

OFFICIAL HISTORY IN MODERN INDONESIA

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
STUDIES OF
THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA
(S.E.P.S.M.E.A.)

(Founding editor: C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze)

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VOLUME 99



OFFICIAL HISTORY IN MODERN
INDONESIA

New Order Perceptions and Counterviews

BY

MICHAEL WOOD



BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON
2005

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wood, Michael.

Official history in modern Indonesia : New Order perceptions and counterinterviews / by Michael Wood.

p. cm. - (Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East and Asia, ISSN 1385-3376 ; v. 99)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 90-04-14478-1 (hardback)

I. Indonesia-History. I. Title. II. Series.

DS643+

2005050139

ISSN 1385-3376
ISBN 90 04 14478 1

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this project would not have been possible without the help of a great number of individuals in Canada, the United States and Indonesia. At the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies my supervisors Dr. Donald Little and Dr. Uner Turgay as well as Dr. Sajida Alvi offered both advice and encouragement (if the final manuscript is devoid of an overwhelming number of grammatical mistakes it is because of Dr. Little's efforts rather than my own). Also at the Institute, Ann Yaxley and Dawn Richards were very helpful. Dr. Howard Federspiel of Ohio State University in Newark made extensive comments on my research. He also acted as a mentor as I became increasingly immersed in the study of Indonesia and Southeast Asia as a whole. The McGill Indonesia Project—Suzi Ricciardelli, Lori Novak, Wendy Allen, the Jakarta office—provided great assistance both in Montreal and Indonesia. The Indonesian students at McGill continue to inspire; I am particularly grateful to Dr. Sri Mulyati. Salwa Farahian, Wayne St. Thomas and Steve Millier of the Islamic Studies Library were always willing to help track down important sources while making my time at McGill a pleasant one. The Canadian International Development Fund made possible an extended stay in Indonesia in 1996–1997. I presented some preliminary findings from my research at a 1999 conference on governance in Indonesia held at McGill University. This presentation was later published as part of the conference's proceedings by Logos Press, Jakarta; some sections of Chapters 1, 2 and 4 are derived from this article. A popular account of my stay in Indonesia was published in the *McGill News*; thanks are due to Diana Grier Ayton and Andrew Mullins. While in Indonesia and later in Montreal and Toronto I received a great deal of support from Elin Weinstein. In Yogyakarta, I was helped by Dr. Atho Mudzhar, Dr. N. Siddiqi and the staff and students of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, as well as by Ibu Dyah and the staff and students of REALIA Language School and Jerome Cheung of United Services Canada. I must also acknowledge the assistance of the Archaeology Department of Gadjah Mada University. In Jakarta, I received advice and information from Dr. Azyumardi Azra of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and Abdurrahim of the

Jakarta History Museum. Gerard O'Brien of AusAid and his wife Allison made my stays in Jakarta possible. Dr. Ida Bagus Rata of Udayana University provided data on the state of archaeological research in Bali; Dr. Thoha Hamim of IAIN Surabaya was a valued companion while visiting the *wali songo* sites. I must thank the McGill Student Awards office for much needed financial aid. Employment as a teacher in the Humanities Department at Dawson College made the final stages of this project both easier and more enjoyable; I must thank the staff, the students and my colleagues. Trudy Kamperveen and the staff of Brill Academic Publishers are owed many thanks for getting this work into published form. Also of immense assistance were Elizabeth Alexandrin, Blanca Alvarado, Jake Daniel, James Devine, Amelia Gallagher, Sami Massoud, Matthew Mayer, Marc Munro, Bradley Semmelhack, Bram Sepers, Ilona Weinstein, Martin Weinstein, Pat Anderson, Bill Wieninger and Dr. Bruce Trigger. I am very grateful to Gordana Milinic for her support throughout the writing of this manuscript. Finally thanks must go to my mother and brother, Beryl and David Wood.

NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY AND SOURCES

This study contains numerous Indonesian names and terms. Indonesian place names will be used unless there is a common English one (Sulawesi not Celebes, but Java instead of Jawa). The Indonesian language (*bahasa Indonesia*) presently uses the Latin alphabet. Names will be spelled using the new (post-1972) alphabet system. Thus, Jakarta will be used instead of Djakarta, Cirebon instead of Tjirebon and Yogyakarta instead of Jogjakarta. The exceptions involve personal names. Many Indonesians still use the old Dutch-influenced system in writing their names (for example Sartono Kartodirdjo). Old names are seldom converted. Thus Djadjadinagrat remains as it was earlier spelled. M. Hatta and M. Yamin spelled their given names, Mohammad and Muhammad respectively. Sukarno and Suharto will always be spelled using the new system (not Soeharto or Soekarno) except in the titles of books. Book titles will always be spelled exactly as shown. Many Indonesians only use one name.

It is the standard practice among scholars not to add "s" to Asian language words in order to create plurals. Nor are Indonesian language plurals commonly used in English language texts (for example, *kucing-kucing* for cats). Instead plurality is indicated by context alone; *kraton* could mean either "palace" or "palaces." As the language of a predominately Muslim country, Indonesian contains many words derived from Arabic; words such as *wali* will be spelled according to Indonesian convention without diacritical marks. The author of this present study possesses no knowledge of Dutch or Javanese: analysis of Dutch and Javanese language sources are those of the secondary authorities cited. Indonesian and French translations, unless otherwise noted, are the author's.

This study is not directly concerned with distant historical periods but of how a recent Indonesian regime viewed and manipulated the past. It is thus somewhat difficult to define what constitutes a primary source. Traditional writings such as the *Sejarah Melayu* and the *Nagarakertagama*, witnesses to past times, are clearly primary sources. The accounts of European travelers such as Tome Pires (sixteenth century) and Stamford Raffles (nineteenth century) are classed as primary sources. But for more recent works the matter is more

problematic. Primary sources will tend to be by Indonesians. This study will also work on the assumption that modern primary sources give insight into how the past is currently perceived rather than just provide factual information about past eras of Indonesian history. Thus, the New Order textbook, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, might contain accurate descriptions about the Majapahit empire, but it is more useful for this study as an indication of how the empire was understood and used by the New Order. Modern official histories, autobiographies, archaeological studies and official guidebooks, written by Indonesians, will be classed as primary sources. Studies, by Indonesians and others, that simply provide historical data or comments on historiography will be classed as secondary sources.

PREFACE

Indonesia is home to the largest Muslim population in the world, some eighty to ninety percent of its 220 million citizens are followers of this religion. This latter statistic may be particularly important today—where some see a post-9/11 clash between the Western and Islamic worlds. Others speak of a struggle within Islam over the proper relationship between religion and politics. Much attention has been focused on events, personalities, ideas and trends from the Middle East and to some extent South Asia; it is not uncommon for introductory texts to the Muslim world to fail to mention Indonesia at all. This is a mistake. Indonesia continues to be an important part of the story of Islam. Such violent incidents as the 2002 Bali bombing might obscure a more significant narrative, one in which a Muslim-majority country has had some success in balancing the desire for religious authenticity with the need for diverse groups (including many non-Muslims) to work together in building a nation. Indonesia's transformation from a dictatorship to a functioning (if still fragile) democracy challenges the notion that Muslim populations are somehow incapable of initiating and sustaining meaningful political change. Indonesians have had long experience with blending various regional, national and international elements in order to create an Indonesian identity. They have found that one can be Asian, Muslim (or Christian, Buddhist or Hindu), Javanese (or Balinese or even Achenese) and Indonesian at the same time. One's history is not a zero-sum game. This can be seen in decisions taken by both individuals and governments, by the ruled and their rulers as to how Indonesia's past should be perceived. This process was particularly noticeable in the history upon which Suharto's New Order (1966–1998) bestowed its stamp of approval.

The New Order government spent a great deal of resources on discovering, analyzing and propagating a particular image of the Indonesian past. This study hopes to ascertain what periods of Indonesian history the Suharto regime emphasized and perhaps emulated. It will describe a coherent New Order past that included ancient kingdoms, resistance against foreign colonialism and modern political developments. This official history reflected the present-day

Indonesia that the New Order felt to be most desirable. The regime hoped that by referring to an ideal past strides could be made in the tasks of building the Indonesian nation and of strengthening its own legitimacy. Counterviews to the New Order past, particularly from an Islamic perspective, will also be described. In studying how the New Order used the past, insight might be gained into the nature of the New Order regime. The regime's attitudes towards the place of Islam in modern Indonesian society and towards Java as a dominant component of the Indonesian polity might be observable. Of course the New Order came to an end with the May 1998 resignation of President Suharto. But its style of rule continues to have a great impact on present-day Indonesia. Most of the people currently active in the Indonesian political arena got their start during the New Order. Also, New Order institutions and ways of thinking have shaped the nation's culture and the political outlook; there has certainly not been the clean break with the past that many Indonesians had hoped for.

This present study consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 will discuss methodology. This chapter will show how the New Order used three specific media to construct a usable past. The "history industry" (the activities of historians and scholars), monuments and textbooks were all employed to build and disseminate a picture of Indonesian history, which was helpful in fostering national integration and regime legitimacy. Chapter 2 will analyze how the New Order promoted a particular vision of pre-Independence Indonesia. This period includes the early empires of Srivijaya and Majapahit, the coming of Islam, the rise of the Islamic Sultanates and the "350 years" of Dutch colonial rule. Emphasis was placed on "golden ages" (the "Srivijaya-Majapahit" era) and the activities of *pahlawan nasional* (national heroes). Chapter 3 will deal with how the regime conceived of more recent events, namely the 1945 Revolution against the Dutch and the 1965 birth of the New Order itself amid wide-spread violence linked to the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI). Official positions on who really defeated the Dutch (the military or civilian politicians) and who was really behind the actions of September 30–October 1, 1965 (in which several high-ranking Indonesian officers were murdered in an apparent coup attempt) will be presented. Chapter 4 will consist of a selection of Indonesian critiques of the New Order conception of the past. The New Order's past, with its emphasis on the glories of Majapahit and

the Indonesian military, was seldom openly attacked. Instead a more Islamic-oriented version of the past was offered as an “alternative history in waiting.” Emphasis was placed on Indonesia’s long membership in the *ummat* (the world wide Islamic community) and on Islamic contributions to Indonesia’s independence and national development. Chapter 5 will offer some comments on how the New Order perceived Indonesian history as a whole, as an age-old struggle to defend an ideal Indonesia from those un-Indonesian, violent and chaotic forces that would destroy it. Comparisons will also be made to other cases of constructed official histories in Egypt, Israel, Cambodia and Yugoslavia in order to assess how successful the New Order was in creating and using the past.

CHAPTER ONE
USING THE PAST

In a 1965 examination of the state of post-independence historiography, Indonesian writer, academic and diplomat Soedjatmoko noted that independence had sharpened the interest of Indonesians in their history. Instructing the citizenry in history was essential in developing love and loyalty for a country as it undertook the task of “nation-building.”¹ In the same volume Indonesian archaeologist R. Soekomo drew attention to the fact that Indonesians were carrying out a fair bit of archaeological research during the early 1960’s, a period which is often characterized as one of political and economic crisis. Rather than seeing such a use of educated personnel as wasteful for a nation “just getting on its feet” he felt that Indonesia should induce more of its trained citizens to join the Archaeological Service.² It is interesting to note that Soekomo does not examine the specific ideological implications of this archaeological work. Perhaps archaeological research is itself an ideological exercise, a statement of modernity. Modern nations, like Indonesia, undertake such research for pure academic motives. Such an attitude, that the study of the Indonesian past is no mere luxury but an integral part of the quest for national unity and modern prosperity, has remained current to this day. Indonesian historian Sartono Kartodirdjo notes:

It becomes clear that historical knowledge and historical consciousness are precious assets in political education for citizenship. National history is an instrument par excellence in nation-building, fulfilling a didactic function like the Babad, Hikayat or Sejarah in olden days. Besides that it explains the *raison d’être* of the nation state and concomitantly legitimizing its existence.³

¹ Soedjatmoko, “Introduction,” in *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), xi.

² R. Soekomo, “Archaeology and Indonesian History,” in *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, 46.

³ Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Indonesian Historiography* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2001), 61.

Most, if not all, countries use “perceptions of history” for political purposes. In newly independent countries, where governments and cultural elites may command only tenuous loyalty, an attempt is often made to impress on the citizenry that they have a shared past, a unified present and a hopeful future. Using the past in this manner is especially important to nation-states like Indonesia, whose citizens have a wide diversity of languages, cultures and religious practices. The citizens of a multiethnic nation-state may in fact not share much of a history at all, except for the shared experience of European colonialism and the struggle for independence. However, the past is not self-evident. A national history must first be discovered through historical and archaeological research. This task is often complicated by the former domination of this process by the colonial powers. This discovered past must then be analyzed; it must be consciously connected to a nation’s current and future political and social fortunes. This process often involves the process of creating what Benedict Anderson terms “Imagined Communities,” groups who have in common a current political destiny yet lack a common history.⁴ The newly-discovered/newly-created common history must then be propagated to the citizenry through such means as textbooks, monuments and ceremonies. Such a process may be very heavy handed in totalitarian states, where the citizens will be constantly forced to identify the continuity between the current leadership and past glories and humiliations. On the other hand disseminating a nation’s official history may be a more subtle process, especially if popular perceptions of the past happen to coincide with official ones.

Bernard Lewis notes that there are many ways in which one can define history. History has been traditionally analyzed in terms of when, where and by whom it is written. More recently the more sophisticated approach of examining history by topic and by methodology, in terms of sources, and ideologically, in terms of the historian’s purpose, has emerged. Lewis proposes a classification, which involves remembered history, recovered history and invented history. Remembered history includes a wide variety of statements on the past, such as the personal recollections of the elders of a society and a society’s living traditions, as can be seen in its classics, its scrip-

⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1990).

tures and “its inherited historiography.” Remembered history can be understood as “the collective memory” of a nation, or any other social grouping. Recovered history is the history of events and people that has been either forgotten or rejected by “communal memory” and then later recovered by academic scholarship through the study of the historical and archaeological remains of the past. This academic enterprise results in the reconstruction of a past, which had been forgotten. Sometimes this reconstruction verges on construction; the recovered past bears little resemblance to what actually might have occurred and is instead tailored to meet current political contingencies. Such reconstructions fall into Lewis’ third category, that of invented history. History invented for a particular purpose might draw on and utilize remembered or recovered history, or when no such raw material is available simply be fabricated.⁵

Very much related to Lewis’ classification scheme is the question of audience. One might conclude that whom a past is intended for is almost as important as the content of that past or those who decide what that content will be. Several visions of the past may coexist, created for different audiences for different reasons. There is a popular version of the past, created by a nation’s public for its own consumption (and in so far as the public is not a homogeneous mass, there may be many versions of popular history). If such a “popular past” has a long pedigree within a society it may be indistinguishable from Lewis’ remembered history. Even recent events, as popularly remembered, could be described in this manner. In many countries there is also a “tourist past,” created by policy makers, workers in the tourism industry and even the tourists themselves.⁶ This version of history is not very interested in accuracy; it is more concerned with the immediate present, the past here merely adding color to beautiful landscapes and exotic local rituals. But it does serve its purposes. Beyond drawing in money to the economy, it is the version of a country and a country’s history that is most visible to the outside world and it is important to acknowledge its existence.

⁵ Bernard Lewis, *History: Remembered, Recovered and Invented* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), 11–12.

⁶ See Neil Asher Silberman, “Promised Lands and Chosen Peoples: The Politics and the Poetics of Archaeological Narrative,” in *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*, ed. Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 261.

There is also a thriving “academic past” which is constantly being constructed, revised, discussed and disseminated by scholars both native and foreign. This version of the past would certainly fall under Lewis’ heading of recovered history. Such a past aims at objectivity, and tries to find out “what really happened.” It also claims to exist for its own sake rather than to serve lofty goals such as national integration. It often supplies the raw material for other versions of history; it can be drawn on for “facts.” Although some local scholars may speak about fostering a more “local-centric” version of the past, by and large researchers in most developing (or developed) countries try to adhere to international scholarly norms. Such research may seem quite apolitical; scholars may not need to generally justify their research in terms of national goals. While this situation may reflect well on the scholarly community, it may also point to a wider insight. In using the past for socio-political purposes, the academic niceties of what research claims actually happened might be largely irrelevant; in most countries, developed or developing, few people read scholarly monographs and articles.

There is also a past which has been created for official purposes. A given government or elite will tend to stress the importance of a particular time period of the nation’s past. But other groups, outside of the political decision-making process, might question the appropriateness of venerating that past, and offer histories of their own. Such alternative histories might better be described as “official histories in waiting” rather than as popular histories, in so much as they are the product of an elite who would eventually like to assume the task of building a national ideology themselves, but who are presently marginalized politically. Here one can see Lewis’ invented history, and like invented history it can base itself on both real and fabricated constructions of past events. In effect it is the academic past which often provides the raw material for official pasts. A state will consciously use specific media in order to disseminate a particular vision of the past in order to strengthen national unity and its own political position. The idea that “emerging nations” make use of their history in this manner is not a new one. Such theorists of nationalism as Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawn have stressed the importance of later perceptions of history in building national identities.⁷

⁷ *Imagined Communities*, 185–190; Eric Hobsbawn, “Introduction: Inventing Tradi-

The former notes the role of museums in building a common past and a present nation, while the latter describes historians as supplying the raw material for nationalistic constructions. Others have also noted the role of philologists, folklorists and historians in reviving (or inventing) modern nations (see for example Adrian Hastings comments on how historical traditions have influenced nationalists in the former Yugoslavia).⁸

The use of the past for political purposes has been the specific focus of several studies. Works by Michael Wood, Donald Fowler and Neil Asher Silberman have dealt with nationalistic uses of history in Egypt, Mexico and Israel.⁹ Archaeological theorists, such as Bruce Trigger, have described how one particular discipline can be driven by political motives.¹⁰ Two recent anthologies have dealt with the political dimensions of archaeological research in a variety of European, Asian and Middle Eastern contexts.¹¹ The history of historiography and archaeology in Indonesia has been described and note has been made of the political implications of such inquiries into the past.¹² A set of articles in the 1970's dealt with perceptions of the past in Southeast Asia. Several of the enclosed treatments link such perceptions to political culture in Indonesia.¹³ Studies dealing with the political and historical dynamics of a particular Southeast Asian country might note in passing the importance of perceptions of the past on later developments. David Chandler, for example, in his analysis of recent Cambodian history, notes the importance for

tions", in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 3;

⁸ *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chapter 5.

⁹ Wood, "The Use of the Past in Modern Egyptian Nationalism," *The Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 35 (1998): 160–172; Fowler, "Uses of the Past: Archaeology in the Service of the State," *American Antiquity* 52, no. 2 (1987): 239–234; Silberman, *A Prophet from Amongst You: The Life of Yigael Yadin: Soldier, Scholar and Mythmaker of Modern Israel* (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993).

¹⁰ "Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist," *Man* 19 (1984): 355–370.

¹¹ Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett, ed., *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*; Lynn Meskell, ed., *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹² Daud A. Tanudirjo, "Theoretical Trends in Indonesian archaeology," in *Theory in Archaeology: a World Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Ucko (London: Routledge, 1995), 61–75.

¹³ Anthony Reid and David Marr, ed., *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979).

modern Cambodian leaders of the medieval empire of Angkor, but this is not the central focus of his book. The importance of past paradigms for Indonesian leaders such as Sukarno and Suharto has been frequently noted.¹⁴ The construction of an official past by the New Order has not been specifically dealt with beyond a short article by the author.¹⁵

A systematic examination of how a state communicates what past it deems acceptable to its citizens, whether by monuments, textbooks or other modes of transmission, is rare. As such, no model really exists as to how the past can be used for political purposes. Some “forms of the past” (official and using Lewis’ terminology, invented) are more important for this process than others. This study will show how a new nation-state (i.e. post-colonial), authoritarian and ideologically motivated, can recover, reconstruct and disseminate a national past. Three broad media, “the history industry”, historical sites or monuments and school textbooks are often used by national governments to describe, define and communicate a national identity. These three particular media have been chosen by this study as being the most fruitful to examine for evidence of state attitudes towards the past, in that they exhibit a large degree of intent. The government in funding archaeological excavations or commissioning textbooks is making a conscious decision; such projects involve personnel who fall under some form of government control or guidance. Monuments are clearly erected for a reason. They are intended to convey a message to a viewer. In fact the making of a nationalist statement is the primary reason to put up a national monument, although secondary reasons, such as the provision of jobs or the attraction of tourists, may also be apparent. Textbooks are usually composed at the urging of a government and would tend to reflect official ideas about the past. However, the portrait painted about past societies would have to be at least partially grounded in his-

¹⁴ David Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1991), 3–6; J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, 3rd ed. (Singapore: Archipelago, 2003); Michael Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change*, (London: Routledge, 1993).

¹⁵ Michael Wood, “The Historical Past as a Tool for Nation Building in New Order Indonesia: a Preliminary Examination,” in *Good Governance and Conflict Resolution in Indonesia: from Authoritarian Government to Civil Society*, ed. Andi Faisal Bakti (Jakarta: Logos, 2000), 97–106.

torical fact if it were to be taken seriously by the intended reader. Such a connection to reality might be dependent on the textbook's expected audience and the general level of control a particular government exercises over the population. In Indonesia the production of all three media was, at least to some extent, done under the umbrella of the Department of Education and Culture. However, as will be noted below, some of the work carried out by the "history industry" was carried out by other government departments, universities and even non-affiliated individuals.

It is true that other media, such as puppets, poems, songs and novels could also be examined. There is a huge body of literature, both anthropological and historical on the *wayang*, the Indonesian shadow puppet play.¹⁶ But the cultural and political significance of the *wayang* certainly deserves its own separate treatment. Puppet plays are put on for a variety of reasons, many of them personal or local, within a village setting. Although the New Order apparently put pressure on *dalang* (puppeteers) to include official messages in their performances, this can only be seen as a small contribution to a much larger, popularly based, cultural enterprise. The regime hoped that puppet performances might help to spread the government message on such policies as family planning, anti-corruption, agriculture, and participation in sports and successful elections. Local projects, such as dams, bridges and canals, were also promoted. Underlying all the pronouncements of the government, projected via the *wayang*, was the spirit of *gotong-royong* (working together).¹⁷ The puppet-master is usually a venerated figure within his community, as the job requires a high degree of skill and knowledge; the play itself takes place within the parameters of tradition and audience expectation. If the *wayang* is projecting a past it is primarily a remembered and popular one rather than an official one. Poems and songs might also hold some political significance.¹⁸ The adoption of *Indonesia Raya*

¹⁶ See Laurie J. Sears, *Shadows of Empire: Colonial Discourse and Javanese Tales* (Durham, S.C.: Duke University Press, 1996). A classic examination of the puppet play and the mythology behind it is Benedict Anderson, *Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1996).

¹⁷ Victoria M. Clara van Groenendaal, *The Dalang behind the Wayang: the Role of the Surakarta and the Yogyakarta Dalang in Indonesian-Javanese Society* (Leiden: KITLV, 1985), 186.

¹⁸ See Burton Raffel, *The Development of Modern Indonesian Poetry* (New York: SUNY Press, 1967).

(Glorious Indonesia) as the national anthem was a noted milestone in the movement towards independence and it was sung in conjunction with the taking of the Youth Pledge (One People, One Nation, One Language) in 1928. Its continued popularity, despite changes of regime and ideological direction, can be seen in the recent replacement of Suharto on the fifty thousand rupia note by a portrait of the anthem's composer. Popular songs may also contain political messages. Rock musician Iwan Fall's song *Bento*, is widely held to be a veiled attack on the corruption and greed of Suharto's son Tommy. *Dangdut* (a form of Indonesian popular music) star Rhoma Irama released many songs calling on Indonesian society to take on a more Islamic tone and was at Suharto's side during 1997 festivities to mark the end of Ramadhan at a large gathering in Jakarta. However, it could be argued that an examination of songs and poems for any political significance would not be the most productive path to take. Most songs and poems are written by people who are not actively involved in the nation-building process. Official songs might be popular for their musical rather than their lyrical content. Also, the motives of poets and songwriters are in the end usually personal rather than political, especially if political is understood to involve the deliberate construction of a broad national identity. Similar comments could be made in regard to novels, television and movies. Although an author of fiction, like Pramoedya Toer or Mochtar Lubis, might be highly committed politically he is in the end an artist. Isolating political elements in their work, while judging it as art, would be a difficult task, which might contribute little to an understanding of Indonesian perceptions of history.¹⁹

During the Suharto era, television in Indonesia was licensed by the government. However, the purpose of its programming seemed primarily to entertain and to make a profit.²⁰ While programming was frequently interrupted by government pronouncements or speeches by Suharto himself, the actual shows, the majority of television content, consisted of either foreign or Indonesian comedies and dramas. The Indonesian shows tended to have contemporary settings in Jakarta or rural regions. Historical themes are not unknown, on television

¹⁹ See A. Teeuw, *Modern Indonesian Literature*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979).

²⁰ See Khrisna Sen and David T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2000).

or in the cinema.²¹ For example, during Ramadhan in 1997, the movies *Wali Songo* and *Sunan Kalijaga*, which dealt with the early history of Islam in Indonesia, were broadcast. But no clear government line on the past seemed intended or was discernible. An exception to this involves a film, shown annually, depicting the 1965 coup attempt. This movie, however, might best be seen as a product of the Indonesian history industry (its plot follows the “official line” of government historian Nugroho Notosusanto), “the movie version” of a school textbook or even a national monument shown ritualistically every year, rather than as a typical Indonesian film.

The History Industry

An official past can be observed in the activities of those involved in the “history industry.” Professional historians, archaeologists and museum curators, those involved in recovering, interpreting and displaying a nation’s past, might be expected to either accept or reject an official history in the course of their work. Examining “what past” these professionals choose (or are allowed to study) might tell us a great deal about official attitudes towards the past. In the words of archaeology theorist David Lowenthal:

The past is everywhere a battleground of rival attachments. In discovering, correcting, elaborating, inventing and celebrating their histories, competing groups struggle to validate present goals by appealing to continuity with, or inheritance from, ancestral or other precursors. The politics of the past is no trivial academic game; it is an integral part of every people’s earnest search for a heritage essential to autonomy and identity. In this search archaeologists form part of a cadre of historians, social scientists, and other scholars increasingly pressed to defend or resist claims to this or that interpretation of the past.²²

In a similar vein, Sartono Kartodirdjo has described history as past politics and politics as present history.²³ The history industry is most

²¹ See Khrisna Sen, *Indonesian Cinema: Framing the New Order* (London: Zed Books, 1994).

²² David Lowenthal, “Conclusion: Archaeologists and Others,” in *The Politics of the Past*, ed. Peter Gathercole and David Lowenthal (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 308.

²³ Kartodirdjo, *Indonesian Historiography*, 29.

concerned with the recovery (and sometimes the invention of) an academic past. This past becomes a powerful symbol, which can be used and propagated by a modern state.

The act of creating an image of the past that can be used by either a colonial regime or a post-independence state requires scholarly activity even if the past that is created is only a popular or an official one. The study of the Indonesian past first emerges in connection with European antiquarianism, a rather haphazard and unscientific fascination with ancient societies. In 1778 the Royal Batavian Society for Arts and Science was founded. This institution had access to a great many artefacts, collected from throughout the Archipelago, which were later housed in the Batavia (now the National) Museum. A great deal of important historical work was done under the supervision of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, the British governor of Java from 1811–1816 and the later founder of Singapore. Raffles sent out assistants to collect information on ancient monuments throughout the island. This research resulted in the rediscovery in 1814 of the Buddhist site of Borobudur and the subsequent publication of the two-volume *The History of Java*. This work drew on a simple classification of Old Javanese and Sanskrit inscriptions; although Raffles was unable to fully use these inscriptions, this could be seen as the beginning of historical archaeology in Indonesia. It might be compared to *Description de l'Égypte*, a twenty-four volume work published between 1809 and 1824, which summarized the results of scientific study carried out by French scholars in Egypt during the Napoleonic occupation. Although *The History of Java* is a more modest work, the common motivating factor of studying the past to make modern political control easier seems clear. In 1822 the Dutch, who had regained control of the Indies from the British, set up the Commission for the Explorations and Conservation of Antiquities. This first official institution was largely ignored; private individuals conducted most research, although often with an increasingly scholarly approach. Many Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic as well as prehistoric and even early hominid remains were uncovered during the nineteenth century.²⁴

In the early twentieth century research into the Indonesian past took on a more official appearance. In 1901 the Commission in the

²⁴ Tanudirjo, "Theoretical Trends in Indonesian Archaeology," 63; Wood, "The Use of the Pharaonic Past," 39.

Dutch Indies for Archaeological Research in Java and Madura was founded under the direction of Brandes (until 1905) and Krom (from 1910, when he revitalized the body). In 1913 the Commission was reorganized as the Archaeological Service in the Dutch Indies with a mandate to carry out both research and preservation within an officially organized framework. Under the direction of Bosch (from 1915) and then Stutterheim systematic research increased and towards the end of the Dutch period some interested Indonesians were trained as archaeologists and were sent to work as assistants in the regional branches of the service established in 1938 in Bali and Central Java. The study and restoration of ancient monuments were emphasized, apparently motivated mostly by the quest for scientific knowledge; tourism was a secondary consideration. Architectural features and epigraphic data were extensively studied. A few Indonesians, such as Hussein Djajadiningrat and Poerbatjaraka, were involved in the study of ancient inscriptions and languages. Analysis often emphasized Indian influence on both Hindu and Islamic developments in the region as opposed to seeing ancient Indonesian civilizations as the product of "local genius." In a similar manner to developments in Indonesian, French archaeologists recovered the remains of the civilization, which had built the huge Hindu temple complex at Angkor Wat in Cambodia. The local inhabitants had largely forgotten about the civilization's existence and French colonial administrators were quick to remind Cambodians that they had degenerated from the greatness of their ancestors, who also, like the French might have been outside invaders (none of this stopped later independent Cambodian leaders, from Sihanouk to Pol Pot, from drawing on ancient Angkor for inspiration). The reluctance of many European scholars to see a local element in the creation of such monuments as Angkor Wat and Borobudur might, it is true, stem from political sentiments. Also, it might be the result of an academic background in Indology (emphasizing the study of Sanskrit) and the popularity of diffusionist theories of human development. This period also marks the development of such scientific approaches as the use of artefact typologies.²⁵

²⁵ Ibid., 66–68. On Angkor see Hong Lysa, "History," in *An Introduction to Southeast Asian Studies*, ed. by Mohammed Halib and Tim Huxley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 49–50; Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light*,

During the colonial period the debate over Indianisation was accompanied by the creation of a powerful image of a particular Indonesian past by foreign scholars. The ancient kingdoms of Srivijaya and Majapahit, like the glories of Angkor, were to a very large extent brought to the world's attention by the efforts of European scholars. Srivijaya had in fact largely passed out of popular memory; although such traditional sources from the Malay world as the *Sejarah Melayu* do connect the royal house of Malacca (very important in the early modern history of present-day Indonesia) to Palembang, where modern scholars have located the Srivijaya capital.²⁶ Srivijaya was a Buddhist trading empire which controlled territory around the Straits of Malacca; it was founded around 600 AD and passed into historical obscurity about five centuries later. This obscurity was lifted at the beginning of the twentieth century by French scholars. George Coedès in a 1918 article was the first to establish direct links between seventh to eighth century Palembang, inscriptions from the Malay Peninsula which mention a kingdom (not as was once thought a king) called "Sriwijaya" and Chinese texts noting a trading center in the area. Coedès also made reference to eleventh century Tamil charters, a few references in Arabic texts and a scant amount of archaeological material (mostly in the form of Buddhist statues).²⁷ His comparison of these diverse sources was able to show that they were all associated with the same polity. In effect, he "signed the birth certificate of the "The Kingdom of Srivijaya."²⁸

Unlike Srivijaya the ancient Javanese empire of Majapahit was not rescued from oblivion by foreign academic detective work. But the Majapahit that would make a major impact on nationalist thought throughout the twentieth century down to the time of the New Order was in many ways a Western creation. The Indonesian

Prince of Darkness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 42; David Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 142.

²⁶ C.C. Brown, trans., "Sejarah Melayu, or Malay Annals," *Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 25, no. 2/3 (1952): 25.

²⁷ George Coedès "Le Royaume de Crivijaya," *Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'extreme orient* 18 (1918), trans. as "The Kingdom of Sriwijaya," in *Sriwijaya: History, Religion and Language of an Early Malay Polity*, ed. George Coedès and Louis-Charles Damais (Kuala Lumpur: Monograph of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1992), 1–22.

²⁸ Pierre-Yves Manguin, "Introduction," in *Sriwijaya: History, Religion and Language*, viii.

scholar S. Supomo has noted that although Java has been home to literate, sophisticated kingdoms since at least the fifth century most of these political entities are largely forgotten. A few kingdoms, however, have remained part of the people's collective memory in the form of folk stories and literary works. No kingdom, although its image is often distorted almost beyond recognition, has made more of an impact on the popular imagination than Majapahit. The legends, chronicles and folk tales of the Javanese and the Balinese as well as those of the Malays and Outer Island population frequently mention this empire.²⁹ Majapahit flourished from the end of the thirteenth century until the end of the fifteenth century (its traditional end is held to be 1530). It was centred on East Java but it may have controlled, to varying degrees, much greater stretches of territory in Sumatra and the Eastern Islands. Its wealth was derived both from control of trade and from elaborate terraced wet-rice agriculture. It was Hindu-Buddhist in religious orientation; after Islam rose to prominence in Java, Majapahit's Hindu elite, according to tradition, fled to Bali which remains Hindu to this day.³⁰

The kingdoms that dominated Java after the fall of Majapahit (Demak and then Mataram) were at least nominally Muslim but the image of Majapahit was not forgotten. Royal descent from Majapahit seemed important to the rulers of Mataram and this is reflected in the *Babad Tanah Jawi*, a major Javanese source originally compiled in the seventeenth century, although the Majapahit it describes is a modest one in both power and territorial extent.³¹ Malay sources, written by the apparent victims of frequent Majapahit attacks, describe Majapahit in much more impressive terms, controlling territory across the Archipelago.³² Majapahit's own description of itself was probably

²⁹ S. Supomo, "The Image of Majapahit in Later Javanese and Indonesian Writing," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*. 171.

³⁰ See Keith W. Taylor "The Early Kingdoms," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume One: From Early Times to c. 1800*, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 176–180, and Kenneth R. Hall "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume One*, 215–226.

³¹ Supomo, "The Image of Majapahit," 175.

³² *Ibid.*, 177–179; cf. A.H. Hill, trans., "Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai," *Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 33, no. 2 (1961): 161; Brown, "Sejarah Melayu," 74–75; J.J. Ras, trans., *Hikayat Banjar: A Study in Malay Historiography* (Leiden: KITLV, 1968), 424–425.

not available to later Javanese or Malay writers.³³ The *Nagarakertagama*, a long Javanese poem written in 1365, describes the customary tour of the monarch Rajasanagara through his realms.³⁴ Majapahit is described in some detail: villages, population, shrines, temples and hermitages are all noted as are the activities of Rajasanagara, his wives and his retainers. The text makes a distinction between areas familiar to its author Prapanca, called *yawabhumi*, (the land of Java) and more distant areas identified as *nusantara* or *dwiipantara*, (other islands) or *desantara* (other countries). Prapanca notes annual excursions of the king throughout Java but not one to the almost one hundred places listed as belonging to *nusantara*; the latter were perhaps little more than geographic terms.³⁵ But the empire described seems an impressive one ruled by an impressive ruler. Rajasanagara is portrayed as a benevolent, almost god-like figure, constantly on the move on behalf of his grateful people. The boundaries of this realm, notwithstanding the division between Java and the other islands, are huge and more or less correspond to present-day Indonesia.³⁶

This Majapahit was brought to the world's attention through the efforts of the Dutch. The only surviving copy of the *Nagarakertagama* dates from 1740; Supomo feels that this poetic description may not have been well known by either Prapanca's contemporaries or subsequent generations of Javanese. This copy remained hidden in the royal compound of Cakranegara in Lombok until 1894. At that time the Dutch, as part of a military expedition launched against Lombok, sent Dr. J. Brandes, a government philologist, to recover manuscripts and other cultural artefacts. The expedition was a success; the Dutch East Indies was soon to cover all of Prapanca's Majapahit and many interesting manuscripts were secured. The *Nagarakertagama* radically changed the standard view of Majapahit; the earlier, more modest description of the *Babad Tanah Jawi* was discarded in favour of what was considered to be a more scholarly reliable model. The *Nagaraker-*

³³ Supomo, "The Image of Majapahit," 180.

³⁴ See Theodore G.Th. Pigeaud, *Java in the Fourteenth Century: A Study in Cultural History: The Nagara-Kertagama by Rakawi Prapanca of Majapahit*, 5 Vols. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960–1963) and a more recent translation by Stuart Robson, *Desawamana (Nagarakertagama) by Mpu Prapanca* (Leiden: KITLV, 1995).

³⁵ Supomo, "The Image of Majapahit," 173–174.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 175.

tagama, which appeared in Dutch translation in a series of articles published between 1905 and 1914, various Javanese inscriptions and the *Pararaton* (a prose piece from shortly after Majapahit's fall) were seen as providing a reliable picture of this ancient empire. This Majapahit soon found its way into the classic work of Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis* and textbooks intended for high schools. This large, powerful Majapahit, brought to life by the Dutch scholars Brandes, Kern and Krom, was seen as the *real* Majapahit, an entity that would serve, for Indonesian nationalists, as a model for a free and united Indonesia.³⁷ Supomo sees it as ironic that Brandes' success as part of the Lombok expedition in rescuing the *Nagarakertagama* ultimately undermined the success of the whole colonial enterprise.³⁸ The Majapahit of Prapanca, Brandes, Kern and Krom was indeed to provide a powerful image for such later Indonesian nationalist writers as Muhammad Yamin as well as clearly inspiring the New Order. There were also attempts on the part of the Dutch, like their French colonialist counterparts in Indochina, to recreate on a physical level, through archaeological research, an ancient Southeast Asian empire. This can be seen in the considerable effort on the part of the Dutch scholar Maclaine-Pont to excavate and preserve the remains of Trowulan, the site of the Majapahit capital.³⁹

During the Second World War archaeological and historical research more or less came to a halt. In 1945 the Archaeological Service was taken over by Indonesia; the Dutch re-established their own Service and in 1950 the two institutions were amalgamated under Bernet Kempers. Although this latter figure was Dutch, many Indonesians began working as archaeologists and in 1953 the Service was handed over to Indonesia. Archaeology departments were established as units of history departments at three universities. There was a general shortage of trained personnel until the mid-1960's when links began to be developed with a variety of foreign scholars.⁴⁰ There was an increased emphasis on local initiative as having been important both during the Classical (i.e. Hindu-Buddhist) and Islamic periods. In 1975 the volume of work prompted the separation of the Archaeological

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 181.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 180.

³⁹ J.G. de Casparis, "Historical Writing of Indonesia," in *Historians of South East Asia*, ed. D.G.E. Hall (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 147.

⁴⁰ Tanudirjo, "Theoretical Trends in Indonesian Archaeology," 70.

Service into institutions for research and preservation. The rapid growth of research in recent decades has involved many multidisciplinary projects as well as some limited interest in current archaeological theories. Most research has employed a cultural historical approach involving the reconstruction of the events and trends of ancient and modern history.⁴¹

Since 1970, archaeology in Indonesia, like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, has become largely dominated by local practitioners, rather than by foreigners, and has become a more professional enterprise.⁴² Archaeology is the most labour intensive and expensive form of historical inquiry; further it requires extensive in-country field research. Consequently, it is not surprising that the same situation does not really apply to the general study of the Indonesian past; much work on the history of Indonesia stills involves the efforts of foreign scholars, particularly in the United States and Australia. But the contributions of Indonesian researchers are considered important ones, not simply as interesting additions to a process defined by Europeans, as was the case in colonial times. Two sources provide useful summaries of the type of archaeological work done during the New Order. A report published in 1996 by the Indonesian Department of Education and Culture, *Pemugaran dan Temuan Benda Cagar Budaya* (The Results of the Restoration and Discovery of Cultural Heritage), describes conservation and research work done from 1969 up to 1994.⁴³ The report includes 155 short descriptions of archaeological and historical sites. This does not represent the total amount of work undertaken by Indonesian government agencies during this period, which encompasses much of the New Order. But the sites examined can be considered (and are identified as) representative of a larger body of work. Time, space and the availability of photographs limit the number of actual descriptions but sites are drawn from every province of Indonesia and are in a variety of states of preservation, from excavations of prehistoric remains to functioning mosques.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Ibid., 71–72; cf. R. Soekomo, “Archaeology and Indonesian History,” 36.

⁴² John N. Miksic, “Evolving Archaeological Perspectives on Southeast Asia, 1970–95,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 26, no. 1 (1995): 60–61.

⁴³ *Hasil Pemugaran dan Temuan Benda Cagar Budaya* (The Results of the Restoration and Discovery of Cultural Heritage) (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1994). This text will be referred to below as the *Hasil Pemugaran*.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1.

Archaeologist John Miksic in a 1984 report provides a bibliographic survey of archaeological reports put out by various Indonesian government departments and institutes from 1978 to 1984. This list includes all externally available reports, studies and monographs put out by the government and Indonesian universities during the middle years of the New Order.⁴⁵

The Indonesian history industry as a whole cannot be dismissed as being merely a reflection of officially sanctioned views. From what the author has seen, historical and archaeological research as practiced during the New Order was certainly up to international scholarly standards. It was carried out with clear scientific objectives and could not be described as simply a source for regime propaganda. That being said, it should be remembered that in any country, developed or developing, academics have to justify their activities in terms of financial restraints and larger national priorities. In the case of Indonesia, some of the funding for archaeological research and conservation work came from foreign sources; this situation might have influenced what sites and topics the Indonesian history industry chose to examine. The United Nations provided funding for the restoration of Borobudur and a restored site would also be expected to bring in tourist revenue. The French were involved in funding and carrying out archaeological work at Banten in association with Indonesian scholars. Although it is true that foreign money, expertise and interest might push Indonesian scholars in certain direction, it is equally evident that final say in what gets excavated and restored lies with Indonesians. Unlike in previous decades, if Indonesians have no interest in particular sites and time periods research is not likely to proceed on the ground. Also, while far from a totalitarian regime, the New Order did exercise some controls over freedom of expression. Periods, events and individuals in the Indonesian past which were not favoured by the regime might expectedly be neglected. But such Indonesian scholars as Taufik Abdullah and Sartono Kartodirdjo did write many articles on subjects that were, beyond their "Indo-centric" focus, of little interest to New Order ideologues. The latter scholar notes that in fact in the case of Indonesia recent works of popular history might be more important in aiding the process of

⁴⁵ John N. Miksic, "Indonesian Publications on Archaeology, 1975-1982," *Indonesia Circle* 34 (1984): 45-50.

nation-building than more academic works.⁴⁶ The Majapahit of the *Nagarakertagama*, brought to life by Dutch scholars, certainly had an impact on subsequent scholars, both foreign and Indonesian, (the Majapahit capital of Trowulan was apparently used as a field school for Indonesian archaeologists in the 1990's).⁴⁷ But it was also an inspiration for certain Indonesian writers, who could more properly be described as polemicists, than as dispassionate scholars. Muhammad Yamin, working in a colonial milieu, wrote in Indonesian (Malay) rather than the Dutch of early local scholars like Djajadiningrat. He clearly saw the emerging Indonesian nation as the historically inevitable end product of a process beginning before the founding of Majapahit. The histories he wrote are both popular and national histories. It was these works which evidently inspired Sukarno and then in turn Suharto and the New Order, rather than more meticulously researched works which remain too obscure and/or ambiguous to act as effective tools in the nation-building process. Two of Yamin's work, *Gajah Mada: Pahlawan Persatuan Nusantara* (Gajah Mada: A Hero of National Unity) and *6000 Tahun Sang Merah-Putih* (6000 Years of the Sacred Red and White), are particularly useful for an understanding of the New Order attitude towards the past, although their author died in 1962.⁴⁸

A somewhat different type of historical analysis was very important to the New Order. This involved officially sanctioned histories of the events of the 1945 Revolution and the incident known in official parlance as "the coup attempt of the Gerakan September Tigapuluh." The latter event ushered in the New Order and has remained a point of controversy, inside and outside of Indonesia, to this day. Officially, blame for the murder of seven Indonesian army officers in the hours between September 30 and October 1, 1965, and the subsequent months of extreme violence, was placed squarely on the PKI. Many Western scholars and Indonesians who opposed the New Order disagreed with this assessment. The official positions on the Revolution and the 1965 incident are associated with the

⁴⁶ Kartodirdjo, *Indonesian Historiography*, 25.

⁴⁷ See Miksic, "Evolving Archaeological Perspectives," 58.

⁴⁸ Muhammad Yamin. *Gajah Mada: Pahlawan Persatuan Nusantara* (Gajah Mada: A Hero of the Unity of the Archipelago), 6th ed. (Jakarta: Dinas Penerbitan Balai Pustaka, 1960) and *6000 Tahun Sang Merah-Putih* (6000 Years of the Sacred Red and White) (Jakarta: Dinas Penerbitan Balai Pustaka Djakarta, 1958).

name of Nugroho Notosusanto. He was also, as will be noted below, instrumental in the conceptualization of New Order textbooks. His views on both ancient and recent history can be seen as representative of those of the Suharto regime. A trained historian, he held a long fascination with military matters. He had served during the struggle against the Dutch in the Tentara Belajar (the Student Army) and if his father, who was a professor of Islamic Law at Gajah Mada University, had not prevented it he would have chosen a military education. Instead he enrolled in the Faculty of Letters at the University of Indonesia. As a writer of short stories, a student leader and as one possessing a notable intellect he attracted the attention of such important people as the historian Onghokam and the left-leaning, Guided-Democracy-era Minister of Education Priyono. In 1965 Notosusanto was approached by the armed forces chief of staff Abdul Haris Nasution and asked to join a team of researchers who were charged with writing an account of the independence struggle. Nasution had been instrumental in the formation of the Indonesian army as a modern professional force and he continued to play a prominent role in the Indonesian political scene; throughout the 1950's and early 1960's he was an advocate for the army playing a strong but limited role in national politics. He was army chief of staff from 1949–1952 and again from 1955–1962 as well as Minister of Defence from 1956–1966. Aside from Sukarno himself, he may have been the most powerful man in Indonesia during the early years of Guided Democracy (a period from 1959 until 1965 during which constitutional democracy ceased to function, instead Indonesia was run by means of a variety of new non-elected institutions and through direct presidential decree; the Guided Democracy period involved a three-way struggle for power between Sukarno, the army and the PKI and was one of economic collapse and foreign policy crisis). Notosusanto's account was to be written from the perspective of the military in opposition to a similar history planned by the leftist National Front, who the army feared would ignore the PKI involvement in the 1948 Madiun Affair (an uprising suppressed by troops of the Republic of Indonesia led by Nasution). Notosusanto accepted the offer and when this project was completed he was involved in the establishment of the Armed Forces History Centre and most importantly the writing of the official history of the coup attempt. While continuing to turn out a considerable amount of written material, he also ran several museums and assisted with film

projects. In 1984 he was made Minister of Education and as such rewrote school curricula to emphasize the historical role of the military. He continued to teach at the University of Indonesia while at the Armed Forces History Centre and while earning honorary promotions in the armed forces (at the time of his death in 1985 he held the rank of brigadier general). In his own words he inhabited two worlds, that of academia and that of the military, and was really not comfortable in either. Many academics rejected his more controversial projects and some in the armed forces were sceptical towards his unearned martial pretensions.⁴⁹ Notosusanto certainly confirms to scholarly norms more than Muhammad Yamin. But like Yamin he was far from a neutral observer and in many ways can be seen as a “court writer”, producing hymns of praise and justification for the regime in power. Notosusanto provides two important texts, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces of Indonesia* and *The Coup Attempt of the ‘September 30 Movement’ in Indonesia*, which are critical to an understanding of New Order perceptions of recent history and perhaps even for understanding the legitimacy of the regime itself.⁵⁰

As noted earlier, Sartono Kartodirdjo sees popular histories as being more important for understanding a nation’s approach to its past than academic works. Popular works include biographies, which have a very eager audience. The appeal of biographical works is enhanced by a tendency towards hero-worship.⁵¹ Biographies and autobiographies have a long tradition in Indonesia. The *Nagarakertagama* is an account of the activities of a Majapahit king, while such works as the *Sejarah Melayu* and the *Hikayat Banjar* were meant to give a ruler legitimacy by describing his genealogy and great deeds.⁵² These court-produced documents were felt to be as necessary for a long and stable reign as the performance of the proper ceremonies or having wealth, retainers and magical heirlooms. In later centuries

⁴⁹ Kate McGregor, “A Soldier’s Historian,” *Inside Indonesia* (October–December 2001): 8–9.

⁵⁰ Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Centre for Armed Forces History, 1975) and Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the ‘September 30 Movement’ in Indonesia* (Jakarta: PT Pembimbing Masa-Djakarta, 1968). For more on Nasution see C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1985).

⁵¹ Kartodirdjo, *Indonesian Historiography*, 25.

⁵² Brown, *Sejarah Melayu*; J.J. Ras, *Hikayat Banjar*.

the published pronouncements of prominent nationalist figures were assigned great importance, whether in the form of letters, speeches or memoirs. The letters of Kartini, written to a Dutch friend and published after the Javanese aristocrat's death, were held to symbolize the struggle of the Indonesian people moving "through Darkness to Light."⁵³ The struggle against the Dutch produced works by such leaders as Mohammed Hatta and Sutan Syahrir.⁵⁴ The debates and conflicts that dominated the post-Independence period are reflected in the works of such political personages as Ali Sastroamijayo (a prime minister under Sukarno) and D.N. Aidit (chairman of the PKI).⁵⁵ Sukarno himself was responsible for several books both of a biographical and an analytical nature.⁵⁶ Suharto, while not given to as deep a level of political introspection as his predecessor, produced an autobiography, which has been translated into English.⁵⁷ It certainly paints a rather different picture of the New Order (and Indonesia) and its past accomplishments (and future promise) than such biographical works penned by foreigners as Michael Vatikiotis' *Indonesian Politics under Suharto*, David Jenkins' *Suharto and his Generals* or R.E. Elson's *Suharto: A Political Biography*.⁵⁸ Acting as a sort of a companion piece to Suharto's own words is a sympathetic biography by the German journalist O.G. Roeder. Although its author claims that it is neither an authorized biography nor "a hymn of praise" to the president it was written with official assistance and was published in New Order Jakarta.⁵⁹ Elson treats the work as a

⁵³ See *Letters from Kartini: An Indonesian Feminist 1900–1904*, trans. Joost Cote (Clayton, Australia: Monash University, 1992).

⁵⁴ *Mohammed Hatta: Memoir* (Jakarta: Tintamas Indonesia, 1982); Sutan Sjahrir, *Our Struggle*, trans with intro. Benedict Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968).

⁵⁵ *Milestones of My Journey: The Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijayo Indonesian Patriot and Political Leader*, ed. C.L.M. Penders (St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1979); *The Selected Works of D.N. Aidit* (Washington D.C: Joint Publications Research Service, 1959).

⁵⁶ See for example, Sukarno, *An Autobiography: As told to Cindy Adams* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965); *Nationalism, Islam and Marxism*, intro. Ruth McVey (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).

⁵⁷ Suharto, *Soeharto: My Thoughts, Words and Deeds, an Autobiography as told to G. Dwiipayana and Ramadhan K.H.* (Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989).

⁵⁸ Michael Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto*; David Jenkins, *Soeharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁵⁹ O.G. Roeder, *The Smiling General* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1970).

“semi-official account.” Ricklefs describes Roeder’s work as an “authorized biography.”⁶⁰ At the very least it might reflect Suharto’s views on recent events.

Historic and National Monuments

Monuments have a very long history in Indonesia and have been constructed to serve a variety of functions. In ancient Java, *candi* (temples) were built to venerate Hindu gods, such as Vishnu or Shiva, or to explain Buddhist doctrine to the faithful. Temples were associated with their royal builders; *raja* were considered semi-divine, having a special relationship with the gods. It is possible that temples may have served as objects of ancestor veneration through their association with Javanese rulers. They were also “points of power”, a focus of spiritual, social and economic activity in a given area.⁶¹ In a primarily agricultural society, based on wet-rice terraced farming, and lacking many urban centers, *candi* could be seen as the embodiment of how society was supposed to be ordered, with willing and productive peasants producing wealth, which would be used by their rulers to provide a divinely sanctioned stability. The *kraton*, the royal compound, served both symbolic and practical purposes. Neither a Hindu ruler of Majapahit, nor a Muslim Sultan of Mataram, was considered a wholly secular ruler. Legitimacy and power were derived both from such mundane sources as control of resources and retainers and from having a divine destiny, a prestigious genealogy, supernatural allies and access to magical tools and weapons. In a sense the *kraton* was not just a residence, nor even a seat of government (in any event a rather anachronistic concept) but a source of otherworldly power, which by representing in symbolic terms the place of the ruler in the cosmos was able to increase that ruler’s earthly authority.

The Dutch drew on a much different monumental tradition. The Dutch government in the Indies were operating as the representatives of a distant, foreign-based sovereign. Most buildings put up by

⁶⁰ *Suharto*, 3; M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, 3rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 437.

⁶¹ Kenneth Hall, “Economic History of Early Southeast Asia,” 205–206.

the colonial authorities were thus rather functional and monuments commemorating events in Dutch history, would be more at home in the centers of Dutch towns than in the tropics. The Dutch did, however, construct a series of palaces which reflected their power in such places as Batavia (Jakarta) and Bogor. Some of these palaces were used by later Indonesian leaders, such as Sukarno and Suharto. The former built many monumental comments on historical (and usually recent) developments and somewhat uniquely the Monas, in central Jakarta, an architectural prompt to remind the viewer of a vague, but glorious, ancient Hindu past.⁶² Suharto and the New Order continued this tradition with the veneration of actual historical sites such as Trowulan and Lubang Baya (the Crocodile Hole). Considerable effort was spent presenting the former site to the Indonesian public. A “Majapahit cast” was given to the adjacent regions of East Java, through new monuments, some of them quite humble, such as decorated courtyard walls for individual family dwellings.⁶³ The Crocodile Hole was a disused well at the Halim Airbase on the outskirts of Jakarta, where on October 1, 1965 the bodies of seven slain military officers were dumped. Since then the site has taken on the character of a shrine to dead national heroes.⁶⁴

Near Halim is Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park). Taman Mini is not the site of a famous battle or a famous birth, nor is it in the traditional sense a museum. It could be described as a nationalistic theme park, intended by the New Order to convey a particular image of the Indonesian past and present it to the Indonesian public and the world at large. The 174-hectare site cleared in 1975 was designed to show 27 exhibits, one for each province. It was designed both to show the diversity of the Indonesia population and to act as a showpiece for Pancasila, the Indonesian state philosophy. The site can be seen as a celebration of *bhinneka tunggal ika* (“Unity in Diversity”), conveying the message that Indonesia’s foundations are its people and that its different

⁶² Benedict Anderson, “Cartoons and Monuments: The Evolution of Political Communication under the New Order,” in *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 173–176.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 177–179.

⁶⁴ Klaus H. Schreiner, “National Ancestors: The Ritual Construction of Nationhood,” in *The Potent Dead: Ancestors, Saints and Heroes in Contemporary Indonesia*, ed. Henri Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 197.

cultures and customs are held together by common traditions.⁶⁵ Like the history industry, the veneration of sites and the construction of monuments, the creation of a theme park with a message cannot really be seen as a New Order innovation. Open-air museums dedicated to popular anthropological topics are common in Southeast Asia (Taman Mini was partially inspired by visits by Suharto's wife Tien to Timland, outside of Bangkok and to Disneyland). This was an old concept in Indonesia itself, linked to tourism (and its political use). The Dutch introduced tourism to Bali shortly after the bloody 1908 pacification of the island (this culminated in the *puputan*, a bloody massacre/mass suicide of Balinese nobles in the main square of Denpasar). Tourism, which was actively encouraged on the island only a few years later, was intended not only as an economic measure but also as a means to restore the tarnished Dutch image overseas. The decision was taken to revive the "real Bali" and turn the island into a "living museum". The Balinese were identified as the last guardians of a Hindu culture that had flourished before the collapse of the kingdom of Majapahit and the rise of Islam in Java. A romanticized Bali was created to serve as a cloak for harsh colonial realities and a disturbingly violent past; Bali "the Island of Demons", a home of slave traders and warriors was transformed into a land of peaceful artists.⁶⁶ One of the first museums in Asia to make use of traditional buildings and open-air displays was the Bali Museum in Denpasar, arranged by Walter Spies in the 1930's.⁶⁷ Taman Mini uses similar open-air displays (it includes parkland, a lake and a vari-

⁶⁵ Michael Hitchcock, "Indonesia in Miniature," in *Images of Malay-Indonesian Identity*, ed. Michael Hitchcock and Victor King (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), 228. Pancasila refers to the "five principles" on which the nation was founded. They are: *ketuhanan yang maha esa* (belief in a supreme God), *kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab* (a just and civilized humanitarianism), *persatuan Indonesia* (the unity of Indonesia), *kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/ perwakilan* (the sovereignty of the people guided by wise polices that have been decided upon through both deliberation and representation), *keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia* (social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people). The five principles were originally proposed by Sukarno in June 1945 and were written into the 1945, 1949 and 1950 Indonesian constitutions. Although originally devised as a means to balance the ideological demands of the various segments of the Indonesian nationalist movement and Indonesian society as a whole, Pancasila underwent a variety of interpretations during the Guided Democracy and New Order periods.

⁶⁶ Hitchcock, "Indonesia in Miniature," 228; cf. Adrian Vickers, *Bali: A Paradise Created* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1987).

⁶⁷ Hitchcock, "Indonesia in Miniature," 228.

ety of buildings, many constructed in traditional architectural styles). Artefacts from across the archipelago are exhibited; some are of recent construction, while others are the sort of antiques that one might expect to find in a museum. Fish and birds, native to Indonesia, are even present, although the site is not really a zoo. If one were to try to understand Taman Mini in terms of its traditional function in an Indonesian context one might describe it as a cross between a *candi* or temple (there are in fact several functioning houses of worship on the site) and a *kraton* or palace (the word *taman* or garden is sometimes used to refer to palaces, such as the Taman Sari, the eighteenth century “Water Palace” in Yogyakarta). It can be seen as symbolic of how the New Order conceives of its past and its present (and how it would like to be understood by outsiders). Perhaps it is intended as a more modern and complete version of such ancient sites as the *candi* of Borobudur and the ruined Majapahit *kraton* of Trowulan. It might also function as a replacement for the *kraton* of Central Java which, while old, are also inconveniently inhabited by Javanese royalty who might compete for Suharto and his regime in terms of prestige.

Other New Order monuments are much more modest and less permanent in nature than Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. Under the New Order each year between July and September the sidewalks bordering Merdeka Square in Jakarta were decorated with painted billboards depicting scenes from Indonesian history and society in commemoration of Independence Day. These billboards glorify the regime’s achievements in regards to political stability, and social and economic developments. The scenes can be seen as an assertion of state ideology and a statement on the part of the regime as to which elements of the Indonesian past and present are fitting components of the national identity.⁶⁸ As celebratory markers of an event which preceded (and surpassed in popularity) the New Order itself, these billboards can be seen as shorthand versions of official textbooks. Also of note, rather surprisingly, is Sukarno’s tomb at Blitar. Although the resting-place of the man whom Suharto replaced, it is clearly a New Order monument. The tomb is located in the centre of the East Javanese town of Blitar (the birthplace of Indonesia’s first

⁶⁸ Jean-Luc Maurer, “A New Order Sketchpad of Indonesian History,” in *Images of Malay-Indonesian Identity*, 209.

president) and draws on the Javanese past for inspiration. Timothy Lindsey identifies the site as “the architectural equivalent of nationalist historical writing.” Sukarno (and by extension his successor Suharto) is identified as the heir to the traditions of a glorious Javanese past. The tomb can also be read as a national *pusaka*, a magically charged heirloom. In building this historically symbolic tomb Suharto and the New Order were able to partake of Sukarno’s power and prestige, whether they are political or quasi-mystical in nature.⁶⁹ (Representations of the supposed continuity between the best of the Sukarno era and the promise of the New Order can be found in some unusual places; a mural in Yogyakarta’s Garuda Hotel shows Sukarno cheerfully handing the Supersemar document, whereby he relinquished power, to a smiling Suharto, against a backdrop of shiny development projects, by 2004 it had been removed). Sukarno’s tomb is very popular with visitors, both Indonesians and foreigners. Lindsey notes that the grave site is often the center of overnight vigils, people come to meditate and pray and offerings are often left.⁷⁰ T-shirts, showing Sukarno in a variety of poses, are available for the less spiritually inclined. In fact the tomb can be seen as a pilgrimage site. Pilgrimage has a very long history in Indonesia. Examples include the Majapahit monarch visiting various shrines within his realm, visits to the tombs of the *wali songo* (semi-legendary saints associated with the coming of Islam to Java) and the *hajj* to Mecca. The latter, since the advent of the steamboat in the nineteenth century, has drawn more and more Indonesians. As a pilgrimage site, Sukarno’s tomb presented a dilemma for the New Order regime: it stressed the continuity of Old and New Orders and past Javanese greatness, but at the same time was the actual tomb of a man whose legacy the regime had hoped would be largely forgotten. The site was not supposed to be “a big draw” (Suharto refused the Sukarno family’s request that the president be buried at his favourite home in Bogor; this was too close to Jakarta).⁷¹ This may be why the tomb is not described in great detail in *Discover Indonesia*.⁷²

⁶⁹ Timothy Lindsey, “Concrete Ideology: Taste, Tradition and the Javanese Past in New Order Public Space,” in *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia*, ed. by V.M. Hooker (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993), 170.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁷¹ Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, 458.

⁷² *Discover Indonesia: A Travel Guide to the Indonesian Archipelago, the Official Guidebook of the Indonesian Tourist Promotion Board* (Jakarta: Bali Intermedia and ITPB, 1991).

Discover Indonesia is an officially sanctioned guidebook put out to promote “Visit Indonesia Year”, a concerted effort to showcase Indonesia to the world and convince foreigners to visit. Guidebooks, aimed mostly at foreign tourists (this is usually indicated by the availability of these books in European languages), present a certain view of a country’s people, culture and past to the reader. This view is almost always somewhat distorted, even in commercial guidebooks, which are intended simply to make a visitor’s time in a country easier and more enjoyable. Such distortion can only be more pronounced in official literature. Note has already been made of the tourist past, which like the remembered, popular past, is not overly concerned with academic accuracy nor academic controversies. This tourist past, clearly discernible in official guidebooks, often draws on both official and to some extent academic pasts for its raw material. In other words, in examining an official guidebook one can see what academic past, as recovered by local and foreign scholars, a government feels would be most useful to represent the country and its historical achievements to the world at large. *Discover Indonesia* provides some indication of which monuments, archaeological sites and even periods of history the regime found significant.

Textbooks

It seems self-evident that in designing textbooks to teach the nation’s children and young adults about the past, even the most even-handed government would present a somewhat biased version of the past. The pragmatic need to present history in a simplified format often leads to an avoidance of dealing with historiographical controversies. Complex historical factors might be ignored in favour of an emphasis on easy-to-remember events and personages, such as battles and “founding fathers”. Certainly “national history” will be just that; the place and importance of a given nation will be emphasized even in regards to world events. The Indonesian scholar G.J. Resink notes that Dutch textbooks (and the more scholarly works behind them) portrayed a pre-European history for Indonesia that was Java-centred. There was an emphasis on Majapahit. Modern history was almost entirely focused on the Dutch East Indies Company and the Dutch colonial authorities. An Indonesian student during the Dutch period learned nothing about local history before 1600 or about

Indonesian social conditions in more recent centuries. Indonesian heroes were routinely shown as villains for opposing the Dutch.⁷³ The first historical textbook by an Indonesian was written in Dutch by the Eurasian political activist and educator E.F.E. Douwes Dekker for the pupils of his Ksatrian Institute in the 1930's although it was not published until 1942.⁷⁴ A brief history appeared in 1938, produced by two obscure Indonesian writers. It faithfully followed the pattern of the standard Dutch textbook by Eykman and Stapel and later commentators expressed surprise that it had even been written by Indonesians (the former work, *Leerboek der Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Oost-Indie*, was used in high schools and was in its ninth edition by 1939).⁷⁵ A more substantial history was put out during the Japanese occupation by the Indonesian nationalist poet Sanusi Pane.⁷⁶ It was at this time, and under Japanese supervision, that the history of the Indies was turned into Indonesian history; the Dutch were shown as evil colonialists and all the present suffering of Indonesians was attributed to them.⁷⁷

After Independence the Ministry of Education and Culture tried, with little success, to issue standardized history textbooks. Texts written by the ministry were deemed as unsatisfactory by most teachers and this shortcoming was met by a large number of widely circulated mimeographed notes, outlines and summaries. The ministry also issued, through the Teacher Training Institute in Bandung, a history book intended to act as a guide to elementary and secondary teachers and for aspiring teachers. Much of this material was in fact based on earlier Dutch models, in particular F.W Stapel's work. This situation whereby the history of the Dutch East Indies was trans-

⁷³ See Anthony Reid, "The Nationalist Quest for an Indonesian Past," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, 293.

⁷⁴ E.F.E. Douwes Dekker *Ichtisar Riwajat Indonesia Koeno dan Permai oentok Sekolah Menengah* (A Summary of the Ancient and Beautiful Story of Indonesia for Secondary School), trans. L. Hoetabarat and L. Siahaan (Bandung: Poestaka Ksastria, 1942?). See Reid, "The Nationalist Quest", 282.

⁷⁵ Zainoeddin Saleh and Anwar Dusky, *Ringkasan Sedjarah Indonesia* (A Summary of the History of Indonesia) (Padang: Express, 1938). See Reid "The Nationalist Quest," 281.

⁷⁶ Sanusi Pane's book was long used as a textbook, *Sedjarah Indonesia* (History of Indonesia), 6th ed. (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1965). See Reid, "The Nationalist Quest," 281.

⁷⁷ Mohammad Ali, "Historiographical Problems," in *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, 1.

formed into the history of Indonesia by simply making it the opposite of what had come before was bound to cause confusion amongst both students and the general public.⁷⁸ For this reason, and because it was felt that Indonesian history was not really being taught in a scientific manner, the ministry decided to entrust Gajah Mada University and the University of Indonesia with the task of holding a history seminar. The seminar was held in 1957 at the former university and attracted the attention of the top Indonesian scholars of the time. It was hoped that this seminar would deal with the political problem of defining and developing the national character while addressing the fact that the scientific restrictions of studying history properly might make the former task difficult. The history seminar was to deal with a variety of theoretical topics. Of note were the tasks of deciding which periods Indonesian history should be divided into and what material should make up the textbooks to be used for the teaching of history in Indonesian schools.⁷⁹

The seminar is of particular note for this study because many of its conclusions were not in fact implemented until the rise of the New Order. A standardized history text was long in forthcoming. When a text did appear, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, it fully reflected New Order concepts of what the Indonesian identity was and what past historical circumstances had produced such an identity. Veteran Indonesian historian Sartono Kartodirdjo was the general editor for the book's first edition. In his introduction to this edition, included in subsequent editions, he discusses the path that led from the 1957 seminar to the eventual publication of a history text for Indonesian high schools. It was widely held by those who attended the seminar that Dutch books were no longer appropriate and that available books by Indonesians did not truly reflect a national reality. The seminar did not really fulfill expectations but it did emphasize the role of national history as a tool for educating Indonesians about their national identity. In 1963 a committee was formed to begin writing a history of Indonesia but the political and social situation at the time prevented much progress. The next step was the Second National History seminar held in Yogyakarta in August 1970. A new generation of historians put forward a variety of papers covering the

⁷⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 3.

many periods of the Indonesian past, from the prehistoric to the present. There were sufficient personnel to complete the task of writing a national history; the historians proposed to the Minister of Education and Culture that a team be set up for this purpose; the latter appointed the Committee for the Compilation of an Indonesian National History Standard Book Based on Pancasila.⁸⁰ The book was a very popular text during the New Order. Nugroho Notosusanto, who worked on the first edition, noted that it went through a number of editions (1977, 1981–1983, 1984) and that by the fourth edition it had earned the nickname “standard text” and was being used in Indonesian high schools. He felt that revisions were probably needed to incorporate new scientific discoveries.⁸¹ The various editions noted had more of the character of reprints with new covers and introductions than thorough rewritings.

In the introduction to the first edition Sartono Kartodirdjo describes the purpose of the book. He notes that decolonisation should also lead to a decolonisation of the writing of history. Indonesians had long been cut off from their own history and the activities of the Dutch colonists had been given undue attention. It was not enough to simply reverse the roles of Dutch hero and Indonesian villain but an attempt would have to be made to understand what forces had produced the Indonesian nation. In writing a new history some prerequisites were evident. A new history must be a “history from within”, where the Indonesian people were the main focus. All factors, whether economic, political, social or cultural, which affected the development of the Indonesian people must be examined. All groups: soldiers, nobles, religious functionaries and peasants involved in this process should be given proper credit. The history of Indonesia should be described as a single synthesis with an emphasis on national integration. Indonesia despite its diversity could be considered to have a single identity, which could be clearly identified within its current borders. The current national generation should be made fully aware that Indonesians are one people. The development of national unity is dependent on the development of an Indonesian

⁸⁰ See Marwati Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (National History of Indonesia), 6 vols., 4th ed. (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI, 1990), Vol. 1.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, vii–ix.

history.⁸² The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* was put together by teams of writers and editors. Notosusanto directed Volume VI “Jaman Jepang dan Republik Indonesia” (The Time of Japan and the Republic of Indonesia), while archaeologist Uka Tjandrasasmita, with the assistance of Hasan Muarif Ambary, was the driving force behind Volume III on Indonesia’s Islamic kingdoms. Volume II which deals with the Hindu-Buddhist (Classical) period was brought out by anthropologist Bambang Sumadio. The textbook seems clearly intended for the task of nation building. This is further indicated by the involvement in the project of Nugroho Notosusanto. In his foreword to the fourth edition Notosusanto, by then Minister of Education and Culture, states that the book was intended to unify and develop Indonesians. History was to be taught to the young in such a way that change would take place in “an atmosphere of harmony, balancing continuity and change”.⁸³ Unity and development were concepts at the heart of the New Order as was a rather conservative way of implementing change.

Nugroho Notosusanto was involved in another New Order textbook project, *30 Tahun Merdeka* (Thirty Years of Freedom). This was a four-volume book, generously illustrated, put out to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence in August 1945. The text of *30 Tahun Merdeka* is based on that of the sixth volume of the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. This more accessible version of the latter work was used in the required course of Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa (Education in the History of the National Struggle). This subject, in theory separate from the teaching of Sejarah (history), was introduced in 1985 by Notosusanto as part of a program of ideological indoctrination in Pancasila.⁸⁴ Another work aimed at making Indonesian history (and its heroes) a subject that could be more easily understood and appreciated by the nation’s youth is the *Album Pahlawan Bangsa* (Album of the Nation’s Heroes).⁸⁵ The first printing was in 1977, and subsequent versions

⁸² Ibid., Vol. I, xiv–xvi.

⁸³ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 1, vii. Poesponegoro and Notosusanto were the general editors of the 4th edition, which will be used by this study.

⁸⁴ *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka* (30 Years of Indonesian Freedom) (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik, 1975). See David Bourchier, “The 1950’s in New Order Ideology and Politics”, in *Democracy in Indonesia: The 1950’s and 1990’s* (Monash: Monash University Press, 1994), 51–52.

⁸⁵ *Album Pahlawan Bangsa* (An Album of the Nation’s Heroes), 16th Ed. (Jakarta: Mutiara Sumber Widya, 2001).

remained unchanged except for the correction of minor errors in grammar and of course the addition of newly minted *pahlawan*. Although this work was put out by a private publisher, it was given government sanction and includes a letter of encouragement from the Minister of Education and Culture.⁸⁶ It consists of one-page descriptions of a variety of men and women, from across the Archipelago and from every religion and ethnic group, who contributed to Indonesia's achieving and preserving its independence as a unified nation. Each description is accompanied by an illustration. Each hero included in the album is one that had been officially recognized by a process originally initiated by Sukarno.⁸⁷ By the end of the New Order 101 individuals had been elevated to the status of *pahlawan* of the Nation or of the Revolution. The government eventually brought out its own biographies of these national *pahlawan* consisting of a five-volume work entitled *Wajah dan Sejarah Perjuangan Pahlawan Nasional* (Face and History of the Struggle of the National Heroes).⁸⁸ Like the earlier private work, the descriptions of each hero tended to be rather stereotypical in nature; *pahlawan* had all fought (and in some cases died) for the glory of the modern unitary Republic of Indonesia (a state that had achieved perfection in its New Order incarnation).

⁸⁶ Ibid., ii.

⁸⁷ On the procedures and criteria for selecting *pahlawan* see Klaus H. Schreiner, "The Making of National Heroes," in *Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt (Leiden: KITLV, 1997), 259–266.

⁸⁸ *Wajah dan Sejarah Perjuangan Pahlawan Nasional* (The Face and History of the Struggle of National Heroes), 5 vols. (Jakarta: Departemen Sosial R.I., Direktorat Urusan Kepahlawan dan Perintis Kemerdekaan, 1994–1995).

CHAPTER TWO

HEROES AND GOLDEN AGES—THE HINDU-BUDDHIST, ISLAMIC AND COLONIAL PAST REMEMBERED

In this chapter an analysis will be offered of how the New Order viewed the pre-Independence history of Indonesia. Three broad periods are of note: the Hindu-Buddhist (Majapahit-Srivijaya) period, the Islamic period and the era of Dutch colonial rule. In describing this New Order past emphasis will be placed on “golden ages” and the activities of “national heroes”. An assessment will be made as to the overall importance attached to each era by the regime and how each era might be seen as part of a larger official past. It will also be shown how the New Order saw certain elements of the Indonesian past as instructive to the running of a modern state and society.

Taman Mini Indonesia Indah and the Srivijaya-Majapahit “Problem”

In his well-known “Pertamina” speech, quoted in *Harian Kami*, January 7, 1972, President Suharto made some rather impassioned references to the glories of the pre-Islamic Indonesian polities of Buddhist Srivijaya and Hindu Majapahit. His wife Tien Suharto had recently proposed an expensive and prestigious project that had generated a great deal of controversy. After a March 1971 trip to Thailand, where Timland, a nationalist or nationalistic theme park had been recently built, Madame Suharto was inspired to plan a similar project for Indonesia.¹ The Proyek Minatur Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Project) was to be constructed by the Yayasan Harapan Kita (Our Hope Foundation) chaired by Madame Suharto. As described in *Tempo*, November 27, 1971, the project was to consist of a fenced-in 100-hectare compound with an eight-hectare artificial lake, in which islands representing Indonesia would be placed. There would also be twenty-six *adat* (traditional) houses, one from

¹ Anderson, “Cartoons and Monuments,” 176.

each province, containing local handicrafts, a one-thousand room tourist hotel, an imitation waterfall, a cable car, a revolving restaurant and an outdoor theatre and other attractions. The park was not a popular idea and it sparked student protests and editorial condemnation. According to *Tempo*, May 20, 1971, as early as May 1971, some of the people evicted to make way for the park were complaining to the Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute). They had been compelled to sell their land to the Yayasan at less than half its value; the land they were given in compensation was of much lesser quality. Student protests, according to *Sinar Harapan*, December 16, 22, 28, 1971, began in Jakarta on December 16, spreading to Bandung on the December 23 and Yogyakarta on December 28, 1971.²

In reply the projects sponsors tried to clarify the purpose of the undertaking. Tien Suharto, according to *Sinar Harapan*, gave a speech to the Working Conference of Provincial Governors on December 1, 1971, in which she urged governors to contribute financially to her project. She felt that it would serve to project their cultures onto the Jakarta stage for the benefit of international tourists. She went on to say:

If in the olden days, our ancestors worked co-operatively together (*bergotong-royong*) to create the Borobudur, which now commands the attention of the whole world, today we too can work co-operatively to build the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Project.³

In a subsequent speech, cited in *Harian Kami*, December 16, 1971, aimed at her critics, Ny Suharto continued:

Whatever happens, I won't retreat an inch! This project must go through! Its implementation won't retreat a single step! For this project is not a prestige project—some of its purposes are to be of service to the People. The timing of its construction is also just right—so long as I'm alive. For someone's conception cannot possibly be carried out by someone else, only by the conceiver herself—unless I am summoned by God in the meantime!⁴

The criticism continued and Suharto responded with threats of his own, quoted in *Harian Kami*, January 7, 1972:

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., 177.

Quite frankly, I'll deal with them! No matter who they are! Anyone who refuses to understand this warning frankly I'll deal with them! If they go on making trouble, it's no problem for me! I'll use Supersemar!⁵

He went on to say that the project was intended to familiarize tourists with Indonesia and to raise national consciousness. Since there were so few remains of Srivijaya and Majapahit, new things were needed to raise national consciousness and pride. Anderson notes that both the president and his wife linked Mini to the glories of the Indonesian past and that this may be related to a similar building project in East Java, which will be noted below.⁶

Of note is the vehemence of the debate (or more accurately the vehemence of the Suharto family's attack on their critics). The students and landless peasants seemed to have a point (money wasted on a vanity project in a poor country with land inequities) but judging from the president's comments these critics were a serious threat to national stability. Also of note is the project's unreality. Southeast Asia was still experiencing heavy conflict, in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Tourists, at least those who would want or could afford to stay at a thousand-room hotel (which was never built), were virtually non-existent in Indonesia (except for a small trickle in Bali). Tourists in Indonesia were still mostly of the Kabul, Katmandhu and Kuta variety, and business people would almost all stay downtown. Why the concern? Was there a deeper political context? Could any criticism be considered a threat? Was this project part of a larger and desperately felt need, to foster consensus and shore up the president's legitimacy? Whom was the Mini really intended for? Finally, why Suharto's concern with Srivijaya and Majapahit? It is true that few sites remain from these two great empires. But Indonesia has impressive attractions from other civilizations, which can both attract tourists and foster national pride, like Borobudur (it is interesting that this project was started before serious restoration work was begun on the latter site). It is of interest why these two empires should have such a prominence in defining national pride. Both are virtually unknown to outsiders. Srivijaya is also largely unknown to

⁵ Ibid. Supersemar (Surat Sebelas Maret, March 11 Letter) refers to a document which transferred political power from Sukarno to Suharto. Significantly, Suharto was often associated with Semar, the clown-god from the *wayang* play.

⁶ Anderson, "Cartoons and Monuments," 177.

Indonesians; European scholars promoted its popularity in the 1920's. Majapahit retains a large place in popular history (last empire before Islam, ancestor of Bali, controlled most of Archipelago), but the scarcity of its remains is problematic. In his speech, and this project, it seems clear that Suharto is looking for a solution of how to use the past to inspire the present.

Ironically Taman Mini Indonesia Indah contains little in the way of direct references to either Srivijaya or Majapahit. The pavilion for the province of East Java houses a stone panel done in a manner very reminiscent of a temple from anywhere in the Javanese past, not necessarily from Majapahit itself. Taman Mini does contain, in the Central Javanese pavilion, a specific reference to Borobudur, a scale model of the temple. Both the eighth century Buddhist monument of Borobudur and the ninth century Hindu temple complex of Prambanan have been the focus of major restoration projects and are currently major draws for tourists, both domestic and foreign.⁷ This may of course be because both sites are in close proximity to the city of Yogyakarta. This city is presently a major arts centre and Indonesia's premier university city as well as the home of a Sultanate, which still retains a great deal of prestige and some power in the present Republic of Indonesia. Neither Borobudur nor Prambanan was produced by the two civilizations noted by Suharto in his speech (although the builders of the former, the Sailendra dynasty, did have some connections to Srivijaya). In fact these sites seem strangely disconnected from any real history. Indonesians may be proud that their ancestors produced Borobudur but no kingdoms, battles, epics and gods associated with it have entered the popular memory. Anderson notes that when the famous Indonesian artist Oesman Effendi was commissioned by the Indonesian government to do a standard painting of the monument to be displayed in Indonesian schools he painted Borobudur as a gleaming white temple. The intricate decorated panels, which show aspects of ancient life, and for which the temple is renowned, were also missing. Perhaps as importantly, the temple is shown as empty of any human visitors.⁸ It might be argued that the New Order is chiefly interested in a vague "Hindu-

⁷ See Jacques Dumarçay, *Borobudur and his Temples of Java*, trans. and ed. Michael Smithies (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), 25–27, 42–48.

⁸ Anderson, "Cartoons and Monuments," 179–180.

Java” past which is seen as the true heritage of Indonesia as a whole. This past is seen as physically surviving in such ancient monuments as Borobudur and Prambanan. It also includes Javanese mannerisms and concepts (deference to authority, *halus* or refined behaviour, *gotong-royong*, *wayang kulit* (the shadow puppet play), the ancient Indian epic of the Ramayana and even traditional Javanese mysticism). The words Srivijaya and more commonly Majapahit refer to this same past; the actual physical remains of the two civilizations receive less official attention.

National History: Srivijaya, Majapahit and the Golden Age

This may be because these names are highly evocative of what has been called Indonesia’s “national history” or “nationalist orthodoxy”. Hong Lysa notes that with decolonization there emerged in Southeast Asia a rejection of colonial historiography and its replacement by national history. At its harshest this national history saw the colonial period as one of darkness, which had cut the nation off from a glorious past and was largely responsible for all current problems. New regimes drew, usually without any acknowledgment, on earlier colonial discoveries and used this past to shape the future.⁹ Indonesia’s national past, with a core based on discoveries made by Dutch scholars and developed further by nationalist thinkers such as Sukarno and Muhammad Yamin, was one that saw Majapahit in particular as a golden age of national unity and power. Along the same lines Anthony Reid describes the nationalist historical orthodoxy as being one in which great Hindu kingdoms had united the archipelago, followed by 350 years of Dutch oppression marked by the resistance of national heroes. These heroes could be found in every region of the country and had been produced by every group of people who would later be known as Indonesians. The needs of such an orthodoxy “allowed little room for historical judgment or even causation, except when discussing the Dutch.”¹⁰ Academic niceties were not of prime importance.

During the independence struggle, earlier local identities had been problematic for nationalist thinkers; sharing Dutch-run classrooms

⁹ Hong Lysa, “History,” 50.

¹⁰ Reid, “The Nationalist Quest,” 298.

with students from across the archipelago, they had to move beyond seeing themselves as Javanese, Minangkabau or Sundanese.¹¹ A Javanese identity was unsatisfactory as it placed too much of an emphasis on a history which was viewed by many as tainted by the dominance of Java over other peoples and regions.¹² The *Indisch* (Indies) nationalism of E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, which saw Indonesia as a single nation brought together by the Dutch and now ready for independence, was seen as unconvincing. It implied that Indonesia was an artificial construct brought into existence by distant foreign powers rather than as something with a genuine heritage, which only needed to be revived and strengthened.¹³ Dutch intransigence in the 1920's forced nationalists to work together. A common history had to be found and the results of new Dutch research into Majapahit, based on the *Nagarakertagama*, were conveniently available. This newly discovered empire was large, powerful and, most importantly, unified. Gajah Mada, rather than Douwes Dekker, was seen as the real architect of Indonesian unity. This drive for unity was seen as originating in Java, now firmly identified as the most dynamic region of the archipelago. All Indonesians were to join together to build a unitary state in fulfillment of this historic mission. History was seen as a weapon to be used against the Dutch and serious historical research was seen as largely unimportant. The 'unitary state' of Majapahit could be joined, for geographical balance, with the Sumatran-based kingdom of Srivijaya. While serious scholars, such as Hussein Djajadiningrat, had written in Dutch, nationalist writers wrote in Indonesian, shaping a history in which the past of the various regions could be related to larger national aims.¹⁴

These themes were later taken up by Sukarno. In a 1930 defence-speech he made in Bandung when on trial for anti-Dutch activity, he notes the importance of history in providing inspiration for Indonesians as they tried to unite and throw off Dutch control:

What about *activating* that nationalism? How do you bring it to life? There are three steps. *First*, we show the people that the life that they led long ago was a good life; *second*, we intensify the realization that theirs is a dismal life today; *third*, we turn their gaze to the bright and

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 287.

¹² *Ibid.*, 283–286.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 284.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 288–289.

shining rays of a *future day*, and we show them ways to reach that promise-filled hour. In other words, the PNI arouses and activates in the masses an awareness of their 'bounteous past', their 'dark ages', and the 'promise of a brightly beckoning future'. The PNI knows that only this trinity will be able to make the flower of victory materialize and resurrect the withered nationalism of our people.

Sukarno continued, making specific references to past kingdoms:

We had a precious former day; we had a period of brilliance! Yes, Your Honours lives there an Indonesian whose heart does not sigh upon listening to tales of those beautiful times: is there anyone who does not feel the loss of that greatness? Where is the Indonesian whose national spirit does not come alive upon hearing stories of the great kingdoms of Melaju and Srividjaja, of the greatness of the first Mataram period, of the Sindok, Erlangga, Kediri, Singasari, Madjapahit, and Padjadjaran periods—and the grandeur of Bintara, Banten, and Mataram II under Sultan Ageng! What Indonesian does not longingly remember his former flag, seen and honoured even in Madagascar, Persia, and China? But conversely, too, ought we not to live with the hope and the belief that a people who achieved *such* greatness formerly will *surely* have the strength to attain as beautiful a future—will *surely* have the capabilities necessary *to rise again* to the level of their former grandeur. Whose soul and body can fail to be rejuvenated upon reading the history of our past? It is also through knowing of this heritage that a national spirit has been brought to life among our people, kindling anew the fires of hope in their hearts and regaining for them once more a soul and new strength there from.

Although not all these kingdoms were always benevolent, they were *Indonesian* and unlike the colonial regime they were far from stagnant:

Oh, of course, former times were feudal times, and this is the modern age. Our intention is not to recapture those feudal times; we never discuss the conditions of feudalism nor do we have any regard for them. We are aware of the evils it involved for the people. We only point out to our own people that the feudalism of the past was *alive*; it was feudalism filled with the possibilities of *growth*, and if its life had not been interrupted by foreign imperialism, it could without doubt have 'run its own course', 'settled by its own evolution'. In other words, it too could have conceived and ultimately *given birth to a healthy modern society*.¹⁵

¹⁵ Sukarno, *Indonesia Accuses! Soekarno's Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930*, ed., trans., annotated and intro. by Roger K. Paget (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), 79.

Of particular note in this section of the speech is the emphasis on a glorious past, a bleak present and a hopeful future, once the Dutch colonialists could be persuaded to leave. Acceptance of this historical analysis was felt by Sukarno to be a vital element in the achievement of independence. He notes a variety of powerful kingdoms, although most are Hindu or Buddhist realms located on Java. He gives a nod to the Sumatran Srivijaya and to the Islamic polities of Banten and the Mataram of Sultan Agung.

In an earlier part of the same speech he acknowledges that both Srivijaya and Majapahit may have exhibited imperialist and aggressive tendencies:

How then do we define imperialism? Imperialism also is a concept, a kind of viewpoint. It has nothing to do with the charges concerning us. It is not a civil servant; it is not the government; it is not authority; it is no individual or organization whatsoever. It is a lust, a system which rules or directs the economy and country of another people. It is a societal 'happening', arising out of the economic requirements of a particular country or people. As long as 'economic nationalism' or a 'national economy' exists, the world will bear witness to imperialism. We find it in the lust of the Roman Eagle flying everywhere, subjugating countries both around and away from the Mediterranean Sea. We see it in the Spanish occupation of the Netherlands to defeat the English, in the Oriental kingdom of Srivijaya's desire to subjugate the Malacca peninsula, the kingdom of Malaya, and to exercise influence over the neighbouring state of Cambodia, or Champa. We can witness the lust of Madjapahit in its subjugation and control of the whole Indonesian archipelago from Bali to Kalimantan, from Sumatra to the Moluccas, or the Japanese occupation of Korea, control over Manchuria, and rule over the Pacific islands. Imperialism is always found in periods of 'economic nationalism'. It is required in all countries whose economies have required it. Not only among white-skinned people is it found, but also among yellow-skinned people, black-skinned people, as proved in the Srivijaya and Madjapahit eras. Imperialism is an 'economically determined necessity', a necessity determined by the low economic level of a society: *it does not discriminate*.¹⁶

Nevertheless, Sukarno was very much impressed with the geographic scope and the political power of these early Indonesian polities. For him they were clearly part of a "golden age" which preceded the darkness of Dutch control. In offering what would become the standard analysis of the Indonesian past, present and future, the expan-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

sionist behaviour of Srivijaya and especially Majapahit, which could be equated, especially by non-Javanese, with Dutch actions, would have to be down-played.

Dutch scholarship and textbooks tended to confirm the first two parts of Sukarno's division of the Indonesian past. The Dutch taught Indonesians that the glories of Majapahit were followed by a history almost wholly concerned with the activities of the Dutch East Indies Company and the government of the Netherlands East Indies. Indonesians were portrayed almost exclusively as opponents of Dutch power. Leaders such as Diponegoro, Surapati and Sultan Agung were shown as traitors, rebels and villains.¹⁷ Subsequent nationalist writers, such as Muhammad Yamin, stayed within this three-part historical outline. The Dutch villains of course became Indonesian heroes (or *pahlawan*) and negative (or divisive) elements of the Indonesian past were glossed over in the interests of opposing the colonial authorities. Yamin's book on the Majapahit *patih* (prime minister) Gajah Mada exhibits the same tendency to minimize negative aspects of Majapahit shown in Sukarno's defence speech. The book is entitled "Gajah Mada: A Hero of the Unity of the Archipelago." Its frontispiece shows a clay figurine found near Trowulan and identified in the caption as being of Gajah Mada "a farsighted politician".¹⁸ It was Yamin who most clearly defined Majapahit as constituting Indonesia's golden age. He moved beyond Sukarno's vague evocation of the past glories of Majapahit (and other kingdoms, both Hindu and Muslim), which had acted as a reminder that Indonesians were as capable as Europeans, to an explicit identification of this Javanese kingdom as a "proto-Indonesia". The period during which Majapahit was at its height was to Yamin one of unity and strength during which the entire Archipelago (and beyond) was under centralized control. This was a period during which Indonesia reached an unprecedented and unsurpassed level of peace, prosperity and advancement. It was also a period whose achievements modern Indonesians, after obtaining independence, might hope to duplicate.

Ironically, the man who spent much of his career promoting the importance of an ancient Javanese empire was not Javanese himself. Yamin, like many twentieth century Indonesian intellectuals of note,

¹⁷ Reid, "The Nationalist Quest," 293.

¹⁸ Yamin, *Gajah Mada*, Frontispiece.

was a Minangkabau. Born in West Sumatra, to local minor nobility, he spent most of his life in Java and came to see Indonesia as a whole as his “fatherland.”¹⁹ During the period of Japanese occupation there was naturally a need to reorient the focus of Indonesian history away from Dutch myths and heroes and towards one that was more acceptable, both to the Japanese authorities and to Indonesians. Yamin rose to be the senior Indonesian in the propaganda service. From this position he was able to develop and promote his concept of Majapahit being the great unifier of the Indonesian nation. He also promoted anti-Dutch fighters as being the true embodiments of national dignity.²⁰ Gajah Mada, although obviously having nothing to do with fighting the Dutch, became for him a central figure in the emergence of Indonesian consciousness. The first edition of his book on Gajah Mada dates from this time. In this book he notes that the name Gajah Mada is associated with the unity of Indonesia and that he worked throughout his life towards this goal.²¹ Of particular note was the 1331 taking of the “*sumpah-sakti*” whereby Gajah Mada forbade himself self-satisfaction as long as the aspirations of the state were not fulfilled. In the royal audience hall he stepped forward and swore:

I will immediately stop enjoying the food of *palapa* until all of Nusantara is subject to the power of the nation when Gurun, Seram, Tanjungpura, Haru, Pahang, Dempo, Bali, Sunda, Palembang and Tumasik have been defeated.²²

Yamin notes that at the time of his last testament and death in 1364, it was clear that Nusantara covered an extensive amount of territory (the word Nusantara commonly refers to the Majapahit empire as a whole). Yamin reproduces several passages of the *Nagarakertagama* in Javanese (with Latin script). He then outlines the extent of Majapahit possessions: all of Java and Madura, all of Sumatra, all of the island

¹⁹ Deliar Noer, “Yamin and Hamka,” in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, 249.

²⁰ Reid, “The Nationalist Quest”, 297.

²¹ Yamin, *Gajah Mada*, 53.

²² *Ibid.*, 50. The meaning of *palapa* is still unclear. The standard Indonesian-English dictionary gives no English equivalent, simply identifying *palapa* as a fruit renounced by Gajah Mada. See John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily, *Kamus Indonesia Inggris: An Indonesian-English Dictionary*, 3rd ed. (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1994), s.v. “palapa.”

of Kalimantan, all of the Malay Peninsula, all of Bali, Lombok, Sumba, Flores and Timor, all of Sulawesi, the Moluccas and all of Irian Jaya. It might be noted that this includes all of present-day Indonesia, as well as all of present-day Malaysia, Brunei and Portuguese Timor. Small parts of the Philippines (in the Sulu Archipelago) and Thailand (the territory of Patani) are part of this vast well-organized state. Yamin also notes the Majapahit had alliances with most of the powerful states of Southeast Asia, including states in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma and perhaps Sri Lanka.²³

The borders of an independent Indonesia, in the eyes of Yamin, had been demarcated centuries ago:

Gadjah Mada and Prapanca, in the fourteenth century, in all of their writings which they have left us as a testament said, "there is a region of Nusantara . . . we know where our motherland is and where its boundaries are!" We in the twentieth century, their descendants, say "there is a motherland, a United Indonesia, which we accept as an heirloom of Nusantara under the protection of Madjapahit." We will receive Gadjah Mada's inheritance and we will bring it to the people so that they can build up the motherland and serve it for eternity.²⁴

He would expand on this interest in Majapahit and its most famous personality in considerable more detail in subsequent decades. His book *6000 Tahun Sang Merah-Putih* (6000 Years of the Sacred Red and White, i.e. the Indonesian flag) is an elaborate historical and linguistic analysis of the history of the Indonesian people and their national colors. Its foreword, a reproduction of a hand-written note by Sukarno, closes with a slogan current at the time, "from Sabang to Merauke!" (a reference to the nationalist desire to unite all of the former Netherlands East Indies, from Northern Sumatra to Irian Jaya, under Indonesian sovereignty, until 1963 Irian Jaya, the western half of New Guinea remained under Dutch control).²⁵ In this work Yamin claims that there have been three nations which controlled almost all of the territory of the Indonesian archipelago: Srivijaya-Sailendara, Singasari-Majapahit and the Republic of Indonesia.²⁶ Yamin had a hand in the periodisation of Indonesian history, worked out at the 1957 Yogyakarta history conference, a

²³ Ibid., 57–59.

²⁴ Ibid., 65.

²⁵ Muhammad Yamin, *6000 Tahun*.

²⁶ Ibid., 174.

time-frame, which has held firm in Indonesian research and textbooks until the present day. As a supporter of Sukarno, during the period of Guided Democracy, his writings came to resemble those of a “court writer”, heaping praise on those in power. Such panegyric utterances had a long tradition in Indonesia (for example the *Nagarakertagama* itself, and such Malay texts as the *Sejarah Melayu*) and they could be detected in the writings of such New Order historians as Nugroho Notosusanto. Yamin was very involved in devising the Pancasila (Sukarno himself outlined these five principles in a June 1945 speech to the Committee for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence, but it has long been rumoured that it was in fact Yamin who was the speech’s real author). Neither Yamin nor Sukarno specifically links the Pancasila to the golden age of Majapahit. But there is an archaic element in the branding of the five principles (the word Pancasila is a Sanskrit term and Hindu symbols, such as Vishnu’s avian steed Garuda, are often used in its promotion), which seems quite visible in what can be seen as a national ideology. Despite the violent changeover between Sukarno’s Indonesia and the New Order there was a great deal of continuity in how the nation’s past was conceptualized. Suharto’s aforementioned speech is a reminder that interest in the Majapahit of the *Nagarakertagama*, as discovered by Krom and Kern and promoted by Yamin and Sukarno, remained strong. Srivijaya, discovered by Coedès, and acknowledged by both Yamin and Sukarno, rated an “honourable mention” in the speech and as will be noted below, for various reasons, found a much less important place in New Order views of the past.

Raising Majapahit: Restoration, Study, Promotion and Fabrication

The Pertamina speech noted a lack of physical remains from either empire; Taman Mini Indonesia Indah was intended as a partial solution to this problem. Another part of this solution involved the excavation and restoration of sites associated with Majapahit in Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra, South Kalimantan and Bali. Of the sites listed in the *Hasil Pemugaran*, 7.74 percent have a strong connection with the Majapahit empire, being either actually built by the Majapahit kings or built during this time period in regions supposedly under Majapahit control. Many of these sites are even specifically

mentioned in the *Nagarakertagama*, and this is noted in the descriptions of the various sites.²⁷ For example, at the site of Trowulan, the Majapahit capital, various structures were restored between 1974 and 1991 as part of the *Proyek Pemugaran dan Pemeliharaan Bekas Ibukota Kerajaan Majapahit* (the Project for the Restoration and Protection of the Former Capital of the Kingdom of Majapahit). These include a series of five temples known as Candi Tikus (in the *Nagarakertagama* referred to as Candi Lima), a huge artificial reservoir (Kolam Segaran) and one of the gates to the Majapahit *kraton*.²⁸ Several sites visited by Hayam Wuruk, Gajah Mada's sovereign, during his tour of East Java described in the *Nagarakertagama*, such as Candi Jawi and Candi Kidal, were also extensively restored.²⁹ Candi Suku, an architecturally unique Majapahit site in the mountains of Central Java, while not mentioned in the *Nagarakertagama*, was also restored and provided with a new access road in the early 1980's.³⁰ Miksic, in his list of publications put out by the Indonesian government from 1975–1982, does not list many works on Majapahit. But those he does note are substantial, and point to an interest on the part of the New Order in studying the details of how the ancient kingdom of Majapahit actually functioned. So, for example, the government sponsored a study by the University of Gajah Mada on the social structure of Majapahit.³¹

A 1997 visit to Trowulan confirmed that the government had taken a great deal of interest in studying, restoring and promoting the physical remains of the Majapahit empire. Trowulan is located

²⁷ *Hasil Pemugaran*. All percentages shown have been calculated by the author.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 146, 149–150, 153–154; Sites noted in the *Nagarakertagama* include Candi Lima (Canto 17, Stanza 4:4 and Canto 76, Stanza 1:3), and the royal *kraton* (Cantos 8–12, Canto 8, Stanza 2:2 refers to the main gate of the complex, Canto 8, Stanza 6:1 describes an inner gate, either one of which could be the Gapura Banjangatu described in the *Hasil Pemugaran*). See Pigeud Vol. 3, 21, Vol. 3, 88, Vol. 4, 115 (Candi Lima) and Vol. 3, 9–19, Vol. 4, 11–28. See also Robson, *Desavarnana*, 36, 107, 29–32, 100–105.

²⁹ *Hasil Pemugaran*, 141, 151; References in *Nagarakertagama*, Canto 55, Stanza 3:3, Canto 37, Stanza 7:1. See Pigeud, *Java in the Fourteenth Century*, Vol. 3, 64, Vol. 4, 151 (Candi Jawi) and Vol. 3, 41, Vol. 4, 114 (Candi Kidal). See also Robson, *Desavarnana*, 64, 126, 51, 118.

³⁰ *Hasil Pemugaran*, 121.

³¹ M.M. Sukarto and K. Atmodjo, *Struktur Masyarakat Jawa Kuno pada Jamah Hindu dan Majapahit* (the Structure of Society in Ancient Java during the Hindu-Majapahit Era) (Yogyakarta: Pusat Penelitian dan Studi Pedasan dan Kawasan, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1979); Miksic, "Indonesian Publications," 50.

about one-hour southeast of Surabaya, near the town of Mojokerto. The “site” was somewhat of a surprise to the author. What was expected was a single ruined city, which could be easily conceived as such. Instead what was found at Trowulan was a collection of sites (in various states of repair), two museums and some shrines (one Buddhist and one secular). Apparently the city was of such a size that modern villages have arisen within it, blurring its original outline. This is in line with what Jacques Dumarçay, has to say in *The Temples of Java*. Apparently, the Majapahit capital was originally built of brick and wood so little of it has survived. Also it was not really a city in the modern sense, but a series of scattered building clusters enclosed by walls and open spaces for meetings and markets.³² This is also in line with the description of the Majapahit capital given in the *Nagarakertagama*.³³ The ruins of this ancient capital were well provided with two museums. The older of the two was rather modest, with only some Majapahit pottery and statuary in the grounds. The staff consisted of trained archaeologists (from the University of Gajah Mada) involved in conservation. The newer museum (opened in 1987) was not as well staffed. It consisted of a large modern building with an extensive collection of artefacts; captions were in both English and Indonesian. The restoration worked, noted above for the period of 1969/70 to 1992/93, continued, as is evident in work done on Candi Brahu and Candi Wringinlawang. Both of these red brick Majapahit structures were dedicated in September 1995 by the Minister of Education and Culture (at the time Professor Dr. Engineer Wardiman Djojonegoro). In 1997 excavation was still taking place at Candi Kedatron (also known as Sumar Upas), the old Majapahit *kraton*. The excavations seemed very extensive and professionally done, with squares laid out on a grid pattern, in some cases excavated to a depth of five or six metres.

The Majapahit sites of the Trowulan area are noted in *Discover Indonesia*, and the government apparently hoped that they would receive foreign visitors.³⁴ The restoration work, the new museum, the dedication plaques and the continued excavation of the *kraton* indicate that the New Order hoped that Indonesians would also be

³² Dumarçay, *The Temples of Java*, 81.

³³ Canto 8–12, 21 Stanzas. See Pigeaud, *Java in the Fourteenth Century*, Vol. 3, 9–19, Vol. 4, 11–28.

³⁴ *Discover Indonesia*, 184–185.

drawn to the site, perhaps for the same reasons and in the same manner that they are drawn to Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. This hope has met with only limited success; the sites seemed only sporadically visited by either Indonesians or foreign tourists. The exception to this is of particular interest. *Discover Indonesia* notes that, “the old Pendopo Agung (Grand Pavilion) is found about two kilometres from the museum”.³⁵ In actuality the Situs Pendopo Agung is not a Majapahit-era ruin but a modern shrine and far from old. This *pendopo* (traditional Javanese pillared pavilion) contains plaques and statuary and was put up by the Brawijaya (East Java) Division of the Indonesian army. The site includes a large statue of Brawijaya, traditionally described as Majapahit’s last king. There is a plaque listing the Division’s commanders, a plaque listing the kings of Majapahit and a relief showing a ceremony from the Majapahit period. The Brawijaya Division’s coat of arms is prominently displayed. A small statue of Gajah Mada was also erected at the site by the Surabaya Military Police. In contrast to the other sites at Trowulan this site seemed quite popular. There were several *warung* (food stalls) and a group of Indonesians were eating a meal under the pavilion. The site had much in common with the Islamic pilgrimage sites of East Java (although with less reverence) in terms of popularity and its availability of food. The site dedicated to the unit’s “fighting spirit” seemed a clear attempt to link the modern Indonesian army with the glories of the Indonesian past, perhaps to boost military morale, perhaps to make a larger political statement to the Indonesian nation as a whole.

The lack of usable Majapahit sites, lamented by Suharto, could also be dealt with by fabricating them albeit on a more modest scale than done at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. This can be seen, uniquely at the Situs Pendopo Agung and throughout the neighbouring areas of East Java, in the ubiquitous “monuments” put up as part of what could be described as a New Order “Majapahitization program.” Multiple examples of mock-Majapahit architecture were observed by the author during his 1997 visit. Near Mojokerto could be seen a statue promoting a family planning campaign (a man, a woman and two children) which utilized the Majapahit multi-tier motif seen in such gates as Candi Wringinlawang. These “Majapahit

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 184.

gates” are very visible at the entrance to many villages in the area. The motif was also very popular in private dwellings; virtually all houses observed in the region had entrances flanked by pillars. Each pillar was topped by “Majapahit” decorations. Usually both walls and pillars were painted in a variation of red and white (although often faded to brown and grey) and the notation “1945.” Anderson previously noted this modern Majapahit artwork; it was surprising just how prevalent it actually still is. It must be stressed that these are not just isolated occurrences in East Java, they seem to occur *everywhere*. In 1972, during Anderson’s last trip to New Order Indonesia, the “Majapahitization” project had apparently already begun. He notes for example, on the outskirts of Ponorogo, a large concrete replica of a major temple from Panataran and the main entranceways to the town of Tulungagung flanked by yellow *raseka* (small replicas of the giants, which guard the entrances to Candi Singosari, and palaces of Central Java). Across the main street leading into Selecta (a mountain resort) was an archway, consisting of two “East Java” style gates linked by a metal cat walk. Decorative portals were evident in countless village and private entrances throughout East Java; the decorations consisted of man-sized concrete numbers in red, 19 on the left, 45 on the right.³⁶ The number “1945” refers, of course, to the Indonesian Independence Proclamation and its use seems clearly intended to link distant and recent national accomplishments. In Anderson’s view these monuments, “represent a sustained program of monument construction and distribution far surpassing the efforts of the Sukarno years and possibly without precedent in Indonesian history since pre-colonial times.”³⁷ Anderson was curious as to what message these gates and mock-temple facades were intended to convey. Although many of these monuments appeared at first glance to be replicas of ancient ruins, closer examination showed that this is not in fact the case. The general shape was replicated so that an observer immediately understood the reference to, for example, the temple at Panataran. The details of any particular temple were not reproduced, although East Java certainly had competent craftsmen and as an official project funding should not have really been a problem. The monuments seemed rushed and clumsy,

³⁶ Anderson, “Cartoons and Monuments,” 177–178.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 179.

more like signposts than reproductions. Anderson also noted that the emblem of the Brawijaya Division consists of a *meru* (a triple-tiered Majapahit gateway) with a star on top and that most of the construction that he observed had been done under the auspices of this division.³⁸ This attempt on the part of the government, and the Indonesian military in particular, to draw attention to Majapahit and to imply that it had a place in *modern* Indonesia was not apparently a passing fancy; the project lasted for much of the New Order. Novelist and travel writer V.S. Naipul also noted the common occurrence of “scabbed gate-posts that spoke of the long dead Javanese-Hindu empire of Majapahit,” during a 1980 trip from Surabaya to Yogyakarta.³⁹ In connection with Anderson’s thoughts on “political signposts”, it is interesting to note the frequent “fake police” found both in Yogyakarta and Bali (and presumably elsewhere). These model policemen (and woman) are life-sized and placed at intersections (often but not always near real police posts). These can be momentarily confused with real police, and they might thus act as a deterrent to traffic violators, but they also might act as a signpost, to the *idea* of an ever present police presence. The police are shown not just to be enforcing the law but also present as a force in society. This fascination with Majapahit was even expressed in the construction of Sukarno’s tomb; its courtyard is entered through a massive “Majapahit” gateway.⁴⁰

The Pointed Story of Majapahit

Majapahit occupies a prominent place in national textbooks and here can be observed the sort of Majapahit (and present-day Indonesia) that the New Order feels is most desirable. Majapahit is described as being at its height during the reign of Hayam Wuruk (1350–1389): “with the help of his *patih hamangkubhumi* (high official) Gajah Mada, Hayam Wuruk succeeded in carrying the kingdom of Majapahit to the height of its greatness.”⁴¹ The latter figure is described as

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 178–179.

³⁹ V.S. Naipul, *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey* (London: Penguin Books, 1981), 304.

⁴⁰ Lindsey, “Concrete Ideology,” 170; cf. Wood, “The Historical Past,” 101.

⁴¹ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. 2, 436.

devoting himself, “to the power and glory of Majapahit.”⁴² Gajah Mada wanted to realize the policy of *nusantara* and to this effect had already taken the *sumpah palapa* during the reign of Hayam Wuruk’s mother Tribuwana (1329–1350). This policy resulted in almost all of the territory of present-day Indonesia falling under Majapahit’s power and influence, including territories in Sumatra in the west, and the Moluccas and Irian in the east; in fact Majapahit influence had spread to neighbouring Southeast Asian countries.⁴³ Majapahit is described as centralized, with a bureaucracy, which is equated with modern ministers and executive boards.⁴⁴ There is a “Dewan Pertimbangan Kerajaan” (Advisory Council for the Kingdom) and a “Dewan Mentiri” (Council of Ministers), which functioned as a “Badan Pelaksana Pemerintahan” (Government Implementation Board). Gajah Mada of course acted as prime minister.⁴⁵ Some of these designations might seem somewhat anachronistic but Gajah Mada is routinely referred to as such in many Western academic works. Also of note are two religious establishments with jurisdiction over Buddhism and Hinduism.⁴⁶ This seems to show a rather New Order view of religion, as something to be classified and managed rather than as something to be experienced.

Interestingly the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* has nothing to say about the ordinary people of Majapahit, the emphasis is wholly on the activities of rulers and bureaucrats, although this may be partially dictated by the sources themselves. In reconstructing the history of Majapahit, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* relies on surviving Javanese texts and inscriptions, rather than archaeological evidence. Of course as the latter consists mostly of palaces and temples, referring to them may not have greatly altered the picture provided. The Majapahit era offered, like that described by Yamin, was an uncritical “golden age.” It is also based on an interpretation of real sources, in particular the *Nagarakertagama*, which describes a wealthy powerful kingdom, supported by a bright minister, a religious and military establishment and happy citizens.⁴⁷ The happy citizens are missing

⁴² *Ibid.*, 438.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 436.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 452.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 453–454.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 454.

⁴⁷ The citizens of Java are in Canto 27, Stanza 2:4 described as looking with

from the New Order account but it might be implied that those reading the textbook (i.e. Indonesian students) are more than happy to help the government obtain its goals and perhaps in some way recreate the lost greatness of Majapahit. The *Nagarakertagama* describes Gajah Mada at the end of his days as having helped increase the area under Majapahit control and that Bali and Sadeng are clear examples of his “annihilating enemies.”⁴⁸ In another passage many other places in the region are described as being under direct or indirect control and this is reflected in both Yamin and the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*.⁴⁹ This passage became important later for defining the borders of an independent Indonesia. The scope and manner of control Majapahit might have exercised over its neighbours is rather difficult to interpret. *Nusantara* might seem to be a shakier basis for territorial claims in Irian Jaya (which Majapahit might have had little control over or contact with) than the fact that the area had once been part of the Dutch East Indies.

It is the *type* of society that Majapahit was, not its borders, which was probably of most interest to the New Order. With the exception of East Timor, Indonesia during the New Order had few problems with its borders compared to what had previously been the case during the time of Sukarno. The slogan “From Sabang to Merauke” shows that Indonesian nationalists might have been quite aware of this. The argument was made that if an area was once part of the Netherlands East Indies (not the empire of Gajah Mada) then it should join the rest of the colony in achieving independence in a unified Archipelago. True, the annexation of East Timor could be explained (or even justified) by an historic need for a “Greater Indonesia,” but other more obviously political reasons seem more likely. It is of note that outside criticisms of the New Order love affair with Majapahit are usually aimed at its misreading of the size of the ancient Javanese empire. Many, starting with C.C. Berg, see the *Nagarakertagama* as providing a “make believe empire” which has

amazement on their king: “Verily nobody but a god coming on earth is He, going about in the world.” See Pigeaud, *Java in the Fourteenth Century*, Vol. 3, 31, Vol. 4, 80. Robson translates: “Indeed he was simply a divinity descended as he roamed the earth.” See *Desawarnana*, 43–44.

⁴⁸ Canto 70, Stanza 3:1–4. See Pigeaud, *Java in the Fourteenth Century*, Vol. 3, 82 and Robson, *Desawarnana*, 70, 135.

⁴⁹ Canto 13–16, 15 Stanzas. See Pigeaud, *Java in the Fourteenth Century*, Vol. 3, 16–19, Vol. 4, 29–39. See Robson, *Desawarnana*, 33–35, 105–107.

little resemblance to the geopolitical reality of fourteenth century Southeast Asia.⁵⁰ This is, ironically, the one element of Majapahit that the New Order did not (and did not need) to focus on. Most Indonesians would agree that they are citizens of a unified nation existing within its current borders; those who might dispute this, like some in Aceh, would probably not be silenced by quotations from the *Nagarakertagama*.

The Majapahit provided through archaeology, through monuments and through textbooks, is the source of certain symbols as well as the source of a story. The story is that of a highly ordered, prosperous state, which can be equated with the New Order, a development-oriented regime, which had gone to extraordinary lengths to depoliticize daily life. The Hindu/Buddhist nature of the empire (in a country where by some accounts ninety percent of the population is Muslim) could be downplayed. The Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim and later Christian inhabitants of *Nusantara* were all Indonesians. The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* even portrayed the fall of Majapahit as an “Indonesian event,” whereby a Hindu dynasty was replaced by another Hindu dynasty centred on Kediri in 1478 and then in 1527 by the Muslim dynasty of Demak. These are shown as changes in government among a single people, rather than dramatic changes from one religious orientation to another.⁵¹ Even such symbols as the *garuda*, in Hinduism Vishnu’s winged mount, could be disassociated from any one religion. In Indonesian the word *garuda* now simply means “eagle” and is appropriately the name of the national air carrier.

Not all were enamoured of either the New Order’s regimented present or by the fact that the regime saw this present as having its roots in an equally hierarchical ancient Javanese past. Many others had problems with Majapahit (and later Sukarno and the New Order) controlling, from the centre, the outer regions of the archipelago. Reid mentions that while the “nationalist past” was being formulated, many brought up the Bubad incident, where a marriage between Hayam Wuruk and a Sundanese princess ended in a massacre on the orders of Gajah Mada.⁵² This incident is mentioned in the fifteenth

⁵⁰ C.C. Berg, “Javanese Historiography—A Synopsis of its Evolution,” in *Historians of Southeast Asia*, 87–117.

⁵¹ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. 2, 449–450.

⁵² Reid, “The Nationalist Quest,” 285–286.

century Javanese poem the *Pararaton*; but according to the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* it is deliberately left out of the *Nagarakertagama* because the incident, “does not lend support to the greatness of the kingdom of Majapahit.”⁵³ The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* skirts around the fact that what would make the incident most offensive in later eyes was the fact that a Javanese hero would act in such a cruel way towards non-Javanese. For many outside of Java, in fact, Gajah Mada, the “hero of national unity,” could never really be anything but a Javanese aggressor.

Srivijaya: “The Wrong Past”

Attempts were made to balance out this situation by trying to promote the glories of the Sumatra based empire of Srivijaya. Suharto in his Pertamina speech specifically noted the lack of surviving Srivijaya ruins as a real problem. Srivijaya is covered in some detail in the national history textbook, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. Srivijaya is described as being run on somewhat different lines than such agricultural kingdoms as Mataram and as having controlled trade routes to China and India and as having been a centre of international Buddhism. Srivijaya was also described as being active militarily throughout the archipelago (military operations are described using the somewhat loaded term of *pasifikasi* (pacification), conjuring up images of the Malay Emergency, the Vietnam War and military operations in East Timor; it is not clear whether for the New Order such associations would be entirely negative).⁵⁴ But the image of Srivijaya has remained more or less an academic one. The *Sejarah Nasional* notes the discovery of the trading kingdom by foreigners from an analysis of foreign sources (in Chinese and Arabic) and a few inscriptions. No archaeological work worth showing to the public has emerged. No actual Srivijaya sites are mentioned as being restored from 1969/70 to 1992/93, although the Rumah Adat Limas (a traditional house turned into a museum) in Palembang is listed as containing artefacts from this time period.⁵⁵ Major scholarly work

⁵³ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. 2, 437.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 71–72.

⁵⁵ *Hasil Pemugaran*, 63.

has been done. Miksic notes a specific seminar conducted on the subject, and Indonesia has been an eager participant in wider Southeast Asian conferences on the history of this maritime state.⁵⁶ There has however been little attempt made to “dust off” Srivijaya or give it a significance beyond its local surroundings (the Palembang newspaper is *The Srivijaya Times*). This despite the real importance of this entity in world history (Srivijaya may have, for a period of around three hundred years, exercised a near monopoly on maritime trade between China and India). Part of this neglect might be an accident of archaeology (i.e. Palembang and other Srivijaya ports would have been built mostly of wood and bamboo, and Srivijaya preferred to build its temples in the “holy land” of India, rather than at home). It thus literally disappeared to be resurrected by foreign scholars, not Indonesians. Much of Srivijaya is presently outside Indonesia anyway, in Singapore and Malaysia. Its Buddhist religion would not be any more foreign to Indonesia than the Hinduism of Majapahit, but its way of life, based on trade, would. The Bugis of Makassar, who still have long-mast schooners moored at the Sunda Kelapa docks in Jakarta, could empathize with such a sea-based empire but the peasants of Java and Bali (and their presidential descendants) could not. For many reasons, Srivijaya was the “wrong past.”

Majapahit and Indonesian (Javanese) Norms

In any event, Majapahit seemed to the New Order to be a better symbol, if not an even better model, for the direction they wanted modern Indonesia to go, especially if the details were kept somewhat vague. As suggested above, the name “Majapahit” could be made into a symbol which could be seen as emblematic of a generalized Hindu-Java past which might give legitimacy to the current application of traditional Javanese models of behaviour (*halus, gotong-royong*) and the cultural trappings associated with them (*wayang, gamelan, Borobudur*). *Halus* refers to a type of refined behaviour valued

⁵⁶ Satyawati Suleiman et al., ed., *Pra Seminar Penelitian Srivijaya, Jakarta, 7–8 December 1978* (Proceedings of the Research Seminar on Srivijaya, Jakarta 7–8th December 1978) (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional, 1979); cf. Satyawati Suleiman et al., ed., *Studies on Srivijaya* (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional, 1981), Miksic, “Indonesian Publication,” 47.

in Javanese social conduct (as opposed to *kasar*, coarse, loud behaviour exhibited by non-Javanese). *Gotong-Royong* (working together for the good of a larger group) is another typically Javanese cultural trait, which wider Indonesian society would be wise to emulate (and is expected to understand). *Gamelan* is a type of traditional Javanese primarily percussion music, which utilizes brass gongs and hollow bamboo stems to produce an ethereal sound. Another such symbol would be the *Nagarakertagama*, the source, in theory for the Majapahit of Kern, Krom, Yamin, Sukarno and Suharto. In fact it might be not just a symbol but a *pusaka*, a sacred heirloom. Considerable effort, pomp and circumstance marked the return of this book to Indonesia by Queen Juliana of the Netherlands in 1972. It is rumoured, according to Adrian Vickers, that Suharto kept the manuscript next to his bed for sometime after its return, even though he would not be able to read the Old Javanese text.⁵⁷ Books have a long history as magic items in Indonesia and Anderson notes that they might be even more powerful if the contents cannot be understood.⁵⁸ C.C. Berg, although his questioning of Majapahit's borders has not made him a popular figure among Indonesian nationalists, proposed that the *Nagarakertagama* might have been intended as a means to unite the archipelago through magical means.⁵⁹ If this was indeed the case then perhaps Suharto understood the power of Majapahit as a politically charged symbol more than his critics did.

The New Order and the Coming of Islam

It is true that the obvious Javanese character of Majapahit might have been somewhat of a problem for the New Order in its dealings with Indonesia's diverse regions. But in other ways Majapahit was a more than adequate base on which to build a national identity. A factual description of the empire was not necessary for political purposes; the regime might have had a great deal of room to

⁵⁷ "The New Order: Keeping up Appearances," in *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History*, ed. Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 75.

⁵⁸ Benedict Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," in *Language and Power*, 127.

⁵⁹ C.C. Berg, "Javanese Historiography."

manoeuvre. Majapahit could be presented to the public in any manner desired and the public could be expected to respond to it the symbol, rather than to the facts behind the symbol. This was not simply a matter of a society not having a free press, as was the case during the New Order. It involves the fact that most people want their image of the past to be just that: an image. And so, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* contains numerous footnotes, in Indonesian, Dutch and English, and is written in a scholarly style that is quite frankly too advanced for its intended audience (i.e. high school students). It is instead, like the *Nagarakertagama*, a *pusaka*, an official statement that “this is our history and we have done the serious research to prove it true.” A modern nation has a modern history done according to scholarly norms (with many references to foreign sources, the West, by implication, the birthplace of real scholarship). The New Order could use such a *pusaka* to indicate what symbols from the Indonesian past are important and few would argue with what is being said even though the details of the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* actually raise doubts about the past being presented. Thus, the Gajah Mada’s massacre of a wedding party could be included in the high school text (noting that another *pusaka* the *Nagarakertagama* fails to mention the incident) without shaking the regime’s credibility in projecting Majapahit as a “golden age” for Indonesia. Such an approach cannot really be used with the place of Islam in Indonesian history. Majapahit is gone; it survives only in Javanese and Malay chronicles, the work of Western scholars and a few scattered ruins. Thanks to Yamin and Sukarno, it did have some resonance with the popular imagination. It cannot simply be ignored. But it can be presented as a rather vague entity somehow including traditional Javanese mannerisms, the borders of the Dutch East Indies, Borobudur and Prambanan and the *wayang*. The coming of Islam to Indonesia, like Indonesian independence, is something real (although many myths and distortions are connected to both events). Islam is a religion practiced, with different degrees of piety, by the majority of the populace. It must be dealt with carefully.

In its analysis of the history of Indonesia the New Order notes the arrival of Islam, but does not emphasize it. Some fourteen percent of sites renovated by the government are connected with the rise of Islam (the activities of the *wali songo*, the emergence of the Islamic states of Pasai, Samudra, Demak and Cirebon). While the number is twice as many as those associated with Majapahit they

are not concentrated in one region (most Majapahit sites were in East Java). It should also be kept in mind that many of the sites connected to the rise of Islam are pilgrimage centers; the government did not decide that they were important, the people did. By contrast, attention to Majapahit sites seems an official or scholarly enterprise. But renovation of Islamic sites remained a government prerogative; all such work was carried out by one government body or another. An example is the hilltop tomb of Sunan Giri (one of the *wali songo*) near Surabaya, which the author visited in December 1996. There was some evidence of the New Order's involvement in the promotion of the site. A large trilingual (Indonesian, Arabic and English) sign in the parking lot identified the tomb's occupant but did little else besides. There was no attempt to place the saint into a larger historical narrative. The sign did not mention any form of official sponsorship, by a ministry, unlike what one would find at a Javanese *candi*, even if such a temple were still in use. However, the government apparently restored the site between 1986 and 1993.⁶⁰

The government also renovated a variety of other sites in East Java, as well as Central Java and other regions, particularly in Sumatra, associated with the rise of early Islamic states. These sites include some of the earliest Islamic grave sites found in Indonesia, that of Fatimah bint Maimun (1082 AD) from East Java and that of Malik Shah from Samudera-Pasai in Aceh. The latter grave may be that of the earliest Muslim ruler of any Indonesian state; Malik Shah ruled from 1297 to 1326 and his reign is often seen as the beginning of the spread of Islam as a political force throughout the archipelago.⁶¹ The mosque complex of Kudus, near Semarang in Central Java, has been in use since its construction in 1549. It is associated with the activities of Sunan Kudus and is one of the few early mosques in Java to possess a minaret. Restoration work in the early twentieth century was in the hands of private individuals but in more recent years the government has carried out such work.⁶² Similarly, the Great Mosque of Demak, built in 1479, and thus the oldest mosque in Java, was restored by Javanese rulers (Pakubuwono I in 1710), then the Dutch and finally the New Order.⁶³ Despite

⁶⁰ *Hasil Pemugaran*, 155–156.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 142, 29.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 117–118.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 129–130.

such extensive (and no doubt expensive) restoration activity, there seems to have been little attempt to make early Islamic sites an integral part of the Indonesian past. Many important and popular sites, such as those associated with the *wali songo*, have apparently escaped government attention. During a 1996 visit to the tomb of Sunan Ngampel the author noted that the site was in no way identified by the New Order government, or anyone else, as a tourist site. No archaeological or restorative work seems to have recently taken place. There has been no attempt made to link the site to a wider nationalistic past (despite the fact that it was in close proximity to the Jembatan Merah (Red Bridge), the site of a key incident during the 1945 Battle of Surabaya). The site apparently received few non-Muslim (i.e. non-pilgrim) visitors although it is mentioned in several of the major foreign language guidebooks. It could clearly be identified as a Muslim sacred place rather than as a material manifestation of Indonesian heritage. Similar comments could be made about the grave site of Sunan Gresik visited the same day.

Judging by the number of reports put out by various government or university departments, a considerable amount of archaeological research has been done on the origins of Islam in Indonesia. Much of this work was produced by Hasan Muarif Ambary or Uka Tjandrasasmita. Particular focus was placed on the rise of Muslim states in Jayakarta (Jakarta), Demak and Kudus.⁶⁴ But the early Islamic past does not seem to be primary focus of Indonesian researchers. There is no Islamic equivalent of the “Majapahitisation” project. The *wali songo* sites are not described at length in *Discover Indonesia*, although the activities of these Islamic pioneers are mentioned in the guide’s history section.⁶⁵ The tomb of Sunan Gresik is noted, but the fact that Gresik was a Majapahit settlement, mentioned in the *Nagarakertagama* is given more attention.⁶⁶ The graves of Sunan Ngampel and of Sunan Giri are not mentioned at all. Perhaps, the sites might not seem very impressive and would presumably only be of interest to a scholar or a pilgrim (Srivijaya has

⁶⁴ See Miksic, “Indonesian Publications on Archaeology,” 46; Uka Tjandrasasmita, “The Introduction of Islam and the Growth of Moslem Coastal Cities in the Archipelago”, in *Dynamics of Indonesian History*, ed. Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. du Marchie Sarvas (New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978), 141–161.

⁶⁵ *Discover Indonesia*, 18.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

also left little in the way of visually interesting remains). These are religious sites and non-Muslims would presumably not have a great interest in visiting them, either because their own religion might not approve such an action or because they might be concerned that they might act in an inappropriate manner. This may also not be an era of the past that the Indonesian government chooses to emphasize. This might not be motivated from any hostility towards Islam as a religion; the government simply has less room to be creative. Indonesians (or at least many Javanese) have their own views, on who the *wali songo* were, a situation which does not apply to popular memories of Gajah Mada and other elements of the pre-Islamic past.⁶⁷

However, ambivalence towards Islam, particularly its political manifestations, might not be totally absent. The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* tries to avoid taking a clear stance on when and from where Islam first arrived in Southeast Asia. It notes that sources are sketchy and the presence of the grave marker of Fatimah bint Maimun in East Java, dated to 1082 AD is difficult to interpret. But by not seriously raising the possibility of Arab bearers of Islam arriving early in the region and instead beginning its account with the emergence of Muslim states in North Sumatra in the late thirteenth century, it seems evident that an early arrival is thought to be unlikely.⁶⁸ The fall of Majapahit is put in an “Indonesian context.” It first falls to a rival Hindu power then to the Muslim state of Demak. It is a case of Indonesians conquering Indonesians. The glory of Majapahit had already started to fade with the death of Gajah Mada and Hayam Wuruk.⁶⁹ In describing the character of Indonesian Islam, later in the same volume, diversity is emphasized.⁷⁰ The coming of Islam is an Indonesian event that cannot be seen as diverting Indonesians from their historic mission to be Indonesians. Muslims must be Indonesians before all else.

⁶⁷ Federspiel suggests that “perhaps the government has not figured out how to make the shrines reflect their own views on religion. Actually their own views on correct Islam are difficult to ascertain, except that they want religion that supports the state in the ways the government deems fit”. Howard Federspiel, e-mail communication, October 9, 2003. Cf. Howard Federspiel, *Indonesia in Transition: Muslim Intellectuals and National Development* (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1998), 15–17.

⁶⁸ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. 3, 1–3.

⁶⁹ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. 3, 5–6.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 203.

Sultans and Palaces

In New Order discourse Muslim kingdoms, sometimes identified as “sultanates,” are assigned two roles. First, they are seen as strong opponents of European dominance. Second, as providers of a royal, Islamic (although very mixed with pre-Islamic, Hindu and animistic elements) style that could be drawn upon as a model of how modern rulers should act and behave. In the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* Aceh is described as a strong military power as is the Mataram of Sultan Agung. The latter monarch marches on and almost captures the Dutch stronghold of Batavia. A similar epic is provided for the Makassarese ruler of Gowa and the Muslim rulers of Trenate and Tidore.⁷¹ Such a portrait, of powerful kingdoms with the resources, people, weapons, leadership and a national mission to try to stop the spread of foreign exploitation is reflected in the New Order interest in studying and restoring the various mosques, palaces and forts connected with this era (this time period is defined here as stretching from the beginning of the sixteenth century, when Islam can be said to have gained a firm, permanent foothold in much of the country until the eighteenth century when Dutch rule could be seen to be inevitable). Around twenty percent of the historical sites in *Hasil Pemugaran* are associated with the Islamic sultanates (such sites as the various palaces of Medan, built in the nineteenth century after the Archipelago had passed under the control of the Dutch government are not included in this figure, while newer renovated versions of structures built at the end of the eighteenth century, such as the Surakarta kraton are included). Academic interest is also reflected in some of the publications put out by the Indonesian government.⁷² But it should be noted that many of the sites for this time period are still in use. Only a few (most notably the mosque and palace complex in the West Java port of Banten) were actually excavated. Most were instead the focus of extensive restoration. Some of the palaces renovated by the New Order government are still the actual homes of quasi-political figures (the Sultan of Yogyakarta is also the

⁷¹ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. 3, Chapter 2, entitled “Reaction of the Islamic Kingdoms towards Western Penetration,” describes the activities of these rulers.

⁷² See Miksic, “Indonesian Publications on Archaeology,” 46–47.

governor of the region). The *kraton* of Java still receive numerous pilgrims and tourists. Yet restoration of royal structures is a government financed and directed project. The government of a modern state is involved in the preservation of the vestiges of political entities, in some cases still living ones, which are older than the Republic of Indonesia itself.

Kraton Culture

Western visitors are often struck by how modest the Central Javanese *kraton* appear. These palace complexes cannot be compared in terms of art and architecture with Versailles or modern Southeast Asian palaces like that of the Sultan of Brunei. Yet these palaces are clearly the focus of a great deal of traditional veneration. Heine-Geldern, whose theories on traditional state and statecraft in Southeast Asia have been immensely influential, notes that rulers have often been equated with gods or at least were felt to occupy a magical position in the universe. A palace was felt to reproduce the universe on a small scale, while at the same time being the centre of the universe.⁷³ The Yogyakarta *kraton* incorporates a similar type of symbolism. Whereas palaces in Cambodia, Burma and Thailand reflected on a microcosmic scale an Indic (Buddhist and Hindu) cosmology, the Yogyakarta palace reproduced the world-view of a mystically inclined variety of Javanese Islam. Mark Woodward notes, "the architecture and iconography of the *kraton* are extremely complex, symbolizing Sufi explanations of the life cycle, the mystical path relationships between Allah and man, and those between normative piety and mystical doctrine."⁷⁴ The ancient kingdom of Majapahit, as understood by the New Order, was run on similar lines. At the center a king, considered the embodiment of a god, dwells in a traditional Javanese *kraton*; peripheral domains, in Java and other islands, revolve around this sacred focal point. The power and prestige of these divine kings of Majapahit gave legitimacy to subsequent Islamic rulers

⁷³ Robert Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia", in *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 2 no. 1 (1942): 15–30.

⁷⁴ See *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989), 16.

through genealogy and the possession of *pusaka*. The eighteenth century Babad *Tanah Jawa* provides an account of the rise and fall of various Javanese kingdoms: Pajajaran, Majapahit, Demak, Pajang, and Mataram. Composed during a time of dynastic conflict and instability the text acts as a detailed genealogical charter for the latter kingdom. Its opening stanza identifies the work as, “a recounting of the ancestors, intended as a religious declaration, a sacred heirloom in the form of a book.”⁷⁵ The *Babad Tanah Jawi* traces various lines of descent starting with Adam, through the heroes of the ancient Indian epic the *Mahabharata* and the rulers of the Javanese kingdoms of Jengalla, Kediri, Singasari and Majapahit.⁷⁶ The kings of Mataram are the heirs of Hayam Wuruk and Majapahit’s last ruler Brawijaya and are also related to figures instrumental in bringing Islam to Indonesia such as a legendary Chinese princess and the *wali songo*, in particular Sunan Kalijaga.⁷⁷

This blending of Hindu and Islamic bases of legitimacy was a striking feature of Javanese culture during the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. The historian of Java M.C. Ricklefs notes that while one cannot properly speak of a distinct Indonesian culture for the period when the Archipelago started to fall under Dutch hegemony, one can start to see the emergence of an identity that moves beyond religious and ethnic labels. Alliances are formed between Javanese, Balinese and Chinese Muslims. Such alliances might seem motivated by Islamic sentiments, identifying the Dutch as outsiders in terms of religion and foreign origin.⁷⁸ But during the political upheavals that marked this era leaders of Javanese kingdoms and rebellions would also frequently draw on earlier symbols. The Madurese prince Trunajaya in leading a five-year-long rebellion, starting in 1675, against Amangkurat I of Mataram claimed descent from Majapahit and a consequent right to the throne.⁷⁹ As the rebellion started to collapse Trunajaya suggested moving the capital of Mataram to the ancient

⁷⁵ James J. Fox, “Sunan Kalijaga and the Rise of Mataram: A Reading of the *Babad Tanah Jawi* as a Genealogical Narrative,” in *Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society: a Festschrift in Honour of Anthony M. Johns*, ed. Peter G. Riddell and Tony Street (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 188.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁷⁸ M.C. Ricklefs, *War, Culture, and Economy in Java, 1677–1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period* (Sydney: Unwin and Allen, 1993), 12, 174.

⁷⁹ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 74.

Majapahit capital of Trowulan.⁸⁰ Similarly, during the final stages of the Second Javanese War of Succession (1719–23) the last stand of the rebels was planned for the ancient Majapahit capital of Trowulan; apparently this was a suitable rallying point for Javanese and Balinese, whether Hindu or Muslim.⁸¹

Ricklef's ideas are echoed by Adrian Vickers in his writings on the history of Bali. Since the Dutch began to subjugate and then study the peoples of the Indonesian archipelago, it has been a commonly held sentiment that developments in Hindu Bali were quite separate from those in Java. Bali was identified as a refuge for the priests and nobles of Majapahit after the rise of Islam. The Dutch authorities felt that the island had to be protected from the influence of the latter religion and that the Hindu Balinese would be both grateful for such protection and hostile to Islam.⁸² But the cultural dynamics between the peoples of the Archipelago may not have been so clear cut. In fact the Balinese might have seen the Javanese as being quite similar to themselves, differing in religion but being part of the same larger civilization.⁸³ The Islamic rulers of Java were not always hostile to Balinese, regardless of whether the latter were Hindu or Muslim. The *Babad Willis*, a Javanese narrative referring to events in eighteenth century Blambangan (in East Java), describes the Balinese Hindu ruler of Mengwi as a friend of "wong Islam" (Muslims) because he was a descendant of Gajah Mada.⁸⁴ In Vicker's words, "religion here is not a fundamental difference so much as Majapahit is a point of fundamental identity."⁸⁵ For both Muslim and Hindu rulers of the "*pasisir* world" (the coastal regions of Java and Bali) the image of Majapahit, if not its physical remains, were important. Trunajaya's attempt to revive Trowulan as a capital was followed twice in the eighteenth century by the Balinese rulers of Klungkung, Mengwi and Tabanan, who with their priests and their vassals tried to restore the Majapahit center.⁸⁶ Such items as the golden crown of Majapahit remained, after Java had by and large converted to Islam, important

⁸⁰ Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, 56.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁸² Adrian Vickers, "Hinduism and Islam in Indonesia: Bali and the *Pasisir* World," *Indonesia* 44 (1987): 31–33.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 34–35.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

heirlooms and sources of both power and legitimacy. (The crown came into the hands of one Captain Francois Tack of the Dutch East Indies Company when the capital of Mataram fell in November 1678; Tack made the unfortunate decision to sell the crown back to the restored Mataram ruler, Amangkurat II, eight years later he repaid the insult by having Tack slain).⁸⁷ Relics of Majapahit joined those associated with the *wali songo* in an arsenal of magical prestige ensuring that later Javanese rulers remained strong and their kingdoms prosperous. The *Babad Tanah Jawi* mentions, for example, two special *kris* made from the iron staff of Sunan Bonang.⁸⁸ *Pusaka*, royal and divine ancestors and even the capital of Trowulan itself are part of the *kraton* culture of Central Java. This culture combined Islamic and Hindu elements and developed from the fall of Majapahit onwards. *Kraton* culture as the name implies is that of the traditional Javanese courts of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (also known as Solo). The New Order, as will be noted below, in many ways emulated the leadership style of these older Javanese sultanates.

Invented Traditions and the “Royal Family”

But as John Pemberton has pointed out, the “antiquity” of much of *kraton* culture was invented at Dutch prompting by royal thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the actual power of the sultanates disappeared the Central Javanese rulers retreated into an artificial world of “venerable ceremonies,” a world where they still occupied the cosmic center.⁸⁹ This tradition of looking back on the past and trying to modify it to deal with (or avoid) political realities continued after the Revolution and was later encouraged by the New Order. Pemberton notes that the royal houses of Java (even the “patriotic” one of Yogyakarta) were largely ignored through the 1950’s and 1960’s. They were felt to be largely irrelevant to modern Indonesia. Benedict Anderson writes that during his stay in Indonesia in the early 1960’s, “power and Javanese culture were largely separated. The old royal palaces were filthy and dilapidated

⁸⁷ Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, 56. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 76.

⁸⁸ Fox, “Sunan Kalijaga,” 196.

⁸⁹ John Pemberton, *On the Subject of Java* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), Chapters 1–3.

largely accessible in a non-touristic way. The Revolution and post-revolutionary populist politics had come very close to eliminating the feudal aristocracy as a serious political force.”⁹⁰ But this situation changed after Suharto came to power. The royal houses (especially those of Solo and Yogyakarta) were given a great deal of encouragement to “rediscover” and celebrate “ancient” Javanese culture. Government restoration of many sites from the glory days of the Islamic sultanates can be seen in this context. *Kraton* culture, traceable to Majapahit, provided further depth to the mythical Javanese past Indonesians were supposed to draw inspiration from. Intentionally or not the *kraton* style that was being promoted was, and perhaps only could be, a Javanese one. Most of the other royal houses in other parts of the archipelago had sunk even deeper into obscurity than Solo and Yogyakarta; in some cases, such as North Sumatra, petty nobles had been massacred during the Revolution by armed youth acting on their own interpretation of what was needed to achieve independence from the Dutch. Also, Majapahit, Mataram, and the *wali songo* and the genealogies and magic items that gave Solo and Yogyakarta (and perhaps the Republic of Indonesia) legitimacy were all Javanese.

Efforts to bolster the profile of Central Javanese courts might not only have helped the New Order as a whole but the president’s family in particular. In 1971 the Suharto family pushed for the establishment of the Mangadeg Foundation. This was a project on the part of the family and other members of the Jakarta elite and the Mangkunegaran Palace (in Solo). The Foundation’s first effort was the renovation of the Mangadeg mausoleum, the grave site of Mangkunegoro I and other royal ancestors.⁹¹ More elaborate plans were made for a complex to be built on nearby Mount Giri Bangun (Mount Awakening). This site was to house the graves of the ancestors of Madame Tien Suharto, who allegedly had ties to the Mangkunegaran *kraton*. The complex was provided with marble columns, carved woodwork and gilded pillars. It was much more lavishly executed than the Mangadeg tombs and intended as the eventual resting place of Tien and her husband.⁹² Tien Suharto passed away

⁹⁰ Anderson, “Introduction,” in *Language and Power*, 4–5.

⁹¹ Pemberton, *On the Subject of Java*, 159.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 166.

in 1996. In 1997, foreigners and Indonesians provided a variety of figures on the cost of the mausoleum (\$US 1–10 million). The project caused much resentment and entry to the vicinity was apparently restricted. It is possible that the Suharto mausoleum was modeled after that of Sukarno, which as noted above could be seen as a New Order monument, despite its occupant. The latter structure was built with *kraton*-type pillars, similar to those of the palaces in Solo and Yogyakarta. Although President Suharto himself has proudly stated that he was born a poor peasant boy, the family tree he provides in his autobiography notes his wife's royal connections.⁹³

In a sense an attempt was being made to create a new ruling dynasty for Java. The term “royal family” was often used with a great deal of contempt in late and post-New Order Indonesia; such royal pretensions may indeed have backfired. While the verdict is still out on the legacy of the New Order and Suharto himself, very few kind words have been saved for his children; Suharto lived to see his youngest son Tommy behind bars. But the creation of a royal persona had a long tradition in Southeast Asia and as a mode of obtaining legitimacy it could often have been seen to work. Heine-Geldern notes that if one possessed the right heirlooms, performed the right rituals and fabricated a good genealogy then one would be accepted as a legitimate ruler or even the incarnation of a god. Thus Ken Angrok the thirteenth century Javanese founder of Singasari is described by the *Pararaton* as a vicious criminal, a virtual one-man crime wave. Nevertheless, he eventually becomes king because, according to the same source, he was an incarnation of the gods. Divine kingship could be used to explain and justify usurpation.⁹⁴ An October 1974 magazine article on his background caused Suharto to take the extraordinary step of summoning foreign and local reporters to his office. With the aid of elderly associates of his family he was able to convince them of his humble background.⁹⁵ This did not, however, really clear the matter up. Rumours of royal connections, to the royal houses of either Solo or Yogyakarta, have persisted, possibly fuelled by the old Javanese folk belief that all rulers are by

⁹³ Suharto, *My Thoughts*, 5, 486–487.

⁹⁴ Heine-Geldern, “Conceptions of State and Kingship,” 7–8.

⁹⁵ Suharto, *My Thoughts*, 5.

definition of noble ancestry; if an important political or military figure, like Suharto, does not have or claim to have such ancestors it is must be because such a descent has been deliberately hidden. Political success constitutes proof of royal blood. Fabrication of a genealogy or the adoption of a royal style, through dress or the building of palaces and mausoleums, merely makes plain what has previously been known to be true but has been kept from public view.

Attempts to adopt (or confirm) a royal identity, despite Suharto's denials, might be observed in the building of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. The theme park could be considered the Suharto's attempt to build their own *kraton*, one not subject to the snubs of the older more established royal families of Central Java. This *kraton* would embody not just a legitimacy derived from the Javanese royal past but one derived from Indonesian history as a whole. It contains a map of the whole archipelago; if Suharto could not adopt the royal name of Hamengkubuwono (Nail of the Universe) he could at least portray "his kingdom" (Woodward notes that some inhabitants of Yogyakarta feel that their Sultan, who is at the center of traditional Javanese belief, could rule not only Indonesia but the whole world if he wished to).⁹⁶ Heine-Geldern points out the importance in Southeast Asia of a ruler building a palace in order to both achieve power and express legitimacy.⁹⁷ Building a new capital to indicate a new regime is a common enough occurrence historically. But a *kraton* is more than simply a new structure; it is a source of power. In Javanese history, a series of new *kraton* were constructed to mark the emergence of new dynasties (Plered and Kartasura were capitals of Mataram and were succeeded by the separate states and *kraton* of Surakarta and Yogyakarta). Taman Mini Indonesia Indah could be seen as Suharto's new *kraton*.

This is not as far fetched as it might sound. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno would have understood; a monumental Jakarta was his *kraton*, symbolic of the new nation's modernity and perceived high status in the world. He was responsible for many of the city's familiar landmarks: the Monas, the Hotel Indonesia, the Sarinah Department Store, the Jakarta bypass and the Senayan clover leaf bridge.⁹⁸ He

⁹⁶ See *Islam in Java*, 21.

⁹⁷ Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship," 15.

⁹⁸ Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 167.

believed that architecture could reflect an ideal society and expressed this view in a 1962 speech:

Comrades from Jakarta, let us build Jakarta into the greatest city possible. Great not just from a material point of view; great, not just because of its skyscrapers; great not just because it has boulevards and beautiful streets; great not just because it has beautiful monuments; great in every respect, even in the little houses of the workers of Jakarta there must be a sense of greatness . . . Give Jakarta an extraordinary place in the minds of the Indonesian people, because Jakarta belongs to the people of Jakarta. Jakarta belongs to the whole Indonesian people. More than that, Jakarta is becoming the beacon of the whole of Mankind! Yes, the beacon of the New Emerging Forces.⁹⁹

Likewise, Suharto (and his wife) attempted to latch onto the aura of the Mangkunegaran palace of Solo. Later they went further and created a sacred palace of their own complete with *pusaka*; Taman Mini Indonesia Indah contains a special pavilion housing hundreds of antique *kris*. Suharto's autobiography speaks of the park as a personal dream, intended to house the nation's heritage and as a place of recreation and education for the Indonesian people. It would promote national culture; critics of the project not only failed to understand what he was trying to achieve, they threatened the country's stability and would be treated accordingly (it is interesting to note that he would still feel the need to attack opponents of the park years after its opening).¹⁰⁰ Like a sacred enclosure of old Taman Mini Indonesia Indah would both embody and advance the harmonious development of society.

Dutch Hegemony

Of course the Dutch eventually subdued all of the rulers of Java along with the rest of the population of the archipelago. The phrase "350 years of Dutch rule" is one frequently used by Indonesians and foreigners alike, although it is not very accurate. Bali was only conquered in 1908 and Aceh, it could be argued, was never really

⁹⁹ Cited *Ibid.*, 167. In Sukarno's political cosmology the world was divided between the New Emerging Forces (the Third World, recently independent colonies) and the Old Established Forces (the old colonial powers and the United States).

¹⁰⁰ Suharto, *My Thoughts*, 269.

brought under full Dutch control. The inhabitants of some remote areas of Western New Guinea, in theory under Dutch sovereignty, were until the 1930's unaware of the outside world's existence. But it could be argued that from 1596, when the Dutch landed, and increasingly in the late seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries, the foreign colonialists were set on a course of action that would lead inexorably to their establishing hegemony over most of the region. This statement is also not totally accurate. Many Dutch conquests were by accident. But the Dutch, whether working for the VOC or the colonial authorities, were certainly united and motivated in a way that their Javanese, Acehnese and Balinese opponents were not.¹⁰¹ The Dutch were conscious of being alien intruders in a hostile environment and had the clear purpose of making a profit; the native rulers and inhabitants of Island Southeast Asia had no concept of being Indonesians until the twentieth century. Such sentiments of a common past, a common present and a common future arose from the common experience of foreign rule.

The era of Dutch control, no matter how it is measured in regards to time and geography, is remembered today by most Indonesians as mostly negative. New Order-era writer Mochtar Lubis describes how encounters between the Dutch East Indian Company and Indonesians followed a common pattern: peaceful contact, growing mistrust and finally violent conflict. This pattern was repeated again and again until the Company was able to impose a trading monopoly.¹⁰² In 1599 the Dutch reached the spice-producing island of Ambon:

Like the Bantamese, little did the Ambonese who watched the arrival of the new ships know what portents these ships from Holland brought. How little they suspected that their paradise would soon be torn apart by violence, with a ruthlessness no less brutal than what the Spaniards during the Inquisition perpetrated against the Incas in South America. In their search for gold in South America, the Spaniards had devastated cities and taken innumerable lives. In their search for spices, and to impose their monopoly on it, the Dutch had been no less cruel, devastating and depopulating whole islands. Blood marked the spice transported from the Moluccas to Europe at enormous profits. The

¹⁰¹ The United East Indies Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or VOC) was founded in 1602. The VOC is often referred to as the Dutch East Indies Company or simply the Company.

¹⁰² Mochtar Lubis, *Indonesia: the Land under the Rainbow* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), 95.

rich merchants' homes in Amsterdam were drenched with the blood of Dutchmen, Portuguese, Spaniards, English and Indonesians.¹⁰³

Lubis goes on to describe the Company as being greater in power than the largest modern multinational corporation. With the power of a sovereign state, it held the power of life and death and not just over individuals, "it has left nothing of value in Indonesia, but death, suffering, and the rape of whole communities and societies."¹⁰⁴

Such sentiments could apply equally to the subsequent period, from 1799 on, when the Dutch government, rather than a private company, exercised sovereignty over present-day Indonesia. The speeches of early nationalist leaders such as Sukarno made it clear that many Indonesians felt that Dutch colonial authorities were as oppressive as the Company had been, despite protestations of working on behalf of the colonized that would have baffled the VOC's governors. Indonesians today seem rather proud of the fact that they no longer hold a grudge against their former colonial masters. If the Dutch language is seldom taught anymore this probably has more to do with its limited use worldwide rather than to any specific antipathy. Indonesian archaeologist Eko Budihardjo mentions that some in the older generation of his fellow citizens do not seem interested in preserving the material remains of the Dutch past and that perhaps such feelings are motivated by shame. They do not want Indonesian youth to see physical examples of colonization. Budihardjo sees this as irrational; Australians preserve old prison complexes even though their ancestors were convicts.¹⁰⁵ Such an attitude is not really born out by the amount of restoration work that has been done on buildings constructed by the Dutch during their stay in Indonesia. Thirty-one percent of the sites described in the *Hasil Pemugaran* are from this time period, although this number includes sites, like the Istana Maimun of Medan, built by Indonesian rulers and the homes of those such as Cut Nyak Dien of Aceh who (along with her husband) opposed the Dutch in battle.¹⁰⁶ But actual Dutch fortresses,

¹⁰³ Ibid., 98.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 125.

¹⁰⁵ See "Conservation of Little Netherlands in Semarang," in *Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Heritage in Indonesia*, ed. Eko Budihardjo, intro. Wardiman Djojonegoro (Yogyakarta: University of Gadjah Mada Press, 1997), 131.

¹⁰⁶ *Hasil Pemugaran*, 30–31, 34–35.

such as Fort Orange in North Sulawesi and Fort Duurstede in the Moluccas have also been conserved.¹⁰⁷ Of course the grim citadels of the Europeans might act as a fitting symbol of what true Indonesian patriots had to fight against.

Heroes of the Struggle

If the Dutch period is seen by the public and perhaps the New Order regime as one of vicious colonial exploitation, albeit one over which Indonesians can show themselves to be mature enough not to be bitter, one thing that cannot be forgotten is how much effort it took to make the Dutch leave. The “Nationalist Past” discussed above emphasized the glorious history of Majapahit and to a lesser extent Srivijaya. Other entities, such as Mataram, might also be included in this roll call of powerful pre-colonial states. These were golden ages, which Yamin and Sukarno and others wanted Indonesians to look back upon with pride. Then the Dutch came. The struggle of “national heroes” (*pahlawan*) is seen as a long one, in some cases starting with the arrival of the first Dutch ships. There is a consistency in the nationalist element of this effort. A unified Indonesia is seen as having existed from the time of Majapahit. Attacks by the Dutch on the various peoples of the archipelago, whether on the Bantenese settlement of Jayakarta in 1619 or on Aceh in the late nineteenth century, are attacks on Indonesians even though those under attack would not have accepted or even understood such an identity.

Pahlawan are portrayed as pretty much the same throughout the centuries of the anti-Dutch struggle and across the archipelago. They bravely fight and then are defeated, usually by treachery, are then cruelly treated, perhaps dying a martyr’s death. These heroic actions are motivated by patriotism, by a love of Indonesia, its people, its past and its destiny to be free of foreign oppression. Of course in actuality their actions might have had much different sources of inspiration. A 1972 issue of the journal *Indonesia* contains several articles dealing with the autobiographies of *pahlawan*. In his introduction, Anthony Reid questions whether these individuals really merit such

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 174, 218.

a description. He notes the almost complete lack in their writings of “appeals to freedom or liberation from alien rule in any absolute sense.” Instead mention is made of the bad faith of the Dutch, a need to protect one’s honour, impatient followers and the overwhelming influence of uncontrollable cosmic forces.¹⁰⁸ They might have felt the need to defend religion (in most of Indonesia, Islam) or a local identity (Java, Bali or Aceh) or to gain control over other peoples and territories before the Dutch did. They would probably not have felt that they belonged to anything called *nusantara* or Indonesia, the latter word only coming into use among some Western ethnologists in the 1850’s.

Regardless of whether *pahlawan* would have identified themselves as Indonesians, they have been celebrated as such by subsequent generations. The lives of national heroes have been described in the popular histories of Muhammad Yamin, continuing the story where his golden age of Majapahit left off and giving substance to Sukarno’s description of a dark present under Dutch domination.¹⁰⁹ Denis Lombard reproduces the cover of a pamphlet put out on November 10, 1953 (Day of Heroes, commemorating the 1945 Battle of Surabaya) which shows some *pahlawan kemerdekaan* (Heroes of Independence). The personages depicted are an eclectic group selected from almost every region of present-day Indonesia. Among the eighteen individuals two are from Sumatra, two from Sulawesi, one from Kalimantan, one from the Moluccas and the remainder from Java. Christians (Sam Ratulangi), Muslims (Sultan Hasanuddin), Indo-Europeans (E.F.E. Douwes Dekker), Javanese (Diponegoro), men and women (R.A. Kartini) are shown to have all been part of the struggle. Both armed resistance (Iman Bonjol) and peaceful organisation (K.H. Dahlan) are understood as having been equally important. Some heroes tried to stop Dutch advances hundreds of years ago (Sultan Hasanuddin of Makassar who was defeated in 1669); others lived to see the attainment of Independence (General Sudirman died in 1950).¹¹⁰ This

¹⁰⁸ Anthony Reid, “On the Importance of Autobiography,” in *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 3.

¹⁰⁹ See Muhammad Yamin, *Sedjarah Peperangan Dipanegara: Pahlawan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (A History of Diponegoro’s War: a Hero of Indonesian Independence) (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1950).

¹¹⁰ Denys Lombard, *Le Carrefour Javanais: Essai d’Histoire Globale* (Javanese Crossroads: An Essay in Global History) (Paris: Editions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1990), Vol. 1, 203.

pamphlet was circulated before the system of selecting heroes was codified by the Guided Democracy regime in 1958.¹¹¹

An analysis of the heroes listed and described in the *Album Pahlawan Bangsa* reveals a certain pattern in those chosen during the Sukarno years. These *pahlawan* tended to be prominent figures in the nationalist struggle of the early twentieth century. A large number of *pahlawan* were from Java. Only four figures (a Batak, two Achenese and a Javanese) were part of the earlier struggle to resist the initial Dutch takeover. Many of those selected were part of the civilian side of the struggle for Independence rather than from the military. The New Order retained most of the *pahlawan* chosen by the previous regime (two leftists, Tan Malaka and the PKI's Alimin, were dropped from the list). However, a new direction became evident in what type of hero was considered appropriate for the nation's veneration. The first New Order *pahlawan* were the military victims of the PKI killed in the G-30-S incident. In early 1966 Syahrir, usually ranked just below Sukarno and Hatta in facilitating the achievement of Independence, also achieved the status of *pahlawan* despite having died in political exile. But the definition of hero was also expanded beyond those involved in the modern nationalist movement to include those who had battled the initial Dutch incursions in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The struggle to create and defend Indonesia had begun with Iskander Muda and Sultan Agung, rulers who thought of themselves as Muslims, as Achenese or Javanese, but certainly not as Indonesians. Heroism could be exhibited after the Dutch were defeated and even after the PKI threat had been countered; such figures as the president's wife Tien Suharto were given the designation of *pahlawan*. The New Order honoured figures from across the Archipelago, from Sabang to Merauke (Aceh to Irian Jaya). Javanese were still present among the selected *pahlawan* but not as prominently; every region was recognized as having contributed to the fight. Adherents of all the official religions of Indonesia also took part in the drive for freedom from foreign control; religiously motivated sacrifice is merged with suffering death or exile for Indonesia. Thus, Iman Bonjol's Padri War against both the Dutch and less Islamic elements of Minangkabau society could be defined

¹¹¹ For more on this selection process see Klaus H. Schreiner, "The Making of National Heroes," 261-267.

as simply an anti-colonial struggle. The death in battle of Balinese guerrilla leader Col. I. Gusti Ngurah Rai was equated with a *puputan*, a traditional suicidal attack undertaken against overwhelming odds.¹¹² Nationalist leader Robert Wolter Mongisidi was described by the *Album Pahlawan Bangsa* as having faced a Dutch firing squad with Bible in hand; as the execution was carried out he raised his fist and shouted *merdeka* (freedom).¹¹³

The format of the *Album Pahlawan Bangsa* is pretty basic. The dates of birth, death and award of *pahlawan* status are noted. Each short description is accompanied by a portrait or photograph. The descriptions note the accomplishments of each hero, particular stress being placed on careers spent battling the Dutch and later the PKI. The national struggle is presented as a non-ambiguous one. All *pahlawan* shared the same goal -*merdeka* and the creation of an independent, unitary Indonesia. Individual motives are downplayed; unique religious, ethnic or class identities are subsumed into a larger Indonesian one. The *Wajah dan Sejarah Perjuangan Pahlawan Nasional*, all five volumes of it, offers more in-depth descriptions.¹¹⁴ But this mostly involves more details about the life and accomplishments of each *pahlawan*. For military figures, more information is offered about where they served and at what rank. For politicians, party affiliations are noted. No analysis is given as to what being a *pahlawan* might involve. The place of heroism in the larger narrative of Indonesian history is left unexamined. Further details on the nation's heroes are presented to the nation's youth in the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. An entire chapter of the history's third volume is devoted to "Opponents of Colonialism." Sections are devoted to Central Maluku, West Sumatra, Central and East Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, Bali, Aceh and North Sumatra. Each section follows roughly the same format. The background of each hero is followed by an account of their war against their Dutch and their eventual defeat.¹¹⁵ Diponegoro's treacherous capture and his tragic exile are described.¹¹⁶ The struggle is shown as something in which whole families, young and old, men and women, take part. The late nineteenth century Acehese husband

¹¹² *Album Pahlawan Nasional*, 159–160.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 137–139.

¹¹⁴ *Wajah dan Sejarah*.

¹¹⁵ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 3, 147–278.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 204–205.

and wife team Cut Nyak Dien and Teuku Umar are noted.¹¹⁷ Kapitan Paulus Tiahahu was beheaded in 1817 in Ambon. Already eighty years old, he was carried to his execution by his followers including his daughter Marta Kristina Tiahahu.¹¹⁸

Celebration of the anti-colonial struggle has been preserved by the New Order on a physical level. Billboards erected in 1985 for the fortieth anniversary of Independence portray a set of heroes with the caption, "let us continue our struggle in our future". Women, although assigned mostly a traditional role in the family and as educators, are shown in as prominent place as men; women have had a relatively high status in the Malay world. Kartini, Cut Nyak Dien from Aceh and Dewi Sartika from Sunda are clearly identifiable. More difficult to make out images may include Maria Christine Tiahahu (Maluku), Nyi Ahmad Dahlan (Central Java), Rasuna Said (Minangkabau), Cut Meutiah (North Sumatra), Maria Walanda Maramis (Minahasa), and R.A. Ageng Serang (Java). These latter heroines are described by Leclerc (who photographed the billboards) as "the six other national heroines usually portrayed in such occasions."¹¹⁹ The major male heroes of the "proto-nationalist" stage of the struggle against the Dutch (the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries) are also shown. These include Sultan Agung and Diponegoro of Mataram, Sultan Hasanuddin of the Gowa Makassarese kingdom, the Minangkabau Islamic, Padri leader Iman Bonjol, from Ambon the Christianised Pattimura, from Aceh the Islamic figure Teungku Umar and Si Singamangaradja, an animist Batak chief. The struggle against the Dutch is portrayed as a long one. Many ethnic groups from across the Archipelago, of different religions and cultures, contributed to the final victory. The actual sufferings experienced during the "cultivation system" are simply noted in passing behind the hooves of Diponegoro's horse; much more attention is given to atrocities committed by the Japanese.¹²⁰ Perhaps the forced deliveries of the nineteenth century were a little bit too indigenous; much of the system depended on the participation of local notables acting on behalf of the Dutch. In Aceh the traditional wooden houses of such fighters against the Dutch as Cut Nyak Meutia (killed in battle 1910)

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 253.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 162.

¹¹⁹ Jean-Luc Maurer, "A New Order Sketchpad," 213.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

and Cut Nyak Dien (died in exile 1908) have been restored.¹²¹ These structures are unusual as the homes of *pahlawan* seldom survived their occupants' defeat by the Dutch. Palaces and mosques constructed during the period of Dutch hegemony have been preserved. However, they are symbolic not just of the nationalist struggle but of traditional culture, both royal and religious. Ironically, resistance to the Dutch is embodied mostly in the fortresses and public houses left by the colonial authorities themselves. The impressive stone battlements of the Vreeberg, built across from the Yogyakarta *kraton*, point to the length the Dutch went to subdue their colonial possessions. Many Dutch colonial buildings were also used by participants in the Indonesian nationalist movement (the Gedung Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge Building), used as a dormitory for Indonesian students of STOVIA (the Dutch sponsored school to train doctors), was the site of the 1928 Youth Pledge).¹²²

Dutch Manners

It is convenient that this is a revolutionary struggle which is over; the Dutch are not coming back. Diponegoro's immediate and even long range aims have little relevance today unlike those of more recent rebels, even ones who also fought the Dutch. In 1963 the government of Indonesia under Sukarno declared the communist activist Tan Malaka (who was shot by the Indonesian army in 1949) a "Hero of National Independence"; his 1925 book, *Towards a Republic of Indonesia*, may have been the first to envision such an independent country.¹²³ It is unlikely that the staunchly anti-communist New Order would have taken such a step. The energy of these heroes can be safely harnessed to current aims without too many contradictions. Thus units in the Indonesian army, a hierarchical and in many ways conservative institution could be named after Diponegoro and Briwijaya, this last king of Majapahit being a far from revolutionary figure. Even the imperialistic Gajah Mada is a *pahlawan*, although of "unity" rather than rebellion (it might be recalled that Sukarno had tried

¹²¹ *Hasil Pemugaran*, 28, 30–31.

¹²² *Hasil Pemugaran*, 80.

¹²³ Aboe Bakar Loebis. "Tan Malaka's Arrest: an Eye-Witness Account." *Indonesia* 53 (1992): 78.

with difficulty to distinguish Majapahit aggression from that of the Dutch). It is the energy of national heroes, their spirit, which makes them suitable role models, not the specific causes they were fighting for (a billboard set up near the main post office in Yogyakarta in 1996 has pictures of Diponegoro, Sudirman and a downed Indonesian airplane; a caption reads “learn history in order to make history,” what that history involves is not explained).

The billboards commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Independence Proclamation highlight success in the field of social and economic development.¹²⁴ The revolution is shown as a completed one; the struggle against colonialism is over. This attitude stands in sharp contrast to Sukarno’s *Konfrontasi*. During the final phase of the Guided Democracy regime, Indonesia was involved in a fierce, mostly rhetorical, stand off with the United States, the United Kingdom and others of the Old Established Forces. This struggle, which included efforts to secure Indonesia possession of Western New Guinea (Irian Jaya) and thwart the creation of Malaysia, was portrayed as a continuation of the revolution against the Dutch (a common slogan of the period, “Crush Imperialism in All its Forms!”). These attitudes changed dramatically with the establishment of the New Order. Billboards put up ten years later when, according to the assessment of Jean-Luc Maurer, Suharto was at the height of his power, are even more at ease with the Dutch legacy. Panels placed behind the Monas on the occasion of the Republic’s fiftieth anniversary in August 1995, show the usual nationalist heroes and events from the struggle for Independence. Many of these images are related to 468 years of settlement at the current port of Jakarta (founded as an Indonesian city and then becoming the Dutch centre of Batavia).¹²⁵ The main panels, however, which flank large portraits of Suharto and his vice president Try Sustrino telescope the entire Dutch period into a few images. Dutch ships are shown landing near present day Jakarta. Above this is shown the City Hall, built in 1710, symbolising the beginning of colonial domination. The next image is at the very end of the period of Dutch hegemony, the 1949 Round Table at The Hague, which confirmed Indonesian

¹²⁴ Maurer, “A New Order Sketchpad,” 213.

¹²⁵ Jean-Luc Maurer, “La gloire du père: images de Suharto a son apogée, les panneaux du 50^e anniversaire de l’Indépendance à Jakarta” (The glory of the father: Images of Suharto at his height: the murals for the 50th anniversary of Independence in Jakarta), *Archipel* 57 (1999): 86–87.

Independence. Most of three centuries of struggle against the Dutch are summarized to the effect that connotations of conflict are removed. By brushing aside the violence and oppression of foreign rule, the New Order may therefore not only be showing itself to be comfortable with the Dutch legacy, but perhaps that it is even willing to emulate the old colonial regime. Adrian Vickers notes that Benedict Anderson, “correctly by-passes the pre-colonial state in order to argue that the New Order state was the colonial state reborn.”¹²⁶ This stood as the “Cornell Orthodoxy” on the subject of the New Order until Suharto stepped down in May 1998. Although it has served rhetorical purposes, it has been shown by Cribb, for example, that there were not necessarily many direct connections between the New Order and the former colonial system. The use of military officers in the civil administration of the Netherlands East Indies has been equated with *dwifungsi* (dual function, the doctrine that the Indonesian defence forces have both a political and military role). But Dutch civilian officials were clearly in the stronger position; military officers were often used simply because there was a shortage of personnel; the colony could in no way be described, like the New Order, as a military dominated regime. The colonial state had less of a reach into the lives of Indonesians than the New Order and there was no equivalent in post-Independence Indonesia of the legal arrangements between the Dutch metropolitan state and the administration in Batavia.¹²⁷ Also, the New Order is clearly an Indonesian regime, with strong cultural and historical roots.

If direct historical links with the Dutch do not stand up to close scrutiny, a vague colonial shadow still remained visible during the New Order. This often took the form of the adoption of Dutch mannerisms through the use of buildings constructed during the colonial era. Sukarno, of course, felt quite at home in the governor general’s residences in Jakarta and Bogor (the former renamed Merdeka Palace). Suharto made use of the same palace for official duties, although his actual residence was elsewhere. The Bogor residence was very much associated with his predecessor (Sukarno was confined there

¹²⁶ Vickers, “The New Order,” 81.

¹²⁷ Ibid. See also Robert Cribb, “Introduction: The Late Colonial State in Indonesia,” in *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies 1880–1942*, ed. Robert Cribb (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), 1–10.

under house arrest after his fall from power) and thus it had less of a profile during the New Order. It might be expected that a newly independent nation would convert the seats of power of their former colonial masters to new uses and thereby mark the end of foreign domination. Such expropriations of official buildings (and official symbols) might also be meant to clearly state that the new regime was the logical inheritor of any previous ones, while also being a clear improvement over previous systems. Timothy C. Lindsey describes how and why Dutch architectural forms have become common-place during the New Order:

The author also believes that the expanse and physical control exercised by the Netherlands East Indies empire is seen, like the perceived authority, power and alleged physical expanse of Majapahit, as precedent for a New Order geographical equivalent, a nation (and *de facto* empire) which is monumentally depicted as the equal of the Dutch and Majapahit empires that are its precursors.¹²⁸

Discover Indonesia, which notes not just architecture, and monuments the regime felt fit to restore, but also which sites the New Order felt the world at large should notice, devotes considerable space to Old Batavia. Dutch buildings, such as the old *Stadhuis* (city hall) and the Kota Railway Station, are described next to indigenous structures, such as the Fish Market and the eighteenth century Mosque of Pasar Ikan (Fish Market Mosque). A quaint neighbourhood, “a Dutch town, built and laid out according to a Dutch model” is offered to the public.¹²⁹ This area does indeed get many foreign visitors. It also is the focus of considerable scholarly restoration work. It does seem strange that so much effort has been devoted to preserving the architectural evidence of a former (presumably once hated) colonial master. But Old Batavia seems more indicative of a desire to celebrate Jakarta than the wish to remember that Indonesia had once been a Dutch colony. For many Indonesians, particularly those from the “Generation of 1945” who came to political and culture prominence in the wake of the Independence Proclamation of August 1945, their childhood experiences, their formative landscapes had a very Dutch look to them. They went to schools and used public facilities built according to *Indische* architectural norms (a style that

¹²⁸ Timothy C. Lindsey, “Concrete Ideology,” 176.

¹²⁹ *Discover Indonesia*, 84–85.

combined European and local elements). They might have known the Dutch language, or at least used a form of *bahasa Betawi* (the Jakarta dialect of Malay) sprinkled with foreign idioms. They would have listened to *krocong*, a form of indigenous music influenced by Portuguese, Eurasian and Dutch rhythms. While mostly the product of a rural Central Javanese childhood, where the *kraton* was more important than Dutch trends, Suharto considered himself (and could be considered) a part of this 1945 Generation.

Such imagery, whether it reflects nostalgia for an elite's youth or a genuine admiration for the Dutch colonial regime, even sees itself reflected in private residences. Lindsey notes that mansions in Pondok Indah, a wealthy Jakarta suburb, use motifs which one might associate with "unpleasant memories of colonial oppression."¹³⁰ He suggests that:

The elite can see the architectural forms of imperialism and international power as appropriate architectural images of power in a new, relatively secure Indonesian empire that sees itself in its own history writing as inheritor of the archetypal Javanese empire in Indonesia, following Majapahit (the 'first empire'), and as conqueror of the Dutch empire in Indonesia (the 'second empire').¹³¹

However, while Lindsey might have been quite right in noting the interest on the part of the New Order elite in the Dutch past, and their lack of ex-colonial bitterness, he probably goes too far in identifying a conscious continuity between the "three empires." Majapahit was clearly felt by the New Order (and nationalist thinkers before that) to have provided Indonesia with its present borders. This was not the case for the Dutch East Indies. The problems the "Nationalist Orthodoxy" had with an Indonesia founded by Douwes Dekker (as opposed to Gajah Mada) and consisting of the land and the peoples that happened to have fallen under rule by the Dutch have been noted above. Although claims to West New Guinea (Irian Jaya) were based on it having been part of the larger Dutch colony, Indonesian histories, such as the *Sejarah Nasional*, do not make the link between the Republic of Indonesia and its European predecessor explicit. The Revolution remains a revolution (or a reclamation) not an inheritance. It is in this context that the return of the *Nagara-*

¹³⁰ Lindsey, "Concrete Ideology," 175.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 176.

kertagama to Indonesia by the Queen of the Netherlands, noted above, should be seen. The colonial usurpers, now good friends, return to Indonesia the sacred property of her true ancestors.

Conclusion: A Golden Age Interrupted

For the New Order, Majapahit was seen as a lost golden age, a heroic empire, which had encompassed the whole of the Indonesian Archipelago and beyond. Under the wise leadership of such mythic figures as Gajah Mada and Hayam Wuruk a rich and powerful civilization controlled international trade and cultivated elaborate rice terraces. Ornate Hindu temples were the focus of worship for a priestly hierarchy. Bureaucrats and soldiers ran an efficient administration on behalf of a passive but grateful population of peasants and craftsmen. Majapahit maintained alliances with neighbouring states, but mostly wished to develop in an independent and self-sufficient manner. This portrait of Majapahit in many ways reflected how the New Order saw itself. This ancient Javanese empire was one in which a strong leadership received the unquestioning obedience of their subjects in return for protection and material prosperity; ideally the New Order would function in the same way. The citizens of Indonesia would defer to the judgment of the small, military elite. This elite would, whatever their actual origins, take on Javanese mannerisms and a Javanese style of governance in executing the regime's political, social and economic development projects. Javanese respect for authority, refined behaviour and willingness to work "behind the scenes" for the good of the group rather than the individual might be seen as desirable traits inherited from Majapahit. Javanese icons, such as the *wayang*, *gamelan* and Borobudur, would be associated, accurately or not, with the name of the mythic golden age of Majapahit. Majapahit was seen as a powerful Indonesian empire. The borders of the present Republic of Indonesia were set by Majapahit and it has been the job of subsequent inhabitants of the region to recognize their true identity as Indonesians and try to restore these ancient frontiers. The character of Majapahit, the relationship between ruler and subject, its attitudes towards the outside world, its wealth and military power, are recalled as admirable. Islam, although not openly seen as a negative force, altered this picture only slightly. The *kraton* culture of the later Islamic sultanates retained

many aspects of Majapahit. The courts of Central Java, of Surakarta and Yogyakarta functioned as the symbolic centers of a universe defined by Islamic, Javanese and Hindu-Buddhist traditions. To some extent Majapahit gave legitimacy to Islamic rulers, as it would later give legitimacy to the New Order. The right to rule was passed down from Gajah Mada, through Sultan Agung and finally to Suharto himself. Like Majapahit, the Islamic states of pre-colonial Java were based on agriculture and military power and gained prestige through elaborate ceremonies, complex genealogies and powerful magic items.

The Dutch brought Indonesia's golden age to an end. The Dutch were seen as bringing centuries of oppression to Indonesia and exploiting the region's natural wealth, with little benefit to the native population. This violence and terror provoked the local inhabitants of every area of Indonesia to fight back. *Pahlawan*, men and women, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Javanese, Moluccans, Achenese, Minangkabau and Balinese, fought, were defeated and died. From their fortresses and warships the colonialists forged the archipelago into the Dutch East Indies, an empire whose boundaries actually exceeded those of Majapahit. But through sacrifice and bravery Indonesians were able to drive the Dutch out and reclaim their nation. Once gone the Dutch presence could be seen as an aberration, a brief interruption in a story starting with Indonesia's golden age of Majapahit and ending with the New Order. The Dutch interlude might even be remembered in positive terms, especially in cases where the Dutch East Indies functioned in ways which seemed similar to New Order conceptions of Majapahit and itself. Thus, the Dutch colonial concept of *rust en ordre* is translated and adopted by the New Order as *keamanan dan ketertiban* (security and order). The conservative Suharto regime was just as concerned with preventing rebellion and chaos as the colonial authorities had been. *Pahlawan*, leaders of rebel armies such as Diponegoro, guerrilla fighters like Iman Bonjol and executed martyrs like Kapitan Paulus Tiahahu, are seen as part of a national struggle that was somehow not a revolution. They were instead involved in a centuries-long project to restore to Indonesia a peace, wealth and stability that it had enjoyed under Gajah Mada. As will be shown in the subsequent chapter, this project continued into the twentieth century, with the 1945–1949 Indonesian Revolution and the 1965–1966 transition to the New Order.

CHAPTER THREE

REVOLUTIONS AND COUPS—THE NEW ORDER AND MODERN INDONESIAN HISTORY

In a 1997 reflection on the significance of the Indonesian Revolution to the New Order, retired Lieutenant General Moerdiono notes that:

Revolution has never been an alien term in our history. The term “physical and spiritual revolution” is used in the explanation of the 1945 Constitutions. In addition, the “revolution” was also a central concept in our political life as a nation during the entire decade of 1955–1965. Interestingly, however, we hardly ever think of it anymore today. At present, our central concept is no longer “revolution,” instead what we now have is *national development*.

It is obvious that an important shift has taken place in the paradigm that we use as a reference in leading our life as a society, as a nation and as a state. The complete paradigm shift took place as we, as a nation, underwent a horrible trauma resulting from the revolutionist paradigm—which was being bolstered and emboldened until it reached its highest pinnacle. At its peak, most aspects of our life as a nation were virtually paralyzed. Today, we can justifiably say that the national development we first launched in 1969 was the anti-thesis of the revolutionist paradigm.¹

For the New Order the Indonesian Revolution was somehow not really a revolution anymore, at least as far as the term is commonly understood. Thus, the radical, Marxist PKI could be seen as “counter-revolutionary.” Clearly the New Order saw the Indonesian Revolution as being profoundly different from the French, Russian, Chinese or American revolutions. The struggle against Dutch colonialism lost much of its original meaning under the New Order. It was portrayed as a process that had been basically completed. Yet the Revolution, as the foundation of the national development process, was still lavishly celebrated every August 17, the nation’s Independence Day.

¹ Moerdiono, “A Reflection on Indonesian National Revolution,” in *The Heartbeat of Indonesian Revolution*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: Penerbit PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1997), 3.

New Order attitudes towards the Revolution might be related to the events of September 30, 1965 and their aftermath. The murder of seven Indonesian military officers marks the beginning of the end of Sukarno's grip on power and the beginning of the rise of the New Order. This event might also mark the high point of the ascendancy of the radicals over the pragmatists in Indonesian politics. Moerdiono describes how these two dominant trends emerged in the context of the Indonesian revolution and involved "different perceptions on how a revolution was to be executed and managed."² He goes on to describe these two groups and their objectives:

The first group maintained that, although a revolution would involve rapid and fundamental changes in various aspects of life, it should always be managed by clear thinking and cool calculation in order to ensure its constructiveness. We call this perception a reformist and realist view on revolution. Proponents of this orientation shared the opinion that within the revolution there should always be respect for law, order and diplomacy.

On the contrary, the other group contended that, in order to be truly revolutionary, a revolution should involve total destruction of old values and abolishment of their roots. On the rubble of the old system, an entirely new system would be built. We can call this view the ultra-radical school of thought on revolution.

To a certain extent, the reformists and realists were able to tolerate the views of the ultra-radicals. However, it was impossible for the latter to tolerate the views of the earlier. In the view of the latter, the attitude shown by the reformists and realists was merely a manifestation of their weakness. Needless to say, such a difference in the basic principles would greatly affect the national policy and strategy outlined by the government.³

Moerdiono identifies Mohammad Hatta, the country's first vice-president, as the most prominent reformer. Sukarno, the ultra-radical eventually came to dominate Indonesian politics. During the Guided Democracy period he led the nation down the road to disaster:

Indeed for the next eight years prior to 1965, we lived in a period marked by *a series of incessant destruction*. All the way we were hoping that at the end of the disorder we would be able to start constructing. The focus of the destruction efforts then shifted from inside the borders of our country to overseas. During that period, Indonesia was

² Ibid., 4.

³ Ibid.

obsessed by the determination to become a center of world revolution, one that was expected to bring about an entirely new world.

We also know that the end of this ultra-radical view was met in a small, old well in a village named *Lubang Buaya*, near the Air Force Base of *Halim Perdanakusuma*, East Jakarta, thirty years ago.⁴

Hatta, a Dutch-trained economist, was vice president of the Republic of Indonesia from August 1945 until December 1956. He also served as prime minister from January 1948 until his capture by the Dutch in September, and again, after his release and further negotiations with the Dutch, until September 1950. An advocate of a negotiated settlement with the Dutch, he was also an opponent of the radical left, especially in the wake of the Madiun Affair. His interest in improving the Indonesian economy was at odds with Sukarno's more political concerns (for example the recovery of Irian Jaya from Dutch control) and during the 1950's he gradually slipped from prominence. He had been inevitably twinned with Sukarno as one of the "Proclaimers of Independence," but he was in the political wilderness for much of the 1950's, despite the demands of regional rebels that he be allowed to form a cabinet. He played no real part in the politics of Guided Democracy, by which time Sukarno's more confrontational approach was in the ascendancy.

Sukarno's political ideology is difficult to label. From early in his career he had been sympathetic towards a Marxist interpretation of Indonesian history, seeing the people of the Archipelago as destined to throw off the shackles of foreign political and economic colonialism so as to create a just, egalitarian society. In addition to Marxism, he also saw both religion and Indonesian nationalism as essential for the nation's full development. In the 1920's he had argued that these three streams of thought were not incompatible; later he developed the concept of NASAKOM (*nasionalisme, agama, komunisme*, nationalism, religion, communism) as the basis of a unified Indonesian political identity.⁵ Under Guided Democracy, his promotion of the "Nasakomization" of society was felt by some to be an attempt to push Indonesia to the left and perhaps even to facilitate a PKI takeover. Sukarno was viewed by the army, religious groups and many in the West as sympathizing with the Party; his foreign policy of

⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵ See Sukarno, *Nationalism, Islam and Marxism*, intro. Ruth McVey (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).

Konfrontasi with the “Old-Established Forces” (i.e. the West) seemed to confirm this assessment. Muslim groups, such as Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), treated Sukarno’s inclusion of Islam in NASAKOM with some scepticism and were of the belief that he favored the anti-religious PKI. Sukarno also drew on other influences, although this is more reflected in his political style than in his ideological formulations. NASAKOM itself might be seen as a Javanese attempt to reconcile extremes in the interest of preserving harmony (as could be seen in the epics of the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* of the *wayang*) and Sukarno often used *wayang* imagery in his speeches.⁶ Although foreign critics often saw NASAKOM as either an incoherent attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable or as an attempt to give respectability to communism, it might make sense in a Javanese context; an attempt to bring together diverse groups as confirmation of a traditional leader’s innate power.⁷ The stress Sukarno put on the betterment of the “Marhaen,” the large numbers of poor Indonesian peasants, who had been ill-served by colonialism, and yet did possess small plots of land and a few tools; indicate that he was interested in the Marxism of the PKI only in so far as it actually described Indonesian conditions.⁸ Sukarno was above all a nationalist, although whether an Indonesian one or a Javanese is unclear.

The PKI itself had been around since the 1924 and by the time of Guided Democracy it had already survived two major setbacks. After its involvement in failed armed revolts against the Dutch in 1926–1927, the Party had been suppressed and much of its leadership fled the country.⁹ The PKI did not take part in the early stages of the Indonesian Revolution. It emerged on the political stage in 1948 to question the direction the Republic was taking. The Party felt that the Indonesian government, in signing various cease-fire agreements with the Dutch was compromising the achievement of full, national independence. The PKI believed that only total “one hundred percent *merdeka*” could inspire the Indonesian people to

⁶ See Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, trans. Mary F. Somers Heidhues (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).

⁷ Benedict Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in *Language and Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 29–30.

⁸ See Jeanne Mintz, *Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesia Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

⁹ See Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), especially Chapters 2, 3 and 12.

defeat the Dutch and any other “imperialist challenges.” A cautious approach to international relations and towards foreign capital was seen as both unnecessary and counterproductive; independence was to be taken not begged or bargained for. Under the leadership of Musso, who had returned to Indonesia after years of exile in Moscow, and former prime minister Amir Syarifuddin (1907–1948), who admitted that he had long been a secret Party member, the PKI made an armed move for power. The Madiun revolt was violently crushed by government forces; Amir Syarifuddin was summarily executed. In 1950 a new generation of PKI leaders, such as M.H. Lukman, Nyoto and D.N. Aidit (1923–1965) emerged.¹⁰ The latter figure, as Secretary General (from June 1953) and Chairman (from 1959), led the Party to an unprecedented level of power (he was made a government minister in 1962). Emphasis was placed by the Party on mass-mobilization, the formation of affiliated labour, peasant, youth, teacher’s and women’s groups, electoral success and education. The PKI was a supporter of Sukarno’s proposal to “bury the party systems” and his initiation of Guided Democracy.¹¹ The Party remained committed, however, to the construction of a communist-inspired society, free of foreign political and economic domination. Independence from the Dutch was seen as simply the first step in a larger struggle against imperialism. The August Revolution (as PKI writings referred to the 1945–1949 conflict) was seen as very much an uncompleted task (Aidit refers to the “August 1945 Revolution and the Role of the National Traitors” in a 1953 article to mark the Party’s anniversary).¹² Nationalism seemed to possess no real answers to Indonesia’s many pressing post-Independence problems; no agreement emerged among Indonesia’s leaders as to what direction the country should take and patriotism seemed simply a matter of jockeying for an advantageous political position. The PKI, more though than any other competitors for power, seemed to many “to hold the key that would open the gate to the just and prosperous society—the modern Indonesia

¹⁰ See Ruth T. McVey, “The Enchantment of the Revolution History and Action in an Indonesian Context,” in *Perceptions of the Past*, 340–357.

¹¹ See Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959–1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). See also Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) and Justus M. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1965).

¹² See *The Selected Works of D.N. Aidit*, 71.

promised by the revolution.”¹³ In organization and ideology the Party seemed the most modern and effective. A large section of the politically involved population saw much that was attractive in the PKI program so that “a good deal of Marxist-Leninist terminology and assumptions had entered into Indonesian nationalist vocabulary, allowing PKI leaders to argue that they were merely carrying to their logical conclusion ideas on which all good patriots agreed”.¹⁴

The Party had limited success in gaining real political power under Guided Democracy; it only won limited representation in the cabinet and it had little access to armed force. Yet its influence was strong in the actual implementation of government policy, in matters of education for example. Also, the PKI had some success in “retooling” elements of Indonesian society, in attacking its opponents, especially in some of the other political parties and in the arts, for not being sufficiently enthusiastic about NASAKOM. The PKI made efforts to form an armed “Fifth Force” (in addition to the army, navy, air force and police), ostensibly to help in Sukarno’s *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia. The Party did make some inroads in the air force; Air Marshall Dhani was a PKI sympathizer. Attempts were also made to infiltrate the army. But the PKI’s main source of power during the final years of Guided Democracy was the fact the Party was protected and patronized by Sukarno. The president saw the PKI as a legitimate part of Indonesian political life and as a necessary balance to the power of the army. The PKI provided much-appreciated mass support for Sukarno’s projects.¹⁵ These projects, and Guided Democracy as a whole, took on an increasingly radical tone and in many cases were almost identical to policies advocated by the PKI. It was not simply cynical self-interest that caused the PKI to back the president; in 1965 it seemed possible that the Indonesian Revolution might be on the eve of true fulfillment on PKI terms, even if actual power remained elusive. Many enemies of the Party could even foresee the president becoming a PKI puppet; the events of September 30, 1965, were seen as a desperate attempt

¹³ Ruth McVey, “Nationalism, Revolution, and Organization in Indonesian Communism,” in *Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honour of George McT. Kahin*, ed. Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1996), 97.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁵ McVey, “Nationalism,” 110.

by the PKI to solidify their power before ill health removed their presidential protector from the scene. In subsequent months the PKI was violently suppressed and Sukarno was edged from the political stage.

The crushing of the ultra-radical stream of revolutionary thought, associated with Sukarno and ultimately the PKI, was one of the main pillars of New Order legitimacy. Henceforth, Indonesia would be primarily concerned with constructing a viable local economy, rather than with fantasies of continuous national or even world revolution. In attempting to restore political and economic stability, Suharto embarked on a course of action very different from that followed by the previous regime. The military was given a more prominent role in Indonesian society. Politics were carefully regulated so as to prevent social disharmony; state employees, peasants and the military were controlled and mobilized through the creation of a government party and managed elections. Western-trained technocrats were brought in to implement ambitious economic development plans; policies favored by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, international loans and money from oil allowed Indonesia to begin to build a modern infrastructure in the fields of transportation, banking, communications and education. The hope was to eventually create a modern industrial and service-based economy. In fact economic development could be seen as the main goal of the New Order and all parts of society were to work towards this objective. The Suharto regime also stressed agriculture self-sufficiency, the betterment of the rural farming population and a reliable inexpensive food supply for the cities. The ideological disputes that had troubled the Sukarno years died down during the New Order with the promotion of a particular interpretation of Pancasila as a state-philosophy.¹⁶ The New Order's approach seemed to be a clear break from the path Indonesia was heading down in the final years of the Guided Democracy period, a period of food shortages during which the solution of economic problems took a back-seat to working out the ideological implications of the Indonesian Revolution. The New Order was also interested in the Indonesian Revolution; it saw the events of 1945–49 and those of 1965–1966, that brought it to power, as intimately related. The New

¹⁶ Federspiel, *Indonesia in Transition*, 6–7.

Order saw itself as the logical culmination of the Revolution rather than, as critics would allege, its obvious betrayal.

Chapter 3 will be divided into two parts, reflecting the two parts of the New Order's narrative of the Revolution, the struggle against the Dutch and the post-September 1965 "correction" of the path the Revolution was taking. The first part will deal with what the Indonesian Revolution meant to the New Order and how political discourse could be moved from an uncompromising stand against the colonial (and the world) order during the Sukarno years to the conservative celebration of a development-oriented status quo that marked the reign of Suharto. In regards to this problem, an assessment will also be made about whom among the revolutionary participants, diplomats or fighters, the New Order most closely identified with. The New Order take on the civilian reaction to the December 1948 attack on Yogyakarta, the March 1949 Republican counter-attack and the October 1945 Battle of Surabaya will be noted. How the New Order distanced itself from a radical interpretation of the Revolution, by ignoring such troubling elements as the violent, *pemudal*-led outbursts of 1945–1946, while emphasizing communist treachery at Madiun, will also be described. The second part of this chapter will deal with New Order perceptions of the *Gerakan September Tiga puluh* (September 30 Movement), otherwise known as G-30-S/ PKI or GESTAPU. A basic outline of the attempted coup and its failure will be provided, although the significance of these events is still a matter of some dispute. The New Order's interpretation of G-30-S will be placed in the context of much Western scholarship which tended to downplay PKI involvement. The New Order, in its description of the Movement, makes it clear that, as far as they are concerned, the PKI was very much responsible for these violent events. Note will be made of the New Order emphasis on communist brutality and treachery, especially as embodied in PKI cadres, the figure of Chairman Aidit and the mysterious "Special Bureau." Although large numbers of communists were killed during the coup attempt's aftermath, the death of the Indonesian officers was commonly portrayed as the more significant crime. In fact these officers, it will be shown below, were conceived of as the New Order's first martyrs. They died at the hands of the PKI, which the New Order insisted was still a current threat to social stability. This chapter will conclude by noting how the New Order viewed the Revolution and the September 30 Movement may reflect the deeper issue of how the

New Order saw the general flow of history (from Majapahit onwards) and what sort of ideal society the New Order hoped to build.

Revolution and Scholarship

At the end of 1941, the Dutch colonial administration in Batavia probably considered the Indonesian nationalist movement to be one of its least important challenges. After all, the Dutch homeland itself was under brutal Nazi occupation and a militaristic Japanese Empire was seizing territory in China and making inroads into Southeast Asia. In June 1941 Japanese troops had been stationed in the Vichy-France colony of Indochina and it was no secret that the Japanese war-machine looked upon the Dutch East Indies as a potential source of oil, rubber and rice. In contrast to this threat, the Indonesian nationalist movement was very weak. The PKI had been smashed after the ill-staged armed rebellions of 1926 and 1927; its leadership had fled the country. Such groups as Sarekat Islam had faded from the political scene and leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta had for much of the 1930's been in internal exile in the Eastern Islands or been prisoners in the infamous concentration camp of Bovel Digul in the jungles of Dutch New Guinea. The Volkstraad, an advisory council set up by the Dutch, failed to give a voice to indigenous aspirations. While a few Indonesians had achieved positions of prominence in the colonial civil service or the military or had succeeded in obtaining a modern education, most remained stuck in poverty made worse by the Depression and the crisis in Europe. This situation changed dramatically on December 7, 1941. The attack on Pearl Harbour signalled the beginning of a rapid Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia. It also marked the end of European political domination of the region, though not all recognized this at the time. The Dutch East Indies fell to Japan on March 8, 1942; the short duration of Dutch resistance (Japanese forces had only landed on Java on March 1) led many Indonesians to the conclusion that the Dutch had given up any legitimate claim to rule the Indies.

The Indonesian people soon found out that they had exchanged one colonial master for another; the three and a half years of Japanese occupation were marked by great cruelty and hardship. However, some of the nationalist leadership, released from Dutch internment, were able to use this period to advance the cause of independence.

Both Hatta and Sukarno cooperated with the Japanese and in doing so were able to heighten their profile among the Indonesian population. They were able to make contacts with other Indonesian leaders and take preparatory steps towards independence. When Japan collapsed Hatta and Sukarno emerged as leaders of an independent Indonesian nation; on August 17, 1945 a Proclamation of Independence was read. This action went unnoticed by the outside world. In September when British troops began to land in Java to take control from the Japanese, many felt that it would be an easy task to re-establish Dutch administration. However, the Indonesian people felt differently and local armed groups had already sprung up to resist the Dutch return. The regular Indonesian army was formed on October 5 and on November 14 the first cabinet was constituted with veteran nationalist Sutan Syahrir (1909–66) as prime minister (Sukarno and Hatta were president and vice president). November 1945 also witnessed the bloody Battle of Surabaya, between Indonesian irregulars and British-Indian forces; the violence of this event convinced the British to back away from involvement in the dispute between the infant Indonesian Republic and Dutch colonial authorities. It also convinced many foreign observers that the Dutch were in error in dismissing an independent Indonesia as a Japanese creation, run by collaborators such as Sukarno and Hatta, who had no popular backing.

The subsequent struggle was one to confirm Indonesian independence and to get the Dutch to accept that their relationship with the East Indies had been radically altered by the Japanese occupation. The Indonesian leadership, who in January 1946 moved the Republic's capital from Dutch-occupied Jakarta to Yogyakarta, tried two approaches to secure Indonesian independence and to hasten a full Dutch withdrawal. On the battlefield, both regular and irregular forces attacked the Dutch, with some success. There was certainly nothing comparable to the 1954 Vietnamese victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu, but Indonesian fighters were able to prevent the Dutch from decisively settling matters through armed force. Two Dutch "Police Actions" (in July 1947 and December 1948) failed to crush the Republic. A search on the part of the Republic for international legitimacy took place in the context of on-going negotiations with the Dutch. The Linggajati Agreement of November 1946 granted Dutch recognition to an Indonesian Republic of Java, Madura and Sumatra; the Republic was to be part of an United

States of Indonesia under the Dutch crown. Although the agreement was ratified by the provisional Indonesian parliament in February 1947, it was never popular and it was not implemented by either side. UN pressure prompted a cease-fire in August 1947; a new agreement was signed aboard the American naval vessel *USS Renville* in January 1948; it called for Indonesian forces to withdraw from behind the "Van Mook Line," which represented the furthest Dutch advances in the July 1947 "Police Action" (Van Mook was the Dutch lieutenant governor at the time). The agreement led to the fall of the Indonesian cabinet of Amir Syahrifuddin, and a great deal of bitterness as many Indonesians, especially among the irregular forces, believed that the negotiators were giving up what had been won with much cost on the battlefield. Sukarno called upon vice president Hatta to form a new cabinet, which coped the best it could with the pressing problems of a large, improvised population crowded into the Republican controlled region of Central Java. The government came under verbal and physical attack from the PKI and from the Darul Islam. The latter was an Islamic-oriented group that felt that the Republic had abandoned them by withdrawing from West Java in accordance with the *Renville* Agreement. The Dutch meanwhile proceeded with a plan to isolate the Republic by creating a network of quasi-independent polities in the areas under their control; these states were expected to act as a counter-weight to the Republic in any federal settlement to the conflict. The Dutch hoped to speed up the process of ending the conflict on terms favourable to themselves by overrunning most Republican held cities in December 1948. But this military action did not have the expected result, although the attack resulted in the capture of much of the Indonesian civilian leadership. Guerrilla warfare continued in the countryside under General Sudirman and the regular Indonesian army. Sudirman of course was later seen as a hero by the Indonesian military; he was at the time dying of tuberculosis. Formerly a school teacher, he stressed martial and nationalist spirit as being more important than formal military training in defeating the Dutch (although the Indonesian military developed on much different lines after the Revolution).¹⁷ The Dutch position may also have been weakened by outside criticism from Egypt, India, Australia, the United States and the United

¹⁷ See Said Salim, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).

Nations. The latter was especially upset that the Dutch capture of Yogyakarta had taken place only a few miles away from a UN negotiating team based at Kaliurang. An armed attack on Yogyakarta on March 1, 1949 belied the Dutch claim that they had militarily defeated the Republic. The crushing of a communist inspired rebellion at Madiun East Java in September 1948 had proved the Republic's anti-communist credentials to the US, and Congress questioned continued financial aid to the Netherlands. Much of the world saw the internment of Sukarno and Hatta as an illegal detention of a legitimate government which had been negotiating with the Dutch in good faith. The Dutch also received little Indonesian support, either in Yogyakarta itself, where Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX, the traditional local ruler, continued to defy them, or among the rulers of the proposed federated states, many of whom looked with admiration and sympathy on the Republic. Recognizing their untenable position, the Dutch entered into serious negotiations that led to the transfer of sovereignty to the federal United States of Indonesia on December 27, 1949. This was in turn transformed into the unitary Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1950, after the various federated states created by the Dutch had dissolved themselves.¹⁸

The Revolution has been described as the seminal event in modern Indonesian history. It involved the coming of age of Indonesia as a self-aware nation. It has had a lasting legacy on almost every aspect of modern Indonesia: relationships between the army and the state, Islam and secularism, Java and the Outer Islands, the status of the president, the natures of the constitution, Pancasila, democracy, economic development and foreign policy, the composition of the elite and the character of Indonesian nationalism as a whole. Indonesians continue to see themselves as the progeny of this struggle.¹⁹ But despite its enormous legacy, the Revolution still remains a matter of great controversy for Indonesians and outside observers alike. Suharto's New Order, like the Guided Democracy regime which preceded it, went to great lengths to popularize its own interpretation

¹⁸ See Charles Wolf, *The Indonesian Story: The Birth, Growth and Structure of the Indonesian Republic* (New York: The John Day Company, 1948) and Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950* (Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman, 1974).

¹⁹ Peter Carey, "Introduction," in *Born in Fire: the Indonesian Struggle for Independence, An Anthology*, ed. Colin Wild and Peter Carey (Athens, Ohio: University of Ohio Press), xix.

of the revolutionary struggle, one which is fundamentally different from the viewpoints commonly held by many Western scholars. An examination of some of the dominant Western opinions on the events and meaning of the Indonesian Revolution may thus help clarify the views of the New Order. Western scholarship on the issue has been dominated by two major debates:—who won the Revolution, the military or civilian leadership?—and was the Revolution a political or a social one? The latter question might be rephrased in terms of the Revolution being a success (in instituting sweeping social change) or a failure (in that many colonial institutions remained intact). Robert Cribb in a 1993 article outlined some of the major Western interpretations of the Revolution and its legacies. For George McT. Kahin, whose sympathetic *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* first introduced the Revolution's participants and events to an English-speaking audience, the struggle's main contribution, besides the actual achievement of independence, was to reinforce Indonesian self-confidence and self-reliance. Indonesians were able to cut ties with the colonial regime more effectively than if there had been a gradual and peaceful transfer of power.²⁰ Herbert Feith agrees with this assessment and sees the decline of parliamentary democracy in the 1950's as the result of "the baleful legacies of the Revolution."²¹ Political tensions between Indonesians had increased during the Revolution because it was understood that the Dutch would eventually leave and the stage was being set for a new country. The physical damage caused by the fighting, the economic burdens of setting up a new system and the issue of recovering Irian Jaya distracted both the political leadership and the people from the business of government.²² Anderson saw the Revolution as largely a failure. An over-reliance on diplomatic exchanges with the outside world turned the Revolution into a mere transfer of power which "left the structures and assumptions of the colonial state relatively intact."²³ To these opinions Cribb adds the "time-bomb" view of the

²⁰ Robert Cribb, "Legacies of the Revolution," in *Democracy in Indonesia*, 74. Cf. George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), 470.

²¹ Cribb, "Legacies," 74.

²² Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 600.

²³ Cribb, "Legacies," 74. Cf. Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 406–407.

struggle seen especially in the writings of Ruth McVey and Ulf Sundhaussen. The revolutionary struggle created a long term problem (or a blessing) in “the form of a self-confident and politicized army, whose experience in the 1940’s provided the underpinning for intervention in politics which led initially to Guided Democracy and ultimately to the thorough military domination of the polity under the New Order.”²⁴

The views of Kahin have been described as the long established, orthodox interpretation. The Revolution was seen as an inevitable process leading towards independence and unity.²⁵ While Kahin does note the importance of military operations in damaging the Dutch position, his work as a whole provides as a context for the Revolution the long nationalist struggle, which had occupied many Indonesians since the founding of Budi Utomo in 1908.²⁶ The dedicated and intelligent leadership of such pre-war nationalists as Sukarno and Hatta was able to achieve independence from Dutch rule and establish the unitary nation-state of Indonesia. On these terms the Revolution could be judged a success. But if more was expected than political independence then the Revolution could be (and has been) judged a failure. Such scholars as Ruth McVey, and especially Benedict Anderson, offered a more radical interpretation of the Indonesian Revolution. Both were students of Kahin at Cornell, who did extensive research in Indonesia during the Guided Democracy era; Anderson in several subsequent published articles expressed his sympathies with the leftward tilt the Sukarno regime was making during this period. Both were representative of a viewpoint that looked with suspicion on the place of the military in Indonesian society, from the Revolution onward. The New Order, of course, was identified as a military-dominated regime, which lacked any popular legitimacy. The academic journal *Indonesia*, associated with Cornell scholars such as Anderson and first published in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Sukarno, tracked the internal dynamics of the Indonesian military in an annual article. The implication seemed to be that this

²⁴ Cribb, “Legacies,” 75. Cf. Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army.” *Indonesia* 11 (1971): 131–176 and “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II.” *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 147–182; Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).

²⁵ Carrey, “Introduction,” xx.

²⁶ Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 336.

institution was both immensely powerful and also somehow foreign to the Indonesian nation's historical development. The New Order (read military rule) was a deviation from Indonesia's true revolutionary destiny. That destiny had been compromised from the beginning with the increased power and influence of the regular military, under the leadership of Nasution, as well as by a reliance on negotiating with the Dutch in the hope of obtaining diplomatic recognition from Western nations. Such negotiations were problematic, not because they were wholly ineffective, but because they betrayed the potential for Indonesia to be a fully-independent nation. Instead they left Indonesia susceptible to external economic and political pressure, while leaving a great deal of power in the hands of an institutionalized military that was hostile to popular aspirations. Anderson sums up this position:

Thus the revolution never became more than a "national revolution"; it ended in 1949 when the Dutch transferred sovereignty over the archipelago to Indonesian hands and Sukarno moved into the palace where governors-general had ruled for generations. What it might have been can only be glimpsed in the short-lived isolated social revolutions in the provinces, and in the memories of some of its survivors. Long after Indonesian sovereignty was recognized by the world, the search for 100 percent *merdeka* was to continue, and was to remain sentenced to disappointment. But the hopes are still with us.²⁷

While few Indonesians would be likely to see their Revolution as a failure, dissatisfaction with mere independence can be seen in the idea that the Revolution did not in fact end in 1949 and was an ongoing and radical process. This was the argument of Sukarno who felt that decolonisation had to continue and that attitudes of inferiority to the West had to be replaced by one of learning to *berdikari* (stand alone). Being an Indonesian had to be seen as a privilege rather than a burden. Such views were put into practice during the 1950's and 1960's when political and economic ties were cut with the Dutch and an independent and unitary republic stretching from Sabang (Aceh) to Merauke (Irian Jaya) was brought into existence.²⁸ The "social revolutions" refer to a series of events, in 1945 and 1946, during which local leaders, including aristocrats, plantation owners and those who had worked for the Dutch and the Japanese

²⁷ Anderson, *Java in a Time*, 409.

²⁸ Carrey, "Introduction," xxi

were removed from power, often with a great deal of violence, by local mobs and irregular fighters (*laksyar* or *pemuda*). Later during the Revolution, while negotiations were taking place with the Dutch, the same revolutionary forces behind these outbursts had resisted any compromise with the demand for “100 percent *merdeka* (freedom).” *Laksyar*, *pemuda* and “social revolution” have been the subject of much scholarship in the West, often in conjunction with studies of the “regional dynamics” of the Revolution.²⁹ According to scholars interpreting Indonesian history from a more left-wing perspective, the radical mobilization of popular forces would have allowed Indonesia to achieve full-Independence in a less-ambiguous manner and prevented the rise of the military, which culminated in the New Order.

The above viewpoints are not those of the New Order. Outside emphasis on diplomacy and the competence of the civilian leadership would certainly be looked upon with suspicion. The various “social revolutions” with their radical implications of overturning the existing Indonesian social and political order are mostly ignored, while any suggestions that the Revolution was either a failure or in some sense a “work in progress” (beyond economic development) would be rejected. The opinions of the military historian Nugroho Notosusanto on what the Revolution meant and how and by whom it was won might be seen as more acceptable. The struggle against the Dutch is seen by him as a *perang kemerdekaan* (war of independence) rather than as a revolution. The anti-Dutch conflict was sustained by the republic’s army rather than by the civilian leadership in Yogyakarta. Most importantly Indonesian independence was won not at the conference table through *diplomasi* but through *perjuangan* (armed struggle).³⁰ The latter point is indeed a central premise of many of the New Order descriptions of the revolution. In historical inquiry, monuments and textbooks the Suharto regime continually made reference to the competence and sacrifice of the Revolution’s fighters while downplaying the skill and even the patriotism of the country’s civilian leadership.

²⁹ See for example Anthony Reid, *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Audrey R. Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985) and William H. Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1989) (the latter focuses on the activities of *pemuda* in Surabaya).

³⁰ Carrey, “Introduction,” xxii.

Perjuangan *versus* Diplomasi

1964 saw a notable “take-off” in the production of military history by Indonesians. This was apparently in response to the “politicization” of the memory of the Revolution by the PKI in regards to the events of the so-called Madiun Incident and, to a lesser extent, by civilian politicians in general. The hope was to put the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI), the regular Indonesia army which had been formed during the anti-Dutch war, at the forefront of any account of the Revolution. It was to be firmly established as the party responsible for the Revolution’s success. Nugroho Notosusanto was one of the scholars involved in establishing military history as an important element of how the Indonesia past as a whole was viewed by the Indonesian people. This trend continued into the New Order with a particular emphasis on the events of the Revolution and “pacification efforts” against the various regional rebellions of the 1950’s. A good example of this type of historical treatment was Nugroho Notosusanto’s *The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation*.³¹ It dealt with the activities of a Japanese-sponsored military force, which could be construed as the “ancestor” of the TNI. Although published while Notosusanto was an established New Order figure, it was apparently begun much earlier while he was an employee of the Department of Defence and Security and a student at the University of Indonesia before the New Order came to power. But he had apparently anticipated the way the political winds would blow and his research seems to have had exhibited a consistently pro-military and anti-radical tone. In thanking his academic mentors he notes that because of their support he continued to work on his research despite his involvement in preserving the integrity of the University during the upheavals of 1965 and 1966 (he was apparently the subject of communist criticism while Deputy Rector for Student Affairs at the University of Indonesia in the months leading up to the October 1965 coup attempt).³² He feels that his work has served an important purpose:

Although aware of the difficulties involved in the writing of a contemporary Indonesian history, I do believe that the study and writing

³¹ *The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation* (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979). PETA stands for Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland).

³² *Ibid.*, ix; Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds. *Indonesia Political Thinking, 1945–1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 477.

of contemporary history is not only justified but necessary. In Indonesia, as in most new nations, the story of the process leading towards independence is foremost in the memory of the generations who have witnessed the transition from colonial domination towards national self-determination.³³

He sees the events of the Revolution (and its aftermath) as being critically important to understanding where Indonesia has been and where it might be going. For Nugroho Notosusanto, history has, “an inspirational use particularly in the socialization process of succeeding generations providing them with an image of their society which, after all, will be theirs to develop further.”³⁴

His book on the PETA could be seen as expressing a particular political viewpoint. He is rather cautious with equating PETA with the TNI, noting that in many ways PETA was not a real army with a central headquarters under Indonesian command. Each battalion was an independent unit, which acted as an auxiliary to the Japanese forces in a particular region. PETA had no real autonomy within a command structure which was Japanese rather than Indonesian. He describes PETA as probably, “an army in-the-process-of-formation, a half-finished structure with a completed facade but with no full-fledged interior.”³⁵ There was some continuity between PETA and later Indonesian institutions, although no direct correspondence between it and the Indonesian military. Some important officers had a background in PETA, while others had been trained by the Dutch. Other officers (like Suharto) had received military instruction from both occupiers. There was in fact no single source for the Indonesia army elite; PETA provided a large number of officers simply because it was a large organization. But the differences between PETA trainees, ex-colonial soldiers and those with no military background diminished during the guerrilla struggle or through post-independence formal military education in Indonesia or overseas.³⁶

While not rejecting a total equation of the PETA with the TNI, he makes it clear that he sees the Indonesian army as “an armed force of national liberation.”³⁷ It is this army which liberated the

³³ Nugroho, *The Peta Army*, 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 187.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 190–192.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 192. He takes the term from Morris Janowitz’s four types of post-colonial militaries. The other three being non-colonial (Thailand), ex-colonial (India)

Indonesian people, not the civilian leadership, not diplomacy and not foreign assistance:

I would like to stress another characteristic of Independent Indonesia, namely that its liberation was achieved by force of arms. Few nations have achieved their liberation through the resort to arms. Most achieved independence through political means and received it peacefully from the colonial power. Other nations, in the same position as Indonesia were Algeria and Vietnam, both ex-colonies of France. The dominant factor causing the wars of national liberation to break out in these colonies was the intransigence of the colonial powers who intended to re-impose their colonial rule after World War II."³⁸

With or without PETA, Indonesia would have fought a successful war against the Dutch. But PETA was of use in providing training to many Indonesians and in providing more intangible help:

I would venture to say that the PETA was an inspiration for most Indonesians. It gave them the sorely needed self-confidence to fight a superior army with the inadequate means at their disposal. From that point the Indonesians have been able to utilize their increasing resources to further develop themselves.³⁹

The spirit of the armed struggle, embodied first in such groups as PETA and then later in the TNI, not only drove out the Dutch but also moved forward Indonesia on the path of national development mapped out by the New Order.

In a lecture, given at the National Defense Institute in Jakarta in 1974, while he was achieving prominence in New Order circles, Notosusanto again underlines the importance of the military in bringing about and preserving the integrity of Indonesian independence:

What is meant by the National Struggle in Indonesia is the struggle of the Indonesian nation to defend, to give substance to its Independence since August 17, 1945; that struggle is still going on up to the present time. Consequently, the scope of the history of the National struggle is parallel to the history of the Republic of Indonesia with the first giving more stress on the aspect of the struggle.⁴⁰

This military effort did not originate in a vacuum. In fact, the anti-colonial fight included the activities of various nationalists during the

and post-liberation; cf. *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 3, 10.

³⁸ Notosusanto, *The Peta Army*, 193.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁴⁰ Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle*, 7.

“period of National Awakening” (from 1908 onwards) and various “heroes of the independence struggle.” The actions of the latter were not based on a national foundation but were motivated by a desire to free individual regions from the clutches of foreign imperialism. The contributions of such resistance fighters might stretch as far back as Srivijaya and Majapahit.⁴¹ Sukarno and Hatta, who in Nugroho Notosusanto’s opinion were not collaborators with the Japanese, were responsible for the actual Proclamation of Independence and, with the help of Yamin and the authors of the Jakarta Charter, also brought forth Pancasila.⁴² Although there was a need to use diplomacy in the period immediately after the Proclamation and thus no army was set up, an army arose anyway and the government was forced to recognize it.⁴³ The events of the Battle of Surabaya apparently underscored this need for military power.⁴⁴ The various diplomatic manoeuvres of the Republic were, in Notosusanto’s opinion, largely ignored by the Dutch, who finally attacked Yogyakarta in December 1948. In doing so they captured much of the civilian leadership including Sukarno and Hatta. While the Republic moved its capital to Bukittingi in Sumatra, the actual effective struggle was an armed one, which continued under the leadership of General Sudirman.⁴⁵ In the end, while not solely acting alone, the TNI was largely responsible for victory.

That, as the views of Notosusanto outlined above indicate, *diplomasi* was largely a waste of time in securing the end of colonial rule was something of a core belief for the New Order. This opinion is notable in Suharto’s own autobiography. Understanding the need for a strong military, he describes how as a PETA officer he learned that independence had been declared; what he had thought about while in his barracks had become a reality, the people truly wanted independence and now that it had been declared it was everyone’s duty to defend it. When Sukarno called on all former members of PETA to join the new Badan Keamanan Rakyat (the People’s Security Force, BKR) it was nothing new, Suharto and his associates had already formed themselves into an armed group.⁴⁶ As the Revolution

⁴¹ Ibid., 7–9.

⁴² Ibid., 11.

⁴³ Ibid., 13.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 16.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 21, 23.

⁴⁶ Suharto, *My Thoughts*, 23.

progressed Suharto saw more and more evidence that diplomacy, as well as the civilian leadership in general, was not of much use in getting rid of the Dutch and was even allowing communists such as Tan Malaka to assume positions of power. Diplomacy took place in the midst of continued fighting. Turmoil within the Republic sank to such a level that in June of 1946 Prime Minister Syahrir was even kidnapped by a rebellious Indonesian faction. Although Syahrir was soon set free Suharto felt that:

Obviously the situation was very tense. I had no choice but to become involved in the political chaos. And it was understandable that as the commander of the regiment in the capital city, I became the focus of the contention between the conflicting parties. But I tried hard to remain calm and steadfast to avoid involvement in the conflict.⁴⁷

Subsequent negotiations only confirmed civilian weakness as the Dutch continued to pressure the infant Republic.⁴⁸

In Suharto's opinion, from the beginning the military had a much better record of defending the Republic of Indonesia. But the civilian leadership, to meet short-term diplomatic goals, was willing to undermine military success. The 1948 January Renville Agreement, which involved the surrender of territory by the Republic and the withdrawal of troops from designated Dutch areas, along with a plan to reorganize (and reduce the size of) the TNI, antagonized the military leadership.⁴⁹ The TNI was disappointed about the order to withdraw from territory it had defended but, "they stood by the TNI principle that the policy of the state was the policy of the army."⁵⁰ Suharto notes that it was Amir Syarifuddin, who would later demand a complete halt to negotiations with the Dutch and admit that he was a secret member of the "illegal PKI", behind the Renville Agreement and that the people would not forget this. The whole incident caused Suharto to sour on politics and the possible contribution of the civilian leadership, "as a young officer, I decided not to become involved in politics. I read a great deal about various political events and I quietly drew my own conclusions".⁵¹ During

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 29–30.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 41.

the Revolution, politics, non-military government actions, could be seen as an object of suspicion for many in the army, even a future president.

Yogyakarta: Civilian Failure, Military Success

The New Order liked to cite specific examples to back up its argument that the success of the Revolution was largely due to the military. According to this view, civilian actions during the Second Dutch attack in December 1948 further weakened the Republic and the ability of the military to defend it. The reaction of Sukarno and others to the Dutch attack on Yogyakarta is portrayed by Suharto as an example of civilian incompetence if not civilian cowardice; according to plan (and under civilian instructions) TNI forces left the city before the actual attack began.⁵²

With what resources and authority he had Suharto tried to do the best he could to resist the Dutch advance. He was only successful in slowing them down for a very short time and in destroying some vital infrastructure (his own headquarters and that of the Intelligence Corp). The city fell and Sukarno and Hatta were captured. General Sudirman, despite very poor health, was able to escape to the hills around Yogyakarta.⁵³ Only the military leadership was interested in carrying on a guerrilla campaign in the countryside or even preventing facilities from falling into the hands of the enemy. Sukarno and Hatta in Dutch custody are judged against the heroic figure of a deathly ill but still defiant General Sudirman.

In New Order accounts, civilian failings are sharply contrasted to the triumphant counter-attack organized by none other than Suharto himself (and the possibility of a positive civilian contribution to the Revolution is usually ignored). Immediately after Yogyakarta fell he began to think of a way to recover the confidence of the people in the TNI (rather than their confidence in the civilian leadership). He was also aware that the city was the Republic's capital and he hoped that any action taken there would have an impact on the resistance movement as a whole and on the international community. He was also frustrated that the Dutch were claiming at the UN that the

⁵² Ibid., 46.

⁵³ Ibid., 47.

“police action” was a success and that Indonesian resistance had collapsed. Consequently he decided to launch a daylight attack on the city in order to, “expose the lies of the Dutch to the world.”⁵⁴ The attack was to be carried out for limited military objectives but it was expected to have a major political impact:

I made it clear from the outset that our assault was not for the purpose of occupying and defending the city, as defence of the city would be contrary to guerrilla warfare tactics. Taking a defensive position would be putting many lives at risk, as the enemy had superior firepower. Our onslaught was for political gain, namely to show to the world that the TNI was still a fighting force, capable of offering resistance.⁵⁵

The assault, which began at 6 am on March 1, 1949, is described in some detail. TNI was able to control Yogyakarta for six hours before withdrawing in good order and according to the ordained plan. News of this victory was broadcast overseas via Sumatra and eventually made its way to the halls of the United Nations.⁵⁶ This “six hours in Yogya” have been to subject of a great deal of controversy. A recent biography of Suharto casts doubts on whether the city really passed into Republican hands for as long as previously claimed and on whether Suharto had the knowledge of the outside world and the political acumen to understand the apparently global ramifications of the action which he had planned.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the events of that day have become, as will be noted below, a central motif in New Order portraits of the Revolution. Not only was it the major event in Suharto’s revolutionary career it could be seen as a successful example of the military strategy which, if implemented more consistently, would have lead to a swifter victory against the Dutch; (Although Kahin in his seminal book, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* nowhere mentions Suharto, the “six hours” have been the subject of several New Order era novels and feature films).

The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* offers a description of the final stages of the Revolution similar to that of Suharto. The civilian leadership, blind to Dutch treachery, allows itself to be captured:

Some days after the negotiations reached a dead end, the Dutch undertook their second military action against the Republic of Indonesia.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 48–49.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 50.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 51.

⁵⁷ R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, 33–38.

Yogyakarta the capital of the Republic of Indonesia was successfully seized and occupied by parachute troops. The president and vice-president as well as many high officials did not evacuate themselves and were captured by the Dutch. But before this the government gave a mandate to Minister Sjafruddin Prawiranegara who was in Sumatra to form and lead the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia.⁵⁸

This passive reaction is contrasted to the heroism of Sudirman and the TNI:

Although he was unfortunately very sick, the Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia General Soedirman withdrew to outside the capital of Yogyakarta and led a total guerrilla war against the Dutch forces. For seven months General Soedirman became the guide for all of the People and was able to carry out an awe-inspiring struggle to perpetuate the life of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, in the moments which were most dark in the Nation's struggle, Soedirman made up (or was) the light which radiated light to his surroundings.⁵⁹

This hagiographic description, of a man who saved Indonesia, is neither of Sukarno, nor Hatta but of the first leader of the TNI. A national hero who played a key role in the physical struggle against the Dutch is offered as an example for Indonesian youth.

Another role model whose contributions the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* emphasizes is Suharto. The Dutch attack on Yogyakarta brought forth a strong reaction from the UN and the US, but of more importance was the response of the TNI:

While this was going on the TNI had for about a month finished consolidating and had begun to give blows to the Dutch force. At first it was aimed at disrupting Dutch communications: phone lines were cut, rail lines were smashed and Dutch convoys were ambushed and attacked. Because of that the Dutch side was forced to increase the number of outposts along major roads which connected the cities which they occupied. With much of their manpower already tied up in thousands of small posts throughout the territory of the Republic which now made up one large guerrilla battlefield. After [Indonesian] troops were spread widely across the countryside outside the occupied cities, TNI began to attack these cities themselves. The General Offensive of March 1, 1945 on the city of Yogyakarta, which was led by Lt. Colonel (now President) Soeharto with the result that the city was held for six hours,

⁵⁸ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Vol. 6, 161.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

brilliantly proved to the world that the TNI was far from beaten, in fact that it still had an offensive capacity. Also, it was clear from [Dutch?] reports that the initiative had clearly passed from the Dutch to the TNI. Now it was the TNI side which attacked and the Dutch side which defended [or was on the defensive].⁶⁰

So thanks to Suharto the hunters had become the hunted. Indonesian military success was accompanied by the threat of the US to withdraw Marshall Plan aid from the Netherlands. The stage was set for the acceptance by the Dutch of the sovereignty of the Indonesian state within the territory of the former Netherlands East Indies.⁶¹

The book *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka* places a similar emphasis on the accomplishments of the Indonesian military leadership. In December 1948 Sukarno and other members of the government were captured by the Dutch without a fight; a photograph shows the president striding calmly into detention. Meanwhile, Sudirman launched a guerilla campaign in the countryside around Yogyakarta despite severe health problems. The text also claims that a plan to set up a provisional civilian government in Sumatra, while leaving military command in the hands of the armed forces in Java, had been agreed upon in advance and so there was no reason to panic.⁶² The implication might be that civilian ministers, whether at large or in the hands of the Dutch, were largely irrelevant; it was military leadership that had led Indonesia to Independence. Further evidence that the Revolution remained on course despite lack of any civilian guidance consists of a set of photos that show the TNI resisting the Dutch advance near Yogyakarta and a bridge destroyed as part of a scorched-earth policy to deny facilities to the enemy. In the guerilla-dominated countryside, student-soldiers, peasants, women and guerrilla fighters are seen cooperating in revolutionary activities including the raising of the Indonesian flag and the singing of the national anthem.⁶³ The "General Offensive" of March 1, 1949 is given its own section complete with photos of a young Suharto and the headlines from the Republic's newspaper *Merdeka* trumpeting the attack's success. The assault on Dutch-occupied Yogyakarta is described as having profound results domestically and internationally: carrying on

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 162.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁶² *30 Tahun*, 192.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 193–194.

the struggle that had been started by diplomatic methods; preserving the morale of the people and of the TNI during the guerrilla war; informing the international community that the TNI had the power to be able to launch an offensive and breaking the moral of the Dutch forces.⁶⁴ Other military triumphs noted by *30 Tahun Merdeka* include the Siliwangi Division's "Long March" from West Java, the TNI's reoccupation of Yogyakarta and the return of the Supreme Commander Sudirman from the countryside.⁶⁵ No reader can fail to draw the conclusion that the Indonesian military, at one with the people, played a pivotal role in expelling the Dutch. To be fair, the intense confrontations that took place across the conference table between Dutch and Indonesian negotiators are also portrayed and described.⁶⁶ Civilian cabinets are listed and the Proclamation of Independence itself by Sukarno on August 17, 1945 (where the only military figures were Japanese) is certainly celebrated. But these civilian contributions could be viewed as a mere backdrop to the larger military struggle (Sukarno's entrance into Yogyakarta on July 6, 1949 merits two pages of description and pictures, while Sudirman's arrival four days later merits four pages).⁶⁷ Many of the diplomatic meetings are described and pictured in a manner that would probably seem rather alien to many young Indonesian readers; long lines of delegates (often foreign) in crisp tropical suits. In contrast the TNI is often portrayed as being dressed in a rather informal manner and always surrounded by the appreciative masses.

Roeder, in his sympathetic account of the life of Suharto, portrays politics (and politicians) as threatening the ability of the TNI to deal with the Dutch threat:

Dissatisfaction and unrest were growing among the Republicans. Progress in conferences with the Dutch was slow, or so many Indonesians thought. Sporadic clashes between armed Indonesians and the Dutch military culminated in what were euphemistically called the Dutch "Police Actions" (1947 and 1948–1949). Still more dangerous for the survival of the Republic were the internal feuds which developed into open fighting between units of the regular army and irregular armed groups that were affiliated to political parties. A climax was reached through the manoeuvres of Indonesia's extreme left-wing.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 207–209.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 196–197, 214–219, 223–226.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 162–163.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 30–31, 19–21.

⁶⁸ Roeder, *The Smiling General*, 108.

Nugroho Notosusanto goes the furthest in attacking the civilian contribution to the Revolution. In a 1974 lecture he openly criticizes the civilian government, in particular Sukarno:

When enemy paratroopers advanced upon the revolutionary capital of Yogyakarta during the War of Independence, Sukarno and Hatta, then the President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, horrified their youthful military commanders by deciding not to escape to the countryside but rather to await the enemy calmly although they were out to capture them. In their minds they were still leaders of the Indonesian National Movement, awaiting the knock on the door to be lead away to prison or to exile. In the eyes of the younger generation especially those fighting in the guerrilla [forces], the two top leaders, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces had forsaken their position of leadership.⁶⁹

He sees civilian performance in the face of Dutch aggression as emblematic of lack of leadership and in fact grounds for putting the fate of the Republic in the more capable hands of the TNI. Its young officers are actively engaged in trying to defeat the colonial regime on the battleground, while older nationalist figures remain stuck in the pre-war pattern of passive resistance, arrest, prison and exile.

Of the New Order's *pahlawan* who participated in the 1945–1949 Independence struggle, twenty-one were guerrilla fighters or armed forces members, six were civilian politicians. Civilian *pahlawan* include Sukarno and Hatta and Otto Iskandar Dinata, the latter killed by “irresponsible people” (i.e. Indonesian radicals). One of the first heroes chosen by the post-Sukarno regime was the civilian politician Sutan Syahrir. Military *pahlawan* include several who died on the battlefield or were executed by the Dutch (Robert Wolter Mogisidi and Lt. Col. Gusti Ngurah Rai). Sudirman was of course designated a *pahlawan*. Eight of the officers murdered by the PKI in 1965 had participated in the military struggle against the Dutch; although they were honoured for their sacrifice in the conflict with the communists more than their earlier anti-colonial activity. Suharto was politically astute enough not to make himself a *pahlawan*; he was apparently satisfied in bestowing the honour on his wife soon after her death in 1996, for her charity work and for her piloting of the TMII project.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Notosusanto, *The National Struggle*, 45.

⁷⁰ See *Album Pahlawan Bangsa*.

Many Western observers have been less willing to give full credit to the military for the achievement of independence and have been much slower to pass a negative judgment on the performance of the civilian leadership. In many ways, as noted before, outside opinion has favored an interpretation of the Revolution which stands in opposition to that promoted by the New Order. Stress has been placed on the importance of diplomacy and international pressure. The close observer of the revolution, George McT. Kahin, presents the Republic's response to the Dutch attack of December 19, 1948 in a very different manner than that put forward by the New Order. First of all, he gives Sukarno and the rest of the leadership, much more of the benefit of the doubt than, for example, would be given by Notosusanto. He claims that despite the deteriorating diplomatic situation, a Dutch attack was not expected, especially because of the presence at the nearby hill-station of Kaliurang of UN observers. The Indonesians were thus caught unawares. The attack came at 5:30 am, a cabinet meeting at 10 am drafted a message of guidance and exhortation to the people (although it was not until January that it reached a national and international audience). Although Sukarno's small bodyguard put up an armed resistance, he ordered them to lay down their arms because of the overwhelming odds. Because of the lightning Dutch attack and their unannounced abrogation of the truce, the Indonesian cabinet was captured. On the morning of the 20 of December the Dutch commander, Major-General Mayer requested that Sukarno order the Republic's army to cease fighting. He refused and was exiled to Sumatra.⁷¹ As per plan an emergency government was set up in Bukittingi.⁷² The civilian leadership faced with a limited number of options made the right decisions. On being captured Sukarno refused to cooperate. This stance was the most effective way to defeat a militarily superior opponent. Kahin thus gives international outrage and diplomatic pressure in the wake of the Dutch attack more emphasis than the continued guerrilla activity of the TNI.⁷³ His analysis does not ignore the strength of the guerrilla movement and he notes that in March 1949 Yogyakarta was almost captured.⁷⁴ But Kahin does not give Suharto a place in the "six hours in Yogya"

⁷¹ Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 336–338.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 392.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 338–345.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 395, 411.

that the New Order would find acceptable (in fact he is not mentioned at all). Sukarno is described by his biographer J.D. Legge as presiding over a hastily conveyed Cabinet meeting while Yogyakarta was under attack; the pros and cons of joining the armed struggle outside the city were discussed. Sukarno apparently received advice to the effect that he it would be better to let himself be captured. Sukarno was taken in to Dutch custody later that afternoon, although he refused to cooperate with the Dutch in ordering the Indonesian Army to surrender. Whether Sukarno had consciously chosen surrender as the best course of action or had simply let events happen, Legge is of the opinion that it was indeed the correct decision. The Second Police Action did not improve the Dutch position. World opinion was upset by the Dutch attack; both the UN and the US became increasingly sympathetic to the Republic of Indonesia. The latter began to link continued economic assistance to the Netherlands to the resumption of serious negotiations with the Indonesians. The Dutch were not able to wipe out the Republican government with a single decisive move. A provisional government was set up in Sumatra in accordance with a previously made government decision. Armed attacks took place on both sides of the cease-fire line; the Dutch were able to hold the towns and main roads but not the Javanese countryside. In the Outer Islands the semi-autonomous states organised by the Dutch continued to look to Sukarno and his government for leadership.⁷⁵ Of course it might be argued that Sukarno was simply being passive and that he would have no way of knowing how the world would eventually react to his capture. Also, the subsequent military success noted by Legge may have owed little to the actions of Sukarno. In a less sympathetic analysis, C.L.M. Penders claims that such military leaders as Sudirman were amazed and disgusted at Sukarno's decision to let himself be captured and that the Dutch were rather unrealistic in expecting that Sukarno's commands would have a great deal of effect on troops in the field. In fact, his prestige with the Indonesian military was quite low and it is unlikely that they would have obeyed his orders to surrender even if he had made them.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Legge, *Sukarno a Political Biography*, 261–263.

⁷⁶ C.L.M. Penders, *The Life and Times of Sukarno* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974), 130–132.

Sukarno himself described his reaction as a well-considered decision aimed at ensuring the survival of the Republic under very difficult conditions. He claimed that he was woken up two hours before the assault by Sudirman, who apparently had foreknowledge of the attack. The young general urged the president to flee to the jungle. But Sukarno rejected this suggestion, noting that he was not a soldier and that he would be of more help remaining in the capital so that he could later lead Indonesia and bargain on its behalf. Sudirman felt that the Dutch might kill Sukarno; the latter brushed aside these concerns. The general promised no mercy from Indonesia's guerrilla army if the Dutch harmed the president, in fact Dutch civilians would be made to suffer. He then asked for instructions; Sukarno told him to get the army out of Yogyakarta, to spread throughout the countryside and to fight to the death if necessary. The president called for "one hundred percent total guerrilla war." He wanted the world to know that Independence was not won through diplomacy but was paid for in blood and effort. The armed struggle was to continue, no matter what happened to leaders civilian or military, until victory was achieved.⁷⁷ And according to Sukarno the struggle did indeed continue, with the Dutch unable to pacify the countryside and international opinion favouring the Republic of Indonesia. He even notes that Indonesian guerrillas retook Yogyakarta and held it for six hours, "long enough to show the world ours was a vital force that would never give up" (no mention, however, is made of Lt. Colonel Suharto).⁷⁸ If Sukarno and the rest of the civilian leadership were at fault in how they chose to deal with the Dutch attack perhaps it was through lack of foresight rather than through lack of courage; after all several of the officers murdered by the G-30-S plotters were taken away without resistance and the New Order has had no difficulty in labelling them as heroes.

But not all accounts portray the Republican leadership in as favourable a light. Dr. Abu Hanifah, who had known Sukarno since the 1920's, was a post-Independence minister and helped advise Cindy Adams on her ghost-written autobiography of Sukarno. He expressed scepticism towards Sukarno's account (as he did with the Sukarno/Adams book as a whole). He claimed that Sukarno turned

⁷⁷ Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, 252–253.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 260–261.

down an opportunity to escape Yogyakarta, aboard a plane sent by Nehru, on the eve of the attack on the advice of his *dukun* (shamans, or traditional religious-practitioners) who felt that the flight would be a fatal one. Instead, Sukarno gave a fiery speech to the Indonesian people promising to personally lead the guerrilla army into battle. This promise was met with doubt and even ridicule on the part of other nationalist leaders such as Syahrir who judged Sukarno to be incapable of fleeing to the hills to be a real revolutionary hero. Rejecting Sudirman's advice to leave the city, Sukarno calmly surrendered to the Dutch after transferring authority to a provisional government in Sumatra and ordering his guards to lay down their weapons. Abu Hanifah speculated that Sukarno might once again have been following the advice of his spiritual advisors or he might have felt safer in Dutch hands; in the countryside the president would have been vulnerable to attack from his communist opponents bent on avenging Madiun.⁷⁹

Western scholars C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen see civilian actions at the time as inexcusable. Sukarno had repeatedly, as late as just before the Dutch attack, stated that the Republic would fight and that if necessary he himself would lead the troops. This promise was not kept. Sukarno and Hatta surrendered; Hatta released an order instructing the armed forces to continue fighting no matter what happened and authority was transferred to Syafruddin Prawirannegara, who was touring Sumatra. Neither Sukarno nor Hatta ever really tried to justify this surrender (beyond the claim of the latter that this was the advice of the head of the air force, Commodore Suryadarma). Presumably no convincing explanation was available. The surrender had a demoralizing effect. The Dutch gave the decision wide coverage while both Darul Islam and Tan Malaka claimed that it was they in fact who represented the real struggle. The reaction of the armed forces was one of outrage and dismay. Hatta's last minute orders made little impact. While the military continued to fight, the civilian leadership simply gave up (although such senior commanders as Sudirman and Nasution chose to keep largely quiet in regards to the matter).⁸⁰ Penders and Sundhaussen add that it was this continued armed resistance which was the key

⁷⁹ Abu Hanifah, *Tales of Revolution* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1972), 3–6, 297–299.

⁸⁰ Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution*, 42.

to eventually defeating the Dutch. By March 1949 the Dutch strategy of controlling the towns and lines of communications was clearly not working; the Republic's military controlled the countryside. There was also strong criticism from the UN, the Americans and many Asian countries; an agreement to end hostilities was signed on May 7, 1949. But the negotiations leading to this agreement were opposed by both Syafruddin Prawiranegara and the army. They felt that the Dutch had always broken agreements in the past and the Indonesians were doing well: the Dutch had failed to crush the TNI; it had food and weapons and was prepared to go on the offensive. This favourable situation was ignored. The civilian leadership, who had been interned by the Dutch, overruled military objections to negotiating a settlement, as they did not wish to give the army full credit for the achievement of Independence.⁸¹ As a goodwill gesture the Republican leadership was allowed to return to Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, the military leadership was not happy with the process. Penders and Sundhaussen note that in subsequent years, the military and its supporters were somewhat sceptical of the gains won at the conference table and that such scepticism might be justified:

In years to come, army officers were to claim that independence was achieved mainly through their efforts, while politicians, often supported by foreign observers, would argue that it was primarily the negotiating skills of the Republican leaders as well as outside pressure which led the Netherlands to release their former colony. While the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes, it could be argued that there is more to the officers' claims than in that of their opponents. Given the fact that the Dutch were militarily on the defensive and had opened negotiations with their prisoners, the results of these negotiations certainly looked meagre for the Indonesians and do not evidence great skills on the part of the Indonesian delegation but rather a willingness to accept whatever the Dutch were willing to grant.⁸²

According to Penders and Sundhaussen the idea that the Dutch succumbed to outside pressure might be an equally dubious proposition. It is true that the US could withhold Marshall Plan assistance but the Dutch could just as easily refuse to join NATO. The Dutch would have been pretty unconcerned with protests from Asian coun-

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 45.

tries and the UN was of such little concern that a military attack could be launched with members of the Good Offices Committee only a few kilometres away. The Dutch were hoping for a quick fait accompli. But despite the capture of the Republic's government the TNI had resolved to fight and this proved to be an effective strategy.⁸³ In fact, if a cease-fire had not been signed it is quite likely that the Indonesian army would have scored a decisive victory; the TNI had already, with Suharto's assault on Yogyakarta, moved beyond "pure guerrilla warfare" to one of large-scale assaults. An attack on Solo, underway when hostilities stopped, may well have become "an Indonesian equivalent of Dien Bien Phu."⁸⁴ Such views are echoed by New Order historian Nugroho Notosusanto:

The War of Independence had ended and a new period had arrived. Without any foreign aid in the form of arms or troops, the Indonesian people had won their independence. But they had to pay a terrible price: every corner of the country revealed the graves of hundreds of thousands of their heroes.⁸⁵

Sacred Graves, Monuments and the Heroes of Surabaya

It is these graves of dead heroes which are the most obvious physical reminder of the armed struggle to drive out the Dutch. The idea that the Revolution was primarily a military enterprise is not really reflected in the *Hasil Pemugaran*, which, as noted above, contains a representative list of which remnants of historical events the New Order has felt fit to either excavate or restore. The monuments chosen seem instead to reflect an assessment of the Revolution closer to that of Kahin's and the one adopted by Sukarno in designating national heroes. Thus, the Revolution was the inevitable result of a process which began with the pre-war nationalist movement. The civilian leadership who won this victory would eventually (according to Sukarno) complete the Revolution by ushering in the period of Guided Democracy. However, this emphasis on such monuments as the homes of exile of Hatta and Sukarno may only be a reflection of the fact that the military struggle (a guerrilla campaign) left little

⁸³ Ibid., 46.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 48–49.

⁸⁵ Notosusanto, *The National Struggle*, 23.

in the way of actual surviving remains. This short-coming had to be compensated for by the construction of monuments. Such monuments include ones built to commemorate those lost in the military struggle. During the Revolution, Indonesian soldiers, whether from regular or irregular units, tended to be buried close to where they fell. Indonesians killed by the Japanese in fighting in Surabaya in October 1945 were buried in a cemetery which was named Taman Bahagia (Garden of Happiness). It soon became a site of nationalist sentiment. Similar cemeteries sprang up across the archipelago.⁸⁶ After full independence a centralization process took place. A series of regional Taman Makam Pahlawan (Hero's Cemetery Garden) under the Minister of Defence (until 1974) and then the Minister of Social Affairs were set up (each provincial capital had one of these sites). Many such cemeteries were located near battlefields, such as Margarana, South Bali where *pemuda* under I Gusti Ngurah Rai fought the Dutch. This battle is known as the Puputan Margarana, recalling the bloody massacre of the Raja of Badung and his supporters in 1906.⁸⁷

Pemuda and others killed in Jakarta and its vicinity were buried in the Eerveld cemetery at Ancol. This was the final resting place for important members of Dutch colonial society; no one seemed to think it strange to bury revolutionary heroes next to the pillars of the regime they worked to overthrow. But the cemetery proved to be too small and in 1953 a new Taman Makam Pahlawan was established at Kalibata on the southern edge of Jakarta. Further enlargement took place in 1974 and Kalibata is now the largest such site in Indonesia with space for 15,000 graves. It became one of the most important ritual venues for Indonesian official hero worship when Suharto declared it to be the "National Hero Cemetery" and later set up a memorial for the "unknown hero" (*pahlawan tak dikenal*). Various Indonesians are permitted to be buried here: regular and irregular revolutionary soldiers, distinguished civilians and those designated as "National Heroes."⁸⁸ The inauguration of the "Monument of the Unknown Hero" involved a ritual reburial at Kalibata on November 10, 1974. Suharto and many high-ranking military and civilian officials attended the Hero's Day internment of the mortal

⁸⁶ Schreiner, "National Ancestors," 184.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 185–186.

remains of an anonymous *pemuda*. He had been killed on the first day of the Battle of Surabaya. His body was exhumed in Surabaya and taken under a military guard to Jakarta. The coffin was placed on a platform for public viewing in the parliament buildings and the next day was brought in procession to a sepulchre at Kalibata. The actual monument consisted of five concrete rectangular pillars of different heights, symbolizing the five principles of Pancasila. The Kalibata monument both celebrates state ideology and the Battle of Surabaya.⁸⁹ In constructing this monument Suharto, “appropriates the legitimate power of the ‘Myth of Surabaya’ as the founding myth of independent Indonesia.”⁹⁰

This myth served two purposes: to narrate a society’s origins and to describe how and why the order of any society is established. Such a myth describes the, “fundamental beginning and the normative foundations of a society.”⁹¹ The transfer of the body of the Unknown Hero transformed Kalibata into the, “ritual center of the state cult.” The presidential decree approved the status of the memorial, “as the most important center of New Order civil religion.”⁹² A new “ritual hierarchy” was established among sacred sites. Surabaya and other sites were deprived of “their symbolic power and ritual significance.”⁹³ Kalibata acted as a mechanism to take possession of the Revolution’s, “decentralized and participatory aspects and incorporated their innate legitimacy.”⁹⁴ The Revolution, which had a particular meaning to its participants, could be instead described and celebrated in terms defined by the New Order. By summarizing the Revolution with a monument such as that put up at Kalibata, the New Order was able to neutralize earlier ones put up by Sukarno and recast a radical struggle against “imperialism in all its form” as a simple transfer of sovereignty from one well ordered state (the Dutch East Indies) to another (the Republic of Indonesia). Such “Soviet-style” monuments as that commemorating the liberation of Irian Jaya and such Indian-influenced monuments as the Monas and the Hero’s Monument in Surabaya could be left standing. They could

⁸⁹ Schreiner, “National Ancestors,” 198.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 199.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 203.

be detached from the Guided Democracy ideology of NASAKOM and lumped together as representative of an Indonesian Revolution and an Indonesian nationalism which was embodied in the New Order.

Specific events were separated from a potentially disturbing narrative and understood in terms that show the New Order in a favourable light. The 1973 ceremony at Kalibata, centred on the reburial of a *pemuda* killed in the Battle of Surabaya, involves a clear expropriation of Heroes' Day by the New Order. Lines between radical resistance and orderly nation building, between the revolutionary spirit of the *pemuda* and the military discipline of the TNI are blurred. This can be seen in the writings of Nugroho Notosusanto. In a pamphlet put out in 1965 he offers a detailed analysis of the battle drawing on Indonesian and foreign sources. He details the toughness of the Indonesian side, alleging that it was about the same size as the British force (and not much larger as is often claimed). But it was badly armed and faced World War II combat veterans.⁹⁵ But despite the odds the Indonesians put up a fight which would be long remembered:

After we had proclaimed the 10 of November as Heroes' Day, we have considered that day as the source of inspiration for the heroic spirit of our Nation in its further struggle. It would be a good thing if the younger generation reflects why we have made the Battle of Surabaya a spiritual monument for our People. Without even an intensive investigation we can already conclude that during the Battle of Surabaya, every group in society disinterestedly and without too much worry about the lack of materiel had been united in fighting a much stronger opponent.⁹⁶

He and his co-author Poesponegoro offer a similar description of the battle to the nation's youth in the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. The conflict is seen as the result of a misunderstanding between British commanders and the local Indonesian leadership. Negotiations (and participants) are described in considerable detail. The trigger for weeks of street fighting is the death of the British commander, Brigadier General A.W.S. Mallaby, an unfortunate mishap the cause

⁹⁵ Notosusanto, *The National Struggle*, 87–88. The work was originally published as *Pertempuran Surabaya* (The Battle of Surabaya) (Jakarta: Pusat Sedjarah Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965).

⁹⁶ Notosusanto, *The National Struggle*, 89.

of which could not be determined (it may have been from Indonesian or British gunfire; the Brigadier is in an earlier paragraph described as being stabbed by *pemuda* with bayonets and bamboo spears).⁹⁷ A series of increasingly harsh British ultimatums followed. On November 7, 1945, Major General E.C. Mansergh wrote a letter to the Indonesian Governor of the city accusing the latter of not controlling the situation, of hampering Allied troops and finally threatening to occupy Surabaya to remove “gangs who do not know the legal order.” He also “summoned” Governor Soeryo for a “formal appearance.”⁹⁸

The Indonesian leadership rejected these provocative demands. All of the inhabitants of Surabaya anticipated the worst and some of the *pemuda* had begun to prepare defences. The city was divided into three military sectors. Meanwhile the *pemuda* leader Bung Tomo “inflamed the spirit of the struggle of the people.”⁹⁹ The standoff came to a bloody climax:

After the time limit for the ultimatum had finished, the situation was increasingly explosive. The first armed contact took place in Perak, which continued up to 18:00. The English succeeded in taking the first line of our defences. The English troops were accompanied by a bombardment which was aimed at the point that was thought to be a rallying point for *pemuda*. Surabaya which was stirred up by the English was successfully defended by *pemuda* for close to three weeks. Sector by sector were defended in a determined manner, although the English used modern and heavy weapons. The battle ended in Gunungsari on the 28 of November, 1945. However, sporadic resistance continued.¹⁰⁰

Credit is given to the courage and revolutionary spirit of the *pemuda* but the fight against the British, a battle which confirmed that Indonesia would not submit passively to the reintroduction of the Dutch colonial regime, is described as a military-style operation, worthy of TNI. The spontaneous nature of the Battle of Surabaya, with the participation of such charismatic leaders as Bung Tomo, is largely ignored in favour of a depiction of a carefully planned, well led defence of individual neighbourhoods against a superior and determined foe. The *pemuda*, the general population and even the civilian leadership of the city were in effect acting like TNI members

⁹⁷ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 110–113.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 114.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 115–116.

rather than as an ill organized (and potentially threatening) social force. As noted above, *30 Tahun Merdeka* also tends to glorify the role of the TNI in the attainment of Indonesian independence. It gives a stirring account (complete with a photo of a fiery-eyed Bung Tomo) of the Battle of Surabaya. The audacious and aggressive British ultimatum to the people of Surabaya is reproduced. The reader is called upon to recall that in remembrance of the heroism of the people of Surabaya, which was part of the larger struggle of the Indonesian nation, the Government proclaimed November 10 Heroes' Day.¹⁰¹ Beyond the Battle of Surabaya the reminder is given that the TNI are in a sense one with the people. Heroes came from all walks of life to participate in the military struggle. Thus, militiamen are portrayed marching with bamboo spears in Jakarta right after the Proclamation of Independence. Women are shown training in Solo with wooden rifles. Ordinary citizens are shown tearing down the Dutch flag from the Hotel Oranje in Surabaya and replacing it with the red and white flag of the Republic.¹⁰²

Pemuda, *Social Revolution and Madiun: The Radical Face of Merdeka*

Anderson sees the *pemuda* as the real driving force behind the Revolution and their eventual taming for reasons of diplomacy as indicative of its failure.¹⁰³ The *pemuda*, locally oriented and militant in their opposition to any foreign control, have often been associated with social upheavals which marked (or in some eyes marred) the early days of the Revolution. This is an element of the Revolution that the New Order tried to play down. Suharto's semi-official biographer describes the initial period of the Revolution in rather ambiguous terms:

The first wave of impetuous and united action by the Indonesian freedom fighters was beginning to ebb. Excesses of the so-called "social revolution," connected primarily with the national upheaval, discredited the struggle for *merdeka*. Well-to-do Indonesian families were murdered by extreme leftists, partly under the pretext of earlier cooperation with the Dutch, partly for the sake of an egalitarian socialism. Moderate

¹⁰¹ *30 Tahun*, 57–61.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 26–27, 42–43.

¹⁰³ Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 409.

groups became afraid of further revolutionary development if trends of growing anarchy could not be curbed. Thus, the Republic went to the conference table.

The policy of negotiating was resisted vehemently by more radical groups, including parts of the Armed Forces. From the first days of the newly born state, political and military were entwined—an outstanding characteristic of Indonesia. Years of confusion developed; Indonesians opposed Indonesians; it was a long way from proclaiming independence to stabilizing the state.¹⁰⁴

Civilian negotiators and military commanders joined in the common struggle to defeat the Dutch but both had to deal with violent outbursts by over-enthusiastic revolutionary youths.

Western scholarship has recently become quite interested in the dynamics of these revolutionary outbursts, particularly their regional dimensions. But the New Order finds that they are uncomfortable events to recall. It is easier to equate the fighting spirit of the *pemuda* with that of the TNI or simply not to mention the social revolutions at all. Conflicts, actual or potential, between Indonesians on how the Revolution should be conducted might in retrospect be ignored. Suharto describes the situation in August 1945:

The tension was building in Yogya. The Revolution was about to explode, with the flame of resistance burning bright. The pressure was building up between our freedom fighters who wanted arms and the Japanese troops who were fully armed and were intent on holding on to their power.¹⁰⁵

Tension was building up within Indonesian society (in the New Order world view all elements of society were to act in harmony) but was the result of foreign domination. The achievement of the Revolution was the ending of such domination and perhaps nothing more. It did not, as far as the New Order was concerned, involve a radical transformation of society.

In fact independence might have been jeopardized not only by the incompetence of the civilian leadership in dealing with the Dutch but by the actions of various political radicals, in particular the PKI. The early incidents of the regional social revolution were minor inconveniences compared to the "Madiun Incident," which in New Order eyes threatened the Republic's very existence when it was

¹⁰⁴ Roeder, *The Smiling General*, 105.

¹⁰⁵ Suharto, *My Thoughts*, 24.

sorely pressed by Dutch attacks. Suharto offers a rather bland description of this communist uprising. After noting the weak position the civilian government took in dealing with the Dutch and the increasingly emboldened communists, he notes the steps taken to safeguard the Republic:

Events moved swiftly. Heavy fighting between troops was unavoidable. On 18 September 1948 the PKI revolt in Madiun broke out, resulting in the takeover of the legitimate local government. In a strong response to the coup, President Soekarno firmly told the people, "Either Musso and his PKI or Soekarno-Hatta! Make your choice."

The Armed Forces took part in Military Operation I, launched to stamp out the revolt, regained control of Madiun on 30 September. Two months later mopping-up operations against PKI followers were declared completed.

After the insurgency, political party activities declined and opposition to the Hatta Cabinet was reduced.¹⁰⁶

The rebellion was decisively crushed but although credit is indeed given to Sukarno for a strong presidential response, he is carefully linked to the more acceptable figure of Hatta. The military is praised, although no mention is made of Nasution, who in actual fact led the government counterattack. In the wake of the incident interest in useless party debates declined and the population rallied behind the Republic.

It is Roeder, in his semi-official biography, and Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, in the standard New Order history textbook, who probably sum up the New Order's opinion on the events at Madiun the best. Clear links are made between the September 1948 uprising and that other defining moment for the New Order, the so-called G-30-S coup:

The Communist Madiun revolt, latter belittled as a mere "affair," had a strong and lasting impact on all political and military leaders of the country, Soeharto not excepted. Actions and counter-actions concerned in the September 30, 1965 putsch cannot be understood without knowing the previous events of September 1948.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 45.

¹⁰⁷ Roeder, *The Smiling General*, 109.

And in an attached footnote:

The Madiun Affair of September 1948 bears many signs of resemblance to the September 30, 1965 Affair: There was a common prelude of rising political tension and minor clashes in the country; a common technique of power seizure, including the abduction of opponents; the close co-operation between so-called progressive revolutionary officers and communists; the probably premature opening of both revolts; the vain hopes of a popular uprising throughout Indonesia; the quick crushing of the rebellions by staunch anti-Communist troops; the mass killings in clashes between Communists and anti-Communists, (mainly Islamic and Nationalist groups) at the end of both rebellions.¹⁰⁸

The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* expresses regret that the PKI was not decisively “eradicated” in 1948.¹⁰⁹ Strong action on the part of the government and the military stops the revolt in its tracks. Unfortunately, in light of later developments:

It was a pity that it was not possible to bring to justice all those involved, the Dutch had already attacked again and many among them [the rebels] slipped through and 17 years later tried again to organize a rebellion against the Republic of the Proclamation (G30S/PKI).¹¹⁰

In suppressing the PKI in 1965 and 1966, the New Order refrained from making the same mistake again.

The Notorious and Mysterious September 30 Movement

The political eclipse and physical extermination of the PKI can be held to begin with the mysterious events which took place in Jakarta in the early morning hours of October 1, 1965. This also marks the beginning of the end of the power of President Sukarno and the emergence as a national, political figure of the future New Order architect Suharto. The failure of the so-called September 30 Movement is a clearly momentous event, one that would define the Indonesian political and cultural landscape for decades to come. New Order Indonesia cannot be understood without reference to the fact that in many ways it was based on the successful suppression of the

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 109.

¹⁰⁹ The section on Madiun is titled “Revolt and Eradication,” Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 155.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 156.

Movement and the communist threat, which was allegedly behind it. Yet to this day the actual details of the September 30 Movement are unclear and are the subject of a great deal of controversy. This is especially the case in regards to who was behind the Movement and what its aims were. The basic facts of what happened that night in 1965 are pretty clear. Armed men attempted to kidnap six high-ranking Indonesian army officers; several resisted and were killed in their homes while the others were taken to the Halim Airbase on the outskirts of Jakarta. There they were killed. The bodies of all the murdered officers were dumped in an old well named Lubang Buaya (the Crocodile Hole), which was then filled in with debris. General A.H. Nasution, escaped capture although his daughter was killed by the conspirators and his aide, who bore a passing resemblance to him, was taken to Halim and murdered (although Nasution's power had started to wane both within the armed forces and in Indonesian society as a whole, he was considered important enough to be marked for death). Soon after, troops apparently associated with the conspirators took up position around Merdeka Square, adjacent to the presidential palace and at other key locations such as the main radio station. A series of broadcasts announced the existence of the September 30 Movement and a Revolutionary Council intended to safeguard the Indonesian Revolution from the supposed plots of a "Council of Generals" that was aiming to take power.

But by the next day the movement had collapsed. Lieutenant General Suharto, head of the army's strategic reserve (KOSTRAD), considered a not very ambitious, conservative officer from Central Java, had taken charge of the situation. He convinced most of the troops stationed around Merdeka, who were largely unknowing participants in the Movement, to stand down. The radio and telecommunications centers, as well as Halim, were secured with almost no bloodshed. Sukarno who had been at the airbase left for his palace in Bogor, while the PKI Chairman D.N. Aidit and the head of the Air Force Vice-Air Marshall Dhani both fled by plane to Central Java. Similar actions which had been carried out by officers sympathetic to the Movement in Central Java were also a failure. The PKI's newspaper *Harian Rakyat* had come out in favour of the Movement and PKI militants (along with Aidit himself) had been at Halim; the army immediately identified the Party as the *dalang* (puppet master) behind the kidnappings and killings. While Sukarno's relationship with the Movement was (and remains) unclear, he was

tainted by the affair and rapidly lost power and prestige after this point. As for the communists, in subsequent days and months the PKI was basically destroyed along with a vast number of suspected supporters.¹¹¹ During this destruction of the PKI, communist complicity in the murders was assumed. This assumption was firmly held to be true by the army and its supporters from the time of the discovery of the murdered officers at Halim onwards. The September 30 Movement was from then on, described as G-30-S/PKI or as GESTAPU (the latter a rather ominous abbreviation for Gerakan September Tigapuluh).¹¹²

The Official Story

The New Order's description of the September 30 Movement was presented with little variation. It was an article of faith that the PKI was indeed trying to take power by violent means. This was considered a justification for the permanent banning of the PKI and the massacre of suspected communists (although numbers were not stressed) that took place, mostly in Java and Bali, in 1965 and 1966. If the PKI was not the primary guilty party, both its violent destruction and the emerging New Order itself could have their legitimacy questioned. So the New Order looked with a great deal of suspicion on outside observers (or critics) who questioned the basic story. The "Cornell Report" of Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey portrayed the PKI (and Sukarno) as more victim than perpetrator. The report consists of a detailed reconstruction of the events of October 1, 1965 and the days immediately following along with an interpretation of these events. Alternative theories, involving the PKI and Sukarno

¹¹¹ The number of estimated dead is still a matter of controversy. Robert Cribb provides a variety of estimates from Indonesian and Western commentators, both pro and anti-New Order ranging from a low of 78,000 (from a pro-government fact-finding mission carried out in late 1965 when many killings were still taking place) to 2,000,000 (from a Western journalist). See "Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia," in *The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, ed. Robert Cribb (Monash, Australia: Monash Centre of Southeast Asian Studies), 12.

¹¹² Good basic outlines of the events of that night along with attempts to sort out who might have been behind the coup attempt can be found in Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), Chapter 4, and in Elson, *Suharto a Political Biography*, Chapter 5.

are also raised (and dismissed). The coup is described as being initiated by elements within the armed forces who wanted the president to take action against corrupt “Jakarta officers”; the PKI was brought in to ensure that the communists and the president would acquiesce with the plan.¹¹³ Interestingly, the authors chose to open each chapter with a relevant quote from the *Nagarakertagama*, perhaps with the implication that Indonesian (read Javanese) politics are unchangingly rooted in Javanese culture. Also, in the same way that the *Nagarakertagama* was a legitimizing document for Majapahit the official account of G-30-S legitimized the New Order. The Cornell Report, which was circulated privately within months of the affair before its contents were leaked, gained some notoriety. Papers written from a similar perspective were soon published and papers attacking its general premise soon followed.¹¹⁴ Daniel Lev asserted that barring some positive proof that the PKI was behind the affair it more resembled a traditional army putsch.¹¹⁵ W.F. Wertheim similarly saw the PKI as probably not involved in the coup attempt.¹¹⁶ Donald Hindley felt that while PKI involvement could not be confirmed, the coup’s failure and possible PKI participation gave the army the opportunity to “strike at the Party on terms most favourable to itself.”¹¹⁷ For others, the PKI could not be absolved from involvement in the G-30-S incident. John O. Sutter links the coup attempt to wider developments in the region (i.e. Viet Cong advances in South Vietnam and Sukarno’s anti-Malaysia campaign), all part of a Chinese-backed master plan to advance the cause of communism in Asia.¹¹⁸ In a series of articles Justus M. Van der Kroef placed the blame on the shoulders of the PKI, although the extent of its involvement might remain a debatable point. The existence of the “Special Bureau,” was in Van der Kroef’s view, a point of evidence that

¹¹³ Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1971).

¹¹⁴ Benedict Anderson, “Scholarship on Indonesia and Raison d’Etat,” *Indonesia* 62 (1996): 2.

¹¹⁵ Daniel Lev, “Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup,” *Asian Survey* 6, no. 2 (1966): 106.

¹¹⁶ W.F. Wertheim, “Indonesia before and After the Untung Coup,” *Pacific Affairs* 39 (1966): 115.

¹¹⁷ Donald Hindley, “Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 36, no. 2 (1967): 244.

¹¹⁸ John O. Sutter, “Two Faces of Konfrontasi: ‘Crush Malaysia’ and the Gestapu,” *Asian Survey* 6, no. 10 (1966): 523–546.

those who wished to downplay the Party's involvement had difficulty in explaining away.¹¹⁹

Arnold Brackman, an American journalist writing from an anti-communist perspective, attacked the report itself, rather than its findings. He saw it as an attempt by some left-leaning Western scholars to "white wash" the role of the PKI. He describes the "Cornell Report" (a name the work soon acquired) as overly emotional and displaying lapses in judgment and even logic in its attempt to downplay PKI involvement. The report was not released to academic circles in the standard manner and seems to have been hastily put together; Brackman sees an ulterior motive in this. Photocopies eventually began to appear a few months after the article was written; by January 1966 a copy was in the hands of Sukarno himself, rapidly falling from power in his Bogor palace.¹²⁰ A later article by Anderson questioned a central premise of the New Order's version, the tortured and mutilated generals whose bodies were found in the abandoned well at Halim. Anderson claims that the evidence points to the officers having simply been murdered.¹²¹ Some outside observers posed similar questions, even raising the possibility that Suharto, the main architect (and beneficiary) of the New Order was behind the coup or at least had prior knowledge of the events.¹²² Since the fall of Suharto many Indonesians have put forward similar theories. Some observers have also debated US involvement in the coup and its violent aftermath.¹²³

The official New Order story in some ways achieved its full form in response to such Western scholarship. Nugroho Notosusanto, who as noted before framed much of the official history written during the New Order, rushed out a quick summary of the Movement in

¹¹⁹ See Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup," *Pacific Affairs* 43, no. 1 (1970): 35, "Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature," in *Pacific Affairs* 43, no. 4 (1970): 557 and "Origin of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia," in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 111, no. 2 (1972): 284.

¹²⁰ Arnold Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969), 175–190.

¹²¹ Benedict Anderson, "How Did the Generals Die?" *Indonesia* 43 (1987): 109–134.

¹²² See for example, W.F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 9, no. 2 (1979): 197–215.

¹²³ See Peter Scott Dale, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno 1965–1967," *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 2 (1985): 239–264 and H.W. Brands, "The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn't Topple Sukarno," *Journal of American History* 76, no. 3 (1989): 785–808.

1966.¹²⁴ A longer, more detailed version was put out in 1968.¹²⁵ According to Anderson this latter work was compiled in 1967 at the Rand Corporation by Notosusanto in collaboration with Guy Paulker, an American political scientist with close ties to the Indonesian military. Paulker's name and section were for some reason deleted before the work's publication. This book drew on the proceedings of the special Military Tribunals, which tried suspected PKI members; consequently part of the book was written by a Lieutenant Colonel Ismail Saleh, a military lawyer (made Attorney General in 1981, Minister of Justice in 1984). For many years *The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia* was the closest thing available to an official history. It was apparently first written in English and was at least partially intended as a response to a foreign "pro-communist guerrilla campaign" based in the West (it did not appear in Indonesian translation until 1989).¹²⁶ This campaign was seen as a genuine threat, which gave aid and comfort to the PKI:

None of these articles [written along the lines of the Cornell Paper] was solicited by us, and all but one of these authors were then, or later became, Southeast Asian scholars of indisputable integrity and standing. At the same time it is understandable that with the "Cornell Paper" in their hands, Indonesia's Army leaders were quick to imagine behind all these articles a sort of international, but Cornell-based, conspiracy; for them the stakes were very high—for if our analysis was even partly correct, the enormous bloodshed they engineered could not possibly be justified as punishment for a murderous Communist plot.¹²⁷

In an attached footnote Anderson gives a story which may indicate how serious the New Order took the Cornell Report. In May of 1968 George McT. Kahin was wandering through the Ministry of Defence looking for Nugroho Notosusanto. In a lecture hall he stumbled upon a blackboard upon which was drawn an elaborate diagram; at its center was the "Cornell Report" with arrows radiating out to the titles of a number of Western articles on the coup attempt,

¹²⁴ Nugroho Notosusanto, *40 Hari Kegagalan G-30-S* (40 Days of the Failure of the G-30-S) (Jakarta: Staf Pertahanan-keamanan, 1966).

¹²⁵ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*. Anderson, "Scholarship on Indonesia," 3.

¹²⁶ Anderson, "Scholarship on Indonesia," 1-3. See Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *Tragedi Nasional: Percobaan KUP G30 31/ PKI di Indonesia* (A National Tragedy: The Coup Attempt of the G-30-S/PKI in Indonesia), 4th ed. (Jakarta: Intermasa, 1993).

¹²⁷ Anderson, "Scholarship on Indonesia," 3.

including some that Anderson was not familiar with. Although Cornell professor Kahin's free access to the ministry might lead one to question whether the Paper was indeed seen as a paramount threat by the regime, the New Order was clearly suspicious of many Western commentators on Indonesia. The story told in the works of Nugroho Notosusanto was given the permanent status of "what really happened," as far as the New Order was concerned, in a "White Book" put out in 1995 by the State Secretariat of Indonesia. Anderson makes much of the fact that it took some thirty years for this official report to see the light of day and that a secret internal report had been produced by the army many years ago. He also states that Suharto associate Ali Murtopo (via Kahin and an Indonesian Cornell graduate) volunteered that the Cornell Report was "basically correct" and lacked only a few facts and more extensive documentation.¹²⁸ But for the Indonesian people, until the fall of the New Order in 1998, the White Paper was the final, unquestionable word on the PKI, the G-30-S Movement and its suppression. An almost identical account is provided in Suharto's autobiography and is reflected in the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (whose volume on independent Indonesia was largely authored by Nugroho Notosusanto). These official narratives stress a series of common themes, while remaining remarkably consistent in regards to details.

The PKI and the September 30 Movement

In describing the events of September 30–October 1, 1965, the emphasis was on violence. The kidnappings and killings were portrayed as a violent attack on the military, on authority, on the family and indeed on Indonesia itself. Squads were sent out with military precision to seize key army officers and then to take power:

In his briefing, Lieutenant Dul Arief maintained the theme of a "General's Council" plot and told the sub-unit commanders that the generals whom they were about to abduct were those planning to undertake a coup and therefore had to be captured and brought back to the Lubang Buaja base, dead or alive. The ruse to be used was to

¹²⁸ *The September 30 Movement: The Attempted Coup by the Indonesian Communist Party: Its Background, Actions and Eradication* (Jakarta: The State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1995). See Anderson, "Scholarship on Indonesia," 5, 11.

tell the generals that they were summoned by the President. The seven sub-units left Lubang Buaja to fulfill their respective assignments at about 3:30 a.m.¹²⁹

Some of the officers greeted the presidential summons with suspicion. General Haryono struggled with his assailants and was bayoneted. His small son was knocked down as his wounded father was dragged away.¹³⁰ In taking General Sutoyo, clad only in pyjamas, his kidnappers took the time to smash his wife's television and china with their rifle butts. Both General Panjaitan and General Yani were gunned down in their homes after reacting angrily to perceived insults from lower ranked soldiers.¹³¹ In their failed attempt to capture General A.H. Nasution, the G-30-S cadres shot and mortally wounded his young daughter. Nugroho's original description of the kidnappings is duplicated in the government White Book, with such lurid details as Major General Haryono's body being bathed in blood as it was dragged off to a waiting truck.¹³² The safety of the home, women and children, the military chain of command and even private property were threatened by the Movement, whose participants were seen as unpredictable and prone to sudden acts of violence.

The depravity of the G-30-S apparently went much further than the kidnappings themselves:

The victims who were brought alive to Lubang Buaja, however, had to suffer even more before they met their deaths. They were subject to abuse and a free-for-all by the mob before they were shot and dumped into an old, deep well on the training ground used by the Communist Youth and Women's "volunteers." The fact that the bullet wounds were found all over their bodies would indicate that they were not shot by a firing squad. It would appear that they were not executed "ceremoniously" after being condemned to death by a "people's court" but rather were used for target shooting or at least for random shooting bouts by persons not used to handling firearms.¹³³

Graphic descriptions are given about the bullet, stab and bludgeoning wounds visible on the bodies of the dead officers after they had been recovered from the well two days later.¹³⁴ The White Book

¹²⁹ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*, 22.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 26, *The September 30 Movement*, 92-98.

¹³³ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*, 28.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

describes PKI volunteers, including female Gerwani members, waiting, with apparent anticipation for the kidnap victims to arrive at the base. The four surviving soldiers, tied up and blindfolded with red cloth, are tortured to death and thrown in an old well. The old well is covered in trash and earth and freshly planted banana tress so as to cover up all traces of the crime.¹³⁵ The savagery of the events at Halim is similarly stressed in the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. The kidnappings themselves are not described in any detail, although the planning which went into the operation is meticulously outlined. Dates, places and participants are given for a series of meetings between PKI activists and the military personnel who would carry out the kidnappings. A name is even given to the action, the “Gerakan September Tigapuluh.” [Thirtieth of September Movement], (although the textbook’s young readers are reminded that society at large prefers G-30-S/PKI or Gestapu/PKI).¹³⁶ But whatever its name, its brutality is assumed:

They began to set [the attempt to seize power] in motion in the early morning of the 1 of October 1965, it was preceded by an action to kidnap and kill six high ranking officers and the head of the Army. All of this was carried out in the village of Lubang Buaya on the south side of the Halim Air Base. Cruelly they were tortured and finally murdered by members of Pemuda Rakyat, Gerwani and other satellite organizations of the PKI. After they were satisfied with all of this cruelty, all of the corpses were thrown into an old well which was then covered with trash and dirt.¹³⁷

The satisfaction of primitive, violent urges is portrayed as being perhaps a more important motivation for the Movement than even the attainment of political power. Any blueprint the PKI might have for a future Indonesia seems unimportant compared to the sheer evil of their actions at Halim.

For the New Order the PKI was heavily involved in the September 30 Movement. Any suggestion otherwise was in fact seen as a threat to the New Order’s *raison d’être* and considerable attention was given to demonstrate that the PKI did in fact act with the aim of seizing power. In the “legal section” of Notosusanto and Saleh’s account of the coup attempt, extensive use was made of the trial testimony of

¹³⁵ *The September 30 Movement*, 98–99.

¹³⁶ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 387–389.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 390.

Njono bin Sastrorejo, a member of the PKI's Central Committee and the First Secretary of the Party Committee for Jakarta. He was charged with, "conspiracy, of planning to overthrow the legal government, and of being a leader and organizer of a rebellion against the government of the Republic of Indonesia."¹³⁸ Meetings and conspiracies are detailed whose implications can be summed up with a blanket statement affirming the guilt of the PKI:

Njono was under the impression that the execution of the 'September 30 Movement' was a team effort of Communists and non-Communist elements in which the cadres and leaders of the PKI took an active part in determining the course of the politics, gave support and assistance to the military operations, and also gave ideological direction of the 'September 30 Movement.' All these indicate that the PKI was indeed involved in the 'September 30 Movement.'¹³⁹

The White Book as a whole could be read as an indictment of the PKI, not just on the charge of involvement in the coup attempt but of consistently trying to destabilize the Republic of Indonesia. Several comments in the book's conclusion are representative of such sentiments, "the armed revolt launched by the September 30 Movement was the culmination of the PKI's treacherous strategy to seize power that had been in preparation since the PKI re-emerged."¹⁴⁰ The PKI's sole complicity in the coup attempt is also emphasized:

Confessions of PKI figures during the Extraordinary Military Tribunal (Mahmilub) trials, as well as other trials, indicated that it was the PKI who was the puppet master and the player, in conceiving the idea, in planning activities, in preparations, and in the operations of the September 30 Movement. It also was revealed in court that the PKI also decided the methods of political campaigning to ensure the success of the armed movement, and who prepared the political concepts after the revolt had begun.¹⁴¹

The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* makes the realization that the PKI was behind the coup a personal accomplishment; perhaps all Indonesians could be similarly vigilant. While the Movement was underway, Suharto, who took the lead in opposing it, immediately recognized the hand of the PKI:

¹³⁸ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*, 107.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 140.

¹⁴⁰ *The September 30 Movement*, 163.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 163.

After evaluating the situation at that time, the Commander of KOSTRAD quickly reached the conclusion that: the kidnapping and murders directed against the high officers of the Army constituted part of an effort to seize the power of the government, that the leader of the Air Force helped the movement, which was named the 30 of September Movement and that the 454th Diponegoro Battalion and the 530 Brawijaya Battalion around Merdeka Square were misused by the G-30-S/PKI (the second of these units were brought into Jakarta in connection with the parade for Armed Forces Day October 5, 1965).¹⁴²

The nation's textbook notes not only that the PKI was behind the coup attempt and had manipulated elements of the army, but that the New Order's founder Suharto was wise enough to recognize this fact. *30 Tahun Merdeka* offers a similar picture of a "take-charge" Suharto. He is portrayed as personally supervising the removal of the remains of the dead officers from the abandoned well at Halim; a photograph shows one of the severely decomposed corpses. The accompanying text states that it was clear to Suharto that the PKI was behind the incident.¹⁴³

The biographies in the *Wajah dan Sejarah Perjuangan Pahlawan Nasional* describe how the murdered officers were specifically targeted by the PKI because of their opposition to the Party. For example, its description of the life, career and death of Yani, the army chief of staff, three pages are devoted to his hostile dealings with the PKI. As Yani rose through the ranks to take on greater degrees of responsibility, the PKI had already become a major threat. The PKI had tried to portray itself as a peaceful organization; but in fact, it was already preparing to launch a rebellion. It also tried to increase its position by trying to hold the balance of power between Sukarno and the army. The army was placed in a difficult position and Yani himself came under more and more pressure. As a military man he had to maintain discipline and obey the president. But he also understood the "depraved (or rotten or putrid) plan of the PKI."¹⁴⁴ For the PKI, the army was the main competitor for power. The Party's suggestion that a "Fifth Force," of armed workers and peasants be formed was rejected by Yani who realized that it could be used to launch a rebellion. He also rejected PKI proposals to politicize the armed

¹⁴² Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 391.

¹⁴³ *30 Tahun*, 53–55.

¹⁴⁴ *Wajah dan Sejarah*, 90.

forces. For these reasons, Yani was considered an enemy of the PKI and was therefore kidnapped and slain. The kidnapping is described in some detail as an affront to the honour of the armed forces. Yani is not allowed to wash before accompanying his abductors. He becomes angry and slaps one of his assailants with the reminder that “you are a soldier.” Yani tries to leave and is shot through a glass door. His body is dumped at Halim. It is later recovered and buried with honours.¹⁴⁵ The text notes that “Ahmad Yani sacrificed his soul (died) for the sake of his country and government, above all for the preservation of Pancasila from the undermining of the PKI. He left a wife and six children.”¹⁴⁶ The *Album Pahlawan Bangsa* offers a similar description. The PKI slandered the army, alleging that it was plotting with foreign powers to overthrow Sukarno. Yani opposed the creation of a Fifth Force and as a result he was “enemied” (denounced) by the PKI. Later he was murdered.¹⁴⁷ The other targeted officers earned the enmity of the PKI for similar reasons, especially for opposition to the formation of a Fifth Force. Brigadier General Donald Ignatius Panjaitan hampered its creation in a most direct manner: by intercepting weapons sent from the People’s Republic of China for use by the PKI. The weapons had been concealed in shipping crates supposedly containing building material for a Sukarno mega-project.¹⁴⁸ Brigadier General M.T. Haryono, in addition to opposing the Fifth Force, simply “did not like the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI).”¹⁴⁹

The PKI was not alone at Halim; others were involved in the events leading to the murders at Lubang Buaya, including, as noted in the last quote from the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, the air force and some perhaps unwitting elements of the army. Also at Halim was President Sukarno. His presence has never been fully explained and he may have been implicated in the coup. However, this is a theme which the New Order has largely chosen not to pursue, although some tentative attempts to do so took place in 1980–1981 and in 1997.¹⁵⁰ It is D.N. Aidit, the PKI’s chairman, who is portrayed as

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 91–92.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 92.

¹⁴⁷ *Album Pahlawan Bangsa*, 67–68.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 75–76.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 74.

¹⁵⁰ See Hong Lee Oey, *The Sukarno controversies of 1980/81* (Hull: University of

the motivating menace beyond the Movement. He is presented to Indonesian students as a devious plotter, who from almost the start of the Republic's independence onward worked towards its destruction:

Since chosen as Chairman in 1951 D.N. Aidit quickly began to redevelop the PKI which had been in a state of disarray since 1948. This effort went well, until the General Election of 1955 when the PKI succeeded in placing itself among the four big parties in Indonesia. Ten years later, or at least since 1964, the PKI felt itself to be a powerful party and began to increase its readiness to undertake the seizure of power. In 1964 a Special Bureau was formed directly under the command of D.N. Aidit. The leading figure in this organization was Sjam Kamaruzaman, the number two person was Pono (Soepono Marsudidjojo) and the third person was Bono (Walujo). The Special Bureau was active in bringing to maturity the situation of seizing power and carrying out the infiltration of the ranks of ABRI, this was accompanied by an effort to build strength by having trained personnel in the military field from among PKI members as well as its most important satellites Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani.

Around the end of August 1965 the head of the Special Bureau of the PKI was continually organizing meetings whose conclusion were reported to the Chairman of the Central Committee of the PKI, D.N. Aidit. Then it was decided by Aidit that the group to seize power would be directly controlled by D.N. Aidit, as the overall leader of the group.¹⁵¹

Similar descriptions of Aidit's activities are given in the White Book. He is shown as instrumental in rebuilding the Party after Madiun and leading it through the challenges of the Guided Democracy Period.¹⁵² Of particular note are his attempts to get Indonesian society to accept Pancasila on PKI terms and perhaps even to abandon it in favour of Sukarno's NASAKOM.¹⁵³ He pressed President Sukarno to create the Fifth Force of armed workers and peasants as a counterweight to the army. Although the army commander General Yani refused this suggestion steps were taken to train male and female

Hull, 1982), Karen Brooks, "The Rustle of Ghosts: Bung Karno in the New Order," *Indonesia* 60 (1995), 61-99 and "Seminar on Sukarno to go on," *The Jakarta Post*, April 1, 1997 and "Impeachment seminar not until 1998," *The Jakarta Post*, April 5, 1997.

¹⁵¹ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 387.

¹⁵² *The September 30 Movement*, 22.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 31.

PKI cadres in military techniques.¹⁵⁴ Some of these volunteers were later at Halim on October 1, 1965.¹⁵⁵ Efforts to physically oppose the army were bolstered by Aidit's plan to infiltrate the armed forces by the creation of a Special Bureau; the composition and activities of this body, culminating in the coup attempt, are extensively described by the White Book.¹⁵⁶ The tragic and violent story, its planning and implementation are shown as almost literally inseparable from the name of Aidit, although he himself is not described as the actual killer.

The Indonesian Killings

The actual killings were, in the New Order version, carried out in the up-scale suburban homes of some of the kidnapped officers by members of the presidential guard and with more fury by PKI cadres at the Halim Airbase. Violent kidnappings also took place in Central Java; a total of ten army and police personnel were killed during the coup attempt. These murders were in a way blurred into the violent suppression (by the army and civilian vigilantes) of the PKI itself in the wake of the Movement's failure (although precise numbers are not given). All of the blood is on the hands of the PKI not just that of the murdered generals. In some sense the PKI is felt to have "brought it on themselves," although this is not necessarily stated in such clear terms as this might draw attention to the very one-sided nature of the affair and might even draw some sympathy to PKI supporters or their families (many more suspected communists were killed than army officers and family members of those associated with the PKI were harassed and discriminated against throughout the New Order period). Certainly, in comparison with the Western scholarship on the "Indonesian Killings" the emphasis is on the murdered generals, not on dead communists. In fact the massacre of suspected communists barely rates a mention in the official New Order version. Nugroho Notosusanto describes how fighting in Central Java, in the wake of the coup attempt, was initiated by the PKI who had infiltrated local People's Defence units

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 37–45 and 70–88.

(a type of army reserve).¹⁵⁷ What violence did occur in the countryside was, if not actually instigated by the PKI, an understandable reaction to the murder of the generals:

The news of what happened at Lubang Buaja spread like wildfire throughout Indonesia. General Soeharto's speech on the occasion of the exhumation of the murdered officers, followed by additional news reports, revealed that the PKI through its mass organizations, *Pemuda Rakyat* and *Gerwani*, was behind the coup attempt and the connected murders. Indonesian society felt betrayed by a group which for the past eight years had declared itself the most faithful, the most progressive, the most revolutionary, and the most patriotic of all while it had accused others of being treacherous, reactionary, and in the pay of foreign interests. Waves of indignation swept throughout the nation, resulting in demands that the PKI be censured for its deeds.¹⁵⁸

Sukarno did not move against the PKI and spontaneous actions began to occur:

This discrepancy between public demands and the will of the President caused an exacerbation in the tensions, already considerably high in the aftermath of October 1, 1965. The local officials, civilians as well as military, were caught between the sense of duty towards their highest superior and their convictions corresponding to those of the community surrounding them. These tensions finally exploded into communal clashes resulting in blood baths in certain areas of Indonesia.¹⁵⁹

But these clashes are not described, justified or explained in any detail:

It is not the task of this paper to condemn or to justify the sanguine happenings mentioned above, but rather to try to explain; but even to explain these events adequately, a separate treatment, more lengthy than the present paper, is necessary.¹⁶⁰

Roeder begins his semi-official account of the life of Suharto with the events of October 1, 1965. He follows the official line; the PKI was fully behind the violent attempt to seize power (although he acknowledges the involvement of "progressive revolutionary officers," the latter were one with the Party in striving towards the same goal). He describes the PKI, under Aidit and Sjam and the revolutionary

¹⁵⁷ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*, 74.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 78.

officers, under Omar Dhani, Col. Latief and Col. Untung, as setting up separate headquarters at Halim, although these headquarters were in constant communication as the events of the coup unfolded. There was a third headquarters at Halim that of Sukarno; Roeder debates whether Sukarno was a full-fledged member of the conspiracy.¹⁶¹ The most interesting aspect of Roeder's description involves a clear attempt to link the extreme violence of that night with subsequent anti-communist massacres:

When the trucks returned to Halim Airbase at about dawn, three of the abducted Generals were still living. The communist mob shouted, danced, intoned slogans, and chanted party songs at what appeared to be a most successful beginning of the operation. A ghastly orgy developed. After being tortured, slashed with razor blades, and with eyes gouged out, the victims were finally thrown down a well. The Crocodile Hole was filled.

The night of murder at *Lubang Buaya* was not an isolated event. Emotions were stirred up. They became the driving force of the following months, leading to more bloodshed—now with the victims mainly on the side of the communists.¹⁶²

In his autobiography, Suharto does provide a justification for destroying the PKI, based on the grisly discovery of the murdered army officers at Halim:

When I saw for myself what had been discovered at Lubang Buaya, I felt that my primary duty was to destroy the PKI, to smash their resistance everywhere, in the capital and in the regions, even in their hideouts in the mountains.¹⁶³

He goes on to describe mass anti-PKI action in Jakarta and military operations in the Merapi area, but again with no mention of massacres.¹⁶⁴ It is the violence of the PKI which stands out rather than that of the party's eradication.

The word "eradication" is used in many New Order accounts of the PKI's downfall in the wake of the failed October coup. The White Book has the full title: *The September 30th Movement: The Attempted Coup by the Indonesian Communist Party, Its Background, Actions and Eradication.*

¹⁶¹ Roeder, *The Smiling General*, 17–18.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁶³ Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, 113.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 116–117.

It describes how the armed forces and the Indonesian people, from the morning of October 1, 1965 onwards, were involved in “eradicating the action to seize power/the attempted coup by the Indonesian Communist Party through the September 30th Movement.”¹⁶⁵ This description deals with events in the capital and the gradually eclipse of Sukarno as leader in the wake of the coup’s failure.¹⁶⁶ No mention is made of the wide-scale massacres of PKI supporters, beyond the death of Aidit and other leaders in November 1965 and of PKI cadres in South Blitar (in the context of post-coup attempt guerrilla activity).¹⁶⁷ The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* notes that the army, navy and police, even before Halim was recaptured and the dead officers found, were “determined to eradicate the G-30-S.”¹⁶⁸ Eradication operations are described as taking place in South Blitar and in the Mt. Lawu region of Central Java. PKI hideouts are uncovered and party cadres and leaders are captured.¹⁶⁹ Although these military sweeps take place in the summer of 1968 they are still understood as a logical follow up to the kidnap of the generals in the early morning hours of October 1, 1965. Operations to wipe out the PKI outside of Jakarta and Central Java are described as having being quite adequately carried out by local reserve military units because the PKI had not really come close to seizing power in these regions. Efforts to suppress the party are again merged with vague allusions to acts of communist rebellion, “Only in the regions of East Java and Bali did there emerge confusion of kidnappings and murders before order was quickly restored.”¹⁷⁰ Likewise, *30 Tahun Merdeka* does not mention the killings of suspected PKI cadres, beyond acknowledging that a special court was set up by the government to try those involved in the coup (Mahkamah or Militer Luar Biasa—Extraordinary Military Tribunal).¹⁷¹ Attention is also drawn to continued violence on the part of the PKI in West Kalimantan and East Java. Operating across the Malaysian-Indonesian border, bands of PKI fighters launched attacked until they were wiped out in a joint operation of the two country’s armed forces in July 1967 (it

¹⁶⁵ *The September 30 Movement*, 121.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 153, 156.

¹⁶⁸ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 393.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 403.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *30 Tahun*, 83–85.

might be recalled that hostility to Malaysia's very existence was a key to the former Sukarno regime).¹⁷² Military operations were also carried out against PKI remnants in the Blitar region in July 1968. This is described (and shown in accompanying photos) as a campaign carried out by special units of the Indonesian military against well entrenched opponents who had adopted a Viet Cong-style guerrilla strategy complete with elaborate tunnel-complexes.¹⁷³

A Snake in the Grass: The Deadly but Resilient PKI

The PKI's actions in 1965 are portrayed as a continuation of long term plans to seize absolute power in Indonesia. Nugroho Notosusanto describes how:

In the years preceding the October 1, 1965 affair, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) appeared to be doing very well. From a small party with a dubious past because of its role in the Madiun Rebellion of 1948, it had grown into a mighty mass party. Its influence was felt in every phase of socio-political life. Representatives of the Party sat in the Cabinet, in the Parliament, in the People's Congress; the Party line was drawn into politics as well as into economics, education, arts and literature.¹⁷⁴

The PKI owed its position to the "cunning leadership" of Aidit, its utilization of the electoral path and the patronage of President Sukarno.¹⁷⁵ It felt that its success would be put into jeopardy by the death of the president and the actions of their long-time rival, the army. The events of October 1, 1965 were thus put into motion in order to improve their influence within the armed forces, prepare for the eventual death of the president and to be able to continue to work to spread their influence throughout the Indonesian population.¹⁷⁶ The White Book describes Marxist-inspired movements in Indonesia from 1913 onwards, including attempts to infiltrate Sarekat Islam (the first modern mass organization in Indonesia), the founding of the PKI and the involvement of the Party in the popular

¹⁷² Ibid., 144–145.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 182–184.

¹⁷⁴ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*, 3.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 4–5.

uprisings of 1926 and 1927.¹⁷⁷ These activities are seen as being solely carried out for the benefit of foreign-inspired communists, not for the benefit of Indonesia. The 1926 revolt, a spontaneous manifestation of “the spirit of national struggle,” was exploited by the PKI leadership, which then fled and went into hiding; “thus the PKI made no contribution whatsoever to the national movement”.¹⁷⁸ The PKI also played a wholly negative part in the attainment of independence. They were absent in preparing the August 17, 1945 Proclamation of Independence, in drafting the Preamble and the Constitution of 1945 and from any participation in the actual fighting of the 1945–1949 War of Independence.¹⁷⁹ Their actions after Independence was declared are described as treasonable. The Party staged a series of regional revolts in Cirebon, in Brebes, in Tegal in Pemalang and of course in Madiun.¹⁸⁰

In the section on “The Eradication of the G-30-S/PKI” in the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Notosusanto and his co-author puts the PKI’s enduring strategy to take power in the context of a world-wide communist movement and dates it to at least the 1948 Madiun Affair:

Each Communist party throughout the world, has a political line which is the same. Their final goal in the framework of creating a dictatorship of the proletariat is to seize power by any means no matter what. The political line of the PKI, in an effort to achieve this target is clearly visible from the Revolt of the PKI in Madiun in 1948 and the development [of the Party] after 1950 up to the explosion of the Revolt of the G-30-S/PKI.¹⁸¹

The PKI is shown as always putting their own desires and plans to achieve political power above the needs of the Indonesian nation. In his autobiography, Suharto reduces the PKI program to a series of negative, counter-productive and perhaps meaningless slogans shouted during Guided Democracy-era “agitation campaigns”: “down with this” and “down with that”; “down with the village satans” and “down with the city devils.”¹⁸² Not only are the PKI’s motives and their commitment to the betterment of Indonesia questioned, but so are their methods. They are portrayed as using subversion, of infiltrating

¹⁷⁷ *The September 30 Movement*, 7–13.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 162.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 162.

¹⁸¹ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 387.

¹⁸² Soeharto, *My Thoughts*, 96.

organizations so as to weaken them and use them for their own purposes. They also engage in extensive conspiracies involving secret units whose existence is known to only a few top PKI leaders. Thus, Nugroho Notosusanto gives a detailed account of the setting up of a “Special Bureau” in order to cultivate sympathetic elements in the army and ultimately to launch the September 30 Movement.¹⁸³ Such activities are similarly described in the White Book.¹⁸⁴ The source as a whole emphasizes a particular PKI mindset given to plotting and trying to set elements of society against each other in a very un-Indonesian manner:

The series of PKI activities described in the preceding chapters clearly indicate that the PKI was an organized conspiracy aimed at establishing a communist state in Indonesia, although externally it acknowledges Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

In the context of achieving their objectives, the PKI made use of an organizational structure that was open in nature, as though it recognized Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, in addition to a secret organizational network. That secret organizational network was used to infiltrate civil and military government apparatuses, various political parties, and social organizations.

The infiltration had two purposes; on the one hand it was intended to form a force within the organization concerned that could be used to undermine its leadership, and on the other, to influence the policy of the organization concerned, so that they would unconsciously carry out the politics and strategy of the PKI. In addition, infiltration was also a vehicle to facilitate the way to establish communist power in Indonesia, both through legal means and the seizure of power.

As a party that holds the view that social developments are controlled by the law of class struggle, and that social-economic changes can only be affected by revolution, the PKI was always looking for and creating conflicts within society.

Those differences were sharpened purposely to become class conflicts, so that finally they could become instruments to form a revolutionary mass force, with a stance in support of the PKI policy line. The tactics of manipulating conditions or differences of opinion were also directed to creating a picture of the PKI as the defender of the people.

On the other hand, as a political organization oriented to the interests of International Communism, the PKI always strove for its international

¹⁸³ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*, 14–15.

¹⁸⁴ *The September 30 Movement*, Chapter 3.

mission, to communize the Indonesian nation through a mass revolution. An armed struggle and the attempted seizure of power by the PKI were all in the context of fulfilling that mission.¹⁸⁵

In the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* it is felt necessary to repeat the details of the Special Bureau and its various meeting in August and September 1965 for the benefit of the text-book's young readers. Particular attention is drawn to the activities of Sjam Kamaruzaman, the mysterious figure who at the behest of Aidit apparently set the whole Movement in motion, while coordinating regional PKI cadres and disloyal members of military.¹⁸⁶ The hidden PKI bogeyman is thus given a name; Sjam can stand as a parallel figure to Aidit whose activities and ambitions would be well known. Sjam might act as a reminder that in addition to openly trying to achieve power through peaceful political tactics, the PKI were "out there" attempting through clandestine means to usurp control.

The Dreaded Crocodile Hole: Slain Heroes Remembered

Most official accounts of the September 30 Movement's attempt to seize power emphasize the violent events at Lubang Buaya (the Crocodile Hole), the disused well on the grounds of Halim Airbase outside Jakarta. The discovery of the bodies is used as evidence of the PKI's evil nature.¹⁸⁷ It is therefore not surprising that a major monument has been set up at the site. In fact, this might be considered the most important of New Order monuments (one commentator has described it as "the sanctuary of the New Order").¹⁸⁸ At Lubang Buaya there is a large plaza to hold public ceremonies, a memorial and the actual well itself. The Monument Pancasila Sakti (Sacred Pancasila Monument) consists of seven giant statues of the slain military officers standing on a large stone pedestal.¹⁸⁹ That of General Yani is in the center. Interestingly enough, having one's

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 161.

¹⁸⁶ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 387-389.

¹⁸⁷ Suharto, 113, *The September 30 Movement*, 124; Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 394.

¹⁸⁸ Schreiner. "The Making of National Heroes," 197.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 196 and 197 and Saya S. Shiraishi, *Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1997), 54-55.

corpse disposed of at the site seems to be the criterion for being included in this memorial; not all of the officers were actually slain there. Also, the conspirators were responsible for the death of a policeman and several civilians (including Nasution's daughter) as well as for the deaths of two officers in Central Java; none of these people are commemorated. The statues are of bronze and are shown in proper military pose and dress; General Yani points his hands accusingly at the observer standing in the public plaza (perhaps asking whether any visitors are as willing as he to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Pancasila, Indonesia and the New Order). Fronting the pedestal is a bronze bas-relief depicting the events leading up to the murders. Trucks are shown bringing captives to Halim, wild-eyed PKI supporters torture officers and above the whole panorama is Suharto striding forth like an avenging angel. Towering above the statue of the "Seven Heroes" is a huge bronze Indonesian Garuda (upon whose chest is the Pancasila crest and within its talons is the national motto, *bhinneka tunggal ika*, "unity through diversity"). Behind all the statues is a monumental stone wall. The well itself, a simple hole in the ground, is covered by a modest Javanese *pendopo* (pavilion) structure. Also at the site are some educational elements, apparently added after the original construction of the monument. A life-sized diorama near the well depicts the violent ends of the officers. A museum explains the "Treason of the Communist Party" from the time of Madiun onwards. A diorama in the museum shows a pyjama-clad General Yani being gunned down in his home. Interestingly, the home, complete with a well stocked bar (with stools) is not what one would expect in a typical Indonesian household and might even lend credence to Anderson's assertion that the Movement was aimed at the removal of "decadent Jakarta officers." It is also possible that this is the sort of home, full of consumer goods that the New Order's development-oriented policies hoped to place in the reach of all Indonesians and that a PKI triumph would threaten (recall the destruction by armed intruders of Mrs. Sutuyo's china and television set).¹⁹⁰

The murders, the discovery of the bodies and the monument itself have all been reproduced in billboards erected on the occasion of Independence Day on Merdeka Square. The billboards for 1985

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 55.

include a panel devoted to the birth of the New Order regime. A large portrait of Suharto in military uniform looks over the Pancasila Sakti monument erected to the military victims of G-30-S. This is accompanied by reproductions of the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto and post-coup anti-PKI demonstrations.¹⁹¹ It could be assumed that the public would easily recognize the events and the monument itself. One of the billboards put up for the fiftieth anniversary of the Independence Declaration in 1995, which as noted earlier could be considered the height of the New Order, depicts the exhumation of the slain officers at Lubang Buaya and subsequent anti-PKI demonstrations. Above both scenes is a large portrait of Suharto in combat dress, as he frequently appeared in the days following the coup attempt. This is a continuation of a longer scene depicting the history of the Indonesian independence struggle, from early heroes such as Diponegoro, Iman Bonjol and Kartini, through the Proclamation of Independence by Sukarno and Hatta, the War of Independence won by Sudirman, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and a young Lieutenant Colonel Suharto. The scene ends with a mature President Suharto ushering in a high-tech New Order of computers and airplane factories. At the center of the scene is the Pancasila Garuda, an embodiment of the national ideology.¹⁹² The caption for the billboard reads (in Indonesian), “The history of the national struggle is given shape in the era of the second national revival.”¹⁹³ The events of October 1, 1965 and Suharto’s response to them are shown as an integral part not just of the founding the New Order, but of the longer independence struggle. What begins with Diponegoro ends with an advanced development-oriented Pancasila state. The New Order is in fact the second stage of the Indonesian project.

Another important monument is the Heroes’ Cemetery at Kalibata, where the dead officers are actually buried. Their burial at this site is presented as a piece of political theatre:

After appropriate treatment, the Army leaders, who were victims of slander and murder by the September 30th Movement, were laid in

¹⁹¹ Photo and description Maurer, “A New Order Sketchpad,” 219, plate 32.

¹⁹² Photo and description Maurer, “La gloire du père,” 93–95.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 92.

wake in the Army Headquarters Hall at Jalan Merdeka Utara, Central Jakarta. The following day, coinciding with the 20th Anniversary of the Armed Forces, October 5, 1965, the bodies of the seven of the nation's best sons were buried with full military honours at the National Heroes' Cemetery in Kalibata. The Coordinating Minister of Defence and Security/Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Gen. A.H. Nasution acted as Inspector of Ceremony when the bodies were brought from Army Headquarters to the National Heroes' Cemetery.

While delivering his speech to those accompanying the bodies of the heroes, the Coordinating Minister of Defence and Security/Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces spoke haltingly and full of grief. He stated that the Armed Forces Day on October 5, 1965 had always been a day of splendour, but today it had been tarnished by treason and tyranny. Gen. A.H. Nasution stated that Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani, Maj. Gen. Soeprapto, Maj. Gen. S. Parman, Maj. Gen. Haryono M.T., Brig. Gen. D.I. Pandjaitan, Brig. Gen Soetojo and 1st Lt. Eng. Pierre Andreas Tendean were victims of slander and treason.

Gen. A.H. Nasution said that the slander against the Armed Forces was a crueller act than murder. But, all the Indonesian people knew that those who were victims of slander and treason were freedom fighters, who for more than 20 years had upheld justice, truth and freedom. Therefore they were heroes for the entire National Army, and Gen. A.H. Nasution prayed that, as heroes, they would return to Allah, the Most Praised, the Creator of mankind, because, in the end, He is our Supreme Commander. Gen. A.H. Nasution believed that what is right will triumph, and what is not right will be vanquished. Finally, Gen. A.H. Nasution appealed to all soldiers of the National Army to carry on the struggle of those heroes, and asked the people to sincerely bid farewell to those heroes to return to the One Almighty God.

Along the entire route of the trip taken by the bearers of the bodies of those Heroes of the Revolution, hundreds of thousands of people accompanied them, as an expression of their respect, their grief and their sympathy. The ceremony at the Heroes' Cemetery in Kalibata, Jakarta, was attended by all levels of society, including State high-ranking officials and prominent society figures, as well as members of the Armed Forces.¹⁹⁴

The cemetery becomes a focus of the people's grief and outrage against the PKI. Nasution's speech identifies the treason of the PKI while underlining that the slain officers were national heroes. Interest-

¹⁹⁴ *The September 30 Movement*, 125.

ingly, the emphasis is on Nasution's speech. Nasution, whose daughter had been slain in the G-30-S attacks, was not a part of the New Order; this Revolutionary and Guided Democracy figure is passing on the torch to Suharto in the symbolically charged context of the Heroes' Cemetery (although Nasution may not have seen it this way, he was later a regime critic). In his speech Nasution describes the victims as "freedom fighters" whose struggle on behalf of Indonesia goes back more than twenty years. In 1974, as noted above, the remains of an "Unknown Hero," killed in the Battle of Surabaya, were buried at Kalibata.¹⁹⁵ It is quite possible that this action was intended not only link the New Order to the heroic dead who fell in November 1945 but was aimed at connecting the New Order's first martyrs (the dead officers) with this same revolutionary struggle. The Indonesian Revolution could be seen as an ongoing struggle, extending into the New Order period, a struggle whose fallen, killed by un-Indonesian forces (British, Dutch and the PKI), deserved to rest side by side in hallowed ground. Heroic death was always a possibility in the continuous struggle to preserve Indonesia; the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* describes the discovery of the bodies at Halim, their arrival at an army hospital, the burial at Kalibata and the awarding of posthumous honours. Similar descriptions (with photographs) can be found in *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*; the funerals of Nasution's daughter and the two officers slain in Central Java (along with the discovery of the officers' bodies) are also described and pictured.¹⁹⁶ Readers are reminded that the achievement of hero status may come at the cost of being a victim of PKI brutality.

Slaying the Demon: the Birth of the New Order

For the above reasons the PKI is seen as the prime threat to Pancasila and Indonesia itself. Such a threat goes beyond communism. After all, the New Order could have "correct" relations with the Soviet Union, good relations with such regimes as Tito's Yugoslavia, and Ceausescu's Romania and even express some admiration for the revolutionary achievements of Vietnam. Communist China was seen as

¹⁹⁵ Schreiner, "National Ancestors," 198.

¹⁹⁶ Poesponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional*, Vol. 6, 394. *30 Tahun*, 53-59, 71-72.

an enemy because it had such close ties to the PKI rather than because of its own political system. The PKI was seen as an “un-Indonesian,” violent and even demonic force whose sole goal was to achieve political power by any means necessary. The PKI was felt to have transgressed all acceptable norms in fulfilling this ambition. The foundation myth of the New Order is very tied in with the slaying of this demon. A long quote from Notosusanto’s *The Coup Attempt of the “September 30 Movement” in Indonesia* sums up how un-Indonesian the PKI was perceived to be and how the New Order, embodying everything the PKI was not, was conversely seen to be the very essence of Pancasila:

Out of the turmoil resulting from the coup attempt of the “September 30 Movement” emerged a new state of mind, permeating large sections of society. This state of mind is no radical departure from what preceded it. Its essence is the conviction that mutual tolerance and cooperation is indeed the true way of life of the Indonesian people and that any alien ideology contrary to *Pantjasila* should be considered a threat and treated as such. Consequently an ideology which postulates atheism and an unavoidable struggle between groups within society should be considered a threat to the Indonesian way of life and acknowledged as such.

The recent coup attempt was the second time in its existence that the PKI had tried to overthrow the legal government by violent means. It is not at all surprising therefore that the Communist Party of Indonesia, which had espoused such classical Communist beliefs as the inevitability of class struggle in society, that religion is the opium of the people, and the need for the violent overthrow of a non-Communist government, now became regarded as an alien ideology contrary to *Pantjasila*. This popular conviction clashed with that of President Sukarno and other like-minded persons who were of the opinion that the PKI represented a natural NASAKOM structure of Indonesian society and way of life. This difference of opinion did not remain academic but resulted in a clash in policy with regard to the PKI in the aftermath of the October 1, 1965 coup attempt. President Sukarno wanted to maintain the PKI at any cost because it represented one of the main cornerstones of his political thinking. The new state of mind dictated the necessity of removing the PKI from that society which is based on mutual tolerance and cooperation because of its inherent incompatibility with it.

The attitude towards the PKI is not, of course, the only aspect of this new state of mind, but in the connection with the story of the coup attempt of the PKI sponsored “September 30 Movement” it is the

most relevant aspect and therefore should be noted as the dominant note in the political pattern after October 1, 1965.

This new state of mind is called in Indonesia the New Order. Viewed historically, it has found its impetus in the events of October 1, 1965; therefore it is perhaps appropriate to end the story of the coup attempt of the "September 30 Movement" with the emergence of the New Order.¹⁹⁷

The PKI encouraged class and religious conflict within society, whereas the New Order tried to foster harmony in these same areas. The mindset, known as the New Order, had of necessity to remove the PKI from society so as to preserve peace, stability and tolerance, hallmarks of Indonesian identity.

But like many demons, the PKI lurked in the void. Its blood lay on the ground but it might come to life, possibly by taking on new forms; the threat of a resurgent PKI was raised as late as the final years of the New Order. The stubborn PKI foe was seen as having survived previous eradication attempts and the Party was acknowledged to have a very long history. But the battle against chaos and for order and stability undertaken by the New Order was seen to have an even longer history. The suppression of the PKI was felt to be a continuation of the Revolution, safeguarding *merdeka* from those who would put their own (possibly foreign inspired) ideological dreams before the good of Indonesia. In fact, it could even be seen as part of the age-old endeavour to restore Indonesia to the greatness it had once held under the banner of Majapahit. This ancient well-ordered society could be seen as the real ancestor of the New Order, surviving despite the violent, irrational desires of those who wished to tear it down.

¹⁹⁷ Notosusanto, *The Coup Attempt*, 78–79.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORIES IN WAITING—COUNTERVIEWS TO THE NEW ORDER'S VERSION OF THE PAST

The New Order version of the past described in the previous two chapters was questioned not for its veracity but for its general tone and the way it deals with certain specific historical periods and events. This is understandable in that the New Order version of history was not an academic past, but was instead an official, created one. It did draw on real facts and displayed a degree of rigorous analysis, but it was in the end an image whose function was to inspire rather than to educate. For this reason questions regarding its historical accuracy miss the point about why a regime constructs and propagates a particular interpretation of the past: for nation-building, rather than as an exercise in academic inquiry. This version of the past is seen as especially problematic from an Islamic perspective. Since before Independence, many Indonesians have felt that more of an effort should be made to foster an Islamic identity for the nation. It was held that while Indonesians were nominally overwhelmingly Muslim, in actuality they were often lax in carrying out their religious obligations. This was especially the case in regard to matters of state. Although Pancasila made it incumbent on every citizen to profess belief in a single deity it did not specify that even Muslims must be firm in their faith. For many, the conduct of the Indonesian government, whether under Sukarno or Suharto, was indistinguishable from that of a secular regime, and in many ways might even be seen as prejudicial towards Muslim interests. It certainly did not help matters that the history promoted as part of the Independence struggle and the nation-building process glorified such pre-Islamic entities as Srivijaya and Majapahit.

Chapter 4 will examine this more Islamic perspective and describe how it saw the Indonesian past. The various alternative histories created differ in many ways from that favored by the New Order but they really cannot be described as full-scale attacks. No one went as far as bringing into question New Order interpretations as a whole, as this might be construed as an assault on the regime's legitimacy.

Although Indonesia during the Suharto years was certainly not a liberal democracy, neither could it in fairness be described as being run on totalitarian lines. Politics were controlled but perhaps society was not. Newspapers were produced as vehicles for journalism rather than simply propaganda, although there was an array of taboo subjects. Indonesia was not a one-party state, although the rules were set up so that Golkar, the government (as opposed to governing) party would always win general elections. There were two permitted “opposition” parties, which did have an independent existence and were allowed to contest elections, although they were not allowed to openly question the broad outline of government policy. A clear statement that one felt the New Order’s portrait of the past and hence its vision for the future was essentially flawed would not be acceptable. Instead different emphasis is placed on specific aspects of the course of Indonesian history, without dismissing the New Order version in its entirety. Some of the alternative readings of Indonesian history were in fact put forward by individuals or groups who are associated with the regime (for example, academics in state universities and government-sponsored Islamic organizations). As these are unofficial interpretations it should come as no surprise that they are mostly reflected in historical writings as opposed to monuments and textbooks (the latter two media being generally the product of government action).

In the previous chapter it has been seen how the New Order’s version of the G-30-S coup attempt (and to a lesser degree the Revolution) was in some ways a response to specific accounts compiled and promoted by outside scholars. While the New Order would probably have come up with an “official story” in any event and would have used it to define and develop the post-Sukarno nation, the story’s specific shape was clearly inspired by the “Cornell Report.” In reply to assertions to the contrary, the New Order was adamant that the PKI was fully involved in the coup attempt. In a similar manner, Muslim accounts of Indonesia’s past had to respond to specific elements of the New Order narrative. The New Order emphasis on the greatness of the Java-based non-Muslim empire of Majapahit was certainly problematic (Srivijaya, not promoted as extensively by the regime, was less of a concern). Not only was Majapahit, a possible proto-Indonesia, a powerful non-Muslim empire, it was a Javanese one. The coming of Islam might be seen as weakening a natural and desirable Javanese hegemony. Javanese norms, even in regard

to personal behaviour, are consequently seen as Indonesian ones. Muslim kingdoms, which followed the fall of Majapahit in Java and elsewhere, might be viewed as less impressive in terms of power and prestige. If Majapahit represented Indonesia's "Golden Age," then such entities as Mataram, Aceh and Makassar could be construed as existing during or even, in a sense, bringing on a "Dark Age." It might even be argued that these kingdoms, if not the arrival of Islam itself, in fact weakened Indonesia and allowed colonial penetration. Also, the glorification of Majapahit and the notion that Indonesian history in a sense began with Java and Hinduism would in some sense cut off Indonesia from full membership in the larger Islamic *ummat*. Indonesian Muslim scholars were particularly concerned with the quickness with which many of their more nationalist colleagues (following the Western example) dismissed the possibility that Islam arrived in the Archipelago relatively early and directly from the Arab world.

In response Indonesian Muslims offered a version of the past which stressed long connections with the Muslim heartland, the Middle East. Islam had been directly brought to Indonesia by Arabs rather than through Persian or Indian intermediaries. The conversion of local people and the emergence of Muslim communities had occurred within the first Islamic century (the seventh to eighth centuries AD). The establishment of kingdoms with "an Islamic character" soon followed. Most of this early Islamic activity took place, not in Java, but in North Sumatra. Powerful Islamic kingdoms later were founded in the rest of Sumatra, in Java and throughout much of the Archipelago. Politics in the Palembang region and in Central and East Java could be seen as descendants of Srivijaya and Majapahit, but such non-Muslim empires were not viewed as a centerpiece of Indonesian identity as they were for the New Order; Islamic kingdoms were just as important in the creation and preservation of Indonesia. From the perspective of a more "*ummat*-oriented" Indonesia, firmly part of the Muslim world, the arrival of Islam in present-day Aceh, rather than the *palapa* oath of Gajah Mada, might be viewed as the most important event in the nation's history.

Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia and Muslim Scholarship

Muslim sources address many of these concerns, but always in a rather constrained context. During the New Order, acceptance of the legitimacy of the regime was a given. In 1985 all groups, regardless of religion, were legally required to accept the government's interpretation of Pancasila as their "sole basis" (*azas tunggal*). Acceptance of the New Order's good judgment in regards to ideological, economic and political matters was assumed to apply to matters of history, at least in terms of official history (academic works, read by a small minority many of whom would be foreigners, were a different matter). One of the most important Muslim comments on the history of Indonesia and the New Order's interpretation of it was the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* (The History of the Indonesian Islamic Community) put out by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Ulama or MUI).¹ The MUI was founded in 1975 at the urging of the Suharto regime, with famed *ulama* Hamka as its first leader. The group was intended as a means by which Muslim political aspirations could be safely channelled towards the meeting of New Order objectives. It was hoped that the MUI would offer assistance in matters of national security, religious tolerance and the government's overall development strategy. Some observers have in fact questioned the group's independence.² But it would probably be a mistake to see the body as simply an arm of the government. It is true that the MUI was to a large degree under regime supervision and any clear anti-regime statements or actions would probably not be tolerated. But during the New Order this was to be expected, alternative viewpoints had to be presented in such a way that the basic pillars of government policy were not openly questioned, never mind attacked. But within these parameters there might be considerable room to manoeuvre. Thus a version of history could be offered that was in many ways contradictory to that of the New Order. The key was not to openly state that it was in contradiction. Also, support of the regime need not imply celebration of all government initiatives (such as the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*) nor preclude the initiation

¹ *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* (The History of the Islamic Community of Indonesia), ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1992).

² See Donald J. Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 78–90.

of all independent projects. Such a project was the *Sejarah Umat Islam Indonesia*; the book was a response to the “standard text” of Indonesian history (as the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* has been described). It offered a more Islamic oriented history of Indonesia, but not an overt refutation of the work of Nugroho Notosusanto and the Majapahit-centric views of Muhammad Yamin, Sukarno and Suharto himself.

The MUI had wished to put out a book on the history of Indonesia since 1977; a series of seminars and meetings, involving both eminent Indonesian historians and a special committee of MUI members lasted from 1980 until 1986 when the actual writing began. Although such figures as Uka Tjandrasmita (an expert on the early history and archaeology of Islam in Indonesia) and Bung Tomo (the revolutionary hero of Surabaya) were involved in the early stages of the project, the final writing team consisted of Taufik Abdullah, Hasan Muarif Ambary, Kuntowijoyo, Ahmad Manshur Surya Negara, Mohammed Hisyam and Ahmad Adabi Darban. Taufik Abdullah acted as the book’s editor.³ Significantly, *ulama*, traditional Islamic religious scholars, were not involved in the actual writing of the book. The book seems to have been intended to stand as an example of Western-style scholarship, like the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. It includes citations of both Western and Indonesian sources. It is written using a Western social-science methodology and many of its authors have had Western academic training or in fact attended Western universities. The book’s authors could be included in Federpiel’s “Muslim Intellectuals,” a group of about one to two hundred figures who were heavily involved in the discourse regarding the place of Islam in Indonesian society during the late New Order. In fact two of the authors, Taufik Abdullah and Kuntowijoyo, are specifically discussed by Federpiel.⁴ These “Muslim intellectuals” were not the same as the *ulama*. The latter tended to have a deeper understanding of traditional Islamic knowledge and a much more limited familiarity with Western methodologies. Although many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals described the *ulama* as a “national treasure,” they also felt that they were often “out of touch” with contemporary Indonesian needs. And while many traditional religious scholars took pride in the achievements of the younger generation

³ *Sejarah Ummat*, 16–17.

⁴ Federpiel, *Indonesia in Transition*, 9.

of intellectuals, they were often taken back by their audacity in questioning accepted wisdom.⁵

However, the MUI felt confident enough in Indonesia's Western-trained academics to ask them to work on this important project. Although many of these scholars have had Western training and could not be classified as *ulama*, as committed Indonesian Muslims picked by the MUI they could be expected to share the aims of the latter group in publishing the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia*. According to the MUI's General Secretary Prodjokusomo the book would "be able to clarify the history of the Islamic Community of Indonesia in the framework of national history" and would remind Indonesian Muslims of the sacrifices of their predecessors and that they in turn should be willing to struggle in order to preserve the nation and the state on the basis of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and "the glory of religion within the homeland."⁶ The MUI's Chairman, Hasan Basri, offered similar sentiments on the importance of history to present-day Indonesia:

From this history we are permitted to draw examples which will be instructive to our present and future lives. With this awareness of history, we are thoroughly thankful and above all full of respect for our predecessors who spread Islam throughout the land of Nusantara, who struggled and sacrificed themselves, preserving and realizing the freedom of the united state of the Republic of Indonesia whose territory stretches from Sabang to Merauke, for the sake of its development.⁷

Here the importance of the arrival of Islam is mixed with the nationalist rhetoric of sacrifice on behalf of a unified Nusantara from Aceh to Irian Jaya. The writers of the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* intended a book, "about Islam in Indonesia covering the history of its arrival, the struggle of its *ulama*, leaders and heroes, as well as all its other aspects."⁸ The authors also stressed that there need not be any conflict between membership in the *ummat* and being an Indonesian citizen and that Pancasila, far from being a mere ideological formulation, was in fact something that had long been struggled for and was and would be a basis for Indonesians now as it had been in the past.⁹

⁵ *Ibid.*, 11–12.

⁶ *Sejarah Ummat*, iii.

⁷ *Ibid.*, xii.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

Similarly, perhaps Islam might be seen as equally part of an historic Indonesian identity.

This book could be described as an “official history in waiting” reflecting a view of history, which, if only by implication, might be seen by many Indonesian Muslims as superior to that outlined in the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (although it should be noted that Hasan Muarif Ambary worked on both projects). Like the latter work, it could also be described as a textbook; although not used in state schools, it had the blessing of the Minister of Religion, was presented in a special ceremony to President Suharto and was to be distributed to *pesantren* and *madrasah* (Islamic schools).¹⁰ The title of the work could be of some significance; noted Islamic scholar (and first chairman of the MUI) Hamka wrote a book called *Sedjarah Umat Islam* (History of the Muslim Community). In putting out their book the MUI might be following a long tradition of historical analysis on the part of the Indonesian Muslim community that in fact preceded the advent of the New Order. As noted above, the New Order’s Majapahit stretches back to the Dutch discovery and interpretation of the *Nagarakertagama* through Sukarno and Yamin. The Muslim equivalent of the Yamin, who synthesized and popularized a nationalist version of the past, was Hamka; the two are explicitly equated, compared and contrasted in an article by the contemporary Indonesian Muslim scholar Deliar Noer.¹¹

Islam Comes to Indonesia

The alternative version of Indonesian history offered, from within the constraints of the New Order, emphasizes the early arrival of Islam and connections to the global Islamic community. The question of when Islam arrived in Indonesia is very much related to questions about how Islamic Indonesia’s historical development has been. An early arrival of the religion, through trade or missionary activity, would tend to downplay the significance of Srivijaya and Majapahit and might make the profession of the Islamic faith a

¹⁰ Darul Aqsha, Dick van der Meij and Johan Hendrik Meuleman, *Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events and Developments from 1988 to March 1993* (Jakarta: Indonesia-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INES), 1995), 408.

¹¹ Noer, “Yamin and Hamka.”

major part of a later Indonesian identity. According to the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia*, colonies of Arabs may have been present in western Sumatra as early as 674 AD and adherents of Islam may have been present in the region at the very beginning of the time in which the religion was taking shape. Arab traders were present in the sea-lanes of Southeast Asia during this early period although there is as yet no evidence of local conversions.¹² Islamic polities may have been established as early as 840 AD; the Sultan of Perlak (in Aceh), according to manuscripts which list the lineage of the kingdom's rulers, was a Muslim. The *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* does not go into any detail about the nature of these manuscripts. But it warns that they should be used with caution and notes that if they were valid they would force a thorough rewriting of the early history of Islam in Indonesia. It is more likely that before Islamic kingdoms emerged, a second stage in the spread of the religion in the area occurred involving the establishment by traders and preachers of Muslim communities. This took place during the hegemony of Srivijaya and later that of Hindu Java. This was a slow process and although local customs were not pushed aside, the more egalitarian outlook of Islam introduced by foreign traders was attractive to many dissatisfied with the hierarchical world view of Javanese-Hindu society.¹³

The third phase of Islam's spread in Indonesia involved the establishment of Islamic kingdoms. For this period the sources are much clearer. The initial contact of Indonesia with the world of Islam is sketchily documented in Chinese and Arab sources, written by outsiders who usually did not visit Southeast Asia. The existence of Muslim communities in the Indonesian Archipelago is notable for more intensive documentation, including gravestones. For the final phase the sources are more varied and trustworthy and include Western sources in Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish and French as well as traditional local historiography. With the rise of Islamic kingdoms the spread of religion could not be separated from the political developments. As the power of Majapahit declined because of internal conflicts various local Islamic power centers emerged. Of particular note was Malacca, which aimed to follow in the tradition of Srivijaya-Palembang as a focus of trade.¹⁴ Malacca was also a nexus of religious

¹² *Sejarah Ummat*, 34–35.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 37–38.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 39–40.

developments attracting Muslim traders and preachers who then fanned out across the region. The process was encouraged by Malacca's economic and political prowess; other parts of the Archipelago were attracted to the cosmopolitan, Islamic milieu of the city. In fact many centers adopted the Malay style of Islamic state as their own. Like Malacca, ports in northern Java became involved with the spice trade with the Moluccas. The rise of Malacca marks the beginning of the modern period for the region. It also marks the beginning of the Western Age of Exploration, inspired by a desire for spices, the spirit of adventure and a wish to carry out the "War of the Cross." This economic and political struggle was marked by the 1511 capture by the Portuguese of Malacca.¹⁵ This heralds the start of the colonial period for the Archipelago but it was also a milestone in the history of the spread of Islam; new Islamic centers emerged and grew powerful. While during the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries various adjustments had to be made to meet the challenge of the West and various crises had to be endured, Islam continued to spread geographically. Institutions emerged and a distinctive Islamic culture developed. A cultural framework for the spirit of Islam was constructed involving the currents of trade, the activities of preachers and the Malay language. The impact of colonialism only confirmed this Islamic culture.¹⁶

The description of the arrival of Islam and the rise of Islamic kingdoms in Indonesia offered by the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* stands out from most Western and New Order accounts of these historical trends in several ways. The possibility of an early arrival of Arab adherents of Islam is entertained. Note is even made of the establishment of the Sultanate of Perlak in 840 AD, although it is admitted that early Arab contacts are still a matter of debate. Like many accounts of early Southeast Asian history the arrival of Islam is assumed to have some connection to the activities of foreign traders and missionaries.¹⁷ But what is probably most interesting about the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* is what it leaves out or downplays in its picture of Indonesian history. It briefly notes the very early (c. 100 AD) trade in bronze kettledrums across Southeast Asia and

¹⁵ Ibid., 41.

¹⁶ Ibid., 42–43.

¹⁷ See Anthony Reid, "The Islamization of Southeast Asia," in *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1999), 15–17.

does refer in a few places to both Srivijaya and Majapahit.¹⁸ But the later two pre-Islamic entities are neither analyzed nor glorified. Instead they seem to be seen as simply predecessors of subsequent Islamic states; Malacca is described as following in the path of Srivijaya-Palembang. Similarly, Majapahit's collapse, due to internal problems, paves the way for the increased economic hegemony of Malacca and the Islamic states of the north coast of Java.¹⁹ But neither Srivijaya nor Majapahit is defamed, beyond a comment that Hindu-Javanese society was rather obsessed with rank. The two polities are simply not emphasized and certainly neither is seen as some form of "proto-Indonesia."²⁰

Of course, the title *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* translates as "The History of the Islamic Community of Indonesia." It does not claim to be a history of Indonesia as a whole. Or does it? The implication might be drawn that Indonesian history in fact begins with the arrival of Islam. The word Nusantara (capitalized as a proper name) is used by the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* to refer to the Indonesian archipelago but it is not indicative of "Greater Java" as the term might have been used by Yamin. Great attention is paid to Malacca, which was not even within present-day Indonesia.²¹ Connections are also made with what happens in the wider Islamic world. Reference is made to the fall of the 'Abbasid capital of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258. But no description is given of the early years of the Islamic community as a whole (i.e. the life of Muhammad, the early Caliphates and the various medieval dynasties). What seems more important is the rise of various Islamic states (in particular Malacca) which in turn foster a unique Malay-Islamic culture (which was the foundation of a later Indonesian one?). In describing the emergence of Islamic/Malay/Indonesian culture in the years leading up to the arrival of European colonialists the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* draws on a variety of sources, although interestingly enough no primary ones. Secondary sources include ones written by Europeans (van Leur), Malaysians (Fatimi) and Indonesians (seminars held in Medan and Aceh).²²

¹⁸ *Sejarah Ummat*, 33.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 40–43.

²² *Ibid.*, 44–47. See O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (Bandung: Sumur

Hamka and Roeslan Abdulgani

That Islam arrived in Indonesia at an early date is an opinion that has long been held by Indonesian Muslim scholars starting with Hamka (full name Dr. H.A. Malik Karim Amrullah), a prominent *ulama* and writer, who acted as a counterpart to the more secular-nationalist Yamin. Born in the Minangkabau region of Sumatra in 1908, Hamka had a long and distinguished career, producing an astonishing literary output including works of Quranic exegesis and history.²³ Of particular interest is his *Sedjarah Umat Islam*, a four-volume work published between 1952 and 1961. As its title implies it is a history of the world Muslim community. Islam of course emerged in the Arab Middle East (*tanah Arab*, the Arab lands) and Hamka begins his history with a description of the area's geography, modern political divisions, natural resources, inhabitants and pre-Islamic history.²⁴ He then outlines the life of the Prophet Muhammad.²⁵ In the second and third volumes of his study Hamka describes all the major Islamic entities in the Middle East, Iran, India, Central Asia and elsewhere, from the Umayyads to the Ottomans.²⁶ The only reference to Indonesia in the first three volumes is a reference to Srivijaya in a description of the world (along with Rome, Judaism, Persia and India) in the period leading up to the life of Muhammad. Srivijaya is shown as facilitating the arrival of Islam in Indonesia through the fostering of trade, but it is not described in any detail.²⁷ It is certainly not given a great deal of attention or praise. The fourth volume is devoted to Indonesia itself with some discussion of prehistory and the early Hindu and Buddhist states, with some pride apparently taken in the antiquity of these ancient kingdoms. Majapahit is noted as an extensive kingdom with Gajah Mada as its most notable leader. But just over a page is devoted to describing the Java-centered empire which inspired multiple volumes on the part

Bandung, 1960); S.Q. Fatimi *Islam Comes to Malaysia* (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1963); A. Hasymy, ed., *Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam in Indonesia* (The History of the Entrance and Growth of Islam in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Almaarif, 1993).

²³ See Noer, "Yamin and Hamka."

²⁴ Hamka, *Sedjarah Umat Islam* (The History of the Islamic Community) 4 Vols. (Jakarta: N.V. Nusantara, 1961), 1-79.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 80-182.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 2 and Vol. 3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 90.

of Muhammad Yamin. Stress is put on the fact that the first Islamic polity (Pasai-Samudra) emerged in the archipelago at almost the same time that Majapahit came into existence (Kartaradjasa was the first king of Majapahit (1292–1309), while 1297 saw an Islamic ruler, al-Malik ash-Shaleh, in Pasai).²⁸ While Hamka does not explicitly portray the glorification of Majapahit as a Western construct, he does list the accomplishments of Western scholars in discovering and studying ancient texts and inscriptions. Such works as the *Pararaton*, the *Nagarakertagama* and the *Sejarah Melayu* have been extensively studied. Ruins such as Borobudur and Prambanan as well as individuals such as Gajah Mada have been retrieved from the realm of myth and legend to be examined by modern science. According to Hamka, modern research has shown the extent of Hindu and Buddhist influence throughout the Archipelago; Hinduism arrived centuries before the birth of Muhammad and was present in the region for about twelve centuries. But then this influence was replaced by Islam; the population numbers show that Indonesia is presently overwhelmingly Muslim despite such long Hindu presence and also despite the efforts of the Dutch to spread Christianity.²⁹ In noting that Hindu influence was replaced by Islam (as well as noting an Islamic ruler at Pasai), Hamka uses exclamation marks.

Hamka was very interested in the arrival of Islam in Indonesia; an area which he notes is very far from the Islamic heartland of the Middle East. He also notes that Islam did not arrive in the Archipelago as part of a process of conquest as was the case elsewhere.³⁰ Hamka was particularly interested in when Islam arrived and whether it arrived “second-hand” or directly from the Arabs.³¹ He feels that Islam came to Java around 675 AD through the actions of Arabs who were traveling to China. They noticed that Hindu influence was strong at the time and subsequently returned to the Malay lands to spread Islam. Their mission involved a peaceful announcement of the Islamic message rather than the use of force, which was forbidden by Islamic practice. By 684 AD there was a colony of Arabs in West Sumatra.³² Hamka bases his reconstruction on Chinese

²⁸ Ibid., Vol. 4, 9–12.

²⁹ Ibid., Vol. 4, 13–14.

³⁰ Ibid., Vol. 4, 15.

³¹ Ibid., Vol. 4, 19.

³² Ibid., Vol. 4, 26.

records; he equates the Ta-Chih (Ta-Shih) with the Arabs and notes their presence in the area during the seventh century.³³ Hamka does not describe these early Arab contacts in any detail; instead he tries to describe how Islam spread through the centuries to various parts of the Archipelago, culminating in the actions of various Muslim figures in the twentieth century Independence struggle.³⁴ He describes Pasai-Samudra as the first Islamic kingdom in Indonesia (the grave-stone of its ruler al-Malik al-Shah dates to 692 AH/1297 AD) as well as the activities of the *wali songo* in spreading Islam in Java.³⁵ This is not out of line with the description of Islam's arrival offered by many Western scholars.³⁶ But in emphasizing the possibility that Islam may have been originally brought to Indonesia by Arabs soon after the death of Muhammad himself, Hamka might be stressing that Indonesia had long been part of the world Islamic community. Indonesian history could be seen as having an Islamic history rather than a Javanese one. Indonesian history was part of a larger history and a larger identity.

Hamka further distances this Islamic history for Indonesia from that of Hindu-Buddhist Java by questioning the benevolence and patriotism of Majapahit. He notes that Java's Hindu rulers were more worried about the rapid development of the Eastern religion of Islam than about the actions of the Western Christian colonizers. Messages asking for help against the advance of Islamic Demak were sent to Portuguese Malacca in 1511 and in 1522 the ruler of Pajajaran (in West Java) allowed the Portuguese passage on their way to attack Sunda Kelapa (now Jakarta).³⁷ He describes the conflict between the Islamic kingdom of Demak and the Hindu empire of Majapahit as a political rather than religious in nature. Although Demak did attack Majapahit, Islam was not spread by force; Demak fought to maintain its freedom and its freedom of religion.³⁸ In fact Islam, since its early arrival, became part of an existing Indonesian identity; Hamka notes that in conquering Majapahit, Demak took over the regalia of the former empire. Subsequently Islam strengthened Indonesia rather

³³ Ibid., Vol. 4, 17.

³⁴ Ibid., Vol. 4, 42–46.

³⁵ Ibid., Vol. 4, 48, 88–96. AH refers to *Anno Hijrae*, the Islamic era which began with the emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD.

³⁶ See for example Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Chapter 1.

³⁷ Hamka, *Sedjarah Umat*, Vol. 4, 105.

³⁸ Ibid., Vol. 4, 104–105.

than weakening it in the face of the challenge of Western colonialism.³⁹ He notes the actions of such Islamic rulers as Sultan Agung and Iskandar Muda describing them as *pahlawan*. Although the term had a nationalist meaning, these heroes could not be described as nationalist simply because the concept of nationalism was not yet in existence. These *pahlawan* were motivated by the spirit of Islam, but the fact that they also fought for their nation is also evident.⁴⁰

It was noted earlier that Hamka could be considered a counterpart to the nationalist historian Muhammad Yamin and that in many ways the two writers had very different interpretations of the Indonesian past. Although they attached very different importance to the coming of Islam and to Majapahit, their relationship was not a hostile one and a meeting between the two on Yamin's deathbed points to an attempt to reconcile their points of view. Deliar Noer sees this meeting as an acknowledgment that both an Islamic and a nationalist perspective were important to understanding Indonesia's history. Sukarno-era politician Roeslan Abdulgani was long a Yamin associate. He was Secretary-General of the Ministry of Information (1947–1954), Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (from 1954) and Secretary General of the Bandung Conference (April 1955), before becoming foreign minister in 1956–1957. From 1957 onward he was instrumental in helping Sukarno formulate and propagate the concepts of Guided Democracy. In doing so he firmly placed Pancasila at the heart of, and specifically rejected Islam as a sufficient basis for, an Indonesian identity. In response to a 1955 call by President Sukarno to be loyal to Pancasila, Abdulgani equates loyalty to Pancasila to loyalty to the Proclamation, to the Revolution and to the sacrifices made by the Indonesian freedom fighters resting in the nation's cemeteries.⁴¹ In a 1957 address given to Indonesia's Constituent Assembly, he described Pancasila as “the answer” and as “inspiring our Revolution.”⁴² In contrast Islam is viewed with at least some suspicion; in a 1955 speech he attacked the “Kartosuwirjo Islamic State” as a “challenge to Pantjasila” and as in “contravention to modern standards.”⁴³ In his 1957 speech Abdulgani found

³⁹ Ibid., Vol. 4, 174.

⁴⁰ Ibid., Vol. 4, 191.

⁴¹ Roeslan Abdulgani, *Pantjasila: The Prime Mover of the Indonesian Revolution* (Jakarta: Prapantja, n.d.), 55–56.

⁴² Ibid., 72.

⁴³ Ibid., 41. Kartosuwiryo was an Indonesian Islamic activist and guerrilla leader.

Islam wanting as a guide for the nation as it still allowed for a monarchical system, it implied one religion was more important than another and its practical implementation had not been thoroughly worked out.⁴⁴

Years later, under the New Order, Roeslan Abdulgani moved closer to an Islamic perspective; according to Howard Federspiel, he even fancied himself a “Muslim scholar.”⁴⁵ In fact his views mirrored those of Hamka in regard to the historical importance of the arrival of Islam in Indonesia. Abdulgani felt that “Islam came to Nusantara bearing civilization [or progress].”⁴⁶ He refers to a general consensus in both the East and the West that emergence of Islam involved the emergence of a “new world, with new thinking, new ideas as well as a new culture and a new civilization.”⁴⁷ In regard to the question as to when Islam first arrived in Indonesia, Abdulgani leans towards an early transmission directly from the Arabian Peninsula.⁴⁸ Islam did not come to Indonesia in a cultural vacuum; the problem of Islam’s arrival involved an “encounter of civilizations”; powerful civilizations were already developing in Nusantara and the Islam which arrived in the Archipelago had already developed a theology and “worldly teachings.”⁴⁹ Islam was not spread by force and was attractive to local trading communities who were thus tied into a larger international community. Islam was a spiritual and socially liberating force, although old-style feudalism did not disappear.⁵⁰ This process of the spread of Islam was interrupted by Western colonialism, political and economic transformations as well as the coming of the Christian religion.⁵¹

According to Abdulgani, this was in fact an interruption of history, Indonesia was forced from its historic path of development and the process of *dakwah*, which was taking place in the centers of a Hindu-Buddhist agricultural society, was slowed down. Islam was just

His movement, the Darul Islam, fought both the Dutch and later the Republic of Indonesia, until he was captured and executed in April 1962.

⁴⁴ Abdulgani, *Pantjasila*, 63.

⁴⁵ Howard M. Federspiel, e-mail communication January 11, 2001. Cf. Mintz, *Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen*, 128–129, 186–187, 196–197.

⁴⁶ Roeslan Abdulgani, *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Indonesia* (The History of the Development of Islam in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Kota, 1983), 7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 26–27.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

taking root throughout Indonesia, but it had to meet the challenge of Dutch colonialism by means of war and rebellion. The Aceh War, the longest and most intense rebellion, marked the end of the armed struggle. In the twentieth century came the challenges of various “two-faced” Dutch policies, alternatively flattering and harsh. The cruel period of the Japanese occupation provided numerous opportunities to end the “historic interruption” and “launch the development of our history in the free manner of before, as a continuation of 350 years ago, when we were still free and were not yet colonized.”⁵² During the “historic interruption” of Dutch colonialism, the presence of Islam was very important. It brought a very progressive religious view and a new way of life which constituted a “liberating force,” which replaced the feudal and caste-based society of that time.⁵³ In fact, in Abdulgani’s analysis:

Islam helped foster the spirit of patriotism and the nationalism of Indonesia, as well as fostering the development of “religiosity” as well as modern social-political feelings, like an understanding of democracy and socialism. Respecting the Proclamation of Independence, Islam follows in giving birth to the ideology and basis of the state: Pancasila.⁵⁴

Abdulgani had questioned the compatibility of Islam and Pancasila. But here he seems to indicate that Islam and Pancasila need not be mutually exclusive factors in motivating Indonesians. In fact, Islam may even, over the course of its long presence in the Archipelago, have provided the basis for the Indonesian national ideology. As a lieutenant of Yamin, who had never totally rejected the views of his mentor, Abdulgani in his later writings shows how a more Islam-oriented view of the Indonesian past could be fostered within a New Order framework of “development” and a reverence for Pancasila.

The Medan, Aceh and Palembang Seminars

The views of Hamka and Abdulgani were echoed in a series of seminars on the entrance and development of Islam in Indonesia. Professor A. Hasymy’s book, *Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Indonesia* (The History of the Entrance and Rise of Islam in Indonesia), consists

⁵² Ibid., 48.

⁵³ Ibid., 49.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 49.

of the proceedings of a 1980 seminar held in Aceh and summaries of two earlier seminars held in 1963 (in Medan) and 1978 (also in Aceh). Contributors to the 1980 conference include Hamka, Hasan Muarif Ambary, Roeslan Abdulgani and Uka Tjandrasasmita. Another seminar was held at Palembang in 1984.⁵⁵ Ambary was of course one of the contributors to the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* and to the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*; he later composed an important book on the Islamic archaeology of Indonesia.⁵⁶ Uka Tjandrasasmita is one of Indonesia's leading archaeologists, whose views on the coming of Islam to Indonesia can be found summarized in an article in *Dynamics of Indonesian History*; like Ambary he was also involved in the production of the third volume of the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*.⁵⁷ In his introduction to the proceedings of the 1980 seminar, Hasymy notes the importance of research into the arrival of Islam in Indonesia; in a country where the vast majority of the population are Muslims, Indonesians still do not possess a comprehensive book about the history of Islam. There are many books about the subject but they are based on documents of the colonizers and were written by Orientalists who are in general tools of colonialism. The first seminar to rectify these problems took place in March 1963 in Medan; participants included A.H. Nasution and Hamka.⁵⁸ This initial seminar produced a set of conclusions that have been very influential in shaping the views of many more Islamic-oriented Indonesian scholars. In fact, these conclusions have been repeated in the conclusions of all of the subsequent seminars and have been specifically referred to by many historians. The 1963 seminar concluded that, as far as available sources can tell, Islam initially arrived in Indonesia in the seventh century AD directly from the Arab world. The district that first encountered Islam was the north-east coast of Sumatra. An Islamic society emerged in the region; the first Islamic *raja* ruled over Aceh. Although Islam was brought to the Archipelago by foreigners, Indonesians actively took part in the Islamization process. Islamic

⁵⁵ K.H.O. Gadjahnata and Sri Swasono, *Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Sumatera Selatan* (The Entrance and Growth of Islam in South Sumatra) (Jakarta: University of Indonesia, 1986).

⁵⁶ Hasan Muarif Ambary, *Menemukan Peradaban: Jejak Arkeologis dan Historis Islam Indonesia* (Discovering Culture: The Archaeological and Historical Trail of Islam in Indonesia), ed. Jajat Burhanuddin (Jakarta: Logos, 1998).

⁵⁷ Uka Tjandrasasmita, "The Introduction of Islam," 141–160.

⁵⁸ Hasymy, *Sejarah Masuk*, 5.

preachers who spread the religion also acted as large-scale merchants. Islam was promulgated throughout Indonesia by peaceful means, bringing a culture and a civilization that critically shaped the personality of the Indonesian people.⁵⁹

The 1978 Aceh seminar reached similar conclusions, although it was admitted that there were still many matters that had to be resolved. Islam arrived in Aceh on the Sumatran coast within a century after the death of Muhammad; the first Islamic kingdoms were Perlak, Lamuri and Pasai. These early Islamic kingdoms emerged within a trading milieu; commerce had developed in the area since the first century AD because of its strategic location across international trade routes, although agriculture, fishing and animal husbandry were also practiced in the region. Islam developed rapidly in Pasai until the kingdom became one of the most important centers of Islamic scholarship in Southeast Asia. The basis of the government of the kingdoms of Perlak, Pasai and Aceh was Islam (both Perlak and Pasai are located within the present-day Special District of Aceh; here Aceh refers to the subsequent kingdom of Aceh, which encompassed much of northern Sumatra). The administrative structures and systems and the customs which developed in Aceh after the arrival of Islam were in line with the culture and teachings of Islam and in turn the customs of Aceh supported the implementation of the teachings of Islam. It is difficult to distinguish between the customs of Aceh and Islamic law. The seminar also notes the wealth and high level of civilization of Aceh and connects this to the arrival of Islam. Also noted is the importance women held in Acehnese Islamic society as government officials, notables and warriors.⁶⁰

The 1980 Aceh seminar clarified the conclusions of the earlier 1963 and 1978 seminars; Islam entered Nusantara directly from the Arab lands in the first century of the Islamic calendar (seventh century AD). The seminar also was of the opinion that the region that first received Islam was present-day Aceh. The entrance and development of Islam in the Archipelago was a lengthy process; it is necessary to distinguish the arrival of Islam from the subsequent emergence of Islamic kingdoms. Based on an analysis of Malay manuscripts it appears that the first Islamic kingdom of Perlak was founded in the

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 12–14.

ninth century AD. Perlak was also mentioned in the writings of Marco Polo. The area became a center for the spread of Islam throughout Nusantara; people came to study Islam in Aceh, while *ulama* were dispatched from Aceh itself to other regions. The 1980 seminar concluded that Islam brought to Indonesia a high and progressive civilization. Islam even helped to form and build Indonesian nationalism, especially as it was able to inspire the spirit of *jihad* so that there emerged throughout Indonesia a struggle for freedom from colonialism (*jihad* here probably refers to self-sacrifice for a cause that would benefit the whole Indonesian community, Muslim and non-Muslim alike). The presence of Islam in such Indonesian societies as Aceh allowed for a vigorous defence against foreign colonizers. The Islamic kingdoms of *nusantara* disintegrated under the pressure of the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English, but in Aceh the struggle continued even after the capture of the last Sultan Mohammad Daud Syah until the time of the Japanese invasion. The seminar was of the opinion that Islam, as shown in the actions of the people of Aceh, “played a role in forming the personality of Indonesians, whose way of life is Pancasila.”⁶¹

In a separate article included in the seminar, Hasymy reiterates the findings of the 1963 and 1980 seminars: that Islam first came to the coast of Sumatra and that after the creation of Islamic societies; Aceh became the first Islamic kingdom.⁶² Hasymy endeavours to reconstruct the emergence of Islamic kingdoms in Sumatra from Malay manuscripts, in contrast to earlier attempts by Western Christian scholars that had relied on manuscripts that they themselves had found in Indonesia and to some extent on the accounts of Arab travelers. Among the manuscripts that guided his investigation is a genealogy of the rulers of Perlak and Pasai written by Saiyid Abdullah Ibn Saiyid Habib Saifuddin. This document claims that the first Islamic kingdom in Perlak was established at the end of the third Islamic century (the middle of the ninth century AD).⁶³ Another contributor to the seminar goes further in stressing the early arrival of Islam and the development of Islamic kingdoms. Husein Azimi

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 52–53.

⁶² A. Hasymy, “Adakah Kerajaan Islam Perlak Negara Islam Pertama di Asia Tenggara (Was the Islamic Kingdom of Perlak the First Islamic State in Southeast Asia?),” in *Sejarah Masuk*, 143.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 144.

speculates that Islam may have arrived in the Malay Peninsula as early as 630 AD with Arab traders. The kingdom of Ta-Shih located in the Archipelago was in diplomatic contact with China between 630 and 655 AD.⁶⁴ During this time *dakwah* (Islamic preaching) came to the area through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea from the Arab world.⁶⁵

Uka Tjandrasasmita also offered an analysis of the presence of the rather mysterious Ta-Shih in Southeast Asia; Chinese sources from the Tang Dynasty mention that the people of Ta-Shih planned to attack the kingdom of Ho-Ling (Java) around 674 AD. Japanese sources from the eighth century and further Chinese sources from twelfth century mention colonies of Ta-Shih in Southeast Asia. Based on such reports some experts believe that in the seventh century AD Muslims (the Ta-Shih) of Arab origin arrived in Indonesia and settled in Sumatra or the Malay Peninsula. Scholars such as W.P. Groeneveldt and Paul Wheatley and Rita Rose di Meglio all agree that the Ta-Shih were an Arab (or Arab-Persian) group, rather than an Indian one. Mention is also made of another early group, the Po-sse, who may have been native Malay Muslims. The Orientalist T.W. Arnold, the Malaysian scholar Syed Naguib al-Attas and Hamka all agree that an early arrival was likely. But other experts, such as the Orientalists J.P. Moquette, C. Snouck Hurgronje and R.A. Kern, feel that Islam only came to Indonesia in the thirteenth century AD from Gujarat rather than directly from the Arab world. According to Tjandrasasmita, the weakness of the latter opinion is that it is well known that traders have passed through the Straits of Malacca to West Sumatra many centuries before this and Muslim traders were evidently present in the ports of China at an early date.⁶⁶ Also, proponents of a late arrival ignore the writings of various Arab geographers and the eleventh century gravestone of Fatimah bint Marimum found in Leran (Gresik); whether or not this was evidence of a Muslim kingdom, Islam had arrived in Java by this date.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Husein Azimi, "Islam di Aceh Masuk dan Berkembangnya Hingga Abad XVI (The Entrance and Growth of Islam in Aceh up to the 16th Century)," in *Sejarah Masuk*, 179.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁶⁶ Uka Tjandrasasmita, "Proses Kedatangan Islam and Munculnya Kerajaan-Kerajaan Islam di Aceh (The Process of the Arrival of Islam and the Emergence of Islamic Kingdoms in Aceh)," in *Sejarah Masuk*, 357–358.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 359.

Tjandrasasmita does not dismiss all the evidence compiled to support the theory of a thirteenth century arrival of Islam in Indonesia. In fact his description of how Islamic kingdoms were founded in the coastal regions of Sumatra and Java in many ways follows that put forward by many Western scholars; note is made of the gravestone of Sultan Malik al-Shah, the accounts of Marco Polo, the *Sejarah Melayu* and the importance of economic factors in the spread of Islam. He seems to acknowledge that although the early arrival of Muslims in Southeast Asia has been ignored, evidence for it remains sketchy. Instead he concentrates on how Islamic polities developed in North Sumatra. This development is most visible after the thirteenth century as a variety of Malay and foreign sources became available. This stage can be distinguished from the earlier period of Islam's arrival in the region and identified as one in which Islamic states and societies were formed. Aceh can be seen as the most important location during both of these stages.⁶⁸ Tjandrasasmita sees this contribution by Aceh to the growth of Islam in Indonesia as contributing to the eventual success of the larger struggle against colonialism. He hopes to eventually see the publication of a book specifically on the history of Aceh that can be used to educate within "the framework of building the unity of the people, the spirit of the people and of national endurance within the state of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on Pancasila."⁶⁹

This emphasis on the importance of Aceh for the Islamization of Indonesia as whole can also be seen in an article contributed by Hamka to the seminar. He describes how one of the *wali songo* before bringing Islam to Java had stopped in Pasai and that there were also, according to the *Sejarah Melayu*, connections between the latter port and Malacca.⁷⁰ Hasan Muarif Ambary also focuses on the importance of North Sumatra for the origins of Islam in Indonesia. Using archaeological and textual sources, he attempts to reconstruct the history of Perlak, a coastal port close to Pasai. Although not a great deal of work has been done in the region, the available evidence points to an early Islamic presence.⁷¹ The *Kitab id harul Haq* by Abu

⁶⁸ Ibid., 360–365.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 369.

⁷⁰ Hamka, "Aceh Serambi Mekkah (Aceh the Veranda of Mecca)," in *Sejarah Masuk*, 228.

⁷¹ Hasan Muarif Ambary, "Sejarah Masuknya Islam di Negeri Perlak Ditinjau

Ishak Maharani is a single-sheet manuscript whose earliest copy dates to the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries; it lists the genealogy of the Pasai-Sayyid dynasty from the years 225–361 of the Islamic calendar (the eighth to ninth centuries).⁷² Given its dubious authenticity, this source must be used with caution. But its implications can be strengthened with archaeological data, such as the excavations that have been carried out at Pasai and at Chinatown-Perlak by the Indonesian Archaeological service as well as all along the coast of North Sumatra.⁷³ This evidence points to an Islamic kingdom in Perlak by the third Islamic century (eighth to ninth century AD). Reports from Marco Polo and Chinese and Arab writers indicate that this kingdom was firmly established by the twelfth to thirteenth century AD. Further archaeological research would, according to Ambary, confirm these conclusions.⁷⁴

A final seminar on the early entrance of Islam in Indonesia was held in Palembang in 1986. In an opening address former Minister of Religious Affairs Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara acknowledged that South Sumatra had long been of strategic importance: “the glorious kingdom of Srivijaya that breathed the Buddhist religion was continued by the kingdom of Palembang Darussalam that breathed the Islamic religion.”⁷⁵ Palembang and other Islamic kingdoms were as much a part of the history of Indonesia as the Hindu and Buddhist empires celebrated in many of the histories of the New Order. But this particular seminar was more concerned with the growth of later Islamic kingdoms than the actual arrival of Islam itself, which as mentioned earlier was the most distinctive element of the Muslim take on Indonesian history. Therefore only the opening address of the seminar will be examined as it offers a concise statement of the significance to the nation-building process of this Muslim interpretation. The Palembang seminar concurs with the findings of the earlier 1963, 1978 and 1980 seminars that Islam arrived relatively early in North Sumatra and was brought directly from the Arab world rather than from India or Persia. These conclusions make up a counterpoint to the version of the history of Islam in Indonesia written

dengan Pendekatan Arkeologi (The History of the Entrance of Islam into the State of Perlak through an Archaeological Approach),” in *Sejarah Masuk*, 440–441.

⁷² Ibid., 443–444.

⁷³ Ibid., 441.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 446.

⁷⁵ K.H.O. Gadjahnata, *Masuk dan Berkembangnya*, iii.

by Western scholars, which claimed that Islam entered Indonesia around the thirteenth century AD from India and Persia. The Palembang seminar also agreed that Islam was promulgated by peaceful means. Perwiranegara claims that Indonesia's schools still teach that Majapahit collapsed under the attack of an armed Islam, while it would probably be more accurate to attribute this fall to internal power struggles. In fact, Islam brought to Indonesia wisdom and culture that was highly important in shaping the larger civilization of Indonesia. If Islam had not been preached in Indonesia much of the population would have remained mired in animism and idolatry.⁷⁶ Perwiranegara sees a model of Indonesian history that stresses the early, peaceful penetration of Islam serving as an alternative to the reconstruction put forward by Western scholars, a viewpoint that still dominates much of the available historical writings. This latter view implies that Islam was spread by the shedding of blood and that Islam was in a sense an Arab, imported religion and that it was a barrier to Indonesia's progress. Such negative opinions might prevent subsequent generations of Indonesians from taking pride in the history of Islam and instead turn with admiration to the West. Indonesians would not understand Islam and in fact see it as something foreign.⁷⁷

Perwiranegara probably overstates the educational hostility directed against Islam in regards to the fall of Majapahit. Also, although most Western scholars do agree with a thirteenth century arrival for Islam, few feel that it was spread by the sword. An exception to this is Ricklefs' comments that Islamic conversion often occurred in the wake of the defeat of a non-Muslim kingdom by Muslim armies. Although there is no evidence of foreign Muslim invaders, "Islamization often followed upon conquest. Islam was spread in Indonesia not only by persuasion and commercial pressures, but by the sword as well."⁷⁸ This did not invalidate any individual (or community) decisions to convert. However, it was certainly a controversial point for many Indonesians who feel that Islam was not something that would have to be forced on Indonesians. Ricklefs' comment was specifically mentioned to the author by an Indonesian colleague while in Indonesia

⁷⁶ Ibid., v-vi.

⁷⁷ Ibid., ix.

⁷⁸ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 17.

in 1996. It must be noted that other factors in conversion are indeed considered much more important by Western scholars, as Ricklefs himself acknowledges.

Islam and Archaeology

The general consensus of Western scholarship, as far as can be gathered from a brief survey of the literature, is that Islam was rather late in having an impact on the population of the Indonesian Archipelago. It is admitted that Islam may have initially arrived in Southeast Asia soon after the religion's founding as from very ancient times the area was part of the same trans-Indian Ocean trading system as Arabia; there were almost certainly unassimilated Muslim communities in the region. There were already several thousand Muslim merchants in ninth century Canton and from the tenth to the twelfth centuries Srivijaya sent envoys with apparently Arabic names to China, although these may not have been local people. Similarly, the early gravestone of Fatimah bint Maimun found at Leran, in East Java, and dated to the year 475 in the Islamic calendar (1082 AD) may have been that of a foreigner or may even have been transported much later as part of a ship's ballast; it need not have been that of a local convert.⁷⁹ In fact, there may have been few local converts in Southeast Asia until the appearance of Muslim-dominated states many centuries later. Such polities did not spread across maritime Southeast Asia in an unbroken wave. Instead Islam established "beach-heads" in various parts of the region; the whole process taking several centuries. At the end of the thirteenth century Muslim states appeared in northern Sumatra. The fourteenth century saw the rise of further Islamic kingdoms in Sumatra and Brunei and a definite Muslim presence in eastern Java, perhaps in the Majapahit court itself. The fifteenth century marked the emergence of Muslim political entities in northern Java and the further spread of Islam throughout Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula culminating in the rise of Malacca as a major center. Malacca, which would dominate Southeast Asian trade for almost a century, apparently had its first Muslim ruler some time in the early fifteenth

⁷⁹ Ibid., 3.

century; at Malacca a distinctive “Malay” culture and lifestyle, involving the Malay language and the Islamic religion along with various local customs developed. It would later be emulated throughout present-day Malaysia and part of Indonesia. The sixteenth century saw the penetration of the Moluccas; such Islamic polities as Ternate and Tidore were soon to encounter the aggressive Christian powers of Portugal and Spain.⁸⁰

Bengal and Gujarat have been seen as the most likely sources for Southeast Asian Islam; Islam was depicted as coming to Indonesia “second-hand.”⁸¹ China, may have also been a possible source for Indonesian Islam, especially for Java, where a significant community of Chinese merchants, some of them Muslim, existed in the fifteenth century.⁸² Among Western scholars, many now see a single source for Southeast Asian Islam as a bit of an oversimplification. Islam’s spread in the region was a long and complicated process; a single group of foreigners spreading the religion seems unlikely. Interest in this debate, and the manner in which this discourse has moved on to new areas of concern, is reminiscent of earlier debates on the influence of India on Southeast Asian civilization during the Hindu-Buddhist period. Several theories as to why the conversion of Indonesia took place have been promoted by Western scholars. The notion that Islam was brought to Southeast Asia by traders has long been popular. It is felt that such traders would have intermarried with the local population and that Islam, because of its alleged egalitarian nature, would have also appealed to the local merchant community who were disenchanted with the strict hierarchical system associated with the traditional Hindu-Buddhist monarchies. Also, conversion to Islam would have afforded Southeast Asian traders access to an international trading network; Muslim traders operated from the Middle East through India and as far east as China. Sharing a religion might also entail sharing credit, information, port facilities and general

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 4–7, 10. Recent evidence (the grave of Sultan Sulaiman bin Abdullah bin al-Basir found in Lamreh in northern Sumatra) may push back the emergence of Islamic states in Indonesia to around 1200 AD. See Suwadi Montana, “Nouvelles données sur les royaumes de Lamari et Barat (New evidence regarding the kingdoms of Lamari and Barat),” *Archipel* 53 (1997): 85–95.

⁸¹ Fatimi, *Islam Comes to Malaysia*, 5–36.

⁸² J.G. de Casparis and I.W. Mabbett, “Religion and Popular Beliefs of Southeast Asia before c. 1500,” in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume One*, 331.

business trust. Indeed, Islam long had a noticeable impact in the region's ports, even when conversion did not spread to the wider population. The ports on the north coast of Java were long centers of Islamic activity as were the ports of the Malay Peninsula. But there are problems with associating the coming of trade with the coming of Islam. Subsequent Islamic polities were really no more egalitarian than previous Hindu-Buddhist ones and trade took place between Muslims and non-Muslims for centuries without the necessity of sharing religious convictions. There is also evidence, that in Java at least, Islam may have made its first inroads among the elites of the agrarian Majapahit empire. But trade was certainly important in bringing Muslims to Southeast Asia; without these early contacts Indonesians would simply not have been exposed to the new religion.⁸³ Others factors may explain why, after centuries of contact with Muslims, many Southeast Asians decided in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries to accept Islam. Some scholars, notably A.H. Johns, have attributed the conversion of Indonesia to the activities of Sufi mystics. Many Sufi orders had their membership scattered across Asia by the coming of the Mongols, who in the thirteenth century devastated much of the Islamic heartland. Sufis fled to India and points further east. Their mystical interpretation of Islam would have appealed to many in Southeast Asia, where mystical doctrines, drawing on Hinduism, Buddhism and older indigenous belief, had long been popular.⁸⁴ The rise of Muslim political entities has been stressed as being particularly important to the conversion process. Although few Western scholars have proposed that Islam was imposed in Southeast Asia at the point of a sword, it has been noted that subjects have usually found it advantageous to follow the religion of their ruler. In Southeast Asia, areas annexed by Muslim polities, after losing wars fought for reasons which had little, if anything, to do with religious matters, have often converted to Islam.⁸⁵ Finally, some have seen the coming of Christianity to Southeast Asia as being perhaps instrumental in the spreading of Islam. The Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch disrupted local trade systems and made a great

⁸³ M.C. Ricklefs, "Six Centuries of Islamization in Java," in *Conversion to Islam*, ed. N. Levitzion (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 103–106.

⁸⁴ A.H. Johns, "Sufism as a Category in Indonesian Literature and History," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 2 (1960): 14–17.

⁸⁵ Reid, "The Islamization of Southeast Asia," 33–34.

many local enemies; their victims were often pleased to find out that others, in the Middle East, the Iberian Peninsula and the Balkans, were similarly confronted by Europe an aggression. Islam may have seemed appealing because it was not the religion of the Europeans, who in Southeast Asian eyes seemed solely driven by greed and the urge to dominate.⁸⁶ In any event, the arrival of foreign Muslims, the establishment of Muslim polities and even the nominal conversion of large numbers of local inhabitants were seen by many Western scholars not as the end of a process but as the beginning of one. Many have argued that Indonesian Muslims are still undergoing this conversion process; exposed to currents from the wider Islamic world while continuing to adapt to local traditions.⁸⁷ Others go even further and imply that the conversion process did not in fact take place at all. Islam did not succeed in winning real converts in Indonesia (this was especially the case for Java). Java could be viewed outside the historical developments of the Islamic world and as something unique: a subtle cultural blend of animist, Hindu-Buddhist, Islamic and Western-Christian-Modern elements. Clifford Geertz entitled his anthropological study of life in the small East Java town of Pare (“Modjokuto”) *The Religion of Java*. This was apparently his term for the religion practiced in Java, a religion that others might term Islam. His choice of title might imply the existence of an extra-Islamic world view unique to Java, rather than a local variant of the religion practiced from Morocco to the Philippines. One could argue that Geertz’s whole theoretical approach stems from the simple premise that the “religion of Java” is not in the final analysis Islam, but is in fact an entity that exists and can be studied on its own terms.⁸⁸ Such a description of Indonesia might have much in common with the New Order Pancasila-nation.

These Western reconstructions of Islam’s arrival and development draw on a variety of sources including traveler’s accounts, such as those of Marco Polo in the thirteenth century, Ibn Battuta in the

⁸⁶ Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: Volume Two Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 146–147.

⁸⁷ Ricklefs, “Six Centuries of Islamization,” 100.

⁸⁸ See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960). Such a premise has been criticized by Mark Woodward. He finds Geertz in error in accepting a text-based version of Islam as being not only normative, but in fact the exclusive barometer by which one can measure what is and what is not Islamic, *Islam in Java*, 60.

fourteenth century, Ma-Huan in the fifteenth century and Tomes Pires in the sixteenth century. The first two figures are helpful in noting the presence or absence of Muslim communities in the Archipelago. Ibn Battuta stopped in Samudra in North Sumatra on his way from China in 1345–1346; the port was under the rule of the Muslim Malik al-Zahir. Marco Polo, who was in the region in 1292, describes Sumatra (“Java the Lesser”) as an island of “idolaters.” Ferlac (Perlak), however, had been converted to Islam on account of the “Saracen traders” who stopped there; neighbouring regions continued to practice traditional religion.⁸⁹ Ma-Huan, one of the principal assistants to Ch’eng Ho, admiral of a great trading fleet sent out by the Ming dynasty, was a Muslim who notes the large number of fellow Chinese Muslims already established on Java’s north coast. Ma-Huan notes that:

The country contains three classes of persons. One class consists of the Muslim people; they are all people from every foreign kingdom in the west who have migrated to this country as merchants; [and] in all matters of dressing and feeding everyone is clean and proper. One class consists of T’ang people; they are all men from Kuangtung [province] and from Chang [chou] and Ch’uan [chou] and other places, who fled away and now live in this country; the food of these people, too is choice and clean; [and] many of them follow the Muslim religion, doing penance and fasting. One class consists of the people of the land; they have very ugly and strange faces, tousled heads, and bare feet; they are devoted to devil worship, this country being among the devil-countries spoken of in Buddhist books; the food these people eat is very dirty and bad.⁹⁰

Tome Pires is an invaluable, albeit rather biased source, on the mechanics of how Islam was able to win large numbers of converts in Southeast Asia, while Portuguese Catholicism was not. He is also a good source for dating when Islam began to make converts in the various areas of Indonesia. When he visited the region (he was at Malacca when it fell to the Portuguese in 1511), “in the island of Sumatra most of the kings are Moors [Muslims] and some are

⁸⁹ See *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354*, trans. and sel. with intro. H.A.R. Gibb (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1929), 272–276. See *The Travels of Marco Polo*, trans. from the text of L.F. Benedetto by Aldo Ricci with intro. E. Denison Ross (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1931), 281–282.

⁹⁰ See *Ying-yai Sheng-lan: ‘The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores’ (1433)*, ed. and trans. J.V.G. Mills (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 93.

heathens [animists]; and in the heathen country some men make the practice of eating their enemies when they capture them." Non-Muslims were in the interior, while Muslims lived in the coastal cities. The city of Pasai had been ruled by Muslim kings for about 160 years before Pires' arrival (so from about 1350 or so); its "heathen rulers" had been "worn down by the cunning" of Muslim merchants who had since held the coastal regions. Similarly, the north coast of Java had been settled by Persian, Arab, Gujarati, Bengali and Malay traders, including Muslims, they had been a political force in the area for at least seventy years (since the 1440's).⁹¹ Local histories have also been extensively used to recreate the early history of Islam in the Archipelago. For example, the seventeenth century *Sejarah Melayu* contains a dramatic account of the conversion of the ruler of Malacca by means of prophetic dreams and visitors from Mecca.⁹² The *Hikayat Raja-raja Pasai* (Story of the Kings of Pasai) gives information about Islam's arrival in Samudra-Pasai and like the *Sejarah Melayu*; it is a tale full of miraculous events concerning the conversion of the local ruler.⁹³ The *Babad Tanah Jawi* (History of the Land of Java) deals extensively with the activities of the *wali songo* as do the *Malay Chronicles of Semerang and Cirebon*.⁹⁴ This latter, possibly apocryphal, text describes the activities of Chinese Muslims in the port cities of northern Java during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; it also makes note of such figures as Sunan Giri as well as the fall of Majapahit to the forces of the Islamic centre of Demak.⁹⁵ It might be noted that recent Western scholars tend to ignore such evidence as the genealogical manuscripts for the eighth to ninth century rulers of Pasai described by Ambarj. They also fail to follow up Chinese references to the Ta-Shih, who may have been Arab Muslims resident in Sumatra in the seventh century AD. Instead such scholars as Ricklefs place a great deal of emphasis on archaeological evidence. As Indonesia is a tropical country and a great deal of construction would have been done in wood, bamboo and other

⁹¹ Amando Cortessao, trans., *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), 137, 143, 182.

⁹² Brown, *Sejarah Melayu*, 53.

⁹³ Hill, "Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai," 109-118.

⁹⁴ See Fox, "Sunan Kalijaga," 187-188.

⁹⁵ H.J. de Graaf and Th.G.Th. Pigeaud, trans. *Chinese Muslims in Java the 15th and 16th Century: the Malay Annals of Semerang and Cirebon*, ed. M.C. Ricklefs (Melbourne: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, 1984), 28, 32-33.

perishable materials, few remains of early mosques survive (the oldest intact mosque in Indonesia is at Demak and it only dates from the fifteenth century). Instead the earliest archaeological evidence from Sumatra or Java is in the form of dated gravestones, of foreign Muslims and local converts (dates are given according to the Islamic and/or Javanese calendars). These include the gravestone of Fatimah bint Maimun from East Java (1082 AD), that of Sultan Malik al-Shah from Samudra (696 in the Islamic calendar, 1297 AD) and several stones from northern Sumatra and from Java dated to the fourteenth century. Scholars are particularly interested in whether local scripts or calendars are utilized as this would indicate the presence of Indonesian converts. Thus, two stones from Minye Tujoh in North Sumatra, both for the daughter of the late Sultan Malik al-Zahir (and dated to either 781 or 791 in the Islamic calendar, 1380 or 1389 AD), are done in different scripts and languages (one in Arabic, one in Malay with paleo-Sumatran characters). The fourteenth century tombs found in and around Trowulan use not the Islamic calendar but the Old Javanese Saka system of dating.⁹⁶

The search for earlier or Arab origins for Islam in Indonesia or for a more Islamic version of the past also draws on archaeological data and speculation. An example is Hasan Muarif Ambary's *Menemukan Peradaban: Jejak Arkeologis dan Historis Islam Indonesia* (Discovering Culture: The Archaeological and Historical Trail of Islam in Indonesia). This is an ambitious work that tries to use archaeology to give a fuller picture of the history of Islam in Indonesia. He describes the background to the rise of Islam in Southeast Asia, noting that since the beginning of the Christian era the area had functioned as a major trade route. It was through such trade that Southeast Asia entered the age of "globalization." With trading ports in Burma, Thailand, the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia, Southeast Asia was open to the influence of the major religious traditions, Hinduism and Buddhism from the first to the fifth centuries AD, Islam from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries AD and since the seventeenth century, that of European colonialism. The arrival of the Hindu-Buddhist tradition made a very great impact on local culture. This impact can be seen in surviving architectural remains throughout the region. Similarly, from the seventh century AD on, although at first with only

⁹⁶ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 4–5.

moderate frequency, the people of Southeast Asian began to gain a familiarity with Islam. Muslim traders began to reside in the area and knowledge of Islam began to intensify, particularly in the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago. The oldest surviving proof, according to Ambarly, of this Muslim presence are gravestones from Vietnam (Pandurrannga/Panrang) and East Java (Leran/Gresik), both dated to the end of the eleventh century AD. Evidence of a more substantial Muslim impact on Indonesia consists of the grave of Malik al-Saleh, which dates from 1297 AD. Although more archaeological and historical research needs to be carried out, it appears that a social network emerged among various Islamic centers, such as Aceh, Demak, Gowa (in Sulawesi) and Ternate and Tidore (in the Moluccas). From there this religious transformation spread throughout the Archipelago. Conversion to Islam was associated with political changes and the growth of a common refined culture. This process can be reconstructed from both textual and material-cultural data.⁹⁷

It was within a context of Arab, Persian and Indian traders in the region that Islamization took place. This involved three phases of social and cultural contact between outsiders and the native inhabitants of Southeast Asia. The first phase involved the activities of Arab traders and took place within a few centuries of the birth of Islam. This phase is documented from such evidence as the writings of Arab geographers and gravestones, such as that of Fatimah bint Maimun. The use of such sources as the Arabic-language *Kiṭab Idharul Haq*, which apparently lists the rulers of Perlak from around 840 AD onwards, is more problematic; the earliest gravestone of a Muslim ruler in Sumatra can only be dated to the thirteenth century. The second phase was marked by the formation of Islamic kingdoms (from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries). Evidence for this phenomenon includes the grave of Malik al-Saleh, the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and the *Sejarah Melayu* along with the writings of Marco Polo. During the third stage of the Islamization of the Indonesian Archipelago a process of institutionalization occurred whereby Muslim traders spread out from Aceh, Demak, and Gresik to Banjarmasin (Kalimantan), Lombok and beyond. Gravestones are particularly important in following the course of this latter phase.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Ambarly, *Menemukan Peradaban*, 53–54.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 55–59.

Ambarly describes the emergence of Islamic centers throughout the Archipelago. He examines evidence derived from the grave complexes of the *wali songo* and the Sultans of Central Java, starting with that of Maulana Malik Ibrahim (822 AH/1419 AD).⁹⁹ He notes the importance of Cirebon in the Islamization of West Java and attempts to reconstruct the physical makeup of the port of Banten and associated graves, mosque and palace.¹⁰⁰ He suggests that the well-preserved site might make an appropriate “living museum” as Banten was very important in the Islamization of the region and Indonesia as a whole.¹⁰¹ Like many other researchers, Ambarly notes the importance of Samudra-Pasai as the first city in the Archipelago to accept Islam. He does not take a radical stance on this issue. Drawing on such commonly cited evidence as Marco Polo, *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and gravestones, he sees the kingdom emerging in the late thirteenth century.¹⁰² In his description of the archaeology of Surabaya, Ambarly analyses the history of this port city and its relations with the Hindu-Buddhist Javanese interior; he also notes the growth of an Islamic culture in the urban area around the grave and mosque of Sunan Ngampel (Raden Rahmat).¹⁰³ His section on the archaeological remains of Ternate (in the Moluccas) primarily deals with Islamic architecture and artefacts, such as the nineteenth century palace complex and the main mosque complex that was built from the eighteenth century onwards, but he also deals with the prehistoric occupation of the area, something that he does not do extensively elsewhere in his study. He connects the Islamization of this eastern area of Indonesia to developments in Java, with Muslim teachers coming from Giri and Gresik.¹⁰⁴

Beyond this region-by-region portrait of the Islamic presence in Indonesia, Ambarly offers treatments of specific elements of how Islamic culture expressed itself regionally. For example, he discusses styles of epigraphy, gravestones and mosque and *kraton* architecture.¹⁰⁵ He also deals with how Islam manifested itself in unique ways in the various areas of the Archipelago. In Java, the legend of an

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 95–104.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 105–115, 119–122.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 128–129.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 144, 147–148.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 153.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 163–170, 191–202.

expected just ruler (*Ratu Adil*), the figure of the *kyai* (respected, often charismatic *ulama*) and the institution of the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) have remained relevant to this day.¹⁰⁶ Ambary offers a more in-depth study of the Islamic gravestones of Aceh and an analysis of the significance of the myth of Iskandar Dzulkarnain (Alexander the Two-Horned, known in the West as Alexander the Great) in Malay language chronicles such as *Sejarah Melayu*.¹⁰⁷ He goes on to detail the growth of present-day Islamic institutions, such as the Department of Religion and to stress the importance of the *pesantren* as a basis for the development of the next generation.¹⁰⁸

These last sections makes no reference to archaeological data, but Ambary sees archaeological research as very important to understanding the place of Islam in Indonesia's past, present and future. He notes that archaeology has been carried out in Indonesia since the eighteenth century and that much valuable work has been recently carried out by the Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional (Puslit Arkenas, National Archaeological Research Center). This government institute is based in Jakarta and has regional offices in Yogyakarta, Denpasar, Bandung, Palembang, Manado, Banjarmasin, Ujung Pandang and Medan, with new centers planned in Ambon and Jayapura, Irian Jaya. Many areas and sites have been surveyed across the country.¹⁰⁹ Subjects studied by the Center have included migration patterns and the interaction of the local cultures of Indonesia with the "great traditions" of Hinduism, Islam and Europe. The development of local culture, cultural diversification and the process of national integration are all broad trends of interest to Indonesian archaeologists, as is the issue of "cultural periodisation." This matter had also concerned the compilers of the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* and Ambary notes that archaeologists have employed an identical division of the Indonesia past: Prehistoric, Classic (Hindu-Indonesian), Islamic-Indonesian and Colonial eras.¹¹⁰ For the Islamic period, archaeologists worked out a sequence of Islamic expansion, starting with early contacts with Muslim traders, the emergence of Muslim communities, a process of socialization among larger Hindu-Buddhist societies,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 230–231.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 235–241, 243–247.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 311–316, 320–321.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 337–339.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 340–341.

the rise of Islamic polities and finally the encounter with the rising political and economic power of the West.¹¹¹ Beyond its interest in this process of Islamization, the Puslit Arkenas has also demonstrated its interest in improving its technical capabilities. Through archaeological excavations and surveys and the rational analysis of data, it has tried to foster a more interdisciplinary, holistic approach.¹¹² In describing the current state of archaeology in Indonesia, Ambary also notes specific conservation work carried out by the Puslit Arkenas on Islamic remains (particularly royal gravestones) in Aceh as well as work done on the ruins of the old port of Banten.¹¹³

Ambary's emphasis on modern archaeological work points to the overall purpose of his book. That is, to counter an Orientalist approach that downplays Islam's importance for the history of Indonesia. *Menemukan Peradaban* was written for some of the same reasons as *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* (a fact acknowledged by Ambary, who was also involved in compiling the latter work).¹¹⁴ In his approach Ambary also apparently builds on the ideas of the Malaysian scholar, Syed Naguib al-Attas. Al-Attas, in offering a general theory on how Islam spread through the Malay world, mentions some of the issues of bias and politicization that have coloured much Western analysis. He notes for example the exaggerated Western interest in the Hindu culture of Java, the implication that the real culture of the region can be found behind later Islamic intrusions. He responds that Hinduism had little impact, beyond the aesthetic, on the beliefs, practices and institutions of the region.¹¹⁵ Islam was much more important. In fact, the arrival of Islam ushered in the modern age.¹¹⁶ The greater importance of Islam is reflected in the Malay language, an area of study neglected by many Western scholars. Arabic is reflected in the Malay language to a much greater degree than Sanskrit, the sacred language of Hinduism.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 342.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 344.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 347–354, 355–362.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 86.

¹¹⁵ Syed Naguib al-Attas, *Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1969), 19.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 22–23.

Interestingly enough, neither Ambary nor al-Attas gives much credence to the very early (seventh century) arrival of Islam in the Archipelago; al-Attas makes passing reference in presenting his theory to a Chinese report that an Arab settlement was present in east Sumatra in 674 AD.¹¹⁸ Nor does Ambary necessarily give a great deal of attention to the numerous national *pahlawan* who happened to be Muslim. Perhaps as an academic he found their stereotypical sacrifices, the sameness of which have been noted elsewhere, difficult to swallow. Also, their individual struggles against the Dutch left little in the way of material remains. Instead, *Menemukan Peradaban* seems to represent an attempt at a total picture of an Islamic Indonesian culture, a culture as important (and valid) as one that sees present-day Indonesia as a new manifestation of Majapahit. This work of archaeological and analysis might also be seen as evidence that such a version of the Indonesian past is as scientifically possible as the earlier reconstructions of Western and nationalist-Indonesian historians. Such an Islamic-oriented version of the past is one that is specifically chosen, as is any official history, as is the New Order's "Greater Majapahit". This approach does not preclude the possibility of an early Islamic arrival; it simply makes it unimportant. Similarly Indonesian Uka Tjandrasmita, while noting that there is some evidence that Islam was established in Indonesia during the seventh century, shifts the emphasis to a process of development, a reconstruction not unlike that of many Western scholars. He sees the rise of Muslim-oriented kingdoms in the thirteenth as the culmination of such a process, a process that began with initial contacts, perhaps in the seventh century. This development of Islamic kingdoms was restricted to the area of the Straits of Malacca. Later in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Islam spread to the north coast of Java before dispersing to other regions.¹¹⁹ Islam was disseminated throughout the Archipelago by both foreign and Indonesian Muslims.¹²⁰ The overall sentiment of both Ambary and Tjandrasmita seems to be that the Islamic development of Indonesia is a very valid focus of study. In contrast much Western scholarship has operated on the assumption (usually unspoken) that Hindu Java represents the "real Indonesia." Tim Behrend comments that even among scholars of

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹¹⁹ Tjandrasmita, "The Introduction of Islam," 143–145.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 148.

Indonesian Islam more are familiar with the details of Borobudur than with Java's many Islamic monuments.¹²¹

Shrines and Pilgrims

Archaeological works, like those of Ambary and Tjandrasasmita, were largely aimed at a scholarly audience and their effectiveness as a challenge to a Majapahit-oriented version of the past may be thus questionable. But sites connected with the arrival of Islam (in the form of the legendary *wali songo*) remain popular with many Muslim pilgrims to this day and archaeological and historical analysis of these tombs and mosques might also add validity to a Muslim-oriented narrative of the past. Henri Chambert-Loir notes the ubiquity across Java of sacred sites devoted to Muslim saints (*wali*). Saints include any person who may have acquired supernatural power, whether by birth, talent or by spiritual effort. When such an individual dies the body retains such power; the grave may be the focus of devotional visitations. Such graves (or *kramat*) might be quite modest, being located on a remote hill or in a village cemetery. Some *kramat* might not really be grave sites at all, being instead simply interestingly shaped rock outcrops, or the "grave" might be commonly held to be empty.¹²² The popularity of such sites is difficult to gauge as is how many such sites exist. There may be tens of thousands of small village-sites that are only visited on an infrequent basis by individual villagers or once a year by the whole community. The larger sites, such as those associated with the *wali songo*, may get many visitors, both individuals and groups. The *wali songo* sites are visited all year round by both groups and individuals and during the month of Rabiulawal and the time of the Prophet Muhammad's birth by huge crowds of pilgrims. During this month thousands visit Demak, and Gunung Jati (near Cirebon) and Gunung Kawi (near Malang) probably both receive 150,000 pilgrims. Pilgrims at Gunung Colo (Sunan Muria's tomb near Kudus) are given only four minutes each to pray.¹²³

¹²¹ Timothy E. Behrend, "Kraton, Taman, Mesjid: A Brief Survey and Bibliographic Review of Islamic Antiquities in Java," in *Indonesia Circle*, 35 (1984), 29.

¹²² Henri Chambert-Loir, "Saints and Ancestors: The Cult of Muslim Saints in Java," in *The Potent Dead*, 132-133.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 134.

In December 1996 the author visited several of the *wali songo* sites. Not far from Surabaya is the hilltop site of Giri. The tomb, reached via an elaborate stairway flanked by Balinese style gates and carvings, is decorated with Chinese carvings, fine lace and Persian tapestries. Although as noted earlier not a site overly favored by the New Order, it attracts many pilgrims, especially according to a local informant, those interested in a more mystically inclined and rural version of Islam. The food stands and kiosks, at the foot of the hill, are an indication of the shrine's popularity (although not all the available souvenirs have religious connotations). The tomb of Maulana Malik Ibrahim is located near Giri. Local tradition identifies the tomb's occupant as Sunan Gresik; Ricklefs notes that there is no documentation for this claim. The grave is dated 822 in the Islamic calendar (1419 AD) and is one of the oldest Muslim grave markers found in Java to date. The inscription is in Arabic, rather than Javanese, and there is a good chance that the grave is that of a foreigner.¹²⁴ The tomb is located in a residential area, in a cemetery next to a Middle Eastern style (domed) mosque (mosques in Java usually follow local architectural norms and seldom possess domes or minarets). The only sign at the site reads *dilarang duduk di atas makam* ("do not sit on the grave"). There were some pilgrims present and this was the only site the author visited where specific literature dealing with the *wali songo* was available.¹²⁵ The tomb of Sunan Ngampel is located in Surabaya's Arab quarter, an area of winding streets and markets near the city's Chinatown. The place of interment itself is located in the courtyard of the Sunan Ngampel Mosque, fenced off from other graves, and was apparently the center of much local devotion; visits by other Indonesian and even foreign Muslim pilgrims were, according to my informant, not unknown.

The popularity of the *wali songo* sites, certainly compared to that shown by the Indonesian public towards Trowulan, indicates that Islamic remains (no matter when they actually date from) perhaps possess more resonance than the somewhat artificial Majapahit.

¹²⁴ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 5.

¹²⁵ A free pamphlet and a short paperback book, *Maulana Malik Ibrahim: Perintis Islam Pertama di Pulau Jawa* (The First Islamic Pioneer on the Island of Java) (Gresik, East Java: Pemeliharaan Makam Maulana Malik Ibrahim, 1974) and M.B. Rahimsyah, *Legenda dan Sejarah lengkap Wali Songo* (Legends and History surrounding the Wali Songo) (Surabaya: Amanah, n.d.).

Archaeological remains, the study of which was firmly in the hands of the regime, might offer an alternative more Islamic reading of the past after all. This popularity might account for the involvement of the New Order in the presentation and the promotion of the *wali songo* sites (although certainly this was not on the scale of the attention lavished on the Majapahit remains). Archaeological research is predictably part of the government domain and thus it responds to and reflects an official view of history. The government may also put more emphasis on Hindu-Buddhist sites because they are more “spectacular” and more appealing to tourists; most of the Islamic sites are far from lavish (but this does not really explain why Majapahit and even Srivijaya, which left no physical remains, get more ideological attention from the New Order than the world-famous remains of Borobudur). The modest shrines of the *wali songo* could form the nucleus of the physical representation of a more *ummat*-oriented version of history. But ironically these tombs contribute little to the view of history pushed by some Indonesian Muslim historians that Islam came relatively early to the Archipelago (possibly the seventh century AD). The *wali songo*, who operated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, figure prominently in the reconstruction of the history of Java by Western scholars and they constitute an important element in the larger culture of Java. But although they may function as historical and cultural actors they are in the end religious figures, venerated for their holiness and their success in bringing Islam to Java, and by extension to Indonesia as a whole. While visiting Trowulan, the author tried to locate the nearby site of Troloyo, a Muslim cemetery containing some of the oldest Muslim graves found in Java, dated according to Ricklefs to the years 1298 to 1533 in the Javanese calendar (1376–1611 AD).¹²⁶ Unfortunately, the site could not be found. This may have been telling; clearly the site was not a tourist destination for non-Muslims, or for Muslims interested in the graves for non-devotional reasons. If the site was one of pilgrimage, it was clearly removed from the major “circuit.” But this should have been expected; the major pilgrimage centers in Java are associated with the *wali songo*. Troloyo was of importance to Western scholars because it contained some very old and very historically significant tombs. But local Javanese Muslims might not really care when Islam first

¹²⁶ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 5.

arrived in Java, especially if this information was provided by non-Muslim foreign historians. They might be satisfied with the knowledge that Islam did indeed arrive at some point, their own current religious adherence is proof of that, and that it was the *wali songo* who carried out this religious mission. As a religious symbol the *masuk Islam* (the arrival of Islam in Indonesia) can ignore historical details. Controversies about when Islamization actually started are of little concern to the devoted pilgrim and scientific, and often sketchy, evidence of a seventh century Islamic presence in the Archipelago might be met with scepticism even if provided by Indonesian Muslim scholars. After all these hypothetical Arab trader/missionaries were no *wali songo*.

But the religious significance of the *wali songo* sites need not remove them from an alternative Islam-oriented Indonesian historical narrative. In the same way that the actual actions and motives of many national *pahlawan* can be blurred with the unfolding of a larger national struggle, the actions of the *wali songo* and the arrival of Islam itself could be given a vague nationalist cast. Neither Iskander Muda nor Sunan Jati, nor Gajah Mada for that matter, really fought for Indonesia. But they did contribute immensely to what came later and were thus suitable objects of admiration for later generations; *Merdeka* begins with the arrival of Islam. The *wali songo* sites are the most visible traces of Islam's origins in the Archipelago. They also retain a popular credibility as devotional sites. Monuments of Islam's arrival become national monuments. The *wali songo* become both national and Islamic *pahlawan*, heroes of the *ummat* and of Indonesia.

An "Ummat-Oriented" History

For Indonesian Muslim historians and pilgrims alike, unlike the New Order as a whole, Majapahit is not really important; more emphasis is placed on the early arrival of Islam. Indonesia is felt to have firmer historical, cultural and spiritual connections to the *ummat* than to a long-dead Javanese kingdom. Related to the notion that Islam arrived early and first-hand in Indonesia is the glorification (in lieu of Majapahit) of various Islamic polities. Certainly for the writers of the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia*, the various Muslim kingdoms of the sixteenth to eighteenth century Java, Sumatra and the Eastern Islands were neither part of a fall from greatness nor the cause of

the Dutch colonial advance. Islamic kingdoms are described as powerful political entities that had a major impact on the area around the Straits of Malacca; Samudra-Pasai and later Aceh are portrayed as controlling this waterway and as functioning as centers of trade and of resistance to foreign control.¹²⁷ In Java, dynastic instability in Majapahit led to the rise of “small Islamic *kraton*” such as Jepara, Rembang, Tuban and Gresik and Demak.¹²⁸ The latter emerged in the wake of Majapahit’s demise as a major power; the Islamization process spread westward towards Cirebon (seat of Sunan Gunung Jati, one of the *wali songo*) to Sunda Kelapa (Jakarta), Banten and the Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran. After Demak, the Islamic kingdom of Mataram, as described in the Javanese-language *Babad Tanah Jawi*, emerged as a major power. Sultan Agung (1613–1645) challenged the power of the VOC with an attack on Batavia.¹²⁹ Similar descriptions are offered of the kingdoms and rulers of Banten, Banjarmasin (Kalimantan), Makassar (Sulawesi), Ternate and Tidore (the Moluccas).¹³⁰ Emphasis is placed on the power of Indonesian Islamic kingdoms and their resistance to Western colonialists. The political history offered by *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* is based on a variety of Indonesian language sources such as the *Hikayat Raja-raja Pasai*, the *Sejarah Melayu* and the *Hikayat Banjar* (Malay) and the *Babad Tanah Jawi* (Javanese).¹³¹ Less credence is given to sources produced by Western visitors to the Archipelago, beyond the writings of the sixteenth century Portuguese apothecary Tome Pires.¹³² Secondary scholarship cited includes works by both Indonesians and foreigners.

Further information is given on cultural and religious developments among these Islamic kingdoms. A description is given of how maritime trade enriched the economy of the Archipelago.¹³³ Such trade fuelled the development of Islamic power in the region and led to the emergence of Islamic institutions and kingdoms with strong bureaucracies.¹³⁴ While Islamic kingdoms flourished in Indonesia, important works of religious writing were produced, including those

¹²⁷ *Sejarah Ummat*, 52, 62.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 68–72.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 79–84, 86–95.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 53, 69, 86.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 80. See Cortessao, *The Suma Oriental*.

¹³³ *Sejarah Ummat*, 112–113.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 117–124.

of Hamzah Fansuri (late sixteenth century), Syamsuddin al-Sumatrani and Nuruddin al-Raniri (?–1666).¹³⁵ Beyond these cultural and social achievements, various Islamic kingdoms offered stiff resistance to foreign colonial control. The “Diponegoro War,” for example, was fought to restore freedom to Java under the “banners of Islam.”¹³⁶ The various battles of this war and Diponegoro’s eventual capture (through Dutch treachery) are described in detail.¹³⁷ The Paderi movement, under Iman Bonjol, is portrayed as a fight against fellow Indonesians who leaned towards customary law over Islamic law, against Dutch non-believers and finally simply for freedom.¹³⁸ The long struggle to preserve the independence of Aceh is labelled a “*jihad* and war in the way of Allah.”¹³⁹ Note is made of the fact that opposition to the Dutch, led especially by the *ulama*, was evident in Aceh as late as 1931, although the Achenese leadership had been captured in 1903; in 1942 small groups were still carrying out acts of sabotage.¹⁴⁰ A combination of anti-colonialism and the call to Islam became the prime basis for Indonesian nationalism. These “people’s wars” provided *pahlawan* who became “a pure symbol of the struggle for the awareness (or awakening) of the nation.”¹⁴¹

The *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* notes that it should be no surprise that even after the fall of the Islamic kingdoms, “Islam and the Malay language stepped forward as the first foundation of modern Indonesian Nationalism.”¹⁴² Subsequent chapters go on to stress the contributions made by Indonesian Muslims to the Independence struggle.¹⁴³ It is the Islamic kingdoms, Aceh, Mataram, Banten and others, which are the real ancestors of modern Indonesia, rather than the New Order’s favored Majapahit. But New Order veneration of Majapahit might not really be as big an issue with Muslims as it might seem. Although there might be some resentment against a Hindu-Buddhist past for Indonesia, there did not appear to be an overwhelming desire to reject this past in total by any large segment

¹³⁵ Ibid., 124–130.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 154.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 143–154.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 157, 163.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 169.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 179.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 181.

¹⁴² Ibid., 99.

¹⁴³ Chapter 9, for example, describes Muslim contributions to the 1945–1949 “Revolution and War of Independence,” 321–372.

of the population during the New Order period. Perhaps Majapahit could be seen as functioning as Rome did for Christianity, allowing the transmission of a new religion along well-ordered routes. And if Majapahit as a whole did not adopt Islam, some within the empire did. Later Javanese traditions (drawn upon in their reconstructions by Western and Muslim writers alike) note royal conversions and marriages between the descendants of Brawijaya and the *wali songo*; these alliances culminate in the Muslim dynasties of Mataram, Yogyakarta and Surakarta.¹⁴⁴ Muslims were perhaps most troubled by implications that subsequent Islamic kingdoms were less important to the nation's rise to greatness than Majapahit and that these Islamic kingdoms were even somehow to blame for the hated Dutch presence.

Related to perceptions on the coming of Islam to Indonesia are views on the place of Java in the nation's history. The history chosen by the New Order was that of a unified nation, descendant of a unified Majapahit empire. But the latter empire was one which subjugated such regions as Bali and West Java. Likewise, in its modern manifestation Indonesia is oriented towards the center; many regions have felt mistreated and exploited by Jakarta. This was often seen in terms of resources flowing to the capital with few benefits in return. Such feelings were particularly apparent during the New Order in those regions whose entry into Indonesia was under special circumstances: Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya (earlier challenges to the unitary state, in West Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi were aimed at changing government policy, rather than at independence and had in any event been successfully dealt with by the previous leadership as had the separatist rebellion in the Moluccas). The New Order was certainly aware of regional complaints but it may have perceived them in terms of individual provinces questioning the cost-benefits of being in Indonesia as opposed to anyone seriously rejecting an Indonesian identity. Benefits from being an Indonesian might be material in nature and it is doubtful whether the story was really one of unrelieved exploitation, although *transmigrasi* certainly caused much resentment (the transmigration program involved the

¹⁴⁴ See Fox, "Sunan Kalijaga," 214–218, and "Interpreting the Historical Significance of Tombs and Chronicles in Contemporary Java," in *The Potent Dead*, 164–166.

semi-voluntary movement of citizens from the overpopulated islands of Java, Bali and Madura to the less populated Outer Islands. Benefits might also be in the form of inclusion in the national epic. *Pahlawan* were from across the archipelago, male and female, of all official religions and most ethnic groups. All worked towards (perhaps unknowingly) the same purpose, a free, unitary Indonesia.

The actions of these local heroes are echoed in a set of regional histories put out by the Department of Education and Culture. These were intended as part of an official history project; the volumes follow a similar pattern. Heroes are honoured for their contribution to their region or the independence struggle but it is assumed that this is part of a longer journey, that of creating Indonesia. Rebelliousness is portrayed as good, so long as it is directed against its proper target, the Dutch. Recent problems with centralized authority are portrayed in a much less favourable light, if at all. Regional histories are understood as being part of a larger Indonesian narrative. Thus, the history of Aceh begins not with the rise of Perlak and Pasai but with events in distant prehistoric times; note is made of early hominid remains and stone tools found throughout Indonesia and Southeast Asia.¹⁴⁵ The second chapter of the regional history describes Aceh itself in more detail. The strategic location of Aceh near the Straits of Malacca is emphasized as are the trade connections between Aceh and China.¹⁴⁶ Some note is made of the possibility of the early arrival of Islam in Aceh. But in general the picture painted is one familiar to Western scholars and involves the emergence of Islamic kingdoms in northern Sumatra between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries.¹⁴⁷ The third chapter of the regional history devotes much attention to describing the wealth and power of Aceh under Iskandar Muda (reigned 1607–1637). His accomplishments in battling foreign invaders and even the number of war-elephants he owned are noted.¹⁴⁸ In outlining the early history of Aceh no particular attention is paid to the role of Islam, despite Aceh's later reputation for religious fervour. Later battles against foreign invaders, specifically the Dutch,

¹⁴⁵ Muhammad Ibrahim et al., *Sejarah Daerah Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh* (Regional History: The Special Region of Aceh) (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1991), 6–16.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 57–58.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 73–78.

are described; the late nineteenth century Aceh War is given considerable coverage.¹⁴⁹ But despite such heroic actions Aceh has had an ambiguous relationship with the central government; the merging of Aceh into the province of North Sumatra caused resentment that eventually led to the emergence of the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia rebellion. The rebellion broke out in Aceh in September 1953 but no lengthy description is offered; various proclamations issued in 1956 and 1957, giving autonomy to the region, are seen as ending any trouble.¹⁵⁰ The Islamic character of the Special Region of Aceh is reflected only in the number of students receiving a religious education; Aceh is shown as being satisfied with its status within the unitary state of Indonesia.¹⁵¹ This Indonesia is a Javanese one. The success of the current regime, ruled from Jakarta by a latter day Javanese king with Gajah Mada as an inspirational ancestor, is seen as the common goal of all Indonesians no matter where they reside. And while, the New Order never explicitly equates being Javanese with being Indonesian, the assumption is made that Javanese cultural traits will have a favourable reception in the provinces. Thus, John Bowen notes that government *gotong royong* programs, whereby funds would go to villages to carry public works projects with semi-voluntary local labour, were neither understood nor implemented in Aceh; *gotong royong* (mutual-aid, usually in the form of unpaid service) was a Javanese concept.¹⁵²

The reverence given to Java and Majapahit was for many Indonesians in fact a point of contention. The New Order version of history was questioned from a regional perspective. Although regional dissatisfactions with the unitary state of Indonesia have had a variety of underlining causes the most interesting ones as far as perceptions of history are concerned involve disputes over the relationship between Islam and the nation-state. The proper place of Aceh, traditionally one of the most devoutly Muslim areas of Indonesia, within Indonesia and Indonesian history has remained a source of conflict into the post-Suharto era. An alternative *ummat*-oriented narrative for Indonesian history might stress the first Islamic kingdom

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 152–157.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 219–221.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 234.

¹⁵² John R. Bowen, "On the Political Construction of Tradition: *Gotong Royong* in Indonesia," in *Journal of Asian Studies*, 45 no. 3 (1986): 545–561.

in Indonesia (Pasai, presently in Aceh), the powerful sixteenth century Sultan Iskander Muda (r. 1581–1636) and the tenacious resistance to the Dutch by the Achenese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as the fact that alone among Indonesian regions, Aceh did not allow the return of the colonial regime and was an enthusiastic early supporter of the Revolution. A history which saw Aceh's resistance to foreign (and non-Muslim) colonialism as part of a greater struggle to create Indonesia would necessarily serve a different purpose than one which saw Aceh's destiny as a separate, inevitably more Islamic one. More sympathy might be offered towards Aceh's position in relation to Jakarta. The question might arise as to why a religiously observant province has found it difficult to thrive within the borders of the world's most populous Muslim nation. Questions might also arise as to whether Iskander Muda was an Islamic, Achenese or Indonesian hero and whether he might not be seen as a more suitable ancestral founder than the Javanese, non-Muslim Gajah Mada. Regionally-oriented works, produced by local scholars, might form the basis of new official reconstructions of the Indonesian past.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ A recent example of history told from an Achenese perspective is Amirul Hadi, *Islam and the State in Sumatra: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Aceh* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This study's conclusion will show that Majapahit, the Islamic Sultanates, the Revolution and the suppression of G-30-S were all facets of a single coherent New Order past, a past that reflected the regime's concerns with stability and social harmony. A summary will also be made of an Islamic "history in waiting" created within (but not by) the New Order. The conclusion will also determine if and how the Suharto regime may have used an official past, with allusions to other cases in Israel, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Cambodia. The conclusion will end with some thoughts on whether the New Order past was as useful for enhancing the regime's own legitimacy as it was for integrating Indonesia as a unified nation.

A newly independent nation, such as Indonesia, will often try to build a common history for a diverse and possibly fragmented population, often drawing on the nation's glorious past. Note is also made of the dark times the nation has (or will soon) overcome and of the bright (or at least hopeful) future that awaits it. The process of building a common national history is part of the process of building what Benedict Anderson has termed "Imagined Communities," groups who share the common political goal of nationhood, but who must by a leap of imagination see themselves as sharing a common identity. In discussing how New Order Indonesia constructed and promulgated a particular view of the Indonesian past, note might also be made of Bernard Lewis' classifications of types of history: remembered, recovered and invented. One might also classify types of history in terms of anticipated audience: popular history, touristic history, academic history and official history. The New Order drew on a recovered/academic history in order to invent an official history that could be used for state, nation-building purposes. Of course, some questioned this official history. They might be moved to create their own pasts, again based on recovering a history; these would constitute "histories in waiting," which might supplement or even replace the official one.

Official histories can be observed in various media: literature, songs, puppet plays, and films. This study has focused on three media:

“the history industry,” monuments and textbooks. The history industry involves how the past is recovered before it can be used to create an official history. Invented history must be based on some real recovered historical fact and analysis if it is to have much resonance; in turn the recovery process might be influenced by what history has been remembered by the traditions of society and by what official history a regime hopes to create. In New Order Indonesia the history industry involved both historical and archaeological research; both disciplines had their roots in work carried out by Dutch scholars during colonial times. Both history and archaeology were carried out at an acceptable scholarly level, although data gathered from such inquiries might be selectively used to strengthen an official viewpoint. Monuments, erected by a national government, could be expected to reflect the official past in an unambiguous manner; they might commemorate specific events or personages in the nation’s past. Monuments might define and propagate a national mythology. Textbooks, historical narratives used in the nation’s schools, might fulfill a similar purpose (and to a captive audience). Textbooks could be understood as statements from the government to the nation’s youth about what it means to be an Indonesian, in possession of a glorious past, a bright present and an even brighter future. The name of Nugroho Notokusanto appears in connection with the use of all three of these media as part of the New Order nation-building project. He filled a role pioneered by Muhammad Yamin, a scholar/writer with official connections involved in the recovery, invention and propagation of a national past. Those who have found fault with the main thrust of the New Order’s past turned to the writings of Yamin’s counterpart Hamka, and continued his work of imagining an alternative, more Islamic-oriented history for Indonesia.

A New Majapahit

At the core of the past promulgated by the New Order was the empire of Majapahit. The Majapahit, described (and celebrated) by the Suharto regime, was Javanese, Hindu, well-ordered and militarily strong. The empire was class-based, with abundant wealth produced by trade and especially by the control of rich, rice-producing lands. Happy citizens cheerfully carried out the commands of the priestly and military castes. At the top of the New Order’s Majapahit

was the figure of Gajah Mada. The fourteenth century prime minister is, in a sense, seen as the father of Indonesia. Under his stern but wise leadership Majapahit controlled most of the Indonesian Archipelago and exerted influence over much of Southeast Asia. The New Order did not wholly fabricate this Majapahit. It was at least partially based on earlier memories (such traditional sources as the *Babad Tanah Jawi* and the *Sejarah Melayu*) and especially on earlier acts of invention and recovery. The Dutch discovered, translated and analyzed the only surviving manuscript of the *Nagarakertagama*, a fourteenth century account by court-poet Prapanca of a royal tour of the territory of Majapahit. Archaeological and historical work carried out by such scholars as Brandes, Kern, Krom and Maclaine-Pont fleshed out the description offered by the *Nagarakertagama*. This strong Javanese empire recovered from obscurity by foreign scholarship was popularized in the works of Muhammad Yamin and in the speeches of Sukarno himself; by the time of the birth of the New Order the official and accepted image of Majapahit as a proto-Indonesia was firmly established (the Buddhist maritime-trade centre of Srivijaya had been partially rejected as a fitting ancestor of modern Indonesia, although its pedigree as a product of foreign research was quite similar).

The coming of Islam did not much alter the New Order narrative. Islam did not, according to the New Order, destroy the older Majapahit/Java/Indonesian identity. Instead it peacefully modified Indonesian culture. The “*kraton* culture” popular among some New Order circles was simply the newest interpretation of an Islamic version of the older royal ways of Majapahit. After Islam’s arrival (in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries according to the New Order) all Indonesians, Muslim or otherwise, had to prepare themselves to face many challenges. Foremost among these challenges was that of Dutch colonialism. Each region, each ethnic group, each religion and both genders and a variety of age groups produced *pahlawan*, national heroes, who fought to defend and preserve an Indonesia that actually had its roots in an Archipelago-wide Majapahit. Resistance to the Dutch was not prompted by individual ambitions, or by ethnic or sectarian pride, but by a common love of a unified Indonesia, a strong nation that had been bequeathed to future generations by a far-sighted Gajah Mada (Yamin’s *Pahlawan Persatuan Nusantara*, Hero of the Unity of the Archipelago). The Dutch, although capable of great cruelty and savagery in suppressing these *pahlawan* had not

been a wholly negative force; they set up a state, the Dutch East Indies that ruled over the whole of the Indonesian Archipelago. In bringing this area under their control, the Dutch were unintentionally recreating a unity that had once existed under Gajah Mada. The Dutch had not so much destroyed Majapahit (it had slipped into obscurity decades before the first Dutch ships dropped anchor in Java) as captured it; Indonesian *pahlawan* sacrificed themselves to rescue Majapahit from this captivity. Any New Order Dutch mannerisms could be explained in terms of nostalgia and in terms of a conservatism that saw a well-managed imperial system for Indonesia, originally formed during the Majapahit era, as simply normal, even if it were run by foreigners.

Such a well-ordered empire survived the transition to Indonesian control. A new set of *pahlawan* helped restore Indonesia to its proper place as an independent nation. *Pahlawan* might include diplomats and politicians but for the New Order victory was self-evidently because of the military. In a debate over what course of action won Independence, *diplomasi* or *perjuangan* (diplomacy or armed struggle), and over who won Independence (Sukarno and the civilian leadership or the TNI) the answer was clear. Events in Yogyakarta are offered by the New Order as clear evidence of civilian incompetence, and perhaps even cowardice, standing in sharp contrast to military bravery and initiative in the figure of a young Lt. Colonel Suharto. The New Order's version of the Revolution differs from the view popular among such Western scholars as George McT. Kahin; this "orthodox" view of Indonesia's Independence is that the Dutch were defeated at the conference table, by diplomatic efforts not on the battlefield. It should also be noted that not all Western scholars downplay the contributions of the TNI. Penders and Sundhausen propose that on the eve of the cease-fire agreement the Dutch were on the edge of military defeat and most of the Javanese countryside was in the hands of Indonesian guerrillas.

Lines between *pemuda* and the TNI are blurred in New Order descriptions of the Battle of Surabaya, so as to remove any radical connotations from the Revolution. It was not a Revolution to overturn society but one to recreate and preserve Indonesia—the newest manifestation of Majapahit. The independent Indonesia proclaimed on August 17, 1945 and defended with four years of fighting and sacrifice was to be a well-ordered, unified, Javanese-dominated state.

New Order descriptions of this struggle emphasize events in Java; although *pahlawan* fought and died across the Archipelago (ironically most of the civilian negotiations also took place in Java). Violent outbursts against property and established Indonesian authority, such as the October 1948 Madiun Incident, are portrayed as counter-productive to the attainment of Independence. The radical actions of the PKI did nothing to forward the Revolution. In fact such actions seem to be motivated by a long-term plan to attain power and transform Indonesia into a state based on the foreign ideology of communism.

New Order commentators claim that this plan continued to be forwarded after full Independence had been achieved and that it was not a new one; the PKI had been trying to subvert the Indonesian nationalist movement since its involvement in the otherwise legitimate anti-Dutch uprisings of 1927. Since then the PKI had been trying to take Revolution down the wrong path, one leading to violence, social anarchy and rampant manifestations of “un-Indonesian” (and especially un-Javanese) attitudes. This PKI program culminated in the bloody events of September 30–October 1, 1965 at a place called Lubang Buaya. New Order accounts describe the kidnapping, torture, murder, mutilation and unceremonious burial of Indonesian military officers in lurid detail. These violent actions of the G-30-S/PKI are shown as threatening home, family, property, the military, law, order and stability (all values and institutions at the heart of what the New Order holds dear). The New Order reconstruction and interpretation of the September 30 “coup attempt” differs from that promoted by many Western scholars. Starting with Benedict Anderson, many have argued that the PKI was more a victim than a perpetrator; the kidnapping and murder of the Indonesian military officers was part of an internal power-struggle within the army. For the New Order it was important to show that the PKI was in fact fully behind this attempt to seize power; a study co-authored by Nugroho Notosusanto was explicitly written to counter Anderson’s “Cornell Report.” It was imperative to establish that the PKI was the real villain, the real menace behind the political violence and chaos that marked the downfall of Sukarno and the birth of the New Order. By shifting the focus to the PKI’s violent attack on the homes and persons of the Indonesian military, an attack that kills several *pahlawan revolusi*, the New Order is able to ignore the subsequent

killings of thousands of suspected PKI sympathizers. In fact little mention is made of the “Indonesian killings,” as they are referred to in the Western literature. Emphasis is instead placed on the deaths of the officers and on the “eradication” of desperate guerrilla remnants in 1967 and 1968; the fact that PKI cadres took to the same Javanese hills to escape government counter-insurgency actions once occupied by Sudirman’s TNI was an irony apparently lost on New Order commentators. Despite this eradication, the PKI, which has had a long history of subversion, might still resurface to threaten the New Order. The New Order felt that it did indeed embody Pancasila itself and all that the PKI was not: peace, stability and harmony between religions and social and economic classes. In defeating the PKI the New Order was steering the Revolution along its proper course—that of protecting Indonesia from those who would thwart its return to the greatness it had once exhibited under the banner of Majapahit and the wise guidance of Gajah Mada.

Not everyone of course saw the Javanese Gajah Mada as a suitable spiritual father for modern Indonesia. Many saw Islam’s arrival in the Archipelago as much more significant than the *palapa* oath to unite all of *nusantara*. An alternative history was constructed stressing the early arrival of Islam directly from its Arab heartland in the seventh century AD. Islamic kingdoms may have been present in Indonesia as early as the ninth century. These kingdoms far from weakening Indonesian unity in fact strengthened it and allowed for the eventual emergence of a Malay-language based culture, *pahlawan*, a nationalist movement and eventually *merdeka*. Such an Islamic-oriented narrative stressed that Indonesia had long been part of the *ummah* (the Islamic world) and shared with it many beliefs, institutions and values as well as a common historical experience of being a victim of foreign colonialism. This version of Indonesian history can be traced back to the ideas of Hamka; his views were eventually even shared by Yamin’s close associate Roeslan Abdulgani. This past is most prominently manifested in the *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* put out by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia. It can also be seen in a series of seminars on the entrance of Islam into Indonesia and in the archaeology work of Hasan Muarif Ambary. This narrative is truly an “alternative history in waiting” as it was mostly formulated by people working within the New Order. It does not openly attack the New Order’s “Majapahit-oriented past,” it acts as an alternative to it and a reminder that the Islamic presence in, and contribution

to, Indonesia should not be ignored. An *ummat*-oriented past might differ in many ways from that created by Western scholars, in regards especially to the coming of Islam, when it came and from where it came. But it might have a strong appeal to an overwhelmingly Muslim country like Indonesia; one might note the popularity of shrines connected with the *wali songo* in comparison to those of Majapahit and even those built to commemorate the victims of G-30-S. An *ummat*-oriented past might also be more inclusive of regional concerns and accomplishments. Aceh, a region with a troubled, or at least ambiguous, relationship with Jakarta, might fit more smoothly into an Indonesian historical narrative that begins with the emergence of the Islamic polity of Pasai and notes the greatness of Iskandar Muda and the heroism of the Aceh War than one drawn from a reading of the *Nagarakertagama*.

The Use of the Past

The official history described by this study was a reflection of how the New Order regime conceived of itself. It is not surprising that an authoritarian, Java-oriented regime would choose a history for Indonesia that emphasized the history of Majapahit and of the successor Islamic kingdoms of Central Java. The New Order also viewed its chosen official history as a powerful tool for fostering national unity. Indonesians are a diverse people, speaking many languages, practicing many religions and possessing many histories. Ambon, for example, was first captured by the Dutch in 1605, while Bali only passed under firm colonial control in 1908. As a nation-building tool an official, national history can be used to convince a people that they are in fact one and that despite apparent diversity they share a common identity and a common past. The New Order was not alone in attempting to use this tool; archaeology, one of the specific media by means of which a national past can be recovered, has been shown to be an important part of the nation-building process in Israel and Egypt. In Israel such archaeologists as Yigael Yadin constructed a modern national identity through the study and popularization of ancient sites and individuals. The modern state of Israel was conceived of as a direct descendant of the Biblical kingdoms excavated by Israeli archaeologists. The site of Masada, where in 73 AD a group of Jewish resisters committed suicide rather than submit

to Rome, became a symbol of modern Israeli tenacity.¹ In Egypt a particular past, that of the ancient Pharaohs, was for the most part down-played; the recovery of this past was tainted by association with Western scholars and colonialists and with Egyptian humiliation. Instead, modern Egyptian thinkers chose to celebrate Egypt's status as a Muslim and Arab nation; the Pharaonic past was simply the wrong past, too far removed in time and similarity to have any real resonance with the population.² An official, national past then is something that is both constructed and chosen; it is constructed from real historical evidence that is then accepted or rejected as representative of national identity on the basis of its usefulness in the furtherance of the nation-building process.

Was the New Order successful in constructing a history that could be used to foster national integration? The New Order's reconstruction of Majapahit included such symbols as the *Nagarakertagama*, a powerful and wise Gajah Mada, the *wayang*, Javanese *halus* mannerisms, *gotong royong* and even the much earlier Javanese site of Borobudur. This history was accepted by many Indonesians as being central to a larger national identity, although such acceptance did not always mask a deeper resentment of Javanese dominance of the modern Indonesian state and economy. A veneration of the *pahlawan* of the anti-Dutch struggle and a celebration of the Revolution and of the foiling of the September 30 coup attempt was noticeable during the New Order and beyond; November 10 remains Heroes' Day for all Indonesians and the PKI is still a banned organization. Both distant and recent events and personages promoted by the New Order have become part of a common Indonesian history and identity. The New Order's past would, it is true, tend to marginalize those who questioned the regime's legitimacy, such as democrats and human rights activists; Western-style democracy could be portrayed as historically un-Indonesian. Those who saw Islam as an intrinsic part of Indonesia's past, present and future would also find that the New Order's vision of history left little room for their aspirations. Those who questioned the inevitability of an Archipelago dominated by Java would be similarly disappointed.

But such concerns apparently did little to derail the larger nation-building project. Contrary to many predictions Indonesia did not

¹ See Silberman, *A Prophet*, 230–231, 273.

² See Wood, "The Use of the Past," 193–195.

fragment after the fall of Suharto. Perhaps a degree of success had been achieved in the creation of a common history and identity. There were some exceptions. East Timor did leave Indonesia, but it possessed a totally different history from that of the rest of Archipelago. The East Timorese had no experience of Dutch occupation, the Revolution or the PKI. Irian Jaya was only tentatively connected to the three. It was where various Indonesian nationalists were interned in the 1930's and its integration into the Republic of Indonesia was long a goal of nationalists in the post-Independence period; it became part of Indonesia in 1969. But it remained a symbol rather than an actual place whose people shared a genuine past with the other regions and peoples of Indonesia. Aceh had a long history of Islamic inspired defiance. Aceh had fought the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Japanese and both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. It has always seen itself as something unique, something that would only be part of Indonesia on its own terms. In none of these cases have desires for regional autonomy been able to win much sympathy from the larger Indonesian population. The rest of the Archipelago seems to accept the proposition that Indonesia is, and has always been, a single entity with a common past and that all regions would naturally want to remain within the Republic despite any short-term resentment. This is in contrast to Yugoslavia, another multi-ethnic country, where history fueled fragmentation rather than unity. The leadership under Tito relied on economic and social progress to foster national integration. History was a divisive element in society, even the significance of recent events like the Second World War could not be agreed upon. As economic and political arrangements began to crumble in the early 1990's appeals were made to historical myths that were unique to each of the county's ethnic groups. These national myths, based on partisan readings of history, inflamed conflict, while confirming the identities of those involved; often history (and religion) was a firmer marker of ethnic identity and group loyalty than language.³ Thus, Yugoslavia fell apart, Indonesia did not.

³ See Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1994), Chapter 1; Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (Toronto: Viking Press, 2000), 11-13; Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 33-40.

This may have been because by the time Suharto stepped down Indonesia had succeeded in constructing a common history whereas Yugoslavia despite decades of prosperity—certainly relative to Indonesia, although the latter had made considerable progress—had not. Whether this is solely because of the New Order is doubtful. Sukarno had tried to rally Indonesian nationalists to work against the Dutch with references to the past accomplishments of Majapahit, Srivijaya and Mataram. Such empires and kingdoms were part of a glorious past that would sustain Indonesia through a dark present as it moved towards a bright, promising future. Sukarno continued to see Indonesia's past as important for the present after Independence had been achieved; Indonesia's first president reminded the population that they had existed as a unified nation long before the Dutch arrived. Independent Indonesia was predisposed to look at regional concerns with suspicion. The leadership believed that a unitary state was necessary to guard against Dutch attempts to retain or regain power by means of some sort of federal system. Even as early as the "regional rebellions" of the late 1950's, Indonesia's unity seemed pretty assured. Insurgents in Sumatra and Sulawesi who defied the central government did so because they felt that Indonesia as a whole was going in the wrong direction not because they wished for independence for their regions. But New Order history may have helped strengthen an existing belief in Indonesia's innate unity, by elaborating on a nationalist past developed earlier by Yamin and Sukarno, by codifying the pantheon of national heroes and by linking ancient golden ages with the modern achievements of the Revolution and its 1965 defense.

However, history may have been of much more dubious value in keeping the New Order itself in power. History might be viewed as an effective tool in increasing a regime's power and legitimacy. As noted earlier, many journalists and scholars have detected the use of historical symbols in the pronouncements of nationalist leaders in Cambodia. Such diverse leaders as Sihanouk, Lon Nol and Pol Pot, looked back on an ancient Angkor, mostly resurrected by French scholars, as a model of what modern Cambodians could do if properly inspired and motivated. This Angkor was not only notable for its impressive architectural, artistic and agricultural achievements, but for its passive population who without question or complaint obeyed the orders of their semi-divine rulers; Cambodia's modern population would presumably be expected to do the same, whether that

ruler is a prince or a communist cadre.⁴ Of course, none of these regimes can really be seen as very successful; Angkor Wat, reproduced on every Cambodian flag devised since 1945, was probably a more effective symbol in encouraging attachment to a national identity than loyalty to any one regime. Similarly, Indonesia's New Order leaders chose the specific past that would encapsulate their world-view, while being the most politically useful. The history chosen was one based on Majapahit. Gajah Mada's fourteenth century "Greater Java" was seen by the New Order as a proto-Indonesia, which may have encompassed most of the Archipelago. Although being a predominantly Hindu empire, Majapahit continued to be venerated long after its fall and many echoes of its culture can be observed in the ways and manners of the Muslim *kraton* of Central Java and ultimately in the thinking and actions of the New Order. The Revolution and the defeat of the PKI could also be viewed as modern efforts to defend and preserve this revered Majapahit against attacks by un-Indonesian elements. Like Majapahit, the New Order was clearly an authoritarian regime, where the great majority of the population was expected to gratefully obey the pronouncements of their rulers. Its rulers derived legitimacy from military strength, from bureaucratic ability and from the command of a state-ideology that stressed the good of society over individual rights. During the periods between elections Indonesian society was largely de-politicized; the majority of the population who lived in the countryside was declared a "floating mass" which was to refrain from any political activity on the grounds that this would interfere with the more important goal of development. Unions, civic organizations, most of the bureaucracy and even legislators were politically powerless. Real decisions were made at the top, by the president, by the military and by various bodies of skilled advisors. The New Order confirmed its right to rule through regular exercises in "Pancasila-democracy." General Elections, to choose a parliament that would ultimately choose the nation's president, were seen as examples of a *pesta demokrasi* (festival of democracy). Consulting the Indonesian people at the ballot box was intended as a Majapahit-style ritual to confirm that the universe was unfolding as it should, rather than as a real mechanism

⁴ See David Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 6, 284–285 and Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk*, 42.

to choose political representatives. Indonesia's citizens were simply supposed to agree that their interests were being taken care of, in the same way that the subjects of Majapahit would stand in awe of their king as he toured his realm (as is described in the *Nagarakertagama*).

Unlike the ruler of Majapahit, Suharto was not the semi-divine object of a state cult. But he did promote his own reading of Pancasila as the only one that was acceptable. Pancasila, the state philosophy of Indonesia first emerged in 1945, ostensibly conceived of by Sukarno, with perhaps some help from Yamin. Under the New Order its principles, which were of sufficient vagueness to earn the support of many diverse groups in Indonesian society, began to be treated in a much more restricted manner. Official interpretations of Pancasila were presented as the only true ones and the word Pancasila began to take on a symbolic meaning independent of the principles themselves. From 1978 onwards the regime undertook an intensive program of indoctrination, among students and government employees, in the approved tenets of Pancasila. In 1985 Pancasila was made the "sole basis" of all civic, labour and religious organizations.⁵ Like the state-cult of Majapahit, the New Order's take on what Indonesians were to believe was not to be questioned. Pancasila was specifically linked to Majapahit through means of the national coat-of-arms. This crest consisted of five fields, each of which represented one of the five principles, backed by a golden *garuda* (a Hindu symbol) and over the Old Javanese motto, *bhinneka tunggal ika* (unity in diversity).

In the end the New Order's long spell in power was probably due more to its performance than to a skilful use of history. It was able to restore order after the economic and political chaos of the late Guided Democracy period, although at a great cost in lives. It started Indonesia down the road of economic development. However, in the 1990's Indonesia's economy began to falter; the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis wiped out many of the gains made during the preceding decades of New Order rule. Unable to provide the type of leadership necessary to overcome a critical political and economic situation, Suharto stepped down in 1998. The New Order's history, of golden ages, Gajah Mada and noble *pahlawan*, of Surabaya, Sudirman and PKI treachery, was insufficient to keep Suharto in power. The regime

⁵ See Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London: Routledge, 1995).

failed to meet the political and economic challenges of the present, despite its successes at constructing an inspiring past. An invented past can have its uses, but perhaps not the uses that its creators intended. History can build a nation but not save a state, nor save a president. No doubt post-New Order governments will have to keep these insights in mind as Indonesia moves into an uncertain future.

GLOSSARY

- ABRI:** Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia. The Indonesian Armed Forces.
- Angkor Wat:** temple complex built in Cambodia in the tenth century. Discovered by French archaeologists, it was later a nationalist symbol.
- ASEAN:** Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
- Babad:** traditional Javanese type of historical writing.
- Betwai:** Batavian, term referring to the local inhabitants and dialect of Jakarta.
- bhinneka tunggal ika:*** unity in diversity. National motto of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Borobodur:** Buddhist shrine built in Java in the ninth century.
- candi:*** Javanese temples. Hindu or Buddhist in orientation.
- dakwah:*** propagation of the Islamic faith.
- dalang:*** the puppet master of the *wayang*. Also describes one who works behind the scenes in a plot or conspiracy.
- dangdut:*** a type of Indonesian music that combines traditional local, Middle Eastern and Western popular elements.
- desantara:*** other countries outside of the immediate core control of Majapahit.
- diplomasi:*** during the Indonesian Revolution the strategy of negotiation. It involved agreements with the Dutch for limited autonomy and gaining international support.
- dwipantara/nusantara:*** other islands outside the immediate control of Majapahit.
- gamelan:*** traditional form of Javanese and Balinese music.
- garuda:*** Vishnu's eagle steed, an Indonesian nationalist symbol.
- G-30-S/GESTAPU:** Gerakan September Tigapuluh, September 30 Movement. A political grouping involved in the 1965 coup attempt.
- gotong-royong:*** a Javanese term meaning "working together." A type of social co-operation encouraged by the New Order.
- Guided Democracy:** 1959–1965. Period during which Sukarno ruled in a semi-dictatorial manner, while balancing the ambitions of the communists and the army.
- hajj:*** the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.
- halus:*** a Javanese term meaning "refined." Highly regarded Javanese mannerisms identified by the New Order as being an important part of Indonesian identity.
- Hikayat:*** traditional Malay type of historical writing.
- Ho-Ling:** a Chinese term for Java.
- Indische:*** an architectural style that combined European and local elements.
- jihad:*** commonly translated as "holy war" a definition that is the subject of much current controversy as it implies the spread of religion through force. It might also imply the furtherance of Muslim interests through other means or self-sacrifice for a cause, which would benefit the whole Indonesian community, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
- Keamanan dan ketertiban/ruste en ordre:*** Indonesian and Dutch terms for "security and order."
- Konfrontasi:** political and military campaign during the Guided Democracy period resisting the creation of an independent Malaysia.
- kramat:*** in Java the venerated tombs of noted Islamic figures.
- kraton:*** the palace of a traditional Javanese ruler.
- kris:*** a traditional curved blade sword, common in Java and elsewhere in Indonesia.
- krocong:*** indigenous music that combines Portuguese, Eurasian, Dutch and local elements.

- kyai*: a Javanese term referring to a venerated Islamic religious figure, usually a religious scholar and often head of a *pesantren*.
- Mahabharata*: an Indian epic, traditional source material for the *wayang*.
- Majapahit: the last major Hindu state in Java. Between the late thirteenth and early fifteenth centuries it exercised a degree of control over much of the Indonesian Archipelago. It was seen as a “proto-Indonesia” by later nationalists.
- Majelis Ulama Indonesia: MUI, Council of Indonesian Ulama.
- Marhaenism: an ideology developed by Sukarno that stressed the importance of Indonesia’s small peasant landowners. An attempt to adapt Marxism to Indonesian conditions.
- Masyumi: Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims. Initially sponsored by the Japanese, this Islamic party achieved some electoral success before being banned in 1960.
- Mataram: an Islamic sultanate that ruled over Java for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the name of an eighth century Hindu polity.
- merdeka*: freedom. Refers to independence from foreign political, economic and cultural domination.
- Nagarakertagama*: a fourteenth century Javanese text that describes Majapahit.
- NASAKOM: *nasionalisme, agama, komunisme*, nationalism, religion, communism. An ideological synthesis on the part of Sukarno during the Guided Democracy Period, seen as a possible basis for organizing Indonesia.
- New Order: 1966–1998. Period during which Indonesia was dominated by Suharto.
- Nusantara: the Indonesian Archipelago.
- pahlawan*: heroes. Those who have fought for Indonesian independence and unity.
- palapa*: an unidentified luxury item, possibly a fruit, that Gajah Mada, vowed to give up until he unified the Indonesian Archipelago.
- Pancasila: the “five principles.” The basis of Indonesian national ideology since the 1945 Proclamation of Independence.
- “Pancasila democracy”: controlled elections during the New Order.
- pasisir*: the north coast of Java, home of a distinct Islamic-oriented culture.
- pemuda/laksyar*: during the Indonesian Revolution youth who formed themselves into militia. Later replaced by the less radical regular armed forces.
- perang kemerdekaan*: war of independence. A struggle for simple political independence as opposed to a more radical political and social transformation.
- perjuangan*: armed struggle. An approach that stressed armed resistance to the Dutch occupation as opposed to diplomacy.
- pesantren*: in Java a traditional Islamic boarding school.
- pesta demokrasi*: “democracy party.” New Order-era general elections that stressed the appearance of popular participation rather than its reality.
- PETA: Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Fatherland. An Indonesian militia sponsored by the Japanese. A component of the infant Indonesia army.
- PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party.
- Prambanan: Hindu temple complex built in Java in the eighth to ninth centuries.
- puputan*: a Balinese term referring to a mass suicide or a helpless last stand against overwhelming odds. Often marked the passing of an old order.
- pusaka*: in Java sacred relics owned by rulers and holy men. Include magic weapons, tools and jewelry.
- Ramayana*: an Indian epic, traditional source material for the *wayang*.
- Ratu Adil*: “just prince.” Frequently prophesied figure who would come to Java and reorder the world in a harmonious manner.
- “Sabang to Merauke”: popular nationalist slogan, while Irian Jaya was still under Dutch control. Sabang (in Aceh) and Merauke (in Irian Jaya) represent the outermost boundaries of Indonesia.
- Sailendras: a Buddhist dynasty that built Borobodur. They later ruled Srivijaya.

- Sejarah*: traditional Malay type of historical writing. Also the modern Indonesian word for history.
- Serekat Islam (SI): Islamic Association. Founded in 1912, it was the first mass political organization in Indonesia.
- “social revolutions”: during the Indonesian Revolution a series of popular outbursts directed against traditional rulers and Dutch allies.
- Srivijaya: Buddhist trading empire centered on Palembang, Sumatra. Controlled the Straits of Malacca between the seventh and eleventh centuries.
- sumpah sakti*: a oath taken by Gajah Mada to unify the Indonesian Archipelago.
- Supersemar: Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret. Authorization Letter of March 11, 1966. Order signed by Sukarno transferring extraordinary powers to Suharto. Semar is also the clown-god in the *wayang*.
- Ta-Chih (Shih): a Chinese term that may refer to early Arab visitors to Java.
- Tanah Air Kita: “our land and water.” An Indonesian expression referring to their country.
- Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII): Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park.
- Tentara Nasional Indonesia: Pre and post-New Order name for the Indonesian armed forces.
- ulama*: traditional Islamic scholars.
- ummat*: the world-wide Islamic community.
- Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC): the United Dutch East Indies Company.
- wali songo*: nine saints who according to tradition brought Islam to Java. They, and their graves are still venerated today.
- wayang*: traditional puppet plays popular in Java, Bali and other parts of Southeast Asia. *Wayang kulit* involves skin puppets performing behind a lit screen.
- yawabhumi*: the land of Java. The core areas of Majapahit.

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