact that of Ibn ‘Abidin not Hamid al-‘Imādī, and 34).

cela-yi vatan and *çift bozan* in Turkish). I first consider the principles in administrative law (*kanun*), then Professor Rafeq's remarks concerning the denunciation of the same by Syrian jurists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This is followed by my own reading of the debates, first in the *fatwa* collections of the official Hanafi *muftis* of Damascus, then in the wider Hanafi jurisprudential tradition.

The principles of sixteenth-century administrative law (kanun)

Without the accord of the administrator, a cultivator was not to give up his lot for any reason save physical incapacity; if he left a son, the son too would be held responsible for the cultivation of the lot. The nature of this responsibility differed from that of an owner (*malik*) as defined in *fiqh*: an owner of land was similarly obliged to pay tax on his land, but in the event that he failed to do so, the Imam could rent out the land and, if no one took it on, he could sell the property to cover the costs of the unpaid tax, reserving the balance for its former owner.³ But in the case of *miri* land, if the cultivator's lot remained uncultivated, the land, as treasury property, could not be sold. Rather, the cultivator was to be returned to the lot. Hence in sixteenth-century law, if a cultivator fled, he or after his death his son, was to be returned to the village within a period of ten years.⁴ These rules were applicable only to *miri* land, not to *waqf* or border fortress lands.⁵ And, if no other person took on the land left behind, the original cultivator

³ For the general principles of Hanafi doctrine, see Baber Johansen, *The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: The peasants' loss of property rights as interpreted in the Hanefite legal literature of the Mamluk and Ottoman periods*, London, Croom Helm, 1988, 7–24.

⁴ See Pir Mehmed el-Üskübi, *Zahîr ül-Kudât*, in A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanun-nameleri ve hukuki tahlilleri*, Istanbul, Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1996, vol. 9, 402–3, *mesele* 43, where the example concerns Muslims: '*on yıldan sonra ra'yyet nakl olunmaz; ta'til-i arzına tazmîn ne şer'îdir ne örfi*.' The latter phrase reveals lack of ease with this aspect of administrative law: 'indemnifying for lack of cultivation of land is a matter neither of *shar'* nor of custom.' The principle is clearly stated again in *idem*, *mesele* 48.

⁵ See the *Kanun-i Cedid* of 1673 published in Anonymous, 'Osmanlı Kanun-nameleri', *Millî Tettebbular Mecmuası*, Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1331/1903, vol. 1, section 2, 305 where it is written concerning *cela-yi vatan*: '*ama derbend reayasinde ve-evkaf reayasinde bu kanun icra olunmaz*'. However, a late *kanun* notes that it was a principle of the 'old *kanun*' that cultivators on sultan *has-i hümayun waqfs* could be brought back within ten years to the village they fled, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esat Efendi 587, fol. 83b.

remained liable for the taxes due on the lot, as was his son after him.⁶ In principle these taxes applied until another cultivator took on the lot.⁷ These taxes were due from individuals, the *sipahi* not being able to hold the village collectively liable for the tax on the lot of a cultivator who had fled.⁸ The requirement that cultivators had to assure the farming of their plots was relaxed only if natural disaster or grave injustice had caused them to flee.⁹

According to the received wisdom of Ottomanists, the great *mufti* of Sultan Süleyman, Ebussuud (d. 1574), achieved a doctrinal synthesis or reconciliation between Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and Ottoman administrative (*kanun*) and penal law (*siyaset*).¹⁰ The formal articulation of these traditions in the sixteenth century allowed the judge of the Islamic court (*qadi al-shar'*) and not only the administrative judge (*hakim al-'urf*) to apply norms whose origins were recognised to lie outside the *fiqh* tradition.¹¹ Certain of these norms became more 'naturalised' in *fiqh* than others. The pair of norms of the *kanun* tradition

⁶ For the principle in the *kanunnames* of the early seventeenth century, see Akgündüz, *Kanunnameleri*, vol. 9, 506, nos. 89 and 95.

⁷ See el-Üskübi, *Zahîr ül-Kudât*, 404, mesele 52: 'On yıl mürûrundan sonra cebren nakle memûr değildir. Arzdan mu'attal yeri kaldıysa ta'tile göre tazmine kâdirdir. Resm-i çift bozan dedikleri budur.' In a case concerning a non-Muslim, the son was still paying the *resm-i çift bozan* of the father after thirty years: see *ibid.*, 403, mesele 47. For Syria in particular see 'Ali al-'Arabi al-shahîr bi-ibn Hilal al-Kabîr (circa 982/1574–75, translated on the order of Amir Ibrahim b. Manhal al-Yusufi), *Risala fi 'l-hisba wa'l-siyasa wa'l-qawanin*, Zahirîya 7761, fol. 13b: 'wa-li-ya'lam anna 'l-ra'aya idha harabu min timar sibahi wa-'atalu falahata-hu wa sakanu fi timar akhar fa-mithl ha'ula' yukhadh min-hum al-'ushr marratain zajran la-hum ya'ni yukhadh min-hum 'ushr al-ard allati zara'u-ha li'l-thani wa 'ushr al-ard allati 'atalu-ha li'l-awwal.' Later *kanun* stresses that either the *resm-i çift bozan* or a double tax (*öşr*) would be collected, see Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esat Efendi 852, fol. 62a.

⁸ See el-Üskübi, *Zahîr ül-Kudât*, 404, mesele 54. In principle the individual was written as such in the tax register. The *fatwas* in el-Üskübi's *Zahîr ül-Kudât* all concern the ability of the village corporation to sell or let the property of a cultivator who has abandoned the village in order to pay tax (see *ibid.*, 405–06, mesele 65, 66 and 68) or its standing legally as guarantor (*kefil*) for such a cultivator as in the case of payment of *cizya*, see *ibid.*, 407–08, mesele 77.

⁹ See *ibid.*, 404, mesele 54 for the general principle of conditions of duress constituting a valid *shar'i* reason for exemption.

¹⁰ See Paul Horster, ed., *Zur Anwendung des islamischen Rechts im 16. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, Von W. Kohlhammer, 1935, and Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1997, and on penal law, Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973.

¹¹ It has been argued that justice in the Ottoman system lay in the possibility of adjudication before the *shar'i* judge of both administrators and tax-paying subjects. See Huri İslamoğlu-Inan, 'Les paysans, le marché et l'état en Anatolie au XVI^e siècle', *Annales, ESC*, vol. 43, 5, 1988, 1025–43.

which required a cultivator not to leave his village and to assure the tax payments on land registered in his name proved among the most problematic to assimilate in the *fiqh* tradition.

While such principles did appear occasionally in one form or another in provincial *kanuns*, it was the collection of Pir Mehmed el-Üskübi, *Zahîr ül-Kudât* that first drew together the general principles in a useful *fatwa* manual for judges in the courts. This scholar (d. 1611–12) held various posts over three decades culminating in his appointment as *mufti* and *shaykh al-islam* of Üsküb.¹² The principles are reiterated in the *Kanun-i Cedid* of 1673, together with a schedule of fees for land left uncultivated; in this el-Üskübi's *fatwas* formed the source for judgements concerning the abandonment of cultivation (*cela-yi vatan*).¹³ The same principles were to be given in *kanun* collections as late as the reign of Ahmet III (d. 1705).¹⁴ Thus, until the early eighteenth century the rules are repeated in compilations of *kanun*; indeed, in at least one *kanun*, the length of time within which a cultivator could be forcibly returned to his village was extended to fifteen years.¹⁵

This pair of norms can be understood only within a conceptual matrix defining the legal status of land, the 'fiefholder' or land administrator (*timari/sahib-i arz*) and the cultivator or subject (*muzari'/ra'yyet*).¹⁶ Here, however, I shall try to make clear only what is essential to follow the problematic pair of rules in legal texts of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The two conceptually linked principles were never seen to originate from, nor to be grounded in, established doctrines of the *fiqh* tradition. Yet they moved from being principles applied in the sharia courts to ones rejected by the same courts well before the Tanzimat: in short, their practical application and, in part,

¹² On the basis of three copies of the manuscript in the Süleymaniye Library, the text has been published in Akgündüz, *Kanunnameleri*, vol. 9, 395–483. A copy exists in the Zahirîya Collection, mss. 10493, fols. 80–156, under the title, *Fatawi zahîr al-qudat fî 'l-qawanin al-'uthmaniya*.

¹³ See Anonymous, 'Osmanlı Kanunnameleri', vol. 1, 111–12 for *çift bozan resmi* and vol. 3, 305–07 for *cela-yi vatan*.

¹⁴ Süleymaniye, Esat Efendi 852, fol. 62a–b and Esat Efendi 587, fol. 83b. The compilation of these is dated by Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, vol. 9, 487–89, following Serkis Karakoç, as late as the reign of Ahmet III.

¹⁵ See Akgündüz, vol. 9, 506, no. 92, where the principle of return is extended to a period of fifteen years in a *kanunname* dated to the era of Ahmad I (d. 1617).

¹⁶ For a more extensive discussion see Mundy and Saumarez Smith, *Governing Property...*, 11–39.

their doctrinal status, changed with the history of agrarian relations in the empire. Lest it be felt, however, that the norms under study 'have nothing to do with Islamic law', two points should be emphasized: first, the norms were applied by judges in the sharia courts;¹⁷ and second, they belonged to a matrix of legal concepts, other parts of which became entirely integrated in the doctrines and court rulings of the 'ulama over the centuries.

The manner in which jurists could legitimate these norms is noteworthy. Although there seems to be little discussion concerning the obligation of a cultivator to assure tax payments on land he abandoned, later *kanun* legitimates the obligation in terms of *darar* or damages to the state treasury.¹⁸ In that spirit, the *Kanun-i Cedid* states as canonical (*kanun*) an interpretation of the fee paid for *çift bozan* as recompense (*tazmin*) due for leaving land idle.¹⁹ In short, for the central Ottoman period this tax obligation does not appear excessively problematic, but the principle of the forcible return of a cultivator or his heir within a period of ten or fifteen years appears more difficult. On the last question, el-Üskübi writes concerning Bekr, son of the *ra'yyet* Amr, whose name appeared in the *sipahi* Zayd's register and who had fled the village, that Zayd could return Bekr by force to his deceased father Amr's village. El-Üskübi notes that the rule was 'not a *shar'i* issue... but one for the office holder to decide; however, if such a command be given, so be it: for the sake of the order of state there is a duty to obey imperial commands'.²⁰ In short this rule derived from the reason of state itself and was so legitimated by el-Üskübi.

Abdul-Karim Rafeq has described these legal principles, along with Ottoman marriage fees and the legitimation of interest payments, as elements from the Ottoman *kanun* opposed by Syrian Hanafi jurists.

¹⁷ For the application of such norms by the sharia courts in Palestine, see Amy Singer, 'Peasant migration: law and practice in early Ottoman Palestine', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 8, 1992, 49–65. Abdul-Karim Rafeq has published decisions indicating that they were also applied in the same period in the courts of Damascus, see 'al-Fi'at al-ijtima'iya wa-milkiyat al-ard fi bilad al-sham fi'l-rub' al-akhir min al-qarn al-sadis 'ashar', *Dirasat Ta'rikhiya*, vols. 35/36, 1990, 120–22.

¹⁸ Anonymous, 'Osmanlı Kanunnameleri', vol. 1, 113, where it is noted that fees are fixed per plough-lot in the Ottoman *kanun*, 'whereas in the noble *shar'* the compensation due is according to the damage (*zarar*) [done]'.

¹⁹ Ibid., 113: 'ta'til arazi-yi tazmin'.

²⁰ 'Şer'i maslahat değildir... ancak bu makûleh veliyyü'-emre mürâc'at olunur. Nice memûr ise öyle olur; nizâm-ı memleket için olan emr-i âliye itâ'at vâcibedir', *Zahir ül-Kudât*, 404, mesele 53.

With reference to two important epistles by Yasin al-Faradi and 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi discussed below, Professor Rafeq wrote: '...the excesses of the *sipahis* in the Syrian countryside from the sixteenth through the nineteenth century, long after the well-intentioned decrees of Sultan Süleyman I had ceased to have any appeal, brought about waves of complaints and the flight of the Syrian peasantry. The top Syrian 'ulama then came to support the aggrieved peasantry because the Ottoman feudal laws and practices flagrantly violated the *shari'a* and Islamic custom.'²¹ In his conclusion Professor Rafeq goes on to add: 'By voicing their concern about the proper implementation of the *shari'a*, the Syrian 'ulama were upholding their Islamic legacy and promoting themselves as guardians of Arab-Islamic culture.'²² He stresses that 'the majority of the Syrian 'ulama from the very beginning of Ottoman rule did not identify themselves closely with the Ottomans.'²³

*Official Damascene Hanafi muftis of the seventeenth and
eighteenth century*

The seventeenth century witnessed major population movement and rural migration into cities. Hence practical and not only doctrinal tension surrounded the principle that the cultivator who left his lot was to be returned. The *fatwas* of the early part of the century condemned violence exercised by political and military authorities but did not reject the systematic application of *kanun* rules concerning continuing tax liability (*kasr al-faddan*) or the forcible return of cultivators authorized by the *kanun*.

Beginning with the great Damascene *mufti* of the mid-seventeenth century, 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Imadi, such issues become prominent in *fatwas*. In an important *fatwa*, al-'Imadi (d. 1649) describes as an innovation contrary to religious tradition (*bid'a*) the imposition by the administrative judge (*hakim al-'urf*) of a fine on anyone who settles outside his village. Nevertheless, al-'Imadi formally rejected the application of this 'innovation' only in the case of functionaries, students and scholars of religion, whose exemption from such rules

²¹ 'The Syrian 'Ulamā, Ottoman Law and Islamic *Shari'a*', 26.

²² *Ibid.*, 28.

²³ *Ibid.*

was in accordance with an order of the sultan.²⁴ In another *fatwa* al-ʿImadi describes a *timar* holder who brought a group of people from one village to cultivate a ruined village. After they had been there for four years, bedouins came and destroyed the houses and crops. The *timari* then tried to force the cultivators to return to the devastated village and to pay the *kasr al-faddan* for the years intervening: ʿAbd al-Rahman rejects this outright. But even here the judgement is not in conflict with the *kanun* since the cultivators simply fled after the destruction of their village by a third party.

The *mufti* of Damascus at the end of the seventeenth century, Ismaʿil ibn ʿAli ibn Rajab al-Haʿik (d. 1702) ruled that the administrator (*mutakallim*) should not oblige the sons of a man who had settled in Damascus more than forty years earlier to return to their village of origin; rather like ʿAbd al-Rahman al-ʿImadi, al-Haʿik grounded this judgement in the will of the sultan.²⁵ ʿAli al-ʿImadi (d. 1706) likewise did not challenge the principles of the *kanun* directly, but the extreme character of the *exempla* he cites suggest that considerable injustice could arise from the application of such rules. His first *fatwa* concerned a village abandoned for twenty years; ʿAli al-ʿImadi denied that the village head (*ustadh al-qariya*) has the right to return a cultivator to the village by force. A second *fatwa* concerned a monk whose father had lived in a village thirty years earlier and who has no property there; the people of the village have no right to demand taxes from the monk ‘for the protection of persons’. In the third *fatwa* a man had married a year earlier and then moved with his wife to another village, only then to have vanished; ʿAli al-ʿImadi rejected the attempt of the people of his original village to force his wife to live in their village so as to make up the taxes for which her husband had been responsible.²⁶ There are similar *fatwas* in the collection of his relative

²⁴ ʿAbd al-Rahman Efendi al-ʿImadi, *Fatawa*, Zahiriya 5377, fol. 82b: ‘*Suʿal fi-ma idha ahdath hukkam al-ʿurf bidʿatan wa-hiya anna-hum yajʿaluna ʿala kull man tawattan fi ghair baldati-hi mablaghan ʿala kull shakhs min-hum waʿl-hal anna-hu warad amr sharif bi-anna ʿl-aʿimma waʿl-ʿulamaʿ wa talabat al-ʿilm waʿl-ashraf la yaʿkhudh min-hum shayʿ min al-takalif al-ʿurfiya huwa anna-hum muʿafun fi-dhalika fa-hal la-hum fi mutalibat al-madhkurin bi-shayʿ min al-takalif al-marquma aw la? ajab yajib al-ʿamal biʿl-amr al-sharif.*’

²⁵ Muhibb al-Din al-ʿImadi et al., *Fatawa bani ʿl-ʿImad wa-ghairi-him*, Zahiriya 5864, fol. 146b: ‘*wa-la yujbir awladu-hu ʿala ʿl-ʿaud ila ʿl-qariya al-mazbura wa-la yurdi bi-hi sultanu-na hafiza-hu ʿllah taʿala wa-ʿllahu aʿlam.*’

²⁶ ʿAbd al-Rahman al-ʿImadi et al., *al-Nur al-mubin fi fatawi al-ʿImadiyin*, Zahiriya 7508, fol. 68a.

Muhammad al-‘Imadi (d. 1723), also *mufti* of Damascus, indicating that the freedom of the cultivator remained problematic in the early eighteenth century.²⁷

‘Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi’s (d. 1731) *fatwas* raise similar questions: can the people of a village oblige a man who has left the village a long time ago to pay an ‘absence tax’ (*mal al-ghurbiya*)?²⁸ Can the village head (*ustadh al-qariya*) oblige two non-Muslims who moved into Damascus fifty years earlier and have no property in the village to pay part of the taxes on the village? Can a villager who moved to live in Damascus but has property in a village and pays his taxes on that property be forced by the administrator (*al-mutakallim ‘ala ‘l-qariya*) to share in the taxes for the protection of persons? Can the administrator of a village oblige a *dhimmi* (a Christian or a Jew) born in Damascus, whose father moved to the city sixty years earlier, to return to his father’s natal village and pay the fine for wrecking the plough lot?²⁹ The answer is negative in all cases. A last question pits the ‘ulama against the government administrators. The agent for a village administrator (*za‘im al-qariya*) demanded that a group of people who had moved to Damascus forty years earlier return to the village and pay a sum for each year away. Although they were from the village, they noted that that they held no property there. They then produced a *fatwa* from each of the four schools of law; on this basis a legal document was drawn up stating that they had the right to live wherever they chose in God’s land and that they should not be opposed in this. al-Nabulusi judged that the *shar‘i* document should be honoured.³⁰

To summarize, all of the judgements of the Damascene Hanafi *muf-tis* support the right of the cultivator to remain where he has moved but none of them opposes the *kanun* principles frontally. This is true even of the *fatwas* of ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, penned during his short period as official *mufti*, who wrote an epistle condemning the principle absolutely. This said, we should note al-Nabulusi’s argument in the last *fatwa*: it rests not on the statutory limitations of time (ten or fifteen years) fixed in the *kanun*, but on the freedom of a man to live where he chooses in God’s lands.

²⁷ Ibid., fols. 70b–71a.

²⁸ *Fatawa al-Nabulusi*, Zahiriya 2684, fol. 199.

²⁹ Ibid., fol. 200.

³⁰ Ibid., fol. 201.

This form of argumentation appears again in two of the three *fatwas* of Hamid ibn 'Ali Ibrahim al-'Imadi (d. 1759) that touch on the question.³¹ In a chapter on miscellaneous questions in the first volume of *Mughni al-mustafti* Hamid al-'Imadi gives two *fatwas*, the first concerning a cultivator in a village that is *waqf*, where the *mutawalli* of the *waqf* and the *subashi* of the village want to force him to return to live in the village; the second concerns a *shaykh al-qariya* who seeks to oblige a man who left to study religious sciences to return to his natal village.³² Both are refused on the grounds of the freedom of a person to live where he would in God's lands: *al-bilad bilad allah, wa'l-'ibad 'ibad allah*.³³ The two *fatwas* do not directly contest the terms of the *kanun*, concerning, respectively, a cultivator on *waqf* lands and a cultivator who left to study religion. But, in a departure from earlier *fatwas*, al-'Imadi does not mention the decades that the person has lived outside the village and cites as sources two Shafi'i scholars al-Husni and al-Suyuti, who argued for the absolute freedom of a man to live

³¹ A more classical argument on the grounds of types of taxation is employed in a *fatwa* found in *bab al-qisma* of vol. 2 of *Mughni al-mustafti 'an su'al al-mufti Hamid Ibrahim 'Abd al-Rahim 'Imad al-Din al-Dimashqi, mufti al-Sham al-ma'ruf bi'l-Muradi*, Zahiriya 5656, fol. 313a. There Hamid al-'Imadi rejects the attempt of the 'people of a village' (*ahali al-qariya*) to force *dhimmis* who hold property there but live in Damascus to move to live in the village so as to share in the taxes 'on heads/souls' and not just the taxes on property. This is rejected on the grounds that taxes on heads are to be paid according to place of residence, not of landed property. The *fatwa* is also given with slight modification by Muhammad Amin ibn 'Abidin in *al-'Uqud al-durriya fi tanqih al-fatawa al-hamidiya*, Dar al-Tiba'a al-'Amira, Cairo, Ramadan 1270, vol. 2, 165–6, in the section Ibn 'Abidin develops from *Bab al-qisma* under the title *Fasl fi'l-gharamat al-warida 'ala'l-qura wa-nahwu-ha*.

³² *Mughni al-mustafti 'an su'al al-mufti Hamid Ibrahim 'Abd al-Rahim 'Imad al-Din al-Dimashqi, mufti al-Sham al-ma'ruf bi'l-Muradi*, Zahiriya 5655, vol. 1, fols. 328b–329a. The first merits full transcription: 'Su'il: fi qarawi rahal min qariyati-hi al-mawqufa wa sakan fi ghairi-ha fa-qam mutawalli al-waqf wa-subashi al-qariya yuk-allifana-hu al-'aud ilay-hi wa'l-sukna bi-ha bi-dun wajh shar'i fa-hal la yujbar 'ala dhalik wa-la-hu al-sukna haith sha'a min bilad allah jalla jalalu-hu am la. Al-jawab: na'am la yujbar al-qarawi al-madhkur 'ala dhalik wa-la-hu al-sukna haith sha'a min bilad allah jalla jalalu-hu wa 'azuma nawalu-hu wa-taqadassat asma'a-hu kama afta bi-dhalik kathir min al-'ulama' wa'l-a'lam rawwaha 'llah arwaha-hum wa-qad alifa bi-dhalik al-'allama al-Taqiyy al-Husni risalat qaddas allah sirra-hu wa-qad qal nabiyyu-na afdal al-khalq 'ala 'l-ittlaq salla 'llahu ta'ala 'alai-hi wa-sallam. wa sharaf wa karam. al-bilad bilad allah. wa'l-'ibad 'ibad allah. fa-haithama asbahta khayran fa-uqim. Dhakar-hu al-Jalal al-Suyuti fi 'l-Jami' al-Sahghir. Wa'l-mu'min amir nafsa-hu yaskun ayy bilad arad. Wa-ya'ish bi-ayy baldat ra'a 'l-rahah li-nafsi-hi fi-ha wa-'llahu subhana-hu a'lam.'

³³ In his abridged and edited commentary on the *fatwas* of Hamid al-'Imadi, Muhammad Amin ibn 'Abidin gives the first *fatwa* but omits the second, see *al-'Uqud al-durriya fi tanqih al-Fatawa al-hamidiya*, Dar al-Tiba'a al-'Amira, Cairo, Ramadan 1270, vol. 1, 'Masa'il shita', 283.

where he wished.³⁴ While the doctrinal position that the cultivator was a free contracting agent with regard to the authorities administering land had been articulated earlier by 'ulama, it is only from the mid-eighteenth century that the formally appointed *muftis* of Damascus argued in these terms.

In the *fatwa* collection of the Muradiya of the later eighteenth century no *fatwa* addresses attempts to force a cultivator to return and only one addresses the extraction of payment for abandonment of cultivation. This takes a collective, not an individual form: 'A question concerns a case where some of the people of a village fled and others died creating a shortfall of tax payments (*wa 'alay-hi mal maksur*); Zayd wanted to impose this [tax] on those present [in the village] without their having given legal surety [for the others] and without any legal basis.'³⁵ Here, collective village actors as much as land administrators confront individuals in a manner expressive of the collective social self-government characteristic of the Ottoman eighteenth century.³⁶

In his commentary on Hamid al-'Imadi's *fatwas*, Ibn 'Abidin (d. 1836) gives the first *fatwa* but omits the second concerning the student of religion.³⁷ Presented in this manner, it appears that the legal principle is absolutely rejected by the end of the eighteenth century. That Ibn 'Abidin does not bother to comment himself on the issue suggests that he regarded it as a dead issue.

In summary, it appears that the officially appointed Hanafi *muftis* of Damascus never embraced the principles of *kasr al-faddan* or *al-nakl jabran* with any enthusiasm. Hence, their *fatwas* concern rather extreme cases in which the *mufti* could reject the particular application

³⁴ With regard to the identification of al-Husni, see fn. 76 below. For the *hadith* cited see Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, *al-Jami' al-saghir fi ahadith al-bashir al-nadir*, Cairo, Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1358/1939, vol. 1, 128.

³⁵ '...min ghair kafala min-hum wa-la wajh shar'i wa-hum yadfa'una ma 'alay-him min al-gharama', 'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Muradi et al., *Majmu' Fatawi al-Muradiya*, Zahiryā 2642, fol. 345.

³⁶ This is true of *fatwas* in Turkish of the period as well, compare el-Üskübi, *Zahîr ül-Kudât*, 406, mesele 68, 69, p. 407, mesele 77, for tensions between village collective *persona* and individual right; true also of the *fatwas* of Bahâi Efendi (d. 1654) where the collective village *persona* appears more strongly, 437, mesele 300, 301, p. 438, mesele 303, 304, p. 442, mesele 337, p. 444, mesele 347, p. 446, mesele 369, p. 449, mesele 392. More generally, see G. Veinstein, 'Inalcık's views on the Ottoman eighteenth century and the fiscal problem', *Oriente Moderno*, n.s., 18/1, 1999, 1–10, on the self-governing corporatism of Ottoman society in the eighteenth century.

³⁷ Ibn 'Abidin, *al-Uqud al-durriya*, vol. 1, 'Masa'il shita', 283.

of such measures under the circumstances. But until the middle of the eighteenth century, no *fatwa* from the Hanafi *mufti* of Damascus frontally contested the terms of the *kanun* regulations.

Professor Rafeq viewed the Syrian jurists as upholding their Arab-Islamic legacy by condemning the forcible return of cultivators to their villages. This characterization merits qualification. First, debate concerning the legitimacy of *kanun* principles was not confined to those jurists whose native language was Arabic but included those whose native language was Turkish.³⁸ Second, although the Damascene *muf-tis* generally did not write in Turkish and even some of the greatest such as Ibn 'Abidin did not apparently read Turkish, the *fatwa* collection of Hamid al-'Imadi suggests that we should be wary of assuming too great a distance between the Arab Damascene Hanafi *muftis* and the Istanbul *shaykh al-islams*. Thus, Hamid al-'Imadi cites in his *fatwa* collection not only Ebussuud and *shaykh al-islam* Abdürrahim Efendi but also *kanun* texts. Third, long-term doctrinal shifts occurred on these issues, most particularly during the eighteenth century. Lastly, it is telling that Hamid al-'Imadi cites Shafi'i sources, for it was Shafi'i, rather than Hanafi, jurists who fully opposed the 'feudal' land regime under the Mamluks and the Ottomans, a question to which we shall return below. In support of these arguments concerning Hanafi *muf-tis*, let us look at some evidence from 'Turkish' jurists who wrote on the question before returning to the wider Arabic Hanafi jurisprudential tradition.

In the mid-seventeenth century, Sadiq Muhammad 'Ali al-Saqizi³⁹ attributed to Ebussuud a ruling outlawing the demand of the village *sipahi* that a cultivator who had left his plot, the cultivation of which had been taken on by another, should pay the fee for 'breaking the plough lot' (*rasm naqd faddana-hu*).⁴⁰ al-Saqizi goes on to say that the sultan had prevented judges from supporting such rulings. It is important, however, that the case concerns land taken on by another, not lying idle. In short, al-Saqizi appears unhappy with the principle, writing that the fee for 'breaking the plough lot' is completely forbidden (*li'anna rasm naqd al-faddan haram mahd*), but, rather like the

³⁸ Compare Mundy and Saumarez Smith, *Governing Property*, 16–19.

³⁹ Described as an Anatolian jurist, al-Saqizi died 1059/1649 according to the *Zahiriya* catalogue, but C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1937–1949, vol. 2, gives 1099/1688 for his death.

⁴⁰ al-Saqizi, *Surrat al-Fatawi*, *Zahiriya* 6143, fol. 21b.

Damascene *muftis* of the same period, he does not condemn it frontally in the forms in which it was allowed by the *kanun*. The *fatwas* of *shaykh al-islam* Bahaî Efendi (d. 1654) are likewise suggestive of a shift in understanding.⁴¹ In four *fatwas* the *tapu* holder left *miri* land for more than three years: first, a *sipahi* left land uncultivated for seven to eight years; second, an ordinary cultivator failed to farm his land for more than three years; third, a minor held land which remained uncultivated for five or six years; and fourth, after three years of the land lying fallow, the cultivator returned to plough his land.⁴² In all cases the men were allowed to reclaim the land before its alienation to another. These rulings do not nullify the general principle that the administrator can reallocate rights to land left uncultivated for over three years,⁴³ nor that a man who continues as *tapu* holder is bound to cover the land tax.⁴⁴ But taken as a whole, the emphasis in the *fatwas* of Bahaî Efendi is on the land administrator acting reasonably rather than on the liability of the cultivator to lose his rights to land. Thus the administrator cannot refuse to give permission simply for personal reasons, and if he insists, the Islamic judge can override him forcibly.⁴⁵ Lastly, a term not found in earlier *fatwas*, *kat'ı 'alaka*, is now used to describe a person who has formally cut all relations with a former place of residence, in *fatwas* of Ahmed Efendi el-Mu'id (d. 1647).⁴⁶ *Shaykh al-islam* Abdürrahim (d. 1716) judges that after ten years have passed the cultivator who has so cut his relations owed neither head nor land (*çift bozan*) taxes.⁴⁷ In short, this limited review of evidence from *fatwas* emanating from Istanbul indicates shifts in doctrine parallel to those sketched for the Damascene Hanafi *muftis* from the mid-seventeenth century onwards.

⁴¹ On Bahaî Efendi, see Kahraman, Seyit Ali et al., *İlmiyye Salnamesi: Osmanlı ilmiyye teşkilatı ve şeyhülislamlar*, İstanbul, Işaret Yayınları, 1998, 75–77.

⁴² A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, vol. 9 (appended to *fatwas* of el-Üskübi, *Zahîr ül-Kudât*), pp. 436–7, *mesele* 294, p. 441 *mesele* 327, and p. 443 *mesele* 426.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 449, *mesele* 396.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 451, *mesele* 412.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 451, *mesele* 410 and pp. 452–3, *mesele* 423. Compare likewise Abdürrahim Efendi Menteşizade (d. 1716), *Fetava*, British Library, Oriental Manuscripts 12462, fols. 502a and 517a–b for strength of the cultivator's right.

⁴⁶ See the *fatwas* of Ahmed Efendi el-Mu'id (d. 1647) in A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, vol. 9, p. 451, *mesele* 412 and p. 455, *mesele* 444 and 443.

⁴⁷ Abdürrahim Efendi Menteşizade, *Fetava*, British Library, OR.12462, fols. 22a–b.

The wider Arabic Hanafi jurisprudential tradition

Apart from 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Imadi's reference to an order of the sultan, 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi's *fatwa* resting on a *fatwa*, and Hamid al-'Imadi's reference to Shafi'i sources, the judgements of the Damascene *muftis* contained no reference to sources. Yet there was a reasonable chain of Hanafi jurisprudential reflection on the theme, of which they were doubtless aware.

The issue had arisen following the Ottoman conquest of Egypt; both Zayn al-Din ibn Nujaym and his brother of the same name had addressed the topic. Ibn Nujaym wrote: 'we have already explained that the land of Egypt is not private tax-paying (*kharaj*) land but rather rented, so the cultivator owes nothing if he leaves the land and thus is no longer renting; he is subject to no forceful obligation as a result and it should be known that if some cultivators have abandoned agriculture and live in a city then they owe nothing. Hence, what unjust persons do in harming a cultivator is prohibited, especially one who wants to devote himself to the Koran and to study at the al-Azhar mosque.'⁴⁸ Ibn Nujaym here builds his argument upon the late Mamluk interpretation of the relationship between cultivator and administrator of land in terms of rent.⁴⁹ His argument rests not on morality but on the character of the contractual relationship between cultivator and land administrator. By contrast, Ottoman Hanafi jurists from Ebussuud onwards did not accept that the relation between the land administrator and the cultivator was one of rent. Rather the cultivator held a kind of subordinate quasi-office, and Ottoman jurists

⁴⁸ Zayn al-Din al-shahir bi-Ibn Nujaym, *al-Bahr al-ra'iq sharh Kanz al-daqa'iq, wa bi-hamishi-hi al-hawashi al-musamma bi-Munhat al-khaliq 'ala 'l-Bahr al-ra'iq* of Muhammad Amin al-shahir bi-Ibn 'Abidin, Cairo, al-Matba'a al-'Ilmiyya, 1311/1893, vol. 5, p. 118: 'wa-qad qaddamna-hu anna ard misr al-an laisat kharajiyya innama hiya bi'l-ujra fa-la shay' 'ala al-fallah law 'atala-ha wa lam yakun musta'jiran la-ha wa-la jabr 'alay-hi bi-sababi-ha wa-bi-hi 'ulima anna ba'd al-muzari'in idha tarak al-zira'a wa sakan fi misr fa-la shay' 'alay-hi fa-ma yafa'alu-hu al-zulama min al-idrar bi-hi fa-haram khususan idha arad al-ishtighal bi'l-quran wa-'l-'ilm ka-mujawiri al-jami' al-azhar'.

⁴⁹ See for the structure of this argument and its only partial adoption by Ottoman jurists, M. Mundy, 'Ownership or office? A debate in Islamic Hanefite jurisprudence over the nature of the military 'fief', from the Mamluks to the Ottomans', in Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy, eds, *Law, Anthropology and the Social: Making Persons and Things*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 142–65.

used the legal terms *tafwid* and *tafarrugh*, generally applied to offices, for delegation and transfer of rights to farming lots.

Ibn Nujaym's argument concerning the freedom of contract and movement enjoyed by the cultivator as a lessee of land is cited in full in Khayr al-Din al-Ramli's (d. 1671) great *fatwa* collection.⁵⁰ al-Ramli distinguishes between *kharaj* land, on which he states that the cultivator has an absolute duty to pay tax if he leaves his plot,⁵¹ and the lands of greater Syria (*al-sham*), where he states that, if their legal status is as Ibn al-Humam described for Egypt, the relationship between administrator and cultivator is one of rent.⁵² Albeit tentatively, al-Ramli here draws a genealogy to late Mamluk jurisprudence for the legal status of the lands of Syria and distances himself from the interpretation of Ebussuud and Ottoman jurisprudence.⁵³ A major *fatwa* of al-Ramli (later echoed by Hamid al-'Imadi and ibn 'Abidin) concerns a village, one-half *waqf* and one-half *sultani*, many of whose inhabitants fled from heavy extra taxation and injustice. These cultivators had lived elsewhere for many years, marrying and bringing up children; thirty years later the administrator (*nazir*) of the *waqf* sought to force them to return or to pay all they owed on the lands they had abandoned.⁵⁴ With regard to *waqf* land, no scholar ever judged that the forcible return of cultivators was licit, since their legal status was that of les-

⁵⁰ *al-Fatawa al-Khayriyya li-naf' al-barriyya 'ala madhhab al-imam al-a'zam Abi Hanifa*, Cairo/Bulaq, al-Matba'a al-Kubra al-Amiriyya, 1300 A.H./1882-83, vol. 1, p. 100, the core of al-Ramli's argument being '*wa-inna ard bait al-mal la kharaj fiha wa-l-ma'khudh min-ha ujra fa-la shay' 'ala al-fallah law 'atala-ha wa-huwa ghair mustajir li-ha wa la jabr 'alay-hi bi-sababi-ha.*' al-Ramli does not appear alone among seventeenth-century jurists in citing the judgements of the two Ibn Nujaym. According to 'Ubaydullah 'Abd al-Ghani in his work *al-Nur al-badi fi ahkam al-aradiy*, dated 1796, both al-Shurunbulali (d. 1659) and al-Haskafi (d. 1677) cite al-Nahr and al-Bahr of Ibn Nujaym and his brother to the effect that *kasr al-faddan* is forbidden/*haram*: see *Zahiriya* 4400, fol. 146a.

⁵¹ *al-Fatawa al-Khayriyya*, vol. 1, 96: '*(su'al) fi-ma idha tarak al-muzari' zar' al-ard al-kharajiya al-muwazzafa al-saliha li'l-zar' yalzimu-hu al-kharaj am la. (ajab) yalzimu-hu al-kharaj zara'a am la, wa-'llahu a'lam.*' See also the *fatwa* where a cultivator who left his original village and settled in another failed to pay his part of the *kharaj al-muqasama* in the area of Nablus. al-Ramli judges that the people of the village have the right to expel the cultivator.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 96: '*lakin idha thabat fi aradiy al-sham ma thabat fi aradiy misr bi-'anna-ha mat ashabu-ha wa-sarat li-bait al-mal, kana dafu-ha bi'l-hissa muzara'atan wa-bi'l-darahim aw ghairi-ha min al-dananir wa-'l-'urud wa-ma yasluh ujrati ijara fa-talzim fi-hi ahkam al-ijara....*'

⁵³ Ebussuud judges that the land of Sham was *kharajiya*, see al-'Üskübi, *Zahir ül-Kudât*, in A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, vol. 9, 432, mesele 256.

⁵⁴ *al-Fatawa al-Khayriyya*, vol. 1, 100.

sees.⁵⁵ Rather, it is the argument concerning state land that is complex. al-Ramli gives three options, first that of Ibn Nujaym, then the classical Hanafi tradition concerning *kharaj* land, whereby if for any reason a cultivator fails to farm the land, the sultan may give it to another to cultivate or even sell it should no one be willing to rent the land. Failing that, the administrator could lend a cultivator the sum needed to bring the land under cultivation. Lastly, al-Ramli notes the dominant interpretation of the later school which refused sale and rental of the land. At the end of this review of Hanafi positions, al-Ramli concludes that the restricted powers accorded the land administrators in all of these interpretations means that they are not allowed to use force against the cultivator. Such acts are thus injustice and wrongdoing, never to be permitted by God.⁵⁶ al-Ramli thus argues that the legal tradition, concerned as it was with assuring legally valid cultivation of land, never entered into discussion of forcible coercion of the cultivator, so that such a practice was impermissible and unjust. It should be noted that although the legal principles advanced by al-Ramli would appear to rule out the forcible return of a cultivator, he nevertheless discussed a case where cultivators had fled from heavy extra taxation and injustice—a case, in other words, where the *kanun* itself would excuse the flight of the cultivators.

There are two Hanafi epistles in the Zahirīya collection concerned with the topic at hand: *Kitab nusrat al-mutagharribin ‘an al-awtan ‘an al-zuluma wa-ahl al-‘udwan* of Yasin b. Mustafa al-Biqā‘i al-Dimashqi al-Faradi al-Hanafi (d. 1684) and *Takhyir al-‘ibad fi sukna al-bilad* of ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1731).⁵⁷ The two bear comparison with al-Ramli’s arguments since, in different ways, both authors depart from the formal legal reasoning of the great Palestinian *mufti*. Like al-Ramli, al-Faradi discusses a case not in contravention with the *kanun* and sultanic decrees: a man of religion from the Biqā‘ who had been away from his village for more than fifteen years, was ordered to return to

⁵⁵ Compare note 5 above.

⁵⁶ Al-Ramli cites in justification the two compendia of Ibn Nujaym and his brother, *al-Bahr al-ra’iq* and *al-Nahr al-ra’iq*, see *al-Fatawa al-Khayriyya*, vol. 1, 99–100.

⁵⁷ *Majmu‘ mushtamil ‘ala 41 risala*, Süleymaniye Çelebi Abdullah Efendi 385/33, *Risalat takhyir al-‘ibad fi sukna al-bilad*, fols. 264b–270. There is a copy of the epistle in the Zahirīya Collection, mss. 4008, fols. 42–44. The text has been published and translated by Bakri Aladdin, ‘Deux fatwas du Şayh ‘Abd al-Ganî al-Nâbulusî’, *Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales*, 1987–88, vols. 39–40, 7–37.

the village where his name appeared in a register (or, failing that, to pay the head tax, *rasm ra'iyya*).

The structure of al-Faradi's epistle is complex, blending moral and legal arguments. It opens noting that men of religion have a duty to go to where they may practice their religion, as *hijra* has been a tradition of the prophets from time immemorial. After describing the appeal that led to the writing of the epistle, whose arguments convinced the *qadi al-qudat* of the justice of the plaintiff's cause, the epistle opens with a section defining injustice (*zulm*); in this, the first citation after Baydawi's commentary on the Koran is to Ebussuud's similar judgement that wrongdoers will have no rest from punishment on the day of resurrection.⁵⁸ All religions prohibit injustice and safeguard from harm: lives, lineages, honour, reason and property.⁵⁹

al-Faradi then structures his discussion of injustice (*zulm*) by type of source, beginning with citations from the Koran before turning to the traditions of the prophet (*hadith*). He concludes that both of these concur in commending migration, forbidding forcible return and extortion of payment (especially if fifteen years have passed) preventing legally unlawful innovation (*bid'a*), and punishing the wrongdoer by religiously sanctioned punishment (*ta'zir*) administered by the *qadi*.⁶⁰ He continues with the writings of the jurists (*fuqaha*) on these issues, reviewing Hanafi doctrines on the status of land and the imposition of *kharaj* tax, before turning to legal relations on *waqf* and treasury lands, citing the Ibn Nujaym doctrines about rental and later scholars in the same vein, before turning to *fatwa* collections.⁶¹ The first *fatwa* examined is that of shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman Efendi al-'Imadi (d. 1649) which had also been the object of legal opinion by the Damascene Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali *muftis* of the day. This is followed by an exhaustive collection of *fatwa* opinions of Shafi'i as well as Hanafi scholars from Ibn Nujaym to al-Ramli.⁶² Central are references to the Shafi'i Taqiy al-Din al-Husni who went beyond any Hanafi opinion to condemn the practice of forcible return as godlessness (*kufr*), not only tyranny (*zulm*).⁶³

⁵⁸ Fol. 5a: 'wa-mithlu-hu fi Abi al-Su'ud rahima-hu al-malik al-ma'bud'.

⁵⁹ Fol. 5b with reference to what are known in contemporary Islam as *maqasid al-qur'an*: *hifz al-anfus wa'l-ansab fa'l-a'rad fa'l-uqul fa'l-amwal*.

⁶⁰ Fol. 13a.

⁶¹ Fols. 13b–17b.

⁶² Fols. 17b–20b.

⁶³ Fols. 20b–21b.

From here al-Faradi turns to the jurists' writings on the punishment due a tyrannical ruler and the definition of unjust administrative practice.⁶⁴ In closing, he first summarizes the argument that the Koran, prophetic tradition, and the consensus of the jurists all treat the departure of a man from his homeland as a legal act that is necessary or commended or permitted.⁶⁵ Two further short sections follow: a juristic condemnation of the leasing (*ijara*) of tax revenues and a discussion of conflicts of interest which render legal testimony inadmissible, including that of a tax collector against a cultivator.⁶⁶ al-Faradi ends with an examination of the psychic paths of the repentant wrongdoer: awareness, admission, self-accusation, emotional pain, mental torment, and pious expiation.⁶⁷

The *risala* is a tour de force: it both avoids frontal collision with the terms of the *kanun* and yet provides a devastating vision of the suffering of both the wronged and the repentant wrongdoer. al-Faradi opens the gate to repentance since, unlike al-Husni, he argues that at issue is injustice (*zulm*), not denying God (*kufr*). In contrast, in his epistle, 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi accepts al-Husni's judgement of such acts as *kufr*. al-Nabulusi begins his epistle with a case similar to that of al-Faradi: men left their village a long time before. The attempt to force their return met the condemnation of jurists of all the legal schools. No reference is made to al-Faradi's epistle, but rather to Ebussuud, to Khayr al-Din al-Ramli, and to the 'Shafi'i al-shaykh al-imam al-'alim al-humam Taqiy al-Din al-Husni'.⁶⁸ al-Nabulusi passes over the duty to pay tax and focuses on that of forced return. Although he refers to the two *fatwas* of al-Ramli,⁶⁹ he departs from al-Ramli by constructing his argument not on the legal freedom of the cultivator as tenant of land, but rather on the cultivator belonging to a yet more fundamental category of agent. The cultivator is first a believer and then a human being. 'The believer is his own lord' (*al-mu'min amir nafsi-hi*) and hence it is particularly heinous for political authority to try to restrict to their place of origin those who seek religious knowledge (*talabat al-'ilm*). But the cultivator is not always identifiable with the

⁶⁴ Fols. 23a–34b.

⁶⁵ Fol. 34b–35a.

⁶⁶ Fol. 35a–40a.

⁶⁷ Fols. 40a–56a.

⁶⁸ For the identification of Taqiy al-Din al-Husni, see footnote 77 below.

⁶⁹ *al-Fatawa al-Khayriyya*, vol. 1, 99–100.

legal person of a believer. Rather the freedom of man to live where he chooses is true even for '*dhimmis*, Jews and Christians, or all other kinds of infidel'.⁷⁰ Here al-Nabulusi leaves law for anthropology: it is human nature for a person to love his natal place, or as it was said in prophetic tradition, 'love of one's country is a part of faith'.⁷¹ Hence, no cultivator leaves his village voluntarily; the flight of cultivators in fact always results from injustice. In accordance with the ruling of Ebussuud concerning those who flee from injustice, no action can be taken against them for abandoning their lot of cultivation.

Beyond the circumscribed agency of the law ('the lessee') and the legal category of the believer there is for al-Nabulusi an understanding about human nature, before law and religion. And so the great mystic and polymath goes much further than al-Ramli or al-Faradi in his condemnation not only of *kasr al-faddan* but especially of the forcible control of a cultivator's movement and residence. The latter is not only tyranny (*zulm*) but an act more heinous than denying God (*kufr*) and 'if there were in the *shari'a* any wrong worse than denying God, this would fall into that category'.⁷² For al-Nabulusi, unlike al-Üskübi, the order of state does not justify departure from the Islamic doctrine. In another context al-Nabulusi remarks that the mere fact of a tax being in the sultan's *defters* does not make it legitimate in Islam.⁷³

Having established that these practices are prohibited for all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, al-Nabulusi ends his epistle with a scene of confrontation between the Islamic (*qadi al-shar'*) and admin-

⁷⁰ *Risalat takhyir al-'ibad*, fol. 267a.

⁷¹ Ibid., 'li'anna 'l-insan min tab'i-hi mahabbat watani-hi wa-'l-hanin ilay-hi wa-'l-farah bi-hi wa-'l-tashawwuq ila ru'yati-hi wa-'l-tarab bi-madhi-hi wa-'l-thana 'alay-hi wa-dhikr ma fi-hi min al-mahasin wa-li-hadha warad fi'l-athr hubb al-watan min al-*iman*.' This argument had been made by Shafi'i scholars although here al-Nabulusi, deep in argument, gives no references.

⁷² Ibid., fol. 267a.

⁷³ *Majmu' mushtamil 'ala 41 risala*, Süleymaniye Çelebi Abdullah Efendi 385/9, *Risala fi jawab su'al warad 'alay-na min al-quds al-sharif*, fols. 67a-71b. In his condemnation al-Nabulusi draws a parallel (*nazir*) between the exceptional taxes, listed in registers and *kanuns*, which *dhimmis* pay out of fear of Muslims, and unjust taxes imposed on subjects in general by oppressive rulers: '*wa-laisa dhalika bi-halal wa-huwa haram 'ala'l-hukkam akhdhu-hu min al-ra'aya wa-laisat al-dafatir wa-qawanin bi-muqtadi-hi li-hall dhalika fi'l-shari'a al-muhammadiya fa-inna ghasb al-amwal bi-ghair haqq shar'i haram fi-ijma' al-muslimin wa-mustahillu-hu kafir bi'llah...*' In his *fatwas* al-Nabulusi nevertheless recognises the priority of the entry in the register as normally establishing a legally binding precedent for taxes.

istrative judge (*hakim al-ʿurf*): the *qadi* obliges the *sipahi* to return all that he has received from the cultivators and punishes him with heavy blows and long imprisonment so as to reprimand him and his ilk for such acts of violence.⁷⁴

In a more sober vein, this judgement appears to have become commonplace by the later eighteenth century. Not only, as we have seen above, does the most prominent Damascene Hanafi *mufti* of the eighteenth century, Hamid al-ʿImadi, echo al-Nabulusi's judgement, but a specialised epistle from the end of the eighteenth century, which draws extensively from the Ottoman *kanun* as well as Hanafi jurisprudential sources and is the most learned exposition in the Zahiriya collection of the doctrines governing land, simply rules this central principle of earlier Ottoman land law out of court. So, ʿUbaydullah ʿAbd al-Ghani in his work *al-Nur al-badi fi ahkam al-aradiy*, dated 1796, states that *kasr al-faddan* is forbidden (*haram*), citing al-Shurunbulali (d. 1658–59) and al-Haskafi (d. 1677) who took as source *al-Nahr* and *al-Bahr* of Ibn Nujaym and his brother.⁷⁵ This foreshortened genealogy of juristic opinion would appear designed to close further debate.

Conclusions

From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, Hanafi jurists from Hamid al-ʿImadi to ʿUbaydullah ʿAbd al-Ghani (who were both versed in Ottoman Turkish sources) to Ibn ʿAbidin (who did not read Turkish but had to hand translations of the *Maʿrudat* of Ebussuud and other material) incorporated *kanun* citations explicitly in a way not seen in the work of the earlier Damascene jurists. Yet they rejected outright

⁷⁴ *Risalat takhyir al-ʿibad*, fol. 270b.

⁷⁵ Zahiriya 4400, fol. 146a. The commentary of Muhammad ʿAlaʾ al-Din al-Haskafi, a scholar who served as *mufti* of Damascus, itself makes no reference to Ottoman judgements on the topic of forcible return of a cultivator yet does not frontally reject the *kanun* since it cites the judgements of the Ibn Nujayms on Egypt. It reads: *ʿfa-qad alimtu anna al-maʿkhudh min aradiy misr ujrāt la kharaj fa-ma yafalu-hu al-an min al-akhdh min al-fallah wa-in lam yazraʾ wa-yusammi dhalika falaha wa-ijbaru-hu ʿala ʾl-sukna fi baldatin muʾayyana yaʾmur dara-hu wa-yazraʾ al-aradiy haram bi-shubhah nahr wa-nahwu-hu fiʾl-Shurunbulaliya muʾazziyan liʾl-bahr haith qal wa-taqaddam anna misr al-an laisat kharajiyān bal biʾl-ujra fa-la shayʾ ʿala man lam yazraʾ wa-lam yakun mustaʾjiran aw la jabr ʿalay-hi bi-tasyibi-ha fa-ma yafalu-hu al-zuluma min al-adrar bi-hi haram khususan idha arad al-ishtighal biʾl-ilm*, Hashiyat al-Tahtawi ʿala ʾl-Durr al-mukhtar sharh Tanwir al-absar, taʾlif Muhammad ʿAlaʾ al-Din al-Haskafi, Cairo/Bulaq, n.p., 1254/1838, vol. 2, p. 467 marginal text of al-Haskafi.

the rules restricting the mobility of the cultivator and imposing unrestricted liability for tax on land left uncultivated.

It is al-Faradi who first makes reference to the Damascene Shafi'i challenge to Hanafi doctrine on the cultivator; al-Nabulusi and Hamid al-'Imadi follow suite.⁷⁶ The epistle of the great populist cleric Taqiy al-Din al-Husni (d. 1426),⁷⁷ *Jawab Taqiy al-Din al-Husni 'an aqwam rahalu min baladi-him*, condemned absolutely such acts by an unjust ruler as tantamount to denying God (*kufir*).⁷⁸ And he drew the logical consequence that the killing of an unjust ruler entailed no sin and no blood-money.⁷⁹ It was thus not an innocent gesture when al-Faradi chose al-Husni's argument as foil for his argument about injustice, and even less so when al-Nabulusi drew the intellectual genealogy for his own argument about godlessness to al-Husni. al-Nabulusi nevertheless closes his epistle with the Islamic judge merely physically disciplining the unjust *sipahi*.

In a more matter of fact way, it is difficult to escape the sense that the restatement by Hanafi jurists of a more universal legal subjectivity was in fact sustained on the ground by the commercialisation of relations between state, tax farmer and cultivator. Thus, the change in the

⁷⁶ Hamid al-'Imadi cites the name in such a form, 'Taqiy al-Husni', as to suggest that he knows the epistle of Taqiy al-Din al-Husni only through its citation by al-Nabulusi (or also perhaps al-Faradi), see note 32 above. In *al-'Uqud al-Durriya*, Ibn 'Abidin reproduces the *fatwa* and with it the form of the name as 'Taqiy al-Husni'.

⁷⁷ Abdul-Karim Rafeq ('Syrian *'ulamâ*', p. 24) gives as dates for the 'Damascene Shafi'i Mufti Taqiy al-Din al-Husni' 1053–1129/1643–1717, but thanks to the conservation of the manuscript of al-Husni's epistle by his descendant Raghīb ibn Hasan al-Husni (d. 1871/72), Zahirīya 9836, it is clear that the reference in al-Faradi, al-Nabulusi and Hamid al-'Imadi is to the fire-and-brimstone condemnation of the godlessness (*kufir*) of the rulers and those jurists who would justify their practices of extortionate taxation and appropriation of land of Taqiy al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Mu'min al-Husni al-Husayni al-Shafi'i al-Dimashqi (752–829 A.H./1351–1426 C.E.). In Istanbul two further works of al-Husni (spelt al-Hisni in the catalogue and in the work of Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher) are preserved: *Kitab qam' al-nufus wa-ruqyat al-manus*, Baġdatlı Vehbi Efendi 649, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, especially fols. 71b–82b, which belongs to a genre of oppositional mirror-for-princes tracts, and several volumes of his great law book, *Sharh al-Tanbih*, Ayasofya 1213. In volume 5, fol. 22a, al-Husni argues that the rulers and judges might themselves be *bugha*, that is, in opposition to the true imam, and hence to be disobeyed. For the later history of the family, see L. Schatkowski-Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Damascene factions and estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985, 204–07, and for the biography of Taqiy al-Din Abu Bakr al-Husni, see Abu 'l-Fallah 'Abd al-Hayy Ibn al-'Imad al-Hanbali, *Shadharat al-dhahab fi-akhbar man dhahab*, vol. 7, 188–89.

⁷⁸ *Jawab*, especially fol. 5a.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 4b.

legal status of the cultivator was paralleled by change in the concept of the land administrator. Where once the category, *sahib al-ard*, designated a military figure holding a bundle of administrative, judicial and coercive powers, it now referred to the distribution of such powers between village leadership, the government registrar, the tax farmer, and the shari'a court judge. The newly re-established freedom of contract of the cultivator may thus be said to have had as correlate not only commercialisation but also the elaboration of administration.

ACCOUNT BOOKS OF OPPRESSION AND BARGAINING:
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE AND PROFIT IN OTTOMAN
ALEPPO, 1784–90¹

HIDEMITSU KUROKI

In the eighteenth century, Aleppo was one of the most important international trade centres in the world, and the third largest city in the Ottoman Empire after Istanbul and Cairo. It was also a theatre of violent urban politics between the mid-eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. As Bodman has described, the governors (*walis*) with their attending militias, the janissaries (originally permanent Ottoman troops, who later became locally recruited paramilitary groups), and the *ashraf* (a faction composed of the descendants of the prophet Muhammad) were constantly involved in three-cornered battles in which two of the groups would join forces against the third more or less interchangeably.²

During those events, the governors were sometimes ousted by the janissaries, the *ashraf*, and the townspeople. For example, ‘Ali Pasha was expelled in 1775, Keki ‘Abdi Pasha in 1784, Mustafa Pasha in 1791, Muhammad Pasha in 1804, and Khurshid Pasha in 1819.³ Since, like other Ottoman officials, they were likely to be appointed to another province after a year or two, the governors of Aleppo and other comparable cities usually devoted themselves to squeezing the wealth of the city and the province in order to recover the bribes they had paid to the central government to secure their post. Although their methods of exploitation and coercion have been described piecemeal by local historians,⁴ the overall impact of their extortion and the details

¹ There is a previous version of this article: see Hidemitsu Kuroki, ‘Account Books of Oppression and Bargaining: Struggle for Justice and Profit in Ottoman Aleppo, 1784–1790’, *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies*, 20, 2, 2005, 53–71.

² Herbert Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760–1826*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1963, 103–45.

³ Ibid.; Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, 86–101.

⁴ Muhammad al-Tabbakh, *‘Ilam al-Nubala’ bi Ta’rikh Halab al-Shahba’*, 7 vols., Aleppo, al-Matba’a al-Maruniya, 1923–24, vol. 3; Kamil al-Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab fi Ta’rikh Halab*, 3 vols., Aleppo, al-Matba’a al-Maruniya, 1923–26, vol. 3.

of individual incidents of popular protest have not been adequately described. Here I will focus on the case of Keki 'Abdi Pasha in 1784, which is exceptionally rich in information both on the nature of his extortion and on the manner of his removal; I will present a characteristic episode in the structure of urban politics in the pre-Tanzimat period by examining the documents concerned. The main sources are, first, a memoir in Arabic written by a contemporary Aleppine Christian, Yusuf al-Halabi, and secondly, contemporary Ottoman documents preserved at the Center for Historical Records in Damascus, a collection which has not been used in previous studies of this event.⁵

The Development of the Revolt

Keki 'Abdi Pasha, who had already been notorious in Aleppo for his atrocious deeds, arrived in the city on 2 July 1784 (13 *Sha'ban* 1198), after serving a succession of governorships, first in Ichel (west of Adana) in 1779, then in Adana in 1780, again in Ichel in 1781, and in Diyarbakr in 1782.⁶ Within a few days of his arrival, he made his rounds of the town, arresting and killing four janissaries. His militias (*tufekjiya*) then marched through the streets and fired warning shots. They proceeded to arrest and imprison passersby indiscriminately, and the innocent prisoners then had to pay to secure their release. The representatives (*wakils*) of the Christian communities were summoned by the governor and were ordered to forbid Christian women from wearing green clothes and hair-bands in churches and to force Christian men to wear clothes distinguishing them as Christians. Following this, the governor's deputy (*mutasallim*) Husayn Agha appeared and demanded payment, threatening them with death. On this occasion, members of the four Christian sects (i.e. the Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, and Maronites) were obliged to pay 6,000 *ghurush*. The governor also began to collect money from the guilds and the city quarters.⁷

⁵ The memoir is: Fawwaz al-Fawwaz, ed., *al-Murtad fi Ta'rikh Halab wa Baghdad*, by Yusuf ibn Dimitri al-Halabi (d. 1806), unpublished M.A. Thesis, Damascus University, n.d. The Ottoman documents are from the *Awamir Sultaniya*, Halab (hereafter AS), vols. 15–18.

⁶ See Appendix 1; al-Fawwaz, ed., *al-Murtad*, 55; Muhammad Süreyya, *Sijill-i Osmani*, 4 vols., Istanbul, 1890/91, reprinted Westmead, Gregg International Publishers, 1971, vol. 3, 411.

⁷ al-Fawwaz, ed., *al-Murtad*, 55–56.

For almost three months during which 'insatiable and extreme oppression, extortion and black deeds rained down' (*la yashba'u 'an al-mazalim al-za'ida wa al-jinayat wa al-musawwadat mithla al-matar*), as Yusuf al-Halabi described it, most Aleppines tended to stay indoors, while some made their escape from the city. In late September, one famous janissary was arrested and taken to the citadel. The janissaries assembled with their chief, the *sirdar*, demanding permission to rebel against the governor. On the night of Wednesday 29 September, two janissaries were taken to the citadel by the governor's militia after their houses in the quarter of Mashariqa (a western suburb of the city) were pillaged and destroyed. On the next day the janissaries united (*hizb wahid*) and began to do battle on a small scale with the militia.⁸

On Friday, 1 October, the janissaries went round the city and ordered all the shops, *suqs* and *khans* closed. Representatives (*wujuh*) of the common people approached the 'ulama and the qadi, al-Sayyid 'Uthman, to ask them to replace the tyrannical governor who had killed Muslims and Christians without cause and violated Islamic law. The qadi soon ordered the cancellation of the call to prayer and of the prayer itself at all the mosques in the city. This was a *de facto* declaration of war by the "people of the town" (*ahl al-balad*) against the governor. The militia blockaded the area surrounding the *saray*, where 'Abdi Pasha was lodged, facing the citadel at the east end of the Madina (central market) area. Two of the four corners of the blockade were at Suq al-Sabun and Khan al-Wazir, less than 100 meters north of the *saray*. They guarded the open space in front of the entrance to the citadel. The janissaries in the front line tore stones from the benches of the Islamic court building and from nearby shops and made barricades of the stones. Shooting their rifles, the janissaries and townspeople pushed the militias towards the *saray* little by little. Some of them occupied the minarets of the Grand Mosque, the mosque of Isma'il Pasha, and the mosque of 'Utrush (west, south, and south-east of the *saray* respectively) from where they fired down. Just after the battle started, the qadi and the notables visited the *saray* to negotiate with the governor but they were captured and held hostage inside the building.⁹

⁸ Ibid., 57–59.

⁹ Ibid., 59–62.

On Saturday, recognizing the inferiority of his forces, the governor began to use cannon to counterattack the janissaries and townspeople. But this did not change the situation. The next morning, on 3 October, the janissaries sent a message to the governor threatening to kill him and all his staff if they did not come out of the *saray*. It was not until the afternoon, after they had been promised the safety of their lives and property, that 'Abdi Pasha emerged with his officers and militia. They were marched off in a procession headed by leaders of the janissaries, the notables, and the qadi towards one of the city gates, Bab Qinnasrin, south-west of the *saray*. At the gate, the janissaries and the youth of the town jeered and made much noise. Then they expelled the governor and his followers through the gate and fired at their backs, killing a staff-member from Diyarbakr who had been especially notorious for his cruelty.¹⁰

'Abdi Pasha and his followers headed northward from Aleppo to Haylan, Killis, and 'Ayntab, then eastward to Urfa, finally settling in Raqqa, about 160 kilometres east of Aleppo facing the Euphrates River, where 'Abdi eventually became governor of the province.¹¹ It was not until December 1785 that Aleppo received a new governor, al-Hajj Mustafa Pasha, so the city remained without a governor for fourteen months.¹²

Contents of the 'Account Book of Oppression'

After ousting Keki 'Abdi Pasha, the Aleppines engaged in two principal activities: preparing to defend themselves against possible retaliation, and submitting an account of events to the Sublime Porte.

'Ali Agha, a leader of the janissaries, chose fifteen janissaries each from Banqusa and Bab al-Nayrab, two quarters in the eastern suburbs which formed the janissaries' major strongholds in the city. He then appointed the thirty janissaries and two of their *bayraqdars* (standard-bearers) to be in charge of the administration of the city, just as the deputies of the governors had done before. 'Ali Agha strongly cautioned the janissaries not to be hostile to the Muslims, Christians, and others in the city, and not to demand any money or 'araq from

¹⁰ Ibid., 61–63.

¹¹ Ibid., 64, 67, 69; AS vol. 18, no. 2.

¹² Bodman, *Political Factions*..., 115.

them. The janissaries helped the townspeople in all the city quarters to protect themselves from possible retaliatory attacks by 'Abdi Pasha. They patrolled the city and kept night watches at the gates. In need of a budget, 'Ali Agha collected 1,000 *ghurush* as an 'honorarium' (*ikramiya*) from each of the four Christian sects as well as from the Jews. He also asked the European consulates for help, receiving money and clothing. The city quarters collected money from the inhabitants for self-defence.¹³ The qadi ordered the chief of the citadel guards to lend sixty rifles to the inhabitants of the quarter of Ma'adi on 7 October, and then to lend twenty rifles to the inhabitants of the quarter of Warraqa on 30 October. Both quarters were outside the city wall.¹⁴

Meanwhile, a group of 'ulama, teachers, notables, *ashraf*, imams, *khatibs*, shaykhs, sufis, merchants, and (Christian and Jewish) subjects came to the Islamic court and asked the qadi to write and send a petition to the central government. The qadi recorded their claims and made a list of 'Abdi Pasha's acts of oppression as supporting evidence (Appendix 1).¹⁵ This was done on 8 October, five days after the expulsion of the governor. The petitioners outlined the proper character of governors in the Ottoman Empire as protectors of the weak and as loyal executors of Islamic law and of the orders of the Sultans. Then they complained that all the governors of Aleppo at the time had been excessively tyrannical, pillaging property and killing the townspeople. After describing 'Abdi Pasha's oppressive behaviour towards the Aleppines, they insisted that many rich merchants and honourable people had left the city, which had caused the stagnation of trade and a decline in tax income. In this way they justified ousting the governor. After quoting these claims, the qadi simply reported the expulsion of the governor and confirmed that the people's actions had been in accordance with the imperial order.¹⁶

The list of 'Abdi Pasha's oppressive acts was divided into two parts: spoils from city quarters, and spoils from guilds and people. The number of quarters recorded, forty-two, seems to have been about half of the total number of quarters in the city.¹⁷ Twenty-nine of these

¹³ al-Fawwaz, ed., *al-Murtad*, 66–67.

¹⁴ AS vol. 17, 128, 141.

¹⁵ AS vol. 17, 131–35.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ According to Marcus, Aleppo had eighty-two quarters in the middle of the eighteenth century. *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity...*, 285.

were outside the city walls and seven out of the eleven quarters inside the walls were concentrated in the south-eastern area around Bab al-Nayrab. Two are not identified. Conversely, the central quarters such as al-Farafira or Suwayqa 'Ali did not appear on the list. The figures recorded for Qarliq and Qastal al-Harami, the north-east and north corners of the city respectively, were far higher than the others. This leads to the conjecture that the governor tried to collect money from quarters which had received many immigrants but did not touch the central and relatively wealthier area. Two quarters where the Jewish population was in the majority, Bahsita and Yahud, were counted, and several of the northern suburbs where the Christians were dominant were also included, but neither al-Judayda nor al-Saliba, both of which had majority Christian populations, was included.

The second part of the list named the sixty-one guilds and individuals involved, and the pretexts under which they were targeted. The total was about nine times larger than that of the first part. The amount from the four Christian sects and the Jews put together (nos. 31 and 32) was by far the highest, 39,000 *ghurush*. By comparing this with the total amount of the *jizya* tax collected from the entire province of Aleppo in 1776—about 59,500 *ghurush*—and considering the fact that the ratio of the number of the *jizya* payers of the city of Aleppo to the total number of the province in 1824/25 was about 60 per cent, it can be estimated that 'Abdi Pasha had taken about the same amount or more than the *jizya* on this occasion.¹⁸ There were only twenty-one guilds, among which the sum taken from the gardeners (*baghjuwan*) (nos. 10, 11 and 21) was an overwhelming 15,972 *ghurush*. When the qadi of Aleppo supervised the collection of a special tax for the war with Russia in 1828, the number of guilds which bore the imposition was sixty-seven.¹⁹ Among these, however, tobacconists, dyers, and greengrocers and some others were not included in the list of 'Abdi Pasha's exactions. The items concerning grains (nos. 1, 34, 40, 48 and 49), whose total was 25,900 *ghurush*, were also significant. In addition to collecting 15,000 *ghurush* from the villages (no. 51), the governor interfered with the distribution of agricultural products in the city, taking a large quantity for himself.

¹⁸ Hidemitsu Kuroki, 'Zimmi in Mid-Nineteenth Century Aleppo: An Analysis of *Cizye Defteris*', *Archiv Orientalni*, Supplementa 8, 1998, 205–50.

¹⁹ AS vol. 45, no. 9.

From this list of 103 items, it appears that more than a hundred persons from the Aleppo quarters, guilds and villages, including Christians and Jews, came to the Islamic Court and complained to the qadi about their sufferings. The list was not made simply for the sake of compensation, but to justify the people's violence, which temporarily destroyed the political order within the city. On 15 October, a week after the documentation had been assembled, a delegation of five was sent to Istanbul with the petition and the list.²⁰

Further Oppression and Bargaining after the Revolt

While the anticipated military retaliation on the part of 'Abdi Pasha did not materialize, the Aleppines suffered from another kind of oppression caused by official decrees.

On 23 February 1785 (13 *Rabi' al-Thani* 1199), about four and a half months after the expulsion of 'Abdi Pasha, the qadi of Aleppo received an imperial order issued in Istanbul in the middle of January. The order was based on a report sent by 'Abdi Pasha himself, who was then in Raqqa. According to his report, he had besieged the Rashwans, a Kurdish tribe, at a place about two hours from Behesni, about 170 kilometres north of Aleppo. After forcing their surrender, he spared the lives of fifty chiefs in exchange for the payment of the *miri* tax for the year 1198. They had previously pillaged a caravan heading for Izmir, and the spoils would be a part of the tax. The amount of the tax had been as much as 1,500 *kese* (750,000 *ghurush*). In order to collect the amount, 'Abdi Pasha seized sheep and camels from the Rashwans and forced the Aleppines to buy them. The money was then immediately to be sent to Istanbul, not to 'Abdi Pasha himself.²¹

Three months later, in late May, 1785, 'Arif Isma'il, the qadi of Aleppo who had succeeded al-Sayyid 'Uthman, angrily reported the consequences of the imperial order to the Sublime Porte. He had received a

²⁰ al-Fawwaz, ed., *al-Murtad*, 67. According to al-Tabbakh, the five members were a representative from the ulama ('*alim*), a *sharif* (*sayyid*), a Janissary (*inkishari*), a subordinate of the qadi (*tabi' qadi Halab*), and a townsman (*wahid min ahl al-balad*). al-Tabbakh, *I'lam al-Nubala'*, 3, 363; Bodman, *Political Factions...*, 115. The French consul was also aware that five persons would be sent to the Sublime Porte to accompany the petition. Amé to the Ambassador of France, Constantinople, 12 October 1784. Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes, Ambassade Constantinople, série D, Correspondance avec les consulats, Échelles du Levant, Alep, vol. 22, ff. 193–94.

²¹ AS vol. 18, no. 2.

notice from 'Abdi Pasha that the Pasha had sent 2,500 sheep, 450 grey camels, and 100 long-haired camels to al-Bab, a village 36 kilometres north-east of Aleppo. Because a sheep cost four *ghurush*, a grey camel 100 *ghurush*, and a long-haired camel 175 *ghurush*, the total amount should have been 72,500 *ghurush*; but when the qadi, the *qa'immaqam* Muhammad Agha and the notables had come to the village and counted the livestock in front of the villagers, they found only 1,178 sheep, 273 grey camels, and 57 long-haired camels. The qadi observed that 'Abdi Pasha had previously selected and sold the healthy animals for his own benefit and had sent over the remaining weak and even dying ones. The qadi and the notables then brought the livestock to the camel market in Aleppo, having them auctioned off for 18,897 *ghurush* 10 *para* (see Appendix 2-1).²² The reasons for this small amount were that first, the regular price of a sheep had been 2 *ghurush*, a grey camel 50 *ghurush*, and a long-haired camels 100 *ghurush*; second, the livestock had been thin and weak, further lowering their prices; and third, the Aleppines had been seriously impoverished by the recent oppression, especially by 'Abdi Pasha, and could not afford to purchase many of the animals. After explaining this, the qadi criticized 'Abdi Pasha's demand that the amount of 72,500 *ghurush* should be sent to Istanbul as unjust and wrong (*ta'addi ve sitem*).²³

In spite of this qadi's protests, it seems that the central government had no have mercy on the impoverished Aleppines. On 13 January 1786, the same qadi tried to cover the deficit of 54,000 *ghurush* by delaying the remittance of half of the amount, and by dividing the other half for impositions among the province (see Appendix 2-2).²⁴ This attempt was unsuccessful. The Sublime Porte issued a *firman* in the middle of November 1786, ordering the governor and the qadi of Aleppo first to remit 20,000 *ghurush* in the charge of Wali Bey, an officer specially dispatched for the purpose, and then to divide the remainder of 52,500 *ghurush* into two instalments. From this it became clear that the officers responsible for the auction had not remitted the amount

²² From the table of Appendix 2-1, the auctioned price of a single sheep can be calculated as 2.75 *ghurush*. The average prices of the grey and long-haired camels cannot be determined, since we only know the total cost of the two. But we may estimate their values at, for example, 40 and 83 *ghurush* each, or 42 and 73.5 *ghurush* each.

²³ AS vol. 18, no. 65, 66.

²⁴ AS vol. 18, no. 129.

of 18,897 *ghurush* for a year and a half. The *firman* ordered the qadi to send the names of all the people who had bought livestock.²⁵

Receiving this imperial order, on 17 March 1787, the governor 'Uthman Pasha again ordered the qadi and other officers to obey, insisting that 'excuses are useless' (*'ilel bihude birle*).²⁶ At last, on 4 September 1787, about two and a half years after the auction, the qadi of Aleppo, 'Abd al-Rahman, listed the details of the auction and payment (see Appendix 2–3). One outstanding presence in these records is that of Chelebi Efendi, Taha Zade al-Sayyid Muhammad. He was one of the most prominent notables in eighteenth-century Aleppo and was the *qa'immaqam naqib al-ashraf* and the *mufti* of Aleppo at the time of the auction. Employing three agents, he had bought 44 grey camels and 28 long-haired camels, i.e. about half of the more expensive ones. He died sometime before the end of December 1786, and a new *qa'immaqam naqib al-ashraf*, Jabiri Zade Mustafa Efendi, was nominated to replace him.²⁷ The Jabiri family also appears on the list.

The matter dragged on, and on 4 January 1788, the Sublime Porte ordered the governor, the qadi, and other officers in Aleppo to remit the 23,391 *ghurush* for the lost livestock. This time the central government showed a little mercy to the Aleppines by acknowledging that drought, inflation and plague had suddenly hit Aleppo and, because of these difficulties, the remainder could be paid in yearly installments of 4,678 *ghurush* over a period of five years.²⁸

Still, the remittance was delayed. On 9 April 1789, the central government sent a *firman* ordering the qadi, the governor's deputy, and an officer specially dispatched for this case, Husayn, to remit immediately the unpaid amount of 38,326 *ghurush*. Referring to the report from Husayn, the order claimed that the people of Aleppo had 'delayed the payment for as long as eleven months, saying we would send the amount today or tomorrow'. Surprisingly, on 4 January 1790, four years and seven months after the auction, the Sublime Porte sent yet another order to Aleppo, urging the officers to remit the same amount. It is not known whether the sum was finally sent to Istanbul or not.

²⁵ AS vol. 19, no. 21.

²⁶ AS vol. 19, no. 17.

²⁷ AS vol. 18, no. 251; Muhammad Qudsi Efendi succeeded him as *mufti* in late April, 1787: AS vol. 19, no. 37. For Taha Zade's power, see Marcus, *The Middle East...*, pp. 83–86.

²⁸ AS vol. 19, no. 139.

‘Abdi Pasha, the initiator of this series of events, moved to Cairo as governor of Egypt after his posting at Raqqa, and in 1790 moved back to his post of Diyarbakr, where he died in the same year.²⁹

In summary: with the help of the qadi, the buyers of the livestock—who were rich urban notables and the chief of the butchers—tried to turn ‘Abdi Pasha’s counter-attack into profit for themselves, but in the end, they had to pay the bill. The local government then extorted from the villagers to compensate for the deficit resulting from the battles that raged between the tyrannical governor and the townspeople of Aleppo. What emerges from the process of these events is a pyramid structure of power comprised of the central government at the top, followed by the governor, the urban notables, the townspeople, and the villagers, with the nomadic tribes at the bottom.

Urban Politics and the Role of the Qadis

The above events may be regarded as a two-act drama in the urban theatre of late eighteenth-century Aleppo. The way it unfolded displays traditional Islamic political norms: when people criticized the governor’s coerciveness in the petition to Istanbul, they used terms such as *zulm*, *khassaret*, and *ta‘addi*, and when justifying their actions, they referred to *‘adl* and *‘adalet*.³⁰ As subjects deserving to be shown mercy by the state authorities, they protested against the governor by accusing him of enriching himself and endangering their property and security, far from fulfilling his honoured duties.

Closing down markets and shops and cancelling prayers were manifestations of the people’s protests and a sharing of the call to revolt. Evading the most fundamental economic and religious activities was the simple way to cause disorder and the most effective way for the weak to protest against a tyrannical ruler. Only after this action did the violence start.

²⁹ AS vol. 20, no. 25; vol. 21, no. 29.

³⁰ Compare Edmund Burke, ‘Towards a History of Urban Collective Action in the Middle East: Continuities and Change, 1750–1980’, in Kenneth Brown et al., eds., *Urban Crises and Social Movements in the Middle East*, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1989, 42–56, and Sami Zubaida, ‘Urban Social Movements 1750–1950’, in Peter Sluglett, ed., *The Urban Social History of the Arab Middle East*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2008, 224–53.

The qadi, al-Sayyid 'Uthman, understood the reasons for the uprising, and committed himself to the revolt by ordering the cancellation of the call to prayer. He willingly tried to mediate between the governor and the Aleppines and was taken hostage. After the revolt, he recorded the extent of 'Abdi Pasha's oppression in a list. His successors always stood by the Aleppines during the negotiations after the auction of the livestock, and the qadi's commitment undoubtedly gave the disturbance a degree of legitimacy.

There is no evidence in the documents that the Sublime Porte criticised the qadi's action in the revolt or the governor's tyranny, nor did the Aleppines criticise the central government's misjudgement in appointing 'Abdi Pasha their governor. The tacit order of the Empire was quite unaffected by this turmoil. As Marcus described it, 'the rough-and-tumble of Aleppo's politics in the late eighteenth century tested and affirmed the underlying stability of the city's social and political order'.³¹

By sending reports to and receiving orders from the central government, the qadi encouraged a third party—the Sublime Porte—to observe the serious struggles between the governor and the townspeople. In other words, the Aleppines approached him in order to introduce a third party into their conflict, just as in a court system. In order to strengthen their forces further, they appealed to a fourth party by asking the European consuls to report the affair to their ambassadors.³²

This manner of introducing a third party as mediator was also utilized by 'Abdi Pasha. Although his expulsion deprived him of his honour and his reputation vis-à-vis the central government, he did not resort to violence in order to retaliate against the Aleppines. Since he needed to score points with the Sublime Porte, he sent the livestock to let the Aleppines pay Istanbul. Official documents were exchanged between 'Abdi Pasha, the central government, and the qadi of Aleppo. Although the notables of Aleppo tried to benefit by purchasing the livestock at discounted prices and imposing the deficit on the city's hinterland, the central government was not cheated. Again, the qadi stood by the Aleppines with sympathy, although ultimately in vain.

³¹ Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity*..., 92.

³² al-Fawwaz, ed., *al-Murtad*, 67; Ironically, the French consul reported to the ambassador that 'Abdi Pasha had not been especially tyrannical in comparison with some of his predecessors. Amé to the ambassador, October 12, 1784, op. cit.

The changing role of the qadis in these urban disturbances of Aleppo was parallel to the changes in their societal position. Already in 1775, when the Aleppines ousted 'Ali Pasha, the qadi had supported the revolt by forbidding the call to prayer.³³ In 1804, after the governor Muhammad Pasha was expelled from the city, he issued an administrative order bitterly criticizing the qadi's support for the revolt.³⁴ But in 1819, when the governor Khurshid Pasha fled from the townspeople's attack and escaped from the city, the qadi followed him, leaving the role of mediation to his deputy (*na'ib al-qadi*).³⁵ In 1850, when Mustafa Zarif Pasha fled from the city on the occasion of the revolt which provoked an attack on the predominantly Christian quarters, the qadi again sought refuge with the governor outside the city and did not take part in the negotiations between the governor and the rebels.³⁶ This change of the qadi's manner during the tentative social disorder symbolized the reality of modernization in the Ottoman Empire and of social transformation at its deepest structural level.

³³ Bodman, *Political Factions*..., 112–13.

³⁴ AS vol. 30, no. 47.

³⁵ Hidemitsu Kuroki, 'Social Relations in an Urban Disturbance: Aleppo, 1819–20', (in Japanese) *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies* 3, 1, 1988, 1–59.

³⁶ Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840–1861*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968, pp. 101–07; Bruce Masters, 'The 1850 Events in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria's Incorporation into the Capitalist World System', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22, 1990, 3–20; Hidemitsu Kuroki, 'The 1850 Aleppo Disturbance Reconsidered', *Acta Viennensia Ottomanica: Akten des 13. CIEPO-Symposiums vom 21. bis 25. September 1998 in Wien*, Vienna, Institut für Orientalistik, 1999, 221–33.

*Appendix 1: A Document Attached to the Petition to the Sublime Porte,
Dated 23 Dhu al-Qa'da 1198 (8 October 1784).*

Source: *Awamir Sultaniya Halab*, vol. 17, 133–35 (translated from the original Ottoman Turkish).

‘Abdi Pasha, the governor of Aleppo, arrived in the city on 13 Sha‘ban (2 July). During his stay, he unjustly killed people simply for the sake of terrorizing the unfortunate, thus causing great fear among the common people. His designated revenues, gifts, incomes, publicly known fines, and the remuneration collected from villages for his followers totaled 100 *kese*; but in addition he called upon several people, merchants, notables, the poor, and *re‘aya* from the city and villages to extort and confiscate money from them. He also seized grain although this has been prohibited by many imperial orders. He continuously demanded from the people many more parting gifts and honoraria than they could afford. Disregarding both custom and imperial orders, he took penalties from people in the city quarters, women, the janissaries, and the guilds. During the period of ninety-five days until his removal from the city on 18 *Dhu'l-Qa'da* (3 October), the total amount of his spoils became extremely great and the confirmed items are recorded hereunder.

City quarters	<i>ghurush</i>
1 Quarter of Qarliq	3,755
2 Quarter of Dallalin	550
3 Quarter of Sajlikhan	267
4 Quarter of Jallum Sughra	540
5 Quarter of ‘Aynayn	891
6 Quarter of Shama‘in	133.5
7 Quarter of Mashariqa	112
8 Quarter of Ma‘adi	450
9 Quarter of Maqamat	350
10 Quarter of Hawarina	70
11 Quarter of Qastal al-Harami	2,463
12 Quarter of Qawanisa	142
13 Quarter of Tatarlar	525
14 Quarter of Farain	280
15 Quarter of Bahsita	750
16 Quarter of Mughair	350
17 Quarter of Bustan	400
18 Quarter of Kharabkhan	300
19 Quarter of Dahdala	400
20 Quarter of Hazzaza	400
21 Quarter of Muhammad Bek	405
22 Quarter of Qastal al-Aqrab	460.5
23 Quarter of Qattan	320

Table (*cont.*)

City quarters	<i>ghurush</i>
24 Quarter of Safsa	360
25 Quarter of Akrad	425
26 Quarter of Oghulbek	130
27 Quarter of Qasila	400
28 Quarter of Yahud	760
29 Quarter of Jubb Asad Allah	487
30 Quarter of Tutu	855
31 Quarter of Almaj	1,382
32 Quarter of 'Atawi Kabir	350
33 Quarter of Kallasa	680
34 Quarter of Sayyida	290
35 Quarter of Aqyul	250
36 Quarter of Altunbugha	300
37 Quarter of Abraj	180
38 Quarter of Kattani	300
39 Quarter of Kharij Bab al-Nayrab	350
40 Quarter of Sakhkhana	90
41 Quarter of ? (illegible)	100
42 Quarter of Dakhil Bab al-Nayrab	150
Total	22,158

Guilds and Others	<i>ghurush</i>
1 The value of 230 <i>makuk</i> of barley extorted from villagers despite an imperial decree prohibiting governors from taking barley	7,500
2 The value of cut straw for stables extorted by the governor (Imperial decrees prohibited taking more than 1,000 <i>oqqa</i> per day)	3,800
3 From the <i>re'aya</i> of the striped cloth weavers guild	3,134
4 From the <i>ashraf</i>	1,250
5 From the Janissaries	420
6 From the citadel guards	330
7 From the tanners guild	1,000
8 From the goldsmiths and silversmiths guild	1,300
9 From goldsmiths and silversmiths (sic.)	1,750
10 From gardeners for the <i>hadiqa sultaniya</i> for the dead (?)	5,247
11 From gardeners of sewage; Prohibited by imperial decree	4,725
12 From the coppersmiths guild	400
13 From the bakers guild	1,500
14 From butchers	1,100
15 From three groups of millers	2,250

Table (cont.)

Guilds and Others	<i>ghurush</i>
16 From the market warden; The value of a garment	2,000
17 From the superintendent of the butchers guild; The value of a garment	2,500
18 From managers of public baths	400
19 From the weavers guild	1,500
20 On the pretext of distributing livestock	177
21 From the gardeners guild	6,000
22 From shovel-makers	1,500
23 From boot-makers	600
24 From al-Sayyid Ahmad Efendi, the former director of a silver refinery	1,600
25 From Amir Zade al-Sayyid Khalil Chelebi	1,250
26 From <i>za'ims</i> and owners of <i>timar</i>	5,500
27 From Jazmati Zade al-Hajj Khalil Chelebi	3,750
28 From Fadawi al-Hajj Mustafa	330
29 From Khoja Oghulu Bey	30
30 From a citadel guard 'Abd al-Hamid	300
31 From the four Christian sects	33,000
32 From the Jews	6,000
33 From the poor in the quarters of Aleppo by deceiving them that they should pay 8 <i>para</i> per 1 <i>ghurush</i> of <i>salyane</i> tax	3,000
34 Value of grain taken from the villages in the province against imperial orders	15,000
35 <i>Adhumiya</i> from the province (?)	2,750
36 From the village of Nayrab	1,400
37 From the village of 'Andan, the <i>waqf</i> of Ghuri Zade	1,500
38 From Khunkarli Zade 'Abd al-Rahim Agha	500
39 From Tutunji oghulu Yasif	2,200
40 Value of grain extorted by 'Abdi Pasha at the station of Haylan; he claimed, falsely, that the grain had been transported from the <i>nahiya</i> of Bab in a manner contrary to established practice.	1,600
41 In addition to <i>salyane</i> tax and ? (illegible), on the pretext of urgency, service, and disbursement	8,013
42 Claiming that it was for his <i>kethuda</i> , 'Abdi Pasha wrote down a substitute in an account book	1,500
43 From a <i>dhimmi</i> Jurji Warshu	920
44 From a <i>dhimmi</i> priest Jurjus	650
45 From an <i>odabashi</i> al-Hajj Yusuf	434
46 Asbar Agha's penalty who was killed by 'Abdi Pasha	450
47 From the post officer of Aleppo	2,000
48 The value of grain which 'Abdi Pasha seized after entering Aleppo contrary to imperial orders	1,300

Table (*cont.*)

Guilds and Others		<i>ghurush</i>
49	By claiming that 'Abdi Pasha provided a legal opinion concerning the grain from Tuman	500
50	From barbers	200
51	Honoraria collected from villages in the province against imperial orders	15,000
52	From the guild of gold or silver thread-drawers	1,957
53	From al-Hajj Mustafa who was from Antakya and was staying in Aleppo	5,000
54	From <i>dhimmi</i> porters who were from Arabkir and were staying in Aleppo	300
55	From <i>sha'ab amini</i>	1,000
56	From Jahin from Birejik	2,000
57	From <i>aghas</i> of Khan Tuman	1,200
58	From merchants and several individuals	11,267.75
59	From the guild of milkmen	750
60	From Matula oghulu 'Umar	150
61	From a <i>dhimmi</i> priest	25
	Total	186,093 (sic)
Total		208,251(sic)

This is the amount taken from inside Aleppo to the above-mentioned governor's treasury, excluding the allowance for 'Abdi Pasha's officers, the amount which should have been paid for the services of the janissaries, and the amounts taken from Antakya, Idlib, Ariha, and other districts.

signature: al-Sayyid 'Uthman, qadi of the city of Aleppo

Appendix 2: Results of the Auction of the Livestock Captured from the Rashwans by 'Abdi Pasha

Source: *Awamir Sultaniya* Halab, vol. 18, no. 65, 66, 129; vol. 19, 42.
(Originally in Ottoman Turkish)

2-1: Result of the Auction Reported to the Sublime Porte by the Qadi of Aleppo, 'Arif Ibrahim, late May, 1785. (AS 18, no. 65, 66)

Sheep	1,178	3,239.5	<i>ghurush</i>
Grey Camels	273	15,658.25	<i>ghurush</i>
Long-haired Camels	57		
Total		18,897.75	<i>ghurush</i>

2-2: Plan for Dividing the Deficit Recorded by the Qadi of Aleppo, 'Arif Ibrahim, 13 January 1786. (AS vol. 18, no. 129)

Originally demanded amount	72,500	<i>ghurush</i>
Amount gained at the auction	-18,896	<i>ghurush</i>
	53,604	<i>ghurush</i>
Charges of accounting and shepherds	+ 396	<i>ghurush</i>
	54,000	<i>ghurush</i>
Half of the amount, the remittance of which is delayed at present	-27,000	<i>ghurush</i>
	27,000	<i>ghurush</i>

Division of undelayed amount, 27,000 *ghurush*

	<i>ghurush</i>
<i>Qadha</i> of Antakya	9,000
<i>Waqf</i> of the town of Ariha	4,000
<i>Waqf</i> of the town of Idlib	3,000
<i>Waqf</i> of the town of Shughur and of the surrounding villages	3,000
Villages in the <i>nahiya</i> of Aleppo	8,000
Total	27,000

2-3: Result of the Auction Finally Confirmed by the Qadi of Aleppo, 'Abd al-Rahman, 4 September 1787. (*Awamir Sultaniya*, 19, 42)

Original Number of the Livestock and the Demanded Prices

	Price per 1 (<i>ghurush</i>)	Number	Price (<i>ghurush</i>)
Sheep	4	2,500	10,000
Grey Camel	100	450	45,000
Long-haired Camel	175	100	17,500
Total			72,500

Numbers of Livestock Auctioned and Numbers Lost

	Sheep	Grey Camel	Long-haired Camel
No. of Livestock Auctioned	1,178	273	57
No. of Livestock Lost	1,322	177	43

Results of the Auction and the Amounts of Payment and Debt

Name of buyer	No. of Sheep	No. of Grey Camel	No. of Long- haired Camel	Total Auctioned Price (<i>ghurush</i>)	Amount Paid to Wali Bey (<i>ghurush</i>)	Amount Paid to Mustafa Bey (<i>ghurush</i>)	Remain- ing Debt (<i>ghurush</i>)
Sayyaf Zade al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman Agha	0	22	0	2,200	903	1,297	0
Agent of Chelebi Efendi	0	1	21	3,775	1,698	2,077	0
Sayyid Taha Shabib	0	21	2	2,450	0	2,450	0
Agent of Chelebi Efendi	0	27	3	3,225	1,128	2,097	0
Agent of Chelebi Efendi	0	6	0	600	325.5	274.5	0
Agent of Chelebi Efendi	0	10	5	1,875	910	965	0
Agent of Jabiri Zade	0	10	0	1,000	440	560	0

Table (*cont.*)

Name of buyer	No. of Sheep	No. of Grey Camel	No. of Long- haired Camel	Total Auctioned Price (<i>ghurush</i>)	Amount Paid to Wali Bey (<i>ghurush</i>)	Amount Paid to Mustafa Bey (<i>ghurush</i>)	Remain- ing Debt (<i>ghurush</i>)
Sayyid Isma'il Shabib	0	0	10	1,750	0	0	1,750
Tarabulsi Zade Sayyid Mustafa Efendi	0	32	0	3,200	500	1,047	1,653
Abu Bakr Agha	0	56	8	7,000	2,468.75	0	4,531.25
Manzilji Killisi Muhammad	0	24	1	2,575	0	1,292	1,292 sic.
Agent of Ghawri Zade Muhammad Efendi	0	17	5	2,575	1,360	0	1,215
Tellquraji Oghulu 'Ali	0	5	5	1,375	417	0	958
Nasir Basha	0	20	0	2,000	688	0	1,313
Wali Oghulu Turkman 'Ali	0	6	0	600	275	0	325
Sayyid A'rabi the Former <i>Bazar- bashi</i> , deceased	0	13	0	1,300	0	960	340
<i>Qassab-bashi</i> Isma'il	1,178	0	0	4,712	2,000	1,239.5	1,472.5
Total	1,178	270	60		13,111.5	14,259	14,839.75
Amount paid to Wali Bey		13,111.5		<i>ghurush</i>			
Added by the province		6,888.5		<i>ghurush</i>			
Amount paid to Mustafa Bey		14,259		<i>ghurush</i>			
Remaining debt		14,849.75		<i>ghurush</i>			
Price of lost livestock (Covered by the province)		23,391.25		<i>ghurush</i>			
Total		72,5000		<i>ghurush</i>			

PART FIVE

RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN *BILAD AL-SHAM*

ÉCRIRE L'HISTOIRE DES CHRÉTIENS DANS LES VILLES DE SYRIE AVANT LES RÉFORMES OTTOMANES

BERNARD HEYBERGER

Pendant longtemps, et encore en partie de nos jours, l'historiographie des chrétiens du *bilad al-sham* a été confessionnelle, voire cléricale, qui évitait, ou refusait même le dialogue avec l'histoire générale de la région.¹

Aujourd'hui les choses ont changé, et l'histoire des chrétiens est placée dans le contexte de la société locale et de l'histoire politique ottomane en général. Cette révision de l'historiographie est en grande partie redevable à l'usage qui a été fait de la documentation conservée dans les archives ottomanes, sur place et à Istanbul. On pense aux registres de recensements fiscaux du XVI^e siècle² ou aux ordres sultaniens.³ Mais je veux évidemment, et avant tout, rendre hommage à Abdul-Karim Rafeq, qui, dans un article datant de 1973 déjà, attirait l'attention sur l'intérêt des registres des tribunaux et révélait la présence des juifs et des chrétiens dans ces registres.⁴ Malgré les critiques qu'on peut formuler à l'encontre de l'usage de ces derniers,⁵ il faut reconnaître que leur exploitation a produit depuis lors l'avancée la plus significative pour la connaissance des chrétiens de Syrie à l'époque ottomane.

¹ Sans même évoquer l'historiographie maronite, je pense par exemple aux travaux de Joseph Nasrallah, chez les melkites, notamment à son ouvrage monumental *Histoire du mouvement littéraire dans l'Eglise melchite du V^e au XX^e siècle*, Vol. IV, T.I (1516–1724), Louvain, Peeters, 1979, T.II (1724–1800), Louvain, 1989.

² Adnan Bakhit, 'The Christian Population of the Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century', in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, New York, Holmes and Meier, Vol. 2, 1982, 19–66.

³ Voir par exemple, Hidemitsu Kuroki, 'Zimmis in mid-nineteenth Century Aleppo: an analysis of Ciyze-Defteris', in *Essays on Ottoman Civilization*, Proceedings of the XIIth Congress of the Comité International d'Etudes Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes, Prague, 1996, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, 1998, 205–48.

⁴ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Les Registres des tribunaux de Damas comme source pour l'histoire de la Syrie', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, 26, 1973, 219–31.

⁵ Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, 31–33.

Par la suite, dans trois articles portant sur les corporations de métiers à Damas et à Alep, Rafeq a livré un matériel abondant sur la présence des chrétiens et des juifs dans ces *ta'ifa*-s, et a analysé longuement leur place dans l'activité économique et dans le partage d'une éthique du travail. Il y soulignait une certaine qualité des relations (*smooth relationship*) qui y régnait entre membres de confessions différentes. Il y insistait sur le fait que beaucoup de métiers étaient mixtes, et que chrétiens et juifs n'y semblaient pas défavorisés par rapport aux musulmans. C'était l'expertise et la qualité du travail qui y déterminait la place de chacun.⁶ Après Abdul-Karim Rafeq, André Raymond a lui aussi évoqué la mixité des *ta'ifa*-s d'Alep dans un article plus récent.⁷ Et Abraham Marcus a souligné l'absence de discriminations des relations entre musulmans et *dhimmi*-s dans la même ville.⁸

On sait à travers les *sijill* que les chrétiens sont intégrés aussi sous d'autres formes à la vie collective. Antoine Abdelnour et Abraham Marcus pour Alep, et plus récemment, Brigitte Marino pour Damas, ont révélé la présence des chrétiens dans les transactions immobilières, pour relever, dans les deux cas, la fréquence du voisinage et des échanges entre chrétiens et musulmans.⁹ Mais dans les deux cas aussi, les auteurs ont montré que l'achat immobilier, du moins dans un quartier

⁶ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Craft Organizations and Religious Communities in Ottoman Syria (XVI^e-XIX^e centuries)', in *La Shi'a nell'impero ottomano*, Rome, Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei, 1993, 25-55; 'Craft Organisation, Work Ethics and the Strains of Change in Ottoman Syria', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 111, 1991, 495-511; 'Coexistence and Integration among the Religious Communities in Ottoman Syria', in Akira Usuki et Hiroshi Kato (éds.), *Islam in the Middle Eastern Studies: Muslims and Minorities*, JCAS Symposium Series 7, The Japan Center for Area Studies (JCAS), National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, 2003, 97-131.

⁷ André Raymond, 'Une communauté en expansion: les chrétiens d'Alep à l'époque ottomane (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)', in André Raymond, *La ville arabe, Alep à l'époque ottomane (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles)*, Damascus, Institut français d'études arabes, 1998, 359.

⁸ Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity. Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, 44.

⁹ Antoine Abdelnour, *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane (XVI^e-XVIII^e siècle)*, Beyrouth, Librairie Orientale, 1982; Brigitte Marino, 'Le 'Quartier des Chrétiens' (Mahallat al-Nasara) de Damas au milieu du XVIII^e siècle (1150-1170/1738-1758)', *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, 107-110, 2005, 323-351; 'Chrétiens et musulmans dans le 'quartier des chrétiens (mahallat al-nasara)' de Damas au XVIII^e siècle (1137-1170 / 1725-1757)', in Louis Boisset, Floréal Sanagustin, Souad Slim, eds., *Les relations entre musulmans et chrétiens dans le Bilad al-Cham à l'époque ottomane aux XVII^e-XIX^e siècles. Apport des archives des tribunaux religieux des villes: Alep, Beyrouth, Damas, Tripoli*, Damas, Institut français du proche orient, Université de Balamand, Université Saint-Joseph, 2005, 145-72.

à prédominance chrétienne, était plus souvent un investissement patrimonial du côté chrétien, un investissement spéculatif du côté musulman, qu'il y avait donc bien une différence de comportement sur le marché immobilier. C'est un argument en faveur de l'idée défendue par André Raymond, d'une dynamique de la ségrégation qui serait en œuvre à Alep. Brigitte Marino est plus nuancée à cet égard à propos du *Harat al-Nasara* de Damas. D'autres liens de proximité unissent les minoritaires et les musulmans : ainsi, Bruce Masters a détaillé par exemple les contrats de *mudabara* qui lient un détenteur de capitaux musulman à un agent chrétien pour une opération de commerce.¹⁰

L'image qui se dégage de ces sources, de minoritaires intégrés économiquement et socialement, voire politiquement, à la société locale, amène Abdul-Karim Rafeq à souligner à plusieurs reprises la tolérance de cette société à l'égard des minoritaires.¹¹ Ce thème de la tolérance est également repris par André Raymond. En recourant à des sources chrétiennes, on pourrait aller plus loin, en soulignant l'intégration des chrétiens dans une culture fortement imprégnée par l'Islam.¹² Mais il faudrait en même temps fixer plus nettement les limites de la 'tolérance' musulmane. Rafeq relève que, devant un tribunal, le serment d'un juif ou d'un chrétien sur son propre Livre Saint était accepté, même à l'encontre d'un musulman. Ainsi, un boucher juif, comparaissant devant le tribunal de la sharia d'Alep le 4 septembre 1593 (7 *dhu'l-Hijja* 1001), jura au nom de Dieu 'qui fit descendre la Tora sur Moïse, prière et paix sur lui !' (... *al-ladhi anzala al-tawra 'ala hadra Musa, 'alayhi al-sala wa'l-salam*). Et un chrétien, aide du collecteur de la capitation, fit un serment devant la même cour, le 29 Août 1645 (7 *Rajab* 1055), 'au nom de Dieu, le Grand, le Compatissant, le Miséricordieux, qui fit descendre l'Evangile sur Jésus, paix sur Lui' (*bi-l-lah al-'azim al-Rahman, al-Rahim, al-ladhi anzala al-Injil 'ala 'Issa*,

¹⁰ Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East. Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo (1600-1750)*, New York, New York University Press, 1988, 48-64.

¹¹ Abdul-Karim, Rafeq, 'Craft Organizations and Religious Communities...', 25-26, 32; 'Craft Organisation, Work Ethics...', 509.

¹² Bernard Heyberger, *Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient au temps de la Réforme catholique*, Rome, Ecole Française de Rome, 1994, 155-67; 'Morale et confession chez les melkites d'Alep d'après une liste de péchés (fin XVII^e siècle)', in Geneviève Gobillot, Marie-Thérèse Urvoy (éds.), *L'Orient chrétien dans l'empire musulman. Hommage au professeur Gérard Troupeau*, Versailles, Editions de Paris, 2005, 283-306. Claudia Ott, 'Die Inschriften des Aleppozimmers im berliner Pergamonmuseum', *Le Muséon*, 109, 1996, 185-226.

'*alayhi al-salam*').¹³ Ces gestes consignés dans les registres d'un tribunal islamique, et interprétés par le juge comme une preuve en faveur du non-musulman, attestent le partage d'une certaine conception du sacré entre chrétiens, juifs et musulmans, dont nous trouvons bien des indices dans d'autres situations. Cependant, à y regarder de plus près, en même temps qu'un tel serment intègre les juifs et les chrétiens dans la cité musulmane, en leur garantissant devant la justice des droits fondés sur la reconnaissance de leurs croyances religieuses, il les subordonne à une lecture musulmane de la Révélation. Car les attributs de Dieu dans le serment prêté par le chrétien sont ceux qui accompagnent généralement son invocation dans l'Islam. D'autre part, la formule qui évoque la 'descente' du Livre saint sur Moïse ou sur Jésus délivre une vision musulmane orthodoxe de la Révélation, bien éloignée de la conception chrétienne, fondée sur l'Incarnation, inadmissible dans l'Islam, puisque explicitement condamnée dans le Coran. La foi de l'autre est donc acceptée, mais elle est interprétée dans des termes islamiques, que chrétiens et juifs doivent eux-mêmes répéter devant le cadî.

Rafeq lui-même donne d'ailleurs des indications précises, tirées des registres, sur le fait que les tribunaux introduisent hiérarchie et discrimination entre musulmans et non-musulmans. Ainsi, note-t-il que dans les délégations des *ta'ifa*-s devant les tribunaux, le nom d'un chrétien ou d'un juif est précédé d'une mention *al-dhimmi*, *al-nasrani*, ou *al-yahudi*.¹⁴ Dans un autre article, il mentionne le fait que des chrétiens de Damas étaient fabricants d'armes, mais aussi qu'ils faisaient l'objet d'un recours contre eux devant le cadî, sous l'accusation de complicité avec l'étranger, d'intelligence avec l'ennemi, accusation d'ailleurs récurrente.¹⁵ Il relève les discriminations à l'égard des *dhimmi*-s qui se marquent par l'usage à leur encontre de termes dépréciatifs, ce qui fera l'objet d'une étude plus approfondie de Najwa Al-Qattan.¹⁶ Mais il est vrai, comme Rafeq le souligne, que discrimination et hiérarchie sont également introduites par des formules qui

¹³ Rafeq, 'Coexistence and Integration...', 106-07.

¹⁴ Rafeq, 'Craft Organizations and Religious Communities...', 33.

¹⁵ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'The local forces in Syria in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', dans V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, 277-308.

¹⁶ Najwa Al-Qattan, 'Dhimmi in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 31, 1999, 429-44; 'Textual Differentiation in the Damascus *Sijill*: Religious Discrimination or Politics of

opèrent d'autres distinctions, fondées sur le statut social ou l'origine géographique, les registres des tribunaux distinguant aussi la *qisma* 'askariya de la *qisma* 'arabiya, et multipliant les catégories comme les *sayyid*, les militaires, les kurdes, les *maghariba*, etc...

Rafeq, Raymond et Masters évoquent tous trois la tolérance et l'ouverture religieuse qui ne sont pas contestables, du cheikh 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (1641–1731), une des plus hautes autorités de Syrie en son temps.¹⁷ Aucun de ces trois auteurs ne relève cependant pour le moins une certaine ambivalence dans l'attitude du grand savant, voyageur et soufi damascène. Dans une controverse qui l'oppose à un 'alim turc, dans laquelle il reproche à celui-ci son manque de compréhension envers les droits du *ahl al-dhimma* et sa mauvaise compréhension de la sharia concernant la *jizya*, il injurie son adversaire avec des arguments qui révèlent toute la profondeur de ses propres préjugés antichrétiens, lorsqu'il quitte la sphère éthérée du débat théologique. En traitant le 'alim turc de chrétien mal converti, il établit une hiérarchie entre les nouveaux convertis et les autres, il considère le costume comme un signe distinctif, et il montre que les habitudes alimentaires et religieuses chrétiennes lui inspirent du dégoût:

Il a dû être chrétien, un récent converti à l'islam. Il s'est mis un turban blanc et a revêtu des habits islamiques, mais Dieu seul peut savoir ce qu'il a réellement dans son cœur. Le rustre n'a pas oublié comment il combattait contre les Musulmans, déifiant le Christ, mangeant du porc et adorant les idoles. S'il crachait, du vin sortirait de sa bouche.¹⁸

En réalité, dans une société fondée sur la distinction et la hiérarchie, chrétiens et juifs étaient intégrés, mais dans un rang inférieur, qu'on leur rappelait à l'occasion, notamment quand les privilèges des musulmans semblaient remis en cause. Les règles de la discrimination étaient souvent flottantes, la distinction s'effaçait, d'où des rappels à l'ordre périodiques de la part du cadî ou de la Porte, pour réaffirmer par exemple la ségrégation souhaitée entre musulmans et infidèles au bain.¹⁹ On

Gender?' in Amira El-Azhary Sonbol (éd.), *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1996, 191–201.

¹⁷ Rafeq, 'Coexistence and Integration...', 109–10. Raymond, 'Une communauté en expansion...', 370. Masters, *Christians and Jews...*, 30.

¹⁸ Michael Winter, 'A Polemical Treatise by Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi against a Turkish Scholar on the Religious Status of the *Dhimmi*', *Arabica*, 35, 1988, 92–103.

¹⁹ Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity...*, 41. Tout ce thème est bien discuté dans Masters, *Christians and Jews...*, 16–31.

pourrait ajouter que, si les *dhimmi*-s étaient assez souvent mécontents du sort qu'on leur réservait, eux-mêmes partageaient ces échelles de valeur inégalitaires. Un proverbe consigné dans un manuscrit chrétien du début du XVIII^e siècle affirme: 'Quiconque proclame que tout le monde est égal doit être irrémédiablement fou'.²⁰ Le diacre Bulus, fils du patriarche Makaryus al-Za'im qui tient la chronique du voyage de son père jusqu'à Moscou, effectué entre 1652 et 1659, évoque les violences commises en Ukraine par les Polonais catholiques, qu'il appelle 'maudits, ennemis de la religion', et s'écrie:

Que Dieu fasse durer l'empire turc à tout jamais! Car ceux-ci perçoivent l'impôt (*kharaj*) sans se préoccuper de la religion, ni de savoir si les habitants sont des chrétiens, des *nusayri*-s, des juifs, des samaritains. Quant à ces Polonais, ils ne se contentent pas du *kharaj* et du '*ashur* de leur frère chrétien, ils les asservissent et laissent les ennemis du Christ, les juifs oppresseurs, les commander, comme nous le montrons plus loin, au point qu'ils empêchent de bâtir des églises et qu'ils ne leur laissent pas de prêtres connaissant les mystères de la religion...²¹

Il s'agit là d'un éloge du système ottoman, qui laisse aux chrétiens, quel que soit leur rite, la possibilité d'avoir un clergé et des églises, en échange simplement du paiement de l'impôt. Mais ce texte suppose aussi une hiérarchie parmi les groupes minoritaires. Un Byzantin comme Bulus al-Za'im ne doit pas être à la merci d'un juif ni d'un *nusayri*: l'autorité turque garantit ce *modus vivendi*, qui, d'après Bulus, n'est pas respecté par les Polonais. Le Sultan maintient un ordre naturel, auquel le chrétien de Damas ou d'Alep est attaché.

L'intégration des chrétiens des villes dans le système politique et judiciaire musulman est encore attestée par leur nombreux recours volontaires au *cadi*, et pas seulement pour des affaires concernant leurs relations avec les musulmans. On en trouve des exemples dans les travaux de tous les auteurs que j'ai cités. Ces cas illustrent d'abord le fait que la justice de la *sharia* n'était pas universellement corrompue et partielle comme elle a pu être présentée.²² On a même l'impression qu'elle est supérieure en indépendance à la justice confessionnelle, lorsque des chrétiens y recourent pour conclure des mariages ou, ce

²⁰ Cité par Marcus, op. cit., 37.

²¹ Heyberger, *Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient*, 394.

²² Raymond, 'Une communauté en expansion...', 365-66.

qui est fréquent, vider des querelles intestines.²³ Par ailleurs, les chrétiens d'Alep disposent aussi de réseaux dans la capitale, pour défendre leurs intérêts, ou y obtenir des *fatwa* ou des ordres sultaniens en leur faveur.²⁴

Cette intégration dans l'empire au niveau global, mais aussi au niveau local, contredit ce qui est souvent écrit sur l'autonomie juridictionnelle des *milla*-s chrétiennes, et sur l'autorité du clergé en matière de droit, notamment de droit personnel. En fait, cette autorité est constamment contestée et affaiblie par les recours possibles à l'autorité éminente de la sharia.²⁵ Mais l'influence du catholicisme, et en particulier l'essor de l'enseignement du catéchisme et de la lecture dévote entraînent, comme je pense l'avoir démontré, une plus claire conscience de ce qui distingue le chrétien du musulman, le catholique de 'l'hérétique' ou du 'schismatique', et une intériorisation de la frontière religieuse, telle qu'elle n'existait pas auparavant. Le modèle d'éducation donné à Hindiyya,²⁶ ou à d'autres jeunes femmes d'Alep me paraît à cet égard significatif. Ce changement de mentalité renforce l'autorité cléricale au sein des confessions chrétiennes, et contribue donc à forger l'image de la *milla* unie derrière sa hiérarchie, telle qu'elle va émerger au cours du XVIII^e, et surtout du XIX^e siècle.

Tous ces travaux menés à partir d'une perspective d'histoire ottomane et d'histoire locale, ont donné des chrétiens dans les villes du *bilad al-sham* une image beaucoup plus vivante et beaucoup plus intelligible que celle qu'on en avait jusque-là. Je voudrais encore souligner que ces études sur les minoritaires dans les archives musulmanes renouvellent aussi notre vision des sources occidentales. Celles dont je veux parler sont les récits de voyageurs et de missionnaires, ainsi que

²³ Ibid., 366; Masters, *Christians and Jews...*, 34, 63; Marino, 'Le 'Quartier des Chrétiens'...', 328–31; 'Chrétiens et musulmans dans le 'quartier des chrétiens'...', 157–166.

²⁴ Masters, *Christians and Jews...*, *passim*.

²⁵ Dans 'Dhimmis in the Muslim Court...', Al-Qattan pose bien les termes du problème, mais il lui manque une connaissance interne des Eglises chrétiennes et de leurs règles.

²⁶ Bernard Heyberger, *Hindiyya, mystique et criminelle*, Paris, Aubier, 2001, 53–68 et *passim*; 'Entre Orient et Occident, la religion des dévotes d'Alep', in Louis Châtellier (éd.), *Religions en transition dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle*, Oxford, Voltaire Foundation, 2002, 171–185; 'Individualism and Political Modernity: Devout Catholic Women in Aleppo and Lebanon between the Seventeenth and the Nineteenth Centuries', in Amira Sonbol, ed., *Beyond the Exotic. Women's histories in Islamic Societies*, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2005, 71–85.

la correspondance consulaire, couramment utilisés. Mais je voudrais aussi y inclure ce que je connais le mieux, la correspondance reçue à Rome, et qui provient souvent d'Orientaux. Non seulement une lecture de ces sources à la lumière de ce que les documents ottomans nous révèlent est à présent possible, mais je crois même qu'elle est indispensable et complémentaire.

Les sources orientales ne discréditent pas les sources occidentales, elles aident au contraire à les relire, et les confirment sur beaucoup de points. Ainsi, arrive-t-il que des chrétiens qui écrivent à Rome pour demander un secours financier fassent référence à des contrats de prêts commerciaux conclus avec des musulmans, comme ces contrats de *mudaraba* décrits par Bruce Masters.²⁷ Ainsi, les missionnaires rapportent-ils assez souvent des cas de mariages conclus devant le cadî, ou de divorces obtenus devant celui-ci contre le consentement du clergé.²⁸ Or, les registres des tribunaux confirment de telles pratiques, encore que peu fréquentes.²⁹ De même, les archives ecclésiastiques, même lorsqu'elles se lamentent paradoxalement de la tyrannie et des persécutions 'turques', font souvent état de recours devant le juge ou le gouverneur musulman contre des coreligionnaires, dans la même confession : ici encore, la chose est confirmée par ce que les registres des tribunaux relèvent.

Que les chrétiens sont intégrés dans la société musulmane, qu'ils y utilisent les rouages que le système leur offre, est donc confirmé aussi par une relecture des sources occidentales. J'irais plus loin, en affirmant que même les marchands et les missionnaires latins sont pris dans le jeu local des alliances et des protections, et recourent à l'occasion au juge ou au gouverneur musulmans, pour obtenir gain de cause au nom de la sharia. L'Occident n'introduit donc pas seulement un nouveau système de relations sociales. Ses représentants sont eux-mêmes souvent happés par les rouages de la société locale. Il est intéressant de

²⁷ Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance...*, 50-53, 62-63; Bernard Heyberger, 'Sécurité et insécurité : les chrétiens de Syrie dans l'espace méditerranéen', dans Anastassiadou Meropi et Bernard Heyberger (éds.), *Figures anonymes, figures d'élite : pour une anatomie de l'Homo ottomanicus*, 148-50.

²⁸ Heyberger, *Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient...*, 76-77.

²⁹ Masters, *Christians and Jews...*, p. 34; Raymond, 'Une communauté en expansion...', 366, 369. Ronald C. Jennings, *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World 1571-1640*, New York Studies in Near Eastern Civilization, New York, Londres, 1993, 14-39, 132-290; 'Zimmis (Non Muslims) in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records. The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 21, 1978, 225-37.

noter que des travaux récents d'histoire missionnaire ont révélé combien, sur des théâtres géographiques très divers, les missionnaires ont dû composer avec les circonstances locales, et passer des compromis avec les pouvoirs locaux, révisant ainsi la perspective traditionnelle du choc de l'acculturation.³⁰

La combinaison des sources est aussi une combinaison des échelles et des points de vue, ce qui permet de reconstituer la logique d'événements ou la cohérence de trajectoires personnelles. Il est intéressant de pouvoir repérer le même individu dans les archives consulaires anglaises, dans les archives ottomanes, dans celles de la *Propaganda Fide* à Rome, et dans les documents conservés dans les couvents libanais. La famille 'A'ida, ou celle de Ilyas Fakhr, que Bruce Masters a suivies dans les archives britanniques et turques, apparaissent à plusieurs reprises dans les sources romaines et missionnaires.³¹ Ce croisement de sources, quand il est possible, fait apparaître qu'un drogman n'est pas seulement un serviteur des marchands étrangers, qui tente de retirer des privilèges de sa relation exclusive avec eux. C'est aussi quelqu'un qui tire son pouvoir du réseau de solidarité dont il a pris la tête, des informations que ce réseau lui permet d'obtenir, et des atouts symboliques qui lui assurent prestige et rayonnement. Sans doute un consul n'accorde-t-il un certificat de drogman qu'à ce prix, à une personne dont il pense qu'elle pourra lui être utile. Dans cet univers social, ce ne sont pas que les motivations économiques qui sont déterminantes. Motivations matérielles, motivations intellectuelles ou spirituelles s'emboîtent. Il n'est sans doute pas indifférent de noter que Jirjis 'A'ida, premier drogman des Britanniques à Alep, a fait porter un don en 1751, au monastère du Sacré-Cœur de Bkerké, nouvellement fondé par la maronite d'Alep Hindiyya, après l'accomplissement d'un vœu pour avoir un enfant. Le même Jirjis, mort en 1775, a constitué

³⁰ Voir en particulier, Serge Gruzinski, *Les quatre parties du monde*, Paris, La Martinière, 2004; Charlotte de Castelneau-L'Estoile, *Les ouvriers d'une Vigne stérile. Les jésuites et la conversion des Indiens au Brésil 1580-1620*, C.N. Calouste Gulbenkian, Commission Nationale pour les Commémorations des Découvertes Portugaises, Lisbonne-Paris, 2000. Hervé Pennec, *Des Jésuites au Royaume du Prêtre Jean (Ethiopie)*, Paris, Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 2003.

³¹ Masters, *Christians and Jews...*, 76-77; Heyberger, *Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient...*, 127-128, 534; Hindiyya, 128. Maurits H. Van den Boogert, 'Intermediaries par excellence? Ottoman Dragomans in the Eighteenth Century', in Bernard Heyberger et Chantal Verdeil (éds.), *Hommes de l'entre-deux. Parcours individuels et portraits de groupes sur la frontière de la Méditerranée (XVI^e-XX^e siècle)*, Paris, Les Indes Savantes, 2009, 95-116. Sur Ilyas Fakhr, voir Heyberger, 'Sécurité et insécurité...', 154-62.

un waqf, lié à la célébration de messes perpétuelles, chez les moines shuwayrites (catholiques) au Liban. Et plus tard, sa femme Sara a fait donation d'une icône à un monastère de religieuses au Liban 'pour le repos de son âme et la protection de son fils susmentionné et sauvegardé'. La fondation de waqf-s en faveur de religieux catholiques originaires d'Alep, dont le rôle économique à cette époque n'est par ailleurs pas négligeable, est un élément d'un système de sociabilité qui assoit le pouvoir de la famille 'A'ida au-delà de leur ville natale. Cela peut aussi être une forme de solidarité confessionnelle qui compense l'absence de solidarité fiscale, par suite de l'exemption de la *jizya*. Ilyas, le fils de Sara, aurait, d'après une chronique missionnaire, quitté Alep pour Istanbul au moment où sa mère a commandité l'icône. Le réseau d'activité et de sociabilité des 'A'ida s'étend donc au même moment à la capitale. Le fils d'Ilyas apparaît par la suite souvent dans les archives ottomanes, en tant que drogman à l'ambassade de Grande Bretagne.

Ainsi, on peut être drogman des protestants et bon catholique en même temps, du moins avant l'élan missionnaire protestant du XIX^e siècle. Mais ce catholicisme lui-même peut être interrogé: lier la fondation d'un waqf à la célébration de messes perpétuelles atteste pour le moins de l'introduction du Purgatoire et de la 'mort de soi', typiques du catholicisme moderne, dans la culture de Jirijis 'A'ida et de sa femme Sara. Cependant, l'icône offerte par cette dernière à un couvent catholique, représentant une Vierge à la Rose et à l'Arbre de Jessé, peinte par Kirillus al-Dimashqi, est peu influencée par la peinture occidentale, aussi bien dans son iconographie que dans son style. Elle révélerait même une inspiration anatolienne.³² Nous avons de très nombreux témoignages sur cette ambivalence culturelle des catholiques syriens, qui additionnent les influences d'origine différente comme ils additionnent différents réseaux de relations. Ce constat nuance un peu ce que j'ai dit plus haut sur la construction progressive d'une frontière confessionnelle plus nette, plus consciente et plus intériorisée.

Les archives ottomanes, les archives consulaires et les archives romaines doivent aussi être croisées avec les documents conservés dans les couvents libanais. Il faudrait recourir systématiquement à la documentation interne des communautés chrétiennes: chroniques, mais

³² *Îcônes melkites, exposition du Musée Nicolas Sursock*, Beyrouth, 16 mai-15 juin 1969, Beyrouth, Musée Nicolas Sursock, 1969, 173, n° 33.

aussi actes de waqf-s, règlements ecclésiastiques, icônes avec inscriptions, ouvrages de toutes sortes: méthodes de lectures, catéchismes, prières, poèmes à la Vierge ou au Sacré-Cœur, règlements de confréries, registres de baptême, de sépultures et de mariages quand ils existent, etc... Ces documents ne prennent tout leur sens que si on les saisit dans le mode de fonctionnement des communautés chrétiennes telles qu'ils sont révélés par les travaux récents. Ainsi, il n'est pas indifférent de situer la composition du traité qu'Ilyas Fakhr a consacré à la controverse contre le dogme catholique de la virginité de saint Joseph au moment où il est drogman des Britanniques à Alep, et qu'il a rompu pour diverses raisons avec Rome, dont il a d'abord été un fervent disciple.³³ Une lettre envoyée à Rome, mais aussi un traité de controverse pro- ou anti-Latin, est un élément dans un dispositif de relations et dans une stratégie complexe, qui s'inscrit de manière cohérente dans le contexte local, mais qui a aussi souvent des ramifications à Istanbul ou au Caire. Inversement, un *firman* demandé à Istanbul n'est qu'une pièce dans un ensemble d'actions visant un but local: éliminer un concurrent de la brigade à une charge ecclésiastique, ou se faire attribuer un bâtiment de culte. Les circonstances sont présentées sous un jour biaisé à l'autorité turque: les catholiques sont traités de '*franj*', ce qui au mieux est une simplification, contre laquelle ceux-ci se défendent en se présentant comme authentiquement syriens, contre les '*rum-s*' étrangers à la région. Les pétitions à Constantinople s'accompagnent de protestations de légitimisme et d'obéissance au sultan, tandis que celles qu'on envoie parfois au même moment à Versailles évoquent l'oppression musulmane et font allusion à une flatteuse prophétie annonçant la reconquête de l'Orient.

L'intelligibilité du comportement des minoritaires chrétiens dans les villes du *bilad al-sham* est pour l'essentiel le résultat du travail des historiens dans les sources locales, travail dont Abdul-Karim Rafeq a été un initiateur. Aujourd'hui, nous pouvons tenter d'aller plus loin, en mettant ensemble les spécialistes de différents fonds d'archives, et en reliant ensemble des informations qui, jusqu'à maintenant, n'étaient employées que dans des perspectives bien déterminées, qu'on peut qualifier d'orientalistes ou d'occidentalistes. Mais c'est moins le contenu du document lui-même que le moment et les circonstances

³³ Heyberger, 'Sécurité et insécurité...', 162.

de sa production qu'il faut interroger, pour reconstituer une 'histoire croisée', qui connecte des récits et des fonds d'archives séparés, afin de rétablir l'espace de circulation, le réseau de relations, et la logique d'action de tel ou tel représentant, plus ou moins paradigmatique, des minoritaires chrétiens de l'empire ottoman.³⁴

³⁴ Bernard Heyberger, 'Pour une 'histoire croisée' de l'occidentalisation et de la confessionnalisation chez les chrétiens du Proche-Orient', *The MIT-Electronic Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, automne 2003, 36–49.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MELKITE CATHOLIC *MILLET*
IN 1848 AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY
IN TANZIMAT SYRIA

BRUCE MASTERS

In 1848, Sultan Abdülmecid granted the Melkite Catholic community official status as an 'autonomous religious community' (*millet*) by adding his seal to an imperial patent (*berat*) naming Maksimus Mazlum 'Patriarch of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria and wherever else Melkite Catholics reside in the sultan's protected realms'. The patent further stated that although the Chaldean, Syrian, Melkite, and Maronite Catholic priests had been under the authority of the 'Catholic Patriarch of Istanbul', they constituted separate communities and would henceforth be recognized as such.¹ With Mazlum's elevation, the Melkite Catholic Church joined the ranks of the Orthodox (the *Rum* in Ottoman Turkish) and the Apostolic Armenian Churches that had long enjoyed *de facto* recognition and the rather more recently legitimated Catholic, later to be known as the Armenian Catholic, (1830) and Jewish (1835) communities. Mazlum's victory came in the face of resistance on the part of the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul who claimed that the Melkite Catholics were both heretics and traitors, disloyal both to their Mother Church and their sultan. Having recognized the Melkites, the sultan opened a floodgate of repressed aspirations for autonomy from the empire's myriad Christian denominations, with the result that the list of officially sanctioned Christian *millets* had expanded to twelve by 1900.

Although the various *millets* within the Ottoman Empire were officially constituted as religious communities, a particular community's own sense of distinctiveness, and hence the need for recognition, arose more often out of a nascent 'proto-nationalism' (to borrow Eric Hobsbawm's term)² than from questions of religious dogma. The

¹ Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Gayri Müslim Defterleri, 6, pp. 11–12.

² '[C]ertain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which...could fit in with modern states and nations'. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and*

insistence of the Melkite Catholics for a *millet* of their own, rather than being subsumed into the pan-Catholic one as the sultan had envisioned in 1830, is indicative of a nascent ethnic identity that was prevalent among the community's elite, both clerical and lay. Key to this was their assertion that they, unlike the Armenian Catholics, were not converts to a new religious dispensation that had been brought into the empire by the Franks. Rather, they were the proud heirs of an unbroken religious tradition founded by St. Peter the Apostle and indigenous to Syria.

Yet the Melkite Catholics did not identify themselves explicitly as a 'national' church in the same way as those Orthodox faithful who spoke Bulgarian and who would gain recognition from the sultan for their own *millet* in 1872. The Melkite Catholics never identified themselves as Arabs, although Arabic was often the language in which their petitions to the Porte were written. Furthermore, they only rarely referred to their place of origin as Syria (*Suriya* in their discourse, never *bilad al-Sham*). Rather they chose to define the boundaries of their imagined homeland in their petitions to the sultan either by listing its principal cities, or more commonly, as in the case of Mazlum's imperial patent, by invoking the traditional Patriarchal sees of the East: Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria.

Nonetheless, their identity as both Arabic-speakers and Syrians was an implicit sub-text of their historical arguments for recognition as a religious community. They were, simply put, the *Rum* of Syria. That designation should not be confused, they wrote in the years following the Greek War for Independence, with either the *Rum* of Anatolia or the *Rum* of Greece (*Yunanistan*). For unlike their reputed coreligionists in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, the representatives of the Melkites wrote that their community had never broken faith with the Pope in Rome, nor, more importantly, with their sultan. This was the necessary strategic moral high ground that they sought to establish for themselves in order to turn the long-standing Orthodox claim on its head that loyalty to the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch was synonymous with loyalty to the sultan.

The creation of the millets

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the *millet* system was firmly entrenched in the Ottoman political imagination and it was within the parameters of that construct that Maksimus Mazlum had to make his case to the sultan for recognition. But it had not been always so. The emergence of the politics of the *millets* was powered by the ambitions of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople to secure ecclesiastical authority over all the Orthodox faithful in the sultan's realm. According to a tradition dating back to the Council of Chalcedon in 451, Christian subjects of the Byzantine emperor were placed under the stewardship of the Patriarch in Constantinople, thereby conflating the geographical boundaries of spiritual and temporal authority. The Arab conquests of the seventh century greatly reduced Constantinople's role in the patriarchal sees of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, but did not completely eliminate it. However, that tenuous connection was severed in the Mamluk period when the Ecumenical Patriarch appointed nominal patriarchs for the 'lost' sees, but they rarely, if ever, visited the places they represented. The exception to this characterization was Jerusalem, a city that figured too prominently in the spiritual geography of the Orthodox imagination to be abandoned entirely to home rule.³

In the absence of patriarchal supervision from Constantinople, Orthodox Christians outside the boundaries of the Byzantine Empire developed their own traditions for selecting their church leaders who, not surprisingly, were usually local in origin. The Ottoman conquest first of Constantinople and subsequently of Syria, Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete forged a new geo-political reality wherein most of the Orthodox faithful in the Mediterranean basin were once again the subjects of one political authority. This provided the opportunity for the ecclesiastical leadership proximate to the sultan's court in Istanbul to reassert authority over those whom it claimed constituted the Orthodox faithful.⁴ Partisans of the centralization of church authority in the see

³ P.J. Vatikiotis, 'The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem between Hellenism and Arabism', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 30, 1994, 916–29; Oded Peri, *Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem: The Question of the Holy Sites in Early Ottoman Times*, Leiden, Brill, 2001, 98–99.

⁴ For Crete, see Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, 175–86.

of Constantinople could not easily appeal to the authority of a precedent set by a Christian emperor if they expected the sultan to support them and so asserted that they were simply returning to a practice established by Mehmed the Conqueror when he named Gennadios Scholarios as head of the Orthodox Church in 1453. There is, however, scant historical evidence to support their claim.⁵

The entry of Roman Catholic missionaries into the empire in the seventeenth century created a new urgency for the Orthodox hierarchy in the capital to petition the sultan for greater control over the lives of Christians in the more distant provinces. Initially, Ottoman officials seemed unconcerned about defections from one Christian sect to another.⁶ That indifference vanished after the aborted Venetian invasion of the island of Chios in 1695, during which the local Catholic clergy collaborated with the invaders. From that point on, the Ottoman sultans consistently sided with the Orthodox clergy ordering governors and *qadis* in the provinces to do all that they could to limit contact between 'Frankish' priests and the subjects of the sultans.⁷

As the concept of the *millets* became more fully articulated in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman bureaucracy understood the Christians of the empire as existing in a social hierarchy governed either by the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch from his see in the Phanar district of the capital or by the Apostolic Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, housed in the district of Kum Kapı. By the middle of the eighteenth century those Christians of the Asian and African provinces who were neither Orthodox nor Armenians—Copts, Jacobites, Nestorians, and Maronites—were understood to be under the political, if not spiritual, direction of the Armenian Patriarch. It would seem, however, from the official silence in the archives, there was never any attempt by the Armenian Patriarch to intervene in the affairs of either the Maronites or the Copts, whose ecclesiastical hierarchies clearly understood that if they did not present opportunities in which the Ottoman state might interfere, its governors and judges would leave them alone. In contrast, the traditionalists among the Jacobites (Suryanis) and Nestorians

⁵ Benjamin Braude, 'Foundation Myths of the Millet System', in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982, vol. I, 69–88.

⁶ Daniel Goffman, 'Ottoman Millets in the Early Seventeenth Century', *New Perspectives on Turkey* XI, 1994, 144–46.

⁷ Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, 85.

made frequent appeals to the Armenian patriarch in Istanbul to punish clergy and laity with pro-Catholic sympathies and he in turn relayed their petitions to the sultan's court.⁸

In the two *millet*s recognized by the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century, religious hegemony would be increasingly invoked to impose conformity to the tongue of the Holy Mother Church, whether Greek or Armenian. In the Balkans, this led to the emergence of an Orthodox clergy who insisted increasingly on 'national' (autocephalous) churches wherein the liturgy would be celebrated in Slavonic. In the see of Antioch, the defense of localism against the encroaching centripetal pull of the Ecumenical Patriarch was not voiced in the name of a 'national' church; although that church was increasingly employing the Arabic language in its liturgy, it had not done so historically and its apologists did not claim that it had. They did, however, freely acknowledge that the laity in the see of Antioch had been Arabic-speakers for generations. Rather, in a historically dubious claim to religious authenticity, the Melkite Catholics asserted that the Church of those called the *Rum* in the see of Antioch had always been Catholic. They were thus distinct from those whom the Porte recognized exclusively as the *Rum* as well as from other Catholics, whether Armenians or Latins.

The Melkite Catholics

Roman Catholic missionaries began to take up residence in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the 1620s and attracted many of the best and the brightest from among the clergy in the see of Antioch to seek ecclesiastical union with Rome. The struggle between the factions led to schism in the Orthodox see of Antioch in 1724 when a minority of the believers, centered in Aleppo and the cities of the Lebanese and Palestinian coasts, acknowledged Kyrillos Tanas as Patriarch of Antioch while the majority of the community and its traditional leadership in Damascus remained loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul and the man he had elevated to the post, Sylvestros of Cyprus. In 1729, Pope Benedict XIII recognized Kyrillos as the

⁸ For example, there is a case from Aleppo in 1772 in which the Armenian Patriarch initiated a request to the Governor of Aleppo to prevent Jacobite Christians from attending the Latin chapel in the Shaybani Khan. Damascus, Dar al-Watha'iq (DW), Aleppo Court Records, v. 95, 121.

Catholic Patriarch of Antioch, although he did not receive his pallium of office until 1744. For Rome, the elevation meant the recognition of a new church that had only recently acknowledged papal authority, but the Catholics of Syria saw the matter differently.

In a letter to Sultan Mahmud I (1730–54), dated 15 *Jumada al-awwal* 1145/3 December 1732, a group of Christians, identified simply as the *Rum* of Aleppo, affirmed their loyalty to the Metropolitan of Aleppo, Maksimus walad Bulus (al-Hakim). Maksimus had been in the Orthodox camp when he was elevated to his post but he had switched loyalties and acknowledged Kyrillos as his patriarch. As a result of his defection, Patriarch Sylvestros sought the Porte's authority to unseat Maksimus and replace him with a candidate of his choosing. The petition from Aleppo charged that 'the priest' Sylvestros had falsely accused the petitioners of following the 'Frankish rite' (*Efrenk ayineleri*) when in fact they were practicing the rites of their Church as they had received them from their fathers and grandfathers.⁹

Against the foundation myth of the *millet* employed by the Orthodox Patriarch, the *Rum* of Aleppo countered with a different version of the past. They claimed that it was the followers of the Patriarch in Istanbul who were the innovators by interfering in their internal affairs for they had 'always' chosen those who would lead them in their faith. Whether because of the strength of their argument or because Maksimus had previously sent a substantial donation to the Porte,¹⁰ the sultan concurred and Maksimus remained in his position until 1736 when the sultan revoked his patent in favor of a properly Orthodox claimant.

The initial success of Maksimus was not exceptional, as silver could cause the Porte to waver in its support of orthodoxy in the early eighteenth century, but it would rule increasingly in favor of the Ecumenical Patriarch as the century progressed. But the fact that clergy loyal to Rome in many towns under the ecclesiastical authority of the see of Antioch continued to offer the sacraments to the faithful is testimony to how weak the sultan's writ could be. This was especially true in the region's largest city, Aleppo. Alexander Russell, an astute observer of life in that city in the mid-eighteenth century, characterized the ecclesiastical struggle as follows:

⁹ Istanbul, BOA, Cevdet Adliye 6212.

¹⁰ Damascus, DW, Aleppo Awamir al-sultaniya, (hereafter Awamir) vol. 3, p. 39.

These religious contests have, as usual, been conducted with all the characteristic bitterness of superstitious zeal and carried out at enormous expense. Each party, in order to obtain possession of the Aleppo church for its own bishop, have endeavoured to purchase the interposition of the porte, in the Patriarch's nomination at Constantinople: and the disappointed party have seldom failed to harass its rival, by vexatious applications to the Seraglio at Aleppo, which met always with encouragement; the Bashaw, always perfectly indifferent to the merits of the cause, inclining steadily to the side which paid best.¹¹

The arrival in Aleppo of new governors often signaled fresh attempts to implement the imperial decrees forbidding subjects of the sultan from worshipping with the Franks. This was, no doubt, done partly out of a sense of duty and partly to encourage the local Catholics to be more forthcoming with their contributions to the governor's purse as the purchase of high office was becoming increasingly expensive. In September 1763, a number of Catholics in Aleppo were arrested at the start of the governorship of Muhammad al-ʿAzm.¹² Hamza Paşa, who arrived in February 1768, went even further, harassing the Aleppines who were going to worship in the Latin chapel in the Shaybani Khan which he then ordered closed. This was, however, a violation of the capitulatory treaty with France, and following the protest of its Ambassador in Istanbul, the chapel was re-opened. After suitable bribes were paid, those arrested were released and local Catholics resumed receiving sacraments in the chapel.¹³

The era of casual indifference on the part of Aleppo's governors toward the often heated rivalries among the *Rum* of the city ended with the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39) who instituted far-reaching policies to reassert the control of the capital over its unraveling periphery, including supporting the established churches in their attempts to re-establish jurisdiction over wayward provincials. In the view of the Porte, centralization could only be good for both church and state. The opening salvo of the Porte's offensive against the Melkite Catholics of

¹¹ Alexander Russell, *The natural history of Aleppo*, London, G.G. and J. Robinson, 1794 (reprinted 1969), v. II, 29–30.

¹² Muhammad Paşa's actions in Aleppo occasioned appeals from both the British and the Dutch consuls in the city on behalf of their dragomans, Istanbul, BOA, Ahkam-ı Haleb, v. 3, p. 84, dated *awa'il Jumadha al-akhir* 1178, and p. 90, dated *awasit Rajab* 1178.

¹³ Fernand Taoutel, 'Watha'iq ta'rikhiya 'an Halab akhidhan 'an dafatir al-akhawiyat wa ghayriha', *al-Mashriq* vol. 42, 1948, 373–75.

Aleppo came in an order directed to the governor Hürşid Paşa, dated *awasit Rabi' al-awwal* 1233/January 1818. It informed him of the various misdeeds of the *Rum*'s clergy in his city including building new churches and their persistence in leading their congregations into worshipping in 'Frankish rites'. Furthermore, in defiance of orders issued in 1732, Frankish priests were educating the children of the *Rum* in Aleppo and treating their sick. The order stated that similar abuses were occurring in Jaffa and Acre but there the Patriarch of Jerusalem was acting vigilantly to stop them. By contrast, the Metropolitan of Aleppo was aiding the Catholics, in violation of an imperial edict issued in 1757. In conclusion, the governor was ordered to expel any of the priests of the *Rum* who were in violation of imperial orders and to act vigilantly to prevent the Latin priests in the city from ministering to the sultan's subjects.¹⁴

On 14 March 1818 a Greek Orthodox Metropolitan named Gerasimos arrived in Aleppo from Istanbul, bearing an imperial order demanding that the *Rum* Catholics should accept the authority both of the Patriarch in Istanbul and of himself as the Patriarch's representative in the city.¹⁵ According to accounts penned by Catholic authors, Gerasimos called the Melkite Catholics to his residence on 17 April 1818. Several thousand Catholics showed up to hear the Patriarch's order read aloud. Not willing to accept its legitimacy, they then approached the governor's palace and asked for an audience. Hürşid Paşa agreed to meet with a delegation that included three Turkish-speakers. He asked them if they were the '*Rum*'. They replied that they were, but that the '*Rum*' had split. The governor responded that neither in Anatolia nor in Istanbul had such a thing been heard. The delegation then tried to explain the tortuous logic of the apostolic succession from St. Peter. Apparently frustrated with their theology, the governor interrupted them with a question followed by an ultimatum, 'Well, if you are not Christians, have you become Muslims or Jews? If you are still Christians, you have to be obedient to the head of the *millet-i Rum*'.

The Catholics left still unwilling to accept the Patriarch's authority and they marched first to Gerasimos' residence and then to the central

¹⁴ Istanbul, BOA, Mühimme Defterleri (MD) vol. 237, p. 205, #775.

¹⁵ The governor of Aleppo had received an order just a month before which stated that as the patriarch was much concerned about the defection of his flock to the Franks, he should make sure that all those who were technically *reaya* were paying taxes. Damascus, DW, Aleppo Awamir, v. 42, pp. 53–54. A copy of a similar order is preserved in Istanbul, BOA, Istanbul BOA, MD v. 237, p. 205.

court building to which he had apparently fled. The governor called out his troops, and in the *mêlée* that ensued, eleven Catholics were killed/martyred.¹⁶ The official Ottoman account of the events, as might be expected, differs from that of the Christian authors. In a report to the sultan dated 23 April 1818, Hurşid Paşa wrote of his meeting with the Catholic delegation. They told him that their fathers had been Catholic for centuries and if the sultan tried to force them to attend Orthodox services they would leave the city. They were obdurate and refused to budge from their state of rebellion to both the Patriarch and the sultan. The governor wrote that he had reminded them that Catholics did not exist as a *millet* in the sultan's realm, and that despite his best efforts to dissuade them, the Christians would not listen to reason. They departed his residence and soon attacked the residence of the Patriarch's representative in the city. Faced with anarchy and rebellion, he called out his troops and restored order. He concluded by saying the city was at peace and the Catholics were attending Orthodox services.¹⁷

Despite the setback, the Catholics among the *Rum* received a major reprieve in 1821 when the Greeks of the Peloponnese rose in rebellion. In retaliation, a Muslim mob hung the Ecumenical Patriarch from the gates of the Patriarchate in Istanbul. Similar attacks on the Orthodox hierarchy by Muslims throughout the empire provided the Catholics in Aleppo with the opportunity to assert their autonomy while stressing their loyalty to the sultan and the fact that while they were indeed *Rum*, they were not Greeks (*Yunan*). In the environment of growing mistrust between Muslims and Christians engendered by the Greek rebellion, their collective identity as Catholics, rendered in Ottoman Turkish as *Katolikler*, became increasingly useful to clear up any possible lingering linguistic confusion in the minds of Ottoman Muslim bureaucrats that the Catholics among the *Rum* of Aleppo might have any connection to the 'perfidious Greeks'.

Not surprisingly, the governor of Aleppo issued a decree recognizing the legitimacy of the Melkite Catholic community, now called simply the *Katolik taifesi*, but meaning only the *Rum* Catholics, i.e. Melkites. The Porte followed suit and issued an imperial order that acknowledged

¹⁶ Bulus Qar'ali, ed., *Ahamm hawadith Halab fi nifs al-awwal min al-qarn al-tasi' ashar*, Cairo, al-Matba'a al-Suriya, 1933, 12–25; Hidemitsu Kuroki, 'The Orthodox-Catholic Clash in Aleppo in 1818', *Orient* 29, 1993, 1–18.

¹⁷ Istanbul, BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn 36231.

the loyalty to the sultan shown by the Catholics of Aleppo. But they had still not become a *millet* in their own right but only a faction (*taife*) of the larger community of the *Rum*. In this order, the actions of the 'Catholics' were contrasted with the disloyalty manifested by the *millet-i Rum*, whose Patriarch had engaged in insurrection and treason (*isyân ve hiyânet*). In reward for their steadfastness, the Catholics of Aleppo were now to be left alone in their religious practices.¹⁸ The status quo that had reigned for almost a century before 1818 returned. The difference was that the community had won its autonomy with the sultan's sanction, making it *de jure* as well as *de facto*.

In 1823, a group of prominent Muslims in Aleppo registered a deposition (*arz-ı mahzer*) on behalf of the Catholics. They stated that while only between twenty and thirty households in the city were loyal to the Orthodox Metropolitan, 1,500 households among the *Rum* followed religious rites similar to those of the Maronites and Suryanis (i.e., Catholic). They claimed that a certain Mihaili had instigated through false charges the persecution of the Catholics that had occurred a few years before. This Mihaili served as dragoman at the Porte but had since been involved in treason (i.e. the Greek rebellion) and fled to Rumania. As a result of his interference in the Catholics' lives, eleven individuals had been killed and fourteen priests imprisoned or exiled. Since then Aleppo had fallen on hard times, the Muslims affirmed. In addition to the earthquake (1822), the persecution of Catholics by the Orthodox Metropolitan threatened to drive away the city's Christian merchants. The petition ended with a request that the priests in exile in Lebanon be allowed to return to the city and that Aleppo's *Rum* Catholics be permitted to worship with the Suryanis and Maronites.¹⁹

This document is of interest on a number of counts, besides the very important fact that the Muslims of the city were willing to intervene on behalf of the Catholics at all. Firstly, there is the implicit message that the Catholics were loyal to the sultan while the Orthodox Christians were not. The prime culprits in 1818 were no longer the Catholics or the by-then disgraced governor, Hürşid Paşa, but a traitorous Greek who had deceived the sultan. Significantly in this period of transition for the empire, the notables' petition was couched in the language of 'tradition'. The Catholics were simply following the religion of their

¹⁸ Damascus, DW, Aleppo Awamir, v. 38, p. 74.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 184.

fathers and grandfathers. They contributed to the state coffers by paying their *jizya* and engaging in trade. If persecuted, they would flee the city and the taxes accruing to the sultan would diminish. This last element seems to imply that a wholesale decamping from Aleppo by its Catholic merchants, as claimed by Charles Frazee,²⁰ had not actually occurred. In addition to the appeal to an earlier rhetoric, however, a new element was added, although cloaked in the mantle of 'tradition'. The Muslim notables claimed the Catholics had been following the same rites from the time of the Ottoman conquest, pushing the origins of the Catholic movement back at least a century before the missionaries had arrived. That claim would later form the backbone of the Melkite argument for imperial recognition.

A millet of their own

The first step to recognition of the Melkite Catholics came in 1830 when Sultan Mahmud II constituted the Catholic community of Istanbul as a *millet*, in response to French and Austrian diplomatic pressure and substantial gifts proffered by the Catholic Armenian merchants of the capital. Although both the Orthodox and Apostolic Churches had long claimed that they had been issued similar patents that carried official recognition, the establishment of the Catholic *millet* is the first that can be documented independently in the Ottoman archives. In all the decrees that the Porte issued in the process leading up to the establishment of the *millet*, it was labeled simply as 'Catholic' and not 'Armenian Catholic' as it was called in European diplomatic dispatches. It seems therefore that the sultan's bureaucrats had envisioned a pan-Catholic organization with a patriarch in the capital to represent all the myriad Catholics of the empire in the same way as already existed for the Orthodox faithful in the office of the Ecumenical Patriarch.²¹ But for the Melkite Catholics, subordination to a Catholic Patriarch not of their choosing was no less onerous than submission to an Orthodox one.

²⁰ Charles Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans: The Church and the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1923*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, 286.

²¹ Kemal Beydilli, *II. Mahmud devri'nde Katolik Ermeni cemâati ve kilisesi'nin tanınması (1830) / Recognition of the Armenian Catholic Community and the Church in the Reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1830)*, Cambridge MA, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, 1995, 260–61.

A synod of Melkite Catholic clergy and laity chose Maksimus Mazlum as their Patriarch in 1833. Once the Pope recognized his elevation, Mazlum used the freedom offered by Ibrahim Paşa's occupation of the Syrian provinces to press the Melkite Catholic case for a *millet*. This renewed vigor on the part of the Catholics in Syria elicited a response from the Orthodox camp. In a letter written in Greek dated 5 May 1838, the Orthodox Patriarch in Damascus complained to the sultan that the Catholics were seizing churches and harassing the Orthodox clergy throughout the lands under Egyptian occupation. He stated that he had approached the governor of Syria, Ibrahim Paşa, but had been dismissed on the grounds that since the sultan had issued the *berat* establishing his patriarchate, only the sultan could deal with the matter. The Patriarch was now appealing to the sultan for redress.²² The Orthodox complaint reflected the changing balance of power in the see of Antioch where the Melkite Catholics were re-establishing control over churches they lost in the wake of the decrees of 1818 with the permission of the occupation government.

Having won recognition from Mehmed Ali, Maksimus Mazlum set off for Istanbul in 1841 where he achieved some initial success. An order sent from the Porte to 'our loyal governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali', dated *awa'il Rabi' al-awwal* 1258/April 1841, announced that the Melkite Catholics (*Melkit Rum Katolikler*) had separated from the 'old' *Rum* (*Rum-i atik*) and were now under the authority of the Catholic Patriarch in Istanbul. However, the order went on, the Orthodox were not turning over churches to the Catholics as they were supposed to do. That assertion seems to contradict the claim made earlier by the Orthodox clergy but the order clearly reflected a Catholic rather than an Orthodox bias. This order is further significant as it cited an earlier document preserved in the sultan's archive, dating from 1838 that had recognized Maksimus Mazlum as the Catholic Patriarch of Antioch.²³

Although the Egyptian army had already left Syria by the time the order was issued, it is nonetheless important for what it did not grant Mazlum as well as for the rights it did give him. This recognition did not constitute the establishment of an officially recognized *millet*. Rather, using the already established model of an Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul, with the individual Patriarchs of Antioch,

²² Istanbul, BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayun 33656-A.

²³ Istanbul, BOA, Cevdet Adliye 5029.

Jerusalem, and Alexandria subordinate to him, the Sultan conceived of the Melkite Catholics as a subgroup of the Catholic *millet*, headed by the Catholic Patriarch of Istanbul. This was not enough for Mazlum, however, who continued to press for a *millet* for the Melkites.

The refusal of Mazlum to acknowledge his subordination to the Catholic Patriarch of Istanbul was more than a simple product of his own personal ambitions, although undoubtedly those were also at play. The Armenian Catholics had made no claim on antiquity and freely acknowledged that they were breaking with a tradition within the Apostolic Church established by St. Gregory by accepting the supreme authority of the Pope in Rome. Furthermore, they explicitly acknowledged that they were seeking ecclesiastical union with the Catholics of Europe. The only concession they made to tradition was their pledge of continued loyalty to the sultan; they were Catholics, but not Franks. For the Melkites, such a radical break with the past seemed unthinkable. Whether or not they believed their claim that the church of the *Rum* in Syria had always been Catholic when they first sought to maintain their autonomy in the eighteenth century, that myth of their origin had apparently taken root in their collective imagination by the nineteenth.

The issue of authenticity was at the heart of a controversy over clerical garb that erupted in the 1840s. The Melkite Catholic clergy had continued to wear the 'stove pipe' hats and black cassocks of the Orthodox as they had been doing for the past century. They saw no reason to give this up, for as we have seen they conceived themselves to be the guardians of the 'traditional' church in Syria with the Orthodox faction representing a recent 'heresy'. They were supported in their assertion of their right to wear the clerical garb of their choice by a petition to the sultan, signed by many prominent 'ulama of Aleppo in 1837, stating that the *Rum* Catholic clergy in Aleppo had always worn the same clerical garb as the Orthodox priests.²⁴ With the support of the Russian ambassador, the Orthodox countered that the Melkites should dress like the Armenian Catholics in whose *millet* they now found themselves.²⁵ Clothing had great semiotic importance in identification of membership in a particular community in the Ottoman

²⁴ Maksimus Mazlum, *Nabdhah ta'rikhiya fi ma jara li-ta'ifat al-Rum al-kathulik mundhu sanat 1837 fi ma ba'duha*, no publisher, 1907, 182–83.

²⁵ Istanbul, BOA, İrade Hariciye 549, dated 20 *Jumadha al-awwal* 1257/ 10 July 1841.

world, and the Melkite Catholic priests did not want to don the clerical garb of the Armenians because they were not Armenians. Rather they were the *Rum* and should dress that way. As petty as it might seem, the Melkites' refusal to break with tradition, as they perceived it, delayed the sultan's recognition of their community.

A compromise was finally reached, with the Melkite Catholics agreeing to wear a six-sided hat and either violet or blue cassocks. Following that, Maksimus Mazlum received an imperial decree in December 1845 stating that he was now independent of the Catholic *millet*. This document still did not establish a separate *millet* for the Melkites, however, but simply said that his Patriarchate was independent from the three officially sanctioned Christian *millets*, i.e. the Greek Orthodox, the Apostolic Armenian, and the Catholic. The final recognition of a Melkite *millet* came in 23 May 1848 with the imperial *berat* naming Maksimus Mazlum as Patriarch of the Melkite Catholics with authority over the churches of the three Patriarchal sees of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria. All Metropolitans, priests and religious of the Melkite Catholic *millet* had now to submit to Maksimus Mazlum as their spiritual leader; no one was to interfere in the free practice of their faith, under pain of prosecution by the sharia courts.²⁶

The Claim of Authenticity

In listing the patriarchal sees for which Mazlum was responsible, the Porte had legitimated the claim of the Melkite Catholics that all three traditional sees of the Church in the East had devolved from the control of Constantinople after the Muslim conquests of the seventh century. There was, however, no historical precedent for one man to fill all three patriarchal sees, since the Orthodox had maintained them as independent of each other, while subordinating them to the Ecumenical Patriarch. Maksimus' claim to the three titles, therefore, had to signify something more. It was probably obvious to everyone that the listing of the three sees together highlighted the fact that the majority of the laity living in each see was Arabic-speaking. In addition, Mazlum's continued reference to the established Catholic *millet* as 'Armenian' in all his correspondence, even though it was simply the

²⁶ Mazlum, *Nabdhah*, 120.

'*Katolik milleti*' in all contemporary Ottoman documents, is significant as it implied that the *millet* he sought to create had an ethnic dimension even if he were defining it simply by what it was not; he and his community were Catholics but not Armenians.

I have suggested elsewhere that the schism among the *Rum* of Syria in the eighteenth century did not reflect deep theological differences. Rather, its origins, like the original 'Great Schism' that divided Catholics from Orthodox in 1054, lay in political grievances.²⁷ Over the course of the seventeenth century, the Ecumenical Patriarch had increasingly intervened in the see of Antioch to ensure that men loyal to orthodoxy would occupy the post. By 1724, the clergy in Istanbul had decided that ethnic Greeks were probably the only men who could be trusted with that responsibility. Such centralization was taking place throughout the Ottoman Orthodox world, but only in Syria did it engender a choice of Catholicism as a resistance strategy, as elsewhere localist resistance was channeled into the push for autocephalous 'national' churches. The Melkite Catholics were not making an explicit claim to being such a 'national' Catholic church to be distinguished from the Armenian Catholic Church, but in listing explicitly all three sees that had Arabic-speaking majorities as their laity, Mazlum seemingly made that claim implicit.

But the weight of the Melkites' claim for recognition lay in their assertion that they had adhered to tradition more doggedly than had their Orthodox adversaries. In response to the Orthodox charge that they had gone over to the 'religion of the Franks', Syria's Melkite Catholics made a counter claim that they were merely 'following in the traditions of their fathers and grandfathers'. Patriarch Maksimus gave a detailed exposition of this claim in a petition presented to the Porte in 1841. The term 'Catholic', he explained, meant 'universal' and the Catholic Church founded by St. Peter embraced many different 'nations, sects, and tongues', suggesting that ethnic Greeks did not have a right to dominate the Church in the East, because the people of the East had their own traditions, languages, and customs. Furthermore, he stated that all the Byzantine emperors and Patriarchs of Constantinople had accepted the authority of the Pope in Rome until the reign of the Patriarch Fotios in the eleventh century who broke the unity of the Church. Since then, the *Rum* of Constantinople had

²⁷ Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World*, 80–97.

introduced new practices that were at variance with the established tradition, including the rite of the Holy Fire at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher on Easter eve. It was the only example he provided, but it had been a flash point between Catholics and Orthodox in the battle for control of the most sacred site in Christendom.

In Mazlum's version of ecclesiastical history, the *Rum* of Constantinople had reunited with Rome in the thirteenth century and again in 1439 with the Council of Florence. He further claimed, in an interesting twist on the myth of origins of the *millets*, that the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 caused a renewed schism as Sultan Mehmed had ordered the clergy in the lands ruled by the House of Osman to break with Rome. It was, he continued, 'as plain as the sun' that the *Rum* of Istanbul were spreading calumny when they said the Melkites had separated from them a hundred and fifty years before. In truth, it was they who had separated from the 'True Catholic Church' after 1453.²⁸ Evidence that Mazlum's version of history gained currency in the region can be found in *A Survey of Palestine* prepared for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 where it was stated that the Melkite (Greek Catholic) Church was founded by believers who wished to remain in union with Rome, shortly after 1453 when the Orthodox repudiated their union with the Pope.²⁹

In making a claim about the antiquity of the Church in Antioch and its autonomy from Constantinople, if not Rome, Mazlum stated that once all the *Rum* had spoken Greek, but that the Arabic tongue had overtaken Greek in the 'kingdoms of Islam' (*mamalik al-Islam*). As a result, the *Rum* in those lands no longer spoke Greek and called their vestments by their Arabic rather than Greek names.³⁰ It would seem that this explanation was in response to an Orthodox argument that the Melkites could not have possibly worn the Greek-style vestments since antiquity as they did not use or even know their proper, i.e. Greek, names. While not making an explicit claim that the Melkite Church was an Arab national church, Mazlum was pointing to a reality that he hoped the sultan would notice, i.e. the members of his spiritual flock did not speak Greek.

²⁸ Mazlum, *Nabdhah*, 256–69.

²⁹ *A Survey of Palestine prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946*, reprinted by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington DC, 1991, vol. II, 896.

³⁰ Mazlum, *Nabdhah*, 262.

Mazlum's congregation in Istanbul also served to highlight that fact. Over the course of the eighteenth century, a significant number of Melkite merchants had left Syria to establish residence in Istanbul, where they were indiscriminately referred to as 'Aleppines' (*Halepli*) regardless of their point of origin. Giovanni Fonto, Istanbul's Roman Catholic Bishop, having taken a census of the Ottoman Catholics in his jurisdiction in 1808, found that of a total of 32,000 Catholics, 500 were 'Arabs from Aleppo'.³¹ The Melkite Catholics were concentrated in the old Frankish quarter of Galata (Beyoğlu) and attended the Roman Catholic churches of that quarter, free from the interference of the Orthodox Patriarch. This presented a problem, however, as most, if not all, the other Latins and all their clergy were technically foreigners in the Ottoman Empire and paid no head-tax as *dhimmis*. Rather than list the Aleppines with the *millet-i Rum* in the city, which technically they were, the Ottoman authorities allowed the Aleppines to designate a Muslim to collect the *jizya* that they owed.

When the Porte recognized the Catholics as a *millet* in 1830, the Aleppine Catholics in Istanbul were told to register with the Catholic Patriarch and attend his churches where the liturgy was celebrated in Armenian. They insisted, however, in keeping their old arrangement with a Muslim *kocabaşı* and attending church with the Latins, as they were not Armenians. If the language of the mass was not to be their own, they preferred the language of the Franks (i.e. Latin) to that of the Armenians. One prominent merchant even swore in a public assembly that he would drown his wife and children in the Bosphorus rather than accept the new dispensation. Faced with a united front, the Ottoman authorities relented and allowed the 'Aleppines' to continue organizing their religious life, as they were accustomed to doing, and in fact they maintained that arrangement until the legalization of the Melkite Catholic *millet* in 1848. Even then, however, they showed reluctance to abandon their established custom of praying with the Franks and were induced to do so finally through the promise of parochial schools whose classes would be conducted in Arabic.³² The Melkite Catholics of the sultan's capital may not have claimed that they were Arabs, but it was abundantly clear from their arguments,

³¹ Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans*, 223.

³² Mazlum, *Nabdhah*, 92–95.

that their mother tongue, as well as that of their Mother Church, was Arabic and not Greek or Armenian.

Hobsbawm lists among the social identities that might give rise to an incipient national identity: language, a shared sense of history and of geographical space, in addition to a common religion and culture. In their arguments for recognition as a *millet*, the Melkite Catholics invoked the first two of the former categories, even if only by saying what they were not. By making a clear distinction between themselves and those of the *Rum* who spoke Greek on the one hand, and between themselves and other Catholics who spoke Armenian on the other, their default identity was both as Syrians and as Arabic speakers. They made neither claim explicitly, however, and their silence as to the question of their ethnicity is also significant.

The case presented by the Melkite Catholics in their struggle for recognition highlights a transition in collective identity from one that was largely religious and an expression of an intense localism to one in which elements of a 'proto-nationalism' could be expressed in its discourse. In part, the *Rum* of Syria were pushed in that direction by the increasing Hellenization of the Orthodox Church hierarchy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They had sought autonomy in the eighteenth century by citing a tradition of 'home rule'. By the nineteenth century, they were voicing their right to autonomy by citing a shared history, geography and linguistic distinctiveness but they were not yet a national church as that nation was yet to be 'imagined', to use Benedict Anderson's paradigm.³³ In short, they were on a continuum of group identity somewhere between being the *Rum*, i.e. defined solely by religious community, and being Arabs, defined solely by ethnic identity.

Paradoxically, given the arguments marshaled to advance their recognition, the subsequent history of the Melkite community in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not establish the Melikes in the vanguard of an Arab nationalist movement, although individuals from the community such as Fransis Marrash and Jubra'il Dallal would make important contributions to the Arabic literary revival of the late nineteenth century.³⁴ That place was ironically taken by their

³³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London, Verso, 1991.

³⁴ Aghnatiyus Dik, *al-Hudur al-Masihi fi Halab khilal al-alfayn al-munsarimayn* (Aleppo, Matba'at al-Ihsan, 2004) Part II, vol. 2, 32–34.

erstwhile Orthodox rivals in Syria and Palestine who had remained loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.³⁵ But there can be no question that the polemic produced by both Melkite Catholic and Orthodox camps in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped to transform what had begun as a simple struggle for 'home rule' in the see of Antioch into one that was increasingly painted with an ethnic brush.

The fear of further 'poaching' of the Orthodox faithful on the part of both the Melkite Catholics and the newly arrived Protestant missionaries pushed the Russians into a role of active interventionism in the ecclesiastical politics of the see of Antioch in the latter part of the nineteenth century that resulted in the elevation of Malatyus Dumani as Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch in 1900, the first Arab to hold the office since 1724.³⁶ The issue remains sensitive in the Orthodox see of Jerusalem where ethnic Greek prelates have continued to serve the Orthodox faithful.³⁷ Consciously or not, the Melkite Catholics had introduced the criterion of ethnic identity into politics of the Church and helped to transform notions of group identity among the Christians in Tanzimat Syria. In focusing their arguments of what it meant to be the 'authentic' Church in Syria, they forced all Christians in the region to question categories of identity that they inherited as 'tradition'. Confessional identity was no longer sufficient in itself to define a larger sense of belonging to an 'imagined community', and new parameters of inclusion and exclusion were yet to be devised.

³⁵ Robert Haddad, *Syrian Christians in Muslim Society: An Interpretation*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970, 70–98.

³⁶ Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843–1914: Church and Politics in the Near East*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, 166–72.

³⁷ Sotiris Roussos, 'The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and Community of Jerusalem: Church, State and Identity', in Anthony O'Mahony, ed., *The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2002, 38–56.

THE AWQAF OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN ALEPPO DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

SOUAD SLIM

At the suggestion of Dr Abdul-Karim Rafeq, I conducted a preliminary study of the *waqf* accounts of the Armenian, Greek Catholic, Maronite and Suryani (Jacobite), communities in Aleppo between 1805 and 1832.¹ These registers are stored at the Syrian National Archives in Damascus together with the registers of the law courts of Aleppo,² and consist of several volumes of the accounts of the various communities as submitted annually to the Muslim religious authorities by their bishops. The exploitation and management of urban *waqf* primarily involved the collection of rents from various shops and houses at a time when the bishops themselves still had sole responsibility for *waqf* administration. This lasted until the implementation of the provisions of the Hatt-i Hümayün of 1856, when a committee of laymen was set up to assist the bishops and patriarchs. By the end of the century the lay committee had taken charge of all aspects of *waqf* management, including leasing property, collecting rents, drawing up accounts, preparing reports, registering changes with the authorities, and paying taxes.

The new methods of *waqf* management introduced at that time are also reflected in the archives, both in the accounts and in the method of presentation. For many centuries, numerical data was arranged horizontally. The data provided by the documents for the renting of shops and houses belonging to the various Christian communities of Aleppo was essentially numerical and statistical. Data relating to real estate, amount of rents, taxes, expenses, the price of different materials, tenants, and quarters were registered in a serial manner which revealed

¹ The Greek Catholic community of Aleppo had overtaken the Greek Orthodox in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It is not clear whether the documents relating to the Syriac and Armenian churches concern the Catholic or Orthodox communities. The Armenian Catholic millet was created in 1830: see page 463 above.

² See Brigitte Marino, Tumuki Ukawara and Da'd al-Hakim, eds., *Catalogue des registres des tribunaux ottomans conservés au Centre des archives de Damas*, Damas, Institut français d'études arabes/Centre des Archives de Damas, 1999.

the functioning of traditional urban religious institutions. Studies of the ways in which *awqaf* were exploited reveal much about such diverse topics as the occupation of urban space, *waqf* revenues, the coexistence of different communities, methods of payment, the different currencies in use, and the conditions and methods in which exploitation took place at different levels. *Ijar* rents in various parts of the city show differences between city quarters and other regions. Higher levels of revenues were also derived from farming contracts, while there is also information on the more traditional *hikr* contracts.

The early nineteenth century was a period of bitter and often violent conflict between the Catholic and Orthodox communities, although both could still be regarded as part of a single community in human, sociological and economic terms. This period was marked by the growing hegemony of the Greek Catholics, who took over most of the city's churches. In March 1821 there were riots marking the beginning of the Greek war of independence, after which the Ottoman authorities in Aleppo allowed Catholic priests to perform baptism and marriage ceremonies for their parishioners in recognition of their loyalty to Islam and the state and as a punishment for the 'treason' of the Orthodox. The departure of the Catholics from the city in the first part of the eighteenth century because of persecution by the Orthodox had had a profound effect on local and state finances. The Catholics were among the city's leading merchants, whose contribution both to trade and to the *jizya* was sufficient to encourage the 'ulama and other Muslim notables to press the *qadi* to persuade the Catholic clergy to return to Aleppo, where they would be able to practice their own rites. By this time the Greek Catholics greatly outnumbered the Greek Orthodox in the city: seven hundred families as against thirty-five. Despite that, and despite the intervention of the local authorities, the Greek Catholic church was not formally recognized as a separate *millet* by the Ottomans until 1848.³

That these accounts exist with the degree of continuity and detail presented here may indicate the beginning of a new administrative situation for the communities involved. The accounts of each year occupy between two and three pages and are found in different registers, and were included with the accounts of the Muslim *waqf*. In 1227

³ See Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: the Roots of Sectarianism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, 91–97, and Masters' contribution to this volume.

AH (1815), there were thirty-four Muslim and four Christian *awqaf*. The documents include details of *waqf* expenditure and the income generated mainly from rents on the shops and houses. By examining the accounts of each community, it is possible to understand the inner workings of this institution, which was very common in the cities of the Arab-Muslim world. The chief official involved was the bishop, who was always named at the beginning of the document as responsible for the accounts and the principal representative and intermediary of his people vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities.

The accounts for the year 1229 AH (1817) state that the Greek Catholics owned seventeen houses (*dar*) and eight shops (*dukkans*). The total rent income from these properties amounted to 717.5 piastres, and expenses were evaluated at 744.75, thus showing a deficit of 29.25 piastres. The Armenian *waqf* consisted of ten *dars* and three *dukkans*, with an income of 357 piastres and expenses of 396.75, resulting in a deficit of 39.75 piastres. The Maronite *waqf* owned four *dars* and four *dukkans* with an income of 424 piastres; expenses came to 474, leaving a deficit of 50 piastres. The Suryani *waqf* owned 11 *dars* and four *dukkans* with an income of 464 piastres; maintenance and taxes amounted to 536 piastres, leaving a deficit of 72 piastres. The different parcels of real estate were recorded under the names of individuals, each identified by his surname, or first name and profession, or by the name of his father, or by the name of the quarter or the district where the *waqf* was situated.

Although the deficits were not very high, they were slightly higher than the amount each community paid for the '*awarid sultaniya* (*avana*)' which came to 25, 27, 32.75 and 40.5 piastres respectively for each community. In the list of revenues from houses and shops, an association of the property with other beneficiaries is mentioned several times, which may suggest that this kind of urban *waqf* was becoming more fragmented. The shops and houses belonging to the various Christian communities were located in different quarters of the city, although most were in the majority Christian quarters of al-Nasara, Salibiya, al-Akrad, Zuqaq al-Arba'in, al-Mawardi and al-Rawwas. As for the *awqaf* known by the names of their tenants, it is not possible to say whether these are surnames or first names. After settling in a district or quarter, families were usually known either by their place of origin or by their profession. After a period of integration which could last three generations or more, families tended to divide into lineages, each of which took the first name of its founder. Thus the Greek Catholic tenants' surnames (which are also common first names) include

Qustantin, Girgis, Ya'qub, Antun, Yuwasaf and Ghadban. A woman Helanah (Helen) is mentioned among the tenants. There are other first names of the tenants of other communities such as Karkur and Wannis among the Armenians, Gibrayil and Dahir among the Suryanis, and Girgis, the most popular in all the communities.

The city's inhabitants were also commonly known by adjectives describing their professions and trades: for example *al-jawhargi* (jeweller), *al-'attar* (perfume seller), *al-khayyat* (tailor), *al-khuri* (priest), *al-qass* (priest), *al-shammas* (deacon), names common among both Catholic and Orthodox of all the communities. Expenses always seemed to have been greater than revenues, and were incurred mainly in construction costs or roof repairs. The Greek Catholic *waqf* was building new houses in three districts of Aleppo: al-Akrad, Zuqaq al-Arba'in and al-Salibiya, but a relatively large sum (261 piastres) was allocated for roof construction or repairs (*musaqqa'fa*).

Among the expenses mentioned are those for *ta'mir* (construction). It also appears as *tarmim* (repair), which is more common. In addition to their cost, the construction and repair of buildings belonging to Christian *awqaf* required special official authorization that was difficult to obtain without the payment of more taxes or bribes. Even after the Tanzimat, a special *firman* was still required to build new churches or to repair old ones. Other expenses incurred for liturgical celebrations were oil and candles for lighting and ceremonial purposes, which incurred an annual outlay of up to 170 piastres, a relatively large sum. It was obligatory to carry a light while walking around the city or the quarter at night and the local authorities prescribed to each community or religion the use and kind of lighting they had to carry.

Many expenses imposed by the authorities were significant, including the *miri* and the *avanas*. The value of the official *miri* tax was the same for all the city's Christian communities. The word *miri* is mentioned beside the word *shama'*, candles. But this probably meant taxes on candles, whose price was listed next to that of the oil. This tax did not exceed five piastres.

The *avanas* were often considerable sums that seem to be disproportionate as well as unrelated to the income or wealth of a particular community's *awqaf*; the Greek Catholic *waqf*, which was evidently the wealthiest, paid the lowest *avania*, while the Suryanis, which had the largest deficit, had to pay the highest. The *avanas* listed under the heading *'awarid sultaniya* were not generally regarded as unjust exactions. They were collected regularly by the city's religious authorities

and recorded in the tax registers as legal impositions by the Ottoman authorities. They were imposed on each of the city quarters and divided among the inhabitants, including the Muslims. Of the thirty-four Islamic *waqf* foundations mentioned in the register for the year 1227 A.H. (1815), only twelve paid the *avania*. It seems that the levy of the *avaniyas* was similar to the *jizya*, and that the authorities took the social and economic situation of the tax payers into consideration. The *avaniyas* were imposed almost invariably from one year to the next, since the official *miri* tax, levied as a fixed tribute after the conquest of Syria by Sultan Selim in 1516, was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the Ottoman treasury.

Under the heading of expenses were a number of items that may be grouped as administrative costs. The relatively high cost of registering documents and other notarial formalities was marked down as payable to the scribe (*khidmat al-katabah*). The Greek Catholics and the Suryanis paid relatively large amounts to the tax collectors, 40 piastres and 30 piastres respectively, while the Armenians and the Maronites did not pay anything at all. We may ask whether the sums were so high in order to prevent the need to bribe the tax collectors, or whether they were perhaps an indirect, yet virtually official, way of paying such bribes and 'gifts'. Other lesser registration and accounting charges were included in the documents, apparently referring to taxes which had been fixed long before. The accounting tax varied from five to seven piastres according to the community, while the registration tax, *qalamiya wa qaydiya*, was less than one piastre for each community.

One expense common to all the Christian communities which was included in the accounts was the charitable aid given by each community to the poor. The mention of the phrase 'service to the poor', *khidmat al-fuqara*, varies from one community to the other. The Rum did not mention it for the year 1229 H. The Armenians and the Maronites paid 176 and 131.75 piastres respectively. The Suryanis did not mention the poor but rather the priests and their servants, *al-qusus w'al-farashin*. Very often the latter were recognized by the authorities as poor and modest, *faqir wa haqir*. Even if giving charity to the poor was not expressly mentioned, all the Christian *waqf* foundations were regarded as a *waqf* for the poor of the community. A principal condition for the validity of a *waqf* is that it had originally been established for charitable purposes. A pious or humanitarian end (*qurba*) is an absolute condition for a *waqf*. Foundations established by non-Muslims are valid only if their aim is not contrary to Islam, for example,

if they are not destined for churches or monasteries. Therefore, during the Ottoman era, all Christian *awqaf* were founded and named in favour of the poor of the church or the monastery, and this is clearly indicated in the title of the document.

Various other expenses are mentioned. Important categories are found under a particular heading in the accounts of one community that are not found in the accounts of the others. Thus we find the expenditure of 130 piastres for community losses in the Armenian accounts, 240 piastres for community affairs in the Suryani accounts, or 264.5 piastres for necessary expenses in the Maronite accounts. Under the heading of expenses, there were also payments common to all *waqf* known as *hikr*, the subletting of *waqf* property. These were either grouped under the heading of 'various *ahkar*' or distributed among several separate headings. The sums, described as *hikr* (pl. *ahkar*), differed widely for each community. The amount ranged from 33.5 piastres for the Greek Catholics to 7 piastres for the Armenians and 7.8 and 16 piastres for the Suryanis. The latter community was the only one to include its cemetery in its accounts, so that 16 piastres are registered as *ahkar al-maqbara*. It is not clear whether the revenue of this *ahkar* came from the tax farming of rural properties, or whether it was a fixed proportion of *waqf* revenues, owed to the administrator whom the bishop employed to collect the *waqf* rents.

Those documents raise many other questions concerning the situation of Christian communities in the cities of the Ottoman Empire. Were they confined to particular *haras*, or were they scattered across most of the quarters of the city? Recent research on Beirut, Tripoli and Aleppo shows that the Christians were relatively well distributed across these cities with minorities or majorities in different locations, although there were obvious concentrations of Jews or Christians in the immediate vicinities of synagogues or churches.⁴ Jean Claude David has shown the extent to which mosques, situated on the principal streets, were public areas and churches, located inside the Christian quarters, were private spaces.⁵ The recent work of Kuroki Hidemitsu

⁴ See James Reilly's contribution to this volume, and the valuable tables in Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth, *Aleppo: Historische und geographische Beiträge zur baulichen Gestaltung, zur sozialen Organisation und zur wirtschaftlichen Dynamik einer vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole*, Wiesbaden, Dr Ludwig Reichert, 1984.

⁵ Jean-Claude David, 'La production de l'espace dans la ville ottomane: les waqfs musulmans dans les quartier chrétiens a Alep au XVI^e et au XVII^e siècles', dans Louis Boisset, Floréal Sanagustin, Souad Slim, eds., *Les relations entre musulmans et*

may also be useful because it seems that the concentration of *awqaf* does not always reflect the distribution of population.⁶ Is it possible to find any correlation between social classes and confessional identities within the various Christian communities? Did the lack of charitable expenses in the Greek Catholic community mean that they were all rich and long urbanized? Were the other communities more in touch with recent rural immigrants from the villages surrounding Aleppo? We know that there were many Orthodox villages in the hinterland of the city and elsewhere in the *liwa*'.

Another problem relating to the sources and the specific aims of the registration of those accounting reports might also be crucial. Over the seventeen years, the general balance of the accounts shows a small annual deficit. This apparently static situation is difficult to reconcile with other studies which have underlined the privileged economic circumstances of the Christian bourgeoisie of Aleppo. Could we attribute this chronic situation of deficit in the administration of the *waqf* to the conflict between communities induced by the schism between the Catholics and Orthodox of each rite, or was it due to the particular economic conjuncture in the region at that time?

Did the expenses registered under the heading of 'community losses' and 'necessary expenses' or 'community affairs' in fact allow a degree of freedom for the Maronites, Suryanis and Armenians to diversify the expenditure of their *awqaf*? Were the local authorities more severe in their auditing of some communities rather than others? Or was it because histories of conflicts between communities at that time often mention denunciations? It may be possible to resolve some of these problems through a more comprehensive study of the *awqaf* of Aleppo in their human, economic and social context.

chrétiens dans le Bilad al-Cham à l'époque ottomane aux XVII^e-XIX^e siècles. Apport des archives des tribunaux religieux des villes: Alep, Beyrouth, Damas, Tripoli. Damas, Institut français du Proche-Orient, Université de Balamand, Université Saint-Joseph, 2005, 267-89.

⁶ Hidemitsu Kuroki, 'The mobility of non-Muslims in mid-nineteenth century Aleppo', in Hidemitsu Kuroki, ed., *The Influence of Human Mobility in Muslim Societies*, London and New York, Kegan Paul, 2003, 117-51.

MIGRATION, FAITH AND COMMUNITY:
EXTRA-LOCAL LINKAGES IN COASTAL SYRIA

DICK DOUWES

Extra-local linkages

In this paper the concept of extra-locality, in terms of space, memory, and devotion, will be applied in an examination of some aspects of communal identities in the mountainous coastal area of Syria in the late Ottoman and early French mandate periods. Particular focus will be on the Ismaʿili and Nusayri/Alawi communities. Developments in the area can, of course, only fully be understood in the wider context of economic, political, and cultural currents; governance and trade are significant factors in understanding extra-locality. The mountainous north-western coastal region of Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire, which meant that local officials operated in an imperial context. Adult male villagers were recruited into the army, and those who returned brought with them accounts of distant wars, while tobacco and silk linked the villages to a network of trade and finance well beyond the empire. European and American missionaries developed (mostly ill-fated) activities in a number of villages, introducing Western visions of God's worldly order. The establishment of French rule in the area after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire demanded that it become fully absorbed in the efforts of European states to acquire colonies and spheres of influence. However, by taking larger, even global, categories as points of departure when analyzing developments in this particular area, there is a real danger such developments will be explained primarily from the point of view of the 'centre' (the provincial capital, imperial government, central mandatory authorities, European banking houses etc.). The principal consequence of this is that local dynamics are effectively ignored. To date, only very limited research has been conducted into the local historical sources of the area, such as the records of municipalities and court registers, local histories and memories, local religious writing and practices, material culture, etc.,

with the result that we often only 'know' these communities through the eyes of the 'other'.¹

The ta'ifiya taboo

When studying local histories we need to bear in mind that, throughout the twentieth century, the topic of communal/religious relations has been a highly sensitive issue in Syria, largely because of the violent encounters which took place in the mid-nineteenth-century (in particular, Druze and Maronite clashes in Mount Lebanon, and the massacre of Christians in Damascus) and in the early French mandate period. The wars and suffering that accompanied both the creation of the state of Israel and the civil wars in Lebanon—two openly sectarian states—have greatly contributed to the negative image of religious particularism and the dangers it poses in the political arena.

However, in a more general sense, the unsettled issue of the correlation between religious and ethnic plurality and a full and equal (sense of) citizenship has also had its influence. To this day, decades of secular Arab nationalist rule have failed to bring about full equality for non-Sunni citizens. Equally, decades of socialist rule and the rhetoric of class struggle have failed to explain away particularistic orientations at grass-root levels.

Religious plurality is usually associated with sectarianism (*ta'ifiya*), and often deemed detrimental to national unity. This modern view of religion as a dividing rather than binding force stems from the introduction of (European) nationalist concepts in which religious communities were increasingly defined as 'nations' that could claim preferential treatment and political rights, including independence.² The tendency to ascribe centrifugal trends to religious plurality affects most minority communities, not only Christians and Jews, but also, and in particular, the more 'obvious' sectarians, such as Alawites and

¹ Admittedly, 'central' resources have also been under-exploited, in particular the Ottoman state archives. One of the very few studies that touch upon the coastal area based upon these rich resources is Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains; Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1998.

² Sectarianism is defined as ascribing political claims or rights to religious communities beyond matters of worship and family. On the development of sectarianism in nineteenth-century Lebanon, see Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Lebanon*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000.

Ismaʿilis, who as a result are more reluctant to claim public space. They have been forced into apologetic responses to their critics and, so far, have largely been denied a modern history of their own.³

The Ottoman Commonwealth

In the late Ottoman period, much of the mountainous coastal area of Syria was part of the Ottoman province of Beirut; only the inland slopes and foothills fell under the province of Damascus, and those in the north under Aleppo. Like other parts of the Ottoman Commonwealth, this area was—and still is—host to a variety of devotional orientations, mostly Islamic but some Christian. More than one language was spoken, but Arabic was clearly dominant. To say that the area was culturally ‘Muslim’ or ‘Arab’ would most likely be regarded today as an accurate observation, but this probably ignores the self-identification of the majority of the inhabitants, who lived a rural life and may not have perceived their world in terms of a larger, commonly shared culture. Most Sunni Muslims, who constituted a sizeable community in the coastal towns (Latakia and Tartus), regarded the beliefs of the great majority of villagers as deviant at best, and heretical at worst. It is therefore difficult to see how the local peasantry could have associated themselves with the idea of an union in faith, be it Islamic or otherwise, beyond their own particular traditions and rites, whether these were rooted in Islam (Nusayris—known as Alawis since the 1910s—and Ismaʿilis) or in Christianity (Greek Orthodox and Maronites).

Nonetheless, apart from the Crusader interlude, the area was ruled for over thirteen centuries by Muslim, mainly Sunni, rulers, who—notwithstanding their formal disapproval of local rites—rarely attempted to discipline the local population into more orthodox practices. Nusayris and Ismaʿilis were able to follow their particularistic traditions and, in general, had access to justice and were treated as subjects of the Sultan often within the construct of an informal but pragmatic legal compromise, positioning them between the faithful (Sunni Muslims) and the *dhimmi*s (Christians and Jews). For better or worse, the Ottoman

³ The memoir of Muhammad Ibrahim al-ʿAli, a retired army officer (*Hayati waʿl-iʿdam*, Damascus, 2003) is an exception to this rule, given his apparent openness concerning a ‘sect’ within the Alawite community, the Murshidiya.

and earlier Islamic commonwealths allowed for the perpetuation of communal variety.

Did/does religion matter?

There is little doubt that religion mattered in the Ottoman Commonwealth, at various levels of communal and imperial existence, but it would be a challenge for historians to try and understand what religion meant when seen from angles different from the familiar ones of institutions or of conflict and political mobilization. Scholarly work on religious plurality in the late Ottoman Empire has focused predominantly on formal institutions, and on communal conflict and political change, in particular on the forces that eroded the traditional Ottoman Commonwealth when it was becoming integrated into the European-dominated capitalist world order. In general, what was different has attracted much more attention than what was common in analyzing communal relations in the context of religious plurality.

In the eyes of nineteenth and early twentieth century European travellers, religion in the Middle East certainly mattered. Curiosity about the 'sectarians' of the area was a widespread phenomenon that was partly rooted in the notion that it concerned communities which, given that they were not seen as 'real' Muslims, would be more susceptible to European, especially Christian, ideas. Moreover, many Europeans who explored the region for Western audiences were looking for the roots of Christianity and expected to find echoes of the pre-Islamic Christian past in the area. Many were intrigued by the Nusayris, often considered to represent a pre-Islamic religious tradition that had largely resisted Islamisation and still carried with it some early, perhaps heterodox, Christian beliefs, as well as pre-Islamic pagan rites. The Jesuit missionary and scholar Henri Lammens concluded that: 'la religion des Nosairis est un compromise entre les vérités chrétiennes et les fables chi'ites.'⁴ Misinterpreting the Arabic language in their enthusiasm, some missionaries referred to the Nusayris as 'little Christians';⁵

⁴ 'Aux pays des Nosayris', *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, 5, 1899, 112.

⁵ A common Arabic name for Christians is 'Nasara' (derived from Nazareth); some missionaries believed that the word Nusayri was the diminutive of Nasara, although this is not a very likely option morphologically. However, this notion can be traced back to earlier travelers, such as the mid-17th century Jesuit missionary Joseph Beson; see his *La Syrie et la Terre Sainte au XVII^e Siècle*, Poitiers, Libraire Henri Oudin, 1862 [Nouvelle Édition].

however, attempts to convert Nusayris either to Catholic or Protestant variants of Christianity were short-lived following the very limited response from the local communities to the missionaries' call, and the Ottoman authorities' discouragement of missionary work among non-Christians.

The existence of a small number of Isma'ili communities in the mountainous coastal regions fascinated the Europeans because the Isma'ilis were the heir to the legendary Assassins—more accurately the New Call (*da'wa jadida*) movement—that figured prominently in the recollections of the Crusaders' wars for the Holy Land.

Saintly networks

The coastal mountains were a poverty-stricken area with very limited agricultural resources. Many lived a deprived life of hard manual labour. Traditional strategies for improving living conditions and seeking consolation included conducting appropriate religious rituals, alongside other options such as extending the cultivation of terraces and improving irrigation, opting for seasonal migration or—in the higher valleys—joining bands of bandits. For the purposes of devotion and sacred dedication to family and land—in other words, to reproduction—all communities gathered around what was, at that time, the most renowned saint, Khidr. The omnipresent Khidr, beloved from the Balkans to the Indian subcontinent, was known among Christians either as Mar Jurjus (Saint George) or Mar Ilyas.⁶ The monastery of Mar Jurjus, situated in the south-eastern foothills in the Valley of the Christians (Wadi al-Nasara), was his principal shrine in the region, but there were numerous other shrines dedicated to this timeless saint. On his festival day (*mawlid*) villagers from the wider area came to the monastery, including Sunnis and Shi'is from villages close to the inland towns of Hama and Homs.

Indeed, the Ottoman Empire (and the Muslim world beyond) contained a veritable network of saintly shrines and rituals. Apart from the exceptionally widespread cult of Khidr/Jurjus, many other holy men—and, sometimes, women—were shared by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Aspiring mystics and the pious travelled over long distances to visit one shrine after the other, in order to receive the 'blessings' of

⁶ On Khidr, see Patrick Franke, *Begegnung mit Khidr; Quellenstudien zum Imaginären im Traditionellen Islam*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000.

these sacred places. Their itineraries connected local shrines both to a rich mystical tradition and to a much wider sacred space. For example, the most famed Damascene mystic of the Ottoman era, 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, visited numerous shrines in the coastal mountains, writing prose and verse about his religious experiences.⁷ However, this tradition of extended shrine pilgrimage barely survived beyond the nineteenth century.

The local tradition of shrine visits does, however, still survive in a different form, although the saints' clientele has dwindled dramatically. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the shrines occupied a central position in popular devotion, in particular among the Nusayris and Isma'ilis who—despite the fact that a few larger villages had mosques—had no tradition of mosque gatherings. Many villagers and townspeople in general believed in the power of the saints and their shrines. Even what may, today, seem to be 'sectarian' shrines, such as that of Shaykh Badr (located in the village carrying his name in the hills above the town of Tartus) attracted a wide variety of devotees and not only Nusayris. Indeed, saints like Shaykh Badr were known to overarch local clan and religious differences and it was not uncommon for contending parties to join together to swear the cessation of hostilities at the shrine after the conclusion of a truce. For instance, a major conflict in the southern half of the coastal mountains in 1919 was settled by taking the following oath: 'I swear by God, while I place my hand on the shrine of Shaykh Badr, with my heart and my soul, that I will keep the peace and will not be the cause of any unrest among the population. Should unrest occur, I will do my utmost to make it stop. We are all one soul in several bodies, brothers without distinction in sect and religion.'⁸

Significantly, very few instances are known of particularistic claims being put on any individual saint. Disputes over the control of (the revenues of) shrines occurred with some regularity, but these were not

⁷ See 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, *al-Haqiqa wa'l-Majaz fi'l-r-Rihla ila Bilad al-Sham wa-Misr wa'l-Hijaz*, ed. A. 'A.-M. Huraydi, Cairo, al-Hay'a al-Misriya al-'Amma li'l-Kitab, 1987.

⁸ See Centre des Archives diplomatique, Nantes (CADN), 2357, *Journal de la Mission politique des Alaouites* (8 October 1919) quoted in Paul van Caldenborgh, 'The Incorporation of the Alawi Community into the Syrian State during the French Mandate Period', Ph.D thesis, Radboud University, Nijmegen, 2005, 63.

particularistic in the sense of concerning diverse religious communities, and in fact such conflicts tended to be family or village matters.

Among the different Muslim communities, some sacred figures dwelled in verse rather than in material shrines, such as 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad), Ja'far al-Sadiq (the highly respected sixth imam), and the great mystic Muhi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi, the *Shaykh Akbar* ('Greatest Shaykh') for many Muslims at the time. Certain objects and spaces had been devoted to all of these (and other) shared holy men, tying them to certain localities, but, unlike Khidr, they had no comparable widespread and close-knit network of shrines.⁹

Saint and community

The inclusive nature of the cults of saints and shrines often transgressed particularistic orientations, if only because of the sheer dedication to the sacred on the part of the population as a whole. Inhabitants of the coastal mountains may have known that Khidr and other saints were held sacred elsewhere, too. Had they known about it, it might well have seemed logical to them for the main entrance of the Citadel of Aleppo to house a shrine dedicated to Khidr. However, to take the concept one step further, such knowledge would probably not have created any sort of sense of belonging vis-à-vis the population of Aleppo, let alone the residents of the Citadel (who were of course Ottoman troops). Above all, saints linked local communities of believers to a world beyond daily existence, an extra-locality of faithful belonging and the hereafter. As the saintly essence was internalized into particularistic religious orientations (e.g. Sunni, Nusayri, Isma'ili, Greek Orthodox, etc.) these extra-local qualities did not necessarily kindle inter-communal cross-overs beyond an acceptance of certain intrinsic values, a few practical conventions, and some shared rituals. In a practical sense, this meant that people could leave belongings such as harvesting tools or a mule at a shrine in the care of a saint, knowing that only very few would risk the wrath of the saint by stealing such items.

The shrines were tended by families of *mashayikh 'ilm*, 'masters [or *shaykhs*] of Knowledge'. This 'knowledge' was called their 'secret'

⁹ Another major sacred network concerned the shrines along the pilgrimage roads to, and those in and around, Mecca and Medina, including many spaces and objects dedicated to the first generations of Muslim leaders.

and, if this secret was powerful, a *shaykh* could become a holy man during his lifetime and a saint after his death. Quite a number of *shaykhs* became saints during the Ottoman period, indicating that the shaykhly tradition was dynamic and that popular devotion not only followed historical precedent but was also organic. Like the saints, religious *shaykhs* often transgressed clan borders and acted as mediators and judges. Religious *shaykhs* kept some (ritual) distance from their 'worldly' counterparts, the *mashayikh zulm*, the '*shaykhs* of oppression', the common cynical reference to clan leaders, but the former in fact often relied on these local power brokers for sustenance.

The vitality of the shaykhly tradition was accompanied by a certain degree of segmentation of religious guidance, with the sacred at times limited to a specific geographical area (for instance, to a number of villages or a limited number of clans). The little that is known about ritual variation within the Nusayri and Isma'ili communities clearly indicates that there was no central source of religious authority. By the early twentieth century there was evidence of various shaykhly orientations within the Nusayri communities; people were referred to as 'Kalazi', 'Haydari', etc., following shaykhly lineages. The much smaller Isma'ili community was also divided according to shaykhly lineages, in particular the Suwaydanis and Hajjawis. This suggests that the sacred was felt to be very close and particular to the local community, with local shaykhly lineages defining and 'living out' that sacred quality. It is tempting to conclude from the narrow geographical reach of some of these lineages that we are dealing with isolated—or compact—communities. However, and apart from other extra-local linkages, some *shaykhs* (or holy men) attracted a much broader clientele, spreading a much wider and more inclusive sense of the sacred. Moreover, many *shaykhs* travelled, visiting other *shaykhs* and shrines in the wider region.

Devotional extra-local linkages

Exceptionally, in the Islamic traditions of the Mediterranean, in Nusayri (and Druze) belief the transmigration of souls connected each generation to earlier and later generations, the number of souls being somehow limited. References to historical events also constituted a form of additional extra-local communal body. Within Nusayri, Isma'ili,

Maronite, and Greek-Orthodox communities, images of a more glorious past and a wider geographical spread had remained alive. Within Nusayri tradition the coastal mountains symbolized a refuge, and several Nusayri clans traced their origins back to Anatolia and Aleppo, areas which they had been forced to evacuate in the wake of the Ottoman and Safavid wars. Similarly, the memory of the expulsion of their co-religionists from Aleppo and Damascus in the twelfth century lived on among the Isma'ilis. Furthermore, in both the Nusayri and Isma'ili communities, memories of an earlier, more widespread existence not only survived, but, at times, also resulted in the 'recollection' of imaginary communities in the East, as far as in China.

In the case of the Isma'ilis the imamate constituted an important devotional extra-local linkage. Very little is known of the history of the Isma'ilis in Syria after their subjugation by the Mamluks of the Castles of the Mission (*qila' al-da'wa*) in the thirteenth century. Small communities of Isma'ilis were, however, still in existence in the nineteenth century, mainly in the southern and eastern parts of the mountains. The Syrian Isma'ilis were attached to the Mu'min-Shah lineage of Isma'ili imams, but had lost actual communication with their own imams some time in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps earlier. The notion of the necessity of having a living imam¹⁰ was revived in the second half of the nineteenth century, when a number of Isma'ili *shaykhs* left for Iraq and Iran in order to re-establish contacts with the imam. Eventually, in the final decade of the nineteenth century, some *shaykhs* journeyed to Bombay and met with the Aga Khan. As he stemmed from a different lineage (Qasim-Shah), many Isma'ili *shaykhs* in Syria were reluctant to recognize the Aga Khan as their imam. The Suwaydani Shaykhs were particularly vocal in challenging the authority of the Aga Khan, but the Hajjawi Shaykhs acknowledged his imamate and mobilized a growing group of followers.

The recognition of the Aga Khan as their imam impacted harshly upon the community; numerous *shaykhs* and others were arrested and put on trial in the first decade of the twentieth century. Clearly, the *shaykhs* had neither anticipated nor understood the angry response of the Ottoman authorities, who interpreted the acceptance of this 'British Indian prince' as a treacherous act directed against the supreme

¹⁰ Within the wider Shi'i tradition the occultation (*ghayba*) of imams is not uncommon.

authority of the Sultan.¹¹ The recognition of the Aga Khan by part of the community bolstered existing differentiation within it, increasing its dependence on extra-local input to such an extent that the shaykhly tradition among the followers of the Aga Khan quickly eroded, causing a local crisis in religious guidance. This was worsened by problems in communicating with the Aga Khan and his entourage which persisted for much of the twentieth century.

Migration and imamate

The main body of the Aga Khan's followers was to be found in the Khawabi area, above Tartus, and in the newly settled part of Salamiya, located to the south-east of Hama. Migration to the fertile inland plain of Salamiya began in 1850, gaining momentum in the last two decades of the century. The fact that Salamiya was once an Isma'ili stronghold may not have escaped folk memory, but the pioneering settlers in this (then) nomadic area were also motivated by the prospect of a more prosperous life and by exemption from tax and army conscription. The settlers followed the example of the Druzes of Mount Lebanon, who had migrated earlier to the Jabal 'Arab area to the south of Damascus to re-cultivate the lands of villages that had been abandoned for many centuries. After World War One, the Salamiya area became the main Isma'ili centre in Syria, attracting migrants from all over the coastal mountains. Many Nusayris also settled in the area, often working the fields of Isma'ili landlords.¹²

The success of the Aga Khan's mission among the settlers may be partly explained by the collapse of clannish hierarchies during the process of migration, and by the simple fact that migrants are, in the nature of migration, in a position to experiment. The majority of the Isma'ilis who remained tied to the mountains, especially in the Misyaf and Qadmus areas, continued to be attached to the

¹¹ See Dick Douwes and Norman N. Lewis, 'The Trials of Syrian Isma'ilis in the first decade of the 20th century', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21, 1989, 215-32.

¹² Migration had not been limited to inland Syria; an increasing number of Christians, in particular, left for more distant climes, favouring the Americas. This emigration was not confined to Christians, as small numbers of Nusayris, Isma'ilis, and Sunnis settled in Latin America; however, unlike the Christians, they did not develop a strong homeland culture, and many converted to Catholicism.

Mu'min-Shah lineage of imams, the last of whom seems to have lived in concealment, shunning direct communication with his community.¹³ These Isma'ilis later adopted the name Mu'minin, not only a reference to the lineage, but also an expression of their conviction that they remained faithful to the 'real' imam.¹⁴ A small number of them settled in the Qadamisa quarter of Salamiya, which was named after their place of origin (Qadmus).

In the 1920s the Aga Khan instructed his followers to refrain from visiting shrines and invoking the blessings of saints. From now on, only the Aga Khan was to be the focal point of veneration. This serious restriction of the sacred strongly affected the position of the religious *shaykhs*. Being cut off from the sacred world of saints and shrines, the *shaykhs* faced the task of communicating between the local Isma'ilis and the Gujarati entourage of the Aga Khan, an altogether awkward task, at least partly because of the language difference. In the Khawabi area some shrines were removed, although most of the aged pine trees, traditionally considered sacred, survived the Isma'ili iconoclasts. But saints and shrines could not be carved out of the religious life of Aga Khani Isma'ilis overnight, and even today a small number have remained faithful to the sacred tradition, occasionally visiting shrines. However, the Aga Khan's policies, together with his geographical remoteness, may well have contributed to the rapid secularization of the community in the mid-twentieth-century.

Migration and localization

The clan-based structure of the Nusayri settlers on the inland plains—increasingly known as Alawis after the First World War—quickly eroded, and they too proved to be susceptible to new religious calls. In the late 1920s a crisis occurred that impacted on the entire Alawi community, when a holy man and self-declared prophet, Salman al-Murshid, who embodied the dual function of clan leader and religious authority, attracted a rapidly growing following in the northern and eastern parts of the mountains. The formation of this large and charismatic clan was supported by the French mandate authorities.

¹³ For an overview of Isma'ili imamate lineages, see 'Arif Tamir, 'Furu' ash-Shajara al-Isma'iliya al-Imamiya', *al-Mashriq*, 51, 1957, 581–612.

¹⁴ *Mu'min* means 'believer'.

al-Murshid's missionaries were able to win Alawi settlers on the inland plain over to their Lord (*rabb*), as he was called.¹⁵

The rise of al-Murshid fitted in with local traditions of divine manifestations and millenarianism. In contrast to the call of the Aga Khan, al-Murshid built on local elements of religiosity and belief. Like the Aga Khan, he moved his followers away from shrines and (other) saints by posing as a divine manifestation and at least temporarily as the absolute authority, and by so doing he dealt a severe blow to the traditional class of religious *shaykhs*. Yet, after his violent death—he was hanged in 1946—he became absorbed into the sacred world of his followers, in the form of their principal saint. His missionaries developed into a new class of religious *shaykhs* with an inward-looking attitude following the suppression of the movement in the 1940s.

The rise of the Murshidiya may have been the most spectacular development, but it was not the only challenge facing the traditional religious *shaykhs*. A small but growing group of educated Alawis argued for more radical departures from their religious past. Some pleaded for far-reaching religious reforms by distancing themselves altogether from shrines and saints, and by trying to position the community within the Ja'fari tradition, seeking a rapprochement with mainstream Twelver Shi'ism.¹⁶ Others opted for secular, mainly social-ist, alternatives.

Conclusion

The context in which the transformation of the Isma'ili and Alawi communities took place was one of an increased openness to regional and global flows of commodities, people, and ideas. In this phase of early globalization and the ensuing societal changes, that which was held sacred was frequently challenged, both from within and from without.

¹⁵ For Sulayman (or Salman as his followers, and some of his critics, call him) see Patrick Franke, *Göttliche Karriere eines syrischen Hirten: Sulaimân Murshid (1907–1946) und die Anfänge der Murshidiya*, Berlin, Klaus Schwarz, 1994. See also the booklet by Muhammad Husayn al-Nuri endorsing Murshid's death sentence, *al-Rabb al-Muzayyif, Salman al-Murshid*, Damascus, 1947.

¹⁶ See for instance Muhammad A. al-Tawil, *Ta'rikh al-'Alawiyin*, Latakia, 1924. For a rather apologetic critique of al-Tawil, see 'Abd al-Rahman al-Khayyir, *Yaqzat al-Muslim al-'Alawiyin fi Matla' al-Qarn al-'Ishrin*, Damascus, Matba'a al-Katib al-'Arabi, 1996.

Particularistic understandings of religiosity, and of the relation to the sacred, came under growing pressure as extra-local intervention and exchange increased, and inter-communal relations changed. Much research is still needed in order to allow us to assess these changes and to compose a modern history of the sacred in this part of Syria.

PART SIX

EUROPEANS IN *BILAD AL-SHAM*

AUX ORIGINES DU PLAN D'ALEP PAR ROUSSEAU: LE PLAN DE VINCENT GERMAIN DE 1811

ANDRÉ RAYMOND

1. *Le plan Rousseau de 1818*


En dehors de l'exception magistrale que constitue le plan du Caire de la *Description de l'Égypte*, levé par les membres de l'expédition française entre 1798 et 1801 et publié à Paris dans le cadre de la publication générale entre 1809 et 1828, le plan d'Alep par Rousseau, daté de 1811–1818 et publié par la société de Géographie, par les soins de Barbié du Bocage, en 1825, constitue le premier exemple de ce qu'on peut considérer comme une cartographie moderne, pour ce qui concerne le monde arabe.¹

La comparaison qui doit être faite avec le relevé de Niebuhr (1766–plan 1) qui a été ensuite repris par Russell (plan 2)² montre bien les progrès réalisés depuis ce qui n'est qu'une simple ébauche, tant en ce qui concerne le travail de cartographie, qui reste très rudimentaire dans ces premiers essais, que dans la collecte des noms de lieux qui commentent ces plans: le tracé de la carte de Rousseau est détaillé et précis, et on passe de 50 toponymes localisés par Russell à 278 dans le plan de Rousseau. Il faudra attendre 1830 et la conquête d'Alger pour trouver un exemple de carte véritablement scientifique, assortie d'une liste de toponymes aussi abondante.³ Malgré ses défauts, relevés dans la *Notice* qui précède sa publication en 1825, et qui sont développés dans l'étude pénétrante que lui a consacrée récemment Jean-Claude


¹ Voir mon article 'Cartographie et histoire des villes arabes', *Environmental Design*, 1996, republié dans *La ville arabe, Alep, à l'époque ottomane*, Damas, Institut français d'Études Arabes, 1998, 116–25.

² Alexander Russell, *The Natural History of Aleppo, Containing a description of the city, and the principal natural productions in its neighborhood; together with an account of the climate, inhabitants, and diseases; particularly of the plague*, 2 vol., Londres, G.G. and J. Robinson, 1794, I, 12. Sur les frères/médecins Russell, voir Janet Starkey, 'No Myopic Image: Alexander and Patrick Russell in Aleppo', *History and Anthropology*, 13, 4, 2002, 257–73.

³ Le plan Pelet d'Alger a été réalisé en 1832.



Plan 1



Plan 2

David,⁴ ce plan présente donc un vif intérêt d'autant plus que les circonstances de son levé sont entourés d'une certaine obscurité.

Tel qu'il a été publié sous le titre 'Plan de la ville de Hhaleb et de ses environs Dressé de 1811 à 1818' par la Société de géographie⁵ le plan est attribué au consul Rousseau qui était consul-général à Alep en 1811 et qui y revint quelques années plus tard en 1818. La *Notice* publiée par la Société de géographie cite l'auteur qui indique dans quelles conditions il aurait été levé: 'Quand au plan de Hhaleb, il fut primitivement tracé (en 1811) sous ma direction, par un jeune homme attaché au consulat, que j'occupais alors dans cette ville; mais ce n'était qu'une simple ébauche très défectueuse, qui avait besoin de rectifications et de développements. En retournant sur les lieux, en 1818, je m'occupai moi-même de ce travail, auquel je dois avoir donné toute la précision désirable; et c'est dans cette confiance que je le présente aujourd'hui'.⁶ Rousseau suggère donc que le plan de 1811 n'aurait été qu'un simple brouillon qui aurait fait l'objet d'un développement important en 1818, permettant d'aboutir au plan définitif publié en 1825.

La découverte que j'ai faite, en 2002, dans les Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à Paris, dans la série 'Mémoires et Documents Turquie', du document original de 1811⁷ permet tout à la fois d'identifier le 'jeune homme' à qui Rousseau attribue la très imparfaite première ébauche de son plan, mais aussi de rectifier quelque peu le rôle que s'assigne le consul dans la confection du plan d'Alep. L'auteur du plan primitif est Vincent Germain. Quant au plan lui-même, une rapide comparaison entre cette première version de 1811 et le plan définitif de 1818 permet de ramener à ses véritables proportions l'importance de l'intervention finale de Rousseau.

2. Du plan Vincent Germain au plan Rousseau

2.1. Le plan de 1811 est intitulé: 'Plan de la ville et des faubourgs d'Alep levé d'ordre du Consul-Général de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale par Vincent Germain dans le courant de l'année 1811' (Plan 3). Il occupe

⁴ Jean-Claude David, 'Le plan d'Alep du consul Rousseau', in *Etudes sur les villes du Proche-Orient. Hommage à André Raymond*, Damas, IFEAD, 2001, 155-62.

⁵ J.-G. Barbié du Bocage, 'Description de la ville de Hhaleb', *Recueil de voyages et mémoires*, Paris, 1825, vol. 2, 218-44.


⁶ *Ibidem*, 198.

⁷ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Mémoires et Documents, Turquie, vol. 53, 102-12.


sur une page de papier légèrement teinté en jaune clair, un espace de 42 centimètres sur 38. Le plan et les indications manuscrites sont portés à la plume. Sur la gauche et la droite du plan deux colonnes proposent des listes de toponymes regroupées sous quatre rubriques : portes ; quartiers ; faubourgs ; portes des faubourgs, édifices remarquables. Une note placée dans le coin gauche, inférieur, indique qu' 'il a été impossible d'entrer dans le détail de tous les édifices publics d'une ville aussi considérable' : on s'est donc limité aux constructions et édifices les plus importants ; 'on a mis le même soin à marquer les directions des principales rues'. Un tracé de couleur ocre rehausse le tracé des fortifications et distingue le quartier central de la Mdineh ; le cours de la rivière Quwayq est souligné de bleu. L'échelle du plan est donnée en 'pas ordinaires'.

Le titre du plan confirme donc que le plan fut réalisé à la demande du Consul-Général Rousseau. Des recherches effectuées dans les archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille m'ont permis d'identifier Vincent Germain.⁸ Un document de l'Echelle d'Alep du 27 novembre 1818 évoque 'le sieur Vincent Germain, fils de feu Michel Germain, de son vivant négociant français à Alep' : il succède avec son frère à la régie de l'établissement de son père sous la nouvelle raison de commerce de 'Germain frères'. Le document indique qu'il s'agit de la suite d'un 'des plus anciens établissements français à Alep'. Cet établissement sera encore mentionné en juin 1822, mais il n'existe apparemment plus en 1824 : il est possible que le terrible tremblement de terre du 13 août 1822 qui ruina la ville ait mis un terme à son activité. Nous perdons la trace de V. Germain à partir de 1822. Vincent Germain appartenait donc à une famille de commerçants installés à Alep où il avait de toute évidence longuement vécu. Il fut bien chargé par Rousseau, en 1811 de lever un plan de la ville. Ce que nous ignorons malheureusement c'est si Vincent Germain, en dehors de son évidente familiarité avec Alep, possédait une formation et une compétence quelconques pouvant l'aider dans une entreprise aussi difficile. Dans le cas contraire on comprend qu'il ait éprouvé des difficultés à lever ce plan et on n'est pas surpris des imperfections qu'il révèle. L'étonnant est même qu'il ait pu parvenir à un résultat aussi satisfaisant.

⁸ Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, M Q 5.1/11, J.-B. Michel à la Chambre de Commerce, 27 novembre 1818, 23 mars 1819, 13 juin 1822.



Plan 3



Plan 4

2.2. Une comparaison un peu précise des deux états du plan d'Alep n'a pas un intérêt seulement anecdotique : elle permet d'apporter quelque lumière sur la manière dont le plan Rousseau a été réalisé. Quoi qu'en ait écrit le consul Rousseau on est évidemment frappé par la presque parfaite coïncidence entre le relevé effectué par Vincent Germain en 1811 et le plan final Rousseau, mis à jour en 1818 et publié en 1825 (plan 4). La structure générale de la ville, telle qu'elle est représentée dans ces deux plans est tout à fait identique, dans les réussites (la figuration de la ville intra-muros et de la zone de la Mdineh), comme dans les défauts (en particulier le caractère généralement arbitraire du tracé de la voirie et la distorsion dont sont victimes les faubourgs nord et est de la ville qui rend tout à fait impossible la superposition avec des plans modernes, et qui fait que la localisation précise des toponymes mentionnés est souvent très problématique). Les remarques judicieuses faites par Jean-Claude David dans son article me dispenseront d'insister sur ce point et sur les raisons de déformations qui sont largement dues à l'inégale connaissance que les auteurs du plan avaient des différentes parties de la ville.

Parmi les quelques différences qui apparaissent entre les deux plans, on ne trouve guère à relever que la correction du tracé du cours de la rivière Quwayq dont le plan de 1818 donne une image passablement différente. La représentation de la Grande mosquée varie d'un plan à l'autre. Le plan du quartier chrétien de Djundayda, qui n'est qu'esquissé dans le plan de 1811, est plus fortement indiqué dans celui de 1818, sans que cette présentation paraisse d'ailleurs beaucoup plus convaincante. Dans le détail des parties du plan concernant Musharqa ou les faubourgs nord et est des différences apparaissent également. Mais il faut bien reconnaître qu'il ne s'agit que de détails de relativement faible importance. On doit donc conclure que l'appréciation assez négative portée par Rousseau sur le premier plan est peu justifiée et qu'elle paraît surtout destinée à rehausser le rôle qu'il joua dans le processus qui conduisit à la publication de 1825. Le plan Vincent Germain de 1811 se retrouve en quasi totalité dans le plan Rousseau et si un mérite doit être reconnu dans la réalisation du plan, c'est évidemment celui de V. Germain.

2.3. Il en va tout autrement de la garniture de toponymes qui fait l'importance du plan d'Alep. Le total des toponymes cités et localisés par Vincent Germain est de 161. Le plan Rousseau nous en présente 278, soit 117 de plus, malgré un certain nombre de suppressions (22 au

total). Il s'agit d'une remarquable avancée quantitative, et sur ce point le consul a raison de mentionner d'une manière très favorable son intervention dans le processus de réalisation du plan.

La présentation de ces toponymes sur le plan Rousseau reprend assez fidèlement celle qui est donnée par V. Germain, dont les diverses rubriques sont à peu près conservées (sauf la rubrique 'Faubourgs' qui est divisée en 'Faubourgs' et 'Portes des Faubourgs' dans le plan Rousseau), de même que leur expression par un système de chiffres romains, lettres majuscules, lettres minuscules et chiffres arabes. Le tableau suivant fait apparaître l'ampleur, par régions, de ce progrès global :

	V. Germain	Rousseau
Portes	9	9
Quartiers	27	25
Faubourgs	25	69 (deux rubriques)
Divers	100	175
Total	161	278

On notera que la liste Rousseau suit d'assez près la liste Germain dans les premières sections. Par contre, du numéro 93 jusqu'au numéro 175 (avec seulement deux exceptions : 97 et 159) la liste de Rousseau est entièrement nouvelle, ce qui montre que la mise à jour a été pour l'essentiel réalisée par une adjonction massive de toponymes supplémentaires à la liste Germain prise évidemment pour base du travail définitif, réalisé sans doute en 1818.

De l'analyse des variations dans le nombre des toponymes retenus d'une liste à l'autre dans les principaux secteurs urbains,⁹ on peut tirer quelques conclusions sur la manière dont la révision a été réalisée par aire géographique :

⁹ Je divise la ville d'Alep en quatre zones géographiques : Mdineh (ou zone centrale), reste de la ville intra-muros, faubourg nord (limité à l'est par la rue conduisant de Bab al-Hadid à Bab Aghyur), faubourg est (jusqu'à Bab Nayrab).

Mdineh :	+ 15	
Reste de la ville intra muros	+ 43	-1
Faubourg nord :	+ 28	-2
Faubourg est :	+ 16	-12

Ce tableau permet de constater que la révision de la carte Germain effectuée en 1818 a concerné l'ensemble des principales régions d'Alep d'une manière assez égale, avec une couverture cependant plus dense dans la partie centrale de la Mdineh et la ville intra-muros, les plus accessibles à des investigateurs étrangers pour un tel exercice d'inventaire, comme le remarque justement Jean-Claude David. Les suppressions concernent particulièrement la région orientale de la ville ainsi que nous aurons l'occasion de l'indiquer dans un instant, en tentant de donner une explication.

2.4. L'analyse région par région de ces modifications autorise quelques conclusions sur les modalités du travail de perfectionnement réalisé en 1818. Dans la Mdineh, zone économique principale, l'enrichissement porte essentiellement sur des centres commerciaux (*khan*: +4) et artisanaux (*qaysariya*, *qa'at al-saqal*: +6).

Le reste de la ville intra-muros, assez peu présent dans le plan Germain (qui se contentait, pour l'essentiel, de mentionner les noms des principaux quartiers) bénéficie d'un effort d'inventaire également marqué. Le quartier juif de Bahsita (que le plan Germain se bornait à identifier [lettre L]), est en 1818, l'objet d'une attention plus fine. L'enrichissement des informations données sur cette région se marque assez fortement semble-t-il par la mention de quatre savonneries (*masbana*: 119, 138, 139, 142) un des domaines d'excellence de la production artisanale locale.

Le faubourg nord est évidemment, avec la Mdineh, le secteur où l'élargissement de l'attention du consul-géographe a été le plus marqué. C'est la région où le quartier chrétien s'est développé du XVI^{ème} au XVIII^{ème} siècle avec une continuité et une intensité qui ont fait de cet essor un des phénomènes marquants de l'Alep ottomane.¹⁰ Les toponymes enregistrés à l'ouest de cette région, la plus densément occupée

¹⁰ Sur les divers aspects de ce développement voir mon article 'Une communauté en expansion: Les chrétiens d'Alep à l'époque ottomane (XVI^{ème}-XVII^{ème} siècles)', dans *La ville arabe, Alep, à l'époque ottomane*, Damas, Institut français d'études Arabes, 1998, 353-72.

par des chrétiens, se multiplient. Mais on est surpris de constater qu'à une vision très précise de la variété des communautés chrétiennes concernées (le plan Germain mentionne dans Saliba, en 88, 89, 90, 91, les églises arménienne, maronite, grecque et syrienne) le plan Rousseau substitue la simple mention d'Églises des Maronites (48 à 52) simplification réductrice et inexacte de la situation des communautés chrétiennes d'Alep. Un autre trait qui paraît très significatif de la manière dont Rousseau envisage l'espace urbain est la mention, avec quelque détail, des activités artisanales textiles qui étaient une des caractéristiques de ce quartier chrétien (et qui furent à la base de sa prospérité et de son essor): absentes du plan Germain elles apparaissent avec force sur le plan de 1818 qui fait mention de fabriques (*kerkhana*) de 'roubas' ('où l'on tire l'or': 167, 168), de fabriques de fil d'or (*qasabjiya*: 166), de fabriques de '*alaja* (étoffes de soie brochées en or: numéros 169, 170, 171, 172 et 173), de teintureriers (*masbagha*: 164, 165). Ces ateliers représentent dix des vingt-huit toponymes ajoutés dans la carte de 1825.

Bien que sa couverture soit sensiblement améliorée dans le plan de 1818 (16 toponymes nouveaux) le faubourg est de la ville reste bien la région la plus mal connue de la ville, ce qui s'explique, pour l'essentiel, par les raisons que Jean-Claude David a mises en lumière dans son étude sur le plan Rousseau. Région surtout vouée à une résidence pauvre et à des activités liées à la campagne, et jugées négligeables pour des observateurs étrangers, ce faubourg apparaissait sans doute peu intéressant, peu 'lisible' (les défauts, qui sont ici particulièrement sensibles, du fond de plan de Germain l'attestent avec évidence) et de toute manière plus difficile à étudier pour des étrangers. Le trait qui caractérise surtout ce quartier dans le plan Rousseau, par rapport au plan de 1811, est la disparition de douze toponymes, c'est à dire plus de la moitié du total des suppressions intervenues entre 1811 et 1818. Il s'agit, pour l'essentiel de toponymes localisés sur la limite orientale de la ville, surtout des poternes (*bawwaba*): c'est le cas de 20, 24, 26, 31, 32, 33.

Cet apparent désintérêt pour ces zones bordières est d'autant plus intrigant que nous constatons un phénomène du même genre en ce qui concerne d'autres régions périphériques de la ville ou le fossé (*khandaq*): c'est ainsi que sont éliminés dans le plan de 1818 les toponymes 83, 75, 73, 72, 71, 81. On devrait en conclure que ce qui intéressait apparemment vivement Vincent Germain, des précisions concernant les limites de la ville et les points par lesquels on pouvait y pénétrer,


avait perdu de son importance aux yeux de Rousseau. Je hasarderai une hypothèse. Établissant son plan en 1811, durant la période impériale, Vincent Germain avait présent à l'esprit le caractère stratégique de tels relevés, qui avait justifié ailleurs d'autres travaux cartographiques du même genre (notamment ceux de Boutin à Alger et à Tunis) où ils pouvaient être considérés comme des documents susceptibles de préparer une éventuelle intervention militaire. Une telle préoccupation avait apparemment perdu toute importance en 1818, ce qui justifierait l'abandon de ces détails dans le plan final. On aimerait évidemment retrouver dans la correspondance consulaire des indications sur la manière dont le gouvernement français envisageait la réalisation de tels relevés et sur la finalité qu'il leur fixait éventuellement.

Dans la région située à l'ouest de la ville, où, par exception, le tracé du plan de Germain subit des modifications sensibles (concernant le cours du Quwayq, et les jardins qui s'y étendaient), la toponymie fut grandement complétée afin d'identifier les 'jardins particuliers' et les 'cimetières des Turcs' qui s'y trouvaient en grand nombre. Le plan de 1818 marquait, en quelque sorte l'entrée de cette zone extérieure à l'intérieur de l'espace urbain.

3. Remarques de conclusion

Ainsi que nous l'avons déjà remarqué, le plan de 1818 ne marque aucun progrès par rapport à celui de 1811 pour ce qui concerne la cartographie même de la ville. Nous ignorons malheureusement les circonstances exactes de la commande qui en fut faite par Rousseau au jeune Vincent Germain, dont nous ne connaissons pas davantage les capacités qui expliquent que l'on ait fait appel à lui pour la réalisation d'un travail aussi complexe. Les conditions de réalisation de ce plan primitif nous restent également inconnues. En tout cas, et quoi qu'en ait dit plus tard Rousseau, ce travail fut alors jugé par lui assez satisfaisant pour qu'il soit confié à Barbié du Bocage et publié à peu près tel quel par lui. Ce que nous apprend le plan Rousseau de la topographie de la ville d'Alep est bien dû, à peu près entièrement, au travail accompli par Vincent Germain en 1811.

Par contre la toponymie de la ville telle qu'elle est exprimée dans les deux plans s'est enrichie considérablement entre 1811 et 1818, ce qui témoigne évidemment ou d'une meilleure connaissance de la ville, ou d'un effort d'investigation plus poussé, ou encore de meilleurs condi-



Plan 5

tions d'accès à l'information (et sans doute tout cela à la fois). De la comparaison des deux listes de toponymes nous avons cru pouvoir conclure à un certain changement de conception d'un plan à l'autre, le plan primitif de 1811 se faisant peut-être l'écho de préoccupations stratégiques qui paraissent absentes du plan de 1818. Instrument potentiel de conquête, le plan serait ainsi devenu une œuvre de connaissance. Dans une version unique, le plan de la *Description de l'Égypte* a connu, du fait des circonstances, une évolution analogue : d'ouvrage à but sans doute surtout militaire dans sa conception primitive, il est devenu produit culturel.

Quoi qu'il en soit, en 1818 le plan d'Alep ne revêt plus qu'un intérêt scientifique et il va être publié comme tel par la Société de géographie. A ce titre il témoigne d'intérêts qui au dix-neuvième siècle prennent le pas sur toutes les autres considérations. Il nous a semblé que le plan de 1818 manifestait un intérêt assez fort pour les communautés religieuses minoritaires, qui allaient être appelées à jouer bientôt un rôle politique essentiel. Nous avons aussi montré, chemin faisant, le souci que le rédacteur de 1818 a de mettre en évidence les aspects économiques qui deviennent alors essentiels dans l'action des grandes puissances européennes au Levant. De ces préoccupations témoignent, pensons-nous, le soin mis à décrire avec plus de précision la zone centrale de la Mdineh avec son énorme appareil commercial, et l'intérêt porté aux grandes activités artisanales, industrie du savon dans la ville intra-muros, activités textiles dans le faubourg nord, chrétien. C'est la comparaison de ces deux plans l'un avec l'autre qui permet pour l'essentiel de mettre en évidence cette évolution, présentée sous forme d'hypothèses.

THE MEMOIRS OF A FRENCH WOMAN TRAVELLER TO THE LEVANT IN 1853–1855

LEILA FAWAZ

Critics of orientalism have said it forcefully and, despite differences of opinion on how well they have argued their case, few would question that the quest for economic and political hegemony was a central motivation of the agendas of colonial ventures. Even with this knowledge, it is still possible to be captivated by reading the accounts of Europeans who travelled to the Middle East in the era of Western domination. Some of the attraction of these accounts might just be pure voyeurism, an opportunity to enter into the everyday lives of people one would never get to know so well otherwise. Yet, when read with sensitivity to their context, these texts also provide insights into the intricate relationship between the West and the Arab world in the age of colonialism. In this article, I offer such a reading of the first part of the unpublished memoirs of the Comtesse de Perthuis which I shall use to construct a narrative history in which to embed a fresh analysis of the French encounter with the Levant.¹

I would have liked to have met Madame de Perthuis in person, perhaps on the deck of one of the many ships she took to come to the Levant, or while she stayed at her son's residence in Beirut. Her memoirs of two trips to the East—the first from 1853 to 1855, the second from 1860 to 1862—are as telling about the West as they are about the East, although she probably thought of her *carnet de voyage* principally as a window into the East. Her travel notes lead the reader to think of her as a lively woman, interested in much around her, a woman who was confident in her place in society and who enjoyed

¹ The late Fouad Debbas made this study possible. With the generosity for which he was renowned, and which he bestowed on me on numerous occasions, he gave me a copy of these memoirs. Since then, they have been published as *Voyages en Orient 1853–1855, 1860–1862: Journal de la Comtesse de Perthuis*, Beirut, Éditions Dar al-Nahar, 2007. I would also like to thank Abdul-Karim Rafeq for his inspiration and pioneering work; Feroz Ahmad, Peri Bearman, and Sugata Bose for their input; and Daniel Benaïm and Ibtissam Messara for their research.

'le beau monde', as well as travelling. In fact, she might well have been a bit of a snob; she was very much aware of propriety, protocol, breeding, and whom not to talk to among the French expatriates (she was a royalist) and others. She disapproved of loudness on the part of some (foreign) women she encountered, and cared deeply about doing what was expected of someone of her rank and stature, notably enjoying the company of her equals and of members of the priesthood, avoiding vulgar people, however rich they were, and being kind to the poor. Overall, her upbringing and her disposition only very rarely led her to make malicious comments. Her attitude toward other cultures was mostly one of benevolence, but she looked at them as if from on high.

I would also have enjoyed meeting the people she speaks of. They include princes of Mount Lebanon, pashas in Egypt, and practically all the European consuls in Beirut as well as some of other areas. They also include Ferdinand de Lesseps, who visited Beirut as he was beginning his undertaking in Suez. She met him again in Egypt,² and had lunch at his country home which, she tells us, was placed at his disposal by Egypt's ruler Sa'id Pasha.³ In Lebanon she met the daughter of Colonel Charles Churchill, a man she simply characterized as 'an original'.⁴ She met Lord and Lady Napier⁵ and a Mr. Pitt.⁶ She also mentions encountering successful French traders such as Joseph Portalis, one of two brothers who established the best known of the silk factories of Mount Lebanon.⁷ I would also have enjoyed listening to some of her gossip about people who are legends in so many of the books we read. At the French consulate in Cairo, the chancellor of the consulate told her that he knew Lady Hester Stanhope, and that what the renowned writer Alphonse de Lamartine had written about his meeting with her was untrue, and that she had refused to receive the poet and simply served him coffee in her kiosk.⁸ On her second trip to the Levant, she met Marquis General Charles de Beaufort d'Hauptoul, commander-in-chief

² 30 January 1855.

³ 3 April 1855, 4 April 1855.

⁴ 16 April 1855.

⁵ 21 March 1855. It is not clear whether the reference is to Robert Cornelius Napier (1810–90), the British general who spent most of his career in India, or to some other members of the family.

⁶ 2 April 1855.

⁷ 8 May 1855, 10 May 1855.

⁸ 24 March 1854.

of the French Expedition to Syria in 1860–61, and she clearly conveyed her opinion of his social skills or, rather, their absence.

Perhaps it would have been particularly pleasurable to hear her story of how, by sheer accident, she almost came face to face with Sultan ‘Abd al-Majid I (ruled 1839–61). In 1855, while visiting Istanbul, she was taken to visit what she refers to as the new palace on the Bosphorus.⁹ Daguerre, the commanding officer of the ship she was travelling on, managed to get her and her party inside the palace under construction. As they went from room to room admiring its abundant luxury, they heard voices coming towards them. The Ottoman official who had allowed them in panicked and rushed to hide them in a small adjacent room; he locked them in, took the keys, and ran to meet the Sultan. From her hiding place, she peeped through the keyhole and saw, standing just feet away across from her, the Sultan. ‘With his big eyes’ he was looking at the ceiling where Italian painters were at work, pointing it out and smiling to someone among his retinue. ‘He looks sad and sickly’, she wrote, ‘but his traits are regular and his gaze is sweet and seductive’.¹⁰

In many ways, the story of Madame de Perthuis shares features common to those of other travellers. Her first trip to the Levant was as a mother planning to meet her son’s fiancée and to attend his wedding, and her second trip was taken in order to spend time with him and his growing family. She took advantage of her time abroad to sight-see, and then comment on and draw sketches of what she observed. In many other ways, however, her story is unique, a window into the circles of a French entrepreneur in Beirut who built several projects in the region and into a period of change in Lebanon and Syria, the

⁹ The palace she visited might well have been the one at Çırağan. Abandoning the Topkapi palace to relatives and supernumeraries, Sultans ‘Abd al-Majid and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz moved to the Dolmabahçe Palace on the Bosphorus. ‘While Dolmabahçe continued to be used as the meeting place for official receptions, ceremonies and council meetings, Abdülmecid spent most of his time at a new palace located slightly to the north, also on the Bosphorus, at Çırağan, begun by Mahmut II in 1836 and actually finished only by Abdulaziz in 1872. Çırağan, with its European-style apartments for the Sultan and his family and its beautiful gardens, soon became the favorite residence for as many members of the imperial family and their servants as could crowd in’. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II: *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, 82.

¹⁰ 17 May 1855.

turbulent middle decades of the nineteenth century. Her memoirs are also a wonderful contribution to narrative history.

On one level, there is the personal story: that of a mother travelling with her husband to the East to attend a son's wedding. As the story unfolds, we learn that she had three sons—Edmond, Léon, and Alfred¹¹—and that it was Edmond, living in Beirut, who was about to be married. His bride was from Cyprus. This surprising piece of information, which would seem to put the bride clearly in the camp of an oriental in the eyes of the mother, is not embroidered upon. We never come to know whether that made Madame de Perthuis uncomfortable—she was too well bred and too discreet about her family to comment negatively on any of its members (least of all on her husband, who was with her on both trips). Even if she meant her diary to be read only by family and friends, her reticence about her future daughter-in-law is striking in a person with such strong emotional feelings about family members, certainly about her sons, as we discover throughout the memoirs. Madame de Perthuis said so little about her future daughter-in-law, either positive or negative, that one wonders whether she was ambivalent about the alliance or simply reserved judgement. Whatever it might have been, she was gracious enough to keep her reservations, if any, to herself.

All we learn is that Madame de Perthuis first met Louise, Edmond's fiancée, in October 1853 when their ship reached Cyprus and her son took them to his fiancée's house in Larnaca: 'She is much intimidated [by us] and very pretty in her Cypriot clothes'. After a dinner with Louise's mother and her grandfather, Count Carpani, Madame de Perthuis went back to the ship where she retired to her bed; the fever she had contracted in Alexandretta (Iskenderun) recurred, she wrote,

¹¹ 13 April 1860. For Edmond de Perthuis, former marine and officer and an Orleanist who left France after the revolution of 1848 to settle in Syria, where he represented the *Messageries Maritimes*, and helped to build important projects in the second half of the nineteenth century, including the Beirut-Damascus road and the renovation of Beirut's harbour, consult Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1983, 61–84. See also Michelle Raccagni, 'The French Economic Interests in the Ottoman Empire', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 11, 1980, 339–76; R. Tresse, 'Histoire de la route de Beyrouth à Damas 1857–1892', *La Géographie*, 66, 1936, pp. 227–52; Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005, chapter 3 and elsewhere.

adding: 'Emotions have contributed to make me sick'.¹² Many months later, she made one of her few comments concerning Louise when she said that her daughter-in-law was a poor walker, 'like all Levantines'.¹³ In time, as Louise bore children, Madame de Perthuis warmed to her and became deeply attached to her grandchildren.

Although the memoirs are very personal, they also record how active Europeans were in the Levant, confirming their engagement in the life of the eastern Mediterranean. They were involved in business and medicine, in the diplomatic corps, and, in times of war and perhaps at other times, in the military. They received fellow national resident missionaries and visiting priests (nuns are rarely mentioned in the memoirs). They led a very lively and active social life and, in Beirut at least, many delighted in a whirlwind of social activities and good works. They visited one other often, meeting over breakfast, picnics, lunches, musical soirées, and elegant dinners. They travelled in groups or joined ranks when they ran into one other on trips; they went on horse rides, sat in coaches and later carriages for promenades and land trips, shared boat trips, and explored ancient and holy sites together.

Any contact with the local population was rather limited and, except for those Westerners who lived in the Levant for long stretches of time, it must have been difficult to gain a full appreciation of local nuances of custom and culture. Although rarely mentioned in her memoirs, Madame de Perthuis did encounter the very high end of society, the families of affluence and influence; in contrast, the other locals she met were commoners: domestics, small shopkeepers, servicemen, guides, translators, and the myriad of people who helped high society live above the fray. She would come across such people in homes, on trips, and during her charity work and social outings. The personnel at her service when she first landed in Beirut and lived with her son included Charles, their French Provençal cook; Butros Caffidji, the cook's kitchen helper and a local Maronite; Joseph Arab, the butler; Khuder, a Turkish manservant assigned to one person (and later replaced by Derwiche Aga); Abdallah, her black Egyptian cleaner [*saïs*] who, having gone on the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, had earned

¹² 8 October 1853.

¹³ 28 April 1854.

the title of *Hajji*, and Arraja, the Lebanese cleaner for the gentlemen in the house.¹⁴

That Madame de Perthuis would be exposed to the extremes of local society in a sense simply reflected reality: society then was mostly made up of the rich and the rest. But at least in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, where she resided most of the time she spent in the Levant, much had happened to create a new middle class: the integration of the economy into a European-dominated network, the growth of international trade, the spread of steam navigation and other forms of transport, improvements to ports, harbours, and roads, and the push for reform by the Ottoman rulers and the men of the Tanzimat.¹⁵ Nevertheless, although Madame de Perthuis' own son Edmond was a very active entrepreneur on the local scene, she did not have sufficient exposure to understand local mores and nuances more fully, despite the fact that society was becoming increasingly diverse.

Whatever the nature of her exposure to local ways and locales, it did not always translate into an understanding of the regions she visited and often loved. At least at first, Madame de Perthuis was as ignorant of local culture as she was confident in her opinions of it. During a stopover at Rhodes, she and her travelling party stopped at a Turkish coffee house, where they ran into what she described as an executioner; 'Muslims honour him', she added, out of nowhere.¹⁶ A few days later, she visited a cemetery in Latakia and somehow gained the impression that, as she put it, a hole is dug in 'Arab tombs' to make it possible for people to communicate with the dead.¹⁷

Madame de Perthuis was not immune from occasional cattiness, which makes for amusing reading. In Beirut she met the 'Mademoiselles Malgamba', and she commented that de Lamartine had devoted pages to these ladies. She writes how he described 'their beauty, of which nothing is left'.¹⁸ At an Arab Greek (read Greek-Orthodox) wedding in Beirut, she accompanied the delegation that brought the bride from her parents' home to that of her husband. The veiled bride was

¹⁴ 9 October 1853. I have kept the spellings used in the memoirs unless the particular person or place referred to are well known and have a more standardized spelling.

¹⁵ I am grateful to Abdul-Karim Rafeq, whose work constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of the social and economic transformation of *Bilad al-Sham* in the late Ottoman period.

¹⁶ 3 October 1853.

¹⁷ 7 October 1853.

¹⁸ 9 November 1853: 'leur beauté dont je ne retrouve plus rien'.

riding a horse. After the priest's blessing she removed her veil, and her husband took a step back and exclaimed on her beauty. Madame de Perthuis commented that his reaction was only in accordance with tradition, for in truth, 'the bride was quite ugly'.¹⁹ In general, she did not seem to approve of Greek women, perhaps because she was a devout Catholic and found Eastern Christianity ignorant and objectionable.

She also witnessed acts of meanness that illustrate a lack of cultural sensitivity on the part of some of the Europeans whose company she enjoyed. The most blatant act occurred on a trip to Egypt, when she was part of a group that went sightseeing in Cairo. When they reached the mosque of al-Hasan, they were allowed to enter barefoot; they then exited through another door than the entrance, to do more sightseeing on the other side of the mosque. When the time came to retrace their steps, they tried to re-enter the mosque and transverse it again in the opposite direction, to reach their donkeys at the entrance. The guard at the mosque would not open the door for them, until one Comte d'Escarac convinced him. This count spoke perfect Arabic, and he had used that in the Sudan to mislead people into thinking that he was a Muslim. Now he convinced the guard to let them into the mosque but as soon as the guard opened the door, the count whipped him vigorously, making the guard cry out in pain. D'Escarac crossed the mosque wearing his thick boots, a sign of disrespect for local tradition not lost on Madame de Perthuis, who, however, described it as another act of bravado on his part. She ended up being hit by a stone, which she believed was meant for her companion.²⁰

Some of her comments are perhaps more revealing of European courtly traditions than of Eastern ones. For example, she assumed that court jesters were part of the circle of local princes, and she mentioned that Amir Haydar, *qa'immaqam* of the north, brought his to the French consulate in Beirut, along with his whole entourage.²¹

¹⁹ June 1854 [no day given].

²⁰ 27 March 1855.

²¹ 27 November 1853. After the sectarian troubles of 1841 in Mount Lebanon, in 1843 the Ottomans chose Haydar Abi'l-Lama' as Christian and Ahmad Arslan as Druze *qa'immaqams*: see Kamal Salibi, *Modern History of Lebanon*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965, 63; Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *The View from Istanbul: Lebanon and the Druze Emirate in the Ottoman Chancery Documents, 1546-1711*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, and Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.

At the same time, the memoirs provide an interesting window into differences in taste among cultures. Of all the arts, perhaps music is the one where differences in taste are the most difficult to overcome, both within and across general cultural areas. One very amusing passage in Madame de Perthuis' memoirs is an account of an elegant soirée in Beirut. Madame Suquet, the wife of a French doctor in Beirut, was very proud to be able to play the piano in front of Amir Haydar. According to Madame de Perthuis, she was a skilled pianist who, 'having played her most brilliant of pieces in front of him, thought that she would produce a profound impression on him'. On the contrary, the prince, who was a great lover of music and very proud of his own musical talent, found that Madame Suquet made too much noise. This led him to comment, perhaps rather indelicately, that although the French were superior in all manners to the Arabs, they could not compete with Arabs when it came to music.²²

The memoirs are also telling of the insecurity of the period, as they are of Madame de Perthuis' own physical courage. During a stop at Iskenderun, they heard a story by a baron by the name of Giron who told them that he was robbed by Bedouins in the desert after visiting Palmyra, and that he had to enter Damascus without clothes, carrying only a lance, which the thieves had left him after they had taken all his weapons.²³ On a visit to the Holy Land, as Madame de Perthuis and her party set up camp for the night outside the walls of the town of Jenin between Nablus and Nazareth, its governor sent officers to bring them inside the town for the night because of the danger presented to them outside city walls by bands of Bedouin thieves. Her party declined the invitation, but after some negotiation, they agreed to accept guards for the night and to travel under escort afterwards. Madame de Perthuis did not sleep well that night, trusting neither the guards nor the Bedouins she had been warned against, so much so that she jumped out of bed screaming when something touched her feet. Under the camp light, it appeared that the culprit had been a big black cat.²⁴ The following day, when the travelling party reached Nazareth, the monks of the Frères de Terre Sainte were amazed that the travellers had crossed

²² 27 November 1853.

²³ 6 October 1853.

²⁴ 3 May 1854.

the region, which was renowned for its thieves and insecurity.²⁵ The threat posed by looters is a topic often brought up.²⁶

Over and over again, Madame de Perthuis noted the hospitality of local people, rich and poor. During this same trip to the Holy Land in the spring of 1854, she and her travelling party stopped at a village for a rest 'in the shadow of a wall in the absence of a tree', at a spot where a travelling Turkish family was doing the same: 'The women put on their veils as we approached, then they sent us fruits'.²⁷ Sometimes she deemed the hospitality too heavy-handed, and had trouble turning down invitations to partake in the meals offered by those who insisted on welcoming them to their homes.²⁸

Everywhere she went, she noticed the women. Her first impressions of the East are from Smyrna and include the sight of pretty local women standing at their front doors and of beautiful Jewish women in Sabbath dress. On one of the first ships she took on her trip, she remarked that the harem of a Turkish employee on his way to Beirut took up half of the back of the deck.²⁹ When she spoke to some of the women of this harem, with the help of a Greek woman who was studying the Qur'an and Arabic, the principal woman of the harem told her that she alone was a wife, and that she hated her husband because he was very jealous and would not allow her to come out of her quarters (a tent, it seems), although her younger sister who was twelve years old and still did not show herself in public wearing the veil, could do so.³⁰ Throughout the memoirs it is clear that Madame de Perthuis was interested in the women she saw or met, from all layers of society. She made an interesting observation during her trip to the Holy Land, namely, that all traditions went back to the Bible in that region. The veil 'that we usually attribute to Muslim jealousy' in fact predated Islam.³¹

Everywhere she went she also admired the landscape. In Tyre she admired from a distance the view of Mount Lebanon and of the town of Sidon, hidden in big clusters of fruit trees, especially some enormous apricot trees, whose fruit ('muchmuch', the local name for them,

²⁵ 4 May 1854.

²⁶ For example, 11 May 1854.

²⁷ 1 May 1854.

²⁸ 5 May 1854.

²⁹ 1 October 1853.

³⁰ 2 October 1853.

³¹ 24 April 1854.

she added) was renowned throughout the region.³² From the moment of her first arrival in Beirut in 1853 until her departure in May 1855, she loved the landscape of Beirut and of Lebanon, commenting that others who visited the East did so as well.³³

The world she portrayed was one of simple pleasures and entertainment: people sitting in gardens and smoking water pipes, walking a lot, visiting one another constantly. Perhaps what is most striking in this respect is how much spontaneous singing and music there seems to have been all around her, encompassing far more of daily life than we can perhaps expect today. At the high end of society, when Madame de Perthuis met with members of her social circle, there was always music: 'We chat as we work, we make music',³⁴ she noted, as if this were the most natural thing to do. Everywhere she went, from ships to social evenings on land, someone, a group, would start singing.³⁵ A typical description of one of her evenings in Beirut is the following: 'Dinner at the French consulate. M. Basili, Russian consul, comes there with his wife in the evening. Mme [*sic*] de Picciotto sings, Mad.[*sic*] Suquet plays a Mendelssohn piece. From now on we meet every evening in an intimate group either at the French consulate or at our house.... Mme de Lesparda receives the colony every Sunday evening, and then we dance to the sound of the piano'.³⁶

Love for such simple entertainment was even more spontaneous and pronounced among the humbler classes of society. It was a world that seemed surprisingly relaxed in front of tourists. During a boat trip down the Jordan river to the site of Christ's miracle of the loaves and fishes, the oarsmen sang continuously, far more than Madame de Perthuis would have liked, and each of them took turns standing up for an impromptu mime show while the rest made approving noises.³⁷ After the trip to the Holy Land, Madame de Perthuis and her companions were returning to Lebanon. They crossed the Damur river (which, to the surprise of any twenty-first century reader, Madame de

³² 13 May 1854.

³³ Lord Napier was travelling from Constantinople to Jerusalem when bad weather forced his ship to dock in Beirut, where Madame de Perthuis embarked to travel to Egypt. She wrote that he claimed that the areas surrounding Beirut were the most beautiful he had seen in all his travels: 21 March 1855.

³⁴ 13 October 1853.

³⁵ 23 May 1855.

³⁶ 13 October 1853. All translations are mine.

³⁷ 7 May 1854.

Perthuis described as unpredictable and dangerous) and then sat down for lunch. As they did, the customs officers brought out their musical instruments and broke into song.³⁸ Music and dance were predominant also whenever she attended local weddings or visited women's quarters (which she did rarely).³⁹

Her street scenes, although rare, explode with life. The mix of communities and races is marvellously described in an account of a short boat trip up the fresh waters of the Golden Horn, which landed her in what she was told was the meeting point of the strollers of Istanbul. There she saw people from all nations. Groups of Turkish ladies who had come by the high road on ox-driven carriages to spread out on the grass; a party of Greeks roasting lamb; attractive Armenians strolling amidst European women; dancers dancing; and from every direction, the sound of the tambourine.⁴⁰

Madame de Perthuis loved the East and brings to life its colours, music, landscapes, and people, but she also lived during troubled times and manages to give us some unique insights into an international war and a civil war.⁴¹ The Crimean war (1854–56) plays a prominent part in her memoirs. As the Ottomans and the Russians began a new round of hostilities, which eventually unleashed a full-fledged international war, Madame de Perthuis made her first reference to the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.⁴² Six days later, she noted that 'volunteers for the war flock to Beirut from all points of Asia in the strangest dress, which worries the inhabitants'.⁴³ Nothing more is said about the war until another entry, in November 1854, which is telegraphic in its brevity: 'News of the disembarkation of French troops in the Crimea'.⁴⁴

The war began to occupy more and more of her attention. She travelled to Egypt in March 1855 and noted that parts of the boat had been

³⁸ 15 May 1854.

³⁹ Madame de Perthuis did so in Cairo on March 29, 1855 when she visited one of the most magnificent harems of Egypt, that of Mustafa Bey. There she enjoyed Arab music and dance.

⁴⁰ 20 May 1855.

⁴¹ Madame de Perthuis refers to the civil war in Mount Lebanon in 1860 on her second trip which is not covered in this article.

⁴² 23 October 1853.

⁴³ 29 October 1853.

⁴⁴ An undated entry sometime in November 1854.

prepared for the transport of cavalry to the Crimea.⁴⁵ In May 1855, she left Beirut and the East and embarked on a sea voyage home.⁴⁶ On board 'people talk of nothing but the Crimea', she commented in her diary.⁴⁷ Before the ship entered the Dardanelles, it overtook a British ship filled with allied Sardinian troops on their way to the Crimea. When they reached the Golden Horn, she wrote: 'We are in the midst of innumerable ships from all nations'.⁴⁸ The sight of them was so striking that after spending a morning in the bazaars of Istanbul and returning on board for lunch, she noted again that the ships in the Golden Horn, foreign and Turkish, all had their flags out, that they were present in numbers never seen before locally, and that they included many French and British warships.⁴⁹ That same afternoon, her party visited Galata and Pera, including the Russian embassy, beautifully situated overlooking the Bosphorus, which had been transformed into a hospital for the French army.⁵⁰

In Istanbul, Madame de Perthuis and her party left their ship, the *Amsterdam*, and boarded another ship, the *Lycurque*, to continue their travels. The ship was crowded with officers and soldiers, some returning to the Crimea after having been treated at the hospital in Istanbul, while others had arrived from France to go to the Crimea for the first time.⁵¹

The war then became personal for Madame de Perthuis. At a port in the Crimea, she searched for her son Alfred, a member of the *Chasseurs d'Afrique* regiment. At first she thought she had missed him and had to fight tears of enormous disappointment. Then she heard calls that her son had arrived, and she was reunited with him in an embrace that moved eyewitnesses. Alfred was leaving for the battleground the following day, and had been given time off to spend an evening with his parents.⁵²

⁴⁵ 21 March 1855: 'Très mauvais gîte à bord le bateau ayant été emménagé pour le transport de la cavalerie en Crimée'.

⁴⁶ 8 and 9 May 1855.

⁴⁷ 15 May 1855.

⁴⁸ 17 May 1855. The boats were surrounded by 'caïques', the long and narrow canoe-like boats used in the Levant.

⁴⁹ 18 May 1855.

⁵⁰ 18 May 1855.

⁵¹ 22 May 1855.

⁵² 24 May 1855. Although Madame de Perthuis first wrote that Alfred was leaving the following day, he was evidently able to stay longer, for on May 26 she wrote that he was leaving for his regiment.

That night Madame de Perthuis could not fall asleep: 'My emotions are strong, [and] the sounds of bombardment and rifle fire are terrible'. Early the next morning, Alfred came to pick her and her husband up and they made their way to the French general headquarters, with her riding on the horse of her son's rifleman. They first came across a long convoy of wounded being transported by ambulance to the port, as a bloody battle had taken place the day before.⁵³ They then used a back way to avoid numerous camps and to get to general headquarters. There Madame de Perthuis was pleased to settle into a tent, which, despite the war and the surroundings, had been made comfortable for her. She admired the ingenuity of those who prepared it, with its 'bed that can serve as couch, washstand or writing table; a chandelier made of white iron gathered from containers of canned food'.⁵⁴

Alfred and his father left for general headquarters, and Madame de Perthuis stayed behind, which she soon regretted as her imagination ran wild imagining the worst that could happen to them. She made a promise to herself to follow her husband everywhere rather than be left alone. When her son and husband returned, the hours they had been gone seemed like 'centuries' to her. As they set out for a walk, bullets from a neighbouring fort fell around them; it was easy to avoid them, and she picked some up.⁵⁵ A gunner by the name of Tréville took off a cross around his neck and gave it to her as a present. He explained that a dying Russian soldier had given him the cross in gratitude for his help on the battlefield, and he said: 'Keep it in memory of Sebastopol and pray for me, which will bring me luck'.

The mix of daily routine, joy, and the horror of war is portrayed vividly. Listening to soldiers sing and watching them perform while on ship on the Black Sea on May 23, 1855, she commented that a particularly jovial evening was 'merry but also very sad', because in a few days, a number of the happy soldiers around her would be dead.⁵⁶ Two days later, on a particularly stressful day for Madame de Perthuis at a camp near the battlefields of the Crimea, Alfred made his small Arab horse run in circles. After sunset a French attaché to the general in

⁵³ 25 May 1855. Madame de Perthuis wrote that the night before 'the murderous battle of the cemetery' took place.

⁵⁴ 25 May 1855.

⁵⁵ 25 May 1855: The '*biscaiens*' which fell around her are defined in dictionaries as round balls from case shots, canister shots, grape shots, or a hail of bullets.

⁵⁶ 23 May 1855.

command of the area paid them a visit: 'The night is magnificent and we take a walk on the plateau', wrote Madame de Perthuis. Around them, bombs crossed one another, while fires indicated the location of various encampments situated well out of the reach of the bombs. The Turkish camp could be seen all lit up, as the breaking of the Ramadan fast was underway; from the British camp, the music of 'God Save the Queen' reached them. The French commander of a steamboat galloped over from the bay where his boat was anchored to invite them for breakfast the morning after, and they accepted. Yet, at the same time, throughout the night, the bombing was so violent that their beds shook.⁵⁷

Madame de Perthuis decided to join her husband when, pumped up about the situation, he decided to visit the battlefield of Inkerman. They found 'sad remains' all over the fields, ironically surrounded by exquisite landscapes, which clearly demarcated where the battles had taken place. Alfred pointed out the exact spots where clashes occurred, as well as the route that he would take to catch up with his regiment in a few days. They entered the Canrobert battery, which happened to overlook a magnificent view of the town of Sebastopol, a detail Madame de Perthuis would never miss noting. As the battery faced Russian troops stationed near their ammunition, she was frightened 'a little', but the French artillery captain reassured her that the Russians were too gallant to use their ammunition when a woman was in the French battery. Still, her son became agitated and urged his parents to move on after a stop of a few minutes. Before getting back on their horses, they visited the tomb of a French marine officer killed a few weeks before at the battery. A short distance later a horseman who turned out to be a gunner stopped them. He offered a bouquet of wild flowers to Madame de Perthuis 'on behalf of the gunners of the Canrobert battery to the only lady who ever stopped by their battery', and galloped away. Her party then stopped by the French general headquarters where they found the commanding officer sitting in his tent, utterly depressed because he had lost a lot of soldiers the night before.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ 25 May 1855.

⁵⁸ 26 May 1855.

As the party reached the waterfront, a boat commander offered to take them by rowing boat to the entrance of the port of Sebastopol, to get a view of the city. Madame de Perthuis remarked that this might be dangerous, and that she did not wish people to say after her death: 'Why did she go to that hell?' The person in charge of the boat told her not to worry since the guns became silent around that time of day, but as soon as they came close to their destination, an exchange of fire erupted between two forts and a bomb fell into the sea a few feet from them. The sailors rowed furiously to get them all out of danger. Finally, she and her party returned to their ship, the *Lycurque*, and Alfred left for duty. Darkness fell, hiding the Crimean coast, but the sky continued to be illuminated by exploding bombs and the sound of the bombing followed them for much longer.⁵⁹ Their ship was packed with mutilated and wounded soldiers: one Turkish captain had lost his arm; one commander had his arm in a sling and four more wounds. The horror of war is vividly conveyed.

There were lighter moments, however. Allies in the Crimean war had small differences, and there were some imponderable situations that only a diary such as that of Madame de Perthuis would make note of. When their ship stopped at Gallipoli, she wrote that several medics attached to a Turkish contingent came on board as their own British ship was under repair.⁶⁰ They immediately tried to take over several cabins occupied by travellers and even the ladies' salon, but the ship's captain refused to keep them on board and they returned to their British ship. They left in a furious state, and 'upon seeing them leave, our sailors danced with joy around our [upper] deck to the sound of Basque drums'.⁶¹

Madame de Perthuis came to love the East and missed it dearly when she left. She had endured physical hardships during her travels, on occasion meeting people she did not necessarily want to meet and even fearing for her safety. But she fell for the beauty of the land and the warmth of its people; she lived her adventures to the full and with no reluctance. After her taste of the East no other place seems to have been good enough. Visiting Trieste after her first trip to the Levant,

⁵⁹ 26 May 1855.

⁶⁰ 16 May 1855. Note that the text reads 'plusieurs carabins', which is translated as medics, but if there were a spelling mistake here, it could be 'carabiniers' or guards.

⁶¹ May 16, 1855. For deck the text has *rouffle* instead of *rouf*.

she wrote that it made a sad impression upon her: 'This is perhaps because the sun of the East does not shine on it', she wrote nostalgically. She had been charmed by the Levant, and with her memoirs so perfectly capturing both place and time, she passes on to us the worlds she came from and visited, so that we in turn are just as charmed.

PART SEVEN

BILAD AL-SHAM IN THE LATE OTTOMAN AND
MANDATORY PERIODS

MUNICIPALITIES IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

PETER SLUGLETT

It is a curious fact that rather little work has been done on municipalities in the late Ottoman Empire. I say curious, because although it is important not to exaggerate, processes of decentralisation and the creation of locally based entities are important aspects of the emergence both of the institutions of civil society and more generally of a public sphere, matters which have attracted a lot of attention among social and political scientists over the past ten to fifteen years. What follows is largely a brief survey of the literature, with particular reference to local affairs in Aleppo in the late Ottoman and mandate periods.

As Marcus observes, perhaps rather harshly, of the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman state:

[It did not seek] to encourage the participation of its subjects in political life and decision-making. The official conception of governance...rested on a set of despotic notions: that the sultan was the absolute master of the realm; that the governmental apparatus was his private instrument rather than any agency for serving the public; that the subjects were entitled to security and justice in return for their obedience, but had no formal share in the exercise of power, and that the tasks of government were to remain in the exclusive hands of a ruling class clearly differentiated from the ruled.... Ideally the loyalty of the subjects was to be expressed by obedience, and in more active form by devotion to the person of the ruler, not attachment to the state as a political abstraction.¹

At the same time, in spite of its corruption and authoritarianism, this particular pre-modern state interfered remarkably little in the daily lives of its subjects, who were not, for example, constantly required to submit to a barrage of regulations and restrictions—however good or bad we may consider such regulation to be.² By the second half of the

¹ Abraham, Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, 18–19.

² Ibid., 73–74. cf. '[T]here was far less theological policing under the Ottomans than there was in Christendom at this time, and this laxity of atmosphere and absence of heresy-hunters fostered the emergence of a popular religious culture which more than anything else in the early modern period united the city's divers faiths around a common sense of the sacred and divine'. Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950*, New York, Vintage Books, 2006, 66.

eighteenth century—although the process had begun even earlier in some places—the control of the Ottoman state over its provinces had weakened considerably, to the extent that a number of powerful local families (or Mamluk soldiery in the case of Egypt and much of Iraq) had essentially taken charge of the local administration. While this process has sometimes been viewed in a positive light, in the sense that there ‘must’ be some intrinsic virtue in the simple fact of local control, interpreted approvingly as a kind of proto-nationalism, it seems very doubtful that such an optimistic interpretation can be justified. It is largely the case that the ‘Azms in Damascus, Ahmad Jazzar Pasha in Acre, the Jalilis in Mosul, and Dhahir ‘Umar in Galilee used their superior local knowledge and greater control to extort more from their subjects than the Ottomans were able to do, and there is little evidence to suggest that their local origins made their rule more palatable to their compatriots.

As Hourani and others have shown, the Ottoman state for much of its existence made use of a group known collectively as the notables to reinforce, or in some cases to carry out, governance in the provinces. In broad terms, the notables were members of the Sunni Muslim land-owning elite, part of whose social and political function was to act as a two-way filter between the Ottoman state and those elements of the local population whom it was necessary to appease, conciliate, galvanise or otherwise accommodate. In terms of politics and administration, while the notables may have played an important, often crucial, role in the economy, they did not of course enjoy ‘autonomy’. In addition, they were frequently divided into factions who fought one another for control over local resources; in consequence they only rarely challenged the state directly, since they were dependent upon it for confirmation in their official positions. On the other hand, as far as economic autonomy was concerned, local control over the agricultural surplus,³ and over the day-to-day functioning of trade, crafts and manufacture through the guilds, generally ensured that provided the city or region paid something approximating to its prescribed tax liabilities

³ See Dina Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540–1834*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, and Hala Fattah, *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf 1745–1900*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1997, for interesting examples of partnerships between Ottoman officials and local merchants and landowners in Mosul and Baghdad.

to the central state, the state would rarely interfere in the details of its economic activities.

In a recent survey of centre-provincial relations in the Ottoman period, Dina Khoury has cautioned against unquestioning acceptance of the standard interpretations of the 'transition to modernity' in the Ottoman Empire between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁴ She considers, for instance, that rather than being symptomatic of the *disintegration* of state control, the institution of tax-farming helped create a local gentry which drew its support from Istanbul, challenged the traditional elite of the city, and eventually provided the backbone of the Tanzimat reforms.⁵ Also, state/city relations varied considerably throughout the empire, according to the nature and economic power of particular urban elites, even within a given geographical area (such as 'Egypt' or 'Syria').⁶ It is possible, then, that the early Tanzimat was something less of a watershed than some of us, myself included, used to think.

Another assumption which long held sway (especially among authors who focussed on the activities of the state rather than the effects of those activities in the provinces) was that the effect of the reforms was (and I exaggerate to make the point) essentially to break the power of provincial grandees and to extend the effective powers of the state into the provinces. Even if we admit that many of the remoter parts of the empire (the Arabian peninsula, the Kurdish areas, southern Iraq, Tripolitania and so on) were never effectively 'governed' until the twentieth century, another major if presumably unintended consequence of the

⁴ As in, for instance Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 1st edn., 1961, rev. edn, London: Oxford University Press, 1979; Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1963; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Volume II: *Reform, Revolution and Republic; the rise of modern Turkey 1808-1975*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

⁵ See Jean-Pierre Thieck, 'Décentralisation ottomane et affirmation urbaine à Alep à la fin du XVIII^e siècle', in Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Moyen Orient Contemporain, *Mouvements Communautaires et Espaces Urbains au Machreq*, Beirut, CERMOC, 1985, 117-68. See also Margaret Meriwether, 'Urban Notables and Rural Resources in Aleppo, 1779-1830', *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 4/1, 1987, 55-73 and Bruce Masters, 'Power and Society in Aleppo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 62, 1991, 151-58.

⁶ Dina Khoury, 'Political Relations between City and State in the Middle East: 1709-1850', in Peter Sluglett, ed., *The Urban Society History of the Middle East 1759-1950*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 67-103.

Tanzimat in the nineteenth century was the expansion of the Ottoman bureaucracy and the concomitant rise in the number of 'new upstarts'⁷ which this entailed. The judicial, fiscal and bureaucratic structures that evolved (in response to major pieces of legislation such as, *inter alia*, the Land Law of 1858, the Law of Vilayets of 1864⁸ and the major reform of civil law, the *Mecelle*, in 1876) gradually came to require the employment of more and more locals who had received a modern, that is secular, education, or were otherwise prepared to adapt themselves to the requirements of government service. While a major purpose of the Tanzimat had been to move towards stopping or at least tempering the 'ascendancy of [the] local power groups'⁹ that had so weakened the empire in the period between the 1780s and the 1820s, the fact that it was necessary to recruit many more locals to carry out a wide variety of governmental functions in the latter part of the nineteenth century meant, paradoxically, that in some ways the broad attempts to centralise did not always have that precise effect. A register of Ottoman civil officials for Aleppo in 1858 lists only 20 individuals, including the governor-general, the treasurer, and the *qadi*, while the provincial *salnames* of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contain lists of employees spreading over several pages.¹⁰

It is also interesting that such locally recruited functionaries could and did occupy quite senior positions. In a letter to the Legation in

⁷ Ruth Roded, 'Ottoman Service as a Vehicle for the Rise of New Upstarts among the Urban Elite Families of Syria in the Last Decades of Ottoman rule', in Gabriel R. Warburg and Gad Gilbar, eds., *Studies in Islamic Society; Contributions in Memory of Gabriel Baer*, Haifa, Haifa University Press, 1984, 63–94.

⁸ I.e. the creation of the various sub-provincial administrative districts (*qadha*, *nahiya*) and the local offices or representatives of the various ministries. Aleppo was formally created a *wilaya* (in the sense implied by the Law of Vilayets of 1864) under the governorship of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha between 1866 and 1868. See Kamal al-Ghazzi, *Nahr al-Dhahab fi Ta'rikh Halab*, Aleppo, 1923–26, Vol. III, 392–93. The province of Syria (based at Damascus but excluding the *mutasarrifiya* of Mount Lebanon) had been created in 1865; see Butrus Abu Manneh, 'The establishment and dismantling of the province of Syria, 1865–1888', in John Spagnolo, ed., *Problems of the modern Middle East in historical perspective: essays in honour of Albert Hourani*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1992, 7–26.

⁹ Dick Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000.

¹⁰ E.g. see 'Report on the Finances of Aleppo', FO 198/13, quoted in Charles Issawi, *The Fertile Crescent 1809–1914: a Documentary Economic History*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 437–40. Some of these bureaucrats managed to pass on their positions to sons and other relatives: see Mahmud Yazbak, *Haifa in the late Ottoman period, 1864–1914: a Muslim town in transition*, Leiden, Brill, 1998.

Constantinople in 1875, the British Consul in Aleppo complained that 'A secretary-general to the provincial government has been appointed, a native of Aleppo which that important functionary should not be, and a man who not more than a year and a half ago was dismissed from an obscure clerkship by the Porte...' ¹¹

In addition, and here we begin to come more directly to the our central concern, the establishment, or perhaps more accurately the reconstitution, of the provincial *diwan* as a body (called either the supreme advisory council, *majlis al-shura al-ʿali* or administrative council, *majlis al-idara*) ¹² which was both in theory and in practice independent of the local *wali*, evidently enhanced, in that it institutionalised, the power and status of prominent local notables. It is unfortunate that apart from Ma'oz' work on Syria and Palestine, ¹³ Thompson's perceptive study of the Damascus *majlis*—based on the only available records of its deliberations (for 1844–45) and Cleveland's study of the Tunis council between 1858 and 1870 ¹⁴—there have been no detailed studies of these councils elsewhere, nor, as far I know, do we know where any other surviving records of their sessions may be.

The work of Ma'oz and Thompson paints a picture oddly familiar to us from other eras and areas of the Ottoman empire, ¹⁵ of a central administration pursuing, in tandem, policies whose easily foreseeable contradictory effects are, or at least seem, utterly baffling. In this case, on the assumption that a major purpose of the Tanzimat reforms was to

¹¹ British Consul, Aleppo, to British Legation, Constantinople, no 16 of 20 August 1875, FO 195/1067.

¹² Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, Volume II*, 84–85; L. Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985, 53–55.

¹³ Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1849–1861*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968, especially 87–107.

¹⁴ See Elizabeth Thompson, 'Ottoman political reform in the provinces: the Damascus advisory council in 1844–45', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25, 1993, 457–45, and William L. Cleveland, 'The Municipal Council of Tunis 1858–1870: a Study in Urban Institutional Change', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 9, 1978, 33–61.

¹⁵ See, for instance, some of the contradictions in Ottoman economic policy (such as the refusal to permit the cultivation of a much more valuable commodity because it would effectively bring to an end the tax revenues derived from a much less valuable commodity produced in the same place) are described in Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1609–1750*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1988), and my review of it in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 19, 1992, 203–04.

reassert the power of the state over the provinces, see that taxation was actually collected, and so on, it is reasonable to assume that the state would appoint experienced administrators to key provinces who had not bought their offices and who would stay in post for quite a long time. To deal with the latter point first, there were some 30 governors of Aleppo between about 1850 and 1895, many of whom stayed in office less than a year.¹⁶ As far as quality is concerned, there are the comments of the consuls and of al-Ghazzi, which are often in agreement. However, the *effectiveness* of these individuals was almost always constrained by the powers of the provincial council (*majlis al-idara* etc.), which could organise itself to block their plans, or to procrastinate in such a way that it soon became time for the governors to be posted elsewhere. To quote Ma'oz:

Furnished with these enormous powers [sc. over administration, finance and justice] the *meclis* was nominally set up to advise and assist the governor in carrying out his duties within the area under his jurisdiction. In fact, however, this institution constituted a further check on the Pasha's authority which was already restricted by other Turkish officials in his province.... the *vali* had to struggle constantly with the *meclis*; he could take no action unless it had been endorsed by a *mazbata* from his council.... The mediocre Pasha... was unable to contend with the sitting members of the *meclis* whose superior information and useful contacts were indispensable. He would often not dare to antagonize these notables for fear of their great influence in both Syria and Istanbul...¹⁷

One might think, perhaps the state is trying to promote some sort of local government at the same time, to give locals meaningful investment in the governance of their own locality. However, the problem with this is that if at least one of the state's main aims is to ensure a steady flow of revenue from the provinces to the centre, then why place so much reliance on a group of individuals whose paramount concern is to keep that revenue flow as much of a trickle as possible? In 1858, for example, Consul Skene described the situation in Aleppo to the Ambassador in the following terms. The tithes, which were auctioned off to members of the council, fell from fourteen million piastres in 1857 to twelve million in 1858. In consequence, instead of being oppressed by the pashas, the rural population is now being oppressed by twenty greedy councillors, a group of 'venal and unscrupulous'.

¹⁶ Computed from al-Ghazzi, op. cit.

¹⁷ Ma'oz, op. cit., 95–96.

pulous speculators' who collude with each other. At the tithe auctions, each member of the council would select the villages whose tithes he wished to farm under the name of a retainer; it was agreed that no-one else should compete, and 'a profitable bargain was struck to the councillor whose turn had come'.¹⁸ In 1861, under the governorship of Ismet Pasha (1277–1279), whom Consul Skene greatly admired, he reported:

The amount of the sales of tithes exceeds that of previous years by about two millions of piastres and a still greater benefit secured by Ismet Pasha has been the *exclusion of all government officers and members of the council from the farming of tithes* (my italics).¹⁹

One can only conclude from this is that the state usually lacked the means to coerce powerful locals to take actions against their will or their economic interests; occasionally, a strong governor might be able to force their hands. Some fifty years later, three years after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the situation had not changed very much. In March 1911 Consul Fontana wrote to the Legation in Constantinople:

The vali Husain Kiamil Pasha, some time after taking up his post in Aleppo, opened a campaign against the local Muslim landowners, whom he arraigned in a newspaper as oppressors of the poor... Since then he has vigorously upheld the cause of the poor peasants and the poorer classes generally... the oppressors and the oppressed seem to have changed places... It is regrettable that the town of Aleppo has been divided into two camps, on the one side the Muslim landowners, notables and *ashraf*, and on the other the Muslim people of the poorer classes, the leading officials and the Christians.²⁰

The Law of Vilayets of 1864 set out a kind of 'organigram' for the provinces: in 1877 the Ottoman government issued the Provincial Municipalities Law, 'according to which each town was to have an elected municipal council, consisting of six to twelve members... One of the councillors was to be mayor [*ra'is al-baladiyya*], not by election but by government appointment'.²¹ The jurisdiction of the municipality

¹⁸ Consul Skene, Aleppo to Sir Henry Bulwer, Constantinople, No. 25 of 20 Aug. 1858, FO 195/595.

¹⁹ Skene to Constantinople, 1 July 1861, FO 195/675.

²⁰ Consul Fontana (Aleppo) to Sir Gerard Lowther (Constantinople), dispatch No. 2 of 20 March 1911, FO 424/227.

²¹ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 1961, 399.

covered such matters as the supervision of building construction, the layout of streets, paving, cleanliness, water supply, lighting, the supervision of weights and measures, the regulation of public health, the supervision of restaurants, coffee houses and so forth.²²

Those who have written on this topic seem to agree that the main impetus for it was European, especially French, ideas of urban government which were circulating in Istanbul, especially in Galata, where most of the non-Muslim and foreign population lived, and in whose southern part, Karaköy, the 'modern' banks, insurance companies, and the stock exchange, hence the 'financial district', came to be located.²³ In response to pressures from its inhabitants for paved roads and other improvements, the municipality of Galata was founded in 1857: '[g]iven the large measure of autonomy accorded the municipal council, an examination of the impetus, direction and success of the municipality illuminates the role of the non-Muslim minorities as cultural mediators and as real of potential instruments of Ottoman regeneration'.²⁴ A preliminary planning commission headed by wealthy merchants, including the bankers Antoine Alléon and Abraham Camondo, demanded a municipal treasury, the right to tax 'and the power to administer all areas of municipal concern independently of the central government'.²⁵ This was enthusiastically accepted by the High Council of Reform, which understood that the unique character of the area (and in particular the absence of potentially conservative and anti-reform Muslim notables) meant that it would be unlikely that residents would raise any serious objections to a reform programme.

²² Ruth Kark, 'The Jerusalem municipality at the end of Ottoman rule', *Asian and African Studies* 14, 1980, 117–41.

²³ See Zeynep Celik, *The remaking of Istanbul*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1986. The Camondos, Ottoman Jewish subjects under French protection, moved the headquarters of their bank from Istanbul to Paris in 1869. Due to their substantial influence as bankers to the Porte, they had already acquired large quantities of commercial real estate in Istanbul even before the law of 1867 permitting foreigners to own land and real property in the Ottoman Empire. See Nora Seni, 'The Camondos and their imprint on 19th-century Istanbul', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 26, 1994, 663–75.

²⁴ Steven Rosenthal, 'The function of a plural society: minorities and municipal reform in Istanbul 1859–1870', in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. 1: *The Central Lands*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982, 369–85, gives detailed demographic and occupational information on Galata, whose population had expanded enormously since the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 374.

While it would be too harsh to label the Galata municipality a failure, it had certain inherent defects in spite of the fact that it had gained the enthusiastic support of the Ottoman government. The main stumbling block—and it is interesting that a similar institution in Alexandria, the *Commissione di Ornato*, founded in 1843, ran up against very similar problems²⁶—was the status of the area's foreign inhabitants. As Rosenthal says '[L]ike their counterparts in Egypt, the diplomatic community of Istanbul was concerned above all with defending their [own and their nationals'] capitulatory rights',²⁷ and this concern always trumped any desire to improve conditions in either city. In sum, the diplomatic community could not countenance any encroachments on the extra-territorial privileges of its constituents, a large number of whom, in both cities, were members of the local non-Muslim communities (Greeks, Jews, Armenians etc.) who had been granted either consular protection or full foreign citizenship. The situation was further, though somewhat artificially, exacerbated by the fact that, in theory, foreigners were not allowed (until 1867) to own real property in the Ottoman Empire, and thus could not or should not be required to pay taxes on property, which, while they might occupy, they could not own. Hence, despite the fact that all the members of the Galata council were Europeans who believed to be in their own long term commercial interests to make improvements in matters of hygiene, road-building, lighting and so on, it 'was from the first perceived not as a European entity, but as a tool of the Porte designed to do away with the Capitulations'.²⁸

Hence the Galata municipality had the greatest difficulty collecting taxes, and in fact went bankrupt in 1863. In spite of this it was bailed out and reorganised by the Porte, evidence of its determination that the institution should succeed. In same way, the *Commissione di Ornato*, which was founded as a board of public works, was a European-inspired attempt to bring some order to the anarchy of local construction in Alexandria. It was presided over by the Greek consul-general and had an Italian chief engineer who numbered and named the streets and enacted other regulations to ensure public safety and

²⁶ Michael J. Reimer, 'Reorganizing Alexandria: the origins and history of the Conseil de l'Ornato', *Journal of Urban History*, 19, 1993, 53–83.

²⁷ Steven Rosenthal, 'Urban Elites and the Foundation of Municipalities in Alexandria and Istanbul', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 16, 1980, 125–33.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 131.

the free circulation of traffic by, for example, trying to limit the speed and numbers of animal traffic within the city.²⁹ But, as Reimer says, 'The glaring defects in urban government derived from the informal and collective nature of European colonization in Egypt before 1882. This meant quite simply that the khedive and his lieutenants could not rein in the colonists and their protégés, nor did any European power dominate the country sufficiently to curtail the anarchic behaviour of a group that counted over forty thousand souls in Alexandria by the 1870s.'³⁰

The size and scope of the *Commissione di Ornato* was greatly reduced in size and scope throughout the 1850s, and by the time of Isma'il's succession to the khedivate in 1863 it had declined to the status of a sub-department of the *majlis al-tujjar*, the mixed commercial tribunal. The problems of European non-compliance and their unwillingness to pay taxes extended to other areas of the public sphere in Alexandria, for instance the problems caused by brawls, thefts and assaults by foreign sailors who could only be arrested or checked by 'their own' (feeble and inefficient) consular police. In 1868 there was an attempt to found a municipality and issue a municipal code, but, in the same spirit as in contemporary Istanbul, such efforts ran up against the opposition of foreign diplomats since acceptance would have involved the surrender of the fiscal and legal immunities enjoyed by the foreign colony.³¹

Finally, let us look briefly at what at least seems to be a more 'everyday' instance of a comparable institution, the municipality of Jerusalem.³² Kark points out that the *meclis-i belediye* came into being *alongside* the *meclis-i idare* and was apparently established at the initiative of the *vali*, Nazif Pasha, in 1867 (that is, even before the promulgation of the law of 1877). 'The new municipalities flourished when the *vali* supported the Tanzimat and declined when he withheld his backing.'³³ Again, we find that the foreign consuls were suspicious of attempts to infringe upon their authority, and of course resisted attempts to tax their subjects, though it was stated that this objection would be waived

²⁹ See Michael J. Reimer, *Colonial Bridgehead: Government and Society in Alexandria, 1807–1882*, Boulder, Westview, 1997, 75.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 131.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 143f. The municipality was eventually founded in 1890.

³² Ruth Kark, 'The Jerusalem municipality...'

³³ *Ibid.*, 119.

if foreigners were to be represented on the council. This duly took place, and representatives were elected; in 1908 there were 2 Jews, 2 Christians and 6 Muslims on the council. Kark reports a pretty proactive institution, with an income of £T 11,000 in 1913, which was mostly spent on paving and otherwise maintaining the streets, planting trees, issuing construction permits (which had to be approved by engineers or architects) collecting garbage from streets and markets, sprinkling water to keep dust down, paying a small police force, appointing a municipal physician who treated patients free of charge, and trying to improve the city's water supply. In 1919–12 the mayor, Husayn Salim Husayni, appealed, apparently with success, to the Jews of the diaspora for the £T500, 000 necessary to lay sewage pipes throughout the city.

The importance of the municipality was that although the pool of electors of councillors was very limited, local leaders were certainly represented on it, and at least judging by its functions, it does seem to have catered for local concerns. In Jerusalem, the objections of the foreign communities do not seem to have been as persistent as those in Istanbul and Alexandria, and many consuls played an active and ultimately 'positive' role in municipal affairs. By the time of the First World War, fairly elaborate schemes involving water supply and electric lighting had long been drawn up. Lack of funds rather than any lack of will had delayed the implementation of these projects, and the general impression given is of a remarkable degree of cooperation between the Ottoman authorities, the foreign consuls, and energetic and dedicated leaders and members of the various local communities.

Finally let me go a little further forward in time, to a letter written at the end of 1933 by the *délégué-adjoint* at Aleppo, Lavastre, to the Comte de Martel in Beirut, welcoming various current proposals for administrative decentralisation which would essentially give local functionaries a greater degree of authority over local matters. Lavastre approved the general principle, saying that as well as unclogging the arteries of the central administration the proposal would also secure better local administration, since the civil servants 'in the sanjaks and vilayets' were almost by definition better informed about local matters than their colleagues in Damascus:

A titre d'exemple j'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-joint le copie de deux documents récents par lesquels on est assez étonné d'apprendre qu'il faut un décret du Président de la République contresigné par le

Président du Conseil pour accorder un congé de quatre jours à deux agents de la Police d'Alep.³⁴

This is obviously a topic which bears more thorough and detailed examination, though success or failure in the enterprise will of course depend on what level and quantity of documentation has survived *sur place*.³⁵ In 2001, I asked one of my best-placed contacts in Aleppo to see if he could find out whether the records either of the Ottoman or the mandate municipality had survived, but his enquiries revealed that they had probably been destroyed when the new municipality was built in the 1950s. I have had similar answers to questions about the law court records of the mandate periods, and it is not clear whether further and more energetic digging would produce more interesting results.

In general, it seems almost axiomatic that the development of institutions of independent municipal government 'must' lead to greater local democracy, and the development of valuable institutions of civil society, and we have certainly examples of energetic Ottoman *walis* teaming up with groups of concerned citizens to produce the kind of bread and butter ameliorations now associated with modern city planning and city government. However, it is not clear whether these institutions eventually developed into genuine civic bodies, or whether they were simply vehicles for power-brokering by Muslim notables and their allies from the various minority communities. One can only hope that more relevant source materials will appear which will enable us to determine this more definitively in one way or another.

³⁴ Lavastre, Aleppo, to High Commissioner, Beirut, HC 5006/20 of 30 December 1933, MAE Nantes, Carton 537, *Mesures de la décentralisation administrative, 1934–1939*.

³⁵ See the useful collection edited by Nora Lafi, *Municipalités méditerranéennes. Les réformes urbaines ottomanes au miroir d'une histoire comparée (Moyen-Orient, Maghreb, Europe méridionale)*, Berlin, Klaus Schwarz, 2005, *Studien des Zentrums Moderner Orient*, 21.

LA DEMEURE DE 'UTHMAN NURI PASHA ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DES QUARTIERS D'AL-'AFIF ET DE JISR AL-ABYAD À LA FIN DE L'ÉPOQUE OTTOMANE

SARAB ATASSI

Préambule

Le point de départ de l'étude du quartier d'al-'Afif trouve son origine dans un travail entrepris par l'équipe de l'Atelier du vieux-Damas sur la demeure du Wali de Damas 'Uthman Nuri Pasha.

En 1998, à l'occasion de quelques conversations liées à l'identification et la datation de sa résidence à Damas, l'Ambassadeur de France ouvrit les portes de sa maison damascène à l'équipe de l'Institut : Sarab Atassi, Hayma Zayfa et Hadi Allouch,¹ de même que les archives locales concernant la Résidence de France à Damas furent consultées et étudiées afin de permettre une recherche approfondie sur l'histoire de la demeure et les circonstances de sa fondation.

Le travail entrepris par l'équipe se limita dans un premier temps au rassemblement des documents et textes concernant la maison ainsi qu'à la recherche de sources identifiant son fondateur, ses propriétaires et occupants successifs; de plus, quelques relevés architecturaux complémentaires de la maison furent alors réalisés. Ainsi, l'étude des archives privées de la Résidence de France à Damas permit d'établir une chronologie détaillée des différentes restaurations et transformations réalisées sur le bâtiment d'origine.

L'étude de cette demeure, hors de son contexte historique et urbain, s'avérant limitée, il me parut nécessaire de reprendre partiellement la monographie préparée au sein de l'équipe du vieux-Damas en l'intégrant à une analyse du développement de l'habitat dans le quartier d'al-'Afif à la fin de l'époque ottomane, lors des débuts de l'extension de

¹ Sarab Atassi est actuellement responsable de l'Atelier du Vieux-Damas à l'IFPO/Damas ; Hadi Allouch et Hayma Zayfa étaient au début des années 2000 les architectes rattachés à cet atelier. Ils ont activement participé à différentes activités scientifiques liées à l'étude de l'histoire urbaine de Damas dont l'important relevé du quartier de Zuqaq al-Sakhr réalisé avant sa destruction et l'installation de l'Hôtel Four Seasons sur son emplacement.

l'habitat moyen et résidentiel dans ce secteur, période à laquelle je me limiterai dans cet article ; l'époque mandataire constituera à l'avenir² une seconde phase dans l'étude et la reconstitution de l'histoire de la résidence et du quartier qui l'entoure désormais marqué par la présence de cette demeure.

En effet, c'est au cours de cette période mandataire et post-mandataire que ce quartier connaîtra un développement marquant du fait d'une transition importante des élites damascaines (politiques) qui quittent les demeures patriarcales pour s'installer dans les quartiers nouveaux aux maisons repérables par leur architecture à plan central, articulée autour d'une grande salle appelée sofa; ces maisons bourgeoises individuelles ou collectives, sont encore nombrables de nos jours au quartier d'al-'Afif, de Jisr al-Abyad et dans la rue 'Ata al-Ayyubi.³

Introduction

Sur la montagne de Damas, Jabal Qasyun, s'étendent plusieurs quartiers d'époques différentes ; au centre le faubourg fondé au 12^e siècle, al-Salihiyya qui se poursuit à l'est par le quartier kurde ou Hayy al-Akrad aux maisons devancées d'un enclos/*hawsh* et à l'ouest par le quartier d'al-Muhajirin construit au tournant du 19^e siècle sur un plan en damier pour abriter des réfugiés musulmans venant de la région des Balkans puis de Crète, lors de l'éveil des nationalités chrétiennes. Les quartiers contigus d'al-'Afif et de Jisr al-Abyad, où est fondée la demeure de 'Uthman Nuri Pasha à la fin du 19^e siècle, se situent aux confins de l'ancien faubourg d'al-Salihiyya, du côté du sud-ouest.

Dar al-Wali 'Uthman Nuri Pasha, demeure de l'émir Faysal d'octobre 1918 au 8 mars 1920, date où il est couronné roi de Syrie, puis Résidence de la Légation de France, et définitivement Maison de France et Résidence de son Ambassadeur à Damas, est une illustre maison, chargée d'histoire ; elle est aussi une élégante demeure construite peu avant l'année 1304/1886-87, dans une zone de jardins, à la limite ouest

² Une étude plus développée de la demeure et du quartier, confortée de nombreux documents iconographiques, doit faire l'objet d'une publication ultérieure.

³ A l'époque du Mandat cette rue était connue comme étant la rue Henri Ponsot (Haut-Commissaire), par la suite elle prit le nom de 'Ata al-Ayyubi, Premier Ministre en 1936 puis Président de la République en 1943; 'Ata al-Ayyubi fait édifier sa villa à l'ouest de la résidence de France, voir la fin de cet article. Qutayba Shihabi, *Dimashq, Ta'rikh wa Suwar*, Damas, 2^e édition, 1990, 386-87.

de l'ancien faubourg d'al-Salihiyya. La maison de 'Uthman Nuri Pasha est bâtie à une époque où d'importants changements urbains se manifestent et où de nouvelles influences s'infiltrèrent dans la vie damascène, elle continue de nos jours à marquer le paysage urbain de la ville, au cœur du quartier d'al-'Afif.

Pour l'historien ou l'architecte il est difficile de lui trouver dans le périmètre damascène une maison semblable. En effet, elle représente une composition assez hybride, les rares textes de voyageurs la mentionnant au début du 20^e siècle, la qualifient tantôt de 'maison de style européen', ou de 'maison stambolitaine', ou encore de 'maison à la turque' ou enfin de 'maison de style arabe', cette hésitation remarquée dans ces différents attributs montre bien la difficulté à la classer dans un cadre architectural défini. Notre propos sera donc de la replacer dans son cadre urbain et paysager lors de sa fondation, en ébauchant quelques parallèles avec d'autres demeures fondées à la même époque.

Les quartiers résidentiels et d'habitat à Damas à la fin de l'époque ottomane, aperçu général

Après le retrait des troupes égyptiennes, le programme de réformes civiles (*tanzimat*) dans lequel s'est engagé le pouvoir central ottoman est étendu à la Syrie.⁴ Les grandes lignes de ces réformes sont inspirées de l'Occident auquel il s'agit d'opposer une modernité ottomane ; pour ce qui est de l'urbanisme et de l'architecture la Sublime Porte impose un nouveau modèle urbain ottoman qui sera exporté dans

⁴ Ce programme de réformes vise essentiellement à mettre en place le contrôle direct de la région par une administration centrale modernisée, d'améliorer les conditions économiques et sociales des sujets ottomans et de promouvoir l'égalité entre tous, en brisant les barrières qui divisent la société en groupes confessionnels. Cette politique mais également l'invasion des produits européens, la fuite des métaux précieux et la hausse importante des prix ébranlent fortement les structures économiques et sociales de la Syrie. Les réactions de la société sont alors violentes et des troubles graves éclatent à Alep en 1850 et à Damas en 1860. Voir Abdul-Karim Rafeq 'New Light on the 1860 Riots in Ottoman Damascus', Festschrift in honour of Fritz Steppat, Axel Havemann and Baber Johansen, eds., in *Die Welt des Islams* 28, 1988, 412-30; Bruce Masters, 'The 1850 events in Aleppo; an aftershock of Syria's incorporation into the world capitalist system', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22, 1990, 3-20.

les provinces: 'Cette période sera riche en lois d'urbanisme visant à remodeler le visage des villes, élargir les rues, supprimer les impasses, tracer les quartiers selon les règles de la géométrie et bâtir en pierre au lieu du bois.'⁵

Avec les réformes, la ville de Damas va afficher peu à peu un nouveau visage. Déjà, au début du 19^e siècle, prélude à des changements postérieurs plus perceptibles, le gouverneur de la ville élève sa résidence *extra-muros* sur l'emplacement actuel de l'immeuble 'Abid. Mais ce n'est qu'aux lendemains des événements de 1860, que des aménagements modernes sont entrepris : en 1866, le Barada est canalisé et couvert, la place Marjah est réalisée et c'est autour de cette place ou dans sa proximité que seront érigés les nouveaux édifices administratifs dans lesquels les réformes trouvent généralement leurs vêtements de pierre.

Ces constructions répondent certes à des nécessités pratiques. Certaines ressemblent en tous points à celles qui sont élevées dans la capitale et reproduites dans d'autres villes ottomanes.⁶ Par l'ampleur souvent de leurs dimensions, la majesté de leurs lignes, la richesse de leurs éléments décoratifs, ces constructions affirment la puissance de l'Etat avec, toutefois, une modernité qui demeure teintée de respect pour les traditions islamiques.

En dehors de ces grands changements qui touchent les espaces publics et administratifs⁷ et avant d'aborder de plus près le quartier d'al-'Afif, il est nécessaire de voir globalement les transformations de l'habitat dans les faubourgs anciens, puis dans les lotissements qui

⁵ Autour de la question, voir Franck Fries, *Damas, 1869-1946, La mise en place de la ville moderne. Des règlements au plan*, thèse de doctorat, Marne-La-Vallée, 2000, Université de Paris VIII; et Jean-Luc Arnaud, *Damas, Urbanisme et Architecture, 1869-1925*, France, Actes Sud, 2006.

⁶ Les architectes qui produisent ces œuvres sont souvent européens, venus en experts, promoteurs d'un style original, synthèse de l'héritage byzantin et turco-islamique de l'Empire. C'est le cas de l'architecte de la Cour qui réalise la colonne de la Place Marjah ou de l'Espagnol qui développe l'immeuble 'Abid, et du même architecte espagnol en collaboration avec un collègue allemand qui bâtissent la Gare du Hijaz dans un style néo-oriental.

⁷ Voir Stefan Weber, 'Ottoman Damascus of the 19th Century, Artistic and Urban Development as an expression of Changing Times', in *Art turc: 10e congrès international d'art turc*, Genève, Fondation Max Van Berchem, 1999, 729-40.

se créent et se développent dans la seconde moitié du 19^e siècle à Damas.

Dans les faubourgs les plus anciens, l'habitat traditionnel construit au 19^e siècle, à l'époque de la fondation de Dar 'Uthman Nuri Pasha, demeure un habitat de type traditionnel conçu autour d'une ou plusieurs cours intérieures, avec pour innovations majeures un déploiement de façades à encorbellements et fenêtres sur rues, avec des changements importants au niveau des décors intérieurs peints, ou à moulures de pierre d'un style baroque, marquant l'époque.

Les familles de dignitaires et notables demeurent encore installées dans les quartiers résidentiels de Qanawat, Suq Saruja, *extra-muros*, 'Amara, Qaymariya, Bab al-Barid, Sidi 'Amud *intra-muros* ; ces mêmes familles possédant des demeures de plaisance, *jawsaq* ou *qasr*, au milieu de propriétés et jardins encadrant Damas au nord et à l'ouest, non loin du Barada ou d'une de ses dérivations, sur les hauteurs des deux Sharaf.

Les quartiers nouveaux qui se développent dans la seconde moitié du 19^e siècle, seront lotis le long des voies de communications qui marquent le périmètre de Damas ; les extensions modernes s'installent, hors les murs, dans les vides laissés par la structure de la ville ancienne. Les chiffres de recensements ottomans montrent une croissance démographique allant de pair avec la croissance urbaine, entre les années 1888 et 1900 et d'après les *salname* de la wilaya de Syrie le nombre des habitants passe d'environ 120 000 âmes à 143 000 âmes.⁸

Au départ, ce sont les familles moyennes, modestes et émigrées qui occuperont ces quartiers et lotissements nouveaux, ainsi on remarque une différenciation sociale qui commence à se faire plus sensible, en même temps que la mise en place d'une réglementation limitée aux questions de voiries ; la construction dans les lotissements étant, en réalité, laissée aux mains des lotisseurs privés sous réserve que les rues soient alignées, selon les largeurs fixées dans la réglementation et les autorisations de construire accordées par l'administration. Ainsi, entre 1860 et 1880, on note la construction des premiers lotissements comprenant des habitats individuels de taille fort modeste au quartier de 'Amara Barraniya,⁹ le lotissement impérial de Muhajirin fondé en

⁸ Jean-Paul Pascual, 'La Syrie à l'époque ottomane, le XIX^{ème} siècle', in *La Syrie d'Aujourd'hui*, éd. André Raymond, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1980, 33.

⁹ Arnaud, op. cit., 179ff.

1896, au nord-ouest de la ville, et les lotissements bordant l'axe de Qassa' ou de Salihhiyya (habitat mixte) qui assure désormais la jonction et le lien avec l'ancien faubourg d'al-Salihhiyya.

La bourgeoisie damascène s'installe au fur et à mesure sur le nouvel axe de Salihhiyya, à Muhajirin et à Halbuni. L'habitat bourgeois est plus varié que l'habitat modeste : généralement les maisons sont construites sur des parcelles rectangulaires et loties, mais il en existe encore qui sont construites sur des parcelles plus anciennes irrégulières, le plan de ces maisons maintient de nombreux caractères de l'habitat plus ancien mais présente aussi plusieurs innovations.¹⁰

Après 1890, la maison bourgeoise est métissée, subissant de nombreuses influences, la principale innovation demeurant l'apparition du plan à *sofa* ; la maison garde aussi quelques éléments anciens et traditionnels, comme le bassin et la cour qui perdent cependant leur fonction au cœur de la maison, pour devenir un espace lié aux services de la maison.¹¹ On remarque également de nouveaux espaces introduits à l'habitat comme la cuisine modernisée, la salle de bain et la salle à manger. Cet habitat offre un niveau de vie confortable tout en restant lié à l'organisation de la maison traditionnelle, ainsi les premiers changements n'ont pas lieu de manière arbitraire ni par simple imitation : l'ameublement sommaire de la salle de bain est un exemple, il reproduit la *maqsura* d'un hammam public tout en introduisant la salle de bain privée dans les demeures.¹²

Le faubourg d'al-Salihhiyya à la fin du 19^e siècle

Sur le flanc du mont Qasyun, qui domine la ville à trois kilomètres au nord, est fondée dès le milieu du 12^e siècle, une nouvelle agglomération,

¹⁰ Fries, op. cit., note 5, 129, 130.

¹¹ Plan à *sofa*: la bourgeoisie abandonnera la maison à cour préférant la villa, type architectural fréquent organisé selon un plan à *sofa* qui s'inspire des kiosques impériaux ou *konak*. A la même époque, nous continuons à avoir encore des maisons moyennes et modestes qui demeurent à plan traditionnel avec cour centrale (exemples nombreux dans le faubourg sud du Midan) ; les maisons traditionnelles moyennes de Salihhiyya ont une petite cour, elles sont élevées en pente et l'étage est aménagé en retrait afin d'avoir une terrasse protégée des regards avec une vue sur la Ville.

¹² Les recherches menées au cours des dernières années par Stefan Weber, Jean-Luc Arnaud et Franck Fries, ainsi que les contributions de jeunes architectes syriens, niveau post-diplôme, ont permis d'approfondir notre connaissance des transformations urbaines et architecturales que connaît la ville de Damas au 19^e siècle, et au début du 20^e siècle avec la mise en place de la ville moderne.

al-Salihiyya ; elle doit son nom à l'installation de réfugiés palestiniens hanbalites qui avaient dans un premier temps séjourné dans la mosquée Abu Salih, à l'extérieur de la Grand porte Est de Damas, Bab Sharqi. Elle se développe sur le Yazid, la plus septentrionale des dérivations du Barada et va conserver longtemps une personnalité propre caractérisée par son éloignement de la ville, par son peuplement et par une certaine sainteté qu'elle tire des nombreux monuments religieux et funéraires (*madradas, zawiyas*, tombeaux, cimetières) qui y sont construits.

Ahmad Dahman puis Michael Meinecke ont consacré une partie de leurs recherches à l'étude de l'évolution de ce quartier qui connut une période faste, teintée d'une forte soudure idéologique et religieuse, sous le règne des Zenguides et des Ayyoubides. Plus récemment Toru Miura mit l'accent sur la structure administrative indépendante du faubourg à l'époque mamlouke, et conclut : 'le quartier ne fut marqué ni par les hanbalites (comme le présente la tradition de l'installation des Banu Qudama de rite hanbalite) ni par les militaires, ni par les *zu'ar* (milices populaires), mais au contraire ce fut la multiplicité de leur réseaux de pouvoir qui, à chaque époque, forma, soutint et modifia le grand faubourg d'al-Salihiyya.'¹³

Ainsi le faubourg d'al-Salihiyya demeure jusqu'à la fin du 19^e siècle, un petit centre urbain bien séparé de la ville de Damas et des quartiers nord qui se sont développés à proximité des murailles : 'Amara, 'Uqayba et Suq Saruja. En effet, un grand espace de jardins vergers, et de jardins ou *bustan-s* maraîchers, a résisté à l'urbanisation par la nécessité de préserver le terrain fertile alimenté par les eaux abondantes

¹³ Dans son article 'The Salihiyya quarter in the suburbs of Damascus: its formation, structure, and transformation in the Ayyubid and Mamluk Periods', *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales*, 47, 1995, Toru Miura met l'accent sur la structure administrative indépendante du faubourg à l'époque mamlouke, en effet y sont nommés un *wali* et un *muhtasib* indépendants de ceux nommés dans la ville alors, le *dawadar* assure la fonction de *hakim* (gouverneur) et des *'arifs* ou représentants des différents métiers étaient désignés pour collecter les taxes et assurer l'ordre. Un second article de Miura, 'Formality and Reality in Shar'ia Court Records: Socio-economic relations in the Salihiyya quarter of nineteenth century Damascus', *Memoirs Toyo Bunko*, 59, 2001, 109-41 établi après l'étude de six registres du tribunal de Salihiyya (1299-95) : Miura y présente une étude approfondie sur l'habitat et sur la structure sociale et familiale à Salihiyya, il étudie le quartier d'al-Taghaliba qui se trouve dans la continuité de l'axe d'Ibn al-Muqaddam (confrontation des données avec les cartes du cadastre de 1930).

du canal Tora, dérivation septentrionale du Barada, et par la vétusté des moyens de transport sur deux chemins vides de constructions.

Les quartiers de 'Afif et de Jisr al-Abyad où est élevée la demeure de 'Uthman Nuri Pasha sont situés à l'ouest du faubourg ancien de Salihyya qui a longtemps formé une entité urbaine regroupée autour d'un axe transversal de direction est-ouest, autour de nombreux édifices religieux, dont trois grandes mosquées à *khutba*, fondées aux époques ayyoubide, Jami' al-Jabal ; mamlouke, Jami' al-Jadid, et ottomane lors de l'entrée de Salim 1^{er} à Damas, la mosquée du Cheikh Muhyi al-Din.

Il est certain que l'histoire urbaine de la ville de Damas abordée dans son ensemble, ne peut ignorer l'évolution de ce grand faubourg urbain dans sa proximité ; parmi les trois chemins anciens reliant à travers les jardins Damas à Salihyya, celui qui nous intéresse est le chemin qui commence à s'étendre entre la Porte des quartiers nord, Bawabat al-Salihyya et la *mahalla* de Jisr al-Abyad qui doit son nom au pont construit sur le Tora. La fin du 19^e siècle correspond au développement urbain de cet axe qui monte vers le Qasyun à travers les rues al-Shuhada et Arnous, où les premiers lotissements datent des années 1889-90.¹⁴ Par ailleurs, l'aménagement dans la ville d'artères importantes qui sont pavées va désormais permettre le passage des véhicules à roues, dont 'ces calèches qui font fureur durant la période des Réformes'.

Les Quartiers d'al-'Afif et de Jisr al-Abyad

Sur les trente *mahalla*-s ou quartiers mentionnés dans les sources du 16^e siècle, sur l'ensemble du faubourg de Salihyya, les suivantes concernent les secteurs qui nous intéressent :

- A— Mahallat al-Jisr al-Abyad, ou le Pont blanc, construit au dessus du canal Tora, on y remarque l'édification aux époques ayyoubide et mamlouke, de nombreux édifices religieux et publics : la Madrasa Maridaniya, Hammam 'Abd al-Basit, Dar al-Qur'an al-Isirdiya, al-khanqah al-Basitiya et al-khanqah al-'Izziya.

¹⁴ Fries, op. cit., 43.

- B— Mahallat al-Sikka wa Khan al-Sabil, la Grand-rue et le Caravansérail des passants et voyageurs où certains édifices sont également cités : la Mosquée al-'Afif, Hammam al-'Afif, Zawiyat al-'Izzawi.
- C— Mahallat al-Dulamiya (maison d'enseignement du Coran) et Hammam Ibn al-Muqaddam, axe intérieur avec de nombreux monuments ayyoubides : Mausolée de Mithqal, Mausolée al-Khatuniyya, Hammam Ibn al-Muqaddam et la grande mosquée mamlouke, Jami' al-Jadid, cet axe ancien rejoint au nord la rue des Écoles, Jadat Bayn al-Madaris et se prolonge par le quartier des Taghaliba.

Sur la carte ces trois quartiers se présentent sous la forme d'une fourche dont l'angle se trouve au Jisr al-Abyad, les deux axes sont Ibn al-Muqaddam, une rue et voie intérieure grimpante, et al-Sikka, ou le chemin extérieur ; une visite du secteur permet encore aujourd'hui, de délimiter des zones d'habitats anciens, moyens et modestes.

Attirées par l'agrément des lieux, l'air pur et le panorama attrayant qui s'ouvrait sur la ville à partir du Qasyun, les familles aisées de Damas s'y faisaient construire des maisons de plaisance où elles se retiraient pendant l'été ; on y trouvait aussi quelques cafés installés sur les bords du Nahr Yazid, où les Damascènes venaient se reposer à l'ombre des arbres fumant le narguilé et sirotant le café.

Vers la fin du 19^e siècle l'aristocratie turque s'installe dans de prestigieuses demeures, aux abords de l'ancien faubourg aux quartiers d'al-'Afif et de Jisr, et surtout sur l'axe de Salihyya ; Dar Ziwar Pasha, détruite il y a quelques années, et Dar 'Uthman Nuri Pasha sont deux exemples représentatifs de ces maisons nouvelles.¹⁵

Si la construction de nombreux mausolées au milieu des jardins remonte aux époques saldjouqide et ayyoubide, la présence de ces demeures de plaisance (*qusur* et *jawasiq*) tout autour de Damas est attestée dans les textes de la fin de l'époque mamlouke. De nos jours, nous en avons repéré qui existent encore à Rabwa, Kiwan, Aqsab Bassatin... Maisons fragiles et élégantes construites sur deux ou trois

¹⁵ Dar ou konak de Ziwar Pacha, située jadis sur l'axe de Salihyya fut louée en 1903 pour accueillir la fondation de la première école de médecine à Damas inaugurée à l'occasion des festivités organisées pour célébrer l'anniversaire d'intronisation du Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II. cf. 'Abd al-Karim Rafiq, *Ta'rikh al-Jami'a al-Suriya*, Damas, 2004, 13-14.

niveaux en fonction de la vue et du paysage, elles mériteraient d'être étudiées avant leur disparition ou transformation.

Dar 'Uthman Nuri Pasha

Aujourd'hui, il existe un bâtiment nouveau qui abrite les bureaux et services administratifs de l'Ambassade de France, derrière lequel a été préservée et restaurée la demeure ancienne et son jardin ; l'édifice, situé à l'angle formé par la rue 'Ata al-Ayyubi et l'axe du quartier de 'Afif, est édifié sur trois niveaux, l'accès principal s'y fait à partir d'un porche monumental et d'un jardin. Au premier étage se déploie une grande galerie de bois orientée sud-ouest, orientation idéale pour Damas, cet étage est actuellement occupé par les pièces de réception et le second étage par des appartements privés.¹⁶

Description

La Résidence de France est élevée sur un terrain en pente, comme nombre de maisons et monuments situés dans ce secteur, ce dénivellement imposant souvent une adaptation de l'architecture à la pente du terrain. Elle est composée de deux étages avec un rez-de-jardin, ou premier niveau construit en pierre, de même qu'elle est dotée d'innombrables fenêtres, et portes-fenêtres, la superficie de son terrain est approximativement de 2030 m². Le premier étage est composé d'une partie principale où se trouvent les salons et la partie de service. Il est destiné à la vie publique tandis que le second étage est strictement réservé à la vie privée avec les chambres à coucher et les chambres du personnel.

Une longue galerie à arcades longe le premier étage et le rez-de-chaussée du côté sud, cette élégante galerie donne sur un grand jardin en partie dallé à la damascène,¹⁷ avec au centre un grand bassin ovale avec jets d'eau. Le jardin supérieur ou en terrasse, situé du côté ouest, est doté d'une treille, il est également dallé à la damascène avec un grand bassin polygonal. Plusieurs changements sont perçus au niveau

¹⁶ Pierre Fournié, 'La demeure de Djisir', in *Ambassades de France*, coordonné par Yvon Roé d'Albert, éd. Perrin, Paris, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1993, 68-77.

¹⁷ Dallage commun dans les maisons traditionnelles, bichrome composé de dalles basaltiques alternées avec des dalles de pierre blanches ou de couleur rose foncée (mizzi), formant des compositions géométriques variées.

du plan en terme de comparaison avec la maison syrienne traditionnelle. La cour (ici cour/jardin) n'est pas au centre de l'habitation mais bien au contraire, elle est rejetée vers l'arrière. De cette cour, on entre dans un grand espace, aujourd'hui nommé 'salon vestibule', large corridor (9.5m × 4.6m environ) qui distribue les autres pièces et salons au rez-de-chaussée ; comment l'architecte a-t-il conçu cet espace distributeur, espace entrée, ou espace salon ? il est probable qu'il ait eu plusieurs fonctions à la fois ; ce *sofa*, espace central couvert, qui a remplacé la cour des maisons traditionnelles, est plus visible au premier étage où un grand hall distribue les chambres. D'autres entrées sont signalées : au nord, une entrée de service permet d'accéder directement à la cuisine. Du côté sud, on pénètre à l'intérieur en passant obligatoirement par le jardin ; dans le passé, l'accès au jardin se faisait par une porte donnant sur l'axe d'al-'Afif.

La similitude et l'importance des portes des salons montrent : donnant sur le jardin, montrent bien que le rapport maison/jardin, du côté sud, est plus important que le rapport maison/rue. La volonté de concevoir une porte d'entrée distinguée des autres portes n'est cependant pas perceptible. Comme toutes les grandes maisons damascènes de la fin du 19^e et du début du 20^e siècle, celle-ci est dotée d'innombrables et élégantes ouvertures à arcades qui lui donnent cette allure de villa et la marquent d'une élégance très personnelle. Dar 'Uthman Nuri Pasha a été construite avec des matériaux traditionnels : la pierre, la terre, le bois et la brique cuite ; les murs du rez-de-chaussée sont en maçonnerie, les murs et cloisons des étages sont en torchis ; les planchers sont en bois et en nattes recouverts de carrelage ; elle est bâtie dans un style qui n'a rien de semblable avec les maisons damascènes tardives fondées à la même époque dans les secteurs résidentiels aisés et nouvellement lotis ; elle se rapproche plutôt de ces maisons construites dans les jardins et sur les hauteurs encadrant Damas, des maisons à fenêtres et étages, bâties sur un socle en dur surmonté d'une armature de bois comblée de matériaux divers dont essentiellement la brique de terre crue.

Le fondateur, sa résidence et son quartier, quelques sondages dans les archives des tribunaux religieux

Après 1864 Damas est le centre de l'Eyalet de Syrie, où séjourne le *wali* et le *mushir al-Urdhi al-Hamayuni al-Khamis*, commandant de la 5^e armée, installés dans la région ; 'Uthman Nuri Pasha, fondateur de la

demeure d'al-'Afif, repéré dans les archives de Damas¹⁸ occupe la fonction de médecin (*tabib*) *al-Urdhi al-Khamis*, quand il fait construire en 1302/1884-5 sa demeure au milieu du jardin qu'il a loué à Salihyya en face du bain d'al-'Afif sur le grand axe (*al-sikka*) ; il occupera par la suite la fonction de *mushir*/commandant de cette cinquième armée avant d'être nommé deux fois gouverneur/*wali* de Syrie en 1307 puis de 1310 à 1312 de l'Hégire. D'après le *salname* ou chronique officielle de la province/wilaya de Damas 'Uthman Nuri Pasha est nommé deux fois à Damas : la première fois en 1889 (1307 H.) pour une courte période de six mois seulement; puis en 1892 (1310 H.) pour un mandat de deux ans et onze mois ;¹⁹ nous avons également une mention en 1309 H. rapportant : le Wali 'Uthman Nuri Pasha qui habitait à Salihyya avec son épouse al-Hajja Zayni Khanum al Tuqatli.²⁰ Selon Taqi al-Din al-Husni,²¹ ce wali cupide ne fut pas très populaire:

Cet homme boiteux était responsable des événements et litiges qui se sont produits avec les Chérifs de la Mecque, quand il y était wali (juste après son premier mandat à Damas). Aussi, ce wali avait d'étranges façons d'acquérir des gratifications, il savait comment tirer l'argent des riches. Ses escroqueries et ses procédés de corruption lui ont permis d'acquérir d'importantes sommes d'argent. Il ne porta aucune attention au développement du pays, son seul intérêt était de tirer le plus possible de dirhams et de dinars.

La description reproduite ci-dessus, correspond au profil du personnage que nous avons retrouvé dans les documents du grand tribunal de Damas.

Une recherche plus approfondie sur la demeure ayant été engagée, il était devenu nécessaire de confirmer l'identité du fondateur et des circonstances de la fondation ; une quinzaine de documents recueillis dans trois registres du grand tribunal de Damas, datant de la fin du 19^e siècle nous ont livré des informations intéressantes ainsi qu'une identification exacte de la demeure, de son propriétaire, et des lieux et toponymes qui l'encadraient à l'époque, de plus, un texte, rédigé

¹⁸ Voir *infra*.

¹⁹ Voir le *salname de la wilayat de Syrie 1308-1309* de l'Hégire/1890-1891, 76.

²⁰ Informations extraites du registre 928/55, Centre des Archives des Tribunaux Religieux Ottomans, Damas.

²¹ Muhammad Adib Taqi al-Din al-Husni, *Kitab Muntakhabat al-Tawarikh*, Damas, 1927, Tome 1, 175.

à l'occasion d'un litige concernant la propriété de la demeure, nous livrait une description détaillée de la maison. Nous avons ainsi trois documents portant la même date du 6 Rajab 1304/5 mai 1886 :

- Premier document : il s'agit d' une vente/hypothèque pour une période d'un an et vente de la moitié de la demeure qui consiste en un emprunt légal (avec intérêt) du prix de la moitié de la demeure (*dar*) acquise en 1302/1885 par 'Sahib al-Sa'ada al-Hajj 'Uthman Nuri Pasha b. 'Ali Afandi b. Abd Allah Afandi, Sayr Tabib al-Urdhi al-hamayuni al Khamis, située dans la Mahalla d'al-Salihiyya sur le chemin *al-sikka* en face du Hammam al-'Afif ; l'emprunt est de 11974 Piastres (le taux de la livre *majidi* égalant la livre française)'. Nous avons également deux documents concernant la vente/hypothèque du quart de la maison chacun (registre 816, documents 63-64) ; il s'agit également d'un emprunt avec intérêt accordé pour une année.
- Le second document qui nous intéresse date de l'année 1305/1888. Il s'agit du procès verbal du conseil légal qui s'est tenu à propos d'un litige concernant 'la demeure du Sahib al-Sa'ada al-Hajj 'Uthman Nuri Pasha tabib al-awardi al-hamayuni al-khamis, située dans la *mahalla* d'al-Salihiyya à Damas, sur la Grand-Rue al-Sultani en face du hammam al-'Afif, et sur l'emplacement de laquelle se trouvait précédemment un jardin. Ce conseil s'est tenu dans la demeure mentionnée ci-dessus en date du 25 du mois de Rajab 1305/avril 1888', (registre 889-document n° 28), le qadi ayant délégué Muhammad Sa'id al-Ayyubi al-Ansari afin de prononcer un jugement concernant un litige traitant de l'affaire suivante : deux personnes préposées à la gestion du waqf de leur grand père, feu Khalil b. Muhammad al-Mashusi (depuis l'année 1264 H.) ont présenté des actes de propriété de la moitié du jardin (*junayna*) al-Mashusi et de ses revenus car ce jardin est planté d'arbres fruitiers divers arrosés par l'eau du canal Yazid, en se plaignant de la mainmise de 'Uthman Nuri Pasha sur l'ensemble du terrain, avec ses arbres et son eau ; les limites du verger étant précisées ainsi : au sud, Bustan al-Tarakmin, au nord, le chemin en cul-de sac, à l'est, al-Tariq al-Sultani, à l'ouest, le restant du jardin (le tiers) loué à Sa'id al-Jammal.

La réponse de Nuri Pasha fut d'exhiber un acte de location du jardin, pour une durée de 9 années, daté du 29 Dhu'l-Hijja 1303/août

1886, et cela par l'intermédiaire de son délégué 'Abd al-Majid al-Khurdaji, auquel il demandait d'y planter des arbres et d'y élever des constructions ; ce procédé lui permettant d'obtenir la propriété définitive de la moitié des plantations et la totalité de ce qui avait été bâti. Le loyer par année était la modique somme de 20 piastres, et le jardin fut acquis selon les conditions signalées et approuvées par un acte (*hujja*), émis par le tribunal d'al-'Awniyya. Ainsi le Qadi Muhammad Sa'id al-Ayyubi certifia et enregistra la propriété de cet édifice (*'amara*) avec la moitié des arbres du verger au nom de 'Uthman Nuri Pasha, et l'affaire fut close.

L'intérêt de ce document est qu'il nous donne une description de la demeure à l'époque de sa fondation entre les années 1302–1304/1884–1886, et cette description confrontée avec le bâtiment actuel, nous révèle son état premier tout en nous permettant d'identifier les espaces : toutefois le second intérêt de ce document est qu'il dévoile une procédure d'appropriation et transformation en propriété privée de toute construction élevée dans un jardin propriété *waqf* louée à long terme, d'autres documents soulevant un litige similaire dans le même secteur nous dévoilent les mêmes procédés d'appropriation de demeures ou pavillons élevés dans des jardins loués.²²

Malgré les faits qui dénoncent une appropriation 'illégal', la procédure était légale dans le cas d'une location à long terme d'une terre propriété *waqf*, le locataire ayant le droit de construire et de planter des arbres, et ces biens devenant légalement sa propriété et pouvant être cédés, cela est régulier et le juge se réfère au nouveau code civil ottoman (*ahkam 'adliya*) mis en place à la fin des années 1870.²³

²² En cas de location de potagers et jardins *waqf* pour une longue durée et lors de l'élévation d'une construction dans ces jardins, il semble bien clair que les habitations ainsi élevées deviennent la propriété du locataire alors que le terrain demeure propriété du *waqf*, voici quelques exemples tirés de situations comparables à al-'Afif :

Une grande demeure traditionnelle de Husayn Qurnuq, reconstruite et restaurée en 1276 ou 96, située à côté de la mosquée al-'Afif, comprenant une grande cour, un *iwan* et quatre pièces (*murabba'*), une cuisine avec une pièce pour les conserves/*bayt muneh*, des commodités/*murtafaq*, un couloir/*dihliz* et un escalier en pierre menant à une *turqa* (galerie)/couloir et une pièce à l'étage, *franga*, des *mashraqa* ou *semi terrasses/jardins* et des services/*manafi'*. A l'occasion d'un litige, le délégué du qadi leur permet de garder la propriété de la demeure contre une location d'une durée de 9 ans/200 Qirsh/année. (Document de 1302 reg 780/107 p. 86).

²³ Une zone d'ombre subsiste toutefois, on ne sait quel type de contrat a été passé par le défendeur et avec qui. En théorie et en pratique cela a dû être régularisé avec le gérant, *mutawwali du waqf*, mais cela n'est pas mentionné. Le juge qui est un substitut du grand juge indique que le défendeur a produit des documents légaux. Toutefois il

Description de la maison selon les documents datant de 1305 H

La nouvelle construction située sur un terrain en pente et comprenant les espaces suivants :²⁴

Une cour ou *saha* avec bassin, comprenant :

- du côté du nord 3 pièces/*oda* ; à l'angle ouest une cuisine avec bassin et foyer/*ujaq*, et à côté de la cuisine du côté du sud 3 pièces/*oda*, un *ghasl-khane*, un *murtafaq* (sans doute un cabinet de toilette et des commodités), une petite *oda* avec un petit *iwan* qui forme un *qabbu* ou galerie où se trouve un escalier qui mène à un jardin avec bassin alimenté en eau à l'aide d'un répartiteur situé dans la cuisine.
- Au dessus (au nord) et au second étage, se trouvent deux *saliya*, ou deux grandes salles, lesquelles sont surmontées de quatre salles, *saliya*, un *sofa*, de commodités et d'un *ghasl-khane* (salle de bain? cabinet de toilette), l'accès se faisant par un escalier en pierres situé à l'intérieur de l'*iwan* sud.

Enfin le texte mentionne trois portes extérieures : deux portes ouvrant sur la rue Sultani : une donnant sur le jardin et l'autre sur la cour, la troisième étant une porte de service avec un accès se faisant par le nord à partir de la ruelle en cul-de-sac. La description introduit des termes nouveaux, *saliya*, *ghaslkhane*, *sofa*, alors que les descriptions des maisons traditionnelles signalées dans le même secteur ont par exemple une cour avec *iwan*, une pièce/*murabba'*, une cuisine un escalier, une *mashraqa*,²⁵ et deux pièces à l'étage ou *tabaqa* et des commodités ou *manafi'*, la *saliya* et la *sofa* introduisent un nouvel habitat où la cour est remplacée par un espace central.²⁶

ne mentionne ni la nature ni les dates des documents, ce qui laisse planer un doute sur la manière par laquelle le défendeur (Nuri Pasha) a pu 's'installer' sur ce terrain (note communiquée par Monsieur Jean-Paul Pascual qui a bien accepté de m'éclairer sur les documents concernant cette demeure).

²⁴ La description est à partir du 1er étage si l'on se situe du côté de l'entrée sud/jardin, ou du rez-de-chaussée si l'on se situe du côté de l'entrée nord.

²⁵ Sorte de petite terrasse jardin parfois aménagée au devant des pièces du dernier étage.

²⁶ Cet exemple est tiré de la description d'une demeure traditionnelle avec cour entourée de pièces avec services et commodités, située à Salihhiyya, au sud de la Madrasa al-Ashrafiyya louée au vizir Ahmad Hamdi Pasha, wali de Damas en 1292 H, puis en 1297 H. par Muhammad Hikmat Mardam Bey (plainte déposée en raison d'un retard de paiement de loyer dû au décès du locataire), année 1309 H, registre 186.

Conclusion

Les premières conclusions concernant le quartier d'al-'Afif à la fin du 19^e siècle permettent de dire que ce secteur contigu au faubourg ancien d'al-Salihiyya s'est développé plus tardivement que les quartiers de Shuhada et de Arnus situés plus au sud, sur l'axe. Au dessus du quartier d'al-Jisr al-Abyad, quelques repérages encore fort modestes dans les sources et sur le terrain permettent de remarquer que les maisons édifiées à l'est de la mosquée d'al-'Afif, situées sous la rue Jadat Bayn al-Madaris, à l'ouest du Hammam Ibn al-Muqaddam sont des maisons à cour, modestes ou moyennes, elles sont liées au tissu urbain traditionnel. Dans ce secteur la pente du terrain et le canal Yazid jouent un rôle dans la distribution des pièces. Ces maisons possédaient souvent une écurie (*akhur*), en raison de leur situation à plus de 2km du centre ancien de la ville. On y trouvait également de nombreuses roues à eau (*nawa'ir*) destinées à élever l'eau du canal Yazid. Plus au sud, une rue tracée parallèlement au dessus de la madrasa Maridaniya voit au début du 20^e siècle se construire tout un ensemble de maisons bourgeoises, de même gabarit, avec de belles façades en continuité, ces maisons à cour réunissent des éléments de la maison ancienne et nouvelle.

En face de toutes ces maisons liées à soit à un tissu urbain traditionnel, ou à un lotissement, de l'autre côté de la rue la demeure du Wali 'Uthman Nuri Pasha est sans doute la première villa construite à Damas, elle appartient encore par son architecture à ces demeures pavillonnaires devancées de jardins, elle intègre un plan à espace central moderne tout en conservant des éléments traditionnels dont une cour : ingéniosité d'un maître d'œuvre et exigences du *wali* et propriétaire, on reste dans des zones de jardins et de propriétés privées, aucunement introverties, où les matériaux demeurent d'une grande fragilité.

Quelques années plus tard, au tournant du 19^e siècle, le mandat prolongé du Wali Nazim Pasha, qui a toutes les faveurs du sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II, marque un moment important dans l'évolution des quartiers situés sur le mont Qasyun. En effet, après quatre siècles d'arrêt de tout développement urbain significatif dans la continuité de l'ancien faubourg d'al-Salihiyya, les constructions nouvelles au quartier d'al-'Afif ne sont que les prémices d'une extension urbaine qui va se mettre en place à l'ouest de ces secteurs ; en effet, Nazim Pasha porte

une attention toute dévouée à la ville de Damas, il y instaure durant son premier mandat, qui se prolonge douze années, des projets d'envergure,²⁷ c'est lui par exemple, qui fait conduire l'eau de la source Fija au réservoir qui se situe au dessus du Qasr de 'Uthman Nuri Pasha, et la fait distribuer sur plus de 400 fontaines.

Parmi ses nombreuses œuvres celle qui nous intéresse tout particulièrement et qui sera à l'origine du développement des quartiers localisés à l'ouest du Qasyun : il choisit les pentes situées au dessus du Nahr Yazid, pour y installer les populations musulmanes émigrées des Balkans, de Roumélie en 1896 puis de Crète en 1897 ; plusieurs installations dont le lotissement impérial à plan à damier d'al-Muhajirin qui est fondé pour les réfugiés musulmans venant de Crète : distribution des lots de terres gratuites et des dates fixées pour l'achèvement des constructions.

Vers la même époque, Nazim Pasha s'installe à Muhajirin et en y faisant édifier au milieu d'un vaste jardin sa demeure, une villa organisée selon un type architectural conçu autour d'un espace central appelé *sofa* ; ce type est fréquent dans l'empire et sert même de modèle aux bâtiments publics de la Police et de la Municipalité (*al-baladiya, da'irat al shurta*). Enfin, c'est en face de ces lotissements qu'il fait aplanir en 1898 une vaste esplanade, *al-mastaba*, où il fait dresser une tente de soie pour y recevoir l'Empereur Guillaume II.²⁸ Par la suite, l'introduction de l'électricité, par une compagnie belge, permet d'installer en 1907 une ligne de tramway reliant dans un premier temps, la place Marjah au sud du Midan, et à Jisr al-Abyad, cette ligne fut complétée de deux branches en 1912-13 au nord-est vers Shaykh Muhyi al-Din, et à l'ouest vers Muhajirin, ce qui permit définitivement d'assurer la liaison et la communication des quartiers situés sur le Qasyun et de ses habitations modestes sur les hauteurs avec le restant de la ville.

²⁷ Parmi les projets de Nazim Pasha citons aussi la mise en place du projet de chemin de fer du Hijaz, la construction de nombreux bâtiments publics comme la caserne Hamidiya, l'hôpital al Ghuraba et sa pharmacie privée, Cf. Shihabi, *Dimashq, Ta'rikh wa Suwar...*, 398-99.

²⁸ Cf. Shihabi, *Dimashq, Ta'rikh wa Suwar...*, 398-99, et Arnaud, op. cit., 169-175, et 170, fig. 11.

La demeure de 'Uthman Nuri Pasha, avec son grand jardin, a toujours formé un ensemble remarquable. Elle est ainsi choisie comme résidence et bureau par l'émir Faysal lors de son entrée victorieuse dans Damas en octobre 1918, couronné roi de Syrie le 8 mars 1920 il s'installera au Palais de Nazim Pasha à Muhajirin. Un deuxième bâtiment administratif situé en contrebas de la demeure devait exister, les deux bâtiments étaient reliés par des jardins, cet espace de verdure a dû être en partie tronqué lors de l'ouverture en 1933 de la rue 'Ata al-Ayyubi. Dès 1920 le Général Gouraud choisit et fait louer la demeure de Jisr comme résidence du Haut Commissaire à Damas et le 26 novembre 1928, la demeure est acquise pour le compte de l'état Français.

Il est aussi attesté dans les archives de l'Institut français de Damas, actuellement Institut français du Proche-Orient, qu'il fut question en 1930 d'acquérir la villa de Nazim Pasha pour y installer l'Institut, il semblait donc être question de quitter le Palais 'Azm pour un quartier plus paisible et plus sûr. Parmi les villas de type nouveau édifiées avant 1930, on peut citer le palais Mustafa al-'Abid (Mhd Ali al-'Abid) en 1907 à Muhajirin ; mentionnons également Qasr Ziwar Pasha, où sera installée en 1903 la première école de médecine, Madrasat al Hayat.²⁹ Telles sont les quatre résidences/palais fondées à la fin de l'époque ottomane et connues à Damas jusqu'à la fin des années vingt.

La véritable urbanisation du quartier viendra plus tard, avec le déplacement des descendants de grandes familles damascènes, mais là une tout autre approche du quartier est nécessaire avec une recherche plus approfondie de la composante sociale du quartier avec l'installation des descendants de grandes familles, les Quwwatli, Kabbara, Hasibi, Mardam-Bey, 'Azm... Là je ne citerai qu'un exemple : la demeure de 'Ata al-Ayyubi, premier ministre modéré qui eut un rôle conciliateur entre les autorités politiques nationalistes qui œuvraient pour l'indépendance et l'autorité mandataire : al-Ayyubi fit construire dans les années 30, à quelques mètres à l'ouest de la Résidence de France, une somptueuse demeure qui s'impose dans le quartier où siège l'autorité politique : bâtiment à plan central encadré d'un jardin

²⁹ Rafiq, *Ta'rikh al Jami'a al-Suriya*,..., 13-14.

en hauteur encadré de palmiers avec en façade un escalier de pierre majestueux ; le parallèle est inévitable...néanmoins, la construction nouvelle en pierre et béton ne peut rivaliser avec l'architecture raffinée et finalement unique à Damas de ce pavillon fondé par 'Uthman Nuri Pasha.³⁰

³⁰ La ville traditionnelle de Damas que nous étudions est essentiellement celle que nous a léguée la période ottomane qui a profondément marqué la structure urbaine et le paysage urbain dont nous conservons encore des traces importantes. À Damas, les monuments ottomans du 19^{ème} siècle, ceux qui ont été élevés à l'extérieur des quartiers traditionnels et qui ont balisé la ville moderne qui se mettait en place ont souvent été sacrifiés dans les politiques de classement et de préservation, la place Marjah est aujourd'hui méconnaissable, le grand hôtel Victoria et le quartier de Bahsa ont disparu dans les années 50 et 60. La prise de conscience de la valeur ce patrimoine est récente : l'axe de Salihiyya est partiellement préservé, le quartier au dessus de la Mardaniya, également, les monuments religieux sont classés. Seulement aucune décision officielle concernant les quartiers du Moyen Age comme ceux de la fin de l'époque ottomane et de la première moitié du 20^e siècle n'a encore été prise, alors que depuis près de trois décennies des responsables et chercheurs avisés insistent sur la nécessité de cette décision.

COMMENT APPROCHER L'HISTOIRE MODERNE DE LA PALESTINE ?

MAHER AL-CHARIF

Dans les études scientifiques traitant de l'histoire des Arabes à l'époque ottomane, le domaine de l'histoire palestinienne occupe une place honorable et jouit d'un intérêt croissant de la part des chercheurs. Le présent exposé se propose de faire l'état de la recherche sur l'histoire moderne de la Palestine au cours des trois dernières décennies, et cela en suivant les problématiques auxquelles elle a été confrontée et qui restent d'actualité encore aujourd'hui. Avant de m'arrêter sur ces problématiques, je voudrais aborder rapidement, et de façon générale, l'évolution de la recherche sur l'histoire de la Palestine à l'époque ottomane et mettre en lumière les sources de cette recherche, sources qui se sont considérablement enrichies et diversifiées ces derniers temps.

Pendant les années 1980, la plupart des études ont porté sur le dix-neuvième siècle, et plus particulièrement sur la seconde moitié de celui-ci, ainsi que sur les deux premières décennies du vingtième siècle, notamment dans le domaine de l'histoire politique. Dès 1978, Muhammad 'Adnan al-Bakhit, dans son étude *Hayfa fi'l-'ahd al-'uthmani al-awwal: dirasa fi ahwal 'umran al-sahil al-shami* (Haïfa durant la première période ottomane; étude de la civilisation de la côte du *Bilad al-Sham*)¹ fut un des premiers à inciter à l'étude du dix-huitième siècle sous ses divers aspects, de façon à 'comprendre le mouvement de réforme et de renouveau avant que ne souffle le vent de la civilisation européenne sur les sociétés islamiques du *Bilad al-Sham* pour les laisser ensuite à la croisée des chemins.² Cependant, il a fallu attendre la fin des années 1990 pour voir paraître des études sérieuses qui traitent de l'histoire de la Palestine durant le dix-huitième siècle. Pour ce

¹ al-Mu'tamar al-duwwali al-thani li-ta'rikh Bilad al-Sham (Deuxième conférence internationale sur l'histoire du *Bilad al-Sham*), Université de Damas, 27 novembre–3 décembre 1978, 299–322.

² Voir également Thomas Philipp, *Acre: the Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1739–1831*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001.

qui est des études sur les seizième et dix-septième siècles, il y en a eu plusieurs, en langue anglaise, la plupart publiées par des Israéliens.³ En revanche, il existe, au moins, une étude en arabe, à laquelle j'ai eu accès, qui est celle du Professeur 'Abdul-Karim Rafeq, publiée dans la seconde partie de l'*Encyclopédie Palestinienne* sous le titre 'Filastin fi 'ahd al-'uthmaniyyin: min matla' al-qarn al-'ashar al-hijri/ al-sadis 'ashar al-miladi ila matla' al-qarn al-thalith 'ashar al-hijri/ al-tasi' 'ashar al-miladi (1516–1800)' (La Palestine à l'époque ottomane, du début du dixième siècle de l'Hégire / seizième après J.-C. jusqu'au début du treizième siècle de l'Hégire / dix-neuvième après J.-C.).⁴ Pour les débuts de l'époque ottomane, l'étude recourt à des récits de voyageurs européens et arabes. Cependant il reste que l'histoire de la Palestine à cette époque attend des chercheurs qui s'y intéressent et lui consacrent du temps, car la tâche n'est pas facile au vu des difficultés à trouver les sources nécessaires pour l'étude de cette période.

En ce qui concerne les sources, on a vu émerger au cours des trois dernières décennies une tendance commune à l'ensemble des chercheurs: le retour aux sources primaires comme base de recherche. Il s'agit en premier lieu des registres des tribunaux religieux, en notant au passage que, pour quelques petites villes palestiniennes, ceux-ci sont perdus; c'est sur ces registres que s'appuie Abdul-Karim Rafeq dans son étude sur Gaza, ainsi que Muhammad 'Adnan al-Bakhit pour Haifa, et Akram al-Ramini, Bahjat Husayn Sabri et puis Beshara Doumani pour Naplouse.⁵ 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad 'Awad, pour sa part, a été l'un des premiers à faire appel aux archives ottomanes du Premier Ministère à Istanbul, pour ses recherches sur la *mutasarrifiya* de Jérusalem.

³ Voir: Amnon Cohen, *Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; Amy Singer, *Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration around sixteenth century Jerusalem*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994; Dror Ze'evi, *An Ottoman Century: the district of Jerusalem in the 1600s*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996.

⁴ *al-Mawsu'a al-Filastiniya: al-Dirasat al-Khassa* (L'Encyclopédie Palestinienne; études spécialisées), t.2, Beyrouth, 1990, 695–848.

⁵ Akram al-Ramini, *Nabulus fi'l-qarn al-tasi' 'ashar: dirasa mustakhlasa min sijillat al-Mahkamah al-Shar'iya bi Nabulus*, Amman, Tubi'at fi Matabi' Dar al-Sha'b, 1979; Bahjat Sabri, *Milaffat wa-awraq baladiyat Nabulus, 1918–1948*, Nablus, Jami'at al-Najah al-Wataniya, Markaz al-Tawthiq wa'l-Abhath, 1986; Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1709–1900*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, publiée en arabe sous le titre *I'adat iktishaf Filastin: ahali jabal Nablus, 1709–1900*, Beyrouth, Mu'assasat al-dirasat al-filastiniya, deuxième édition, 2002.

saalem.⁶ D'autres exploitent les registres des terres, les recensements de population ottomans ainsi que les annuaires ottomans. Parallèlement 'Adil Manna' met en évidence dans ses deux ouvrages *A'lam Filastin fi 'awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani* (1809–1918) (Figures de Palestine à la fin de l'époque ottomane),⁷ et *Ta'rikh Filastin fi 'awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani* (1709–1918) (Histoire de la Palestine à la fin de l'époque ottomane),⁸ l'importance des archives privées comme source primaire principale pour la fin de l'époque ottomane, tandis que Salim Tamari, à travers l'étude des mémoires de 'Umar al-Salih al-Barghuthi, de Khalil al-Sakakini et de Wasif Jawhariya, montre la nécessité de se référer à ce genre de sources.⁹ Enfin Walid al-Khalidi, et après lui 'Isam Nassar, collectent les photographies, qui, d'après eux, constituent une source sans équivalent pour étudier cette période.¹⁰

Auparavant, Alexander Schölch avait fait un travail de précurseur en se référant aux rapports des consuls et aux archives des ministères des affaires étrangères européens. Mais l'exploitation de toutes ces sources ne diminuait en rien l'importance des informations enregistrées par les témoins visuels et consignées dans des carnets et livres de voyageurs, comme l'ont montré avec force l'Espagnol Pedro Martinez Montavez et les Russes M. Rijnikoff et I. Smilianskaya.¹¹ Venons-en maintenant aux problématiques, en particulier à celles qui n'ont rien perdu de leur actualité pour les chercheurs aujourd'hui. Je me limiterai à trois d'entre elles, étroitement liées. La première trait à la question : où commence l'histoire moderne de la Palestine ? La deuxième

⁶ *Muqaddimah fi ta'rikh Filastin al-hadith, 1831–1914*, Beirut, al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiya, 1983.

⁷ Beyrouth, Mu'assasat al-dirasat al-filastiniya, 1995, deuxième édition.

⁸ Beyrouth, Mu'assasat al-dirasat al-filastiniya, 1999.

⁹ Voir, par exemple, Salim Tamari, *al-Jabal didda al-bahr: dirasat fi ishkaliyat al-hadatha al-Filastiniya*, Ramallah, Muwatn, al-Mu'assasah al-Filastiniya li-Dirasat al-Dimuqratiya, 2005; Salim Tamari et 'Isam Nassar, *Madinat al-hujjaj wa'l-a'yan w'al-mahashi: dirasat fi ta'rikh al-Quds al-ijtima'i wa'l-thaqafi*, Jerusalem, Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Maqdisiyah; Markaz Dirasat al-Quds, 2005, et Wasif Jawhariya, éd. Salim Tamari et 'Isam Nassar, *al-Quds al-'Uthmaniya fi'l-mudhakkirat al-Jawhariya: al-kitab al-awwal min mudhakkirat al-musiqi Wasif Jawhariya, 1904–1917*, 2^e édition, Beirut, Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniya, 2003–2005.

¹⁰ Walid Khalidi, *Before their Diaspora: a Photographic History of the Palestinians*, Washington DC, 1991, Institute for Palestine Studies.

¹¹ Irina Smilianskaya, ed., *Siriia, Livan i Palestina v opisaniiaakh rossiiskikh puteshestvennikov, konsul'skikh i voennykh obzorakh pervoi poloviny XIX veka*, Moscow, Nauka, Glav. red. vostochnoi lit-ry, 1991.

concerne la continuité et rupture dans l'histoire de la Palestine à la fin de l'époque ottomane, avec le problème corollaire des rapports entre tradition et modernisme. La troisième est centrée sur l'identité et la cristallisation de la conscience nationale moderne. La complexité de cette dernière problématique tient au fait qu'à l'époque ottomane, la Palestine n'était pas vraiment constituée en unité politique et administrative propre.

Pour la première problématique, on note de grandes divergences entre les chercheurs, quand ils veulent déterminer le point de départ de l'histoire moderne de la Palestine. Ainsi Alexander Schölch, dans *Palestine in Transformation, 1856–1882 : Studies in Social, Economic, and Political Development*,¹² perçoit dans la période qu'il étudie un changement décisif dans l'histoire de la Palestine aux deux niveaux, économico-social et politico-administratif, changement qui aurait contribué de façon évidente à jeter les bases de la Palestine 'moderne'. Certes, il part de la campagne de Napoléon Bonaparte, mais pour lui ce n'est qu'un événement fugitif qui n'a laissé aucune trace en Palestine. De même, il considère que si la période de l'occupation égyptienne (1831–1840) constitue bien une nouvelle étape, elle n'a d'importance que par ses deux conséquences : l'ouverture du *Bilad al-Sham* à la pénétration européenne à la fin des années 1830 et la politique de réforme ottomane qui vint concurrencer la politique de réforme égyptienne après que les Ottomans eurent reconquis la Palestine. C'est pour cela que Schölch préfère prendre en compte la période qui commence en 1856, année marquée par la fin de la guerre de Crimée et l'adoption par le gouvernement ottoman d'une politique de réformes plus efficace que celle de 1839, et cette période se termine en 1882 avec le début de l'immigration juive. Ce choix de Schölch se retrouve dans de nombreux travaux de chercheurs tels Nabil Badran, Jacques Qabanji, As'ad 'Atat, Maher al-Charif et Tamar Goujanski, qui situent comme lui l'émergence de la Palestine moderne dans la seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle. Ce n'est qu'à cette période, argumentent-ils, qu'on voit apparaître un dynamisme, des pratiques sociales et des rapports nouveaux, conséquences à la fois des réformes du gouvernement ottoman et de la pénétration accélérée du capitalisme européen. Tout autre

¹² Trs William C. Young, Michael C. Gerrity, Washington, D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993. En arabe, trs. (de l'allemand), *Tahawwulat jadriya fi Filastin 1856–1882 : Dirasat hawla al-tatawwur al-iqtisadi wa'l-ijtima'i wa'-siyasi*, Amman, Université de Jordanie, 1988.

est le point de vue de 'Adil Manna'; dans *A'lam Filastin fi awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani* (1809–1918), il part du début du dix-neuvième siècle, époque où l'on observe, selon lui, de nombreux changements radicaux en Palestine, non seulement pour ce qui est des rapports économiques et politiques, mais encore dans les modes de gouvernement et d'administration, changements qui ne feront que s'accélérer au milieu du siècle. Puis, dans son second ouvrage : *Ta'rikh Filastin fi awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani* (1709–1918), il s'interroge sur l'opportunité de prendre une date ou un événement précis comme point de départ de l'histoire moderne de la Palestine, ce qui aboutit à distinguer clairement un avant et un après. Quant à Beshara Doumani, dans son étude sur les habitants du *jabal* Nablus : *Rediscovering Palestine...*, il prétend dépasser les divisions traditionnelles et proposer de nouvelles limites dans le temps et dans l'espace. Il affirme en effet que, s'il part du début du dix-huitième siècle, c'est pour rétablir un lien entre deux périodes que l'on avait distinguées artificiellement dans l'histoire de la Palestine ottomane.

D'ailleurs, il ne faudrait pas croire que le désaccord se limite au choix entre le début du dix-huitième et le milieu du dix-neuvième siècle comme début de l'histoire moderne de la Palestine. On a vu apparaître de nouveaux points de vue, selon lesquels le tournant décisif se situerait en 1834, à l'heure de la révolte armée contre les forces égyptiennes : celle-ci constituerait en effet, selon Baruch Kimmerling et Joel Migdal, dans leur ouvrage *The Palestinian People: a History*,¹³ 'le premier mouvement politique unifié, rassemblant les trois classes sociales du peuple : les paysans et leurs leaders, les notables des villes et les bédouins'. Pour d'autres historiens enfin, il faudrait situer ce tournant dans les années 1759–1775, à l'époque où Zahir al-'Umar était gouverneur de Acre et de la côte : ses tentatives pour se libérer du pouvoir central auraient 'malgré leur échec, provoqué un début de prise de conscience d'une entité politique et déterminé une évolution concrète dans le domaine de l'économie et des exportations'. Telle est donc la première problématique.

Avant de développer la seconde—continuité et rupture, tradition et modernisme—je voudrais faire trois remarques préliminaires : d'abord l'hypothèse selon laquelle les provinces arabes durant l'époque ottomane étaient plongées dans une léthargie profonde avant que ne viennent

¹³ Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2003.

les réveiller la pénétration européenne et la politique de réformes ottomane, est une hypothèse à laquelle on ne peut adhérer pour la bonne et simple raison que l'histoire des sociétés humaines peut connaître différentes étapes d'évolution, mais jamais un état d'immobilité absolue. Ensuite la problématique de la continuité et de la rupture, de la tradition et du modernisme, est bien plus complexe que ne le laisserait supposer la simple opposition entre deux termes. On est en présence parfois de formations économiques et sociales qui sont passées par de longues étapes intermédiaires où l'on observe des interférences et des interactions constantes entre tradition et modernisation, entre ancien et nouveau.

En général, les sociétés qui ont eu à subir le fait colonial européen au dix-neuvième siècle sont passées par cette longue période de transition qui, pour certaines, n'est pas encore achevée. Enfin, on note ces dernières années chez les chercheurs qui s'intéressent à l'histoire du monde arabe à l'époque moderne, la tendance à soutenir la thèse selon laquelle la pénétration européenne, initiée par l'expédition de Napoléon Bonaparte, aurait constitué pour les sociétés arabes un obstacle sur la route du progrès, en éliminant les facteurs d'évolution qui se faisaient jour depuis le dix-huitième siècle et qui auraient pu aboutir à une *nahda* économique et sociale proprement arabe. Certes, cette thèse constitue une réponse, légitime en soi, à ceux qui affirment que la pénétration européenne a réveillé les sociétés arabes de leur sommeil. Cependant, elle a le tort de sous-estimer le rôle de cette pénétration au dix-neuvième siècle, en particulier dans la seconde moitié de celui-ci ; cette pénétration, en effet, en favorisant l'apparition d'une nouvelle dynamique sociale, a provoqué de nombreux changements spécifiques et radicaux, différents de ceux que les sociétés arabes avaient connus auparavant.

Selon moi, la tendance à soutenir cette thèse est marquée par la quête d'une authenticité fictive et par une certaine nostalgie d'un passé révolu. Une fois ces trois remarques faites, je vais analyser de façon plus concrète la problématique du cas palestinien à travers la critique des idées développées par Beshara Doumani dans *Discovering Palestine*. Ce dernier souhaite en premier lieu repenser l'histoire ottomane et mettre en lumière la dynamique de ce qu'il appelle 'la vie provinciale' dans les grands espaces ottomans. Il s'appuie surtout sur le rôle des commerçants et des paysans dans la formation des liens villes-campagnes dans le but de réfuter l'hypothèse de la rupture historique qui diviserait l'histoire palestinienne en deux étapes distinctes : tradition

puis modernisation. Les tenants de cette hypothèse prétendent que la seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle a vu se produire une franche rupture avec le passé, à la suite de la pénétration européenne et des changements capitalistes qu'elle a imposés.

Pour la réfuter, Doumani s'efforce de démontrer comment beaucoup d'institutions et de pratiques que l'on rattache à ce que l'on appelle 'la modernisation et les changements capitalistes', comme l'économie monétaire, la transformation des terres en marchandises et l'apparition d'une classe de propriétaires terriens, existaient dans le *Jabal Nablus* bien avant la date de leur introduction supposée lors de l'occupation égyptienne, des *Tanzimat*-s ottomans, de l'expansion européenne ou de la colonisation juive. Par ailleurs, selon lui, ce qu'on appelle les modes traditionnels d'organisation sociale et économique sont restés vivaces jusqu'à une date avancée du vingtième siècle. Pour ma part, si je suis d'accord avec Doumani quand il refuse l'hypothèse d'une rupture dans l'histoire palestinienne au cours de la seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle, mon opinion diverge de la sienne pour ce qui est de la nature des changements capitalistes survenus à cette époque dans les domaines sociaux et économiques, à la suite des réformes ottomanes et de la pénétration européenne. En effet, même si ces changements s'inscrivent en partie dans une continuité, ils sont cependant très différents, de par leur nature et leurs répercussions, de tous ceux qui les avaient précédés.

Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de considérer l'augmentation de la population en Palestine : selon certaines estimations, le nombre des habitants serait passé de 280 000 au début du dix-neuvième siècle à 600 000 vers 1900 ; cela par suite des évolutions économiques et de l'amélioration du système de santé. Il en va de même pour le réseau de communication et les moyens de transport : la première route carrossable entre Jaffa et Naplouse est terminée en 1869, la première ligne de chemin de fer reliant Jaffa à Jérusalem est inaugurée en 1892. Les moyens de production évoluent aussi : la décade de 1870 à 1880 voit apparaître dans l'agriculture les pompes pour l'irrigation, les charrues et les faucheuses mécaniques, la moissonneuse batteuse, les engrais. À quoi on peut ajouter l'utilisation de la machine à vapeur pour moudre les grains. De plus, j'objecterais à la thèse de Doumani que l'économie monétaire, la transformation de la terre en marchandise, l'apparition d'une classe de propriétaires terriens, pas plus que les investissements dans une agriculture d'exportation, ne suffisent à transformer l'argent

en capital ; une telle transformation exige, pour s'effectuer, que soit assuré un certain nombre de conditions. J'en rappellerai deux : la première est l'existence d'une législation qui couvre la transformation des terres en marchandises, en protégeant les droits du propriétaire dans sa propriété et en permettant la vente de la terre comme n'importe quel bien ; cette législation n'apparaît qu'avec les réformes ottomanes et la promulgation de tout un dispositif législatif, en particulier les lois sur les terres en 1858, sur l'organisation du *tabû* en 1861, sur l'acquisition de terres par les étrangers en 1867, et toutes les mesures qui ont suivi. Ces lois ont permis, tout en les réglementant, l'achat des terres domaniales ainsi que l'enregistrement comme propriétés privées, avec pleine jouissance sur elles, de terres qui étaient auparavant soumises au statut de *waqf*.

La seconde condition, qui dépend de la première, est la transformation de la force de travail en marchandise, avec l'émergence de couches sociales qui, ayant perdu le principal moyen de production qu'était la terre, ont dû recourir à un travail salarié pour assurer leur subsistance. C'est ce qui s'est produit quand les terres ont été confisquées aux paysans qui en vivaient, soit pour créer de grandes exploitations agricoles capitalistes (c'est le cas en particulier des orangeries : vers 1895, à partir de la seule région de Jaffa, 250 000 caisses d'oranges étaient exportées vers l'Angleterre), soit pour les vendre à des capitalistes européens ou à des juifs, comme l'ont fait de grands propriétaires terriens qui résidaient hors de Palestine et auxquels le gouvernement avait vendu la terre de 17 villages dans Marj Ibn Amir (cf. Schölch). La masse de ces paysans sans terre s'est accrue quand on a accéléré l'intégration de l'agriculture palestinienne au sein du marché mondial, en soumettant les terres à une exploitation intensive et en orientant la production vers l'exportation. En fait, Doumani n'ignore pas les changements survenus dans la propriété terrienne et dans la nature de l'agriculture palestinienne pendant la seconde moitié du XIX^{ème} siècle. Il pose seulement l'hypothèse qu'une « classe moyenne rurale » serait apparue auparavant et aurait joué un rôle concret d'intermédiaire dans le mouvement du capital commercial et dans les relations villes-campagnes.

Mais, d'une part, cette hypothèse ne s'appuie que sur un seul document, qui date de mai 1849 et mentionne la répartition des bénéfices d'une entreprise montée par cinq villageois, lesquels ne font partie ni des familles de notables, ni de la masse des paysans pauvres. D'autre part, elle néglige l'importance du processus d'expropriation des terres

qui a touché une grande partie des paysans qui en vivaient; il n'a pas conduit au développement d'une « classe moyenne rurale » qui a vu en fait diminuer la taille de ses propriétés (certaines sources signalent en effet que la superficie globale occupée par les petites et moyennes propriétés diminue et passe de 50 à 20 % dans la partie méridionale de la Palestine); ce processus a bien plutôt favorisé l'émergence d'une nouvelle couche sociale, qu'As'ad 'Atat, dans son étude *Mulkiyat al-'aradi fi Filastin qabla 'l- intidab al-baritani* (La propriété des terres en Palestine avant le mandat britannique),¹⁴ appelle 'les propriétaires des titres de *tabû*'. En fait, il s'agit de grands propriétaires fonciers, dont 134 possédaient à eux seuls, en 1909, 3 131 000 *dunum*-s (soit 313 100 ha) de terres agricoles.

J'en viens à la troisième et dernière problématique, celle de l'identité palestinienne et de l'émergence d'une conscience nationale moderne. Comme je l'ai déjà dit, c'est une problématique complexe parce qu'à l'époque ottomane la Palestine n'avait pas d'unité administrative et politique, mais constituait seulement une partie du *Bilad al-Sham*. Les *liwa*'-s de Jérusalem, de Naplouse et d'Acre dépendaient de la *wilaya* de Saïda, puis après la promulgation de la loi de 1864 qui réorganisait les *wilaya*-s et créait une nouvelle *wilaya* en Syrie, ils relevèrent de Damas. Entre 1872 et 1874, le *liwa*' de Jérusalem fut transformé en une unité administrative indépendante (la *mutasarrifiya*) liée directement à la Sublime Porte et constituée des *qada*'-s de Ghaza, Jaffa et Hebron.

Je voudrais partir de là pour reprendre certaines analyses qui cherchent à situer au dix-neuvième siècle la constitution de l'identité palestinienne et l'apparition d'une conscience nationale chez les habitants de la Palestine, en les reliant aux projets d'unification administrative de la région, en particulier autour de Jérusalem. Dans la conclusion de son *Ta'rikh Filastin fi 'awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani (1709-1918)*, 'Adil Manna' affirme que si la Palestine a été, durant l'époque ottomane, un pays divisé en plusieurs *liwa*'-s administratifs distincts, sans unité politique, cela 'ne signifie pas que l'histoire de ces *liwa*'-s et régions était complètement distincte l'une de l'autre.' En vérité, comme il l'écrit, 'l'histoire politique, économique et sociale des régions de la Palestine est une histoire commune, faite tantôt d'entente et de coopération, tantôt de concurrence et d'affrontement.' Butrus Abu Manneh, dans sa

¹⁴ Beyrouth, *Samid al-iqtisadi*, n° 16, mars 1981, 36-45.

présentation du premier ouvrage de Manna¹, *A'lam Filastin fi 'awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani* (1809–1918), s'arrête longuement sur cette question et considère que les transformations administratives et politiques apparues après 1841 'ont fait naître en Palestine l'image d'une entité à part dont Jérusalem était le centre administratif'. Il pense que la division établie par la Sublime Porte entre la *mutasarrifiya* de Jérusalem et la *wilaya* de Syrie a aidé à 'la formation de la notion d'une entité palestinienne propre'.

Déjà avant Manna¹ et Abu Manneh, Alexander Schölch avait esquissé cette idée dans son livre *Palestine in Transformation* ; il considère que la Palestine, durant le dix-neuvième siècle et au début du vingtième, a lentement acquis 'une forme propre dans la conscience de ses habitants et aussi dans celle du gouvernement central ottoman'. Même s'il pense que l'image d'une Palestine perçue comme une entité (celle de la terre sacrée) 's'est développée chez les Européens dans la seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle de façon plus précise et plus forte et sous une forme différente de celle que pouvaient avoir élaborée les Palestiniens ou l'administration ottomane', il note cependant que la conscience d'une appartenance commune existait chez les habitants 'malgré l'instabilité des frontières administratives depuis 1830'. Toutefois, les signes de cette appartenance ne se précisent que dans les années 1870. De tout cela, il croit pouvoir conclure que 'la Palestine, à l'époque du Mandat, n'était pas une entité fabriquée par la colonisation'.

Pour ma part, je pense qu'il est difficile d'accepter l'hypothèse qu'une entité palestinienne propre et des sentiments d'appartenance à cette entité seraient apparus dès le dix-neuvième siècle. En effet, l'apparition d'une conscience nationale moderne ne dépend pas seulement de tentatives d'unification administrative de différentes régions (tentatives qui, dans le cas de la Palestine, restèrent partielles et peu concluantes jusqu'au début des années 1920). Il faut d'abord qu'apparaisse une couche sociale capable d'élaborer l'idée d'une entité nationale, et de la propager dans les autres couches de la société par des moyens modernes. En d'autres termes, je ne pense pas qu'on puisse parler d'une conscience nationale dans les régions de Palestine avant que certaines conditions ne soient réalisées : tout d'abord, la séparation entre le domaine du savoir et celui de la religion, et l'institution d'un enseignement moderne 'laïc' ; ensuite la possibilité de se confronter aux idées européennes et la naissance d'une intelligentsia ; enfin, le développement de l'imprimerie et la diffusion d'une presse écrite.

Toutes ces conditions n'ont commencé à être remplies qu'à la fin du dix-neuvième et au début du vingtième siècle.

Je me suis longuement arrêté sur ce sujet dans mon livre *al-Ba'th 'an kiyan: dirasa fi'l-fikr al-siyasi al-filastini 1908-1993* (À la recherche d'une entité. Étude sur la pensée politique palestinienne, 1908-1993);¹⁵ j'ai émis l'hypothèse que la conscience nationale arabe chez les Palestiniens qui ont participé à la fondation des partis et des associations nationalistes réformistes s'est exprimée de façon spécifique; la menace sioniste a joué un rôle déterminant dans le sentiment d'appartenance à une terre et à une patrie bien définie, surtout après la seconde vague d'immigration juive en Palestine, durant la première décennie du vingtième siècle, quand les nouveaux arrivants avaient pour slogan 'Occupons le travail, occupons la terre'. Cette spécificité palestinienne au sein du mouvement nationaliste arabe s'est manifestée dans la presse palestinienne qui a commencé à paraître en 1908: en particulier le journal d'Haïfa, *al-Karmil*, de Najib Nassar, et celui de Jaffa, *Filastin*, de 'Issa Dawud 'Issa. À partir de 1913, *al-Karmil* invite 'les nobles, les gens importants, les lettrés et tous les patriotes en Palestine' à créer une Union (*Jami'a*) Arabe Palestinienne, en vue de 'préserver le pays et de le faire revivre'.¹⁶

Mais en même temps, j'ai montré que jusqu'en 1920, ce sentiment « national » naissant reste partie intégrante du nationalisme arabe, qui incarnait, surtout dans le Mashriq, les aspirations des Arabes à la liberté et à l'unité dans un seul État; ainsi, en 1918, les représentants palestiniens adoptent l'hymne et le drapeau de la Révolution arabe. Leur première expression politique s'est constituée, sous la forme d'associations islamo-chrétiennes, comme une partie indissociable du mouvement nationaliste basé à Damas. Lors du congrès que ces associations tiennent à Jérusalem au début du mois de février 1919, il est affirmé que la Palestine 'est une partie de la Syrie arabe puisque, de tout temps, rien n'est jamais venu les séparer'. Le Congrès général syrien, qui se tient à Damas au début de juin 1919, maintient cet objectif et appelle à 'ne pas séparer [du reste] de la Syrie sa partie sud, connue sous le nom de Palestine, ni la zone côtière qui comprend le Liban'. Il appelle aussi à reconnaître l'indépendance de la Syrie et à respecter son unité. Par la suite, des représentants palestiniens participent à l'appareil et

¹⁵ Nicosie, Markaz al-abhath wa'l-dirasat al-ishtirakiya fi'l-'alam al-'arabi, 1995.

¹⁶ *al-Karmil*, Haïfa, n° 336, 19 septembre 1913, 1.

aux institutions de l'État arabe proclamé à Damas, avec le roi Fayçal comme souverain.

Cependant, cet élan unitaire fut brisé dès 1920, par suite de deux événements liés l'un à l'autre, et qui ont provoqué la division du mouvement nationaliste arabe en courants régionaux, lesquels ont ensuite adopté chacun des objectifs propres: en avril 1920, la conférence de San Remo légitime au niveau international l'occupation des régions arabes par les puissances occidentales; la France impose son mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban; la Grande-Bretagne le sien sur la Palestine et l'Iraq. Au mois de juillet, les forces françaises, arrivées de Beyrouth, occupent Damas et détrônent le roi Fayçal. C'est dans ce contexte de division coloniale du *Bilad al-Sham* que se tiendra le troisième congrès arabe palestinien à Haïfa en décembre 1920. Il appelle à la formation d'un gouvernement national en Palestine, gouvernement qui serait responsable devant une assemblée de députés élus par les habitants présents avant la guerre. Mais il n'est plus fait clairement allusion à l'unité avec la Syrie.

En conclusion, je voudrais préciser que la conscience nationale palestinienne, constituée dans le cadre de l'unité administrative et politique mandataire, n'était qu'une des composantes de l'identité des Palestiniens. En effet, outre le sentiment 'supra-national' d'appartenance à la Nation arabe, on relève des allégeances infra-nationales, religieuses, familiales ou régionales, qui remontent à un passé lointain et qui sont les restes de 'la longue et difficile période de transition d'une société traditionnelle à une société moderne'.¹⁷

¹⁷ Sur ce sujet, voir Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1997.

THE UPRISINGS IN ANTAKYA 1918–1926: GUIDED BY THE CENTRE OR INITIATED ON THE PERIPHERY?

DALAL ARSUZI-ELAMIR

Modern Syrian historiography has paid little attention to the uprising in Antakya, probably because most research has concentrated on the national movement and the uprisings and events around the main cities while neglecting the periphery.¹ Contemporary commentators have tended to consider Damascus or Aleppo as the main focus of the rebellions; hence the uprisings in northern Syria have been analysed from the Damascus point of view while ignoring the independent role played by Antakya, which is treated as largely peripheral. This is even more true of the Arabic secondary literature. It is not only that any objective analysis of political defeats in the past² stands in the way of the over-arching national myth,³ but it is also inevitable that interpreting the past always means interpreting the present, a potentially dangerous political undertaking. Most accounts of the early years of the Syrian state are based on the assumption that power was concentrated

¹ Many authors have reduced the uprisings in northern Syria, which spread over entire northern and western Syria, to Hananu's uprising in northern Syria, which is presented as a regional Sunni-religious uprising against the French. In general events in the country are presented as being initiated at the 'national centre' and ending at the centre. Research on the periphery has begun only recently: see Dalal Arsuzi-Elamir, *Arabischer Nationalismus in Syrien: Zaki al-Arsuzi und die arabisch-nationale Bewegung an der Peripherie Alexandretta/Antakya 1939–1938*, Münster, LIT, 2003, in which the author demonstrates the important independent role played by the periphery of Antakya in influencing and shaping Arab nationalism. Recent studies on other peripheral regions include: Birgit Schäbler, *Aufstände im Drusenbergland: Ethnizität und Integration einer ländlichen Gesellschaft Syriens vom Osmanischen Reich bis zur staatlichen Unabhängigkeit 1859–1949*, Gotha, Perthes, 1996, Nadine Méouchy, 'Le Mouvement des 'isabat en Syrie du Nord à travers le témoignage du chaykh Youssef Saadoun (1919–1921)', in Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett, eds., *The British and French mandates in comparative perspectives/Les mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative*, Leiden, Brill, 2004, pp. 649–72, and Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism*, Austin, TX, University of Texas Press, 2005.

² The Alexandretta region was occupied by Turkey on 5 July 1938, and annexed on 23 June 1939. See Arsuzi-Elamir, *Arabischer Nationalismus*...

³ Cf. 'Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so'. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 12.

in Damascus, which sits well with the national myth of a single monolithic Arabism representing the interests of the nation. Thus the internal structures, differentiations, and developments in specific regions of Syria are seldom mentioned.

To understand the background of the causes of the uprising in Antakya and the way in which it functioned as the starting point of all uprisings in northern Syria, it is necessary to consider the political and social conditions of the region as a whole.

The Administrative, Social, and Economic Structures of the Region

Around the end of the sixteenth century, several decades after the Ottoman conquest of Greater Syria in 1516, the *wilaya* system of administration was introduced, under which Antakya, or rather the region of Alexandretta, became part of the *wilaya* of Aleppo.⁴ Under the Law of Wilayas of 1864, the region of Alexandretta continued to be assigned to Aleppo. The entire region of Alexandretta was included in the Blue Zone which was designed to come under French influence (according to the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916). On 27 November 1918, the French High Commissioner, General Gouraud established a new political and administrative unit—the *sanjak* of Alexandretta—in French-occupied western Syria,⁵ and this separate status created the circumstances which made possible the cession of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1938/39. In the 1920s, Antakya, Qirqkhan, and Alexandretta were formed into sub-provincial units (*qadhas*) with Alexandretta as the administrative and political centre of the region and the seat of the local Delegate of the High Commissioner.⁶

The Ottoman Land Law of 1858 facilitated the creation of private property in land, and most peasants became sharecroppers on large estates, while the landowners were generally absentees, living in the cities. Graduates of foreign and Ottoman schools, mostly from the

⁴ Muhammad 'Ali Zarqa, *Qadiyat liwa' al-Iskandaruna. Watha'iq wa-shuruh*, 3 vols., Beirut, Dar al-'Uruba, 1994, vol. 1, 18.

⁵ 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali, *al-Marahil fi'l-intidab al-faransi wa nidalina al-watani, min 'am 1926 hatta nihaya 'am 1939*, Aleppo, Matba'a al-Dad, 1958–60. vol. 4, 407.

⁶ Zarqa, *Qadiyat...*, vol. 1, 237.

effendi class, formed the new administrative and professional elite.⁷ The Christian population lived mostly in the towns and in the coastal areas. The majority of the rural population consisted of landless peasants or very poor small farmers, and many peasants were obliged to leave the land because of the heavy burden of taxation and debt.⁸ The Sultan's forces intervened repeatedly to put down desperate spontaneous peasant uprisings, which flared up regularly in all the Arab provinces.

The ethnic, social, and religious composition of the population in the region was diverse. It had a fairly large Turkish population, and some Kurds, but the majority were Arabs, members of a variety of Christian and Muslim sects, with a substantial number of heterodox Muslims, mostly 'Alawites. In the late nineteenth century, religion or religious sects rather than ethnicity still formed the main marker of identity in the Ottoman Empire. This was one of the reasons why members of particular sects did not rebel against the large estate owners for whom they worked if they belonged to the same sect as the landowner.⁹ If class stratification was reinforced by members of different classes belonging to different religious communities, what were essentially socio-economic conflicts could be diverted into religious quarrels.¹⁰

In general, only Christians and Jews enjoyed the status of legal minorities within the Empire, while the various heterodox Shi'i sects, particularly Isma'ilis, Druzes, and 'Alawites were not officially recognized. In general, the Alawites, who form about 12 per cent of the population of modern Syria, did not occupy government posts¹¹ and

⁷ Dhuqan Qarqut, *al-Mashriq al-'arabi fi muwajahat al-isti'mar: qira'a fi ta'rikh Suriya al-mu'asir*, Cairo, al-Hay'a al-Misriya al-'amma li'l-Kitab, 1977, 9.

⁸ Karl Melzer, *Philosophische Grundlagen der nationalistischen Theorien Zaki al-Arsuzi, eines Mitbegründers der Ba'th-Bewegung*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Leipzig 1978, 25ff.

⁹ Qarqut, *al-Mashriq al-'arabi*, 9.

¹⁰ For a sophisticated discussion of sectarianism and the general conclusion that outbreaks of sectarian violence can almost always be traced to specific external historical conjunctures, see Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2000.

¹¹ However 'Even before the Tanzimat we...find individual Nusayris serving as Ottoman bureaucrats and sometimes attaining high office', especially Kara Mehmed Pasha who became 'warden of the Bosphorus with the rank of full vezir' and died in 1828 after having served as governor of Ankara and Çankırı. See Stefan Winter, 'The Nusayris before the Tanzimat in the eyes of Ottoman provincial administrators, 1804–

were treated with contempt by the members of the government and the leading groups in the cities. They originally lived in the 'Alawite Mountains, the range stretching from the mountains of Alexandretta in the north to the mountains of Lebanon in the south, but many had migrated to the plains in search of work. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they were often forced to pawn their lands to town dwellers to be able to pay taxes and to buy protection.¹² Those who rose up against the system fled to the mountains and sought protection with their fellow believers. The state carried out punitive expeditions in which there were exemplary executions and whole villages were sometimes destroyed.

The social structures in the region of Alexandretta showed their own specific features: the population consisted of Arabs, Turks, and Armenians, and smaller numbers of Kurds and Circassians. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the total population was estimated at 125,042.¹³ Geographically, the various groups were unevenly distributed.¹⁴ For instance, 40 percent of the population of Antakya were Turks, and about 50 percent Arabs, while the population of the surrounding countryside was about 70 percent Arab (mainly 'Alawites). In Alexandretta the Arabs represented 70 percent of the population, 80 per cent in Rihaniya, and 90 percent in Suwaydiya. Most of the Sunni Arabs lived east and southeast of Antakya in the villages of al-Qasir and al-'Umq. 90 percent of the Christian Arabs were Greek Orthodox, living mostly in the towns of Antakya and Alexandretta. In

1834', in Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, eds., *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon*, Beirut and Würzburg, Orient Institut der DMG, 2004, 97–112, here 110–11.

¹² The origins of the 'Alawites as a religious community dates back to the ninth century when they split away from Imami Shi'ism. Alawite doctrine is considered to originate from the Shi'i theologian Muhammad ibn Nusayr al-Namiri (lived c. 850), and then more substantially from the writings of Husayn ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi (d. 957 or 968); see Yaron Frieman, 'al-Husayn ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi: A Historical Biography of the Founder of the Nusayri-'Alawite Sect', *Studia Islamica*, 93, 2001, 91–112. See also Dick Douwes' article in this volume.

¹³ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères/Nantes, Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation en Syrie et du Liban 1921–1936. In the year 1936 the total population was 219,080, composed of: Turks 85,242 (38.9 per cent); 'Alawite Arabs 62,062 (28 per cent); Sunni Arabs 22,461 (10 per cent); Christian Arabs 18,051 (8.16 per cent); Armenians 24,919 (11.36 per cent); others 3 per cent. In both sets of statistics (from the 1920s and from 1936) the groups were listed according to ethnic criteria, e.g. Sunni Turks, Armenian Catholics etc., while the Arab groups which were included according to their religious sect but without an ethnic label, e.g. 'Alawites, Sunnis, and Christians.

¹⁴ See the map in Arsuzy-Elamir, *Arabischer Nationalismus...*

addition, some villages in al-Qasir and as-Suwaydiya were entirely Greek Orthodox; 90 per cent of the inhabitants of the villages of Jabal Musa and some of the villages of Baylan and Qirqkhan were Armenians. All the inhabitants of the nineteen villages in al-Harbiya were 'Alawite Arabs, who also formed the majority of the inhabitants of the Wadi al-'Asi, between Antakya and as-Suwaydiya on the Mediterranean. Most of them were peasants working for Sunni landowners living in Antakya.¹⁵ Only a few 'Alawites were urban notables, and some members of their families worked as civil servants.¹⁶

*The Uprising in Antakya against Ottoman and French Rule
1918–1926: the Origins of the Arab National Movement in the
Region of Alexandretta*

As in the rest of Syria, the origins of the Arab national movement in the Alexandretta region first emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. The Tanzimat, the gradual process of secularisation in the fields of law and education which began in 1839 and lasted for much of the nineteenth century, led to the rise of new elites whose knowledge and secular political thinking contributed to new developments in the Empire. However, this secularisation also contained elements which would gradually lead to the further dissolution of the empire: the decisive fact was that non-Muslims were, at least in theory, to be treated on the same legal basis as Muslims, which meant that the latter lost their privileged legal status. The idea was that if all subjects were treated equally, then individuals from all communities would want to be incorporated more fully into the structure of the state. In fact, especially in southeastern Europe, the policy tended to strengthen the separatist aspirations of the non-Muslim minorities, who formed into autonomous ethno-linguistic groups which began to organize themselves more efficiently and to demand more rights for themselves. In the end, however, the military and economic superiority of Europe in the nineteenth century would be the decisive factor behind the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷

¹⁵ *al-Qabas*, Damascus, 19 August 1936.

¹⁶ Zarqa, *Qadiyat*... vol. 2, 52.

¹⁷ Thomas Philipp, 'Der Aufhaltsame Abstieg des Osmanischen Reiches', in Helmut Altrichter and Helmut Neuhaus, eds., *Das Ende von Grossreichen*, Erlangen, Palm und Enke, 1996, 214–20.

In the last decades of the Empire, the influential families in the larger cities were part of the Ottoman 'aristocracy of service', meaning that they identified themselves to a greater or lesser extent with the ruling elite of the empire, and sent their sons to Istanbul for civilian or military training. Initially, since they were of course almost all Muslims, they believed in the possibility of Arabs and Turks living together on the basis of equal rights under the symbol of a liberal, constitutional Ottomanism. In 1908 the Young Turks, mostly from military backgrounds, seized power in a coup supported by Arab officers, who were promised equal rights. Over time the Young Turk leaders leaned more and more towards a Turkish nationalist perspective and began to direct the structures of the state towards greater centralisation, ignoring Arab demands for cultural autonomy and political and administrative decentralisation. The more the Young Turks replaced the Syrian notables in the provincial administration with their own supporters, and the more they insisted on the almost exclusive use of Turkish in schools, the law courts, and all aspects of the administration, the more Arabism became popular among the Arabs of Syria. Between 1909 and 1914, the embryonic Arab national struggle increased in intensity and organisation, particularly in Damascus and Antakya, partly supported by the personal ambitions of influential men who hoped to strengthen their own political positions.¹⁸ In Aleppo, on the other hand, there was far less opposition to the Ottoman state, partly, perhaps, because Aleppo merchants had long standing commercial relations with Anatolia. In general, the large landowners were content to leave power in the hands of the Ottomans, provided that they themselves could retain their local economic and political power.¹⁹

During the years before World War I, a number of organizations, both public and secret, had come into existence, each of with different aims. The majority wanted more rights for the Arabs within a

¹⁸ Alexander Schölch, 'Der arabische Osten im neunzehnten Jahrhundert 1809–1914', in Ulrich Haarmann, ed., *Geschichte der arabischen Welt*, 3rd edition, Munich, C.H. Beck, 1994, 365–432, here 426. See also C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism; essays on the origins of Arab nationalism*, Urbana IL, University of Illinois Press, 1973, and for a more nuanced perspective, Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908–1918*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997.

¹⁹ See the various articles on Ottoman Land Law in Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1984.

decentralized Ottoman empire, while a minority aimed for complete Arab independence. Various secret societies were formed by dissatisfied Arab officers (in the Ottoman Army) from Syria and Mesopotamia to advance these goals. When the Ottoman Empire joined World War I on the side of the Central Powers on 30 October 1914, a new situation presented itself for these groups; if the Central Powers were to be defeated, there would be a realistic possibility of Arab political independence, although this would almost certainly require the support of the Western Powers.²⁰

The main manifestation of activity on the part of the 'Arab nationalists' was their participation in the British-funded and initiated Arab Revolt of 1916. The declared aim of the Revolt was to create an independent, united Arab state, which would include the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula. On 1 October 1918, the Arab army under Faysal, the son of the *Sharif* of Mecca, marched into Damascus,²¹ and on 5 October Faysal announced the formation of an Arab government in Damascus.²² In brief, British and French interests gradually destroyed Arab hopes for independence.²³ The mandate system, a form of international trusteeship (arguably colonialism in disguise), under the auspices of the League of Nations, was devised to 'assist' the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire to independence.²⁴ In

²⁰ Schölch, 'Der arabische Osten...', 427f.

²¹ Hans Ulrich Scupin-Breslau, 1940. 'Das französische Mandat über Syrien und das Alexandrette Problem', in *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*, 26, 1, 1–30; Nizar al-Kayyali, *Dirasat fi ta'rikh Suriya al-siyasi al-mu'asir, 1929–1950*, Damascus, Dar Talas li'l-Dirasat w'al-Tarjamah wa'l-Nashr, 1997, 33.

²² Hasan al-Hakim, *al-Watha'iq al-ta'rikhiya al-muta'alliqa bi'l-qadiya al-Suriya fi 'l-'ahdain al-'arabi al-Faysali wa'l-intidab al-firansi 1915–1946*, Beirut, Dar al-Sadir, 1974, 35. The standard account in English is by Malcolm B. Russell, *The first modern Arab state: Syria under Faysal, 1918–1920*, Minneapolis, Bibliotheca Islamica, 1985. See also Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1869–1920*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

²³ Abdul-Karim Rafeq, 'Gesellschaft und politische Macht in Syrien 1918–1925', in Linda Schatkowski Schilcher and Claus Scharf, eds., *Der Nahe Osten in der Zwischen-kriegszeit, 1919–1939: die Interdependenz von Politik, Wirtschaft und Ideologie*, Stuttgart, F. Steiner, 1989, 449–81, here 440. See also C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas: the Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion 1914–1924*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1981. Faysal's government was not as popular as official Syrian historiography would have it: see James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1998.

²⁴ See 'Les mandats/the mandates; Some reflections on the nature of the British presence in Iraq (1914–1932) and the French presence in Syria (1918–1946)', in Peter Sluglett and Nadine Méouchy, eds., *The British and French mandates in comparative*

April 1920, at San Remo, Britain was awarded the mandate for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and France the mandate for Lebanon and Syria. Under the (eventually unratified) Treaty of Sèvres, what was left of the Ottoman state recognized Alexandretta and some of Cilicia as Arab territory, and thus as part of the new state of Syria. On 24 July 1922, the text of the mandate for Syria set out the duties and rights of the mandatory power more precisely, particularly France's obligation to guarantee the territorial integrity of the state and to protect it against the encroachments of foreign powers. Furthermore, the text of the mandate also determined the Syrian border, which, apart from the inclusion of Mosul in Iraq, generally coincided with what had been defined under the Sykes-Picot agreement.²⁵

On 17 June 1920, the French High Commissioner in Beirut gave Faysal an ultimatum, demanding that he should recognise French mandatory authority over the whole of Syria. After the defeat of the Arab army at the battle of Maysalun on 20 July, Aleppo and Damascus were occupied by French troops. The ensuing struggle was strongly influenced by the socio-economic structure of society, so that while in the main cities it took the form of a struggle for political power, in the more distant provinces and in the rural areas the rebels were more or less fighting on their own against the French authorities. At the beginning of the occupation and mandate the urban opposition was largely restricted to intellectuals and members of the rising bourgeoisie, initially organized in secret societies.²⁶ Many of the more 'aristocratic' nationalists, on the other hand, were politically moderate, and were induced to change sides by being offered high positions in the administration and by having their privileges guaranteed by the French. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation on the rural periphery it was not difficult for the French to establish peace in Damascus, as many nationalists had fled from the capital.

perspectives/Les mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative, Leiden, Brill, 2004, 103–28.

²⁵ For the political and economic history of the mandate, see Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French mandate; the Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1987.

²⁶ For example the Society of the Iron Clasp (*Jam'iyat al-Qabda al-Hadidiya*) in Damascus and the Iron Party (*al-Hizb al-Hadidi*) in Aleppo. See Rafeq, *Gesellschaft...*, 453.

The Course of the Uprising in Antakya 1918–1926

Faysal's march into Damascus triggered various spontaneous local uprisings which were generally not directed or initiated by his government in Damascus. Uprisings in northern Syria, first against the Ottomans, and then against French rule, began in Antakya and were restricted to the surroundings of the city until the autumn of 1919. Around Alexandretta, there had been a number of supporters of Arab nationalism among local army officers and high ranking former Ottoman civil servants.²⁷ In 1914 Najib al-Arsuzi²⁸ had accompanied the Arab officer Amin Lutfi al-Hafiz to Aleppo where he joined *al-ʿAhd*,²⁹ and later founded a branch of the society in Antakya.³⁰ Most of the members of *al-ʿAhd* in Antakya were ʿAlawites and Christians, hoping to achieve the same rights as all other religious communities by opting for Arab nationalism, but the movement also included Sunnis opposed to the Young Turk policy of wholesale Turkification.³¹ Thus, Christian and Muslim intellectuals, officers, and notables contributed to the development of Arab nationalism. The activities of the organization were discovered in 1916, and Najib al-Arsuzi and two of his sons, Nasib and Adib, who had taken part in its political activities, were sent into exile, while Amin Lutfi al-Hafiz was hanged in Beirut on 6 May 1916.³² al-Arsuzi reported every detail of the rising in Antakya:

Despite the different religions of her inhabitants, Antakya was the first Syrian town to strive for the revival of the Arab nation....My father told me that an Arab commander in the Ottoman army, named Amin Lutfi al-Hafiz, had come to Antakya...aiming to re-establish Arab rule. My father had been the leader of the union (*al-ʿAhd*) in Antakya, and

²⁷ Adham Āl al-Jundi, *Taʾrikh al-thawra al-suriya fi ʿahd al-intidab al-firansi*, Damascus, Matabaʿa al-Ittihad, 1960, 65.

²⁸ Najib al-Arsuzi, Zaki's father, was born in 1868. He lived in Alexandretta before attending a grammar school in Adana and then graduated after having studied law. At the beginning of the twentieth century he hid in the ʿAlawite mountains as he had been accused of carrying out activities against the Ottoman state. Zaki al-Arsuzi, *al-Muʿallafat al-kamila*, Damascus, 1972–76, Matabiʿ al-Idarah al-siyasiya liʾl-jaysh waʾl-Quwat al-Musallaha, vol. 6, p. 489.

²⁹ al-Zarqa, 59-page unpublished manuscript written on the anniversary of al-Arsuzi's death; Damascus 1969, pp. 19f. A picture of Amin Lutfi al-Hafiz in the Syrian National Archives in Damascus identifies him as the chairman of *al-ʿAhd* in Aleppo.

³⁰ Samun, *Qadiyat al-Iskandaruna*..., 13; Zarqa, *Qadiyat*..., vol. 2, 20ff. See also Ibrahim Fawzi and Nadim Shamsin, *Qadiyat al-Iskandaruna waʾl-siyasa al-faransiya fi Suriya 1918–1946*, Damascus, Wizara al-Thaqafa, 2004, 23ff.

³¹ Fawzi and Shamsin, *Qadiyat*..., 23ff.

³² al-Zarqa, manuscript, 20.

Nafid Bey,³³ the local military commander, was also a member of the union.... But the behaviour of the members of the union aroused the suspicion of Ahmad Bey Turkman Zada, a member of the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul. When Anwar Pasha and Cemal Pasha [later the notorious military governor of Damascus] came to Iskenderun to inspect the troops,... Ahmad Bey Turkman went to Baylan and told them that the behaviour of the Arab upper class of Antakya was suspicious.... The only thing happening then was that members of the union, my father among them, were sent first to Damascus, then to Konya.³⁴

Before the end of World War I the Turkish military governor, Cemal Pasha al-Kabir was moved to a different region. He was replaced by another officer, Cemal Pasha al-Saghir, who pardoned those still awaiting execution.³⁵ After the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, there was a demonstration in Antakya in which Subhi Barakat,³⁶ Muhammad al-Atali,³⁷ and Najib al-Arsuzi took part.³⁸ The Turkish flag was hauled down in front of the government building and the Arab flag was hoisted instead. The demonstrators later announced that they intended to establish a local government to administer the region.³⁹ This step was undertaken by members of the Antakya elite, including Najib al-Arsuzi and his two sons, Nasib and Adib, who were very much influenced by the general mood in the country.⁴⁰ al-Arsuzi

³³ These names, as well as the *qa'immaqam* of Antakya, Ibrahim Adham, are identified as members of the Arab Union in several sources. See Fawzi and Shamsin, *Qadiyat*, 23f.

³⁴ al-Arsuzi, *Sawt al-'uruba*..., in *al-Mu'allafat al-kamila*, p. 23.

³⁵ al-Zarqa, manuscript, 22.

³⁶ Barakat was born in Alexandretta and was of Turkish origin. After the occupation of Aleppo he deserted to the French. Yusuf al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*, Harim 1955, mss. in the Syrian National Archives in Damascus, 19ff.; (see Nadine Méouchy, 'Le Mouvement des 'Isabat en Syrie du Nord...', which makes extensive use of this manuscript); al-Arsuzi, *Sawt al-'Uruba*, 27. Barakat was made president of the Syrian Confederation in 1923 and speaker of parliament in 1925. After the Turkish invasion of Alexandretta in July 1938, and after the proclamation of the 'State of Hatay' on 2 September 1938 until the proclamation of Turkey's decision to annex the region on 23 June 1939, he became a member of the Turkish parliament. Arsuzi-Elamir, *Arabischer Nationalismus*, 186.

³⁷ His name is mentioned in other sources. See Fawzi and Shamsin, *Qadiyat*..., 23.

³⁸ According to al-Zarqa, al-Arsuzi, Barakat and al-Atali were the main leaders of the uprisings in Antakya and in the vicinity. Interview with Zarqa, Damascus, 1 April 1999; Sa'dun only mentions Barakat: *Mudhakkirat*..., 2.

³⁹ Lajnat ad-Difa' 'an al-Iskandaruna, *al-Liwa' 'arabi bi-haqq al-quwwa wa quwwat al-haqq*, Vol. 4, Damascus 1956, 24.

⁴⁰ al-Zarqa, manuscript, 23.

described the pioneering role played by Antakya in the foundation of the Arab state:

One day the leading people of the town were meeting in the Khan at-Tujjar. They decided to change the situation and called upon the people to support them. Their demonstration moved from the centre of the town to the seat of government. From every market and from every quarter people came in masses and joined them. When the crowd had come into the government building, my father announced the unanimous decision to bring down the Ottoman government and to proclaim an Arab state. Then he threw the Ottoman flag to the ground and hoisted the Arab one instead (...), even before it flew over Damascus when Faysal was marching in.⁴¹

Although al-Arsuzi's account of the timing of these events does not fit the facts as far as Faysal's march into Damascus was concerned, this does not reduce the significance of Antakya, its leading role in the fight for Arab independence, and its unwillingness to be controlled by outsiders.

Faysal's deputy in Aleppo sent a delegation to Antakya to observe the uprising and to ask the citizens there to give him authority to act on their behalf at the peace conference. Faysal wanted to bring the uprising under his influence and tried to control it from Damascus, to make it seem as if it had originated there and to give the impression that Damascus was the centre of Arab nationalism, of 'Arabism', and of all national aspirations. Accordingly, 'Abd al-Ghani Ghazzal was sent to Antakya with a delegation to collect letters of support.⁴² The people of Antakya had prepared a petition with 18,000 signatures recognising Faysal as King of Syria, including Alexandretta.⁴³ There was also a referendum in Antakya in which many civil servants took part, and the results were sent to the peace conference at Versailles.⁴⁴

The Arab government in Antakya held power for some six weeks. The Turkish army, which was stationed at Baylan and had the support of the Turkish nationalists there, was able to capture Antakya, suppress the uprising, and arrest, drive away, or execute the Arab leaders of the uprising. Antakya stayed under its control for one week.

⁴¹ al-Arsuzi, *Saut al-'uruba...*, 19ff. Compare Ali Sultan, *Ta'rikh Suriya, 1918–1920: hukm Faysal ibn al-Husayn*, Damascus, Dar Talas, 1987, 33.

⁴² Zarqa, *'Adam shar'iya...*, 23.

⁴³ Samun, *Qadiyat al-Iskandaruna...*, 17.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 20ff.

al-Arsuzi described this development, deplored both by himself and the Arab inhabitants of Antakya, and gave the reasons for the fall of Antakya.

As the Turkish army mounted a surprise attack, and the Arabs were unprepared for it, some of them, like my father, fled to the Syrian heartland. The others, including Subhi Barakat, were put in prison in Antakya. The Turkish army stayed in Antakya for only one week, and then left the Arab territories and retreated behind the Taurus mountains because it feared to be attacked in this foreign and hostile area far away from its supply line. Thus, it withdrew as rapidly as it had come. In those days also the central committee [of *al-'Ahd*] began to meet again and coordinated its activities for the new state. It started to build up relations with Aleppo and the other towns around, such as Jisr al-Shughur. Arab volunteers streamed into Antakya from everywhere.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, General Gouraud asked Faysal for permission to send troops via Rayaq-Homs-Aleppo in order to reduce pressure from the Turkish troops at Baylan which were still resisting the French forces. Faysal tried to take advantage of this and demanded the regular payment of customs duties as well as the recognition of Syrian independence, but Gouraud refused, and his troops landed in the harbour of Alexandretta on 24 November 1918.⁴⁶ Some days before, members of Faysal's army had come to Antakya and had been welcomed with great popular enthusiasm. Despite Turkish pressure, the majority of the Arab inhabitants of Antakya, or rather more generally of the region of Alexandretta, wanted to join the Arab state. Turkish troops from Baylan tried to reoccupy Antakya but did not succeed, and were attacked by French aircraft and resisted by the inhabitants of the town.⁴⁷ Immediately after French forces marched into Alexandretta, there was a revolt against the French in the Alexandretta region (Antakya, Qirqkhan, al-

⁴⁵ al-Arsuzi, *Saut al-'uruba...*, 26ff.

⁴⁶ 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bitar, *Qadiyat liwa' al-Iskandaruna wa'l-wahda as-suriya min taqsim al-dawla al-'uthmaniya hatta taslimihi ila Turkiya 1918-1939*, Damascus 1997, 16. At the end of 1919 the occupation of the Syrian coastal zone by the French (the British had evacuated their troops in September) resulted in the division of Syria into three districts: the Western Zone (between Ra's al-Naqura, south of Tyre, and Alexandretta, i.e. from Lebanon and Latakia as far as the Gulf of Alexandretta) under French mandate; the Southern Zone (Palestine) under British administration; the Eastern Zone (Damascus, Aleppo, Jabal Druze, and Jordan) to Amir Faysal. See Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-1920*, London, Athlone Press, 1969, especially the map on page 75.

⁴⁷ Lajnat ad-Difa' 'an al-Iskandaruna, *al-Liwa' 'arabi*, 24; Longrigg, *Syria...*, 107f.

Hamamat, al-‘Umq and Bab al-Hawwa).⁴⁸ These uprisings in northern and western Syria which took place at various times between 1918 and 1926 inflicted heavy casualties on the French before they were put down.

On 7 December 1918 French troops stationed in the region of Antakya, Qirqkhan, as-Suwaydiya, and Alexandretta attacked the headquarters of the Arab government in Antakya. They took the building and replaced the Arab flag with the French one.⁴⁹ This did not end the Antakya uprising, but shifted its focus from the town to the countryside, to the regions of al-Qasir, al-Harbiya. Nasib al-Arsuzi went to the village of al-Darsuniya, 5 km away from Antakya and made contact with leaders of the uprising in other regions, such as Jisr al-Shughur, to win their support.⁵⁰ During this time there were a number of military actions.⁵¹

Gouraud was aware that pressure on his forces had increased, particularly in the Antakya region: from there the revolt spread as far as the Euphrates, where the rebels occupied the railway stations.⁵² Because of this he refused to permit Faysal to travel to Europe, a trip which had been planned to begin at the end of May 1919, saying, ‘First, he must cease his hostile actions against France’.⁵³

The Arab government in Damascus changed the military rules in favour of the rebels and accepted the resignation of several officers who wanted to join the rebels.⁵⁴ At the end of 1919 it sent two civil servants from the region, Subhi Barakat and Ibrahim Hananu,⁵⁵ who

⁴⁸ Āl al-Jundi, *Ta’rikh al-thawrat...*, 64ff.; Ghalib ‘Ayyashi, *al-Idahat al-siyasiya wa-asrar al-intidab al-firansi fi Suriya*, Beirut, Matabi‘ Ashqar Ikhwan, 1955, 181.

⁴⁹ Samun, *Qadiyat al-Iskandaruna...*, 14.

⁵⁰ al-Zarqa, manuscript, p. 24. Also Nasib’s father and his brother Adib al-Arsuzi took part in this uprising and took over leadership of certain groups in the region of Antakya.

⁵¹ Āl al-Jundi, *Ta’rikh al-thawrat*, 64.

⁵² Sultan, *Ta’rikh Suriya 1918–1920...*, vol. 2, 241; Longrigg, *Syria...*, 152. The attacks at al-Suwaydiya and at Harim should be mentioned (April/May 1919). Ihsan al-Hindi, *Kifah al-sha’b al-‘arabi al-suri, 1908–1948*, 2nd edn., Damascus, Idarat al-Shu’un al-‘Amma, 1962, 69.

⁵³ Sultan, *Ta’rikh Suriya 1918–1920*, vol. 2, 338.

⁵⁴ al-Hindi, *Kifah...*, 31; al-‘Ayyashi, *al-Idaha al-siyasiya...*, 185.

⁵⁵ Hananu was a former Ottoman civil servant, born at Kafr Takharim in the district of Harim west of Aleppo in 1869, the son of a rich landowner. He gained two diplomas from the famous *Madrasat al-Malikiya* in Istanbul, and also studied law. See Khoury, *Syria and the French mandate...* 105. He held the position of *qa’immaqam* in the *wilaya* of Erzurum. When the Arab revolt started in 1916, he joined Faysal’s Arab army as an officer and marched into Aleppo with the allies in 1918. He joined

were charged with extending the Antakya revolt.⁵⁶ They wanted to prevent the French from advancing from the coast to the interior and to establish themselves there, after the French army had replaced British troops in Cilicia and the western regions of Syria under an agreement of 15 September 1919 in which the British essentially dropped their support for Faysal.⁵⁷ Before this, Franco-British relations had cooled because France claimed that Britain was supporting Faysal and seemed reluctant to evacuate its troops from Syria. On orders from Damascus, Hananu called upon seven persons from his home, Kafr Takharim, to come to Aleppo and form a group which he supplied with bombs and rifles. Ibrahim al-Shaghuri brought the rebels of Kafr Takharim into contact with the government in Aleppo. There the number of rebels fast increased to 40 so that fast moving small groups were formed, able to inflict chaos on the French troops.⁵⁸

On 13 March 1920, the rebels in the Antakya region were able to take Antakya and hold it for several weeks. In response the French bombed the town from the air for about 17 days until the rebels had to retreat to the village of Narlija. As the London *Times* reported, these events were described by the Arab newspapers in Damascus, which called the rebels '*Isabat al-Fida'iyyin al-'Arab* (bands of Arab guerrillas).⁵⁹ In protest at the dispositions of San Remo (April 1920), the uprisings in Antakya, Harim, al-Qasir, Qirqkhan, in the Alawite region, in the 'Amil mountains, at al-Buja, and Kafr Takharim became more substantial.⁶⁰

al-'Arabiya al-Fatat and in the summer of 1919 was appointed representative of the district of Harim at the conference in Damascus. See Nizar al-Kayyali, *Dirasat fi ta'rikh Suriya...*, 54. He left Damascus and went to Idlib at the beginning of October, 1919. al-Hakim, *Suriya*, 168f. In July, 1921, he fled to Jordan, where the British surrendered him to the French. He spent six months in prison in Aleppo but was released in March 1922 after having been cleared of the charge of rebelling against the French.

⁵⁶ al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*, pp. 8ff. al-Hindi only mentions Hananu: *Kifah...*, 70.

⁵⁷ For details of the British agreement to withdraw troops from Syria see Nevakivi, *Britain, France...*, 172–96.

⁵⁸ al-Hindi, *Kifah...*, 70; al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat...*, 9. Ibrahim al-Shaghuri, *Mudhakkirat*, (unpublished memoir in the Syrian National Archives, Damascus), p. 2. al-Sa'dun writes about Hananu's role in starting the uprising at Kafr Takharim but not about his leadership. al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat...*, 22.

⁵⁹ Fawzi and Shamsin, *Qadiyat*, 32f., Méouchy, 'Le Mouvement des '*Isabat...*'

⁶⁰ Abdulla Hanna, 'Die nationale Befreiungsbewegung in Syrien von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1920.' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leipzig, 199; Fawzi and Shamsin, *Qadiyat...*, 32.

In the course of the fighting the French were evidently not able to deal with all the rebels at the same time. They conscripted soldiers from the local population who were not always reliable when fighting their own people. The French tried to gain the cooperation of the large landowners, whom they paid to recruit militias whose task was to defend the roads against the rebels. They also knew the value of good relations with the Turks in their attempt to weaken the Arab resistance movement in Syria, as the rebel units operating in northern Syria frequently retreated across the Turkish border.⁶¹ On 11 May 1920, General Gouraud claimed that France did not have sufficient resources to take action against the Turks and the rebels at the same time. In a report on 21 September 1920, he mentioned that 600 armed men had attacked the police station at Hamam, six kilometres east of Qirqkhan, and that the Amanus region, Antakya, and the road from Aleppo to Alexandretta were all under rebel control.⁶²

The French had already taken Aleppo on 23 July 1920 without any resistance, which provoked bitter criticism from al-Sa'dun and Āl al-Jundi.⁶³ Two days later, after their victory over Arab troops at May-salun, the French occupied Damascus and put an end to Faysal's rule. With that, the rebels lost their urban base. In the same year the French guaranteed the large landowners their privileges, and the merchants of Damascus, following their economic interests, were not willing to continue the fight against the French.⁶⁴

Barakat called a meeting at al-Qasir to discuss the new situation. Some proposed to lay down their arms, some to fight on, and others wanted to make contact with the Turkish rebels to win their support. The next day Barakat fled to the French. After both Barakat and the local Turkish elements had withdrawn from the uprising in Antakya, the rebels in the region of Alexandretta began to reorganize.⁶⁵ Troops

⁶¹ al-'Ayyashi, *al-Idahat*..., 198ff.; Rafeq, *Gesellschaft*..., 473.

⁶² Fawzi and Shamsin, *Qadiyat*..., 34f. Details of the constant fighting in the vicinity of Harim, al-Qasir, and Antakya can be found in al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*..., 8, 6ff.

⁶³ al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*..., 16; Āl al-Jundi, *Ta'rikh al-thawrat*..., 70; for information about the 750 insurgents attempting to take Aleppo from the French, see al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*, 8 and 16ff.

⁶⁴ Hanna, *Die nationale Befreiungsbewegung*, 221.

⁶⁵ al-Zarqa, manuscript, 24; al-Sa'dun *Mudhakkirat*..., 19. Āl al-Jundi, *Ta'rikh al-thawrat*..., 70ff. al-'Ayyashi, *al-Idahat*, 82ff.; according to al-Hindi, Barakat's quitting the uprising suggests that he was working for Turkey. al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 69.

under Yusuf al-Sa'dun gathered in the region of al-Qasir.⁶⁶ After Aleppo had been occupied, Hananu fled to Baruda, intending to carry on the fight against the French. When the rebels from Harim, al-Qasir, and Antakya heard about this, they rallied around him.⁶⁷ Thus, the uprising in northern Syria had four centres: al-Qasir or rather Antakya under Yusuf al-Sa'dun with more than 400 volunteers, Kafr Takharim under Najib 'Uwayd with 250 volunteers, Jabal al-Zawiya under Mustafa al-Hajj Husayn with 200 volunteers, and Sahyun⁶⁸ under 'Umar al-Bitar with 150 volunteers. On 17 August 1920, Hananu went to Mar'ash with a group of his followers to ask the newly forming Kemalists for their support. On 7 September he signed an agreement with the Kemalists, the latter recognizing him as the representative of the Arab government in Syria and promising him military support. Some days later, Salih al-'Ali, who had started his uprising in the 'Alawite Mountains in 1919, announced his readiness to work alongside the northern rebels.⁶⁹ The most important fighting during the second half of the year 1920 took place at Harim, al-Isqat, Kafr Takharim, Jisr al-Shughur, Tall Kalakh, Jisr al-Hadid, and Darkush, especially around al-Qasir and Antakya.⁷⁰

Arab resistance intensified against the French policy of *divide et impera* which was supposed to weaken national resistance by dividing Syria into different autonomous districts. After the turn of the year 1920/21 some popular militia groups known as *chetehs* joined the forces in the Antakya region, raiding villages and fortresses in the mountains behind Alexandretta. Sometimes they succeeded in occupying parts of towns for several days or weeks. After the Kemalists had moved in reinforcements, and the French had set the different

⁶⁶ al-Sa'dun was born in 1888 in the village of Jisr al-Hadid which belonged to the *qadha* of Antakya. He served in the Ottoman army and fought against the British in Iraq during the First World War. He was one of the leaders of the uprising in Antakya, and commanded the area of al-'Umq as far as Darkush and south of Jisr al-Shughur and Kassab. At the end of 1921 he fled to Turkey with his family and lived in 'Aintab until 1926. He was sentenced to death *in absentia* by the French. In the 1930s he came to Aleppo and lived there in hiding. He was subsequently cleared of the charges but lived under house arrest until 1940. See Méouchy, 'Le Mouvement des 'Isabat...'

⁶⁷ al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*..., 16ff.

⁶⁸ The uprising at Sahyun started at the beginning of 1919 and came to an end in 1922/23. Āl al-Jundi, *Ta'rikh al-thawrat*..., 14ff.

⁶⁹ al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 72, al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*..., 34ff.

⁷⁰ Nizar al-Kayyali, *Dirasat*..., 55; Āl al-Jundi, *Ta'rikh al-thawrat*..., 81. For the locations of the uprisings, see al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 76.

groups of the population against each other, the situation in the region changed especially after the French won over some large landowners who had previously supported the rebels. Hence Antakya became divided between followers of the *chetehs* and sympathizers with the French, that is, those notables and high-ranking civil servants who distributed positions to their own people under the protection of the mandate authorities.⁷¹

During the negotiations between Hananu and the French, which took place in the village of Kurin in April 1921, the French had to admit that the districts of Antakya, Harim, Jisr al-Shughur, Idlib, and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man were under rebel control.⁷² In order to defuse the uprisings along the northern and western borders on the coast, General Gouraud decided at the end of June 1921, that the four regions—Damascus, Aleppo, the 'Alawite area and the Druze area—should form *al-Ittihad al-Suri* (the Syrian Union) under the presidency of Subhi Barakat.⁷³

France knew that it had to make concessions in order to obtain a ceasefire with the Kemalists. On 20 October 1921, the 'First Ankara Agreement' between Turkey and France was signed, ending hostilities between the two countries, particularly in Cilicia.⁷⁴ Under this agreement France ceded 18,000 sq. km. of Syrian territory (Cilicia) to Turkey, including Mar'ash, Kalas, Urfa, and 'Aintab.⁷⁵ Article 8 of the agreement ignored the previous border between Turkey and Syria and defined a new frontier between the two states. Khadduri wrote:

According to Article 8, the border between Turkey and Syria was shifted towards the south. The frontier begins on the Gulf of Alexandretta, at a place to the south of Payas, which would later be defined more precisely, and continues eastwards as far as Midan Ikbis. (...) At first the line runs

⁷¹ al-Zarqa, *Qadiyat*, vol. 1, 25f. and vol. 2, 73. Longrigg describes the *chetehs* as 'irregular Turkish groups'. According to him, they were active between 1922 and 1924. He confirms the difficult situation of the French troops, suffering from heavy losses due to the massive attacks of the *chetehs*, whom they were only able to fight with the help of fighter planes and local troops. Longrigg, *Syria...*, 154.

⁷² Longrigg, *Syria*, 155; Rafeq, *Gesellschaft*, 470. There was an Alawite majority in the *qadhas* of Jisr al-Shughur, Tal Kalakh, Misyaf, Tartus, al-Husn, and Safita: al-Hakim, *Suriya wa'l-'ahd al-Faysali...*, 94. Many areas in which the rebels were strong were inhabited by Christians, Alawites, and Sunnis.

⁷³ Munir and Nadir Ashrafi, *Suriya 'l-mustaqilla*, Aleppo 1936, 26ff.; al-Hindi, *Kifah*, 83f.

⁷⁴ According to Longrigg, *Syria...*, 156, the uprisings ceased at the end of 1921.

⁷⁵ Khadduri, *Qadiyat...*, 7.

to the east, then to the south of the town of Ikbas, with the Baghdad Railway staying within Turkish territory. Then the line turns to the east again until it meets the Tigris at Jazira Ibn 'Umar.⁷⁶

The French motivation for the 'First Ankara Agreement' was the realization that in order to bring some sort of peace to Syria it would first be necessary to establish order in the north. One of the clauses of the agreement says that Turkey would cease military actions against France on the Turkish-Syrian border and would stop supporting the uprisings there.⁷⁷ Thus, the rebellion in Syria was doomed to fail; after the expulsion of Faysal and the occupation of the major cities, the last source of support for the rebels was lost. Turkey supported the uprisings in northern Syria only to put pressure on France, in an attempt to get France to cooperate with Turkey against the British, who occupied the Straits, and against the Greeks, who held Izmir.

To fight the rebels, France transported 50,000 men from the front in Cilicia to Syria. When the rebels could no longer obtain supplies, when treachery was spreading among them, and when the French authorities proclaimed martial law and every village whose inhabitants supported the rebels was burned down and the inhabitants themselves arrested or executed, some decided to negotiate with the French and finally surrendered. On 11 or 12 July 1921 Hananu went to Jordan. Yusuf al-Sa'dun and Najib 'Uwayd wanted to carry on the armed struggle, fleeing first to the mountains with some of their followers, then to Turkey at the beginning of December 1921, basing themselves near the frontier, from which they carried out raids into Syria. In the summer of 1922 Yusuf al-Sa'dun came to Jabal al-Zawiya with about 100 men to punish anyone who had betrayed the uprising.⁷⁸ On 26 August 1922 he attacked a postal convoy in the village of al-Darakiya between Antakya and Darkush. Between December 1925, and August 1926, his followers carried out several attacks on French troops and outposts. The last and most important fights were at the beginning of April 1926, at Tall 'Amar and on 8 August 1926 in the region of al-

⁷⁶ Ibid. 7; al-Kayyali, *al-Marahil*, vol. 4, 400.

⁷⁷ Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Abteilung III Türkei/Frankreich, (R 78498), 26 February 1926. The Turks went so far as to order their people, like 'Asim Bik, to attack villages in the name of the rebels to spoil the reputation of the uprisings among the inhabitants and thus to distance themselves from the rebels. 'Asim Bik's followers destroyed Sqilbiya and killed many of its inhabitants. As a result, he was executed by Najib 'Uwayd. al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 80; al-'Ayyashi, *al-Idahat*..., 226.

⁷⁸ al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*, pp. 95–113; al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 78.

Qasir. When pressure on the rebels increased, when they were short of weapons, and when the Turkish government threatened them with persecution and to hand over their families living in Turkish territory to the French if they did not immediately return to Turkey or if they tried to return to Syria, they gave up their resistance.⁷⁹ Thus, after seven years of fighting, the uprising in Antakya, or rather in the Alexandretta region, came to an end.

Structures, modalities and goals of the risings

Social, religious, and nationalist groups took part in the uprisings. Influential persons, officers and intellectuals—who also came from outside the areas of the uprisings such as Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus—supported the rebellion. Some were sentenced to death and others exiled for their participation.⁸⁰ Indications suggest that even women were deeply involved in the fighting. According to al-Hindi, several women died in the course of the fighting at Jabal al-Zawiya.⁸¹

The fact that the different resistance groups restricted their activities to specific areas contributed to solidarity among the rebels of each region, united by affiliations to family, village, urban quarter, or religious community. While this secured both solidarity among the fighters and the fighters' loyalty to the leaders, it made central control of the uprising difficult. The uprisings did not develop into a struggle for the socio-economic freedom of the rural population, since the leadership consisted mostly of large landowners. The fighters were helpers, called *musanada* (supporters), or volunteers recruited from the villages. In the course of time reserves were assembled in each village, consisting of units of 29–30 persons. After it became apparent that French agents were increasingly infiltrating the rebellion, every volunteer was thoroughly checked by the local committee, and had to present a

⁷⁹ In 1923 al-Bitar was killed in an attack on French troops in the vicinity of Idlib. 'Aqil al-Saqati arrived with ten of his followers and carried out several attacks on the French: cf. his attack on the government building at al-Safira and his occupation of the police station at Jisr al-Hadid. al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 81f. 'Al al-Jundi confirms that the fighting in the north continued until as late as August 1926: *Ta'rikh al-thawrat*..., 115 and 285.

⁸⁰ al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 53.

⁸¹ al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*..., 7; al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 78.

guarantor of his loyalty to the revolution.⁸² The rebels under al-Sa'dun dealt with the lack of recruits by conscripting 12–14 year old youths. The villages provided the recruits with supplies and Syrian officers trained them. All in all it is difficult to gain an accurate picture of the number of rebels; taking part in the rebellion depended on possessing arms, so that whoever bore arms was a rebel.⁸³

The geographical conditions in the different regions, alternating between plains, valleys, and mountains, and the variety of ethnic and religious communities in the region made dividing into small groups the most effective way to organize the rebellion. Each guerrilla group knew the geography of its region and was ready to defend the latter at any price. Mostly the rebels attacked at night. But if they were not able to escape direct confrontation with the enemy they kept in fighting order, just like a regular army. The rebels mostly operated independently from each other, but they would work together during major offensives. Contacts with other groups and uprisings were maintained by the local commanders. Two aims were crucial: to inflict as much damage as possible upon the French troops, and to demonstrate the rebels' determination to resist.⁸⁴

In addition to seizing the weapons left on the battlefield by defeated French troops and donations by wealthy supporters, the rebels obtained weapons and money from the Kemalists and the representatives of urban elements, as long as this served the latter's political purposes. The rebels of the early period considered themselves a part of Faysal's Arab government and claimed to have Faysal's support, even after he had left Syria on 25 July 1920. The agreement of 7 September 1920 between Hananu and the Kemalists referred to the *i'ana* (assistance) which Turkey was supposed to provide to the Syrian rebels, including weapons, ammunition and general military cooperation.⁸⁵

Religion does not seem to have been more important than pan-Arab feeling. Clearly, the rebels' motivation was fundamentally nationalist, even if there was some reference to religious terminology. Religious

⁸² Rafeq, *Gesellschaft*..., 466ff.; al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 53f.

⁸³ al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 53f.

⁸⁴ See Fawzi and Shamsin, *Qadiyat*..., 23ff.; Āl al-Jundi, *Ta'rikh al-thawrat*..., 14 and 66f.; al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*...; al-Hindi, *Kifah*..., 53f.; Rafeq, *Gesellschaft*, 469ff.

⁸⁵ al-Sa'dun, *Mudhakkirat*, 20; Jamil 'Ulwani, *Nidal sha'b wa-Sijill khulud*, Damascus 1973, 50.

solidarity between the rebels and the Turks did not prevent the latter from withdrawing their support from the rebels after the signature of the 'First Ankara Agreement'. Equally, this solidarity did not prevent the Arab national movement from working against the Turks when each group was pursuing different goals for the future of Alexandretta during the 1930s.⁸⁶

Conclusion

As we have seen, Faysal's capture of Damascus triggered the rebellion in Antakya, just as the latter triggered further uprisings in northern and western Syria. The uprisings in southern Syria were part of the same phenomenon. But it must be clearly emphasized that each of these uprisings was the result of local initiatives, at least in the beginning. There were always attempts on the part of the government in Damascus to instrumentalise and monopolise such movements, just as there were a number of partly successful attempts at coordination between the various local risings in the regions where they had started and after which they were mostly named. This was clearly the case with the uprising in Antakya, because it was evidently supported and carried on by the entire population, even after some leaders—such as Barakat—had abandoned it. This was in contrast to Hananu's rising, which started with him and was doomed to failure after his departure, since it was intimately connected with his name.

The social, political, and religious structures in Antakya were extraordinarily complex. Different structures competed for the loyalty of each individual, and were partly inclusive and overlapping, and partly exclusive. Almost all the Arabic-speaking members of the 'Alawite community were small farmers or farm labourers, while the large landowners were Sunnis, some Turks, some Arabs. In both cases social class and religious affiliation overlapped. But nationalism was trying to establish new (national) identities. Like most of the Arab-speaking Christians of the urban middle class, the 'Alawites eagerly supported the idea of Arabism, as they hoped it would enable them to free

⁸⁶ See Arsuzi-Elamir, *Arabischer Nationalismus...*

themselves from religious discrimination and isolation. They had supported the resistance from the beginning, as they wanted to free themselves from injustice and from the severe economic discrimination which they faced as a powerless rural population. Very soon the goals of this protest were pushed aside by national goals—certainly not without the influence of the Arab-speaking large landowners and urban elements. By identifying the Ottomans or the French as the main enemy, national independence became a more important goal than social justice. The fight for national freedom in Antakya differed widely from that in Damascus for a variety of reasons. In Ottoman times Antakya had been on the periphery of the Syrian heartland and closer to the Ottoman centre of power, always ruled by a Turkish/Ottoman elite, and a substantial Turkish minority had always lived there. In Antakya the issue was not only Arab identity, but the even more basic question of whether the Arabs had any legitimate claim to the territory. Hence the tactical goals and the intensity of the struggle in this part of the Syrian periphery were not identical with those in the centre.

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Note: common terms such as *mahkama shar'iya*, Ottoman Empire, Ottomans, qadi, Syria, trade, *'ulama*, *waqf/awqaf/waqfiyya*, have not been indexed.

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In Index I, items are listed in English alphabetical order. If the French term is alphabetically close to the English, they have been indexed together: thus coffee, Fr. *café*. If the French term is very different, the reader will be guided to the English: thus *créances*, see debt.

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