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Early Development of *Kalām*[*]

109 The subject "early development of *kalām*" needs clarification. *Kalām* is understood, in secondary literature, in a broad and in a narrow sense. In the broad sense it means something like "Muslim theology," in contrast to philosophy (*falsafa*) or to jurisprudence (*fiqh*); in the narrow sense it means a technique which became a characteristic of Muslim theological texts, namely the dialogue, be it real or fictitious, with an opponent, on a given problem, proceeding in question and answer, preferably on the basis of alternatives derived from this given problem. The opponent is confronted with a doctrine which he himself considers to be true, or with a statement which draws its authority out of itself, e.g. a verse of the Qur'ān. Then in a series of questions normally put in the form of a dilemma which does not leave him any opportunity for evasive answering, he is forced to admit a consequence which contradicts his own thesis, or the untenable nature of all its implications. The dialogue always aims at a merciless reduction to silence; missionary zeal and the conviction of defending eternal truth, both so characteristic of a religion based on revelation, work together to expel the charm and elegance of Socrates' maieutic method on which this technique is ultimately based.[1]

In this technical sense the word *kalām* is an eloquent term; it reveals its close connection with the corresponding verbal forms *kallama* and *takallama*, "to talk to somebody" and "to talk about something." These words may always possess a terminological meaning, but they are still close enough to their basic connotations to leave our judgment sometimes in suspense. The problem we

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* This article preserves to a large extent the form of the paper read at the colloquim. Most of it is merely a summary of a few former publications of mine; the ideas will look new only to somebody who does not read German. As I cannot go far beyond these results for the moment, it would have been meaningless to go into detail again. Only where I refer to primary sources is new material – and perhaps a new interpretation – to be expected; wherever I simply repeat myself I will only refer to my own publications. I apologise for this narcissism, but even so it seems the most honest solution. [This remark was written in 1976. Now, in 1980, reading the proofs, some of what I said in the article looks to me even more dated than at that moment. I have left, however, everything as it was; literature which was published after 1976 has not been incorporated.]

1 On the method of disputation in Muslim theology cf. my article "Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie," in: REI 45 (1977): 23 ff. for further references.

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have to solve is when the transformation took place – the *waḍʿ*, to use a term of later Muslim linguistics – and why it was considered to be so decisive that, for a long time, no other word for "theology" could rival *kalām* in Arabic; *fiqh* was soon restricted to "religious science" in the sense of jurisprudence, *ilāhiyyāt* was confined to philosophy, *ʿilm al-lāhūt* to Christian theology, and | only *uṣūl al-dīn* 110
gained a certain appeal for Ḥanbalī and Ashʿarī circles from the fourth century onward.[2] Why and when was Muslim theology characterized in this way? Why was this not according to its subject-matter like Greek *theología*, but according to its formal structure?

The conventional answer to this question has been repeated over and over again. Let me quote from an article published in 1974: "le premier *kalām* a été muʿtazilite."[3] The Muʿtazilites, so it is assumed, were the first to develop this kind of argumentation, be it as a methodical tool in real discussions or as a stylistic device for the exposition of their ideas; and they *had* to develop it because they assumed the task of defending Islam against its numerous intel-

2 The history of these terms has still to be written. For *fiqh*, cf. the material brought together by I. Goldziher in EI[1], German edition, 2, 107b (= *Handwörterbuch des Islam*, 132b), and slightly enlarged by J. Schacht in EI[2], 2, 887b; the most notorious examples for its use in this sense are the titles of the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar* and the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-absaṭ* attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa (cf. EI[2], 1, 123b f.). The relationship of these titles to each other shows, incidentally, that *akbar* and *absaṭ* have to be connected with *kitāb* and not with *fiqh*; they serve as a differentiation between two books of different importance and, perhaps, origin, not between two different kinds of *fiqh*. It is therefore unjustified to assume that *al-fiqh al-akbar*, in the sense of "the greater (more important) *fiqh*," meant theology in contrast to normal *fiqh* in the sense of jurisprudence (an error committed by D.B. MacDonald in EI[1], German ed. 2, 720a = *Handwörterbuch des Islam*, 261b, also by A.J. Wensinck in his *Muslim Creed* (Cambridge: 1932), p. VI, and taken up by myself in: *Erkenntnislehre des ʿAḍudaddīn al-Īcī* (Wiesbaden: 1966), p. 14). *Uṣūl al-dīn* is attested, although in a slightly divergent form, by Ashʿarī's (died 324/935–936) *Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna*; as a later Ashʿarite example we may mention ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī's (died 429/1037) *Uṣūl al-dīn*. For Ḥanbalī texts cf. Ibn Baṭṭa's (died 387/997) *Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-sunna wal-diyāna* and especially Abū Yaʿlā's (died 458/1066) *Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn*. The term was taken over by the Christians: Elias I, patriarch of the Nestorian church (died 1049), seems to be the author of a theological compendium with the title *Uṣūl al-dīn* (cf. Graf, GCAL, 2: 159 f.). The connotations connected with *uṣūl al-dīn* usually implied a certain antithesis to *kalām*: the style of these treatises tended towards greater neutrality and "objectivity." Theological differences were not passed over in silence, but sometimes simply enumerated as in doxographical works, and even if they were refuted, the dialectical structure typical for *kalām* was avoided. This is at least true for the later texts; Ashʿarī's *Ibāna* still shows a dialectical style. But this work starts with a *ʿaqīda* into which the *uṣūl al-diyāna*, in their original sense as "principles of religion," are incorporated.

3 D. Gimaret in *Studia Islamica* 40 (1974): 71.

lectual critics from outside, especially the adherents of the dualistic creeds in the area of the former Sasanid empire. *Kalām* as a technique was understood as an instrument of apologetics. This has turned out to be wrong or at least only partially true. We possess at least one testimony which is earlier than the Muʿtazila, extensive fragments from a treatise against the Qadariyya written about A.H. 75 by a grandson of the Caliph ʿAlī, Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya. In this text the *kalām* technique is applied with a certain awkward stubbornness, and even the word *takallama* is used once in its terminological sense. The date and authenticity of the text are, of course, open to discussion; but a paragraph by paragraph comparison with other documents relevant to the Qadarī movement (Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's letter to ʿAbd al-Malik written between A.H. 75 and 80; ʿUmar II's epistle against some anonymous Qadarites, presumably Khārijites and adherents of Shabīb b. Yazīd al-Najrānī, written about A.H. 100; and the material derived from our *ḥadīth* collections)[4] seems to demonstrate a certain primitiveness on the part of Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya and an ignorance of later solutions which it would have been difficult to imitate afterwards.[5] Thus the *kalām* technique was not invented by the Muʿtazilites in Iraq, but dates back at least to the time of ʿAbd al-Malik, to an influential member of the House of the Prophet who seems to have spent much of his time in the Ḥijāz.

Once we accept this as a fact, we discover that it does not stand completely isolated. In an Ibāḍī source a certain Ṣuḥār al-ʿAbdī who, in spite of all uncertainty in matters of biographical detail, has to be dated back to the first century
111 of the Hijra, is credited with the following advice concerning the | treatment of the Qadarites whom he disliked as much as his contemporary Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya: "Talk with them about (divine) knowledge (*kallimūhum fī l-ʿilm*)! If they admit it, they contradict (their doctrine); if they deny it they fall into unbelief." This is characteristic in three respects: because of the technical use of *kallama* in *kallimūhum*; because of its "if – if not" disjunction, i.e. the

4 For the authenticity of the letter written by Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, cf. my summary of the arguments in: *Anfänge muslimischer Theologie* (Beirut: 1977), pp. 27 ff. for further references. For ʿUmar II's epistle against the Qadariyya, cf. my edition, translation, and commentary of the text, *ibid.*, pp. 114 ff. and 43 ff. (of the Arabic text). For the material found in *ḥadīth*, cf. my *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie* (Berlin: 1975).

5 For an analysis of the text, together with an edition and translation, cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 35 ff.; a preliminary account of its importance for the theological development in the first century A.H. is given in my article, "The Beginnings of Islamic Theology," in: J.E. Murdoch and E.D. Sylla, eds., *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning* (Dordrecht: 1975), pp. 87 ff. = pp. 855–872 above.

alternative or dilemma typical for *kalām*; and because of its naive assumption that God's foreknowledge means predestination and that the Qadarites therefore cannot deny the latter if they accept the former – a hasty identification of two different concepts which is also found with Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya, but which was already refuted by Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in his letter to ʿAbd al-Malik. The same source mentions as the first *mutakallim*, obviously within the Ibāḍiyya, a certain Bisṭām b. ʿUmar b. al-Musayyab al-Ḍabbī who had joined Shabīb b. Yazīd al-Shaybānī, the Kharijite rebel against al-Ḥajjāj who had been drowned in the Tigris in A.H. 77 – thus another personality of the first century. With this in mind we might perhaps reconsider our sceptical reaction towards some Shīʿī material concerning *kalām* discussions by their *imāms* Muḥammad al-Bāqir and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq. Although there is no doubt that the danger of projecting and antedating is especially imminent here, we should not overlook the fact that with these reports we are already entering the second century.[6]

In all this, however, there is not only a problem of time, but also of space. The early Shīʿī *imāms* resided in Medina, and so, probably, did Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya. *Kalām*, then, obviously did not – or not only – originate in the centres of the pre-Islamic oriental civilizations, in Syria or in Iraq, but in the birthplace of Islam itself. Does this mean that we are dealing with an inner-Muslim development and that all those well-known parallels with Christian vocabulary and technique: the stereotype Greek formula *ei dé phate – apokrinoumetha* discovered by von Grunebaum as the counterpart of the Arabic pattern *in qultum – qulnā*, the equation *kalām* = *dialexis* and *takallama* = *dialegesthai* etc.,[7] are a mere coincidence or only relevant for a later stage of development? This seems rather hard to accept.

We might, of course, venture the hypothesis that the Shīʿī *imāms* as well as Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya had frequent contacts with Iraq and that they were not entirely unfamiliar with the circumstances in the capital, Damascus – that they learnt theological argumentation there, at a court where | John of Damascus lived, the author of the well-known *Dialexis Christianoū* 112
kai Sarakēnou. Being written in Greek, the text was, of course, not immediately accessible to the Arabs; but its contents and its intention leave no doubt that the Christians used their bilingualism to defend their religious convictions against the "heresy" of their Muslim masters.[8] Nevertheless, this theory sounds

6 Cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 19 ff., "Beginnings," pp. 89 f.

7 Cf. my *Erkenntnislehre des ʿAḍudaddīn al-Īcī*, pp. 56 ff. for further references.

8 Testimony for anti-Muslim polemics in Arabic appears somewhat later. The oldest documents known up to now are two Egyptian papyri which may be dated to the time of Theodore Abū

somewhat too contrived. Moreover, John of Damascus was not the first Christian to use the method; his *Dialexis* is a good example of *kalām*, a *dialektos* of the kind already practised by Origen in his discussion with Heraclides and the Egyptian bishops,[9] but it was certainly written *after* A.H. 75, the approximate date when Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya finished his treatise.[10] Moreover, we may be sure that a more thorough analysis of our sources will yield additional names: the same Ibāḍī text referred to before mentions a certain Ṣāliḥ b. Kathīr "*min mutakallimī l-muslimīn*" (*muslimīn* here evidently meaning not the Muslims in contrast to Christians and Jews, but the Ibāḍīs who considered themselves the Muslims *par excellence*), and this man turns out to be also a Medinan, a friend of al-Zuhrī.[11]

What we have thus far failed to consider are two things: first, Medina was at that time – more than in any other period – not a point outside or at the periphery of the civilized world; and secondly, *kalām* was always applied with the Qur'ān in mind. The Qur'ān, however, uses *kalām* structures: the Prophet gets divine advice on how to question his Jewish, Christian or pagan opponents, and how to anticipate their answers. This advice is normally introduced by the formula *qul* (Say); thus, many passages of the Scripture have the character of a manual for argumentation, and controversy becomes an essential part of revelation.[12] This does not mean that the Qur'ān is the ultimate and only source of the *kalām* technique; we must not expect too much of its *iʿjāz*. It only shows

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Qurra (circa 740–820), the disciple of John of Damascus. It seems significant that the first text is composed in the form of a fictitious dialogue, whereas in the second one the opponent is directly addressed in the second person (cf. F. Bilabel and A. Grohmann, *Griechische, koptische und arabische Texte zur Religion und religiösen Literatur in Ägyptens Spätzeit* (Heidelberg: 1934), pp. 9 ff. and 26 ff.).

9 Cf. REI 45 (1977): 26.

10 For the authenticity of the *Dialexis*, cf. H.G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* (Munich: 1959), p. 478; and recently J. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam* (Leiden: 1972), pp. 99 ff. In any case the text belongs to the second century A.H.

11 Cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 22 ff.

12 Cf., e.g. Qur'ān 3: 30: "*fa-in ḥājjūka fa-qul*"; or Qur'ān 2: 111, 2: 135, 10: 38 etc. where "*qul*" is preceded by the explicit argumentation of the opponents; Qur'ān 2: 142, 10: 20 etc. where it is preceded by a question, and Qur'ān 10: 15 where it is preceded by an invitation. Sometimes the structure is more complex; cf. Qur'ān 10: 31 where the argumentation develops in two steps ("*qul: man yarzuqukum ... fa-sayaqūlūna: Allāh, fa-qul ...*") or Qur'ān 10: 50 f. where two answers are given. A typical dilemma structure is found in Qur'ān 3: 20: "*wa-qul li-lladhīna ūtū l-kitāba ... fa-in aslamū fa-qad ihtadaw, wa-in tawallaw fa-innamā ʿalayka l-balāgh.*"

that the Qur'ān, too, was part of a tradition[13] and that Muḥammad's method of argumentation is not essentially different from that of his adversaries who had inherited their dialectical style over the centuries. His successors in spirit – or even in the flesh, like the two Shīʿī *imāms* I mentioned – would not have had the impression of creating any *bidʿa* when they argued in terms of *kalām*. Whether they were aware of paying homage to an age-old, pre-Muslim custom is another question.[14] What they had to learn was not the technique itself, but skill in applying it; they had not lived outside | the intellectual world of antiquity, only 113
at its periphery.

So much for *kalām* in its specific and more restricted sense. Whoever talks about *kalām* would, however, disappoint the expectations of his audience if, in malicious precision, he were to understand *kalām* only as a technique typical of Muslim theology, and not as Muslim theology itself, i.e. as its content rather than its form. We will then have to put up with the fact that *kalām* in the sense of "theology" (which is a usage of the term introduced by western Islamicists; a Muslim would either say *ʿilm al-kalām* or use a completely different expression) does not necessarily manifest itself in the stylistic form called *kalām*. If we take, for instance, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's epistle to ʿAbd al-Malik, we are justified in saying that this is an important specimen of early Muslim theology, but as a letter expounding upon request the author's opinion about a certain theological problem, it is, by definition, not *kalām*. In shifting the accent thus from *Formgeschichte* to *Dogmengeschichte* we always have to keep in mind that we are not dealing with a phenomenon restricted to one region, but with the intellectual history of an empire. We have to differentiate, therefore, not only according to problems, but also according to areas.

The main problem in Syria and obviously also in the Ḥijāz was *qadar*, the question of the origin of and responsibility for man's evil actions. This is, of

13 Even pre-Islamic poetry, in spite of its natural unsuitableness for "prosaic" structures, may come rather close to formulations appropriate to *kalām*; there is, e.g., a passage in a *qaṣīda* by Zuhayr where alternatives are listed and pondered (cf. *Dīwān* with commentary by Thaʿlab (Cairo, Dār al-kutub: 1363/1944), pp. 74 f.; with commentary by Shantamarī, ed. C. de Landberg, *Primeurs arabes*, 2: 159 f.).

14 We should not underestimate the importance of religious disputations with non-Muslims in this respect (cf. the material collected in my article in REI 45 (1977): 28 ff.). On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that there is nothing directly corresponding to a *kalām* treatise in early Christian literature. There are lots of dialogues and *erotapokriseis*, but no texts composed in the impersonal style typical of *kalām* (cf. *ibid*., p. 59, with respect to the case of Iunilius' *Instituta regularia divinae legis*).

course, no mere coincidence: in the capital man's responsibility tended to be understood as the caliph's responsibility, and evil actions meant the injustice of the ruling establishment and the social iniquity of a rapidly changing world; the theological discussion was loaded with political and revolutionary overtones. But this only accounts for the importance attributed to the problem, not for its origin. The theological discussion precedes the political crisis: about A.H. 75, i.e. several years before the execution of the so-called founder of the Qadariyya, Maʿbad al-Juhanī,[15] Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya refers to a conceptual apparatus of the doctrine which is rather elaborate. One of the key terms seems to have been *duʿā'*, God's "call" to follow his commandments, the "right guidance" (*hudā*) provided by the prophets. Man is free to accept this *hudā* or to reject it; evil originates through his giving in to his own whims (*hawā*)
114 or to the deception (*takhyīl*) of Satan. This presupposes that man is | able to perform something (*qadara*) and that he possesses a capacity (*istiṭāʿa*) which has been conveyed (*wakala*) to him by God. In order to find the right direction he needs reason (*ʿaql*), and reason is therefore given to everybody, as *fiṭra*, as his nature by which he becomes *a priori* aware of God's existence and of his own createdness.[16]

All this does not sound very new. But we should not forget: it is not yet Muʿtazilite theology but is conceived before the last quarter of the first century. And it is not sectarian for only later heresiography treated the Qadariyya as a sect – with all the consequences of such a concept as being a minority and a novelty (*bidʿa*) introduced by a founder. Yet the Qadariyya probably never had a founder; the movement is solidly rooted in a consistent exegesis of the Qurʾān – an exegesis which has been shown to correspond well with the Qurʾān's own intentions in the recent study of H. Räisänen[17]–and rooted to such an extent that its adherents never wholly agreed to accept other authoritative proofs for their view, especially not from *ḥadīth*.[18] Secondly, there is no evidence that the movement, at that time, reflected only the interest of a minority. It may have become the position of a minority later on because of the resistance of the government and through political escalation (although considering the undisputed success of the early Muʿtazila even this may be subject to doubt, at least for certain areas). But even if the other side represented

15 For the problems connected with his person cf. my article "Maʿbad al-Ǧuhanī" in *Islamwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen Fritz Meier zum sechzigsten Geburtstag* (Wiesbaden: 1974), pp. 49 ff.

16 Cf. the summary in my *Anfänge*, pp. 12 ff., with references to the passages in the text itself.

17 Heikki Räisänen, *The Idea of Divine Hardening* (Helsinki: 1972).

18 Cf. my *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie*, especially pp. 68 ff., pp. 184 f., and 192 f.

the majority, they did not have the better theologians; the conceptual apparatus used by Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya is rather primitive. One gets the impression that he is not so much defending a traditional position, as constructing his own stance in reaction to the more elaborate Qadarī system. He is remarkably cautious in his refutation: he never says that God creates evil or is responsible for it; he only insists on the fact that it is always God who initiates actions and events. Instead of the Qadarī notion of *duʿāʾ*, God's call which leaves the response to man's own decision, he uses *tawfīq* which leaves the choice to God: those to whom God "grants success" will act righteously, while everybody else will go astray. This is, as he understands it, a token of divine grace; there is no compulsion, *jabr* or *ikrāh*, involved.[19] The Jabriyya is a myth created by the heresiographers, and the term is taken over from Qadarite propaganda.[20]

The way the Qadariyya used this term shows the direction which the discussion was going to take: | for them it implies more a political than a reli- 115
gious deviation. *Jabriyya* means the "tyranny" of the Umayyads from the time of ʿAbd al-Malik onward, that is, of all those who were only recognized as kings (*mulūk*) after the period of the ideal caliphate. Whoever, according to the Qadariyya, admitted that God may "force" someone to do evil justified the Umayyad *jabriyya* and identified himself with it. With special delight the Qadarīs brought up the case of Pharaoh, and we may be sure that they did not do so merely as an exercise in Qurʾānic exegesis; Pharaoh was the unjust tyrant *par excellence*.[21] The other side stressed the idea that man owed his *rizq*, his livelihood, solely to God, not to his own endeavor; and *rizq*, in spite of its etymology (from Persian *rōzīk*), did not only mean the daily bread or the daily ration of a soldier, but also the power given to a caliph, his *mulk* understood as his *milk*, and the wealth granted to the Arab aristocrats in contrast to the *mawālī*. Predestinarianism was seen as a guarantee for the established social order and against the onslaught of the underprivileged. The political and social antagonism involved may explain, together with other, more specific reasons, the execution of Ghaylān al-Dimashqī, a *mawlā*, who himself was obviously not a revolutionary, but whose ideas concealed a revolutionary ele-

19 Cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 14 ff.

20 Cf. *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie*, p. 183.

21 Cf. *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie*, pp. 183 f. and 218; *Anfänge*, pp. 154 ff. It is interesting to see that Pharaoh was also discussed in Byzantine theology in connection with predestination; cf. Hildebrand Beck, *Vorsehung und Vorherbestimmung in der theologischen Literatur der Byzantiner*, Orientalia Christiana Analecta, vol. 114 (1937), p. 120.

ment which was set free in the rebellion against Walīd II and the program of Yazīd III.[22]

The situation in Iraq was different. Many Qadarīs lived there, but we do not hear that much about their specific political aspirations. And whereas in Syria our information breaks off with the rise of the ʿAbbāsids, it continues in Iraq at least up to the end of the second century: the continuing predominance of the theological aspect of the problem facilitated the integration of the movement into the new society. The movement was gradually taken over by the Muʿtazilīs who, in spite of differences in their *qadar* doctrine, came close enough in order to make the merger possible, especially as the predestinarian polemics did not make any efforts to differentiate between them. Whatever remained of the militant wing may appear in our sources as those Muʿtazilites around Bashīr al-Raḥḥāl who, in 145, joined the rebellion of al-Nafs al-Zakiyya.[23]

But the Qadarīs only played a role in Baṣra where they lived in fruitful tension with the Ibāḍiyya who were, for the most part, moderate predestinarians.[24] Kūfa, on the contrary, was held by the Shīʿa and the Murjiʾa. In this town the
116 activists were attracted | by the slogans of a strong pro-ʿAlid community; they could combine their revolutionary energy with the frustrations of the House of the Prophet.[25] Mukhtār had exploited these feelings. When his rebellion collapsed, the expectations which he had raised lived on in a number of millenarian movements whose gnostic superstructure shows the influence of foreign, e.g. Mandean, ideas. These movements were initiated and supported by craftsmen and simple people, members of the lower strata of the population who had frequently come from the countryside. By emancipating the *mawāli*, Mukhtār had obviously encouraged a wave of religious syncretism where Islam, which was still more or less restricted to the larger towns and the upper classes, came into closer contact with the notions of indigenous religiosity. These ideas had survived Zoroastrian impact and Christian mission, and they could now infiltrate Islam all the more easily as the shape and circumference of the new religion were not yet sufficiently defined. Since these sectarian movements came from social strata which were utterly despised by the new masters, they mani-

22 Cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 232 ff.; *ibid*., pp. 177 ff., for a detailed analysis of the scattered reports about Ghaylān al-Dimashqī. For the political program of Yazīd III, cf. my article "Les Qadarites et la Ġailānīya de Yazīd III," in *Studia Islamica* 31 (1970): 269 ff.

23 Cf. Kaʿbī, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn* in *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Tunis: 1974), p. 117, -7 ff.: they wore *ṣūf*!

24 For the Ibāḍiyya, cf. the excellent article by T. Lewicki in EI², 3, 648 ff. and the literature mentioned in my article in ZDMG 126 (1976): 25 ff. and 127 (1977): *1* ff.

25 Cf. *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie*, pp. 61 ff. and 189 ff. for further references.

fested themselves in a chiliastic form; one waited for the Mahdī to establish justice in this world, or even more than that, one believed in new prophets having come and Paradise having been installed on earth.[26] This utopianism normally exploded in rebellion or terrorist activities; the social injustice in the newly founded towns seemed unbearable to those who came from outside, driven away from their land by an over-demanding tax-policy or by the insecurity caused by the Khawārij.

The wealthy ʿAlids and the Iraqi *ashrāf* did not show much sympathy for these fantasies. The most impressive attack against the extremists – impressive enough to be repeated over and over again in the political propaganda of the time – came from an ʿAlid, the same Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya whom we mentioned earlier as an opponent of the Qadariyya. Shortly after 73/693 he wrote an open letter to the adherents of his family and to whoever wanted to listen to it, especially in Kūfa, where he severely criticised the "Saba'iyya" – not "Kaysāniyya" as they were called later on – and accused them of claiming secret knowledge and distorting the Qur'ān. This was intended as an initiative in favor of ʿAbd al-Malik who tried to restore the religious unity of his empire after the end of Mukhtār's rebellion and the downfall of ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr's anticaliphate. The key term of his letter was *irjā'*, meant as a call for political moderation and prudent abstention from | useless discussions about 117
the mistakes of the first civil war. Thus, in a sense, an ʿAlid started a religious movement, the Murji'a, which was later on usually regarded as the ideological legitimation for Umayyad rule.

This is paradoxical only in hindsight. Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya's initiative progressed differently from what he had intended. In spite of the fact that, during the last phase of Mukhtār's rebellion, he himself had joined the revolutionaries – or perhaps just because of this – he could not calm them down now. He did not even succeed in becoming the head of a moderate Shīʿī wing. His idea turned out to have a future, yet not in politics but in theology – like the Qadarī doctrine at Baṣra. He had pleaded for *epochē*, postponing one's judgement, in the case of the participants of the first civil war, especially ʿUthmān and ʿAlī, i.e. in the case of a limited and well-defined number of people and certain well-known events in the past. Shortly afterwards this was reinterpreted as abstention from judgement about the salvation-status of anyone in the past or present. The decision not to talk about the possible "sin" of ʿUthmān and ʿAlī –

26 An analysis of these phenomena has recently been given by W.F. Tucker in his Ph.D. thesis *Revolutionary Chiliasm in Umayyad Iraq* (Bloomington: 1971), parts of which have been printed separately in *Arabica* 22 (1975): 33 ff., MW 65 (1975): 241 ff., and *Der Islam* 54 (1976): 66 ff.

who, after all, had been Companions of the Prophet – was changed into the conviction that nobody, be he alive or dead, should be denied the predicate of *muʾmin* as long as he had pronounced the *shahāda*.[27] In spite of this development, however, the basic intention of the movement remained unbroken: i.e. to preserve the cohesion of the community. This created a peculiar atmosphere; for whereas the other movements were mostly interested in elaborating their own standpoint and in contrasting it against other views, the Murjiʾa tried to define the minimum of beliefs and tenets to which all Muslims should adhere. Instead of refutations, they wrote *ʿaqāʾid* of which the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar* connected with the name of Abū Ḥanīfa was only the first.[28]

This is how the Murjiʾites outlined the limits of the Sunna. Characteristically enough, Abū Ḥanīfa, in his letter to ʿUthmān al-Battī, strongly objects to being called a Murjiʾī, which he understands as a derogatory term used by the *ahl al-bidaʿ*, and prefers, as a self-designation, names like *ahl al-sunna* or *ahl al-ʿadl*.[29] The latter term strikingly evokes the pretensions of the Muʿtazila.

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27 Cf. my edition of the text in *Arabica* 21 (1974): 20 ff. = above pp. 718 ff.; also the summary in "Beginnings," pp. 93 ff. For Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya's biography cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 1 ff. and 277, also my forthcoming article "Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya" in EI², Supplement, for further references [= vol. XII 357 f.].

28 The analysis of the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar* (I) given by Wensinck in his *Muslim Creed*, pp. 102 ff., remains valuable in many points; cf. now W.M. Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh: 1973), pp. 132 ff. and index s.v. Later examples of this simplistic and Unitarian trend in Murjiʾī/Ḥanafī thought are the *ʿAqīdat al-uṣūl* by Abū Layth al-Samarqandī (died 373/983), ed. A.W.T. Juynboll in: *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië*, ser. IV, vol. 5 (1881): 215 ff. and 267 ff., which became famous among the Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia, the *ʿAqīda* by Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (died 537/1142) translated, together with Taftazānī's commentary, by E. Elder, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam* (New York: 1950), and the *ʿAqīda al-lāmiyya* (*Badʾ al-amālī*) by ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān al-Ūshī (died 575/1179), ed. Kemâl Edîb Kürkçüoğlu in: *İlah. Fak. Dergisi* 3 (1954): 1 ff. We must not, however, create the impression that elaborate *kalām* had not originated in the same milieu. Already the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-absaṭ* attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa is composed in the form of a manual for dialectical discussion; cf., e.g., p. 43, 7 ff. of the edition by Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo: 1368). Wensinck even assumed that the *Fiqh al-akbar* was extracted from the *Fiqh al-absaṭ* (cf. *Muslim Creed*, p. 123. The hypothesis is not very convincing; it seems easier to suppose that we are dealing with a "more important," *akbar*, and a "more extended," *absaṭ*, presentation of the same tenets). Good examples of later *kalām* works in Ḥanafī environments are the *Kitāb al-tawḥīd* by Māturīdī, ed. Fatḥallāh Khulayf (Beirut: 1970) and the *Kitāb tabṣirat al-adilla* by Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (died 508/1114). [Cf. above pp. 749 ff.]

29 Cf. the edition by Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo: 1368), p. 37, ult. f.: Abū Ḥanīfa seems to refer to the usage of the term Murjiʾa in Baṣra where ʿUthmān al-Battī lived.

This observation tallies with the fact that the principle of *al-manzila bayna l-manzilatayn*, which was so characteristic of Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ's theology, is not entirely without parallel in Abū Ḥanīfa's thinking. | But for Abū Ḥanīfa all peo- 118
ple who are not polytheists (*mushrikūn*) share this *manzila*, which can only be changed for the better, namely into the status held by the prophets and the *ʿashara al-mubashshara*, but not for the worse.[30] Wāṣil's thinking, for his part, has also a Khārijī component: when he disapproves of the attempt to restrict general (*ʿāmm*) statements in the Qurʾān to specific (*khāṣṣ*) cases,[31] he seems to be attacking the Murjiʾī doctrine that the Muslim sinner is exempt from the Qurʾānic prediction of eternal punishment.[32] We may assume that his *Kitāb Aṣnāf al-Murjiʾa*[33] contained criticism in addition to mere doxographical description. In the long run, the Muʿtazilīs turned out to be much more exclusive than the Murjiʾa; their rationalism pushed them in this direction. Abū Ḥanīfa and his followers, on the contrary, seem to have extended their univer-

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ʿUthmān b. Sulaymān al-Battī (died 143/760; cf. GAS 1: 418) was a famous jurist there who did not adhere to Abū Ḥanīfa's school; the Ḥanafīs were proud of the fact that Zufar b. al-Hudhayl al-ʿAnbarī (110/728–158/77 5), a famous disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa, had succeeded in alienating some of his pupils (cf. Kawtharī, *Lamaḥāt al-naẓar fī sīrat al-Imām Zufar* (Cairo: 1368), p. 18, 8 ff.). This was not so easy: Yūsuf b. Khālid al-Samtī, another pupil of Abū Ḥanīfa and addressee of one of his *Waṣiyya*s (cf. GAS 1: 417, no. VI) had been thrashed by the Baṣrans when he had pointed to the diverging views of Abū Ḥanīfa (cf. Kawtharī, *ibid.*).

30 Cf. Abū Ḥanīfa's *Kitāb al-ʿālim wal-mutaʿallim* (Hyderabad: 1349), p. 20, -4 ff. and the English summary by J. Schacht in: *Oriens* 17 (1964): 111: "*al-manzila al-thālitha hum al-muwaḥḥidūn naqifu ʿalayhim lā nashhadu ʿalayhim annahum min ahl al-nār wa-lā min ahl al-janna wa-lākinnā narjū lahum wa-nakhāfu ʿalayhim*." Also my remarks in *Arabica* 21 (1974): 50.

31 Cf. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *Kitāb al-awāʾil*, ed. Muḥammad al-Miṣrī and Walīd Qaṣṣāb (Damascus: 1975), 2: 134, 9 ff. and the German translation of the passage by S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre* (Berlin: 1936), pp. 126 f. (where the reading of the text is corrupt at the end). We should, however, take into consideration that the parallel in Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl*, p. 234, 17 ff. mentions *khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm* just in the reverse sequence and therefore does not allow the interpretation we give to the passage.

32 That the discussion about *ʿāmm* and *khāṣṣ* has frequently to be interpreted in this context is made clear by Ashʿarī in the relevant chapter of his *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn*, ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul: 1927 ff.), p. 144, 7 ff. Cf. also the parallel material in my article in *Recherches d'Islamologie. Recueil d'articles offert à G.C. Anawati et L. Gardet* (Brussels: 1977), pp. 340 f.

33 Cf. Yāqūt, *Irshād al-arīb*, ed. D.S. Margoliouth (GMS, no. 6), 7: 225, 11 f. Wāṣil died before Abū Ḥanīfa (in 131/748) but at a rather young age. For him cf. the recent article by Abū l-Wafāʾ al-Taftazānī in: *Dirāsāt falsafiyya muhdāt ilā l-duktūr Ibrāhīm Madkūr* (Cairo: 1974), pp. 39 ff.

salist claim also to jurisprudence; it would be interesting to investigate to what extent the Ḥanafī *madhhab* was meant to be more than just the Iraqi school of law. More than Mālik b. Anas, Abū Ḥanīfa seems to have attracted disciples from everywhere. We have to ask whether this is merely a reflection of the growing influence of Iraq in the first two decades of ʿAbbāsid domination (between 132 and 150, the year of Abū Ḥanīfa's death) or the indication of a conscious effort on his part.[34] Balkh was called by Kūfan scholars Murjiyyābād because of the local predominance of the Ḥanafīs.[35]

Balkh brings us to a new area, Iran. Here, our information about factions and movements like those in Syria and Iraq is scarce, but we encounter the first systematic theologian of Islam, Jahm b. Ṣafwān. We might venture the statement that theology properly speaking did not exist before Jahm. The early community did not discuss theological issues as such, but its widely diverging views of history, its *Geschichtsbild*. For what had been really novel in Islam was not its doctrine; Muḥammad's message was to be understood simply as a renewal of the kerygma of the Old and the New Testament. What was novel was its success and its rapid expansion; this development, together with its social and political consequences, was the prime factor requiring an explanation. This is why predestination was seen in connection with political power and "repression." It was only Jahm who changed predestination into a systematic determinism; for him God's power and almightiness were not so much linked with man's action, but with God's entire "otherness."

119 In spite of this, Jahm was not a completely isolated figure. His formulation that, in view of God's omnipotence, all statements about human actions and worldly events are mere "metaphors" can now be traced back to Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya's treatise against the Qadariyya.[36] He adopts the Murjiʾī concept of community together with their definition of *īmān*, belief. But he is the first to develop a consistent concept of God and His attributes. His "system" (which we have to reconstruct from a few remarks found in the heresiographers) puts strong emphasis on God's transcendence, and we are still unable to decide whether this attitude was simply a formulation of a principle genuinely inherent in Islam as such, or whether it originated out of Neoplatonic

34 The rapid expansion of the Ḥanafī school of law can be nicely observed in the list of early Ḥanafīs given by al-Kardarī in his *Manāqib Abī Ḥanīfa* (Hyderabad, 1321), 2: 219 ff.

35 Cf. ʿAbdallāh-i Balkhī, *Fażāʾil-i Balkh*, ed. ʿAbdulḥayy Ḥabībī (Tehran: 1348 sh./1969), p. 28, pu. ff. The dominating figure there during the first generation was Abū Muṭīʿ al-Ḥakam b. ʿAbdallāh al-Balkhī (died 199/814) who seems to be responsible for the redaction and composition (?) of the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-absaṭ* (cf. GAS 1: 414, no. 11).

36 Cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 108 f.

ideas,[37] or reacted against divergent views where God was conceived as a body immanent in space, as propounded by a circle of theologians in the Iraqi Shīʿa[38] and presumably also by Muqātil b. Sulaymān, a compatriot of Jahm in Balkh.[39] The problem of Neoplatonism is that we lack any precise information as to the intellectual background against which early Islam could unfold itself in Khurāsān.[40] The Shīʿī "corporealists" in Iraq present us with the difficulty that all of them were probably one generation younger than Jahm. Muqātil, on the other hand, was really a contemporary, for he met Jahm at Marw where he discussed the problem of anthropomorphism with him. Both of them are said to have written books against each other on this topic after their dispute.[41] But the character of Muqātil's *tashbīh* is still a mystery.[42] Possibly their disputation

37 This is the hypothesis proffered by R.M. Frank in his article "The Neoplatonism of Ǧahm ibn Ṣafwān," *Le Muséon* 78 (1965): 395 ff. The article is the most thorough contribution to the understanding of Jahm's ideas as such.

38 I am thinking of theologians like Muḥammad b. Nuʿmān, known as Shayṭān (or Muʾmin) al-Ṭāq, Hishām b. Sālim al-Jawālīqī, ʿAlī b. Mītham, and, with certain modifications, Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. Their theory of an immanent and "corporeal" God has been treated by W. Madelung in a paper entitled "The Shīʿite and Khārijite contribution to pre-Ashʿarite *kalām*," which he read at the conference in honor of H.A. Wolfson at Harvard in 1971. It is due to appear in a collection of studies entitled *Islamic philosophical theology* to be edited by P. Morewedge at the State University of New York Press.

39 For him cf. the Ph.D. thesis by M.M. al-Sawwaf, "Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, an early Zaydī theologian, with special reference to his Tafsīr" (University of Oxford: 1968). He died in 150/767 in Baṣra; the material on his biography has been collected by al-Sawwaf, pp. 29 ff.

40 Perhaps we should not be too sceptical. Balkh was the old capital of the Bactrian empire; Tirmidh, the place where Jahm used to teach, seems to owe its name to the Greek prince Demetrios, the son of Euthydemos of Bactria (cf. W.W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge: 1938), pp. 118 f.). The Neoplatonic ideas which were introduced into Islam by Fārābī (died 339/950) two centuries later, may have stemmed from Central Asia where they were developed at the same time, or perhaps even somewhat earlier, by Ismāʿīlī circles, especially al-Nasafī who was executed in 331/942.

41 Cf. Dhahabī, *Mīzān al-iʿtidāl*, ed. Bajāwī, 4: 173, 13 ff.

42 We should expect traces of it in his exegetical works (cf. GAS 1: 36 f.), but there seems to be almost nothing of this kind. It is true that he interpreted the "hand" of God in its literal sense (in Qurʾān 5: 64 and 38: 75; cf. now the recent edition of Muqātil's *Kitāb al-wujūh wal-naẓāʾir fī l-Qurān al-karīm* by ʿAbdallāh Maḥmūd Shaḥḥāṭa (Cairo: 1975), p. 321, 11 ff.), but this does not automatically make him an anthropomorphist – and even this was eliminated by Abū l-Faḍl Ḥubaysh b. Ibrāhīm al-Tiflīsī (died 588/1192) in his Persian redaction of the same *Kitāb al-wujūh* (cf. p. 316, 3 ff. of the edition by Mahdī Muḥaqqiq in *Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Ṭahrān*, no. 720 (Tehran: 1340 sh./1961), where God's hand is understood as His power and His generosity or as His action). Several

had concentrated on the problem whether God can be located on His throne or whether He is *lā fī makān*; the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-absaṭ*, which seems to have been transmitted in Balkh since the time of Abū Muṭīʿ,[43] attacks some "unbelievers" just for this doctrine.[44]

Muqātil and Jahm were not only opponents in their theological views but also enemies in political affairs. Jahm was executed as a secretary of the anti-Umayyad revolutionary Ḥārith b. Surayj in 128/746 whereas Muqātil had been selected as an expert on the Qurʾān, together with his namesake Muqātil b. Ḥayyān,[45] by Naṣr b. Sayyār, the Umayyad governor, during his negotiations with Ḥārith b. Surayj.[46] Jahm's execution did not hamper the expansion of his theological ideas; they remained prominent in the area where he had lived. The Jahmiyya is explicitly attacked in the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-absaṭ*;[47] and in the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar*, where the attack constitutes only a few lines,
120 they are the only | group of opponents mentioned by name.[48] Simultaneously, but in their own way, the *muḥaddithūn* started to formulate their protest. Ibrāhīm b. Ṭahmān (died 163/747–748), author of one of the oldest collections

problems come together here: the relevant texts are not yet edited (al-Sawwaf's thesis contains an edition of Muqātil's *Tafsīr khamsimiʾat āya*); their transmission – with all its possibilities of later changes and additions – is rather complicated, and the judgments on Muqātil are normally pronounced in a polemical context. We should not forget that, in his period, the positions concerning anthropomorphism were probably different from later on. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, the great founder of Qurʾānic exegesis, seems to have naively assumed a *metaphorical* interpretation of the anthropomorphisms in the Qurʾān. This is at least what may be learnt from early Ibāḍī sources like the *Musnad* by Rabīʿ b. Ḥabīb who preserved a direct connection with Ibn ʿAbbās through his pupil Jābir b. Zayd al-Azdī (cf. my remarks in ZDMG 126 (1976): 32 ff. and 127 (1977): 1*). Jābir b. Zayd equally rejected a literal exegesis in such cases (which is, of course, the reason why he preserved these reports about Ibn ʿAbbās, whereas they were suppressed in the later "orthodox" tradition). This attitude was thus not a *bidʿa* of the Muʿtazilīs, but probably rather the normal position of Qurʾānic scholars in early Islam. If Muqātil reacted against this it would be easy to understand why his opponents called him an "anthropomorphist." In any case, his *tashbīh* has nothing to do with the ideas of the Iraqi Shīʿīs mentioned above. The attribute "Zaydī" which is sometimes applied to him (cf. the title of al-Sawwaf's thesis), does not point in this direction; what it means in connection with him remains unclear anyway.

43 See above, n. 35.

44 Ed. Kawtharī, p. 49, 1 f.

45 He was also a *mufassir* (cf. GAS 1: 36).

46 Cf. Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, 2: 1918, 13 ff.

47 Cf. p. 52, 2.

48 Cf. Wensinck, *Muslim Creed*, 104, paragraph 10.

of *ḥadīth* preserved,[49] had discussions with the Jahmīs in Nīshāpūr and tried to convert them to Murji'ī views.[50] His *Kitāb al-sunan*[51] contains a fair amount of traditions which were later on used as key arguments against the Jahmiyya and which may have already been collected by him for this purpose.[52] During the same period Jahm's ideas found their way into Iraq where they influenced the first Mu'tazilī theologian to develop a comprehensive coherent system of his own: Ḍirār b. 'Amr.[53] Thus some of his concepts were taken over into a Mu'tazilī context – at least for one generation until Abū l-Hudhayl and Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir dissociated themselves from Ḍirār and excluded his "Jahmisms" from the official Mu'tazilī doctrine.[54] The "heresies" were thus set free again to be taken over, now in their Ḍirārian framework, by a non-Mu'tazilī theologian (and jurist) who played an important role during the *miḥna* under the Caliph al-Ma'mūn: i.e. by Bishr al-Marīsī. Only after this shift did the term Jahmiyya come into use in Iraq.[55]

This *tour d'horizon* is by no means complete. I have not mentioned dogmatic issues like the preexistence of the Qur'ān and the character of God's speech[56] or politico-religious movements like the Khawārij.[57] I have passed over theolo-

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49 Cf. GAS 1: 92 f.

50 Cf. M.T. Mallick in: *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* 24 (1976): 5 after *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, 6: 107, 16 f.

51 This title may be hidden behind the so-called *mashyakha* preserved in the manuscript Ẓāhiriyya, maj. 107 (fol. 236–255) where the title has been added by a later hand (cf. Mallick, 29).

52 Cf. Tahir Mallick, "A Study of the Manuscript known as *al-Djuz' al-auwal waṭ-ṭānī min mashyakhat Ibrāhīm b. Ṭahmān*, a traditionist of the 2./8. century" (Ph.D. thesis Tübingen 1973). The text was published in RIMA 22 (1976): 241 ff.

53 Cf. my article in: *Der Islam* 43 (1967): 271 f. and 279. The attack against the Jahmiyya in the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar* may point to an earlier usage of the term in Iraq, if the *Kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar* is of Iraqi origin.

54 *Ibid.*, 273 f. They were also the first to talk about an "influence" (cf. Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir in: Khayyāṭ, *Kitāb al-intiṣār*, ed. A. Nader, p. 98, 8). Ḍirār himself rather intended to develop a theological concept of his own in contrast to Jahm, especially with regard to his determinism.

55 Cf. *Der Islam* 44 (1968): 30 ff. This geographical transfer may explain, to a certain extent, the mystery of the "Jahmiyya" (cf. Watt, *The Formative Period*, pp. 143 ff.).

56 Cf. for a detailed and well-balanced analysis, W. Madelung in: *Orientalia Hispanica. Studia F.M. Pareja octogenario dicata* (Leiden: 1974), 1: 504 ff. For the later development cf. Jan Peters, *God's Created Speech* (Leiden: 1976).

57 The best information about them is given in several articles by Watt; cf. his *Formative Period*, pp. 9 ff. and the literature mentioned in the notes.

gians like Jaʿd b. Dirham[58] and ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd, and I have only touched on the numerous attempts at installing new prophets, attempts which are so typical of the Umayyad period, not only inside the Shīʿa. We need only remember the enigmatic personality of Ḥārith b. Saʿīd who claimed the gift of prophecy in Syria and Jerusalem during the time of ʿAbd al-Malik.[59] Instead, I would like to add a few final and very tentative remarks about a problem which brings us back to *kalām* as a technique and as a "profession," i.e. about the social position of the *mutakallimūn*.

It is well known that Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ sent missionaries (*duʿāt*) to different regions of the Muslim *oikumene*. They distinguished themselves through an ascetic life style and special apparel: they performed nightly supererogatory prayer and clipped their moustaches; they wore a special kind of turban, and some of them may have dressed in wool garments (*ṣūf*).[60] Moreover they
121 excelled in the art of disputation; one of them, Ḥafṣ b. Sālim who had been | sent to Khurāsān, is said to have debated with Jahm b. Ṣafwān in Tirmidh.[61] This last fact leaves no doubt that the missionaries had to function as *mutakallimūn*.

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58 Cf. the remarks by Madelung in: *Orientalia Hispanica*, pp. 505 f.

59 For Ḥarīth b. Saʿīd, cf. D.M. Dunlop in: *Studies in Islam* (New Delhi: 1964), 1: 12 ff. and my *Anfänge*, pp. 228 ff. A lot of valuable information on pseudo-prophets in early Islam is found in the fifth chapter of Abū l-Maʿālī's *Bayān al-adyān* (which was long considered to be lost and is only found in the most recent edition of the work by Hāshim Rāżī (Tehran: 1342 sh./1963), pp. 49 ff.). On Shīʿī pretenders, cf. the Ph.D. thesis by W.F. Tucker mentioned above, note 26. Even among the Ibāḍīs a certain Yazīd b. Unaysa expected a new prophet who was supposed to be a non-Arab abrogating the law brought by Muḥammad (cf. Watt, *Formative Period*, p. 34). The most interesting figure outside Islam during this period was the Jewish pretender Abū ʿĪsā (= ʿObadyā) al-Iṣfahānī who recognized Muḥammad as a Prophet before him and who presented himself, in correspondence with the ideal developed for Muḥammad, as an *ummī* who performs miracles (cf. the report in Qirqisānī, *Kitāb al-anwār*, ed. L. Nemoy (New York: 1939–1943), pp. 283 ff.; also Friedländer in: JQR, NS 2 (1911–1912): 240 ff. and *Encyclopedia Judaica*[2], 2: 183 f. s.n.). All this shows, of course, that the expression "seal of the Prophets" (*khātam al-nabiyyīn*) applied to Muḥammad in the Qurʾān was not understood by everybody in the sense of his being the last prophet, as was the case in later times. But this is a problem which needs further investigation.

60 Cf. the poem by Ṣafwān al-Anṣārī translated by W.M. Watt/P. Cachia in: *Islamwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen Fritz Meier zum 60. Geburtstag* (Wiesbaden: 1974), pp. 310 f.; for *ṣūf*, cf. above no. 23 (in connection with Bashīr al-Raḥḥāl who did not belong to Wāṣil's *duʿāt*, but was only one generation – or even less – younger than he).

61 Cf. Ṣafwān, pp. 310 f.; also Kaʿbī, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn*, p. 67, 4 and Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl*, p. 237, 5 ff. and p. 241, 1 ff. (both texts edited together by Fuʾād Sayyid, Tunis: 1974).

In the same way, however, as *kalām* turned out not to have been invented by the Muʿtazilīs, so also did the idea of proselytizing not originate with them. We should mention here the Ibāḍīs who had moulded the intellectual atmosphere at Baṣra where the Muʿtazila were to emerge. They had applied the same tactics before Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ; they called their missionaries *ḥamalat al-ʿilm*.[62] Hishām b. ʿAbdallāh al-Dastuwāʾī (died 153/770 or 154/771), a famous *muḥaddith*[63] of Ibāḍī leanings,[64] offered every bedouin who accepted his teachings a garment from those fabricated by the Ibāḍī community in his native town of Dastuwā in Ahwāz.[65]

There may have been differences in the organizational set-up: Wāṣil's enterprise looks like the idea of one man, whereas the Ibāḍī missionaries followed the instructions of the *jamāʿat al-muslimīn*, the "presbyterian" council of the sect which, in true Khārijī tradition, identified its circle with the community of the only "true" Muslims.[66] But there are many similarities, too. Hishām al-Dastuwāʾī's disciples attracted attention through their supererogatory fasting and their piety[67] as the early Muʿtazilīs did through their nightly prayer. Most Ibāḍī missionaries were merchants who, in connection with the far-flung trade relations of the Baṣran Ibāḍī community, may have combined the pious with the useful. And, strangely enough, Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ was a spinner (*ghazzāl*), i.e. a cloth merchant, like those Ibāḍīs who furnished Hishām al-Dastuwāʾī with the garments which served as bait (or as token of identification?) in his mission. Reports which try to interpret Wāṣil's *laqab* in a less direct way look like attempts at removing from him the blemish of a contemptible profession.[68] His disciple ʿUthmān b. Khālid al-Ṭawīl, a *mawlā* of the Banū Sulaym whom he sent to Armenia as his emissary, was a rich draper who had apparently belonged to the circle of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. Following Wāṣil's advice, he introduced himself in Armenia by delivering *fatwās* according to Ḥasan's principles and met with

62 Cf. Lewicki in EI², 3, 650b.

63 Cf. my *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie*, p. 63.

64 This in spite of the fact that he was a Qadarī (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 63 and 217).

65 Cf. Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wal-tabyīn*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (Cairo: 1380/1960), 1: 33, 2 ff.

66 Cf. Lewicki in EI², 3, 648b and in: *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale* 13 (1971): 74 f.

67 Cf. Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 1: 33, 6, in an anonymous poem.

68 Cf. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *Awāʾil*, 2: 137, 9 ff.; Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 1: 33, 9 f.; Mubarrad, *Kāmil*, ed. Zakī Mubārak (Cairo: 1356/1937), p. 921, ult. ff.; Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, ed. Reżā Tajaddud (Teheran: 1393/1973), p. 202, -7 f. etc. That weaving belonged to the low professions is a well-known, although not easily explicable, fact (cf. R. Brunschvig in: *Studia Islamica* 16 (1962): 51 ff., now reprinted in: *Études d'Islamologie* (Paris: 1976) 1: 154 ff.).

great success afterwards.[69] It seems that the merchants were the first to give up, for obvious reasons, the exclusiveness of the town-dwellers; here it did not make much difference that the Ibāḍīs were, by descent, genuine Arabs, mostly from the Azd, whereas all the early Muʿtazilīs belonged to the *mawālī*.[70]

122 Both movements also resembled each other in the | success they had. In the Maghrib they entered into a competition which lasted for centuries.[71] The Ibāḍīs of al-ʿAṭf in the Mzāb still preserve the cemetery of the Muʿtazilite community whom they gradually superseded from the sixth century of the Hijra onward.[72] The propaganda was aimed at Muslims and non-Muslims alike. There were, of course, lots of unbelievers to be converted, but the missionaries sent by Wāṣil in Medina[73] probably functioned in the context of "inner mission," like Ḥafṣ b. Sālim in his dispute with Jahm b. Ṣafwān.[74] The Umayyad caliphate was generally not interested in the conversion of its non-Muslim subjects and did not set any specific religious ideals for the Muslims either. Consequently, groups which recognized the caliphate only as an inevitable evil like the Ibāḍīs, or a movement like the Muʿtazila, which sprang up at a time when the spiritual weakness of the caliphate had become evident, felt the need and the right to fill the gap.

There is a second point where the Ibāḍiyya tells us something about the relevance of *kalām*. When ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustam, who was Imām of Tāhert between 168/784 and 208/823, fought against the Zenāta berbers who were Muʿtazilīs and dominated the environs of his town, he felt he had to arrange a *kalām* discussion before the battle.[75] *Kalām* was thus not only an intellectual pursuit of ivory tower theologians; its polemical character made it suitable for psychological warfare. Something of the battles in rhetoric of the *ayyām al-ʿArab* seems to have survived here. But since one was fighting for Islam now – or for the better interpretation of Islam – the poets had been

69 Cf. Kaʿbī, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn*, p. 67, 6 ff.; Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl*, p. 237, 11 ff.; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*, p. 32, 9 ff. (Wilzer).

70 The middle class origin of the early Muʿtazilīs has been stressed in an interesting article – though hard to obtain – by Muḥammad ʿImāra in: *al-Shūrā* 2, no. 4 (1975): 74 ff.

71 For the history of the Muʿtazilī mission in the Maghrib, cf. the remarks in ZDMG 126 (1976): 51 n. 48 [= p. 790 f. n. 49 above].

72 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 58, n. 59.

73 Cf. Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl*, p. 251, 11.

74 The same is true, at least to a certain extent, for ʿUthmān al-Ṭawīl. In a non-Muslim environment he would not have needed to introduce himself by delivering *fatwā*s (see above, p. 899).

75 Cf. ZDMG 126 (1976): 50.

replaced by *mutakallimūn*. There is more material to back up this theory. Ḥārith b. Surayj who employed Jahm b. Ṣafwān tried, during his battles, to convert his enemies by means of moral and religious arguments.[76] Secret agents of the ʿAbbāsid revolution arranged *kalām* disputations in order to win adherents for their cause.[77] The ideal situation was, of course, when the general himself was experienced in *kalām*. Again the Ibāḍīs offer an example: ʿĀṣim al-Sidrātī who came to Baṣra in order to study with Abū ʿUbayda al-Tamīmī, the head of the Ibāḍī scholars in the beginning of the second century A.H., and then returned to the Maghrib where he appears as a general and a preacher of his community in Tripolitania.[78]

Does this mean that the *mutakallimūn* were a kind of militant clergy or, as has been said recently, "a fundamental political and social institution of Islam"?[79] Certainly only in a limited sense. We | should not overlook the fact 123
that all our present examples from the early period deal with anti-Umayyad movements. It is true that ʿAbd al-Malik for some time supported *kalām* and seems to have used Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya to further his religious peace policy. Thus assuming responsibility for the religious unity of his empire, he may have had in mind, apart from mere political considerations, the example of the Byzantine emperors.[80] And it is true that ʿUmar II invited representatives of different religious movements for discussion in order to win them for the ideal of one *jamāʿa* under one Sunna.[81] We might add that Jaʿd b. Dirham had been the teacher of Marwān II. But the same Jaʿd b. Dirham was executed at the order of Hishām; *kalām* had turned out to be an ambiguous instrument. The theological institution created by the Umayyads were not the *mutakallimūn* but the *quṣṣāṣ*. Their position had been fixed by Muʿāwiya,

76 Cf EI², 3, 224b.

77 Cf. my *Anfänge*, p. 20.

78 Cf. Lewicki in: *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale* 13 (1971): 88. For some time I thought that we possess an early eastern parallel for this, too: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ mentions in his *Risāla fī l-ṣaḥāba* "many *mutakallimūn*" among the commanders of Manṣūr's army (cf. ZDMG 126 (1976): 51f. and *Anfänge*, p. 20, n. 1). But in the meantime I convinced myself, through C. Pellat's translation of the text (*Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, mort vers 140/757, "Conseilleur" du Calife* (Paris: 1976), p. 24, paragraph 12), that this passage does not suit my purpose. The *mutakallimūn* among Manṣūr's generals are obviously simply those who "make statements" by giving orders. Also my translation of *al-mubāyana li-ahl al-hawā* found in the same context was wrong (compare ZDMG 126 (1976): 52 with Pellat, p. 32ff., paragraph 25).

79 Cf. S. Pines in: *Israel Oriental Studies*, 1, 1971, 228.

80 Cf. *Anfänge* pp. 6ff.; "Beginnings," p. 101.

81 Cf. *Anfänge*, pp. 124f.

and under ʿAbd al-Malik they had been officially established in the mosques.[82] Their functions were sometimes the same as those described above in connection with the *mutakallimūn*: they had to speak encouraging words and to pray for victory before the battle.[83] This entanglement with government interests, together with a certain theatrical behavior almost inevitable in this profession, exposed them to the reproach of hypocrisy. It also explains why they came quite soon under the attack of the religious opposition and why they obviously did not survive, as an institution, the downfall of the dynasty, at least not in Iraq or in Syria.[84] The *mutakallimūn* are found, so it seems, rather among the intellectual cadres of the opposition movements. As such they were taken over by the ʿAbbāsids and afterwards achieved a high reputation as court theologians.[85] As members of the new establishment they, in turn, attracted the criticism of the religious idealists. But this carries us beyond the scope of the period we are concerned with here.

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82 Cf. N. Abbott, *Arabic Papyri*, 2 (Chicago: 1967), pp. 14 f.; also C. Pellat in EI², 4, 734a, s.v. "Ḳāṣṣ."

83 Cf. J. Pedersen in: *Goldziher Memorial Volume*, 1 (Budapest: 1948), p. 232, with examples from the battle at the Yarmūk and of the Khawārij.

84 In Egypt they seem to have persisted even as an institution far beyond the Umayyad period (cf. Pedersen, p. 233 f. after Maqrīzī).

85 I know that this formulation is too undifferentiated. Muʿtazilīs seem to have become court theologians in a larger number only under the Barmakids and from the caliphate of al-Maʾmūn onward; Hārūn al-Rashīd still persecuted them. In Baṣra the theologians were connected rather with the local bourgeoisie and with independent intellectuals like physicians (for instance cf. the story of the physician Maʿmar b. al-Ashʿath who had among his *ghulāms* at least four *mutakallimūn*: the Muʿtazilīs Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm and Muʿammar, the predestinarian Ḥafṣ al-Fard and the Murjiʾī Abū Shamir; in Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 113, 17 ff.). The question needs further investigation.