PART EIGHT

BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC

CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

DIO CHRYSOSTOM

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Most of the orations of Dio Chrysostom pursue what has been called (broadly) a 'moralizing' agenda, in line with the author's self-projection as a hardy, practical philosopher. His use of narrative to serve this end (finding an obvious precedent in Plato→) has been the focus of a certain amount of recent work; but, as commentators have stressed, there is also a strong current of irony, and indeed indulgent pleasure, running through his works, sometimes running contrary to the narrowly moralizing trajectory.[1] Dio pays sustained, and self-conscious, attention to the role of narration within his works, which emerges as a complex, devious and even morally ambiguous phenomenon.

Dio's orations are designed for public performance, and the primary narratorial voice almost always reflects upon the speaker:[2] either 'Dio' himself presents autobiographical experiences as an internal narrator,[3] or we are dealing with a narratorial *alter ego*.[4] Most importantly, the narratives almost always at some level reflect analogically upon the pedagogical relationship between 'Dio' and his primary narratees: it is, as I shall call it, 'metapedagogic'.

There are two principal literary contexts for Dionic metapedagogy. Firstly, a significant number of his texts are dialogues. Dialogic utterances are not necessarily 'narrative' in the conventional understand-

[1] '… one typical trait … [is] a degree of reticence, and the sense of narrative resourcefulness is held in check by an overriding moral responsibility' (Anderson 2000: 143); see also Saïd 2000, who sees a less hierarchical relationship between the two elements.

[2] The exceptions are arguably *Orations* 28 and 29 on Melancomas, at least if they are to be read side by side: the primary narrator of 28, who states that he has never seen Melancomas (28.5), cannot be the narrator of 29, who claims to have been a close friend of his (29.1).

[3] Especially *Orations* 1, 7, 13, 36.

[4] Principally in orations 6 and 8–10, the 'Diogenes orations'; but also in orations 53–55, on Homer and Socrates respectively, and in 56–57, which focus upon the role of Nestor.

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ing of the term, but it is helpful to consider them in this context, partly because there are important overlaps with Dio's practice in more straightforwardly narrative contexts, and partly because (at the level of literary form) dialogue is so often interwoven with narrative: although some texts are 'straight' dialogue,[5] some frame the dialogue with an indication on the part of the primary narrator of where he heard it,[6] after the fashion of Plato's *Republic* (→).[7] Still others use dialogue to frame a central speech: the intriguing piece *Charidemus* (oration 30) uses a dialogic frame to report a deathbed oration by its subject (a structure derived from Plato's *Phaedo*);[8] while oration 74 begins as a dialogue (74.1), but the next 28 chapters adopt the form of an oration (with the frame unclosed at the conclusion).

In several of these dialogues, the dramatic scene is metapedagogical: the interlocutor plays the role of acquiescent narratee (55, 56, 67, 70), his function being to represent conventional opinion (*doxa*), offsetting the brilliant but deviant pedagogical narrator. In the sixtieth oration, the narrator early on secures the narratee's assent that they must speak 'contrary to the *doxa* of the many' (60.2). The responses of narratees may express shock at the narrator's challenges to received opinion ('What! Do you consider it the mark of insanity in a man to wish to be very highly prized and to amass great wealth?' 77/78.9), or 'amazement' (*thauma*) at his outlandish utterances (55.9; cf. in a non-dialogic context 80.1, where the narratees are said to express *thauma* at the solitary wandering of 'Dio'). The course of the dialogue can trace the 'conversion' of the narratee, most notably in oration 56, where the narratee's conclusion contains the observation that 'I am at last beginning to understand the drift of your argument'.[9] Of course, the assent of a 'metapedagogic' narratee does not guarantee that of a 'pedagogic' reader: one function of such all-too-acquiescent interlocutors may be, paradoxically, to inspire disagreement (and hence to develop the reader's critical autonomy). Elsewhere the narratee may be more feisty (especially in oration 60), though none aggressively challenges the

[5] *Orations* 14, 21, 23, 25, 26, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 67, 70, 77/78.

[6] *Orations* 15, 28, 36.9–15, 58.

[7] Cf. 'After coming up from the harbour …' (28.1) / 'I went down yesterday to the Piraeus …' (Pl. *Rep.* 327a).

[8] See Trapp 2000: 223–224; and esp. Moles 2000: 200–202 on the intertwined narrative voices.

[9] For 'conversion dialogues', or *logoi protreptikoi*, see Schäublin 1985.

pedagogical authority of 'Dio', as Thrasymachus does to Socrates in Plato's *Republic*, or Callicles and Polus in the *Gorgias*.

The principal vehicles for Dionic metapedagogy, however, are the exemplary stories, or 'parables' (as I shall call them), that percolate his oeuvre.[10] I shall begin by focusing upon the first four orations, which contain some of the most extravagant and intriguing examples. These so-called *Kingship orations* are assumed by most scholars to have been addressed to the emperor Trajan,[11] although it should be noted that the narratees of the second and fourth orations are covert (whereas the first and third are explicitly addressed to the emperor). Dio artfully varies his parabolic practice in these texts: the first oration is framed by two narratives, one an apparently traditional encounter between Timotheus and Alexander (marked as such by *phasi*, 'they say': cf. 'it is said that', 2.1; 'they say that', 4.1), the other a quasi-autobiographical presentation of a supposed event in Dio's life; the second and fourth orations consist of dialogues reported by a narrator, who asserts his presence in an opening frame; the third opens with a narrative about Socrates and the Persian, which is then revealed as a negative paradigm (3.2). All these narratives constitute attempts to use analogy to steer the primary narratee's ('Trajan's) reception of the primary narrator's ('Dio's) speech by providing paradigms of kingship, evaluated in accordance with the receptivity of the king in question towards philosophical learning.[12]

Moreover, each (apart from the negative paradigm of the third oration) dramatizes the response, be it good or bad, of a secondary or tertiary 'narratee' to a 'narrator': the parabolic narratives construct an interpretative frame for the response of primary narrator to narratee. I use apostrophes for the secondary 'narrator' and 'narratee' because the situations alluded to are not always straightforwardly narrative. Not every presentation in the dialogues is narrative, on a strict definition.[13]

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[10] I concentrate upon the richest examples, although Dio uses this device with great frequency: 1.1–3; 1.50–84; 2; 3.1–2; 4; 5; 7.1–80; 16.10; 17.13–18; 20.19–23; 21.4, 6; 43.4–6; 57; 58; 60.9–10; 62; 66.6. See also Saïd 2000: 171–174; → Lucian's parables. I shall not discuss here the various orations to the cities (orations 31–35) or those on civic matters (orations 38–51): although these are frequently in one sense narrative (defending one's conduct, for example, necessarily involves telling a story), they are more amenable to the techniques of rhetorical analysis than narratology.

[11] For bibliography and discussion of the problem of audiences, see Whitmarsh 2001a: 325–327.

[12] Moles 1990.

[13] → Introduction and → Plato for the argument that dialogue can be considered a form of narrative.

In the parable that opens the first oration, can we count the flautist, Timotheus, as a narrator, and his audience, Alexander, as a narratee? In the narrated dialogues of the second and fourth orations, do the moral points exchanged count as narrative?

In what follows, I have adopted generous definitions, because the metapedagogic strategy does depend fundamentally upon the distribution of narrator/narratee roles between the figures in the dialogue. In the fourth oration, for example, Alexander (serving on this occasion as a secondary narratee) responds passionately: 'He flushed and grew angry' (4.18); 'in fear' (4.26); 'he became upset and aggrieved' (4.49). Clearly, this can be taken as a negative paradigm for an imperial response to moral improvement (and indeed the description of Alexander's arrogant character that opens the oration has already prepared the way for this). This chimes with what we might suppose to be the primary frame for the delivery of this oration, i.e. Dio to the emperor. In the second oration, however, the responses of Alexander are not described, whereas those of Philip are: Philip 'laughs at' (2.13, 17) and 'teases' (2.19) Alexander; he also 'betrays awe' (2.7), 'something close to anger' (2.16), and 'delight' (2.79) at him. The ambivalent responses of Alexander's 'narratee' suggest perhaps that the target audience of the second *Kingship oration* is not Trajan but a Greek audience, who are being encouraged to consider their responses to Roman imperial power.[14]

In the complex parable that concludes the first oration, however, it is certainly a *narrative* (in the strict sense) that we are dealing with. 'Dio', functioning as internal narrator, promises a 'sacred and salutary story (*logos*) in the guise of a myth (*muthos*)' (1.49): in a sequence modelled on Socrates' encounter with Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*, he claims to have met with an Elean or Arcadian prophetess (1.50–84), who presented to him a narrative. The larger part of this secondary narrative consists of a version of the famous story of Heracles' choice, familiar from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.1.21–34): Hermes guided Heracles to two mountains, one representing kingship and the other tyranny, and asked him to choose between the two (1.69–77). Hermes' advice makes him a tertiary narrator and Heracles a tertiary narratee. In this narrative, Hermes 'figures' the pedagogic role of the primary narrator, and Heracles that of the primary narratee, who is thus steered towards true

[14] Whitmarsh 2001a: 204.

kingship (and simultaneously to a favourable reception of the present oration).[15] In this particularly ingenious text, then, the metapedagogic fiction analogizing the primary narrator–narratee relationship resides at the third level of narration, the secondary narration serving as a flamboyant, platonizing intermediary between the two.

Prior to this narrative, however, comes another, particularly sophisticated and knowing, engagement with the primary narratee. The prophetess prognosticates a future occasion when her (secondary) narratee 'Dio' will report the tale to 'the ruler of many lands and peoples … even if there will be those who will ridicule you as a rambling (*planēs*) wind-bag' (1.56). This future-time narration maps onto the supposed narrative scenario in the present ('Dio' addresses the emperor). Even in this context, where there is no figuration, i.e. where the secondary narrator/narratee maps exactly onto the primary narrator/narratee, there is a protreptic directive: the negative response of deriding 'Dio' as a windbag is stigmatized and (ideally) defused. (The passage is also a joke, however: Dio the *planēs*, the 'wandering philosopher', often ironizes his own 'wandering' narrative style.)[16]

This playfully involved imbrication of primary and embedded narrative situations exemplifies nicely Dio's manipulative narrative skill. It is arguable, however, that matters are even more complex than this. The fifty-seventh oration, *Nestor*, appears to be a preamble for a performance of one of the *Kingship orations* before a Greek audience: at any rate, it presents the narrative of Nestor's speeches to Agamemnon as a parable for the 'words I spoke before the emperor' (57.11).[17] Whether all or any of the *Kingship orations* themselves were originally performed before Trajan we cannot tell for sure; the *Nestor*, however, means that we may have to refine our account of the narrative scenario of at least one of them. If preambled by this text, the *Kingship oration* in question—that is, the sum of words addressed to the emperor—would itself become a secondary narrative, the imperial addressee (if we are dealing with the first or the third orations, which explicitly address the emperor) would become a secondary narratee, the parabolic narratives tertiary narratives, and what we have called the tertiary narratives of the first oration (assuming that is the oration in question) quartary narratives.

[15] Moles 1990.
[16] Whitmarsh 2001a: 160 n. 108.
[17] Whitmarsh 2001a: 327.

That this narratological complexity in Dio's parabolic narratives is artfully thought out should be clear enough from the examples above, but there are also passages where his practice is explicitly discussed. The sixtieth oration is a dialogue between (apparently) Dio and an unnamed interlocutor, interpreting the narrative of Nessus and Deianeira. The dialogue form was discussed above; for now I want to concentrate upon the closing speech of the interlocutor, who is permitted, almost exceptionally among Dio's dialogues, a remarkably vigorous challenge to Dio's interpretation:

> By heaven, it seems to me not a bad or unconvincing [interpretation], either. And somehow or other I have the feeling that the method of some philosophers in dealing with their arguments resembles in a way that of the makers of figurines. For these craftsmen produce a mould, and whatever clay they put into this they form into the shape of the mould; and some of the philosophers before now have proved like that, with the result that whatever myth or story they take in hand, by tearing it to pieces and moulding it to suit their fancy they render it beneficial and suited to philosophy. (60.9)

The interlocutor's final speech, from which this passage is drawn, closes the dialogue without reply: the reader is left with an unresolved, and provocatively critical, assessment of Dio's parabolic practice. This is interesting in terms of the dynamics of the dialogue form: the combative rejoinder of the narratee (already pre-empted by his earlier expression of caution that 'We may destroy the myth', 60.30) ironizes the speaker's ('Dio's') moral authority, and steers primary narratees towards a more active engagement with his parabolic practice. It is notable also that this interlocutor is granted a certain narratorial authority by his magisterial use of simile himself: the comparison to a maker of figurines constructs him as a pedagogically competent figure.

A more explicit commentary on the function of parabolic narratives comes in the fifth, *Libyan*, oration. The larger part of this (5.5–27) is taken up with the narration of a supposedly traditional myth ('it is said that …', 5.5), but the opening frame (5.1–5) explains the role of this narration. The primary narrator 'Dio' begins by observing that a 'myth' (*muthos*) at first sight does not provide promising material, but that 'subjects that are guided in the proper direction and act as parables for (*paraballomena*) true reality' provide no small amount of usefulness (*khreia*). The implicit connection here between *muthos* and pleasure, on the one hand, and *logos* ('rational account') and utility, on the other, is deeply embedded in Greco-Roman thought, going back via Stoic

theory at least to Thucydides (1.22.4). In the following passage (5.2–3), he compares his practice to agricultural grafting: he is attaching a 'useful, edifying *logos*' onto 'useless myths' (5.3). Framed by this explicit moralizing preamble, the myth of the sexy, siren-like serpent women of Libya who tempt men to their death, a brood later wiped out by Heracles, is easily decoded as an allegory of the conquest of sexual lust by philosophical hardiness (an explanation that is in any case made explicit at 5.23–24).

This programme is at first blush straightforward: the primary narratees are being directed towards moral improvement. The exposition of the myth, however, is more complex. The narrator's promise to 'gratify' (*epikharizesthai*) the younger members of his audience with a little bit more mythologizing (5.24–27) ties up worryingly with the general emphasis upon the dangers of male lust within the narrative proper: the last story tells of two Greek 'young men' travelling in Libya, led onto a gruesome death by the sight of what they take as a sexy local harlot.[18] On this interpretation, the promise of exotic sexual pleasure to the young men within the narrative encodes an allegory for the promise of exotic narrative pleasure to the primary narratees, both false promises: pleasure is substituted in the first case by painful death, in the second by painful but salutary moral lesson. This interpretation cannot be a complete one, however, because it insists that narrative pleasure must necessarily be overmastered by moral vigour; whereas nothing can guarantee that primary narratees will not take pleasure in this pornographic snuff-movie of a parable. Unless the reader is truly Heraclean—and for Stoics, no man is truly wise—the beast within will survive the heroic moralizing.

The question of the pleasure of narratees is one of abiding interest to Dio, especially given his self-consciousness about the potentially uncongenial nature of his material. In several places, secondary narratees are used as a device to stigmatize negative responses to his moralizing. In the dialogue *Agamemnon or on kingship* (*Oration* 56), the Dionic figure begins by asking whether hearing about as ancient a figure as Agamemnon is likely to 'annoy' his interlocutor; the latter responds that he would not be aggrieved even if he were to hear of still older

[18] Cf. the two cases of an uncontrollable lust among male onlookers: 5.14, 26. The serpent women are presented in notably erotic terms ('bosom and breasts': 5.12, 14, 25); the myth has been justifiably compared (cf. now Anderson 2000: 155–156) to that of the alluring but deadly Vine-women and Ass-legs in Lucian's *True stories* (1.8; 2.46).

figures, 'providing I am likely to be improved' (56.1). This commendable narratee rightfully puts instruction first. Analogously, the contumacious interlocutor of the sixtieth dialogue (*On Chryseis*), discussed above, is advised by the Dionic figure: 'Do not be grouchy (*duskolos*) when you follow the argument', advice to which his interlocutor explicitly accedes (60.2).

One important passage in connection with narrative pleasure comes in the eighth oration, *Diogenes or on virtue*. Orations 6 and 8–10 form a group of narratives presented by an external narrator focusing upon Diogenes the Cynic, each reporting a substantial speech uttered by Diogenes to unnamed individuals or masses in the cities. As so often in Dio, the relationship between secondary narrator and narratee reflects metapedagogically upon that between their primary counterparts. The external primary narrator's voice is almost entirely covert, the occasional parenthetic *oimai* ('I imagine') constituting an isolated and hardly obtrusive exception (8.36; 9.1): in general, the *persona* of Diogenes is allowed to shade imperceptibly into that of the narrator, his near-homonym. The secondary narratees of the Diogenes orations (i.e. those addressed by Diogenes) stand for *doxa* (common opinion), the secondary narrator Diogenes (and implicitly the primary narrator 'Dio') for the radical voice of philosophical enlightenment. In general, the responses of secondary narratees are predictable enough, dramatizing the eccentric but powerful role of the philosopher: 'some admired him … to others he seemed crazy' (9.8). But the eighth oration concludes in an interesting and unusual manner:

> While Diogenes thus spoke, many stood around and listened to his words with great pleasure. Then, possibly being put in mind of the act of Heracles, he stopped speaking, squatted on the ground and performed an indecency. Immediately, the masses scorned him, and the sophists started up their din again, like frogs in a pond when they do not see the water-snake. (8.36)

In this case, the secondary narratees respond with pleasure … and the secondary 'narrator'—though it is hardly a narrative act he performs here—reacts by defaecating on the ground. Or, rather, by performing an *adoxon*, translated 'indecency' but also suggesting an affront to *doxa* or common opinion. The Augean stable that Diogenes attempts to clear out is the mistaken assumption, fostered by the sophists, that pleasure is the proper aim of language. As with the conclusion of the *Libyan oration*, this represents a coded threat to the primary narratees, warning them not to miss the water-snake concealed in his genial

narrative. At the same time, this closing narrative itself operates at a pleasurable, or perhaps seriocomic, level: it is an amusing twist to find defaecation used to establish a philosophical position after the sermon has been misinterpreted by the secondary narratees. This is a cunning joke on all who would wish to make sense of this oration: what sort of meaning does this shit have? Is it just a joke? Is there any metapedagogical value in it? What would be gained from treating the observers of this shit as secondary narratees? An ingenious double bind, then: pleasurable responses to narrative are stigmatized in a passage itself saturated with ludic narrative pleasures.

Some of Dio's parables are more complex. In the thirty-sixth (*Olbian*) oration, 'Dio' functioning as an internal primary narrator recounts to (according to the manuscripts) a Prusan audience about a journey of his to Olbia; embedded therein is a narrative that he claims to have presented as a secondary narrator to the Olbians. This consists largely of a tertiary narrative, a (Stoicizing) cosmic myth supposedly told by the Persian Magi (39–61), which completes the oration. The secondary narratees (the Olbians) are characterized as culturally ambiguous (they practise pederasty, 8; they like Homer, 9; they have beards and Homerically long hair, 17; but they wear trousers and Scythian garb, 7; and 'no longer speak Greek clearly', 9).[19] The metapedagogical role of the secondary narratees is not self-evident: do they preserve a true, vital Hellenism, unlike that artificially ossified by Roman conquest (cf. 17 for anti-Roman sentiment among the Olbians)? Or are they debased, barbarized Greeks, childlike in their lack of sophistication (cf. 10–11, where the secondary narrator 'Dio' recommends to them the simple, gnomic poet Phocylides)? The challenge, for the primary narratees, is to establish what is the relevance of the secondary narrative to them, and how to respond to the cues of the secondary narratees (since this will implicate their own cultural definition); that is, how the 'argument' function of the narrative relates to the 'key' function. This sense of uncertainty is characteristic of Dio's pedagogical style,

The famous eleventh (*Trojan*) oration is also in a sense a metapedagogic parable: the primary narrator 'Dio' claims to instruct his primary narratees (11.1), and to remove the *doxa* ('common opinion') from them (11.3). In line with his complaint elsewhere that only the intelligent few understand philosophy (cf. 5.1; 11.145; 60.2), he predicts a frosty

[19] See further Moles 1995; Trapp 1995.

response: 'I know you will all think that this is false, except the wise' (11.124). Yet for all that its narratorial voice is parasitic upon that of the moral parables, this oration is a *jeu d'esprit*. It purports to address narratees in contemporary Troy,[20] offering them the supposedly comforting suggestion that Troy was never captured, the Homeric texts being implausible fictions. The *Beglaubigungsapparat* that underpins this claim is a narrative, presented by 'Dio' functioning as internal narrator, about a trip of his to Egypt (11.37–124): a 'very old priest in Onuphis' (11.37), he reports, told him the true story about Troy (a device that looks knowingly to Hdt. *Hist.* 2.118–119). Homeric correction is, of course, rife in the literature of the empire, and Dio's contribution should be viewed in the context of the journals of Dictys and Dares, as well as Philostratus' *Heroic tale*.[21] A further consideration is the possible congeniality of Dio's revisionist account to Roman readers, the supposed descendants of Trojan Aeneas.[22] But ultimately, the oration acts not as a simple vehicle for Romanizing ideology, but as a ludic challenge to its primary narratees. The text begins with the observation that 'I am almost certain that while all people are hard to teach, they are easy to deceive' (11.1): a brilliantly playful ambiguity (will the following words teach or deceive?), which is only partially resolved by the narrator's subsequent insistence that he has the true account. This oration exploits the metapedagogic paradigm principally to pleasurable, ironical effect.

His most brilliant and celebrated moral parable comes in the seventh, *Euboean*, oration.[23] This is another autobiographical tale: 'I shall now relate events I saw myself, not things I heard from another' (7.1). The action is set on the island of Euboea, in 'practically the middle of Greece' (7.1): this marked location indicates to the readers that the narrative is to be paradigmatic of Hellenic values, while the surprising choice of Euboea (rather than, say, Athens or Delphi) as the near-centre figures the reversal of perspectives that 'Dio' will enforce upon his primary narratees. After a shipwreck, 'Dio' narrates, he was cast ashore in the Euboean wilderness, where he was given hospitality by a hunts-

[20] Seeck 1990; Anderson 2000: 152–153; Saïd 2000: 176–186.

[21] Esp. Merkle 1994: 194.

[22] That different versions of the myth will appeal to narratees of different cultures is a theme of this oration: 'You [Trojans] should be grateful and hear me gladly, for I have been zealous in defence of your ancestors' (5); 'there was some advantage in [believing the Homeric account] for the Greeks of those days [the time of the Persian Wars]' (147). For the 'Roman' theory, see Saïd 2000: 178–179, with references.

[23] Highet 1973; Russell 1992; Swain 1994; Moles 1995; Trapp 1995.

man. As they walk to his home, he becomes a (secondary) narratee: the huntsman tells him of his farming practices, and reports a visit to the town when he was charged with tax evasion. Within this secondary narrative, tertiary narration takes place: the huntsman and his prosecutor deliver speeches to the assembly (24–53); the huntsman is saved from the assembly's wrath by a certain Sotades, who narrates how he once benefited from the huntsman's hospitality (54–59). When the secondary narrative closes, 'Dio' reports that they reached the homestead, where he was well if simply entertained; presently, it transpired that the huntsman's daughter was to marry her boyfriend, the son of another cohabiting huntsman and the first huntsman's sister. The metapedagogical value of this narrative is then decoded, as it segues into a long, moralizing section about the superiority of rural over urban dwelling (7.81–152). The different parts of the oration are artfully interlinked. In the main autobiographical narrative, 'Dio' links his observations to aspects described in the secondary narrative;[24] while the narrative in places artfully foreshadows the moralizing section.[25]

As we have seen, Dio recurrently presents his narratives in terms of pleasure and utility. This particular example is framed by references to these principles. At the start, the narrator states that as an old man he recalls such events in his life 'not without pleasure' (*ouk ahēdōs*, 7.1); but at the conclusion of the narrative section, he states:

> Now I have not narrated this entire story idly, or—as some might think—because I am a chatterbox, but to present a paradigm (*paradeigma*) of the manner of life I originally adopted, and of the lifestyle of the poor … (7.81)

A parable that promised its primary narratees pleasure is revealed simultaneously to be paradigmatic of a larger moral argument about the superiority of rustic simplicity over urban decadence. Interestingly, in the present context, both the pleasure and the moral instruction (which are inextricably interlinked) are engendered by clashes of perspective between narrators and narratees. Dio's primary narratees are implicitly constructed as sophisticated urbanites, who are to be both

[24] See 64, where he jokes that the huntsman concealed 'the fairest of your possessions' (i.e. his vegetable patch) when he was being prosecuted; 68, where he asks whether this is the daughter who gave Sotades the cloak (cf. 58).

[25] Cf. 9: '[I found that] poverty is in reality a sacred and inviolable thing'; 65: 'I could not help deeming these people fortunate and thinking that of all men that I knew, they lived the happiest lives'. See also Swain 1994: 169.

amused by the extent of the rustics' naïveté and educated by their simple virtue. The narrator shuttles between the two perspectives, mediating between (and simultaneously embodying) the knowing intellect of the urbanites and the moral probity of the rustics.

On occasion, the pleasant humour is explicitly marked in the amused reaction of narratees at moments of miscomprehension between rustics and urbanites. In the huntsman's secondary narrative, his speech in the city (a tertiary narrative) is greeted with intermittent laughter (7.23, 24, 29, 30).[26] These occasions are not straightforward cues to the primary narratees, however: the aggressive and unsympathetic reaction of the city folk (tertiary narratees)[27] is offset against the more compassionate response of 'Dio' (the secondary narratee). Yet the events *are* amusing, and all the more so for that they are presented by a narrator (the huntsman) who remains apparently as ignorant as he was when the events took place (an issue to which we shall return). This is particularly evident when he narrates how he saw, 'square buildings on the walls' and 'ships peacefully moored as though in a lake' (7.22):[28] his naïve perspective upon two familiar phenomena of urban life, towers and harbours, is enclosed within and framed by the knowing perspective of the primary narrator/secondary narratee ('Dio') and primary narratees.

In the course of the narrative, the role of the internal narrator 'Dio' shifts from that of translator of an unfamiliar world—that is, a townsman interpreting the country for townsmen—to that of apologist for rustic values (and thus the concluding part of the narrative serves as a transition to the fiery moralism of the second part of the oration). At the beginning of the narrative, the character 'Dio' is cast as a powerless figure abandoned on the shore of an unfamiliar world (ever since the *Odyssey*, the shipwreck on the beach has been a familiar narrative topos). This powerlessness is cognitive as well as physical: 'Dio' the narrator recalls how he needed to make inferences from his surroundings. The presence of a deer lying on the beach and dogs barking on the cliff indicated to him that the deer had been forced over the cliff; the clothing of the man he subsequently met told him that he was a huntsman (7.4). As at the beginning of Heliodorus'

[26] The laughter at 64 and 68, on the other hand, is benign and non-aggressive.

[27] Characterized as a fickle 'mob' (*okhlos*, 7.23, 24, 29; *plēthos*, 30), whose reactions are easily manipulated by disreputable orators.

[28] The manuscripts transmit the glosses 'towers' and 'in the harbour' in these two phrases, but editors rightly delete them as marginal notes that have been incorporated into the text. See Russell 1992: 117.

Aethiopica, the primary narratees' knowledge of the scenario is built up inferentially: the internal narrator 'Dio' narrates according to his experiencing focalization, suppressing any *ex eventu* knowledge, and the narratees are dependent upon his interpretative powers.

By the conclusion of the narrative, 'Dio' is still apparently dependent upon the huntsman for an interpretation of the world: he wrongly suggests (with a misplaced laugh) that the rustics concealed their garden from the city folk (7.64). He assumes that the rustics will need the help of the rich in the village, when in fact the situation is more the converse (7.69); and he needs to ask a number of details about the arrangements for the wedding (7.70–72). There is, however, an important distinction to be drawn here between 'Dio' the agent in the story and 'Dio' the narrator: while the former may have been rooted in the town, the latter is (constructed as) an experienced traveller with a diverse range of cultural and phenomenal experience. One of the processes staged in this text is Dio's own transition from the blinkered city-man he was before his exile to the enlightened moralist and exponent of simple values he is at the time of narration. 'Dio' the agent is a naïf, needing instruction; 'Dio' the narrator, however, is a knowing figure, an instructor himself, closer to the huntsman. It is possible even that the huntsman (the secondary narrator) might be considered as an *alter ego* of 'Dio' (the primary narrator), a technique that looks back to Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*, or indeed the prophetess in Dio's first oration. It is also worth noting that none of the rustics is named: this too compounds the sense that they are fictitious paradigms of rusticity contrived to serve Dio's narrative purposes (and so the claim to autoptic experience that opens the oration would have to be read as an ironical play with a well-worn narrative formula, rather than a simple statement of fact). The *Euboean oration* relies upon the elegantly constructed distance between the perspective of the rustics and that of the townsfolk, but Dio himself shuttles artfully between the two, both engendering narrative irony and arrogating to himself moral authority.

Storytelling appears throughout Dio's corpus. Usually, as we have seen, it serves a metapedagogical function, analogizing the pedagogical relationship between primary narrator ('Dio') and his narratees. This metapedagogy, however, is not straightforward or self-evident; in fact, its instructive value may even be said to lie in its inculcation of critical skills that might allow primary narratees to negotiate the gulf between their situation and that of their second-, third- or fourth-order counterparts. Moreover, the role of metapedagogical presentations is compli-

cated by the narrator's stated awareness of the pleasurable seductions of narrative. The 'useful' effects of narrative never fully prevail over the 'pleasurable'. Rather than consider this philodiegetic impulse as a 'sophistic' dilution of 'philosophical' ideals (the dominant view since Philostratus, who includes Dio among the 'philosophers in the guise of sophists': *Lives of the sophists* 479, 492), it is preferable to conclude that Dio's narratives engage in a self-conscious, sophisticated, and (for sure) playful manner with the received theories of narration. His primary narratees, that is to say, are not simply to be instructed; or, perhaps better, they are not to be instructed *simply*. Narratees should think hard about narrative, and the role it plays in pedagogic communication.