

INTRODUCTION

The collective group of wars, commonly referred to as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), neither marked the beginning nor the end of the numerous conflicts ongoing in continental Europe in the first half of the 17th century. There had been tensions within the German *Reich*, or Holy Roman Empire, long before 1618, which revealed itself through frequent political, social and religious unrest. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 had brought about a temporary settlement between the Protestant and Catholic powers: but the terms of Augsburg had not been adhered to and by 1608, many Protestant princes feared a Jesuit-led Catholic counter-reformation. To deal with the perceived threat, some of the Protestant Princes formed an 'evangelical league' under the leadership of Frederick IV of the Palatinate. In response to this, a Catholic League formed soon afterwards under Maximilian Duke of Bavaria. Just over a decade later, a kaleidoscope of conflicts had evolved which pitched Catholic against Protestant, Lutheran against Calvinist, co-religionists against each other, princes against the Holy Roman Emperor and prince against prince. The Thirty Years' War had begun.¹

However, there was more to the Thirty Years' War than simply the internal tensions of the Holy Roman Empire. To the Dutch, the conflict represented only the last thirty years of an eighty-year struggle against the Spanish government dating back to 1568.² While the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended that particular war, Spain continued fighting against France until 1659. Other nations entered the Thirty Years' War despite being engaged in other struggles that also continued beyond 1648. Sweden and Poland-Lithuania, for instance, only concluded their series of wars in 1660. The very fact of entering

¹ The best general works on the war in English remain J.V. Poliřenský, *The Thirty Years' War* (London: 1971); R. Asch, *The Thirty Years War The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618–1648* (Basingstoke: 1996); G. Parker et al., eds., *The Thirty Years' War* (London: 1997). See also the more recent collection by K. Bussmann and H. Schilling, eds., *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, 3 volumes (Münster and Osnabrück: 1999).

² See Marco van der Hoeven, ed., *Exercise of Arms. Warfare in the Netherlands (1568–1648)* (Leiden: 1997).

the 'German Wars' could also lead to conflicts beyond the confines of the geo-political region normally associated with the Thirty Years' War. One need only look to the civil wars in the three kingdoms of the British Isles between 1639–1652 to find interesting case studies.³ Such campaigns fought beyond the bounds of the Holy Roman Empire, often by veterans of the German conflict, show how the war could influence events beyond the confines of the *Reich* and the tight 1618–1648 time period. Nonetheless, as early as May 1648, the term the *Thirty Years' War* had found both expression and a degree of definition within Europe.⁴

In recent years, volumes of academic work have been produced on the Thirty Years' War and, as Geoffrey Parker has noted, the very scope of the subject requires scholars who view the topic from numerous standpoints in order that we may better understand it.⁵ This collection of articles brings a fresh perspective by focusing on the impact of the monarchy, parliament and people of Scotland on the war.⁶ Such a collection might initially seem to be a strange choice of subject since references to Scottish participation in the war are often vague or elusive. In one of the most recent publications, the Scots are mentioned barely three times in as many volumes.⁷ However, even before the events of 1618, the Scots had formed a very strong connection with Protestant Germany through the person of the Scottish princess, Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of James VI & I of Great Britain.

As early as April 1611, Danish and French ambassadors arrived in London to urge the marriage of Elizabeth to Frederick V, the Elector of the Palatinate.⁸ The royal wedding, which eventually took

³ For the Scottish war see A.I. Macinnes, *Charles I and the making of the Covenanting movement 1625–1641* (Edinburgh: 1991). An important work on the war in Ireland is by Micheál Ó Siochrá, *Confederate Ireland, 1642–1649* (Dublin: 1999).

⁴ Asch, *Thirty Years' War*, ix; Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, xii.

⁵ Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, xvi.

⁶ For an understanding of early 17th century Scotland see Macinnes, *Charles I*; K.M. Brown, *Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union 1603–1715* (London: 1992); A. Grant and K.J. Stringer, eds., *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London: 1995); B. Bradshaw and J. Morrill, eds., *The British Problem, c. 1534–1707; State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (London: 1996).

⁷ Bussmann and Schilling, *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, I, 302; II, 183–184; III, 114.

⁸ *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries of Northern Italy* (38 vols., London: 1864–1947). [hereafter *CSPV*], 13, 1610–13, 133–4. Marc' Antonio Correr, 14 April 1611; Jonas

place in 1613, was greeted with enthusiasm in Britain where it was seen as a positive move for European Protestantism.⁹ Within a few short years, this marriage of Scottish princess to German elector would prove to have serious implications for the British kingdoms. In July 1617, Archduke Ferdinand II of Austria succeeded to the throne of Bohemia as king-designate, having been elected by the Bohemian and Hungarian Estates. This move actually unsettled Bohemia's protestant nobility, and their bitterness increased in the lead-up to his election as Holy Roman Emperor in August 1619. Frederick V was raised to the kingship of Bohemia by her nobles in place of Ferdinand whom they had solemnly deposed. Frederick's election made the Scottish princess Elizabeth the new Queen of Bohemia and thus involved the House of Stuart directly in the unfolding events in the German *Reich*. When Habsburg forces attacked Bohemia, many Scots nobles and gentry flocked to the defence of Elizabeth Stuart and her family. Some Scots serving in Imperial service changed sides to serve in the so called 'protestant' armies. Sir Henry Bruce, Imperial governor of Mikulov in 1620, relinquished that position to raise a regiment for Elizabeth Stuart whom 'he no longer wished to fight'.¹⁰ Thomas Kellie, published a military manual after service in Christian IV's army in which he exhorted others to join the fight for Elizabeth of Bohemia, 'the Jewell of Europe'.¹¹ Major Robert Monro and Colonel Donald Mackay both wrote of fighting against the enemy of the daughter of their king, the Queen of Bohemia and for the love of Charles I.¹² Contemporary sources

Carisius was in England in 1611 to work for the Elector's marriage to Elizabeth Stuart. See *Kong Christian den Fjerdtes egenhændige Breve*, eds., C.F. Bricka and J.A. Frederica et al., 8 vols. (Copenhagen: 1878–1947) I, 67, Christian IV to Earl of Salisbury, 24 October 1611, and footnote.

⁹ See F.A. Yates, *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment* (New York: 1996 edition) 16 and 36. The motives of James VI & I in seeking this marriage can be found in G.P.V. Akrigg, ed., *Letters of King James VI* (London: 1984) 323–325. James VI and I to Sir Thomas Edmondson, 27 August 1612.

¹⁰ Polišínský, *Tragic Triangle*, 181. See also Ferguson, *The Scots Brigade in Holland*, 224. A letter from Carlton to Secretary Naughton, 15 April 1620, which notes that Bruce left the Emperor's service since he would not bear arms against 'his Majesty's son-in-law'.

¹¹ T. Kellie, *Pallas Armata or Militarie Instructions for the Learned* (Edinburgh: 1627) 2a.

¹² R. Monro, *Monro His Expedition with a worthy Scots regiment (called Mac-Keyes regiment)* (London: 1637) I, 21; Mackay quoted in R. Mackay, *The house and clan of Mackay* (Edinburgh: 1829) 272; Monro, *His Expedition*, I, 21. Grant, *Memoirs of Sir John Hepburn*, 12; J.H. Burton, *The Scot Abroad* (Edinburgh: 1864) 315; Th. Fischer, *The Scots in Germany* (Edinburgh: 1902) 73.

indicate that the cause of Elizabeth Stuart led the majority of the Scottish officers, or in Kellie's case a private soldier, to volunteer into European armies.

The status of Elizabeth Stuart did not only force the Scottish royal house into supporting one side or another in the conflict. As a blood niece of Christian IV of Denmark-Norway, Elizabeth was also a junior member of the Danish House of Oldenburg. Christian IV, as leader of the Lower Saxon Circle and Duke of Holstein, had a whole list of grievances against Ferdinand II of Austria in his own right.¹³ However the direct involvement of his niece proved to be the motivation for seeking a new alliance between Great Britain and Denmark-Norway after 1618. Such a confederation had actually been in place since 1589, but both James VI and Christian IV sought to re-affirm this with the treaty of The Hague concluded on 29th April 1621.¹⁴ Thus, when Christian IV entered the war in 1625, Charles I was duty bound to commit his subjects to the war for two reasons: the love of his sister Elizabeth, and through his treaty obligations to his uncle Christian.

This study of the Scots sheds new light on a whole range of broader issues pertinent to the war, not least the importance of dynastic links between such protagonists as James VI, Charles I, Elizabeth of Bohemia, Frederick V and Christian IV. Fundamentally, this collection presents an opportunity to broaden interest in the war from a British perspective. But it also highlights the wider European nature of the conflict by illuminating the process which saw the war in Bohemia draw in Scottish combatants, leading to a significant Scottish presence in several European armies thereafter. Considering issues such as distance from the conflict, Scottish participation becomes all the more remarkable, especially given the limited life span of Stuart governmental interest in pursuing the war militarily. In addition to the role of the Stuart monarchy, each of the contributors have high-

¹³ Danish foreign politics and diplomacy of the period have been discussed in J.A. Fridericia, *Danmarks ydre politiske historie i tiden fra freden i Lybeck til freden i Prag, 1629–1635* (Copenhagen,; 1972 reprint). An alternative evaluation in English is given by P.D. Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648; King Christian IV and the Decline of the Oldenburg State* (Selinsgrove: 1996).

¹⁴ L. Laursen and C.S. Christiansen, eds., *Danmark-Norges Traktater 1523–1750, med dertil hørende aktstykker* (11 vols., Copenhagen: 1907–1949) III, 10, 14–21. 'Ægteskabstraktat mellem kong Jacob VI af Skottland og kong Frederik II's datter prinsesse Anna, 20 August 1589'; *Danmark-Norges Traktater*, III, 380–411. 'Alliance og Handelstraktat mellem Danmark-Norge og Storbritannien, 29 April 1621'.

lighted the remarkable conviction of the Scots in whichever capacity they participated.

In Great Britain, the Thirty Years' War has traditionally been viewed very much in the background of a number of other issues such as English parliamentary history or the English Civil War—and most historians have been keen to leave it there. This, however, creates a gap in our understanding of the social history of the period. The communities from where so many of the soldiery originated must have been affected by issues such as lower fertility, higher mortality and problems of labour during harvests. Neither could the landed classes have escaped the consequences of war on such a large scale. There must surely have been an impact caused by the loss of tenantry to the conflict and the early death of so many of the landed classes themselves. Without thorough investigation of Scottish participation in the war itself, such interesting studies cannot be fully understood.

Perhaps the fact that British involvement in the continental conflict has usually been viewed as a series of military failures, the result of inept leadership, explains the lack of a historical appetite for the subject. The English force sent to Bohemia in 1620 under Sir Horace Vere, ultimately had to withdraw in defeat after only a few months in the field.¹⁵ Some 500 of his men had, in any case, deserted before they even reached their destination.¹⁶ Sir Charles Morgan had to surrender his command to General Ambrosia Spínola at Bergen-op-Zoom soon after in 1623.¹⁷ The following year the Earls of Oxford and Southampton raised a new force of 6,000 Englishmen for the Dutch army which got off to a poor start as both leaders died of disease within months of arriving. Thereafter the remaining regiments at Breda, under the command of Sir Horace Vere and Sir

¹⁵ J. Taylor, *Taylor his travels: From the city of London in England, to the city of Prague in Bohemia* (London: 1620) B4; Anon., *Certaine Letters declaring in part the Passage of Affaires in the Palatinate from September of this present moneth of April* (Amsterdam: 1621); S.R. Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War 1603–1642* (10 vols., London: 1883–1884) III, 358; *DNB*, V, 890 [Essex] and *DNB*, XX, 234–235 [Oxford].

¹⁶ J.V. Polišíenský, *Anglie a Bílá hora* (Prague: 1949) 164; For a contemporary commentary on the disorder and desertion of English troops see Anon., *Certaine Letters*, B2–B3.

¹⁷ *DNB*, XIII, 910; There was also a Scottish presence as units under the command of Colonels Andrew Gray and John Henderson of Fordell took part in the siege. J. Grant, *Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn* (Edinburgh: 1851) 18–21.

Charles Morgan, surrendered once more to General Spínola.¹⁸ As these events unfolded Count Mansfeld's new British army of 13,000 men also suffered an inglorious passage to the war in 1625.¹⁹ After sailing from Dover on 22 January 1625 they were refused permission to land in France as originally planned and many of them succumbed to disease in the ships and died in their thousands.²⁰ Even the private expedition under William, Lord Craven between 1637–1638 ended in fiasco as the English army and their allies were defeated in their first engagement resulting in the capture of Craven and Prince Rupert.²¹ These events, however, only represent one part of British involvement in the conflict.

Diplomacy and Politics

There was a lot more to Scottish involvement in the war than the seemingly endless supply of soldiers. From the very outset of the conflict, Scots served with distinction among as leading British diplomats. Their absence from the majority of historical accounts of the period stands testament to the need for more rigorous research into British diplomacy. Too often researchers confuse 'English' and 'British' foreign policy, when in fact the emphasis should more correctly be on Stuart overseas strategy. To miss out the Scots employed by the

¹⁸ *Acts of the Privy Council of England* (45 vols., London, 1890–1964) [hereafter *APC*], 1623–1625, 249–250 and 258; *Calendars of State Papers, Domestic Series—First Series* (13 vols. London: 1856–1992) [hereafter *CSPD*], 1623–1625, 217, 248, 251, 267, 281 and 295; *DNB*, XX, 235 [Oxford]; *DNB*, XXI, 1060 [Henry Wriothesly, 3rd Earl of Southampton]; *DNB*, V, 890 [Essex]; *DNB*, XX, 237–238 [Vere] and *DNB*, XIII, 910 [Morgan].

¹⁹ E. Thomson, ed., *The Chamberlain Letters: A selection of the letters of John Chamberlain concerning life in England from 1597–1626* (Toronto: 1966) 333–334, 9 October 1624; *CSPD*, 1623–1625, 397–420.

²⁰ *APC*, 1623–1625, 434–435; *CSPD*, 1623–1625, 455; Grant, *Memoirs of Sir John Hepburn*, 22–23; Gardiner, *History of England*, V, 222; F.C. Montague, *The History of England 1603–1660* (London: 1907) 123; L. Tandrup, ed., *Svensk agent ved Sundet; Toldkommisær og agent i Helsingør. Anders Svenssons depecher till Gustav II Adolf og Axel Oxenstierna 1621–1625* (Aarhus: 1971) 546–547; Asch, *The Thirty Years' War*, 84; C. Russell, *The Crisis of Parliaments: English History 1509–1660* (Oxford: 1971) 299.

²¹ Dutch sources note that he arrived in Zeeland with fully 15–17 companies while Christian IV made his councillors aware of eight or nine ships on the river Weser full of English troops sponsored by Craven. See J.A. Worp, ed., *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1634–1639* (The Hague: 1913) 485; *KCFB*, 121, Christian IV to Korfits Ulfeldt, 23 October 1638; *DNB*, V, 45–46.

Stuarts is too ignore the majority of Scandinavian and Polish embassies conducted during the war. It also excluded many crucial embassies undertaken to France, Spain, the Spanish Netherlands and the Austrian Habsburg Empire. Without a contextualization of these missions, there can be no meaningful understanding of Scottish, English or 'British' diplomacy at all.

The intervention of Scottish diplomats during the Thirty Years' War took several forms. Initially, Scots sought to further British diplomacy through their commitment to the House of Stuart. This phase of diplomatic intervention effectively lasted until the peace of Prague in 1635. When mainstream British diplomacy failed under the leadership of Charles I, several prominent Scotsmen in foreign service began to attempt their own independent 'diplomatic' intervention with the powers in whose service they found themselves. In this volume, David Worthington explains the very secretive and unexpected nature of these endeavours in the various Habsburg spheres of influence. Alexia Grosjean also highlights the role of the Scots in Swedish diplomacy through the apparatus of the Swedish state. As Grosjean observes, Scottish signatures on the treaty documents of Bavaria (1647) and Westphalia (1648) were undoubtedly regarded by some as just rewards for the efforts of the Scottish nation throughout the course of the 1618–1648 conflict.

Scottish foreign policy also took another form in the 1640's. It is still a matter of debate as to whether the civil wars in the British Isles were an extension of the wars on the continent. Certainly Wenceslaus Hollar's account from c. 1642 links the wars in the British Isles in the 1640s to events in Bohemia in the 1620s, with Scotsmen being apportioned a significant role in both affairs.²² In this Hollar was quite correct. Many of the protagonists in Scotland viewed the wars in Germany as part of a more general war of religion. With the drafting of the Scottish National Covenant in February 1638, Charles I faced a rebellion in Scotland not too dissimilar in motive to the Bohemian Revolt of 1618. Allan Macinnes has summed up the Covenanting movement as a 'a revolutionary alliance of the landed and commercial classes intent on redressing constitutional and nationalist grievances in the State as well as upholding the Presbyterian

²² A. Griffiths and G. Kesnerlová, *Wenceslaus Hollar: Prints and Drawings from the collections of the National Gallery Prague and the British Museum, London* (London: 1983) 42.

version of the Reformed tradition in the Kirk'.²³ After the Scottish victory against Charles I in the two Bishops' Wars of 1639–1640, the hard-line Covenanters took control of Scotland. Thereafter the Scottish Parliament undertook an aggressive protestant policy which sought to export the Covenanting revolution beyond the borders of Scotland, linking events in Scotland back to those on the continent. As John Young explains, the movement had a remarkable success. Not only was England brought on board through the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643, but key continental powers were caught up in the project through a series of diplomatic missions orchestrated by the Scottish parliamentary committees. This had a direct impact on the Thirty Years' War, leading to fresh recruitment of Scottish soldiers by Sweden and France for service against the Habsburgs. In return for this recruitment, the Scots received varying degrees of support against Charles I. It was even reported by Hugo Grotius in October 1644 that Charles Louis, titular Elector Palatine, signed the 'treaty between the English and the Scots' which can only refer to the Solemn League and Covenant.²⁴ Heavyweight intellectual support for the project also came from Samuel Hartlib who addressed a letter to the Committee of Both Kingdoms [Scotland and England] in January 1645 asking if he might promote 'the publicke Religion, Iustice and Liberty of the three kingdoms amongst forraners [...] and to propagat the sacred effect of the most Solemne and National Covenant'.²⁵ His theological confederate, John Durie also supported the Solemn League and Covenant, seeing it as a basis from which to unite the protestant churches across Europe in pursuit of his irenicist agenda.²⁶ As the

²³ A.I. Macinnes, *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788* (East Linton: 1996) 88; M. Lee jr., *The Road to Revolution: Scotland under Charles I 1625–37* (Urbana: 1985); M.C. Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars; Charles I's campaigns against Scotland 1638–1640* (Cambridge: 1994).

²⁴ J.A. Worp, ed., *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1644–1649* (The Hague: 1915) 81, 2 October 1644; 'Envoy De Groot reports that the Elector of the Palatinate (Karl Ludwig/Charles Louis), before he went to England, signed the treaty between the English and the Scots [the Solemn League and Covenant], a strange course of action. He is very keen on his rank/position in England.' Kindly translated for me from Dutch by Edda Frankot.

²⁵ Hartlib Papers CD Rom, f. 9/4/1A–2B. Hartlib to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 15 January 1645.

²⁶ A. Milton, 'The Unchanged peacemaker?', John Dury and the politics of irenicism in England, 1628–1643' in M. Greengrass, M. Leslie and T. Raylor, eds., *Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation. Studies in Intellectual Communication* (Cambridge: 1994) 114–115.

contributors reveal, the diplomatic intervention of Scotsmen—whether on behalf of the House of Stuart, the Scottish Parliament or through the intervention of influential individuals elsewhere—made an impact at the highest levels among all the major contesting powers.

The Military Dimension

Despite the wide-ranging diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Scotsmen during the war, the most overwhelming involvement of the Scots was in the military sphere. This particular aspect must be approached from the perspective of both governmental and individual involvement by Scottish participants. The contributors to this volume have shown that the numbers of Scottish soldiers involved are far greater than previously realised. Indeed, Professor Polišenský has been one of the few historians to have singled out the Scottish contribution to the early phase of the war in Bohemia. As he demonstrates in his chapter, claims that 2,500 British troops went to the Palatinate in 1620 are a significant underestimate.²⁷ Bringing together the information he has previously collated about the Scots, Polišenský details the contribution of the 1,200-strong Scottish regiment of Sir John Seton and 1,500 countrymen in the mixed British regiment of 2,500 troops commanded by Sir Andrew Gray.²⁸ Two months after Gray left Britain, Sir Horace Vere's Englishmen also set out for Prague.²⁹ Rather than having an army of 2,500 in Bohemian service, some 6,000 British soldiers can be shown to have been recruited in 1620–21 alone, joining several thousand more already in service on the continent.³⁰

These numbers increased dramatically between July 1624 and October 1625 when more soldiers were raised for service; 6,000 with the Dutch, 13,000 for Count Mansfeld and 10,000 on Wimbledon's expedition to Cadiz. Indeed, in this 15-month period some 29,000

²⁷ G.M.D. Howatt, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London: 1974) 28; Asch, *The Thirty Years' War*, 68.

²⁸ *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, (14 vols. Edinburgh: 1877–1898) [hereafter *RPCS*], XII, 1619–1622, lxxvii–lxxviii, 255 and 257–261.

²⁹ Taylor, *Taylor his travels*, B4; Anon., *Certain Letters*, A4; *DNB*, V, 890 [Essex] and *DNB*, XX, 234–235 [Oxford] and 235–239 [Vere].

³⁰ *CSPV*, 16, 1619–1621, 326–7. Girolamo Lando to Venice, 9 July 1620 and 617–20, 26 March 1621. On two separate occasions Lando estimated that there were 8,000 'British' troops engaged in the war.

British soldiers enlisted in the armies fighting the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs. This is a larger commitment than the two armies offered in 1624 by Christian IV and Gustav II Adolf combined.³¹ According to Charles I they went to fight in the 'Wars of Religion', which he believed united the various campaigns ongoing in Germany and Spain.³² The fact that these British forces subsequently achieved little militarily is irrelevant to the fact that they were levied and shipped in the first place. The sacrifice of those men who never actually made it into the field, either through disease, shipwreck or other circumstance, was arguably greater than of those who survived to record their exploits in memoirs. Any historical evaluation of Scottish and British participation must, therefore, look to the disasters as well as the successful episodes.

It is not just in these early stages of the war that Scottish or English levies have been neglected. British participation has even been misrepresented during the better known Danish and Swedish campaigns. Ernest Beller once erroneously declared that Sir Charles Morgan's unsuccessful expedition to Germany in 1627–1629 was 'the only military assistance given to Christian by his nephew Charles I. Morgan [and] the King of Denmark's military situation demanded more than the army of under 5,000 men which Morgan commanded'.³³ Such a view ignores the contribution of some 13,700 Scots soldiers who entered the Danish army between 1626 and 1629.³⁴ Kevin Sharpe similarly stated that in 1630 Charles I only allowed the levy of 6,000 troops for Swedish service and 'contributed no more to the Swedish campaigns'.³⁵ Yet, as Alexia Grosjean demonstrates, Sharpe's figure falls well short of the mark and relates only

³¹ These two forces would have equalled 21,208 men. Gustav II Adolf proposed to provide 12 regiments of foot, each of 1,184 men, totalling 14,208 soldiers plus 2,000 horse. Christian IV offered an army of only 5,000 men which he envisaged would eventually be built up to 30,000 men with his German allies and 7,000 troops from James VI/I. See PRO SP75/6, f. 32. The military proposals of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, 1624; PRO SP75/5, f. 349. 'An abstract of Sir Robert Anstruther's negotiations in Denmark, Holstein and Germany, 1624'.

³² *RPCS*, second series, I, lxxv.

³³ E.A. Beller, 'Recent Studies on the Thirty Years' War' in *Journal of Modern History*, March (1931) 3, No. 1, 74; Beller, 'The Military Expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627–9' in *English Historical Review*, (1928) XLIII, 539.

³⁴ Three separate authorisations: Charles, February 8, 1627, *RPCS*, second series, II, 531–32, 539, and 539–40; J. Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries in the service of Denmark and Sweden', unpublished Ph.D. (Glasgow: 1972) 34.

³⁵ K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (London: 1992) 79.

to the 'English' (though actually British) forces raised by the Marquis of Hamilton. The consensus now among historians is that over 25,000 Scots served in the Swedish campaign as well as several thousand Englishmen.³⁶ Scots also participated in the war in non-Scandinavian armies. As Matthew Glozier highlights, about 11,000 Scots joined the French army, many due to the intervention of Queen Henrietta Maria. They were supplementing perhaps as many as 10,000 Irishmen who allegedly served there between 1635 and 1641 under the leadership of Colonel Tyrell, giving a possible total of as many as 21,000 Stuart subjects in that army alone.³⁷ Scots also continued to enlist in the army of the Dutch Republic throughout the course of the war.

Clearly, given this information, historical perceptions of British and Irish participation do not reflect the actual numbers of men involved. James Fallon's doctoral thesis showed that official warrants for some 48,080 Scotsmen were issued for the anti-Habsburg armies throughout the course of the war.³⁸ Often these are cited as an overestimate, but it is plain that the warrants for men and the numbers actually in service do not match up.³⁹ This is in part because there was a large military participation for which no official Scottish warrants exist. For instance, Colonel John Seton's regiment of 1,200 men in Frederick V's army are not represented in Scottish governmental statistics. Neither do these figures include the 2,000 men reported to have been recruited for Frederick V by Sir Henry Bruce in October 1620. It remains unclear how many, if any, he actually took to the continent.⁴⁰ In November 1622, Sir James Spens had informed the Swedish Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, that Sir Andrew

³⁶ This is actually a conservative estimate. Alf Åberg, former archivist in Krigsarkivet [the Military Archive] in Stockholm believes that there may have been as many as 30,000 Scots alone in Swedish service during the Thirty Years' War. See A. Åberg, 'Scottish soldiers in the Swedish armies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in G.G. Simpson, ed., *Scotland and Scandinavia 800–1800* (Edinburgh: 1990) 91; See also E. Furgol, *A Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies* (Edinburgh: 1990) 2.

³⁷ H. Murtagh, 'Irish soldiers abroad, 1600–1800' in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery, eds., *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge: 1996) 297; P. Gouhier, 'Mercenaires Irlandais au service de la France (1635–1664)' in *Irish Sword*, 7, 1965–1966, 58–60; *Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques et Papiers d'État du Cardinal de Richelieu*, ed., M. Avenel, vol. 16 (Paris: 1867) 238–240. Richelieu to M. de Bellievre, 13 November 1638.

³⁸ Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries', 34.

³⁹ S. Murdoch, 'Scotland, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart 1603–1660: A Diplomatic and Military Analysis', unpublished Ph.D. (Aberdeen: 1998) 251–252.

⁴⁰ *CSPV*, 16, 1619–1621, 432–435. Girolamo Lando, 11 October 1620; J.V. Polišenský, *Tragic Triangle The Netherlands, Spain and Bohemia 1617–1621* (Prague: 1991) 181; J. Ferguson, ed., *The Scots Brigade in Holland* (Edinburgh: 1899) vol. 1, 224.

Gray had authority to use an army of 6,000 fresh British troops to reinforce Bergen-op-Zoom *en route* to Mansfeld's army.⁴¹ It appears these could not be raised in time to prevent the city falling to Spínola's army. King James apparently confirmed his permission to covertly levy 6,000 troops in Scotland the following year, yet once more records do not survive to say how many men actually enlisted.⁴² Nor indeed are there many records relating to the estimated 4,000 Scots levied by Colonels Gray and Ramsay for Mansfeld between 1624–1625 or if, indeed, these were these were actually the end result of the covert levy of 1623.⁴³ These troops were, in any case, supplemented by several hundred Englishmen.⁴⁴

However the enlistment of Englishmen into Scottish regiments merely mirrored a similar process ongoing in England. One of the four specifically English regiments of Mansfeld's British army was assigned to Viscount Doncaster, none other than the Scotsman James Hay. As noted in the first chapter of this volume, Hay involved himself more in politics than military affairs. None the less, the English Privy Council records contain warrants for Lt. Colonel James Ramsay, Sgt Major Alexander Hamilton, Captain John Douglas and Captain William Douglas, of Lord Viscount Doncaster's regiment, to press men in England for service under Mansfeld in 1624.⁴⁵ At least one of the four 'English' regiments was therefore recruited in the name

⁴¹ Sv. Ra. Anglica 3, Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, 3 November 1622.

⁴² *CSPV*, 17, 1621–1623, letter nos. 800, 824, 845; *CSPV*, 18, 1623–1625, letters 2, 15 and 20.

⁴³ Thomson, *The Chamberlain Letters*, 333–334, 9 October 1624; *CSPD*, 1623–1625, Chamberlain to Carlton, 9 October 1625.

⁴⁴ *CSPD*, 1623–1625, 413. Lord Lieutenant to the Council, 19 December 1624. Another Captain appointed to Gray from England, was the Scot David Murray. *Ibid*, 380, Conway to Belcher, 17 November 1624; *APC*, 1623–1625, 395. By the 24th of the same month it was made clear in a letter from James VI/I that the men given to Douglas were intended for another company under Captain Thomas Beaton, also of Gray's regiment. See *CPSD*, 1623–1625, 418. King James to Andrew Gray, 24 December 1624.

⁴⁵ Lieutenant Robert Douglas took charge of 150 soldiers from Nottinghamshire who were ordered into Andrew Gray's regiment. Some 200 more Englishmen were also to be delivered to either Captain Archibald Douglas or Captain James Beaton, also officers in Gray's regiment. Thus, the 'Scottish' regiment of Sir Andrew Gray in 1624 contained Scottish officers and men, but also several hundred English recruits. See *APC*, 1623–1625, 398. See also *CPSD*, 1623–1625, 464 and 551. Some of these are named as lieutenants John Haitley, George Douglas, James Stewart 'and other officers' who 'having served under Count Mansfeld since the beginning of the Bohemian wars, they came to Scotland to join the new levy'. The Scottish captains waiting in London for places in the two Scottish regiments are unnamed.

of, and commanded by, Scottish officers and undoubtedly contained Scottish enlisted men. In addition to these men, fresh volunteers from both England and Scotland steadily enlisted into Mansfeld's army after the main force had arrived on the continent, including 300 Scotsmen under Sir James Leslie in the summer of 1625.⁴⁶

A variety of other Scottish volunteers were already serving in continental armies before the war, while others enlisted abroad and both sorts are also 'statistically' missing. Paul Dukes makes reference to numbers of Scots in Russian service that suggest a number greater than the 200 allowed for by the Scottish Privy Council. They arrived in Russia from Swedish service or were recruited on the continent. Robert Frost shows that units of as many as 900 Scots could be mustered by the Poles from the Scottish diaspora at any time, as per their levy in 1621.⁴⁷ But the Poles were not the only soldiers to rely on this source. Alexia Grosjean has established that the Swedes, for instance, sent Captain Thomas Hume to recruit 200 Scots from the Polish Scots in 1632.⁴⁸ Thomas Riis has noted elsewhere that many members of the Scottish communities throughout Denmark were expected to serve in some military capacity throughout the war.⁴⁹ Individual Scots on the continent also sought out Scottish, or Scottish led units as a way out of any financial or personal difficulties. Andrew Melvill, for example, managed to escape dire situations twice through this method, once in the Spanish Netherlands in 1648 and again in Germany in 1652.⁵⁰

In addition to these 'legally' enlisted Scots drawn from the diaspora community in Scandinavia and Europe, Scottish officers recruited large numbers of men in Scotland between 1635 and 1637 for Sweden, without permission from the House of Stuart.⁵¹ The numbers recruited are not recorded and they would have been shipped directly to Germany and integrated into the regiments with

⁴⁶ Tandrup, *Svensk agent ved Sundet*, 549–551. Anders Svensson to Axel Oxenstierna and Gustav II Adolf, 31 March/3 April 1625; *RPCS*, second series, I, 49–51, 16 June 1625.

⁴⁷ See Robert Frost's chapter in this volume.

⁴⁸ *RAOSB*, VII, (Stockholm: 1926) 418–420, 16 June 1632.

⁴⁹ T. Riis, *Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot . . . Scottish-Danish Relations c. 1450–1707* (2 vols., Odense: 1988) II, passim.

⁵⁰ T. Ameer-Ali, ed., *Memoirs of Sir Andrew Melvill* (London: 1918) 90–91 and 158.

⁵¹ A. Grosjean, 'Scots and the Swedish State: Diplomacy, Military Service and Ennoblement 1611–1660, unpublished Ph.D. (Aberdeen: 1998) 88 and Grosjean's chapter in this volume.

as little fuss being made about them as possible. Additionally, many of the 800 Scots recruited for Spain in 1622 believed they had been recruited to fight against the Habsburgs. Large numbers promptly crossed over to the Dutch from the Spanish Netherlands, adding several hundred more recruits to the Dutch army over those highlighted in official sources.⁵² In other words, regardless of whether or not the number of Scots reached the 48,080 soldiers suggested by the Scottish Privy Council warrants, evidence exists that over 12,000 Scots may have enlisted in such a way that they were not recorded officially in Scotland. It is reasonable to conclude that about 50,000 Scots are likely to have served during the war in the anti-Habsburg armies along side a similar number of soldiers from England, Wales and Ireland (table 1). Both Robert Frost and David Worthington also bring our attention to the several thousand Scots who served in the armies of the Habsburgs and their allies, although accurate estimates still remain elusive.

For whatever reason they served, evidence of Scots of all social ranks have survived in literature, paintings, pamphlets and books both in Scotland and in Germany.⁵³ Hartmut Ruffer and Kathrin Zickerman have carefully scrutinised many of these to evaluate their impact on contemporary Germans and modern German historians. Their conclusions will undoubtedly be of interest to all scholars of the war, animating the lives of the ordinary Scottish soldier as well as that of the officers.

⁵² See *RPCS*, XII, 1619–1622, 730–1, 755–756, 780, 781 and *CSPV*, 17, 1621–1623, letter no's 317, 327 and 552.

⁵³ There is an idiom in Scots Gaelic attributed to the Thirty Years' War; 'Na h-uile fear a theid a dhollaidh, Gheibh a dolar bho MhacAoidh' [He that is down on his luck, shall get a dollar from Mackay]. This is supposed to have been a reference to the fact that in times of hardship, the Mackay men could always get service in the regiment of Lord Reay. Gaelic scholars have often said that this highlights the first use of the word dollar in the Gaelic language, although records show that European dollars of various types were frequently used in Scotland, as Dauvit Horsbroch shows in this volume, even in Gaelic-speaking Strathbogie. See J. Mackay, *An Old Scots Brigade* (Edinburgh: 1885) Appendix K, 254; *RPCS*, IX, 248–260, 13 September 1611. The Privy Council set out to prosecute the individuals responsible for importing the 'Swaden, Zeland and other dollars' imported from Holland which they described as 'a sort of verie base and unworthy coyne of aucht deneiris fyne'.

The Question of Motives

The involvement of so many Scots during the Thirty Years' War raises questions as to why they became involved. There is no single answer to that question. Bill Brockington's evaluation of the memoir published by Robert Monro gives us a particularly detailed military, and deliberately public, insight into the war from the perspective of one regimental commander. Drawing on a large corpus of letters and written evidence left by other Scottish soldiers, diplomats and observers, Dauvit Horsbroch illuminates the way the soldiers related the war to their kith and kin at home, thus encouraging increased Scottish participation. These two accounts in particular reveal much about the contemporary interpretation of the 'German Wars' and the role of the Scots in it.

The majority of historical commentaries on Scottish military involvement invariably view the armed participation of Scots in the service of a foreign power as simply 'mercenary', although this perspective has been recently challenged.⁵⁴ The modern definition of the word 'mercenary' has parallels in 17th century parlance. Certainly Danish historians make the distinction between the Scottish and English troops who served in Denmark-Norway and soldiers of other nationalities. They referred to British soldiers as *hjelptropper* (help troops) as an indication of their status as people from an allied country.⁵⁵ Individuals from other countries were usually called *lejetropper* (literally 'rented' troops), especially soldiers from Germany.⁵⁶ The Swedes also make this distinction in reference to the reign of Gustav II Adolf, and refer to the Scots in terms of both allies and volunteers. For this period the Scots are never referred to as *legotropper* as they had been the century before (and as the Germans continued to be during the 17th century) but considered an important allied nation, a point vigorously argued by Grosjean in particular.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ See S. Murdoch, 'The House of Stuart And The Scottish Professional Soldier 1613–1640: A Conflict of Nationality and Identities', in B. Taithe and T. Thornton, eds., *War: Identities In Conflict 1300–2000*, (Stroud: 1998) 43–48.

⁵⁵ *KCFB*, II, 44, footnote to the letters from Christian IV to Charles I, 25 October 1626 and 230–233, Christian IV to Frederick Gunther, 3 December 1629.

⁵⁶ Tandrup, *Svensk agent ved Sundet*. In the notes on 527–528, Tandrup relates information regarding 'trophehjælp' from England, while in talking about Mansfeld and Christian of Halberstadt the wording is of the two 'lejetropførere' or mercenary leaders and their men. See 546–547.

⁵⁷ *Konung Gustaf den förstes Registratur*, Handlingar Rörande Sveriges Historia, första

Irish historians have noted the creation of several new Hiberno-Spanish regiments in the Spanish Netherlands between 1632–1646 perhaps totalling 7,000 men under the leadership of men like Owen Roe O'Neill and Thomas Preston.⁵⁸ Worthington and Frost highlight the fact that Scots could also be found in armies allied or sympathetic to the Habsburg Empire. Contrary to the position in the anti-Habsburg armies, Frost shows that the numbers of Scots who arrived in Poland are much lower than the warrants would lead us to believe. This however, does not mean that the soldiers were not raised in the first place. Using a variety of sources, Frost shows that the reason for the discrepancy between warrant numbers raised and troops in service was the result of several external factors. These included loss through shipwreck, but also the ill-will of the Scandinavian monarchs who frequently prevented their departure from Britain or passage through the Danish Sound. Worthington takes a new approach to Scottish levies in the service of Holy Roman Emperors by challenging the notion that to be on the Habsburg side was necessarily to be disloyal to the House of Stuart. Mercenary motivation was undoubtedly a factor for some Scots on both sides. However, Worthington has shown that theological and dynastic loyalty could also play a part in the decision of a soldier to fight for the Habsburgs and still hope to see a pro-Stuart settlement for the Palatinate.

The Thirty Years' War is often described as having been fought along sectarian lines. Nonetheless, the motivation of the opposing forces cannot always be explained through religious affiliation. As Robert Frost has previously pointed out, historians often focus on 'the actions and motivations of those who directed armies, not those who fought in them'.⁵⁹ Undoubtedly many Scots sympathised with the distressed Protestants in Germany. As Dauvit Horsbroch argues,

serien (29 vols., Stockholm: 1861–1916) XXVI, 442. Gustav Vasa till Egon Dodis och Michael Lermont i Edinburg angående deras erjudande af skotska legotrupper i kriget mot ryssarne, 15 August 1556; By the 1620's, the Swedes treated Scotland as an independent allied nation. See Grosjean, 'Scots and the Swedish State', particularly 157–161 and 166–173.

⁵⁸ R.A. Stradling, *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain 1618–68* (Blackrock: 1994) 17 and 25. See also J.H. Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms. The Career of Ranald Macdonell, Marquis of Antrim, 1609–1683* (Cambridge: 1993) 154–187.

⁵⁹ R.I. Frost, 'Confessionalization in the army in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 1550–1667' in J. Bahlicke and A. Strohmeyer, eds., *Konfessionalisierung in Ostmitteleuropa* (Stuttgart: 1999) 143.

the Scottish Kirk felt that Scottish Calvinists had a special role to play in the protection of their fellow Protestants in Europe. Indeed, in July 1627, a fast was ordered to show solidarity with 'the distress and cruel persecution of the members of the reformed Church of Bohemia'.⁶⁰ Yet it cannot be overlooked that leading Scottish Catholics, such as Sir Andrew Gray, Robert Maxwell Earl of Nithsdale and Sir John Hepburn served as principle recruiters and commanders for the alleged 'Protestant' armies.⁶¹ Scots Catholics also joined the pro-Habsburg alliance, but in comparison to the numbers of Scots on the anti-Habsburg side, their numbers were small, at least according to Colonel Robert Monro.⁶² Contemporary evidence indicates that the Duke of Bavaria's army in 1644 only contained two Scots.⁶³ Geoffrey Parker noted that of the Catholic armies involved in the war, the Scots favoured service with the French.⁶⁴ The question that has to be asked is again one of motive. There were, in fact almost 11,000 Scots in French service, the vast majority of whom enlisted after France joined the anti-Habsburg alliance. For a Scotsman, particularly a Catholic Scot, service under the French against the Habsburgs might have been construed as an act of loyalty to the House of Stuart. As Matthew Glozier clearly demonstrates, it cannot simply have been due to Catholic empathy as many Scottish Calvinists also enlisted in France.

Large-scale Scottish and Irish recruitment totalling 21,000 men occurred exactly at the time when France took on her leading role against the Habsburg empire between 1632–1648. The explanation as to why Scottish [or English and Irish] Catholics would join an army ostensibly fighting for the 'Protestant' cause is best achieved by looking at the war from a perspective other than that of religious division.

⁶⁰ 'Proceedings of the Commissioners of the Kirk at a meeting held in Edinburgh in July 1627', in *Bannatyne Miscellany*, III (Edinburgh: 1855) 222–223.

⁶¹ Nithsdale's Catholicism featured in Charles's correspondence to Denmark. Dk. Ra. TKUA England A I 3. Charles I to Christian IV, 8 February 1627; C. Rogers, ed., *The Earl of Stirling's Register of Royal Letters* (Edinburgh: 1885) 130. Charles I to Sir Robert Anstruther, 8th February 1627. Charles I told Christian IV about Nithsdale's Catholicism and instructed Anstruther to vouch for Nithsdale's loyalty; 'Although he is addicted to the Romish religion, yit in regard of the proof we have had of his sufficiency and affection to our service, yow shall answer for his fidelitie in our name'.

⁶² Monro, *Monro His Expedition*, II, 75.

⁶³ F. Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his work force* (2 vols., Wiesbaden: 1965) I, 456.

⁶⁴ Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, 174.

In Scotland and Britain, an assault by the Empire on Bohemia was more than an attack on protestantism; it was also seen as a direct act of aggression against the House of Stuart. Colonels Gray, Hepburn and the Earl of Nithsdale had at least two valid reasons to return to Bohemia, regardless of their religious affiliations: defence of Queen Elizabeth and her family in particular, and upholding the honour of the House of Stuart in general. Intervention on behalf of the House of Stuart has certainly been attributed to the Irish serving in France after 1635 since, as Aidan Clarke has put it, a French alliance was seen ‘as a way of achieving the restoration of the Elector Palatine’.⁶⁵ As noted above, defence of the honour of the House of Stuart is a motive attributable to many of the Scottish soldiers and a theme addressed by a number of the contributors to this edition.

This collection in no sense seeks to be definitive. Indeed, as noted at the very start, there are numerous questions that need to be addressed, particularly what effect the departure of so many men to continental Europe had on Scotland itself. If the amended figures for Scots going abroad are correct, then some 20% of the adult Scottish male population was engaged in the war.⁶⁶ There are also questions to be asked relating to the impact of the war on areas like trade, education and the transfer of intellectual ideas. If this collection encourages others to engage in further research in Scotland, Britain and Ireland or indeed elsewhere in Europe, then it will have achieved its aims.⁶⁷

The contributors would all like to pay tribute to Professor Polišenský, a great historian of the Thirty Years’ War, who died while this work was in the press. It is dedicated to his memory.

⁶⁵ A. Clarke, ‘Sir Piers Crosby 1590–1646; Wentworth’s Tawney-Ribbon’ in *Irish Historical Studies*, XXVI (1988–9) 157. For more on Irish loyalty to the House of Stuart in the seventeenth century, particularly in reference to Catholic support for a ‘heretical king’ see B. Ó Buachalla, ‘James Our True King: The Ideology of Irish Royalism in the Seventeenth Century’ in D.G. Boyce et al., eds., *Political Thought in Ireland since the Seventeenth Century* (London: 1993) 11; B. Ó Buachalla, *Aisling Ghéar: Na Stiobhartaigh agus an t-aos léinn* (Dublin: 1996) 47.

⁶⁶ Based on Edward M. Furgol’s figure that 25,000 equates to 10% of the adult male population. If true, then 50,000 must equate to 20%. See E.M. Furgol, ‘Scotland Turned Sweden: The Scottish Covenanters and the Military Revolution, 1638–1651’ in J. Morrill, ed., *The National Covenant in its British Context, 1638–1651* (Edinburgh: 1990) 136.

⁶⁷ I would like to express my thanks to the contributors to this volume for their constructive comments on this introduction, in particular Dr Robert Frost and Mr David Worthington. Dr Micheál Ó Siochrú also discussed the subject at length and provided me with numerous important suggestions—go raibh maith agad!

Table 1: British Isles Forces Raised for Service Against the Habsburg Armies 1618–1648

DATE	NUMBER OF MEN	MAIN COMMANDERS	SPECIFIC ARMY
1618–1648	5,000 [5,000 Scots]	Colonels David Balfour, William Drummond, William Brog et al.	United Provinces
1620	1,200 [1,200 Scots]	Colonel John Seton	Elector Palatine Frederick V
1620	2,500 [1,500 Scots]	Colonel Andrew Gray	Count Mansfeld
1620	2,500	Earl of Essex, Earl of Oxford, Sir Horace Vere.	Elector Palatine Frederick V
1624	6,000	Earl of Essex, Earl of Oxford, Earl of Southampton	United Provinces
1625	13,300 [4,300 Scots]	Lord Cromwell, Sir Charles Rich, Sir John Burgh, Viscount Doncaster, Sir Andrew Gray, Sir James Leslie et al.	Count Mansfeld
1625	10,000	Viscount Wimbledon et al.	Wimbledon
1626–1629	18,000 [13,700 Scots]	Earl of Nithsdale, Lord Reay, Lord Spynie, Baron Murckle and Sir Charles Morgan.	Denmark-Norway
1628–1648	30,000 [25,000 Scots]	Field Marshal Alexander Leslie, Generals Baron James Spens, James King, Patrick Ruthven, Marquis of Hamilton, and Colonels Mackay et al.	Sweden
1632–1648	11,000 [11,000 Scots]	Marquis of Huntly, Sir John Hepburn, Lord Andrew Gray, Earl of Mar, Earl of Irvine, Lord James Douglas et al.	France

(Table cont.)

DATE	NUMBER OF MEN	MAIN COMMANDERS	SPECIFIC ARMY
1635–1641	10,000	Colonel Tyrell et al.	France
1630–1632	200 [200 Scots]	Sir Alexander Leslie of Auchintoul	Russia
1637–1638	3,000	Lord William Craven	Elector Palatine Charles Louis
Total	112,700 [61,900 Scots]		

NB. It is not yet known how many men from any particular army transferred into the service of another throughout the course of the war. Recorded rates of 'attrition' and 'transfer' suggest it was probably not more than 10%, i.e. 10–13,000 men. The total figure given must, therefore, be treated as an 'enlistments' statistic only. Actual service was probably undertaken by c. 100,000 men of which some 50,000 are likely to have been Scots.

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FIGURES 1-6



Fig. 1. James VI and I (1566-1625). He was crowned 'King of Scots' in 1567, and later became king of England and Ireland in 1603. In 1604 he declared himself king of Great Britain and Ireland although the artist of this print has clearly confused England and Great Britain as being the same thing. (Öffentliche Kunstsammlung Basel.)



Fig. 2. Elizabeth Stuart (1596-1662). Born in Scotland, the daughter of James VI and Anna of Denmark, Elizabeth moved to England in 1604. In 1613 she became Electress Palatine and Queen of Bohemia in 1619. She lived most of her life in exile in The Netherlands, but died in Britain. (Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nürnberg.)



Fig. 3. This is one of many versions of the 'Stettin Woodcut' c.1631. The artist has confused these Scottish veterans of Mackay's regiment with Irishmen, although there was no Irish regiment in Swedish service at that time. The confusion probably arose due to the custom of referring to Highlanders in Scotland as Erse or Irish. The soldiers are pictured after Bayer landing in Stettin with Gustav II Adolf at the start of his campaign in Germany. (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München.)



Fig. 5. Detail of Gustav II Adolf's sword which was on display at the Scotland and the Thirty Years' War conference in Aberdeen. The sword is said to have been brought to Scotland along with the king's spurs by Colonel Hugh Somerville. The sword is now preserved in Aberdeen's Masonic Temple and the spurs are in Edinburgh. (Photo © Rainnea Graphics.)



Fig. 6. The Highlander on the march. It took some time for the German population to get used to the attire of Scottish Highland soldiers. This print shows that by the 18th century they were viewed with less suspicion than in the 1630s. (Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nürnberg.)