

CHAPTER TEN

A COLLECTIVE PROFILE (I): ETHNIC IDENTITY

In his *bā'yyah* poem, Naṣr ibn Sayyār established the inseparability, in his tribal world, between the Criteria of Identity and the Criteria of Visibility and Recognition.¹ The correlation between these two sets of Criteria is understandable, since obscurity cannot be envisaged as an indicator of belonging to the militarily-administered and tribally-structured finite and localized society of the Arabs in Khurāsān, and their relatively visible Iranian affiliates, the *mawālī*. Thus, broadly speaking, a very obscure character is much more likely to have been neither an Arab nor a *mawālī*. Naṣr contended that the majority of the Revolutionaries were incognitos, and, therefore, neither Arabs nor *mawālī*. The question now is, to what extent do our figures vindicate Naṣr's contention, at least as strictly applicable and limited to our statistical base? Before we deal with this question, however, some comments must be made regarding the validity of the specific criteria, and of the derivation of the conclusions sought from them.

It must first be stated that the data are not all strictly raw factual data garnered from the sources. In the instances where a scheme or a system of gauging the raw data is improvised, our interference is obvious and declared. This said, however, it must be stressed that the data thus gauged is itself purely raw. The improvised schemes are expounded, and even-handedness is eagerly targeted. What might look like an anomaly is the fact that the 'grades' given as results of these systems are entered as measurable raw data, side by side with the unprocessed ones. The possible drawbacks from this juxtaposition are automatically precluded by the fact that these gauging systems are singled out for special justifications by the author, and for scrutiny by the potential critic.

¹ Criteria of Identity compromise: Ethnicity (codified, in Agha, 'Agents,' in field no.14 of the Membership Tabulations, pp. 509-19, and elucidated, p. 551), and Tribal Identity (fields 12 and 13, pp. 509-19, elucidated, p. 550). Criteria of Visibility and Recognition compromise: E.O.H.R. (field 17, pp. 509-19, elucidated, pp. 552-3), and I.O.H.R. (field Kf.55 = Kn.61, pp. 509-19, elucidated, p. 569). The two groups are straddled by: Name (fields 2-10, pp. 509-19, elucidated, pp. 548-9) and N.R. (field 11, pp. 509-19, elucidated, pp. 549-50); however, formally and in the Statistical Tables, N.R. is treated as belonging to the second group, i.e., Criteria of Visibility and Recognition.

The first two such instances are organically related, and are the most important. They bear directly on determining the ethnic origins of the 401 members. It is the most important issue; and the present treatment of this issue could be, potentially, the most precarious aspect of the entire exercise.

The sources reported, in unison or at variance, the ethnic origins of 152 members. They are 63 Arabs and 89 non-Arabs. This leaves 249 members, a Relative Revolutionary Size of 62% of undetermined ethnic stock. In the absence of further specific labeling in the sources, there are three theoretically possible tracks.

The first track is to declare the quantitative approach inadequate, for lack of complete or sufficient data. This would leave the turf exclusively open to rhetorical arguments, and far less dependable inferential work. It will be the gravitational pull of, either Naṣr ibn Sayyār, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Yaḥyā and Wellhausen, or that of the revisionist school, which will dominate the process of opinion-forming vis-à-vis the controversy.

The second possible track is to short-circuit the quantitative probe, accept the attested count of 89 non-Arabs to 63 Arabs, a ratio of 1.4:1, extend the ratio to the rest of the known statistical base, and, from that, work out any possible further implications to the larger issue. This would fall too short of a more realistic ratio. No matter how eagerly a revisionist supporter tries to manipulate the bulk of the raw data, such a ratio is not sustainable.

The third possible track is to probe, within the available raw data, for clues and indicators which, by themselves and in correlations, may provide determinants, or, at least, factors of preponderance, to the probe. But, do such clues exist? Yes, of course. And, they are a lot more indicative, and less prone to clever hypothesizing, than the isolated fragments of evidence, on the twisted interpretation of which the polemic approach seeks to rest its rhetorical arguments.

It is this third track for which this study opts. The process of generating inferential and ‘evaluatory’ data is unavoidable, but it will be kept as close to the raw base of inference as possible. The first ‘mine’ prospected for the desired clues is the one most attendant to a member’s historiographical existence—the member’s name.

I. *What’s in a Name?*

The nomenclature, provided it is mined properly, has a lot to offer. No rush for the first gleam of golden yellow can redeem it; nor should impatient exasperation doom it as a false mine.

The revisionists rushed for the most false of all the ‘veins’ in the mine—the tribal *nishbah* element of the name. Noting that the affiliations Tamīmī, Khuzā‘ī, Azdī, etc. appear as parts of the names of a majority of the *nuqabā’* and *du‘āt*, they hastened to conclude that they were Arabs, and that therefore the predominant ethnic identity of the movement was Arab.² In addition to the fact that the second conclusion does not necessarily follow from the first, the first conclusion itself is based on a wrong premise.

Realizing the revisionists error, Daniel notes the “discrepancies among the sources concerning the proper form of a name and whether an individual was an Arab, a *mawlā* or an Iranian.”³ He reviews some of the elements that usually comprise a name, each in isolation; and, in apparent exasperation, he paints this potentially rich ‘mine’ as infested with discrepancies. His “chief conclusion ... : No one group, racial or otherwise, dominated the *dā‘wa*.”⁴

Iḥsān ‘Abbās hits the right chord: “Saying that ‘someone’ (*fulān*) is a Khuzā‘ite or a Tamīmīte does not necessarily mean that he is an Arab; the sources often neglect, in such cases, to add the term ‘through clientage’ (*bi-al-walā*).”⁵ Actually, the presence of the tribal *nishbah* in an individual’s name is decisive in only one respect. It identifies the individual as having a connection to the tribe; it does not, by itself, specify whether the connection is a blood connection (*ṣalībatan, minhum, min anfusihim*, etc.), or a social, initially military or administrative connection of clientage, (*mulḥaq bihim, mulṣaq, mawlāhum*, etc.). In the terminology used in this book, this *nishbah*, therefore, distinguishes between the Arabs and *mawālī*, on the one hand, and the converts, on the other. Its absence means the individual had no known connection to an Arab tribe. The tribal *nishbah* is a social qualifier; it is not necessarily an ethnic identifier.⁶

² Omar, *‘Abbāsīd Caliphate*, pp. 71-2; Shaban, *‘Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 151-2; Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 193 ff.

³ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 34.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 36, cf. pp. 34-5.

⁵ ‘Abbās, p. 91, n. 1.

⁶ To illustrate the point, consider the interesting episode about the real ethnic origin of the famous *faqīh* Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī. Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān, a cousin of al-Saffāh and al-Manṣūr, ‘asked about Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī, whether he was an Arab or a *mawlā*? They, [the questioned], disagreed on the matter. So he summoned the prefects of the Nakha‘ [tribe]. They brought their *ḍuwān*; in the *ḍuwān*, he, [Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī], was found to be a *mawlā*.’ (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 95). This is not to say that this Ibrāhīm was really a *mawlā*; for, Balādhurī immediately reports another account which asserts that he was an Arab. The point is that, despite his celebrity status and the fact that the *nishbah* (al-Nakha‘ī) was so organically a part of his name that, by itself, it uniquely referred to him in the relevant literature; this was not enough to decisively identify his ethnic origin. Similar cases abound in the sources.

To that extent, many of the discrepancies to which Daniel refers may be dispelled. Except for the single disagreement on the ethnic origin of the *naqīb* Sulaymān ibn Kathīr ... al-Khuzāʿī (no.350),⁷ and probably few other insignificant cases, the others are not really irresolvable.

Some perceived discrepancies may be attributed to the scholars' misunderstanding of the texts. Daniel and Omar⁸ misunderstood Jāḥiẓ. Daniel thought that Jāḥiẓ gave two separate lists of the *nuqabāʾ*, one comprising only Arabs and ascribed to the anti-*shuʿūbīs*, and the other comprising only *mawālī* and ascribed to the *shuʿūbīs*.⁹ An ostensibly slight misunderstanding of the nuance of the language and of Jāḥiẓ's style makes all the difference. What Jāḥiẓ actually did was present one incomplete list of the *nuqabāʾ* read from two ends. The pro-Arab spokesman cites only the seven Arab *naqībs*; the pro-*mawālī* spokesman mentions only three of the five *mawālī naqībs*. That is as far as citing names went. In a flare of enthusiasm, the Khurāsānite, who, in Jāḥiẓ's text, represents the Iranians, i.e., neither the Arabs nor the *mawālī*, claims all twelve *naqībs* and seventy *dāʿīs*.¹⁰

How Omar construed that "according to Jāḥiẓ and Azdī, all the twelve *Naqībs* were Arab," and Arab Yamanites at that, is a puzzlement.¹¹ He compounds this by affirming that "Ibn Ḥabīb maintains that there were only two *Mawālī* among the twelve 'Abbāsīd *Naqībs*."¹² Actually, Ibn Ḥabīb lists thirteen, not twelve, *naqībs*, eleven of whom carry a tribal *nisbah* without further specification, one carries no identification at all, and one is identified as *mawla Khuzāʿah*.¹³ He does not say that any specified number of them were *mawālī*. Azdī¹⁴ lists eleven *naqībs*; he identifies nine of them by the tribal *nisbah* only, one by a tribal *nisbah* and by *walāʾ*, and refrains from identifying the eleventh.

Taking all the above lists, in addition to *Akhbār*'s, Balādhurī's list and his alternatives, Ṭabarī's two lists, and the partial list that may be compiled from Ibn Ḥazm;¹⁵ none of the perceived discrepancies is a contradiction—save for the single case in Balādhurī concerning Sulaymān ibn Kathīr. That is to say, viewed in the light of 'Abbās'

⁷ Balādhurī says: '*mawla Khuzāʿah* ... and it is also said: of their authentic pedigree (*wa yuqāl min anfusiḥim*).' Ibid., p. 115.

⁸ And David Ayalon as quoted by Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 232.

⁹ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 34.

¹⁰ *Manāqib*, pp. 22, 24, 14.

¹¹ Omar, '*Abbāsīd Caliphate*', p. 72.

¹² Ibid., p. 72.

¹³ Ibn Ḥabīb, p.465.

¹⁴ Azdī, p. 26. Omar's reference is to Azdī's *Tārīkh al-Duwal al-Munqaṭiʿah*, a manuscript not available to us.

¹⁵ *Akhbār*, pp. 216-7; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115-6; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1988; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, pp. 214, 236, 242, 319, 404.

pointing out the usual inadvertent omissions by some sources of the *walā'* identifier, there are no discrepancies that bear on the ethnic origins of the *nuqabā'*. A *naqīb* who is explicitly identified as an Arab, by one source, is nowhere identified as a *mawlā* by another. The opposite is also true. The perceived discrepancies emanate from the fact that all five *mawālī* of the twelve *naqībs* are listed in some sources with only the tribal *nisbah*, while other sources make up for the omission.

In all these cases, and in the greatest majority of other members' names—that is, where the information does exist—the sources must be viewed as complementary. A combined approach to the issue will, perhaps astonishingly, result with cumulative, rather than conflicting, information towards the construction of the fullest possible forms of the names of the Organization members.

This is how the members' names are constructed here. In an attempt to preserve, to the extent possible, a genuine feel of the identifying significance of a name as it was probably used during the life time of its bearer, the use of the *nisbah* elements¹⁶ was limited to cases where such elements were listed in the earlier sources. Even though the tribe, occupation and/or the geographical origin or domicile of a certain member may be known, and even if a later source did use one or more of these affiliations as an element of the member's name; this was not enough to include the said element in the name as listed in the Membership Tabulations. It cannot, in such cases, be considered to be a part of his identity, as characterized by his name as it was probably used by his contemporaries, or, at least, by sources closer to his times.¹⁷

On the other hand, a tribal connection is inferred from a tribal *nisbah*, even if the *nisbah* is mentioned only in a late source. This is so because, even together, they are not viewed as ethnic determinants. All what can be construed from such a *nisbah* is the existence of a connection to the tribe. Whether it is a blood relation or a *walā'* (clientage) must be ascertained, where ascertainable, by other criteria.

The available elements of a name are treated as a possible auxiliary key to the identity of its bearer as it may have been perceived by his

¹⁶ In Agha, 'Agents', fields 7, 8 and 9 of the Membership Tabulations, pp. 509-19, and elucidated, p. 548.

¹⁷ For example, Yāqūt (d.622/1225) asserts that Bukayr ibn Māhān (no.15), came from the village of Hurmuzfarrah, and refers to him as al-Hurmuzfarahī (Yāqūt, V: p. 403); so does the earlier Sam'ānī (d.562/1167), V: p. 635. No earlier source used this *nisbah* to refer to Bukayr. This *nisbah*, in Bukayr's case, is therefore, not recognized here. Likewise, a geographical *nisbah* was not automatically used to infer from it the geographical location to which a member may have belonged. In the few cases where such an inference may have been made, other reasons would have prompted the inference.

contemporaries—best judged, in the absence of better leads, by the earlier sources' scheme of reference.

The order in which the elements of the name were listed in the Tabulations does not conform to the conventional order, where the *kunyah* is usually the first element to be inscribed. Although in some cases it was used as a *nom de guerre*, defining the member's identity within the Revolutionary circles, and at the same time obscuring it or actually reflecting its genuine obscurity to the outside world, or probably because of that; the *kunyah* cannot be considered as uniformly being an intimate part of the name, identifying its bearer within the context of the wider social setting. In a number of cases, the *kunyah* was the only or the most significant of the few known elements of the name. In some other cases, most prominently Abū 'Ikrimah's (no.61), the same person carried two *kunyahs* to blur his identity before the authorities. It was, therefore, relegated in this exercise to the last position.

The logic behind the employed sequence is that the elements closer to the personal identity came first, followed by elements which define the other dimensions of social identity, then the *kunyah* (not infrequently used by its bearers as an instrument of disguise).

In many cases, essential elements of the name are missing; computer sorting gave precedence to an empty space over letters of the alphabet; hence, these incomplete names cluster at the beginning.¹⁸ Thus, each of the resulting names (in the Membership Tabulations, in Agha, "Agents", and in the Prosopographical Appendix) is, by and large, constructed block by block from the fullest information available—within the prescribed historiographical parameter of this quantitative study. It is this totality of the name, not any one isolated element of it, that may be reasonably tapped for indications of ethnic identity.

The number of possible constellations that may emerge from the chaotic presence of some of the nine elements of a name and the absence of others is staggering. A scheme to streamline them into manageable categories had to be improvised, thus the Criteria of Name Recognition.

¹⁸ Therefore, the entire alphabetical system is rendered mechanically useless. To spot the entry on a member (whether in the appended Prosopographical listings, or in the Membership Tabulations in Agha, 'Agents'), the searching reader will have to resort to the general index. Alternatively, he would be looking for that entry under its serial number.

II. *Name Recognition*

These Criteria possess has also the potential to gauge the degrees of contemporaneous *cum* historiographical social recognizability or obscurity. But it is the direct ethnic dimension that is primarily behind devising the scheme. This is the first instance of interference by the author, and this interference is restricted to two aspects. The first is the grouping of the possible constellations into eight logical and coherent categories. The second is determining the values attached to this classification.

Because of the primarily tribal structure of the Arab society, especially in Khurāsān, and because of the special significance of the ethnic dimension in the controversial demographic composition of the Organization; the highest merits in grading these names are given to the ancestral lineage and the tribal affiliation elements of the name. The highest grade, grade 1, goes to the most complete and recognizable names, the lowest, grade 8, to the most incomplete and obscure names.¹⁹ Obviously, a full Arab lineage gives us no choice but to determine the Arab stock of the bearer. The presence of a tribal affiliation is, by itself, indecisive, since the bearer could be a *mawlā*. Its absence from the lists, while not an absolute proof that the bearer of the name is a non-Arab, is, nevertheless a predominating factor.

It comes as no surprise how poorly the Organization, as a collective, scores on the higher grades, and how richly it does on the lower. Consecutively, on the grades from 1 to 8, the Relative Criterial Sizes are:

For the Kūfah Chapter	8.2%, 1.64%, 3.28%, 18.03%, 16.39%, 0%, 18.03%, 34.43%
For the Khurāsān Chapter	16.18%, 1.76%, 3.24%, 20.59%, 9.71%, 0.29%, 27.65%, 20.59%
For the Organization	14.96%, 1.75%, 3.24%, 20.20%, 10.72%, 0.25%, 26.18%, 22.70%

If the imaginary curve resulting from these figures is too illogical and erratic, it is because the classification into 8 grades is rather too hair-splittingly theoretical. For example, grades 2, 3 and 6 apply only to a handful of members. The hair-splitting is rather an extra precautionary

¹⁹ The scheme is fully elucidated in the exposition of field 11, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 549-50.

measure to safeguard, to the extent possible, an impartial weighing of indications of ethnicity.

When it comes to using the scheme as a Criterion of Visibility and Recognition, broader lines are drawn, and a more logical grouping of the above eight grades is employed, creating three broad categories of: high (grades 1 and 2 combined), medium (grades 3 and 4 combined), and low (grades 5 through 8) Name Recognition Criteria. According to this balanced scheme, the scores become as follows:

For the Kūfah Chapter	9.84%, 21.31%, 68.85%
For the Khurāsān Chapter	17.94%, 23.82%, 58.24%
For the Organization	16.71%, 23.44%, 59.85%

The imaginary curve resulting from these figures is in perfect unison with the other curves which result from the two other Criteria of Visibility and Recognition. All of these curves escalate from low levels of high recognizability to high levels of obscurity, as shall be demonstrated. The differential between the two Chapters of the Organization is also in unison with the higher Relative Criterial Size of the non-Arab Group in the Kūfah Chapter.²⁰

III. *The Ethnic Composition of the Organization*²¹

From the combined individual profiles, and through clear indications and direct statements in the sources; the ethnic origins of 152 out of the 401 members are attested: 63, i.e., 15.71%, are found to have been ethnic Arabs;²² and 89, i.e., 22.19%, non-Arabs.²³

Had it not been for the fact that the ethnic identity of the Revolution, and the Organization, was the major point of contention; it would have been within the limits of an acceptable margin of error to assert, without further ado, that the remaining 249 members were all non-Arabs. This

²⁰ For statistical details of how the Name Recognition Criteria apply to the various demographic groups, ethnic and tribal, see Agha, 'Agents,' for Kūfah, tables I.B.1-I.B.3, pp. 593-8; for Khurāsān, tables II.B.1-II.B.3, pp. 678-83; for the Organization, tables III.B.1-III.B.3, pp. 778-83.

²¹ Codified in Agha, 'Agents,' in field 14, pp. 509-19, and elucidated, p. 551. For the following statistics on this issue, see *ibid.*, for the Kūfah Chapter, tables I.A.1-A.10, pp. 573-92; for the Khurāsān Chapter, tables II.A.1-A.10, pp. 658-77; for the Organization, tables III.A.1-A.10, pp. 758-77.

²² 5 in Kūfah, 8.2% of the Chapter's strength; and 58 in Khurāsān, 17.06% of the Chapter's strength.

²³ 23 in Kūfah, 37.7% of the Chapter's strength; and 66 in Khurāsān, 19.41% of the Chapter's strength.

would have been too contentious; and, therefore, a case-by-case appraisal of the 249 members who fall below this line of attested ethnicity was undertaken.

To maintain objectivity, the appraisal process went through four distinct conceptual and concrete steps. First, I determined who of these members should be deemed Arab, and who should be considered non-Arab. Of course, not all cases can be positively weighed. Second, cases which cannot be positively determined were formally posted as undetermined. Third, the assumption here is that Arabs, who are historiographically reported as taking part in political activities, could have rarely been tribal incognitos—because, even today, a tribal society does have its humble classes, but it houses no incognitos. All those members of undetermined ethnicity must, therefore, have been non-Arabs. Fourth, for the purposes of the remainder of this study, the outcome of the appraisal process was combined with the attested cases. We shall be looking at statistics of Arabs and non-Arabs, without further reference to the distinctions between the methods of determination. For the benefit of the potential critic, these distinctions are, however, maintained in the Membership Tabulations, and analyzed and computed in the Statistical Tables.²⁴

In considering the individual cases, general guidelines had to be drawn up, but without losing sight of the specifics. Some guidelines are procedurally exclusionary; that is, they automatically put the case outside consideration for a judgment in favor of determining either an Arab or a non-Arab ethnic origin. Others are inclusionary, in the sense that they spot indications which help formulate a judgment in favor of asserting either one.

The first of these guidelines is to look for a tribal connection. While its presence does not necessarily betoken Arab stock, its absence disqualifies the case from consideration for inclusion in the Ethnic Arab Group. It may be argued that the absence of such a reference, in the limited historiographical base of this survey, does not mean it is not mentioned elsewhere. Theoretically, this is true; but, while the chances for such further findings are slim on the individual level; their overall statistical impact on the collective level would be negligible.

Once the fact of the absence of a tribal connection is accepted as a historiographical starting point, it is very difficult to dispute its

²⁴ As codified in field 14 (Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 509-19), and elucidated (p. 551): '1' and '3' stand for attested Arabs and non-Arabs consecutively, '2' and '4' stand for those determined to have been thus, and '*' stands for those undetermined. tables A.1-A.8, of each of the series I (Kūfah, *ibid.*, pp. 573-88), II (Khurāsān, *ibid.*, pp. 658-73), and III (Organization, *ibid.*, pp. 758-73), compute the distinct as well as the combined results.

significance as an indicator. It simply means that nobody knew the fellow. Even excluding the genealogical literature, historical records—at least until the end of the Umayyad period—is laden with the specific Arab tribal nomenclature; so much so that even the names of the *mawālī* were predominantly listed complete with the identification tags of their adoptive Arab tribes. It is not easily conceivable that an Arab individual be mentioned, especially if repeatedly, but also in isolation, without his tribal identification capping his name, or somehow otherwise established, unless he is too well-known for that.

Another exclusionary guideline is the presence of a full lineage connecting the individual to tribal ancestors. Such cases cannot be considered non-Arab, despite the not unusual genealogical fabrications. Three specific pseudo-cases were, however, treated differently: Quraysh ibn Shaqīq al-Sulamī (no.318), ‘Uthmān ibn Nahīk ibn Wahb al-‘Akkī (no.370), and the celebrated general Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-‘Akkī (no.287). All three were mentioned as Arabs only by Ibn al-Kalbī, each being deficiently traced to a specific sub-tribe of their respective tribes. The problem is that the chain of lineage is broken, in the first case immediately after the father, and in the second and third cases immediately after the grandfather.²⁵ Not that, if the lineages had been complete, they would have necessarily presented authentic cases; but they would have had to be at least acceptable under the declared guidelines of the present appraisal. Especially with Ibn al-Kalbī being the only source claiming genealogical connections for these cases, but not going the extra step of making up for the missing links of the chains; these cases become even more suspicious. But this is not all. Mazyad ibn Shaqīq al-Sulamī (no.259), Quraysh’s brother, and supposedly a Muḍarite, was the harshest against Muḍar in Abū Muslim’s arbitration between them and the Yaman. It is his specific language, (referring to Muḍar in the third person, and to the group to which he belonged in the first person), that makes it untenable to genealogically connect him to Muḍar.²⁶ He must have been a *mawlā* of the tribe whose name he carried, the Muḍarite Banū Sulaym; and, what applies to him must apply to his full, or at least paternal, brother. ‘Uthmān ibn Nahīk, when ordered to murder Yazīd ibn ‘Umar ibn Hubayrah, asked to be relieved of the task, and for a good reason. He said: “let an Arab kill him.”²⁷

²⁵ Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ḥamharah*. (Caskel), I: p. 123, II: p. 471; I: p. 219, II: p. 579, I: p. 219, II: p. 431.

²⁶ He said: ‘Muḍar are the murderers of the Prophet’s family ... our bloods are on their necks (on their hands—*dimā’unā fi a’nāqihim*), and our possessions are in their hands,’ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1986.

²⁷ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 153.

Obviously, he was not one. Nor were his two brothers, ʿĪsā (no.212), and ʿUmar (no.365). The case of Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm al-ʿAkkī is not as straightforward. There are no additional signs which positively preclude his having been an Arab. But there are no signs that indicate he was. Attributing Arabic poetry to him,²⁸ and to others about him,²⁹ cannot be taken for such signs.³⁰ In fact, the entire episode of these ʿAkkīs (Muqātil and the three Nahīk brothers) provokes suspicion. Al-Manṣūr would later arrange a marriage of six sons of two of them to the six daughters of a third.³¹ The fact that Ibn al-Kalbī is the only source to provide these *Abnāʾ* with their short circuited Arab lineages only strengthens the suspicion of an organized operation of genealogical fabrication.

A contextual situation providing a sign of a paternal link to a known Arab relation,³² something in the individual's pre-Revolutionary background indicating tribal prominence or recognizability,³³ and, in one case, a very unusual Arabic father's name,³⁴ prompted the inclusion of the individual in the Group considered most likely to have been of Arab stock.

In addition to contextual situations which may point to a more likely non-Arab stock,³⁵ the name combination is the major guide. While Iranian and Turkic elements in the combination should point to a non-Arab origin, they are not the only elements which are relied upon. The mere fact that a name comprises Arabic elements, even if up to the grandfather, is not a predominating token of Arab descent.³⁶

Moreover, to acquire a two or even three-generation Arabic name, complete with a *kunyah*, and perhaps also a tribal *nishbah*, a non-Arab did not have to be the descendant of converts. Even recent converts could change their names and the names of their fathers, or have them changed by their patrons. We need not go beyond ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muslim Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī, who may also be called al-Murādī.³⁷

²⁸ *Akḥbār*, pp. 314, 347-8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

³⁰ The well-known poets Ziyād al-Aʿjam and Abū al-ʿAṭāʾ al-Sindī could not even pronounce the language properly.

³¹ Tabarī, III: p. 420.

³² For example, nos.310, 230, 303, 99.

³³ For example, nos 319, 322.

³⁴ Bishr ibn al-Furāfiṣah al-ʿAbdī, (no.14).

³⁵ See e.g. above cases of the ʿAkkīs and the Sulamīs.

³⁶ Consider some high-profile, confirmed non-Arab *mawālī*, such as the *naqīb* Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq ibn Asʿad al-Khuzāʾī (no.351); his brother Muṣʿab, ancestor of the Ṭāhirids (no.298); Khālīd ibn Kathīr ibn Abī al-ʿAwraʾ al-Tamīmī Abū al-Mughīrah (no.238); one of the purported killers of Qaṭṭabah, Aḥlam ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām (no.119); his brother Bassām ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām (no.144).

³⁷ At least according to one account, see *Akḥbār*, p. 265.

A grandson, his father, and perhaps grandfather, could also convert together and have their names changed in one package. Abū Muslim's campaign of converting cum recruiting of the Iranian masses must have facilitated the process.

These, however, are not by themselves decisive factors. A comprehensive approach requires the appraisal of the full combination. Therefore, the Name Recognition scheme is the yardstick. However, because it is also necessary not to lose sight of the specifics, the scheme could not be applied indiscriminately across the board. But, by and large, it remains valid.

Utterly obscure names, mostly with only one or two elements, were all deemed to be non-Arab. Of this category, only seven names carried a tribal *nisbah* in addition to only one other name element. They all belong to the lowest Name Recognition grade 8. As it were, all 91 names assigned to this grade are determined to have been non-Arab. Twenty-seven of them are attested non-Arabs, and the balance, 64, are deemed to have been so. These are the likes of Abū Sharāḥīl, Ibrāhīm Abū Zayd, Abū Turāb, Mas'adah al-Ṭā'ī, Muslim al-Arghadī, Šubayḥ al-Aqṭa' Abū Hāshim, etc.³⁸

Beginning with Name Recognition grade 7, the second lowest, and working our way up, the appraisal gets less certain and more difficult to maintain an objective handle on. Although names assigned to this grade look more wholesome than those in the previous one, comprising only a personal name and a father's name, they are almost as obscure. Despite this fact, in most cases, only positive signs are taken to facilitate any positive determination. From the 105 names assigned to this Group, 1 is accepted as an attested Arab,³⁹ and 1 is determined to have been so;⁴⁰ twelve are attested non-Arabs and twenty one are determined to have been non-Arabs by virtue of certain clues.⁴¹ And, for lack of positive

³⁸ Nos.82, 84, 202, 302, 343.

³⁹ 'Amr ibn Ḥassān (no.128). Actually this figure is mentioned only once (*Akhbār*, p. 222), as one of the *Du'āt*. Ṭabarī mentions a certain 'Amr ibn Ḥassān al-Ṭā'ī who participated in the Qaṣr al-Bāhilī battle, in 102/720-721, (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1422). Ibn al-Kalbī mentions the same name in a genealogical line parallel to that of Qaḥṭabah's (*Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 175). We opted to consider the name as belonging to the same Arab individual.

⁴⁰ Mas'ūd ibn 'Ilāj (no.258). Ṭabarī identifies him as '*raḡul min Bakr ibn Wā'il*,' the tone sounds like it means: an Arab of this tribe, but of no further consequence, (Ṭabarī, III: p. 15).

⁴¹ Some such clues are: the father's name being only the patronymic derived from the subject's name, e.g. 'Ayyāsh ibn Abī 'Ayyāsh (no.13); Kinship to a known non-Arab, e.g., al-Ḥasan ibn Ḥamzah (no.22), Bukayr's nephew, his sister's son. Of course, it may be assumed that Bukayr's sister may have been married to an Arab called Ḥamzah. But then, Ḥamzah who? An obscure name, with such a clue, could have hardly belonged to an Arab. Another clue is where the father's name is clearly non-Arab, e.g., al-Ḥasan ibn

clues, the 70 remaining obscure names in this grade are relegated to the formal category of the undetermined.

In grade 6, where the first name is missing, there is only one name, Ibn Zurayq ibn Shawdhab al-Shaybānī (no.89). His ethnicity could not be determined.

What distinguishes the names in the highest grade of the low Name Recognition Group, i.e., grade 5, from the obscure ones in grade 7, is the existence of additional, but genealogically insignificant elements. That is, a grandfather's name and a tribal connection would be still jointly missing. The additional elements may, therefore, be any combination of: *laqab* (nickname), *Kunyah* (allusive name), geographical, and or occupational *nisbah*. In such a genealogically shallow combination, when there is a major defining element, and it happens to be geographical or occupational or similarly incidental, the overriding connotation, especially in the context of a tribal society, is that the specific individual's distinguishing identification, which best betokens his contemporaneous recognizability, was just that—incidental. These are determined to have been non-Arab.⁴² Of the 43 names in this grade, 13 are attested non-Arabs, 17 are determined to have been non-Arabs, and 13 are relegated to the undetermined.

The lowest of the two medium grades, i.e., grade 4, is the first on the lower end of the scheme to show a tribal connection.⁴³ With a personal name, a patronymic and this *nisbah*, the names look rather complete. In modern, or even in late 'Abbāsīd Arabic nomenclature, this combination is sufficient. For it to indicate Arab ethnicity in the context of Umayyad nomenclature, other elements, or some supporting clues, must be present. Of the 81 names in this grade, 5 are attested Arabs, 14 non-Arabs; 5 are determined to have been Arabs, 2 non-Arabs;⁴⁴ and 55 are undetermined.

The highest of the two medium grades, i.e., grade 3, is the first on the lower end of the scheme to show an ancestral name beyond the father's, but only up to the immediate grandfather. A tribal *nisbah* is not used by

Mākhanbadh (no.177), Asad ibn al-Marzubān (no.131) Ziyād ibn Farrūkh. Certain clues derived from the individuals' backgrounds, and, combined with the obscurity of the name, would strongly point to a non-Arab origin. Such are the cases of Abū Muslim's companions in the professional quarter of *al-Qaṣṣārīn* (fullers or bleachers) in Kūfah, Mūsā ibn Yazīd and 'Uthmān ibn 'Isā (nos.41, 48).

⁴² For example, Yaqūn ibn Mūsā al-Abzārī (no.51); 'Isā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Sarrāj (no.29); Muḥriz ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jubānī (no.280), 'Abd al-Ghaffār ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Ṭālaqānī (no.103).

⁴³ Except for the 7 names in grade 8, where the tribal *nisbah* was only one of two elements in extremely obscure combinations.

⁴⁴ The Sulamī brothers (nos.259, 318) discussed above.

any of the earlier sources as an element in these names, but a tribal connection may be otherwise established. The 13 names comprising this grade are distributed as follows: 1 attested Arab, 8 attested non-Arabs, 2 determined to have been Arabs, 1 determined to have been non-Arab, and 1 undetermined.

Grade 2 is superior to grade 3 only in that the tribal *nisbah* is used by the earlier sources as an integral part of the name combination, but any ancestry beyond the immediate grandfather is still lacking. It is significant that 4 of the 7 names in this grade are attested non-Arabs.⁴⁵ The remaining 3 are: 1 determined to have been an Arab,⁴⁶ 1 determined to have been non-Arab,⁴⁷ and 1 undetermined.⁴⁸

Grade 1 features the optimum combination of an Arab name, complete with a long ancestral line, which, credibly or incredibly, reaches, in most cases, the grand tribal patriarch. As would be expected, the overwhelming majority in this grade are Arabs: 56 attested and 2 determined to have been so. The only 2 in this grade who are not Arabs are confirmed Iranian *mawlās*.⁴⁹

The following table sums up the outcome of the first step of the appraisal process, along with the application of the fourth step to it:⁵⁰

⁴⁵ The case of Salamah ibn Bujayr ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Muslī (no.45) may be debatable. He was the first chief of the Organization in Kūfah, and the son of a certain 'Abd Allāh ibn Bujayr, who had been with al-Mukhtār, and who was noted for his bravado when the bitter end came. Being so noted, yet surrounded with obscurity otherwise, tip the balance in favor of considering him one of the *mawālī* who rallied around al-Mukhtār (cf. *Akhbār*, p. 183; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 738, 740-1; Ibn A'tham, VII: p. 198, and supra, pp. 5-6). Not so contentious, however, are the cases of 'Uthmān ibn Nahīk ibn Wahb al-'Akkī and his brother 'Īsā (nos. 370, 212) discussed above; and al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth ibn Quṭbah al-Khuzā'ī (no.121) son and nephew of the celebrated Sughdian *mawlās* Ḥurayth and Thābit. (cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1026-7, 1080-2, 1152-61, 1953, 1967; *Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 219-20, 273, 278, 337; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 116; cf. Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 58-61 and passim; Blankinship, *'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān*, pp. 316-8, supra, pp. 143-7).

⁴⁶ Al-Junayd ibn Khālīd ibn Huraym al-Taghlibī (no.230).

⁴⁷ Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-'Akkī (no.287) discussed above.

⁴⁸ Tamīm ibn 'Umar ibn 'Abbād al-Tamīmī (no.352).

⁴⁹ Muṣ'ab ibn Zurayq ibn As'ad ibn Rādūyah (or Zādhāyah or Māhān) al-Khuzā'ī, and his brother, the *naqīb*, Ṭalḥah (nos. 398, 351).

⁵⁰ For tribal breakdown and calculations of Relative Sizes, see in Agha, 'Agents,' for row (1) of this chart, tables A.1 of the series I, II and III, pp. 573-4, 658-9, 758-9; for row (2), tables A.2 of all three series, pp. 575-6, 660-1, 760-1; for row (1+2), tables A.3 of the three series, pp. 577-8, 662-3, 762-3; for row (3), tables A.4 of the three series, pp. 579-80, 664-5, 764-5; for row (4), tables A.5 of the three series, pp. 581-2, 666-7, 766-7; and for row (3+4), tables A.6 of the three series, pp. 583-4, 668-9, 768-9.

Sr. No.	Ethnic Group	Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
(1)	Attested Arabs	5	58	63
(2)	Most likely Arabs	1	10	11
(1+2)	Total Arabs	6	68	74
(3)	Attested non-Arabs	23	66	89
(4)	Most likely non-Arabs	21	76	97
(3+4)	First sub-total of non-Arabs	44	142	186

The application of the third step to the outcome of the second step, i.e., adding the number of the members of undetermined ethnicity to the grand total of members attested to have been non-Arabs or deemed to have been so, may be more contentious.⁵¹ Therefore, a further probe of the outcome of the second step may be required in order to gauge its tenability and the impact of any perceived margins of error on the totality of this quantitative study.

The absence of reasonably acceptable positive clues leaves 141 members in the Undetermined Ethnicity Group. Of these, some do have tribal connections, either attested in their name combinations, or otherwise inferred. The difficulty arises when one tries to accommodate the revisionists' indiscriminate acceptance of a tribal connection as an indication of Arab ethnicity. As a matter of principle, this snag could simply be disregarded—at least in the light of the foregoing arguments. Procedurally, however, the revisionists' contention must be addressed on its face value.

The breakdown of this class is as follows:⁵²

Sr. No.	Tribal Connection	Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
1	Undetermined ethnicity, tribally identified or connected	8	53	61
2	Undetermined ethnicity, tribally unidentified and unconnected	3	77	80
3	Undetermined ethnicity, total	11	130	141

⁵¹ The reference is to the four conceptual steps in the appraisal process, hereabove.

⁵² For tribal breakdown, and calculations of Relative Sizes, see: tables A.7 of all three series: I, II and III, in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 585-6, 670-1, 770-1.

The tribally unidentified and unconnected cross-section (row 2 above) offers no theoretical conflict with the revisionists' contention. Its 80 members may, therefore, be added to the first sub-total of non-Arabs already computed.

The contention would then center around the cross-section of the 61 tribally connected but ethnically undetermined members (row 1 above). This may be addressed on three levels.

The first level is purely hypothetical. If, for the sake of argument, we consider all 61 members to have been Arabs, this would bring the numbers to 266 non-Arabs and 135 Arabs; i.e., 66.33% to 33.67% i.e., 2:1. This is as close as the ratio of non-Arabs to Arabs can get; and yet, the non-Arabs would still enjoy a two-thirds majority. Of course, the very premise of this hypothesis is completely incompatible with the logic of this study.

The second level is a statistical compromise. It still would be incompatible with the basis of this study, but it is not statistically unusual. In the attested categories, the tribally identified non-Arabs are 74,⁵³ and the Arabs are 63.⁵⁴ This is a ratio of 1.17:1. If this is to be considered an acceptable average, applying it to the present contentious cross-section would yield 33 non-Arabs and 28 Arabs. Under this compromise, the grand totals would be 299 non-Arabs and 102 Arabs; i.e., 74.56% to 25.44% i.e., a ratio of 3:1. The non-Arabs would still enjoy a three-quarters majority.

The two previous exercises are meant only for the benefit of the potential skeptic, and to establish the improbable highest differentials which would constitute the limits of the margin of error to which this appraisal process might be susceptible.

The third level is where the present study conforms to its fundamental principles. An Arab tribal affiliation does not betoken an ethnic Arab identity, unless it is so proven. Therefore, appreciating the absence of any positive signs to the contrary, this study incorporates all the members, whose ethnic origins could not be determined, whether or not they are tribally-identified, into the non-Arab Group. Thus, the final ethnic breakdown, as recognized in the remainder of this study, is as follows:⁵⁵

⁵³ Computed in table III. A.4, *ibid.*, pp. 764-5.

⁵⁴ Computed in table III. A.1, *ibid.*, pp. 758-9.

⁵⁵ For tribal breakdown and calculations of Relative Sizes, see *ibid.*, tables A.3 and A.8 of the three series: I, II and III, pp. 577-8, 587-8; 662-3, 672-3; 762-3, 772-3.

		Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
(1+2)	Total Arabs	6=(9.84%)	68=(20%)	74=(18.45%)
(3+4+*)	Total non-Arabs	55=(90.16%)	272=(80%)	327=(81.55%)
(1+2+3+4+*)	Total membership	61=(100%)	340=(100%)	401=(100%)

Henceforth, no references will be made to the previous procedural distinctions.

IV. *The Non-Arabs: Mawālī and Converts*

A different type of distinction, however, is one of great consequence. It has already been pointed out, and it will remain with us throughout this quantitative part of this book. This is the distinction, within the non-Arab Group, between the *mawālī* and the non-*mawālī*, who are referred to here as converts. The principle underlying this distinction is simple. All non-Arabs who are tribally-identified are *mawālī*. All non-Arabs who, despite their conversion to Islam, were not accommodated in the tribal structure of the Umayyad Establishment are simply converts. With this ethnic/socio-religious dimension super-imposed on the demographic profile of the Organization, the final panorama appears as follows:⁵⁶

Ethnic/Socio- Religious Groups	Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
Arabs	6=(9.84%)	68=(20%)	74=(18.45%)
Non-Arab <i>Mawālī</i>	33=(54.10%)	117=(34.41%)	50=(37.41%)
Non-Arab Converts	22=(36.06%)	155=(45.59%)	177=(44.14%)
Total	61=(100%)	340=(100%)	401=(100%)

It is intensely interesting to note the relative and the absolute preponderance of the *mawālī* in the Kūfah Chapter. It is compatible with the fact that, since Bukayr had left his conservative impression on this Chapter, it did not witness a mass wave of grass-roots recruits who

⁵⁶ For tribal breakdown and calculations of Relative Sizes, see *ibid.*, tables A.3, A.9 and A.10 of all three series: I, II and III, pp. 577-8, 589-92; 662-3, 674-7; 762-3, 774-7.

might have altered its class composition. In Khurāsān, the situation is reversed. It is the converts, not the *mawālī*, who were the majority in the ranks of the Chapter, with a margin of 25.59% over the Arabs, and a margin of 11.18% over the *mawālī*.

But these figures must not be taken as reflections of equally unchanging ratios in the demographic compositions of the two Chapters. The historical dimension must be taken into consideration. The above figures represent a static demographic profile which is a cumulative product of a scan that spans almost three decades of organized Revolutionary activity. Snapshots that would freeze statistically-measured demographic profiles of the Organization as it may have been at any given stages of its historical evolution may not be invariably feasible, but certain such glimpses are possible.

If the monolithic history of the Kūfan Chapter allowed for a sustained preponderance of the *mawālī* and dominance of Bukayrism; the turbulent history of the Khurāsān Chapter, and the accompanying changing dynamics of its appeal to the different demographic groups, forced an upheaval in its Ethnic/Socio-Religious composition. Twice in Khurāsān, a shift in the focus of the movement, from Shī'itic religio-political to Iranian socio-nationalistic, begat a metamorphosis in the demographic composition of the adherents.

It has already been advanced that, perceptually, this study holds that the Khidāsh years were a severe disruption of Bukayrism in Khurāsān. Rhetorically, it can easily be argued that the *mawālī* held sway in the pre-Khidāsh Chapter in Khurāsān, lost it during the Khidāsh years, and regained it, albeit with a slimmer margin, when Bukayr regained control of the Chapter in 120/737-738. Despite the devastating blow delivered by the authorities, and the damage control exercised by Bukayr's formal structuring, Khidāshism was not completely eradicated. When Abū Muslim resurrected a wiser and more cunning strain of Khidāshism, old Khidāshists flocked back to the ranks, and new recruits from recent, and, more importantly, instantaneous, converts swelled their numbers in the Revolutionary tidal eruption.

But can the rhetorical arguments be statistically substantiated? Except for the Khidāsh years themselves, where we have a virtual historiographical black hole, the figures do tend to corroborate the perceptual thesis.

From the reports on the earlier years, while the Khurāsān Chapter was being established, 21 names are gleaned of individuals from the province who featured in some covert role—mainly around Bukayr's

founding activities.⁵⁷ Of these, 9, i.e., 42.86%, were Arabs, 11, i.e., 52.38%, were *mawālī*, and only 1, i.e., 4.76%, was a convert, a certain Mūsā ibn Mūsā al-Jurjānī (no.294).⁵⁸ It is interesting to note the near proximity between the *mawālī* and the Arabs, during this early stage, which was dominated by a Shī'itic religio-political focus. Converts were all but non-existent in the ranks.

The Khidāsh period itself cannot be gauged. But, almost immediately in its wake, the general assembly was convened, and Bukayr's structuring was enforced. Two sets of figures, which will be presently analyzed, and a more detailed examination of the leadership structures themselves, which will be conducted later, unmistakably demonstrate the interplay between the de facto demographic situation, laden with Khidāshist residue, and Bukayr's balancing act. The demographic composition of the leadership structures created by Bukayr must be viewed as both: reflecting this situation and expressing Bukayr's willful policy as to how it should be managed.

The clandestine activity, during the period surrounding and following the assembly, features 46 members.⁵⁹ Of those, 11 have already appeared in the pre-assembly period discussed above. The 35 new names are distributed as follows: 7 Arabs, i.e., 20% of the set, 16 *mawālī*, i.e., 45.71%, and 12 converts, i.e., 34.29%. While the gap between the *mawālī* and the Arabs was widening substantially, the converts were closing the gap between themselves and the *mawālī*, before eventually overtaking them.⁶⁰

The sheer numbers with which Bukayr populated the leadership structures do roughly reflect this emerging demographic balance. But the hierarchical allocations are of a different order of policy and intent. *Akhbār*'s various lists of these organizational ranks yield a total of 148 names.⁶¹ These are distributed as follows: 35 Arabs, i.e., 23.65%, 62 *mawālī*, i.e., 41.89%, and 51 converts, i.e., 34.46%.⁶²

This is a fairly equitable representation in the light of the demographic situation surrounding the assembly—although it slightly

⁵⁷ These are codified in field 18 of the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, *ibid.*, pp. 511-9; and p. 558 for the elucidation of the coding system.

⁵⁸ See table II.E.1, *ibid.*, pp. 732-3.

⁵⁹ These are codified in field 26 of the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, *ibid.*, pp. 511-9; and p. 560 for the elucidation of the coding system.

⁶⁰ See table II.E.2, *ibid.*, pp. 734-5.

⁶¹ *Akhbār*'s six lists are codified in fields 19, 21-25 of the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, *ibid.*, pp. 511-9 for the fields, and pp. 558-60 for the exposition. Some names appear on more than one list. After deleting the repetitions, the net total comes to 148 names.

⁶² See table II.D.7 in *ibid.*, pp. 730-1.

favors the *mawālī* over the converts. But it is not equitable in terms of the final cumulative figures. While it involves 51.47% of all 68 Arab members in Khurāsān, and 52.99% of all 117 *mawālī*; it involves only 32.90% of all 155 converts.⁶³ More importantly, the converts were completely excluded from the higher echelons—not a single *naqīb* or vice *naqīb*. They heavily populated the lowest rank of *Du'āt al-Du'āt*: 23 of their numbers made up 62.16% of the rank's 37-member formation. This was vintage Bukayr prudence—trying to address and contain a demographic situation, within the Organization, which he could neither alienate nor allow to continue commandeering the Organization.

But then came the flood. With Abū Muslim's advent in Khurāsān, a flood of new names, which have never appeared before, start cropping up. One hundred and seventy-one such names appear in all—a full 50% of the 340 which make up the Chapter's lists. Of course, the large number is due, partly, to the emergence of the Organization from the clandestine stage, and partly to the intense Revolutionary activity of the period and the stronger historiographical interest and accessibility. It cannot all be ascribed to Abū Muslim's campaign of simultaneous converting and recruiting. At least 27 of the 171 names could not have been Abū Muslim recruits. These are mainly sons, brothers and other relatives of old Organization members. But the majority of the remaining 144 are certainly intriguing. They are distributed as follows: 17 Arabs, i.e., 11.81%, 34 *mawālī*, i.e., 23.61%, and 93 converts, a formidable 64.58%. What makes it more interesting is that these 93 new recruits make up a full 60% of the total cumulative number of the 155 convert members.⁶⁴ This could not have been a coincidence. The steadily climbing curve of the numbers and proportions of the converts may be abstracted from this consolidated comparative table:

	Converts	<i>Mawālī</i>	Arabs
Pre-structuring, (also pre-Khidāsh) Stage	4.76%	52.38%	42.86%
Post-structuring, (also post-Khidāsh) Stage	34.29%	45.71%	20%
The Leadership Structure	34.46%	41.89%	23.65%
With and post-Abū Muslim Advent	64.58%	23.61%	11.81%
Cumulative Final Profile	45.59%	34.41%	20%

⁶³ See the Relative Involvement column in table II.D.7 in *ibid.*, pp. 730-1.

⁶⁴ See table II.E.3 in *ibid.*, pp. 736-7.

Thus was the Organization numerically hijacked, for the second time within two decades. Had it not been, the Revolution would probably have not taken place when it did. Abū Muslim may have more than doubled the meager numbers of the historiographically recognized converts' names; but, was this about all? Do the above ratios, even at their highest for the converts and at their lowest for the *mawālī* and the Arabs, really reflect the true demographic balance in the composition of the Revolutionary forces on the ground?

It must be remembered that the statistical base of this study is neither a random sample nor a representative cross-section—whether vertical or horizontal. It is primarily the upper crust of the edifice, in which are reflected traits and balances which do not exist in the rank-and-file. The principle of equitable representation or contribution, besides its having been unfashionable and incompatible with the nature of a clandestine sectarian movement, was also intentionally and inadvertently sacrificed for machiavellian and other considerations.⁶⁵ The present statistical base is loaded with Bukayrist cadres. Uniquely Abū Muslimist cadres must be looked for in the post-Abū-Muslim-elimination rebellions, where the existence of tens of thousands of his followers is also reported.⁶⁶ Above all, it must be remembered that this statistical base is a cumulative product, its figures are tempered by cumulative averages. It does not

⁶⁵ See, for example, the *nūqabā'* of Umru' al-Qays, and the entire issue of leadership structures, *infra*, chapter 13. Another enlightening example of the almost completely inverted equitability is the comparative cases of Ṭayyi' and Khuzā'ah. In Absolute Revolutionary Size, Khuzā'ah's Comparative Standing is 1st amongst Tribal Groups—2nd only to the arbitrary listing of the Tribally-Unidentified as a Tribal Group; Ṭayyi' is 4th—or 5th when the Unidentified, i.e., the Converts, are thus included. In its participation in the open stage of the Revolution in Khurāsān, Khuzā'ah maintains its prominent Comparative Standing, and demonstrates a very high Relative Representation Size, at 20.62% of total participants, a very high Relative Involvement Size, at 60.61% of its own total strength, and an over-Representation Ratio of 2.12:1. In the same stage, Ṭayyi' slips to the lowest Comparative Standing, with the almost non-existent scores of (consecutively as Khuzā'ah's): 2.06%, 9.52% and an under-Representation Ratio of 0.33:1. See table II.E.8, *ibid.*, pp. 746-7. The situation is completely reversed in the participation in the March West. Khuzā'ah almost all but disappears, slipping to the lowest Comparative Standing, and scoring (in the same order as above): 4.35%, 15.15% and an under-Representation Ratio of 0.44:1. Ṭayyi' soars to highest prominence, occupying the 1st Comparative Standing in Relative Involvement, at 66.67% of its total strength, also 1st Comparative Standing in over-Representation Ratio, at 1.97:1, and 3rd only to the Converts and Tamīm in Absolute Representation Size, at 14 participants, 12.17%. See table II.E.12, *ibid.*, pp. 754-5. Almost all the Statistical Tables are rife with similar examples of the unequitability of representation and participation.

⁶⁶ Balādhurī puts the number of those killed with Sinbādh (no.342) at 30,000; Ṭabarī and Mas'ūdī put the figure at 60,000. If these were only the fallen, how many were the rebels?! See: Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 247; Ṭabarī, III: p. 120; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 145; also, Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 360; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 71; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 357.

reflect the demographic balance at the historic Revolutionary moment and within the tidal wave which it unleashed.