INTRODUCTION

Suraiya Faroqhi and Fikret Adanir

In the present volume, the authors hope to contribute to the ongoing discussion of historiography concerning the Ottoman Empire, focusing on issues in one way or another relevant to the history of southeastern Europe. Such an enterprise must be viewed in the context of our discipline's self-examination, which has been going on for more than twenty years, since Edward Said published his scathing critique of 'orientalism'. Admittedly, Said's book but marginally addressed itself to the work of Ottomanists; yet it did not fail to make an impact on many thoughtful representatives of our field.[1]

In a different vein, our questioning also has been directed at the performance of national states in general, with those established in southeastern Europe, present-day Turkey included, as the center of attention. This questioning has gained in urgency due to the conflicts of recent years. Given the political context, present-day rethinking of Ottoman history will often include a re-examination of sultanic policies *vis-à-vis* dissident provincials, with special emphasis on those political measures evaluated negatively in the past.[2] Conflicts encouraging such a re-evaluation of the performance of both multi-ethnic empires and national states include the Cyprus war of 1974, the Lebanon conflagration (1975–1990), repressive measures against the Muslim minority in Bulgaria culminating in the mass expulsion of 1989, serious military confrontations in eastern Anatolia, and especially the horrors of the war in former Yugoslavia, of which the

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[1] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978). For much pertinent criticism of Ottomanists' assumptions, see Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State, The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany NY, 1991). For a recent evaluation of primary and secondary sources on Ottoman history see Klaus Kreiser, *Der osmanische Staat 1300–1922* (Munich, 2001).

[2] Engin Akarlı, *The Long Peace, Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1920* (Berkeley, 1993). For a different perspective, see Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire," *Politics and Society* 21, 4 (1993), 393–423, and also Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats, the Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, London, 1994).

Muslim Bosnians were among the principal victims. It is difficult to avoid asking oneself how these traumas might have been prevented. Some researchers will also wonder whether integration into a Muslim-based but secularized supranational state might not have opened up the road to a less confrontational future.[3]

But apart from this background more or less specific to our discipline, there also exist trends in other fields of history which encourage historians working in very different specialties to re-examine the value of their work. To begin with, there is the public concern with memory. While memory coincides with the results of historical research in certain areas, it noticeably diverges from scholarly reconstruction in many others.[4] Searching investigations into the memory of witnesses have been going on for the past decades, undertaken by historians, journalists and above all, film makers.[5] But at present this research is if anything intensifying, as the number of people who witnessed World War II and the Nazi mass murders dwindles every year. But by concerning themselves with the memories of eye witnesses, historians have had to confront the challenge that those most immediately involved often do not 'recognize themselves' in the historical reconstructions proposed by members of the discipline. Debating the links and cleavages between history and memory, historians have been obliged to rethink their own procedures. For active fields producing considerable numbers of studies every year, we possess recent book-length summaries which map the state of the field, criticize certain aspects of it and point to the current desiderata.[6]

Within the limits set by our linguistic and other capabilities, the contributors to the present volume attempt something similar. In the body of our text, we will survey the work which has been done by scholars active in the Balkan 'successor states' of the Ottoman Empire, and also in republican Turkey. But before we get to this point, it

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[3] In the economic realm, this questioning has been carried furthest by Michael Palairet, who has defended the thesis that the Ottoman Empire of Mahmud II and Abdülmecid I constituted a better framework for economic development in the Balkans than the nineteenth-century national states: Michael Palairet, *The Balkan Economies c. 1800–1914, Evolution without Development* (Cambridge, 1997).

[4] For a monumental collection of studies concerning these issues, compare Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les lieux de la mémoire, la République, la Nation, les France*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1997).

[5] For a historian's treatment compare Annette Wieviorka, *L'Ère du témoin* (Paris, 1998).

[6] Compare Michel Balard *et alii*, "Byzance, l'Orient chrétien et le monde turc", in Michel Balard (ed.), *L´histoire médiévale en France, bilan et perspectives* (Paris, 1991), 331–62.

seems necessary to discuss the links of twentieth-century historiography with the rich historical tradition of the Ottoman Empire itself. In this introduction, we will consequently examine the manner in which certain underlying themes of the great Ottoman chronicles, such as sultanic power, the Ottoman bureaucracy and warfare, have been treated in twentieth-century Ottomanist historiography.

Certainly, the present authors would submit that twentieth-century historiography departs from its Ottoman predecessor in two major ways. On the one hand, the relationships of the Ottoman world to its neighbors have been viewed by modern historians in a new and different perspective. However, the transition from Ottoman to post-Ottoman was gradual. While Ottoman chronicles down to the early nineteenth century regarded relations with the outside world purely as a matter of campaigns and treaties, authors of the following period attempted to explain the reasons for certain major events taking place outside the Ottoman frontiers. Such developments included the French Revolution or, later, even the rise of socialism.[7] Thus the foundations of a more broadly based history of the Ottoman Empire and its relations to various neighboring states were laid in the closing decades of the Ottoman period, even though more scholarly researches took place only during the later, republican epoch.

In the same vein, Byzantine history entered the consciousness of educated Ottomans in the late nineteenth century, when authors such as Ahmed Midhat, following European models, stigmatized the Byzantine Empire as the abode of 'fanaticism, absurdity and immorality'.[8] However, even Ahmed Midhat accepted that close parallels existed between Byzantium and the late Ottoman world, if only because both empires were embattled states under attack from all sides. In a lengthy article first published in 1931 and read by most Ottomanists of our generation, Fuat Köprülü, the founding father of Ottoman cultural history, came to the conclusion that few immediate links between the two socio-political systems can ever have

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[7] Christoph Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument, Ein Plädoyer für die Tanzīmāt vermittels der Historie. Die geschichtliche Bedeutung von Ahmed Cevdet Paşas Ta'rīḫ* (Münster, Hamburg, 1994); *idem*, "Mazdak, nicht Marx: Frühe osmanische Wahrnehmungen von Sozialismus und Kommunismus", in *Türkische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte von 1071 bis 1920*, ed. by Hans Georg Majer and Raoul Motika (Wiesbaden, 1995), 211–26.

[8] Michael Ursinus, "Byzantine History in Late Ottoman Turkish Historiography", in *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 10 (1986), 211–22; Christoph Herzog, *Geschichte und Ideologie: Mehmed Murad und Celal Nuri über die historischen Ursachen des osmanischen Niedergangs* (Berlin, 1996).

existed. After all, Byzantium was long past its prime when the Ottoman Turks appeared on the Anatolian scene.[9] However, while students were for a long time encouraged to think that Köprülü's article was the final word on the question, recent studies have shown that this is very far from being the case. Quite to the contrary, the Byzantine-Ottoman transition, and thus linkages between the two societies, have turned into a fruitful field of study, and the chapter by Klaus Peter Matschke in the present volume contains a comprehensive survey of recent research in this field.

Ottoman historians made frequent references to the embattled border areas, the *serhad*. Yet only in the twentieth century did historians working in Turkey begin to study the functioning of the Empire's sixteenth-century northern, southern and eastern borders in any detail. And even then, this concern was less intensive than one might have expected.[10] On the whole, border relations with the Habsburgs, and with the Russians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were left to the attentions of non-Turkish researchers.[11] In the same way, Ottoman-French, Ottoman-English and Ottoman-Dutch relations became the province of European and North American scholars, often though not exclusively from the states immediately concerned. In the Habsburg instance, mainly Austrians and Hungarians were intrigued by the complexities of border relations in peace and war.[12]

On the other hand, economic relations with Europe did become

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[9] Köprülüzade M. Fuat, "Bizans müesseselerinin Osmanlı müesseselerine te'siri hakkında bazı mülahazalar", *Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası* 1 (1931), 165–314.

[10] Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı-Rus rekabetinin menşei ve Don-Volga kanalı teşebbüsü", *Belleten* 12 (1948), 349–402; Bekir Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran siyâsî münasebetleri, I: 1578–1590* (Istanbul, 1962); Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun güney siyaseti. Habeş Eyaleti* (Istanbul, 1974).

[11] Exceptional are two studies by Kemal Beydilli: *Die polnischen Königswahlen und Interregnen von 1572 und 1576 im Lichte osmanischer Archivalien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der osmanischen Machtpolitik* (Munich, 1976), and *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar, XVIII. yüzyılda Osmanlı-Prusya münasebetleri* (Istanbul, 1985).

[12] Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (eds.), *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Budapest, 1994); Markus Köhbach, *Die Eroberung von Fülek durch die Osmanen 1554. Eine historisch-quellenkritische Studie zur osmanischen Expansion im östlichen Mitteleuropa* (Vienna, 1994); Claudia Roemer, *Osmanische Festungsbesatzungen in Ungarn zur Zeit Murads III. Dargestellt an Hand von Petitionen zur Stellenvergabe* (Vienna, 1995); Gábor Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans, Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22,1 (1998), 126–41. On Hungarians' treatment of the Ottoman-Hungarian border, in its entirety see the contribution by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor in the present volume.

a major field of research in Turkey from the 1970s onwards.[13] Scholarly interest focused on the Ottoman Empire's incorporation into the early modern and, later, into the fully capitalist world economy. Many of the historians concerned worked within the Wallersteinian model and asked themselves how, and at what time, the Ottoman territories became part of a dependent 'periphery'. At a later stage, the question of how Ottoman producers reacted to their 'incorporation', whether they simply went bankrupt or found means of adaptation, equally became a major issue.[14]

Down to the present day, Turkish historians have followed the cues given by their Ottoman predecessors and have shown a strong predilection for the study of the Ottoman center. Yet a second novel aspect of present-day Ottomanist historiography, in which it differs strongly from its Ottoman antecedents, involves the history of individual regions within the Empire. On the whole, these had received short shrift from Ottoman chroniclers, whose lives and careers were so often oriented toward the imperial center. In the present introduction, we will limit ourselves to a cursory glance at the relations between center and provinces, as this theme will dominate many contributions to our volume. Of course, the legitimation of regional studies among historians is inextricably linked with the nationalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even if the more naive attempts at equating eighteenth-century tendencies toward decentralization with proto-nationalist movements now have been overcome. Just a few years ago, an important study has appeared which shows that centralization is not always equivalent to 'modernity'.[15] In this perspective, local elites' greater consciousness of the potentialities of 'their' respective regions can coexist with close and even intensifying ties to the Ottoman center. This observation is especially applicable to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

For the sake of completeness, this tension between integration and regional consciousness, which is not treated at any great length by our contributors, will briefly occupy us here.

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[13] For an overview over the relevant work, see Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy* (Cambridge, Paris, 1987).

[14] Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge, 1993).

[15] Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime".

Ottoman history in the Ottoman period

Every 'modern-style' historian is, in one way or another, dependent on the historiographical tradition of the society which he/she sets out to study. This tradition determines what kind of information the researcher will find in the sources at his/her disposal. If chronological precision and attention to political detail were no priorities for the writers of a given age, modern historians will have a lot of trouble determining the when, how and why even of fairly important events.[16] On a deeper level, there is the problem that researchers often will strongly identify with 'their' sources, on which, after all, they have to spend such a great deal of time. Frequently a linguistic barrier has to be overcome, made more daunting by the fact that in many cultures it was and is customary to employ languages other than the idiom of everyday communication for courtly, diplomatic or scholarly purposes. All this means a considerable investment of time and effort, and once this investment has been made, researchers often will feel that 'their' sources 'must be getting it right'. For if this were not the case, a new investment would need to be made in order to access novel sources, and a human lifetime, alas, is of limited duration.[17]

Adherence to routine apart, it is this emotional identification with the relevant primary sources which often induces modern historians to accept the views of sixteenth- or nineteenth-century authors without too much criticism. What Ottoman historians regarded as important, will quite 'naturally' appear as such to the novice and even to the experienced Ottomanist. Moreover, this *de facto* dependence soon will be legitimized on a scholarly level as well: We all fear anachronism, that mortal sin of historians, and to accept the perspective of the primary sources at hand seems a sure protection against this danger. An overly close adherence to the statements of chroniclers or memorialists will, however, result in a neglect of every-

[16] Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds, The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1995), p. 116 and elsewhere.

[17] As an instructive example, we might point out that the changeover from Arabic to Roman characters in Turkey (1928) was received with great reserve by the foreign scholarly community. This new alphabet had been well thought out, and among other positive points, for the first time ever permitted the cursory reading of Turkish texts. Yet it took several decades before this script was accepted by many foreign Ottomanists, who, after all, had spent a long time mastering its predecessor.

body and every issue which these personages considered *quantité négligeable*, including, in the Ottoman instance, craftsmen, peasants and women. Closeness to the primary sources must thus alternate with a critical contextualization of the relevant authors and the latters' major claims. But all this means that we cannot make sense of Ottomanist historiography without taking the Ottoman historiographical tradition into account.

In their own time, Ottomans close to the court, often active or former officials, wrote numerous histories of the Ottoman dynasty. In the sixteenth century a *şehnameci* was specifically commissioned to produce an account of the current reign in verses inspired by that master of Iranian epic poetry, Firdawsi.[18] This enterprise was not pursued for long, and in the seventeenth century there were no official historiographers. When the sultans once again began to sponsor the production of chronicles at some point in the eighteenth century, the new accounts were written in more or less sober prose, often by highly qualified authors, such as the Aleppine Mustafa Naima or Mehmed Raşid.[19] Until the end of the Empire, the sultanate repeatedly commissioned official histories until the end of the empire.[20] But the authors of these often multi-volume works never monopolized the field; there were always writers who produced histories without official sponsorship, and in the nineteenth century, many such accounts were to be printed. Most authors of officially sponsored chronicles were expected to cover long spans of time which they themselves had not witnessed; this meant that they needed to rely on the works of their predecessors. In certain cases, especially if the authors were present or former high-level bureaucrats, they also might gain access to a selection of official documents.

Moreover, the writing of historical accounts was by no means a lost art in the Ottoman provinces. Even in the sixteenth century, Istanbul intellectuals were impressed by the history, and history-writing, of Mamluk Egypt; but the events of the subsequent period were also recorded in chronicles. Down to the seventeenth century, Ottomans writing on Egypt normally gathered their information from local, Egyptian sources, while from that time onwards, they

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[18] Christine Woodhead, *Taʿlīkī-zāde's şehnāme-i hümāyun. A History of the Ottoman Campaign into Hungary 1593–94* (Berlin, 1983).

[19] Lewis Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. by Norman Itzkowitz (New York, 1972).

[20] See Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument*, for the manner in which a distinguished politician and intellectual undertook this task in the nineteenth century.

increasingly undertook researches of their own.[21] In the large cities of Syria, the eighteenth century was a time in which both Muslims and Christians wrote about local events. Sometimes they limited themselves to what happened in their respective home cities, but some chroniclers took a wider view and, for instance, included information on the pilgrimage routes to Mecca and the deserts they traversed.[22] In Mosul, local *ulema* and even craftsmen wrote about life in their city. Particularly fascinating is the poem in which a master textile artisan of the eighteenth century complained about having sunk so low that he was obliged to deal with beyond-the-pale creatures such as women.[23] At the end of the eighteenth century, a modest inhabitant of Sarajevo by the name of Mustafa Başeskiya produced a town chronicle as well, written in Ottoman with numerous borrowings from Bosnian.[24] Greek provincial chronicles were composed ever since the seventeenth century; some of them will be treated in the present volume by Johann Strauss.

Sometimes, but by no means always, Ottoman dynastic history was placed into a world historical context, which might include pre-Islamic rulers as well as early Islamic history. But the main focus of interest were the deeds of the Ottoman sultans themselves. Accordingly, the reign of an individual ruler was the normal unit of time to be treated in a single section. Warfare and public construction, which functioned as major sources of imperial legitimacy, were accorded special attention. But Ottoman officialdom also used these chronicles as venues to document its own history; thus appointments to the major offices often were treated in separate chapters. Moreover, after the events of a given reign had been covered, many

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[21] Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule, Institutions, Waqf and Architecture in Cairo (16th and 17th Centuries)* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 8–13.

[22] Bruce Masters, "The View from the Province: Syrian Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114, 3 (1994), 353–362.

[23] Dina R. Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire, Mosul, 1540–1834* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 138.

[24] On chronicles written by Bosnians compare the introduction to Salih Sidki Hadžihuseinović Muvekkit, *Tarih-i Bosna*, trans. and commented by Abdulah Polimac *et alii* (Sarajevo, 1998), pp. XVII–XXXIII. Salih Sidki (1825–1888) has produced a book midway between a traditional chronicle and a modern study. While he writes in "an epic style" (p. XXX) and is not always concerned about historical accuracy, he has used an impressive array of sources in both Serbian and Ottoman. He thus may be compared to certain Greek authors of the Ottoman period, to whom Johann Strauss will refer in his section of our book. We are grateful to Markus Koller, who has supplied us with this reference.

chronicles included selected biographies of the important figures who had died during the period under consideration. This was another opportunity to supplement the ruler's history by that of the men who had served him. Such a manner of conceiving history made sense from a socio-political viewpoint. After all, from the 1640s onwards, it was increasingly obvious that grand viziers, chief jurisconsults, dowager sultanas, chief eunuchs and Janissary commanders had a major role to play in Ottoman politics. In the worst case, the Ottoman state could now survive a sultan's long minority, the latter's lack of interest in state business, or even, at least for a while, a ruler who was a madman.[25]

A challenge to twentieth-century historians

All this means that when nineteenth and twentieth-century scholars began to study the history of the Ottoman Empire, they could base themselves on an ongoing historical tradition. This applies both to subjects and former subjects of the sultan and to those who, like the Austrian scholar-diplomat Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, wrote about Ottoman history as outsiders.[26] At least where Istanbul-centered histories were concerned, the Ottoman mode of historiography formed part of an imperial tradition; one cannot help remembering that the Chinese court also sponsored official histories of every dynasty. As to the provincial chronicles, their prestige was minimal. Johann Strauss' article shows how long these writings were ignored, even in the places where they had originated and whose history they glorified.

Ottoman imperial history emphasized 'kings and battles' in a fashion quite familiar to European historians working in the aftermath of World War I, and in many instances even much later. Wars, with diplomatic relations a poor second, were considered *the* stuff of history, both by Ottoman chroniclers and by European historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This remarkable congruence probably was due in part to the monarch-centered style of thinking which characterized the historical professions in the two cultures concerned. Monarchs, along with their ministers and generals, were considered as almost the only legitimate historical 'players'. On

[25] Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, p. 38.
[26] However Hammer-Purgstall was a long-term resident of Istanbul.

this issue, comparable styles of thinking prevailed, both in the Ottoman Empire and in nineteenth and twentieth-century central Europe, where interest in things Ottoman was at that time especially strong.[27]

Sultanic power and magnificence

Given this congruence, it is surprising that only during the last twenty years or so have historians begun to investigate the roots of sultanic power and legitimacy. Up to that time, this legitimacy was taken for granted, at least where the pre-Hamidian period and the Empire's Muslim subjects were concerned. Or conversely, as apparent from Büşra Ersanlı's study, in early republican Turkey the Ottoman ruling group was viewed as corrupt and therefore *per se* illegitimate.[28] However, in reality sultanic legitimacy was not as simple a matter as it might appear at first glance.[29] In the 'classical period' of the sixteenth century, Ottoman sultans do seem to have suffered from a 'legitimacy deficit', in the sense that they did not belong to the Quraysh clan from which legitimate caliphs were expected to issue. Moreover, unlike other Islamic dynasties in this position, the Ottoman sultans never made any claims to Quraysh descent either. Nor could these rulers claim Genghis Khan as their ancestor, the dominant form of legitimation in the Turco-Mongol context of Central Asia. Rather, Ottoman sultans normally asserted that their rule was justified by the concrete services they rendered to the Islamic community.[30] Victories over the infidels played a major role in this form of legitimation, and even in the later seventeenth century, a sultan who

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[27] Admittedly, by no means all the scholars who after 1945 were to promote a different type of history, strongly socio-economic in orientation, were notable for their democratic convictions. Yet to an observer of twentieth-century events, it became increasingly difficult to ignore the role of 'ordinary' people in contemporary history, however much they might have been manipulated by their 'betters'. This real-life situation must have appreciably contributed toward discrediting the 'king and battle' approach.

[28] However, this did not mean that Ottomanist historians became interested in the practices which we, and sometimes contemporaries as well, perceived as 'corrupt'. One of the few analyses of this kind which has appeared in print is due to Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Muṣṭafā ʿĀli (1541–1600)* (Princeton, 1986), 85–86, 120–121 and *passim*. See also Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı Devletinde rüşvet (Özellikle adlî rüşvet)* (Ankara, 1969).

[29] Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 270 ff.

[30] Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 288–89.

suffered defeat against the Habsburgs was liable to lose his throne.[31] But within the Empire's confines, the 'just rule' of the sultan also was a major legitimizing factor. This is apparent from the numerous sultanic commands issued as responses to petitions for the reparation of abuses, which arrived in the capital every year. But Ottoman rulers also demonstrated their right to govern by the care they took to promote the interests of the Empire's subjects'. These activities included the protection of merchants, travelers and especially pilgrims to Mecca. But ensuring the grain supply of the Holy Cities in the Hejaz, or establishing impressive pious foundations in highly visible sites also could augment sultanic legitimacy.

Yet this practical aspect to Ottoman legitimation did not exclude the use of symbols, far from it. Gülru Necipoğlu has studied the commissioning of a helmet rather reminiscent of the papal tiara, which the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha undertook in the 1520s, when the entourage of the young Sultan Süleyman evidently hoped for a speedy conquest of central Europe and perhaps also Italy.[32] When these conquests did not materialize, the tiara was melted down. But in the 1550s, the great mosque complex of the Süleymaniye was decorated with inscriptions celebrating the sultan as the victor over Shi'i heretics, a motif later taken up by Sultan Ahmed I in his 'Blue Mosque' as well.[33] That Ottoman rulers arranged for major public festivals in the capital and also in the larger provincial towns, must have also enhanced their image, at least among a section of their subjects.

Recent research moreover has shown that the funeral ceremonies for a deceased sultan and the inthronization of his successor also involved ceremonies intended to further the legitimacy of the dynasty. This remains true even though funerary ceremonies, especially after the sixteenth century, tended to emphasize the religious truth that the dead ruler shared the fate of all deceased Muslims. By this time, Sunni piety had become a major legitimizing feature in and of itself. Moreover, while at first glance the legitimizing value of the central

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[31] Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman Methods of Negotiation: The Karlowitz Case", *Der Islam* 51, 1 (1974), 131–37.

[32] Gülru Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry," *The Art Bulletin* 71, 3 (1989) 401–27.

[33] Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar, "The Süleymaniye Complex in Istanbul: an Interpretation," *Muqarnas* 3 (1986), 92–117; [Ca'fer Efendi], *Risâle-i mi'māriyye, an Early-seventeenth-century Ottoman treatise on architecture*, trans. Howard Crane (Leiden, 1987).

enthronement ceremony seems to have been limited, in reality the advent of a new sultan had a wider impact. For in addition to the declaration of loyalty on the part of viziers and high officials, which was concealed from public view by the walls of the Topkapı palace, a novel rite was developed in the seventeenth century. This involved the girding of 'the sword of Osman' in the *extra muros* sanctuary of Eyüp. In the course of this pilgrimage-*cum*-enthronement rite, the ruler was made visible to the people of Istanbul and symbolically took possession of his capital city.[34]

Many of the events discussed in these modern studies of the sultan's power and legitimacy were first recorded by chroniclers active in Istanbul, and thus the Ottoman elite must have considered them important. Therefore it makes sense to claim that modern historians concerned with sultanic power and legitimacy link up with the works of their Ottoman predecessors. However, modern historians do study the relevant phenomena in the broader context provided by comparative history and political anthropology.

Bureaucrats as historical subjects

The bureaucracy as a historical subject, which figured so prominently in the Ottoman chronicles, also should have made sense to the Ottomanist historian of the early twentieth century. After all, Max Weber recently had suggested that bureaucratic rule was characteristic of 'mature' states. However, before the 1940s, Weber did not as yet excite much interest among Ottoman and Turkish historians.[35] On the other hand, European historians dealing with the Ottoman Empire were busy assembling their primary sources, a difficult task when, due to World War I and then to post-war turmoil, libraries were in disarray and travel budgets non-existent. Broader

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[34] Nicolas Vatin, "Aux origines du pèlerinage à Eyüp des sultans ottomans" *Turcica* 27 (1995), 91–100.

[35] For a convenient summary of Weber's ideas on the issue in English, see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York, London, 1964), pp. 341–68. The first Turkish historian to use Weberian categories, in an attempt to explain the peculiarities of 'artisan mentality' during the late Ottoman period, was Sabri Ülgener (1911–1983). More recent contributions include the two books by Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte 1789–1922* (Princeton, 1980) and *Ottoman Civil Officialdom, a Social History* (Princeton, 1989).

perspectives on the role of the Ottoman bureaucracy in a world historical perspective were thus completely missing. Only after 1945, and perhaps with subterranean links to the neo-Weberian current among contemporary American social scientists, did the Ottoman bureaucracy 'arrive' as a major scholarly topic.

But a considerable challenge to historians concerned with Ottoman state structures also came from a set of lengthy descriptions of the Ottoman military and central administration. These had been published by Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı during and immediately after World War II, with a latecomer volume on the specialists in Islamic law and religion (*ilmiye*) appearing in 1965.[36] These books were something of a novelty in the Turkish context, insofar as Ottoman historiography had but rarely produced such tableaux of administrative structure. However, the format was well known to European historians of the Ottoman Empire, as attempts to describe Ottoman 'institutions' had been made ever since the sixteenth century, with Joseph von Hammer publishing an especially elaborate version in 1815.[37] Yet before Uzunçarşılı, such surveys had been based on the information contained in the few Ottoman source texts available. Or for the most part, they relayed material gathered by European travelers to the Ottoman Empire, whose sources of information often left a great deal to be desired.[38] At the very best, occasional documents might have been used by those authors who could gain access to them, such as Mouradjea d'Ohsson in the late eighteenth century and Hammer in the early nineteenth.[39]

Uzunçarşılı, by contrast, set out to document his descriptions from sources much closer to the structures under consideration, namely Ottoman chronicles and, to a large extent, original archival documents. From a present-day perspective, Uzunçarşılı's great weakness is his

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[36] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti teşkilâtına medhal* (Istanbul, 1941); *idem, Osmanlı Devleti teşkilâtından kapukulu ocakları*, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1943–44); *idem, Osmanlı Devletinin saray teşkilâtı* (Ankara, 1945); *idem, Osmanlı Devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilâtı* (Ankara, 1948); *idem, Osmanlı Devletinin ilmiye teşkilâtı* (Ankara, 1965).

[37] Joseph von Hammer-[Purgstall], *Des Osmanischen Reiches Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung, dargestellt aus den Quellen seiner Grundgesetze* (Hildesheim, reprint 1963).

[38] A fine example of such misinformation concerning the manner in which a *şeyhülislam* might be executed has been analyzed by Hans Georg Majer, "Der Tod im Mörser: eine Strafe für osmanische Schejchülislame?" in *Von der Pruth-Ebene bis zum Gipfel des Ida. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Emanuel Turczynski*, ed. by Gerhard Grimm (Munich, 1989), 141–52.

[39] Mouradjea d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de'l empire Ottoman*, 2nd ed., 7 vols. (Paris, 1788–1824).

inability, or refusal, to think of the different bureaucracies within the Ottoman administration as subject to change over time. Even though he chronicled major reorganizations, particularly those occurring in the eighteenth century, his institutions appear to exist in a timeless realm. One might say that for Uzunçarşılı there was a static 'classical Ottoman period', which began in the middle of the fifteenth century and ended about four hundred years later. During this period, whatever changes might have happened were no more than the superficial ripples which a deep lake may show on a fine summer's day.

Nor does Uzunçarşılı transmit a real sense of place. This omission is all the more remarkable as the author tends to limit himself to bureaucracies operating in Istanbul. Yet the constantly changing mammoth capital with its diverse inhabitants rarely enters the picture. Throughout his volumes, the author never asks himself how the Ottoman administration reacted to changes within the subject population. Thus the possibility that administrative reorganizations might have social or economic backgrounds does not enter the picture at all. This gives the present-day reader a curious feeling of abstractness, of living in a never-never land. But these are criticisms made from a perspective developed during the 1970s and later, when problems of this type began to enter the field of Ottomanist historical vision. For the 1940s, Uzunçarşılı's volumes constituted a tremendous achievement, and we may even describe scholarly interest in the Ottoman bureaucracy as developing 'when Uzunçarşılı met Weber'.

Ottoman warfare

Everybody knows that in 'king-and-battle' history, the battles are writ large, and Ottoman history-writing down to the nineteenth century is no exception to this rule. Quite to the contrary, as we have seen, victory in war against the infidels constituted a major legitimizing device. From the sixteenth century onwards, moreover, European authors have tended to regard the Ottoman Empire as a near-perfect military society.

However, in the historiography of the last seventy years, Ottoman warfare has not constituted a favorite field of study. On the Turkish side, this may have something to do with the fact that the successive governments of the Republic of Turkey certainly regarded, and continue to regard, the war against Greece and its British and other allies as *the* founding event of the new state. But once the

Peace of Lausanne had been concluded in 1923, the Republic not only proclaimed its desire for international peace, but also managed to steer clear of external wars to a remarkable degree.[40] This may well explain why, even though *sefer ve zafer* ('campaigns and victories', i.e. of the Ottoman sultans) continue to form part of political rhetoric, Turkish historians are not greatly interested in Ottoman warfare.[41] Moreover, many participants in the Ottomanist field, of whatever nationality, may have developed a visceral reaction against warfare of any kind. With the trauma of war and Nazism but a short span of years away, this is not a topic which can be approached with detachment. On the other hand, it also makes little sense to many non-Turkish historians to project their own concerns about the horrors of war upon a fairly remote past and a foreign civilization. Avoidance of the topic thus seems a logical conclusion.

Be that as it may, this outlook is changing. In the beginning there was a seminal article by the economic historian Mehmed Genç, concerning the manner in which Ottoman wars were financed in the eighteenth century.[42] Genç assumes that the military setbacks, especially after 1750, were caused largely by a failure to adequately supply the Ottoman armies with weapons, uniforms and tents. This weakness of the Ottoman craft economy in turn was caused by the fact that payments for war matériel, if they occurred at all, were way below market value. Moreover, the more efficient producers were asked for larger deliveries than their less successful competitors. Collection from a few major suppliers was of course easier from a bureaucrat's point of view. But we also must keep in mind that the ethic of artisan-guildsmen frowned upon anybody who earned more than his fellows, and Ottoman officials may well have endorsed this judgment. In consequence, a war of any length resulted in the near-collapse of capital-starved craft producers, and the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire became a victim of its inade-quate system of war financing.

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[40] The only exceptions constitute the declaration of war against the Axis powers late in 1946, the sending of a contingent to fight in the Korean war, the landing in Cyprus (1974) and a rather limited involvement in the recent Gulf War.

[41] It is of interest that among the emerging group of specialists in the field of Ottoman warfare, we find English, American and Hungarian scholars, but very few Turkish historians.

[42] Mehmet Genç, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş," *Yapıt. Toplumsal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 49/4, pp. 51–61; 50/5 (1984), pp. 86–93; French version: "L'Économie ottomane et la guerre au XVIII^{e} siècle," *Turcica* 27 (1995), 177–96.

Genç approached the issue from the viewpoint of the economic historian; his younger colleague Rhoads Murphey was to adopt the social historian's approach.[43] Murphey sets out to show that the old story, often casually repeated in the secondary literature, of Ottoman soldiers motivated to heroic deeds by religious zeal alone, is no more than a fable. Similarly to other soldiers, Ottoman military men expected tangible rewards in terms of booty, but also in the shape of an albeit rough justice, which awarded merit its due. Here the sultan's prestige, which stood high throughout most crises of Ottoman history and which was based on his reputation for justice, worked as a major stabilizing factor. In Murphey's perspective, Ottoman society until about 1700 was organized in a fashion which enabled it to meet the soldiers' expectations without major stress or strain.

Murphey's research had first focused on Murad IV and his eastern campaigns. But when writing his monograph, he could also base himself on the work of Caroline Finkel, who previously had studied the logistics of Ottoman campaigns during the Long War in Hungary. Finkel also had pointed out that around 1600, Ottoman military organization was more efficient than had been assumed in earlier years. For she was able to show that most supplies, as well as a considerable number of soldiers, did not come from the Ottoman core lands at all, but from Bosnia, which thus justified its reputation as a *serhad*, or land of border warfare.[44] Gábor Ágoston pursued this line of work, asking himself how the Ottomans responded to the major features of what in the European context is known as the 'military revolution' of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This spate of innovations included the massive use of firepower and small arms.[45] In Ágoston's view, it was not an attachment to outmoded armament technology, or even a lack of essential supplies such as lead and gunpowder, which caused the defeats of Ottoman armies in the later seventeenth century. Rather, it was a problem of organization, of getting large quantities of supplies to remote fronts, and, in addition, there also was the difficulty of achieving high and relatively uniform technical quality in firearms.

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[43] Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700* (London, 1999).

[44] Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1988).

[45] Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans".

Virginia Aksan, who has focused on the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768–1774 with its catastrophic outcome for the Ottomans, emphasizes problems of manpower rather than equipment. In Aksan's perspective, Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II, when they attempted to reform the army, not merely were following European models. They also continued the Ottoman tradition, well-established ever since the seventeenth century, of recruiting the 'landless and lawless' into the armed forces. According to Aksan, there were thus Ottoman precedents for the military reforms of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which finally instituted non-janissary military corps. She thus shifts the blame for Selim III's failure against the janissaries away from the 'foreignness' of the military innovations he had attempted to introduce, a feature which had been emphasized by a previous generation of historians. In Aksan's view, the defeat was largely due to the lack of political skill and energy on the Sultan's part, who did not use the forces at his disposal when the janissaries rebelled. Or in the case of Mahmud II, whose well-trained and well-supplied armies suffered a major defeat against Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, Aksan concludes that it was probably a simple matter of Ibrahim Pasha's superior generalship.

Thus the element of 'good fortune', long since known as a major ingredient of success in war, finds itself rehabilitated.[46] But on the whole, modern treatments of Ottoman warfare have concentrated exactly on those aspects which quite a few Ottoman chroniclers tended to pass over in silence, concentrating instead on those aspects of warfare in which political and social history intersect: behind-the-fronts organization, manpower, weaponry and food supplies. Major motifs suggested to historians by the Ottoman historiographical tradition, such as sultanic legitimacy, bureaucratic structures and warfare, thus are being replayed in a new key.

Toward old-new horizons: Ottomans and Byzantines

Our next step must be to highlight certain themes in which present-day Ottomanist historians depart from Naima's or Raşid's tradition,

[46] Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies in the Late Eighteenth Century," in Erik J. Zürcher (ed.), *Arming the State* (London, 1999), 21–33.

namely the treatment of Ottoman relations with the outside world, the history of individual regions and, last but not least, the role of non-Muslim nationalism and Great Power intervention in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Among the numerous states which form this 'outside world', the Byzantine Empire occupies a place of choice. Not so much because of its real power; after the 'Latin' conquest of 1204, Byzantium became a minor state, precariously holding on to a few fortress towns in western Anatolia. Moreover, these Anatolian possessions were rapidly lost after Michael Palaiologos had regained the old capital in 1261. What remained of the once mighty Byzantine Empire were a few minuscule territories on the tip of south-eastern Europe. However, the ideological status of Constantinople/Istanbul was quite out of proportion with the real power of the Byzantine emperors. This discrepancy is well known to historians of western Europe, and failed crusades and futile church councils aiming at the incorporation of the Orthodox into the Catholic Church have spawned an extensive historiography.

On the Ottomanist side, the first historian to demonstrate the importance of Istanbul's conquest and resettlement in the political agenda of Mehmed the Conqueror and his successors was Halil İnalcık. After a series of fundamental studies of the political devices by which the early Ottoman sultans transformed conquered territories into permanent provinces, İnalcık tackled the complicated situation with which the Ottoman government was confronted in the former Byzantine capital.[47] İnalcık has stressed the role of the Ayasofya as the city's religious and high-cultural center before the construction of the Fatih complex, but he also has focused on the new commercial buildings, above all the covered market (*bedestan*), which helped promote trade and thus contributed to the revival of the all but deserted city. Many years later, İnalcık has rounded off his series

[47] Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954), 103–129; *idem*, *Hicrî 835 Tarihli Sûret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid* (Ankara, 1954); *idem*, "The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 23–24 (1969–70), 229–249. Further studies of the political and artistic implications of the reconstruction of Istanbul as the Ottoman capital include Stéphane Yérasimos, *La fondation de Constantinople et de Sainte-Sophie dans les traditions turques* (Paris, 1990), Gülru Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial and Power. The Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Cambridge MA, 1991) Theocharis Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs. The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453–1474)* (Leiden, Boston, Cologne, 2001) and the forthcoming study by Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu.

of articles on early Ottoman Istanbul by a study of Galata, in the fifteenth century still largely an Italian-speaking town.[48]

Through these works, it has become clear that the revival of the former Byzantine capital was made possible by extensive commercial activity. As the Black Sea increasingly was transformed into an Ottoman lake, Muslim merchants took over from Venetians and Genoese, and numerous products of the northern steppe lands became available to the consumers of the Ottoman capital. It is largely through İnalcık's works that we have understood that the Ottoman ruling group of the fifteenth century was in no way inimical, or even just indifferent, to long-distance trade. Quite to the contrary, the tendency to leave foreign trade to non-Muslims, so characteristic of nineteenth-century Ottoman society, evolved rather late. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire emerged as a state closely concerned with the control of long-distance trade routes, and not a few of its Muslim subjects made fortunes by traveling them.[49]

Viewed from a different angle, recent interest in the Byzantino-Ottoman transition certainly represents an attempt by concerned historians both Turkish and Greek to tone down combative nationalist rhetoric and establish a scholarly dialogue.[50] This interest also documents the growing maturity of the two historical fields. On both sides, certain participants now have enough self-confidence to confront the 'other'. After all, it is sometimes possible to make up for the deficiencies of the late Byzantine or early Ottoman source bases respectively by calling on those materials now made available by the efforts of the Ottomanist or Byzantinist 'neighbors'. As Klaus Peter Matschke's article demonstrates, the study of numerous historical questions stands to gain from this kind of scholarly cooperation.

We will evoke but one example taken from the religious sphere: Ottomanist historians have to confront the difficult problems linked

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[48] Halil İnalcık, "The Hub of the City: The Bedestan of Istanbul", *International Journal of Turkish Studies* I/1 (1979–80), 1–17; *idem*, "Ottoman Galata, 1453–1553", in *Première rencontre internationale sur l'empire Ottoman et la Turquie moderne*, ed. by Edhem Eldem (Istanbul, 1991), 17–116.

[49] Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914* (Cambridge, 1994).

[50] The Byzantinist congress recently convened in Istanbul, at the University of the Bosphorus (1999), should be taken as an indication of these concerns. The Turkish organizers not only expressed their satisfaction at the numerous participants from within Turkey itself, but also at the fact that after several politically motivated false starts, such a congress finally had been held in the former Byzantine and Ottoman capital.

to the heterodoxies which so often flourish in border regions, the fifteenth-century Ottoman *serhad* not excluded. In this context, the titles of two books by Michel Balivet, both a Byzantinist and an Ottomanist by training, in themselves represent a program: "(une) imbrication gréco-turque" and "Islam mystique et révolution armée dans les Balkans ottomans".[51] One of these books deals with the many instances of peaceful cohabitation on the part of Byzantine Greeks and Ottoman Turks. By contrast, the other is concerned with a specific case of armed rebellion, namely the uprisings of Bedreddin Simavi, Torlak Kemal and Börklüce Mustafa. Basing themselves on the traditions of Islamic mysticism, these early fifteenth-century rebels seem to have aimed at a more egalitarian polity than that which Sultan Mehmed I was busily restoring at the time. Since our information on dissident milieus is very limited indeed, it is necessary to bring together whatever can be collected from both Ottoman and Byzantine sources.

On a more mundane level, an international community of scholars has concerned itself with the potential of the Ottoman tax registers for late Byzantine local history. This proceeding was based upon the recognition that Ottoman administrators were not particularly anxious to change taxation practices in newly conquered territories. Provided that there had been a direct transition from Byzantine to Ottoman rule, early sultanic tax registers, produced within a few years after the Ottoman conquest, were likely to contain numerous traces of late Byzantine revenue arrangements. Models for such transition studies had been developed earlier, namely by Nicoară and Irène Beldiceanu in dealing with the little-documented Muslim principality of Karaman finally conquered by Sultan Mehmed II.[52] In recent decades, Macedonia, Bithynia, certain Aegean islands and Trabzon have emerged as the favorite testing grounds for the study of the Byzantine countryside, as mirrored, apart from Greek or Italian sources, in Ottoman revenue records.[53]

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[51] Michel Balivet, *Romanie byzantine et pays de Rûm turc, histoire d'un espace d'imbrication gréco-turque* (Istanbul, 1994) and *Islam mystique et révolution armée dans les Balkans ottomans, Vie du Cheikh Bedreddin le "Hallâj des Turcs" (1358/59–1416)* (Istanbul, 1995).

[52] Nicoară Beldiceanu and Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Recherche sur la province de Qaraman au XVI siècle," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 11 (1968), 1–129.

[53] Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, (Birmingham, Washington, 1986) contains a good bibliography of these studies.

Incorporation into the European world economy

At the very beginning of Ottoman history stood the conflict with Byzantium. Let us now move six hundred years ahead in time. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire's existence, this state was weakened not only by nationalist movements among its subjects and the ambitions of the European Great Powers. At least equally serious was its economic dependence, mainly on Britain, but also on other states of an industrializing Europe. This dependence was a fact of everyday life, which members of the nineteenth-century Ottoman elites, but also peasants prosecuted for tobacco-smuggling by officials in the service of the Dette Publique Ottomane, experienced as a galling humiliation.[54]

Yet an intellectual framework permitting scholarly discussion of this dependence emerged relatively late, namely in the 1970s. This is the concept known as 'world systems theory', elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein and his collaborators, including quite a few Turkish scholars. From the Ottomanist's viewpoint, Wallerstein's approach has contributed substantially towards making Ottoman history a part of world history in its own right, and not merely an 'exotic' field studied by nationalist Turks and a few oddballs. Moreover Wallerstein's approach has a good deal in common with that proposed by Fernand Braudel, whose work has for a long time been known and esteemed among Ottomanists. In his three-volume work on capitalism and material life, Braudel also has constructed a model of international economic relations during the early modern period, in which the Ottoman Empire, regarded as an independent 'world economy', has been accorded considerable importance.[55]

To put it very briefly, 'world systems theory' is based upon the following assumptions: Down to the sixteenth century, a European economic system developed largely in the territories to the west of an imaginary line linking Stockholm to Venice. But from the early 1500s, this system expanded to become the core area of an emerging 'world economy'.[56] Fundamental to 'world systems theory' is the

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[54] As the representation of the Ottoman Empire's creditors, the Dette Publique Ottomane had been assigned some of the best-yielding taxes paid by the sultans' subjects.

[55] Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV^e–XVIII^e siècle*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 11–70.

[56] On world economies prior to the European version compare Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony, The World System AD 1250–1350* (Oxford, 1989).

contrast between such a core region, in which mercantile and later industrial capitalism predominates, and economically subservient 'peripheries'. Territories forming part of the periphery may be formal colonies or retain a measure of political independence. But in any case, they produce foodstuffs and raw materials, while providing a captive market for the products which the 'core country' dominant in the relevant peripheral region wishes to export. As a transitional area between core and periphery, the system also contains semi-peripheries, which may come about when strong states close to the core region effectively resist marginalization. Thus, for example, Spain and Portugal, whose elites had opened up large parts of Asia, Africa and America to European expansion, were unable to maintain themselves as 'core countries'. Yet their monopolistic hold over large overseas territories ensured that these two countries could not be pushed back into the periphery. Of course, relations between core, semi-periphery and periphery are never static. In the early modern period, the principal dynamic factor was the expanding economic power of the European 'core countries', which managed to 'incorporate' ever more previously independent territories into the area under their control.[57]

Given the size and importance of the Ottoman world empire, a major political and military competitor of European states from the fifteenth to the very end of the seventeenth century, its fate was of crucial importance to scholars wishing to gauge the usefulness of the 'world systems' model. To phrase it differently, these researchers needed to determine at what time the Ottoman territories had been incorporated, as a periphery, into the capitalist world economy. From an Ottomanist's viewpoint, a study of the Ottoman economy in the framework of 'world systems theory' involved deciding when the Ottoman Empire ceased to function as an independent economic world and whether there were regional differences in the process of 'incorporation'.[58] Here there was a choice between two radically different options. If one followed the work of Barkan, Braude or Çizakça during his early years, the conclusion was that peripheralization

[57] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 3 vols. (New York, 1974, 1980, 1989).

[58] Immanuel Wallerstein, Hale Decdeli and Reşat Kasaba, "The Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the World Economy," in *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, ed. by Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge and Paris, 1987), 88–100.

began at the end of the sixteenth century.[59] As an alternative one might accept Braudel's view, shared by many of today's Ottomanists, namely that European economic domination of the Ottoman Empire was not established until the later eighteenth or even the early nineteenth century.[60] Çizakça was to adopt this position in a later article, while Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba refused to take sides in this dispute.[61] They stressed that 'incorporation' was a complex process, different from one region to the next, and that available research did not yet allow them to give a hard-and-fast set of dates for Ottoman incorporation into the 'world system'.

A very sophisticated discussion of Ottoman history in the Wallersteinian mode has been presented by Huri İslamoğlu.[62] She has taken up the challenge inherent in the 'localist' approach adopted by many historians of the 1980s and 1990s. These scholars have pointed out that the 'world systems' approach negated the importance of the previous history of the 'peripheralized' regions. No matter what kind of social and political relations existed in a given polity, so this objection runs, what determines history once the region in question has been 'incorporated' is merely the dynamic of the core area. Given this set of assumptions, for the social scientist wishing to understand the contemporary situation there is no need to go back beyond 1750, or at most 1590. The social scientist's 'cutoff date' will correspond to the year or years which specialists on the area under study consider the time of the region's 'incorporation'. İslamoğlu points out that this objection should be taken very seriously. It does not imply a reversion to the old historicist claim that every major state has an 'essence' of its own, which world historical developments may destroy but cannot really modify. To take account of the

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[59] Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975), 3–28; Benjamin Braude, "International Competition and Domestic Cloth in the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1650, A Study in Undevelopment," *Review*, 2, 3 (1979), 437–54; Murat Çizakça, "Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: a Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550–1650," *The Journal of Economic History* 40 (1980), 533–50.

[60] Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle*, vol. 3, 406–11.

[61] Murat Çizakça, "Incorporation of the Middle East into the European World-Economy," *Review* 8, 3 (1985), 353–78.

[62] Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, "Oriental Despotism in World System Perspective," in *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, ed. by Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge, Paris, 1987), pp. 1–26.

difficulty, she suggests a double-pronged approach: on the one hand, it is legitimate to study the complex political and economic history of the nineteenth century, when a few European 'core countries' made large areas of the world into their periphery. But this approach needs to be integrated with a close study of local dynamics, and it is necessary to understand how these forces furthered or hindered the relevant regions' integration into the capitalist world system. Phrased in an 'operational' manner, İslamoğlu calls for a close interaction between Europeanist and Ottomanist historians in studying the genesis of the 'world system'. Obviously those who engage in this project will need to cope with the tensions between different historiographical traditions, not always an easy task.

Appropriating the Ottoman center

'World systems theory', Ottoman style, shows how certain well-established centers, namely Istanbul and the Aegean coastlands, which together formed the Ottoman core provinces, lost their previous positions and became one of several peripheries linked to a European-dominated world economy.[63] Yet this scenario of center-periphery relations is by no means all that can be said on this issue in the Ottoman context. To the contrary, concentration upon the Ottoman center forms part of a historiographical tendency which was obvious in the 1940s, when 'world systems theory' did not as yet exist and is still very much with us.[64] By dint of this 'centralizing' scholarly tradition, Turkish historians of the republican period, once the initial distaste for Ottoman history had faded away, 'appropriated' the Ottoman center. From the perspective of Turkish scholars, the wish to 'rehabilitate' the Ottoman Empire undoubtedly was strong, especially after Ottoman victories and cultural florescence had come to be regarded as a source of national pride, from the later 1930s on-

[63] On the centrality of the eastern Balkans and western Anatolia for the functioning of the Ottoman Empire, compare Klaus Kreiser, "Über den Kernraum des Osmanischen Reiches", in *Die Türkei in Europa*, ed. by Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen, 1979), 53–63.

[64] Turkish scholars have shown interest in Ottoman borderlands mainly where the sixteenth century is concerned. As an exception to this rule, one might however name Akdes Nimet Kurat, with his focus on late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century figures such as Charles XII of Sweden and Peter I of Russia: *XII Karl'ın Türkiye'de kalışı ve bu sıralarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu* (Ankara, 1943).

wards. After all, the Ottoman state had been systematically denigrated, both by European authors and by the nationalist discourses current in many of the states formed on previously Ottoman territory.

For the more naive, historians and others, it was the Ottoman Empire's military glory which formed the principal attraction. For the more sophisticated, the interest of Ottoman history lay, and continues to lie, in the possibility of explicating the workings of a major empire, particularly the linkages between state apparatus and a tax-paying society. For until the opening of the Istanbul and Ankara archives, the Ottoman social formation had been very imperfectly known, and misunderstandings abounded. Considerations of ideology apart, one should not neglect the scholarly impetus to discover a world hitherto little known.

Economies, cultures and local identities in Ottoman provinces

A major break with the historiographical tradition of the Ottoman centuries lay in the attention paid, especially from the 1950s onwards, to individual provinces. Generally, the historians of most states located on previously Ottoman territory tended, and still tend, to concentrate upon the lands situated within the borders of the modern country within which they happen to operate.[65] This makes sense in practical terms, as in any given state, university positions and research money depend on definitions of 'legitimate' academic study. Ministerial bureaucracies, to say nothing of the general public, tend to feel that study of the 'national territory', and perhaps of lands to which the relevant government lays claim, should be accorded priority.[66] Thus the geographical delimitations of the area to be investigated are not as innocuous as might be assumed at first glance.

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[65] This applies also to some foreign scholars: thus one of the present authors would see herself as a historian of Anatolia.

[66] Apart from research in Greek, Bulgarian or Rumanian, there exists a very considerable literature on the Balkans in English, French and German, which can barely be touched upon here. In the German-speaking territories, this concern with the Balkans doubtless was motivated first by the Habsburg legacy. At least in their later years a German-speaking dynasty, the Habsburgs had acquired, and stubbornly held on to, considerable Balkan territories. Moreover, in both World Wars, Germany had possessed Balkan allies and made sizeable conquests in the peninsula. This political situation induced the governments of the time to create an infrastructure for Balkan studies, both within and outside the universities. Balkan studies

Sometimes, as in the case of Tunisia, the borders of a certain modern state more or less correspond to the provincial divisions of Ottoman times, but this is by no means the rule. In fact, the disjunction between Ottoman administrative divisions and modern borders is most unfortunate for the historian. It is impossible to think of any particular state without taking into consideration the regions of which it is made up. Yet it is a major anachronism to assume that relations between regions were what they are today, when the territorial units under consideration, along with many others, formed part of a large-scale empire such as the Ottoman.

In addition, administrative divisions could have a considerable impact upon the lives of 'ordinary' Ottoman subjects. It made a difference for a non-Muslim inhabitant of the Empire whether he/she lived in Wallachia, Moldavia or Transylvania, or else in one of the Balkan sub-provinces governed by a *beylerbeyi*. On the one hand, in the principalities Orthodox hospodars might provide patronage for art and learning of a kind not available to non-Muslims in the 'core territories'. But on the other hand, the taxes needed to finance the appointments of rapidly changing hospodars weighed heavily on the subjects, to say nothing of the fact that a rebelling governor might cause an invasion by Habsburg or Ottoman armies, or even by both of them. As to the Anatolian context, it would be a mistake to assume that conditions in the large border fortresses of Erzurum or Kars, where central control was well established, were necessarily replicated in Bitlis. For in the seventeenth century, this latter town was ruled by a local Kurdish *khan*, albeit under Ottoman overlordship. Since we expect a good deal of integration within today's national states, these and similar differences between regions are easily obscured when seventeenth- or eighteenth-century history is studied within modern territorial limits.

Given the long history of Balkan conflicts, including their most recent avatars, differences in economic and cultural development, ethnicity and identity formation have been much in the foreground

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in Germany were to stress the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in territories such as Bavaria, this was all the more attractive as a Bavarian prince, admittedly without much political luck or skill, once had occupied the Greek throne. Moreover, this infrastructure survived the Nazi régime quite well. After the end of World War II, the Balkan peninsula was divided, with Greece and Turkey becoming NATO members and all other Balkan countries, apart from Yugoslavia, members of the Warsaw Pact. In the Cold War environment, anti-Communist credentials continued to function for a while; but with the passing of time, a substantive change in personnel and outlook occurred.

of research into the history of the Balkan regions.[67] One focus of research concerns the vexed question whether, and if applicable to what extent, Ottoman policies were responsible for the Balkan lands' late transition to capitalism.[68] Moreover, one may speculate whether Ottoman political and commercial organization inhibited the development of crafts and manufactures, so that when 'incorporation into the world economy' finally arrived, the Balkan territories immediately were earmarked as agricultural peripheries.

However, if we follow Michael Palairet, many parts of the Ottoman Balkans were in fact slow to turn into 'peripheries' of any kind. While many Ottoman urban textile industries declined under the impact of early nineteenth-century European competition, rural industries often expanded, especially in the Rumelian provinces which later were to become Bulgaria. When the Ottoman state had managed to ensure minimal security on the roads after about 1830, these products of a rural 'proto-industry' were able to win a large number of customers. However, the situation changed quite dramatically from 1878 onwards. After independence, Bulgarian peasants paid fewer taxes than had been the case during the Ottoman period. Since land for peasant farming became readily available due to the expulsion or flight of land-holding Muslims, many peasants reverted to a subsistence economy. In consequence, urban marketing largely collapsed, and an almost totally peasant economy established itself. A similar situation had been characteristic of Serbia, with its lack of proto-industrial traditions, at an even earlier date. In Palairet's perspective, it was reversion to a peasant economy with little market-orientation, rather than any outside impact due to peripheralization, which explains the poor performance of Balkan economies during the nineteenth century.[69]

Linked to this question is the problem why what is known as the 'Balkan Renaissance' is such a 'late' phenomenon, post-1750 for the most part. Peter Sugar has pointed to the lack, in most provinces, of a local aristocracy which could have patronized the arts and learning.[70] In the artistic realm it was assumed for a long time that

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[67] Antonina Zhelyazkova and Johann Strauss will discuss these issues *in extenso*, but the topic is well-nigh inexhaustible.

[68] A similar problématique is favored in Hungary, compare the contribution of Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor to the present volume.

[69] Palairet, *The Balkan Economies*, pp. 50–57, 359–370.

[70] Peter Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804* (Seattle, London, 1977), pp. 274–275.

Ottoman restrictions upon church building were responsible for cultural stagnation, as churches, even in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, constituted major venues for architecture and the decorative arts. But the work of Machiel Kiel has made us at least seriously qualify this judgment. Kiel has demonstrated that in certain Ottoman provinces more opportunities for building and painting by the Empire's Orthodox artists existed than had been suspected previously.[71] Recently, more attention has been paid to the extreme competition for positions within the Orthodox church, along with the attendant expenditures. Thus money which could have been made available for schools or libraries reached the coffers of Ottoman dignitaries in the shape of bribes and the state treasury in the form of accession fees.

As to the formation of national identities, debates and disagreements concern not only the relationship between the Ottoman authorities and their Orthodox subjects, but also conflicts within the Orthodox Church itself. Where the Ottoman-Orthodox conflict is concerned, much debate hinges on conversions, and on the relative weight, in the formation of the Balkan Muslim communities, of immigration from Anatolia and the conversion of autochthonous people. Potential for disagreement is exacerbated by the lack of sources. After all, the Ottomans often were not interested in differentiating between Muslims of Turkish and those of Slavic background. Thus in many cases, it is none too clear whether a given person, of whom we may know very little beyond his given name and that of his father, belonged to one or the other category. Likewise, it is often difficult to differentiate between the late medieval abandonment of settlements due to the plague or to warfare between Balkan rulers, which were not at all rare, and the flight of local populations from Ottoman raiders and armies. A special issue is the claim that certain populations were converted by force, which in the case of the Muslims inhabiting the Rhodopes is deconstructed in the present volume by Antonina Zheljazkova. Due to the frequent lack of solid information, the scope for politically inspired rhetoric is greater than in most other historical subfields.

With respect to relations between different Orthodox groups, recent work has emphasized that the *millet*s in their centralized form, includ-

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[71] Machiel Kiel, *Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period* (Assen, Maastricht, 1985), pp. 143–205.

ing the Orthodox variety, are largely a creation of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[72] In earlier periods, relations between laity and churchmen remained relatively unstructured; they were to become increasingly conflictual with the growth of an educated lay public. By contrast, the church itself was strongly centralized, insisted on a Greek liturgy to the exclusion of Slavic varieties, and *de facto*, only Greek priests could obtain higher positions in the hierarchy. These privileges of Greek speakers and the Greek language led to considerable tensions at the time of the different national revivals, with the mid-nineteenth century formation of a Bulgarian autocephalous church a particularly dramatic climax.[73] That scholarly controversies concerning the identities of different Balkan communities were often overdetermined by current political rivalries goes without saying. It is also typical of these debates that quite a few groups and individuals who sought accommodation with the Ottoman state and its ruling stratum were conveniently 'forgotten'.[74]

Integration and decentralization

Authors, who in the 1950s and 1960s dealt with evidence on provincial magnates, often assumed that the activities of these personages constituted evidence of 'Ottoman decline' and autonomist, if not proto-nationalist, movements in the provinces. On the Turkish side, such magnates were viewed as rebels against the Ottoman center. In the course of a long career, Albert Hourani has contributed to a less simplistic and parochial view by drawing attention to the alliances which particularly in the Arab provinces were formed between well-to-do merchants or religious scholars, on the one hand,

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[72] Paraskevas Konortas, "From Tâ'ife to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Greek Orthodox Community," in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism, Politics, Economy and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ, 1999), 169–80.

[73] Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. 1: *Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, 1983), 344–45.

[74] For a perceptive discussion of these issues, to which we are much indebted, see Maria Todorova, "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," in L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York, 1996), pp. 45–77. However previous authors also have dwelt on these issues: Karl Barbir, "From Pasha to Efendi: The Assimilation of Ottomans into Damascene Society 1516–1783", *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1, 1 (1979–80), 68–83; Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics, Damascene Factions and Estates in the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, 1985).

and, on the other, administrators and military men. For the latter, often well integrated into Arab society despite their Ottoman origins, Hourani has coined the term 'local Ottomans'; the cultural and social borders which such people crossed in becoming Damascenes have been studied in some detail.[75] In certain places, such as Damascus or Mosul, local dynasties were able to monopolize governorships for several generations. By contrast in Egypt or Iraq, power lay in the hands of grandees who owed their ascent to their membership in a Mamluk political household. Local magnates who actually aimed at political independence were rare; and even when the early nineteenth-century *vali* of Egypt Mehmed Ali Pasha did make a bid for separate statehood, the cultural flavor of his court was Ottoman and not Egyptian.[76] Recent research thus has led us to stress the integrative powers which the Ottoman center retained even when it was politically very weak in the years around 1800.

Ottomanist historians, for the last ten or fifteen years, have been attracted to this remarkable strength-in-weakness which kept the Empire going, more or less, until the end of World War I. As a subtext we can discern the claim that decentralization had its advantages, and this view is probably connected to the work of the New York historical sociologist Charles Tilly. The latter has done much to demystify state formation and centralization by pointing to the heavy costs of these operations.[77] Several other studies concerning the multiple economic crises which plagued most states of seventeenth-century Europe have reached similar conclusions. Niels Steensgaard has linked these recurrent economic and financial difficulties to the tendency of seventeenth-century rulers to spend more on warfare than the fragile economies of their respective territories could afford.[78]

With centralization no longer the *summum bonum* which it had been to Europeanists—or even Indianists—of an earlier generation, Ottomanists have also begun to ask themselves whether increasing the power of the central authorities was necessarily a sign of 'political progress'.[79]

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[75] Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York, 1991), 249–56; Barbir, "From Pasha to Efendi".

[76] Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 32–33.

[77] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, 1985), 169–91.

[78] Niels Steensgaard, "The Seventeenth-century Crisis" in Geoffrey Parker, Lesley M. Smith, *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1978), 26–57.

[79] Salzmann, "Ancien Régime"; Khoury, *Mosul.*

After all, as Engin Akarlı has pointed out, the recentralization engineered by Mahmud II demanded a stiff price: the Porte was able to prevent Mehmed Ali Pasha from setting up his Egyptian state only by involving England and other European powers in the internal disputes of the Ottoman Empire. As a counterfactual hypothesis, one may venture the suggestion that by accommodating Mehmed Ali Pasha and foregoing certain attempts at imperial centralization, a much modified Ottoman sultanate could have retained more independence from foreign governments than it actually was able to achieve.[80]

In this context, tax farming, much maligned in the past because it cost the taxpayers money and yet failed to fill the coffers of the central state, has experienced a partial rehabilitation. When tax farms were sold on a life-time basis starting in 1695, this arrangement certainly consolidated the formation of an Ottoman 'aristocracy', which Lady Mary Montagu discerned even in the 1720s.[81] From the very beginning, members of the subject population were excluded from the bidding, which had been open to all moneyed persons as long as tax farms had been limited to only a few years' duration. By contrast, privilege was accorded to figures strategically situated within the Ottoman administration. Generally, these men had secured their positions by affiliation with a personage already established in government service, and of course they possessed the necessary financial resources. Such personages could retain the tax farms awarded to them as profitable investments, and, in practice if not in theory, often pass them on to their sons.

But at the same time, life-time tax farming allowed the Ottoman central government to ensure the loyalty of the members of great households, in other words, the Ottoman aristocracy in the process of formation. 'Local Ottomans' attachment to the central state was of major significance, as from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards 'political households' constituted a major avenue of recruitment into the ruling groups of both the capital and the provinces. It was mainly—and in most instances only—through their

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[80] Engin Akarlı, "Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad Al-Sham and Egypt," in Abdeljelil Temimi (ed.), *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l'époque ottomane* (Zaghouan, 1988), vol 3, pp. 41–56. On related issues compare *New Perspectives on Turkey* 7 (Spring 1992) which is entirely devoted to the British-Ottoman Treaty of 1833.

[81] Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı maliyesinde malikâne sistemi," in *Türkiye iktisat tarihi semineri, metinler—tartışmalar*, ed. by Osman Okyar and Ünal Nabantoğlu (Ankara, 1975), pp. 231–96; Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, *Turkish Embassy Letters*, ed. by Anita Desai and Malcolm Jack (London, 1993), 88–91 and elsewhere.

legitimation as 'servants of the sultan' that tax farmers were able to collect dues from peasants and guildsmen. While local magnates might supplement their incomes by commerce, the basis of their fortunes was and remained political.[82] Thus by assigning revenues to notables and magnates, the Ottoman government had instituted a kind of power-sharing familiar to historians of the Mongols and their Chinese empire, but until very recently unknown, even as a mental category, to historians of the Ottoman world.[83] In certain instances, such as eighteenth-century Mosul, links to the Ottoman center actually may have been closer in the eighteenth century, when the Jalili magnate family was in power, than they had been two hundred years earlier. While in the seventeenth century the central power theoretically was absolute, its actual control over the border territories of modern Iraq often remained quite limited.[84]

The center and its subjects: the Tanzimat Years

Up to this point, we have focused on the pre-Tanzimat period. Yet it is especially after the 1839 Gülhane Rescript had assured all Ottoman subjects that their lives, properties and honor were henceforth to be guaranteed, that tensions between the government in Istanbul and its non-Muslim subjects, particularly those living in the Balkans, really erupted.[85] Nationalist ambitions in southeastern Europe already had led to the formation of the Greek state in 1830, that is, in the pre-Tanzimat period. However, the Kingdom of Greece was established after the Greek uprising itself had been defeated by

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[82] Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980), 283–337.

[83] Ariel Salzmann, "Measures of Empire: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Régime, 1695–1807," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1995, is not at present available for consultation. However, an idea concerning this important work, hopefully soon available as a book, can be gained from Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime" and from references in Khoury, *Mosul*. On power-sharing in the Mongol context see İsenbike Togan, "Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms," in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. by Halil Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi (London, 1992), 185–210.

[84] Khoury, *Mosul*, p. 25.

[85] For interpretations of this documents, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), 144–147; Halil İnalcık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu", *Belleten* 28 (1964), 603–622; Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript," *Die Welt des Islams* 34 (1994), 173–203.

the troops of Mehmed Ali Pasha, governor of Egypt, and owed its existence to the military and diplomatic intervention of the Great Powers in favor of a Greek state.[86] Yet even so, the Ottoman Empire retained a sizeable number of Orthodox Christian subjects. It was the ambition of Czar Nicholas I to establish a protectorate over these people as a preliminary to future Russian hegemony in the Balkans—the demise of the Ottoman Empire being viewed as imminent in St. Petersburg. These policies formed the major cause of the Crimean War (1853–1856). Evidently in the eyes of French and British politicians, such an expansion of the Russian sphere of influence was regarded as unacceptable, as a significant threat to the Mediterranean interests of the two states involved.[87]

The Crimean War was fought out on the Crimea only in part; there were also Danube and Caucasus fronts. At the very end of the war, the Russian army succeeded in conquering the Ottoman fortress of Kars.[88] Moreover, in the plans of the Czar and his minister Nesselrode, a Russian occupation of the principalities of Moldavia and Walachia, still under Ottoman suzerainty, was to have sparked an overall uprising of the Orthodox throughout southeastern Europe. However, such an uprising never materialized, only a limited number of volunteers serving in the Russian armies.[89] Thus the Crimean War, in the short run, brought the Ottoman central government a certain respite. For even though its military contribution, after the naval disaster of Sinop and the all but total loss of its battleships, had not been very great, at least the government in Istanbul did find itself

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[86] See Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821–1833* (London, 1973), and the contributions in Richard Clogg (ed.), *The Struggle for Greek Independence. Essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence* (London, 1973).

[87] Ann Pottinger Saab, *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance* (Charlottesville, 1977); Irma L'vovna Fadeeva, *Osmanskaya imperiya i anglo-turetskie otnosheniya v seredine XIX v.* (Moscow, 1982); Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War. A Cautionary Tale* (Hannover, NH, 1985); Vitaliy Ivanovich Sheremet, *Osmanskaya imperiya i Zapadnaya Evropa. Vtoraya tret' XIX v.* (Moscow, 1986); David M. Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War* (London, 1994); Alain Gouttman, *La guerre de Crimée 1853–1856* (Paris, 1995); Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War, 1853–1856* (London, 1999).

[88] W. E. D. Allen and P. Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828–1921* (Cambridge, 1953), 55–102.

[89] S. A. Nikitin, *Ocherki po istorii yuzhnykh slavyan i russko-balkanskikh svyazej v 50–70–e gody XIX v.* (Moscow, 1970), 110–145; Maria N. Todorova, "Die Freiwilligen von der Balkanhalbinsel im Krimkrieg", in *Nationalrevolutionäre Bewegungen in Südosteuropa im 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. by C. Cholio1čev, K. H. Mack and A. Suppan (Vienna and Munich, 1992), 134–151, here 138–140; *eadem*, "The Greek Volunteers in the Crimean War", *Balkan Studies* 25 (1984), 539–563.

on the winning side. However, it proved impossible to continue the war without resorting to loans from European bankers. Given high interest rates and commission payments, in addition to a constant need for fresh loans to finance armaments and an albeit limited modernization of the infrastructure, the Ottoman government was bankrupt within less than twenty years after the end of the war (1875).[90]

For the better-off among Ottoman non-Muslims, the years following the Crimean War were a time of ambiguity. On the one hand, nationalist ambitions had spread yet further among the Christian inhabitants of southeastern Europe. Thus, after the Serbs and Greeks, Bulgarians now began to demand greater influence over the institutions which governed them. While in the earlier nineteenth century, considerable mutual sympathy had existed among the different national movements of the Balkans, the Bulgarian drive for autonomy was at first directed largely against the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church and the latter's upper clergy. By contrast, during the first stages of the movement to form an autocephalous Bulgarian Church, Bulgarian political leaders could count on a degree of sympathy from members of the Ottoman ruling group.[91]

Such temporary alliances were promoted by a considerable *de facto* secularization of the Ottoman political elite during the Tanzimat period. Now the latter aimed not so much at the promotion of Islam, as at the focusing of the loyalties of all Ottoman subjects upon the sultan and the state (*ittihad-ı anasır*). During this period and well into the 1870s, 'Ottomanism' as an ideology aimed at the formation of a 'political nation'. The reforms of 1839, expanded through a solemn sultanic edict of 1856, promised Ottoman non-Muslims equal rights and, among other things, employment in responsible positions within the developing Ottoman bureaucracy.[92] These advantages explain why the mid-century restructuring of the Ottoman state was supported

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[90] Olive Anderson, "Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854–55", *Historical Journal* 7 (1964), 47–63; Mihail D. Sturdza, "Haute Banque et Sublime Porte. Préliminaires financiers de la Guerre de Crimée", in *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman*, ed. by J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and P. Dumont (Louvain, 1983), 451–480.

[91] Halil İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar meselesi* (Ankara, 1943; Repr. 1992); Richard von Mach, *The Bulgarian Exarchate: Its History and the Extent of Its Authority in Turkey* (London, 1907).

[92] Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963); Irina Evgen'evna Fadeeva, *Official'nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoy imperii (Osmanizm-Panislamizm)* (Moscow, 1985); Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte 1789–1922* (Princeton, 1980); *idem*, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, 1989).

by quite a few non-Muslims, while many Muslims felt that they were losing ground and were not slow in expressing their resentment.[93]

On the other hand, from the perspective of Balkan nationalists, this situation involved considerable danger, as it meant that potential supporters of a variety of nationalist projects reaffirmed their ties to the Ottoman state.[94] This view explains the emergence of political terrorism during the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Macedonian variety constituting the best known but by no means the only example.[95] For as the terrorists saw it, their acts would elicit a violent response from the Ottoman administration, and in most cases reprisals would be directed at non-Muslim subjects completely uninvolved in the acts in question. In response, the victims would see little alternative to espousing the cause of this or that emerging Balkan nationality; and, in fact, terrorism contributed substantially to the fears of disloyalty which many Ottoman administrators were more than ready to express *vis-à-vis* their non-Muslim subjects.

In a nineteenth-century context, military service constituted a core feature both of state formation and of nation-building. Thus, for instance in France, performing military service became a *conditio sine qua non* for citizenship, and at the same time, 'peasants' were turned 'into Frenchmen', to quote Eugen Weber's well-known study, not least through the instruction provided in the course of military service.[96] Moreover, mixing men from different regions often resulted in a growing uniformity of customs back home. Spaghetti spread throughout Italy after conscripts had encountered them during their military service, and in Germany after 1870, the Christmas tree ceased to be regarded as a Protestant peculiarity after Catholic ex-soldiers had brought the custom back to their villages. This assimilatory effect, which made itself felt all over Europe, was well-known to Ottoman policy makers at various levels, and when a possible

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[93] Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York, 1996), 114.

[94] On the strained relationship between Balkan nationalists and Ottoman reformers see Irina E. and Jurij A. Petrosyan, *Osmanskaya imperiya. Reformy i reformatory (konets XVIII–nachalo XX v.)* (Moscow, 1993), 78–88.

[95] Fikret Adanır, *Die Makedonische Frage. Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908* (Wiesbaden, 1979); Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror. The Macedonian Liberation Movements 1893–1903* (Durham NC., and London, 1988); Gül Tokay, *Makedonya Sorunu ve Jön Türk ihtilalinin kökenleri 1903–1908* (Istanbul, 1996). See also the as yet unpublished dissertation of Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage (1890–1918)*, University of Munich, 2001.

[96] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, 1976), 292–302.

'military adventure' of Ottoman non-Muslims was discussed, the question whether the latter should serve alongside Muslims or in separate units was very much in the foreground of the debate.[97]

Things looked rather different in the perspective of European observers, among whom it was generally assumed that their Muslim beliefs did not permit Ottoman statesmen to place arms in the hands of Christians. Historically speaking, this was an oversimplification: Among border warriors and irregulars on the Habsburg frontier, Christians long had been well represented, to say nothing of the pass-guards (*derbendci, armatoloi*), whose duty it was to protect travelers on the high roads. However, the increasing intensity of nationalist sentiment among Balkan Christians did raise the specter of such troops deserting or even going over to the enemy. But even when cases of this type did occur with some frequency during the Balkan wars of 1912–13, Ottoman generals insisted that these events had not been the cause of the catastrophic defeats suffered by the army they had commanded.[98]

Significant opposition to non-Muslim military service came from leading figures among these communities themselves; here it was exactly the power of assimilation in which shared military service might result which formed the major reason for protests. Representatives of the non-Muslim communities often suggested that paying an extra tax in lieu of military service was preferable, and Sultan Abdülhamid II, who believed that non-Muslim soldiers made no sense in an Islamic caliphate, tended to agree with them.[99] A long-term consequence of this dispute was that in World War I, many Greeks and Armenians were forced to do their military service in labor battalions instead of in the regular army.[100] But that had not been the issue back in 1858.

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[97] This formulation is taken from Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveni* (Istanbul, 2000).

[98] Fikret Adanır, "Christliche Rekruten unter dem Halbmond: Zum Problem der Militärdienstpflicht für Nichtmuslime im spätosmanischen Reich", in *Von der Pruth-Ebene bis zum Gipfel des Ida. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Emmanuel Turczynski*, ed. by Gerhard Grimm (Munich, 1989), 153–164.

[99] Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System, 1844–1914", *International Review of Social History* 43 (1998), 437–449; Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveni* (Istanbul, 2000).

[100] Feroz Ahmad, "War and Society Under the Young Turks, 1908–18", *Review* XI/2 (Spring 1988), 265–286; Erik Jan Zürcher, "Between Death and Desertion. The Experience of the Ottoman Soldier in World War I", *Turcica* 28 (1996), 235–258.

The central government and its subjects in Southeastern Europe: the Hamidian Years

Abdülhamid II came to power in 1876. He soon suspended the constitution by which Tanzimat statesmen such as Midhat Pasha had hoped to integrate the non-Muslims, and, by the same stroke, make the attacks of European politicians and writers against the sultan's supposed 'Asiatic despotism' appear less convincing.[101] Shortly after Abdülhamid's enthronement, another war was waged with Czarist Russia, which soon turned into a major military disaster (1877).[102] With the Russian army in the suburbs of Istanbul, the Czar concluded the peace treaty of San Stefano (today: Yeşilköy) which established a large Bulgarian state with comfortable access to the Aegean Sea. This once again was regarded by the western European powers as a territorial gain which they were not willing to grant the Russian Empire, as the new Bulgarian principality was widely regarded as a client state of the Czars. In the following year, an international congress held in Berlin permitted only the institution of a much diminished Bulgarian principality, which moreover remained, for the time being, under the sultan's suzerainty.[103]

Due to the war, a large number of Muslim refugees inundated Istanbul, some of them having fled the immediate vicinity of the battlefields, while others had been expelled from what was now Bulgarian territory.[104] On the Bulgarian side as well, the war left a legacy of

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[101] On Midhat Pasha and his policies see Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore, 1963); Ezel Kural Shaw, "Midhat Pasha. Reformer or Revolutionary?", Ph.D., Harvard University, 1975; Irina Evgen'evna Fadeeva, *Midhat-pasha. Zhizn' i deyatel'nost'* (Moscow, 1977); Krumka Sharova, "Midhat Pasha i Bulgarskoto revolyutsionno dvizhenie prez 1872 godina", *Istoricheski pregled* 1991, No. 6, 3–16, and No. 7, 3–19; Maria Todorova, "Midhat Paşa's Governorship of the Danube Province", in *Decision Making in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Caesar E. Farah (Kirksville MO, 1993), 115–128.

[102] İ. Halil Sedes, *1875–1878 Osmanlı ordusu savaşları*, vol. 1–3 (Istanbul, 1935); Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "1877–78 Osmanlı-Rus harbinin sebepleri", *Belleten* 26 (1962), 567–592.

[103] See the contributions in Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Der Berliner Kongreß von 1878. Die Politik der Großmächte und die Probleme der Modernisierung in Südosteuropa in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden, 1982).

[104] Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk göçleri. Belgeler*, vol. 1–3 (Ankara, 1968–1989); Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk göçleri (1877–1890)* (Ankara, 1994); Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821–1922* (Princeton, 1995), 59–108; Wolfgang Höpken, "Flucht vor dem Kreuz? Muslimische Emigration aus Südosteuropa nach dem Ende der osmanischen Herrschaft (19./20.

lasting bitterness; this was largely due to the depredations of Circassian irregulars, themselves poorly integrated recent refugees from the Czarist empire, who ran out of control and caused much bloodshed.[105]

Given these conditions, Sultan Abdülhamid and his advisers considered that Ottomanism and the integration of non-Muslim subjects should be written off as failures. Instead Islam was now expected to provide the ideological ties which, hopefully, would bind together what remained of the Empire.[106] In consequence, southeastern Europe, where the Ottomans in the meantime held only a limited amount of territory, lost much of its previous importance in the eyes of the Istanbul government. However, Bosnian Muslims arriving on Ottoman territory after the Austrian occupation of 1878 and the refugees from other southeastern European territories were seen as a source of manpower to be settled wherever the government considered it desirable to increase the number of Muslims and to diminish the concentration of the local non-Muslim population.[107]

Ethnic nationalism in the Ottoman Empire during the last decades of its existence

This changing mood was reflected also in the economic philosophy of the period. The Hamidian regime saw the first instances of an étatistic interpretation of the emerging national economy. In the long run, this policy implied the elimination of the non-Muslim intermediary groups, whose members formed the only commercial bourgeoisie existing in the Ottoman Empire around 1900. Inspired by the ideas of Friedrich List, a popularizing writer such as Ahmed Midhat Efendi frequently discussed the preconditions for the devel-

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Jahrhundert)", in *Zwangsmigrationen in Mittel- und Südosteuropa*, ed. by Wolfgang Höpken (Leipzig, 1996), 1–24.

[105] Jono Mitev, *Istoriya na Aprilskoto vustanie 1876*, vol. 1–3 (Sofia, 1986–1988); Richard Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875–1878* (Oxford, 1979).

[106] Bayram Kodaman, *Şark meselesi ışığı altında Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in Doğu Anadolu politikası* (Istanbul, 1983); Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam. Ideology and Organization* (Oxford, 1994); Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909* (London, 1998).

[107] Fikret Adanır and Hilmar Kaiser, "Migration, Deportation, and Nation-Building: The Case of the Ottoman Empire", in *Migrations and Migrants in Historical Perspective. Permanencies and Innovations*, ed. by René Leboutte (Brussels, 2000), 273–292. On Bosnian Muslim immigration into the Ottoman Empire, see also F. Adanır's contribution in this volume.

opment of a Turkish middle class.[108] However, in practice, Abdülhamid II maintained good relations with quite a few non-Muslim businessmen, who were given marks of sultanic favor in the form of decorations and honorific titles. Only after 1908 was the creation of a 'national bourgeoisie' on the part of the state put on the official agenda, and it was only in the 1920s, when war, flight and massacre had decimated the non-Muslims of what had recently become the Republic of Turkey, that this policy was implemented in earnest.[109]

However, major steps on this road were taken after the Ottoman catastrophe of the Balkan War in 1912, when the original liberal project of the Young Turks was abandoned entirely in favor of a petit-bourgeois populism that instrumentalized Muslim grievances at the expense of non-Muslim citizens.[110] Consequently, already in the first half of 1914 about 100,000 Greeks were compelled to leave Aegean Anatolia for the nearby islands. Once the First World War began, the forced transfer of Greek population continued, this time to places in the Anatolian interior.[111] Yet more comprehensive and radical measures were taken against the Armenians living in the eastern provinces. Their indiscriminate deportation after 1915 was a virtual "ethnic cleansing" leading in some places to wholesale extermination.[112]

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[108] Ahmed Güner Sayar, *Osmanlı iktisat düşüncesinin çağdaşlaşması* (Istanbul, 1986), 398–417; François Georgeon, "L'économie politique selon Ahmed Midhat", in *Première Rencontre Internationale sur l'Empire Ottoman et la Turquie Moderne*, ed. by Edhem Eldem (Istanbul, 1991), 461–479.

[109] Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Milli iktisat" (1908–1918)* (Ankara, 1982), *passim*; Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey. A Study in Capitalist Development* (London and New York, 1987), 71–90; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 108–116.

[110] On populist currents of the period, see İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan, "Türkiye'de halkçılık ideolojisinin evrimi", *Toplum ve Bilim* 6–7 (Summer-Fall 1978), 44–110; Zafer Toprak, "Osmanlı narodnikleri: 'Halka Doğru' gidenler, *Toplum ve Bilim* 24 (Winter 1984), 69–81. On Young Turk political ideas in general, see Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri 1895–1908* (Ankara 1964); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir siyasal düşünür olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve dönemi* (Istanbul 1981); *idem*, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York and Oxford, 1995); *idem*, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (London, 2001); Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876–1924* (Leiden, 1985); Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks. Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley, 1997); Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908–1913* (Leiden, 2000).

[111] References in Fikret Adanır, "Lo scambio greco-turco di popolazioni nella storiografica turca", in *Esodi. Trasferimenti forzati di popolazioni nel Novecento europeo*, ed. by M. Cattaruzza, M. Dogo and R. Pupo (Naples, 2000), 89–101. See also the forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation of Onur Yıldırım, Scholars, Diplomats and Refugees: A Historical Study of the Turco-Greek Population Exchange, 1922–1923.

[112] For a discussion of the relevant literature, see Fikret Adanır, "Die Armenische Frage und der Völkermord an den Armeniern im Osmanischen Reich: Betroffenheit im Reflex nationalistischer Geschichtsschreibung", in *Erlebnis-Gedächtnis-Sinn.*

Thus it can be argued that the response of the Ottoman ruling group to ethnic nationalism was basically a kind of imperial nationalism. A similar ideology was in fact developed by the ruling classes of the Habsburg Empire in its final stages, perhaps with the difference that in the Ottoman instance, this way of thinking articulated itself in more militant terms.[113] In any case, the abandonment of pluralist positions was concomitant with the ascendancy of ethnic exclusiveness, the final implications of which surpassed by far the narrow boundaries of inter-communal rivalries within the *ancien régime*. Significantly enough, neither the Ottoman nor the Habsburg Empire survived the First World War, and the legacy of both has been stained by deportations, massacres and even genocide.

In conclusion: reflections of nationalism in the historiography

Given this conflict-ridden history, the historical sciences in the Balkans have developed along lines determined by the needs of the emerging nation-states.[114] An adequate understanding of the specificities of nation-state formation is therefore essential in order to explain how historical tradition has evolved in this part of Europe. The liberation struggles in Ottoman Serbia, Greece or Bulgaria originated in rural conflicts in which semi-military elements such as *haiduk*s, *martolos*, or *armatoloi* were prominent.[115] What role did urban or 'bour-

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Authentische und konstruierte Erinnerung, ed. by H. Loewy and B. Moltmann (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1996), 237–263; *idem*, "Le génocide arménien? Une réévaluation", in *L'Actualité du génocide des Arméniens*, ed. by H. H. Ayvazian *et al.* (Créteil, France, 1999), 405–418.

[113] Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder and Oxford, 1997); Fikret Adanır, "Religious Communities and Ethnic Groups under Imperial Sway: Ottoman and Habsburg Lands in Comparison", in *The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from Early Modern Times to the 20th Century in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Global Worlds*, ed. by Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder and Adrian Shubert (forthcoming).

[114] Fikret Adanır, "Balkan Historiography related to the Ottoman Empire since 1945", in *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, ed. by Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden, 2000), 236–252 (for a more developed version see *idem*, "Ikinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Balkan tarih yazınında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu", *Toplum ve Bilim* 83, Winter 1999/2000, 224–240).

[115] Gale Stokes, "The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics before 1840", *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* IV/1 (Fall 1976), 77–90; Lawrence P. Meriage, "The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813): National Revival or a Search for Regional Security", *Ibid.*, IV/2 (Spring 1977), 187–205; Hans-Michael Miedlig, "Patriarchalische Mentalität als Hindernis für die staatliche und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung in Serbien im 19. Jahrhundert", *Südost-Forschungen* 50 (1991), 163–90.

geois' groups play in these processes? Even in the Greek case, where a relatively developed 'national bourgeoisie' stood behind the insurrectionary movement, it was hardly the aim of merchants operating throughout the Mediterranean and Black Sea basins to establish a small Greek state at the southern tip of the Balkan peninsula. To the contrary, urban commercial groups hoped, together with the Phanariote aristocracy, to transform Ottoman rule into a Greek-controlled multi-ethnic oriental empire. Intellectuals such as Adamantios Korais or Rhigas Velestinlis also seem to have thought in 'imperialist' categories, envisioning a Greek 'republic' which would include the Balkans, the Archipelago and Asia Minor.[116]

It is true that the Bulgarian national movement, which gained momentum after the Crimean War, operated in a different sociopolitical setting. It began, as we have seen, as a struggle against Greek ecclesiastical and cultural dominance, whereby Bulgarians even counted on the support of the Ottoman reform bureaucracy. In addition, it was no longer Russia, the loser of the Crimean War, that extended protection, but rather the liberal West to which one turned for help and guidance. Emerging 'bourgeois' or 'petit-bourgeois' elements within Bulgarian society therefore had a better chance of asserting themselves. But once again, the national question was not resolved by a political compromise articulating the internal dynamics of the local civil society, but by an external factor, namely the victory of the Czarist armies.[117]

Thus it can be argued that nation-state formation in Ottoman Europe was hardly a corollary of bourgeois aspirations for social and political emancipation. Independence, attained in the wake of an Ottoman military defeat, brought the most militant factions of the relevant elites to the forefront. Consequently, nation-states were created before the corresponding national societies had developed, and the new rulers had to embark upon daring projects of nation-building 'from above'. In this context, we have referred to the Ottoman

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[116] See Notis Botzaris, *Visions balkaniques dans la préparation de la révolution grecque (1789–1821)* (Geneva and Paris, 1962), 183–209; Apostolos Daskalakis, *To politeuma tou Rēga Belestinlē. Prōton suntagma ellinikēs dēmokratias kai eleutheras diabiōse ōs tōn Balkanikōn laōn* (Athens, 1976); and the contributions in Richard Clogg (ed.), *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence* (London, 1981).

[117] Cf. Harald Heppner, "Theorie und Realität der 'nationalen Revolution' in Bulgarien in den siebziger Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts", in *Nationalrevolutionäre Bewegungen in Südosteuropa im 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Christo Choliolčev, Karlheinz Mack and Arnold Suppan (Munich, 1992), 60–67.

and later the Turkish case, but there were others as well. As a result, historical scholarship was made to play a predominantly ideological role.[118] Creating historical traditions—and the interpretation which the Ottoman period received in that context—served not only to legitimize the new regimes internally. Equally important was the external justification *vis-á-vis* a European world which cherished its own notions of nationhood and which was eager to dispatch its princes, generals, bankers or missionaries into the region. In this way the romantic concept of the uniqueness of nation, the novel idea of nationhood based on language, the employment of history in support of irredentist projects and similar modern concepts entered the Balkans. No wonder that the Balkan states from their inception were bent on reattaining their medieval or ancient grandeur. Even present-day conflicts are internally vindicated, and acquire significance internationally, with reference to imperial inspirations from the past.[119]

In the light of the above, the nineteenth-century European image of Ottoman rule has had a direct relevance for the emerging Balkan historiographies. Philhellenic sentiments of the post-Napoleonic era fostered in the West a deep interest for the fortunes of Ottoman subject populations in southeastern Europe. Even the positivist school, which is credited with impartiality based on a dispassionate and critical investigation of historical questions, often indulged in sweeping generalizations which confirmed Eurocentric theoretical constructs reflecting political and moral prejudices against an 'external principle' such as 'Islam' or 'Asia'. In the same vein, an observer as sympathetic as Joseph von Hammer could not desist, when judging the Ottomans, from assuming the stance of a morally and intellectually superior European. Upon reaching the period of the first westernizing influences in his multi-volume history, he could not help but exclaim: "Both the author and the reader of Ottoman history can finally breathe more freely . . . Given the warm winds generated by contact with European politics and culture, at least the edges of the rigid ice crust of the Turk are thawing, and a gentler breeze of humane mildness and civilization blows."[120]

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[118] Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans", *European History Quarterly* 19 (1989), 149–194.

[119] Stefan Troebst, "Fluchtpunkt San Stefano—Nationalismus in Bulgarien", *Die Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* 37 (1990), 405–14; Wolfgang Höpken, "Geschichte und Gewalt: Geschichtsbewußtsein im jugoslawischen Konflikt", *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* 15 (1993), 55–73.

[120] *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 7 (Pest, 1831), 1–2.

Legitimizing one's own state in the eyes of western European scholars and literati thus became a project of some significance for historians of the newly independent Balkan states, and, particularly after the founding of the Republic of Turkey, for Turkish historians as well. Yet the stance taken by Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian historians was the exact opposite of that later adopted by their Turkish colleagues. For nineteenth-century authors of non-Muslim background, it was easy to adopt the image of the 'terrible Turk', which, as we have seen, already had become an established cliché among their western European colleagues. Thus the contemporary misery experienced in every corner of the Peninsula could be conveniently explained as resulting from Ottoman occupation. Jireček's "History of the Bulgarians", published in 1875, a work "written in the best tradition of nineteenth-century European historiography", introduced the notion of the 'Turkish yoke' into the Balkan historiographical scene.[121] Ironically, in the very year of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, it was Nicolae Iorga who claimed that, despite remarkable efforts to reform state and society, the Ottomans were—not least due to the rigidity of Islam—doomed to fail. Iorga thought that, although the Turkish body politic still showed signs of life ("Der türkische Staatskörper lebt noch"), the Turkish soul was long dead ("Aber die türkische Seele ist . . . erloschen").[122]

On the Turkish side, by contrast, certain historiographical characteristics of late nineteenth-century western European historiography, such as the widespread denigration of Byzantium, were adopted as a legitimizing device; after all, it was the Ottomans who had defeated the Byzantines.[123] At a later stage, after the Ottoman Empire once again had become a 'fashionable' topic among Turkish scholars and politicians, a new argument emerged. In the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s, it was the 'state' founded by the sultans as a non-feudal entity, which ended the oppression of Balkan feudal lords and liberated the peasants.[124] Furthermore, attempts in the European secondary literature to deny systematically the originality of Ottoman architecture by viewing it as an inferior copy of the Aya Sofya,

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[121] Maria Todorova, "Bulgarian Historical Writing on the Ottoman Empire", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 12 (Spring 1995) 97–118, here 108–109.

[122] Nicolae Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 1 (Gotha, 1908), viii.

[123] Michael Ursinus, "Byzantine History in Late Ottoman Turkish Historiography", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 10 (1986), 211–222.

[124] Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Türkiye'de toprak meselesinin tarihi esasları", *Ülkü* 11 (1938), No. 61, 53.

resulted in an exaggerated emphasis on all architectural features which could conceivably be considered 'central Asian'.[125] To sum up, legitimizing the nation-state doubtlessly has inspired a number of serious studies, but it has also saddled present-day historical scholarship with a problematic legacy of which it is not easy to divest oneself.[126]

The Contributions

It is in this research context, which highlights centralization and its opposite, as well as legitimacy, power-sharing, identity and nationalism that we must view the studies forming part of the present book. It has been long in the making, much too long for comfort. About nine years ago, a panel at the Congress of German Historians brought together an international group of scholars interested in the manner in which Ottoman history was perceived, mainly but not exclusively in the twentieth century. The participants liked each others' papers well enough to plan for a common volume. However, that was easier said than done. As a single panel does not normally make a book, extra papers were commissioned, promised, and then sometimes delivered and sometimes not. Certain lacunae in the coverage thus are due to the fact that the editors waited very long for the relevant papers to be submitted, and then they realized it was too late to commission new ones. It is this situation that explains the lack of contributions concerning Serbs and Albanians. 'We crave the readers' indulgence'.

Our volume begins with a discussion of how members of the Ottoman elite saw themselves at a particularly critical stage of the Empire's history, namely Christoph Neumann's study "Bad times and better self: definitions of identity and strategies for development in late Ottoman historiography (1850–1900)". This chapter deals with the attempts of authors such as Namık Kemal, Hayrullah, Ahmed Cevdet, Ahmed Vefik and Mustafa Nuri to come to terms with Ottoman history during the troubled years of the later nineteenth century. Given European encroachments on Ottoman territory and the role of Christianity as a device for legitimizing these

[125] Cf. Emel Esin, "An Eighteenth-Century 'Yalı' Viewed in the Line of Development of Related Form in Turkic Architecture", in *Atti del Secondo Congresso Internazionale di Arte Turca* (Naples, 1965), 95.

[126] Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History: an Introduction to the Sources* (Cambridge, 1999), 176–220.

encroachments, it is not surprising that late Ottoman authors were on the lookout for a Muslim or, at the very least, non-Christian model of political success against European powers. Legitimizing the Ottoman state and ensuring its survival were given top priority. Even if these writers were less than sympathetic toward the current régime of Sultan Abdülhamid II, they were public employees, and no alternative state model could offer them the opportunities available in the Ottoman Empire as it actually existed.

Japanese successes against Russia in 1905 thus were received with great satisfaction. But an older model also was available, namely Mehmed Ali Pasha's attempt to develop Egyptian industry in tandem with military power. Neumann concentrates on the manner in which late Ottoman authors treated—or, in some instances, failed to treat—the policies of the erstwhile rebellious governor and opponent of Mahmud II. Here was the example of a Muslim ruler who had, for a while, been successful in 'modernizing' his state, even if by the 1880s, the failure of his policies had become obvious. But at the very end of the Empire, Abdürrahman Şeref, the last imperial historiographer and first head of the Historical Commission of the Republic of Turkey, wrote approvingly of Mehmed Ali Pasha's autocratic centralism. Maybe this judgment indicated the policies which the Empire's last official chronicler, and with him other members of the former Ottoman elite, considered appropriate for the newly founded Republic of Turkey.

The defense of this new state of Turkey, a novel and rather special case among the Ottoman Empire's successor states, was undertaken by Turkish historians but encouraged by the powerful Kemalist state apparatus. This enterprise constitutes the topic of Büşra Ersanlı's contribution. She is concerned with the precarious coexistence in the authoritarian climate of the 1930s of scholarly research interests, on the one hand, and an identification with the official Turkish 'party line' on the other. Ideological tension stemmed from the fact that in those years the elite of the Republic of Turkey saw itself as the carrier of a 'cultural revolution' against an *ancien régime* described as profoundly corrupt. This was the brief phase which Halil Berktay has called 'Jacobin' and in which a major scholar such as Fuat Köprülü opened up new scholarly horizons.[127]

[127] Halil Berktay, "Der Aufstieg und die gegenwärtige Krise der nationalistischen

In contradistinction to the defunct elite, the supporters of the Republican government regarded themselves as Turkish nationalists, and saw this nationality as reaching back in time far beyond the Ottoman age. Given the racialist undertone of many if not most nationalisms of the 1930s, it is not surprising that race also played a role in the 'ideology of origins' propounded by many Turkish nationalist historians. However, the emphasis was defensive rather than offensive: Turkish nationalists were simply defining themselves as members of the white race, regarded as superior throughout Europe and North America. In consequence emphasizing possible links to the Mongols was considered 'bad form'. Many historians and ideologues also believed that among the peoples of pre- and protohistory, the Turks had played a preponderant role.

But at the same time, it was difficult to deny that the Republic of Turkey had been formed out of quite a few of the defunct Empire's core provinces. If one took a closer look, it also became obvious that there existed no sharp break between the late Ottoman elite and its early Republican successor. Moreover, particularly in the non-elite sectors of society, the prestige of the Ottoman sultans still stood high. Thus it seemed inadvisable to neglect this important source of national pride, which could, after all, be useful in legitimizing even the Republic. Yet when glorifying the 'campaigns and victories' of Ottoman rulers, it was difficult to avoid discussing Islam, as the Ottoman sultans had defined themselves above all as Sunni Muslim rulers. An emphasis on religion, however, conflicted with the militant secularism which characterized the Republican elite down to the election of 1950.

Büşra Ersanlı has shown how these tensions worked themselves out in the committees which planned the school books of the period, but also in the papers read at the different officially sponsored history congresses of the 1930s. In her perspective, the underlying tensions were never resolved. This led to a monotonous repetition of unproven and unprovable claims, and, as an unintended result, the historiography of the early Republic in its dogmatism rather resembled the state-legitimizing Ottoman historiography it had set out to supplant.

Geschichtsschreibung in der Türkei," *Periplus* 1 (1991), 102–125. Berktay's views of the Turkish historiography of the early 1930s are, however, much more optimistic than Ersanlı's.

Thus Neumann and Ersanlı critically reflect upon the work of late Ottoman and early Republican authors concerning the Empire's history and structure. Next in line, there are three articles which deal with Byzantines, Ottoman Greeks and the way in which the different groups of people which can be subsumed under these headings are reflected in recent historiography. In "Research problems concerning the transition to Tourkokratia: the Byzantinist standpoint", Klaus-Peter Matschke deals first with the long-term socio-economic aspects of the transition, namely population changes, the situation of peasants, urban history and commercial exchanges at fairs. The following section covers autochthonous populations actively participating in the Ottoman expansion, either as military men or due to their business activities. How the Orthodox Church and the major monasteries coped with Ottoman rule constitutes yet another variant of the Byzantino-Ottoman transition. The last major section concerns the Byzantine aristocracy, or, to put it differently, the way in which members of the old ruling group attempted to survive under the new dispensation.

Among other studies, Matschke draws on the work of the Dumbarton Oaks-Birmingham group, which has done a great deal to elucidate the Byzantino-Ottoman transition on a regional level. But he also highlights the work of Machiel Kiel, who for many years has struggled to free the historiography, especially of Bulgaria, of the nationalist mythologies which have accumulated since the second half of the nineteenth century.[128] In this indirect fashion, Matschke's survey is connected to the study of Antonina Zhelyazkova, also to be found in the present volume, and dedicated to the Ottoman Balkans.

Matschke arrives at a conclusion diametrically opposite to the claims often made by Balkan historians: Ottoman rule did not mean the cessation of commercial activity in favor of a purely landlord-peasant economy, quite to the contrary.[129] In Matschke's perspective, late Byzantine towns were often largely agricultural settlements, while the 'new towns' established in the Balkans by the Ottomans often became the sites of flourishing trade and crafts. Principally, the beneficiaries of this commercial revival were the largely Muslim

[128] For a discussion, see Faroqhi's contribution at the end of this volume.

[129] For a futher recent refutation of such claims, linked to the Veneto-Ottoman transition, see Molly Greene, *A Shared World, Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, 2000), 121.

inhabitants of these towns. But indirectly even the rural Christian population might benefit from the new opportunities.

Matschke also stresses an element of continuity between the late Byzantine and the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, namely the existence of aristocratic Byzantine families active as entrepreneurs. These people managed the finances of the Patriarchate, thus allowing the Patriarchs to accumulate the important sums of money needed to maintain themselves in office. Moreover, even though Matschke expresses himself with great reserve, he does not deny that there may have been links between these sixteenth-century aristocratic entrepreneurs and the Phanariotes of the following century.

This tale of Greco-Ottoman imbrication is continued in Johann Strauss' contribution "Ottoman rule experienced and remembered, remarks on some local Greek chronicles of the Tourkokratia". Strauss has analyzed three narratives dealing with Greek-speaking territories under Ottoman rule. A seventeenth-century priest from Serres (Serrai) named Papasynadinos has left a chronicle of his town which contains some autobiographical information and plenty of detail on the small-town Orthodox notability of which the author was a member. Strauss shows that quite a bit of information concerning the affairs of the sultanate must have filtered down to the author and his friends. Interestingly enough, the violent and, to the modern observer, often irrational punishments meted out by Sultan Murad IV were received positively by Papasynadinos—he sympathized with a ruler who could strike terror in the hearts of 'the Turks'. Intercommunal tensions thus are highlighted, although the legitimacy of the Ottoman ruler, whom Papasynadinos calls by a title normally used for the Byzantine emperor, is never questioned.

By contrast, Ottoman legitimacy among many inhabitants of present-day Greece had long been a thing of the past when Panayis Skouzes wrote his chronicle of late eighteenth-century Athens. A veteran of the 1821 war, Skouzes wrote about the 'bad old days' when the Haseki Hacı Ali, the financial manager of an Ottoman princess, made life difficult for the local notables. Strauss also highlights the information on social ranking among the Christian inhabitants of eighteenth-century Athens, an intricate structure which is not reflected in Ottoman sources.

While both Papasynadinos and Skouzes were townsmen, the third chronicle is special in having been authored by a villager, who unfor-

tunately remains anonymous. Events of empire-wide importance and even international politics attracted the attention of the author, who covered the last decennia of Ottoman Cyprus. Yet not these events, but rather the state of the harvest determined whether a given year would be classed as good, bad or indifferent. Harvests could be ruined by climatic factors, epidemics and locusts, but also by local rebellions and banditry. In consequence, such events were regarded as much more important than the fall of Selim III or the institution of the Tanzimat.

As a logical counterpart, the topic 'Greeks looking at Ottoman rule' calls for a discussion of Ottomans or Republican Turks and their vision of the Empire's Greeks. Hercules Millas' "Non-Muslim minorities in the historiography of republican Turkey, the Greek case" adopts the second perspective. Millas' article is openly polemical in character and in part reflects debates which have taken place among Turkish intellectuals during the last decade or so. His text attacks all 'essentialist' visions of the Turko-Greek relationship. Millas' polemic is directed at the judgements which are phrased most clearly in Turkish history books aimed at the general reader, but which, in varying degrees, have left traces in academic production as well. While the more scholarly authors often will admit that non-Muslims did not enjoy equal rights in the Ottoman Empire, it is readily assumed that the 'Rum milleti' was 'ungrateful' for those privileges which it did receive. Discontent is regarded as mainly incited by European powers, with no basis in the real lives of the Empire's Orthodox. In consonance with the work of historians such as Çağlar Keyder, Millas demands a more detached discussion of ethnogenesis and the rise of capitalism in the late Ottoman context.[130]

Among historians concerned with Ottoman and post-Ottoman Bulgaria, discussions concerning the implications of nationalist self-definition in opposition to the Ottoman Empire have been going on for over fifteen years. Antonina Zhelyazkova takes up this thread in her study of "Islamization in the Balkans as a historiographic problem". She opposes the 'romantic' visions concerning the Ottoman conquest widespread in Balkan historiography. On the one hand, notions are bandied around of a local, particularly Bulgarian population, swamped

[130] Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey, a Study in Capitalist Development* (London, New York, 1987).

by immigrants, most of them nomads (*yürük*). On the other hand, Bulgarian nationalist historians tend to make much of the notion that large sectors of the autochthonous population converted to Islam and were 'Ottomanized' (or even 'Turkified'). Among those historians least afraid of anachronism, we even find the notion that the Ottoman state aimed at the 'denationalization' of the Balkan subject population, an interpretation for which there is no basis in the sources.

Against this background, Zhelyazkova tackles a story which has achieved some notoriety, namely the supposed forced conversion of the mountain population of the Rhodopes. She points out that the sources which claim such a forced conversion are in reality nineteenth-century fakes, composed by people (there was a woman among them) who wanted to mobilize their fellow countrymen in favor of the nationalist cause. Such falsifications were quite often perpetrated in the process of nation building. However, it is remarkable that Antonina Zhelyazkova has been obliged to denounce this major 'invention' as late as 1988, while for instance in the Czech context, Thomas Masaryk exploded a similar 'invented source' before World War I.

Among Balkan nationalities, the Muslim Boshnaks of Bosnia-Hercegovina hold a special place. This is due not merely to the recent war or to the fact that, apart from Turks and Albanians, the Boshnaks constitute the only major Muslim group present in southeastern Europe. Ethnogenesis, which has been continuing ever since the 1878 Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, has been particularly complicated due to the special links which the Bosnian upper classes had established with the Ottoman government. For the Bosnian gentry had legitimized its privileged position by its tenacious defense of the frontier of Islam (*serhad*) and, by extension, of the Ottoman sultanate. However, after 1878, and even more drastically after the Austro-Hungarian annexation of 1908, it became obvious that the sultans were no longer able to defend their Boshnak subjects. Gentry and commoners both were confronted with a difficult situation. For those who wished to remain under Muslim government, emigration was the only viable alternative; and this option was taken by tens of thousands of people.

Further problematic adjustments became necessary after 1918, in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later to become the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As the older name indicates, the Boshnaks were not recognized as a separate ethnic group. Only in Tito's

Yugoslavia did they finally gain an—albeit grudging—recognition as a separate ethnic entity. And as the breakup of Yugoslavia amply demonstrated, this recognition proved fragile indeed.

All this meant that Boshnak historians, in the modern sense of the term, whose activity began in the interwar period and intensified after World War II, oriented their work in several different directions. One of their concerns was the genesis of Islam in the region, which Fikret Adanır discusses by confronting the tenets of Boshnak historians with those defended by certain of their American and western European colleagues. At issue is the role of the medieval Bosnian Church, which according to Catholic sources was heretic or at least schismatic; to what extent it was Bogumil is a subject for debate. Boshnak historians assume that dissatisfaction with oppression on the part of Catholics and Orthodox alike was a major factor in explaining the rapid Islamization of much of the Boshnak population. By contrast, western European and American specialists tend to assume that the Bosnian Church had become extinct before the Ottomans ever appeared in the region. Adanır has taken up a point originally made by Tayyib Okiç, reminding us that the early Ottoman tax registers of Bosnia contain a category known as *kristiyani*; this name does not correspond to the Ottoman terminology for Christians, who are called *kâfir* or else *gebrân*. Moreover, these *kristiyani* progressively disappear as conversions to Islam take place. This would indicate that the theory which assumes that some Muslim Boshnaks originally had been adherents of the Bosnian Church may be valid after all. For in the fifteenth century, the Ottoman conquerors had little interest in the sectarian divisions among non-Muslims and would not have recorded the *kristiyani* under a distinctive name if the people in question had not described themselves as such. Yet Adanır warns against exaggerated claims, for the number of people involved was quite limited, and endless debate is possible on the reasons for this state of affairs.

Up to this point, our concern has been with Anatolia and especially the Balkans; in dealing with Hungary, the next chapter will transport us to the uttermost limits of the Ottoman Empire, well into central Europe. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor have discussed the enormous number of studies which during the past century have covered the territories of present-day Hungary and Transylvania, that is Ottoman Erdel, a western province of today's Rumania.

Ottomanist history in Hungary has had to struggle in order to avoid being something the German language, with an unkind but telling phrase, calls 'Legitimationswissenschaft', a branch of scholarship designed to legitimize existing power structures.[131] For as Dávid and Fodor put it, Hungarian historians of the period following World War I, when the 'Hungarian' half of the defunct Habsburg empire was cut down to a fraction of its original size, were concerned with the explanation of this unsatisfactory state of affairs. In so doing they often focused on the retreat of the Magyar population, while under Ottoman rule, from many territories of medieval Hungary. After 1526, the largest section of the former kingdom of the Angevins, and later of the conqueror of Vienna Matthias Corvinus (1443–1490), became an Ottoman border province. Certain parts of the country, laid waste by warfare, were repopulated with southern Slavs; historians could thus argue that the Ottoman conquest was responsible for the dismemberment of medieval Hungary, with patriotic rhetoric as a constant temptation.

Such a concern with the increase of the non-Magyar population of the former Hungarian kingdom during the Ottoman period gave rise to a particular interest, on the part of Hungarian Ottomanists, in historical demography. This was quickened once the latter had come into its own as a separate discipline after 1945, first in England and France and then in other European countries as well.[132] When summarizing the results of Ottomanist research in demography undertaken by Hungarians, based on a systematic confrontation of Ottoman and Habsburg records, Dávid and Fodor discount exaggerated notions of early Ottoman Hungary as a 'disturbed beehive', in which the population fled hither and thither due to the Ottoman invasion. They also point out that at least in some parts of the territory administered by the sultans' governors, population turnover was no more intensive than in the western provinces which passed under Habsburg control.

Yet the nationalist project in Hungary has thrown up further questions which Hungarian Ottomanists are expected to answer. One of

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[131] Peter Schöttler (ed.), *Geschichtsschreibung als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945* (Frankfurt/Main, 1999).

[132] For the relevant literature compare Pierre Goubert, *The Ancien Régime. French Society 1600–1750*, translated by Steve Cox (New York, San Francisco, London, 1973), 49–50.

them rather resembles a problem frequently discussed in Balkan historiography, namely the question whether Ottoman control prevented Hungary from developing culturally and economically according to the model proposed by Renaissance Europe. This problématique gains scholarly legitimacy if one takes into account the efforts of Matthias Corvinus, highlighted by the recent synthesis of Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, to acclimatize High Renaissance architectural forms in Hungary.[133] For these efforts predate all other such attempts north of the Alps. Between the World Wars, some Hungarian historians focused on the 'alienness' of the Ottoman conquerors' culture, positing a dichotomy which anticipates present-day ideologies constructed around a supposed 'clash of civilizations'. Recent researchers rather have tended to highlight the fact that throughout the Ottoman period, Hungary was an outlying border province and Buda reduced to the status of a mere garrison town in which cultural investment on the part of the Ottoman elite remained limited. Moreover, some emphasis has been placed on the weaknesses of the Hungarian economy well before the conquest. Recent specialists on Ottoman Hungary judge that even without the battle of Mohács (1526) and its aftermath, there would have been a gap between Hungary and western Europe. But decades of warfare ensured that the lag was greater than it would otherwise have been.

To outsiders such as the present authors, it is of some interest to note the manner in which the 'double taxation', to which a significant part of Ottoman Hungary was subjected, is regarded by present-day Hungarian historians. That nobles residing on Habsburg territory, as well as of course the Ottoman authorities, collected dues from Hungarian peasants is described as a situation which allowed the perpetuation of institutions typical of Christian central Europe. That is as it may be. But surely 'double taxation' also must have affected the welfare of a peasantry already disturbed by frequent warfare.

Moreover, a recurrent theme in Hungarian historiography concerns the question whether after 1526 it would have been possible to construct a kingdom of Hungary under Ottoman suzerainty, thus preventing the 'provincialization' of the country. This matter has been considered important because if such an option had in fact

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[133] Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, *Court, Cloister and City. The Art and Culture of Central Europe 1450–1800* (London, 1995), 39–46.

existed, Hungary might have had a better chance of becoming a medium-sized rather than a small national state in the twentieth century. Accordingly the issue was discussed with some heat in the 1970s and 1980s. But Dávid and Fodor assume that once Süleyman the Magnificent's armies had defeated the king of Hungary, the establishment of direct control was well-nigh inevitable, given the secular conflict between the Ottoman sultans and the Habsburgs. Only the conquest of Vienna might have rescued the Hungarian territories from their unenviable position at the center of a battlefield.

Diverging and often incompatible visions of Ottoman history thus have been produced in the different territories which once formed part of the Ottoman Empire. This situation calls for a study of the manner in which Ottoman provincial diversity, which long preceded all nationalisms, has been treated in the secondary literature. Suraiya Faroqhi discusses the paradigms through which Ottomanists have attempted to make sense of this diversity. All the models at issue focus on the relations of the Ottoman center to provincial ruling groups, both those elites which were already present at the time of the Ottoman conquest, and, more importantly, those who owed their positions to the responsibilities they had been given by the sultan's government. Our concluding chapter thus highlights the theories of centrality which in the 1960s and 1970s interested many geographers and regional planners and which were taken up by Ottomanist social historians. It is the purpose of any historiographical project to make the impulses which history receives from more 'practical' pursuits visible and intelligible. Therefore, demonstrating a linkage between the theories of urban and regional planners and the recent concerns of historians seems a fitting way to conclude our enterprise.

In conclusion

From these summaries a degree of commonality emerges, of which the struggle against anachronisms born from the nationalist paradigm in history is the most important. In the same vein, the contributors have distanced themselves from the nostalgia for 'the past greatness' of certain rulers of yore, a latter-day version of the 'Golden Age' which continues to attract followers the world over. All contributors view twentieth-century nations not as communities formed

at the dawn of history, but as shaped by a variety of political, religious and economic contingencies, many of them of fairly recent date.[134]

Hopefully it will become clear that Ottomanist historiography has made some significant progress in evaluating the vast information available in the Ottoman archives and is now ready to engage in debate with specialists from other historical disciplines. If the present volume has helped to promote that kind of debate, it will have fulfilled its purpose.

[134] Particularly Antonina Zhelyazkova and Klaus-Peter Matschke have stressed the fact that the Byzantino-Ottoman transition was not an undifferentiated process without any internal contradictions. Quite to the contrary, temporary alignments between social groups emerged and then dissolved. Therefore what is valid for the middle of the fifteenth century may be inapplicable thirty to forty years later. These two authors also tend to deemphasize conscious political planning on the part of early Ottoman sultans. Such planning *avant la lettre* at one time was much favored among Ottomanist historians, but Matschke and Zhelyazkova remain sceptical concerning the degree of planning possible to early Ottoman rulers, in the complicated situation of the fifteenth century.