

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ARABS IN THE PROVINCE

I. *Revolutionary 'Aptitude'*— *A Question of Motives and Intentions*

On the other side of the ethnic balance were the Arabs, with their petty and grave tribal schisms. Wellhausen ably reviewed this aspect of the Arab presence in the province, so it needs not detain us.¹ Even Wellhausen's critics, who reject the tribal dimension of his interpretation, inadvertently revert to it.²

It must, however, be stressed that, insofar as the tribally based *ḏūwān al-jund* represented the pillar of the Establishment, the greatest majority of the upheavals which occurred within the Arab tribal structure in Khurāsān were not anti-Establishment. Even the pro-Zubayrid, anti-Umayyad dynastic tones of Ibn Khāzim's Qaysite insurgency expressed themselves in wresting control of the province in favor of an Arab tribal group and in the name of yet another Arab dynasty. The insurgency of his son, Mūsā, grave and enduring though it was, contained itself, or was contained, in Tirmidh and the vicinity; and Mūsā refrained from making any attempt against the seat of Arab power south of the Oxus, even when he had the opportunity. The less self-restrained al-Hārith ibn Surayj, who led the least tribal—at least in the first phase of his crusade—and the most radical of these upheavals, was openly anti-Umayyad, and ostensibly a cosmopolitan egalitarianist. Under duress, however, he showed his true colors. Even his dynastic animosity to the Umayyads vanished when he was granted the pardon he sought from the similarly 'pious' usurper (Umayyad caliph) in Damascus, the very city he had claimed he was destined to dismantle brick by brick. Then his thrust disintegrated in the same tribal pit in which it had grown. When the consequences of the third civil war, in Syria, Jazīrah, and Iraq, spilled into the province, the Azd, under al-Kirmānī, rose against the Muḏarite provincial government of Naṣr ibn Sayyār. Until their eleventh hour alliance with Abū Muslim, they had never expressed a

¹ Mainly by streamlining Ṭabarī's accounts. Wellhausen, chapter VIII, pp. 397-49.

² Shaban accuses F. Omar of 'reverting to Wellhausen's position,' but then he himself couldn't avoid the all-pervasive trap, because it is Ṭabarī's rather than Wellhausen's; Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, xv, cf. pp. 42-4, 51, 56.

genuine moralistic or social concern,³ and they had disowned neither the Umayyad dynasty nor the Arab tribal base of the *diwānized* Establishment.

Aside from a minority within the Arab ranks, who—unlike al-Ḥārith—may be labelled as militant and true Murji'ites, or as partisans of one leaning or the other within the proto-Shī'ite spectrum, and aside from the alien Khārijites led by Shaybān ibn Salamah, there was no genuine anti-Establishment sentiment amongst the Arabs of Khurāsān. Most of the province's upheavals prior to the Revolution may be broadly termed, in today's language, as violent 'loyal opposition'. This is not because life under the Umayyad regime was utopian, but rather because the Khurāsānite Arabs were actual beneficiaries.

Rarely, if ever, has morality been an instantaneous driving force of history. Cumulatively, over centuries, it does provide the human race with inspiration and corrective measures; but it does not, by itself, launch Revolutions. The French Revolution, possibly the greatest moral inspiration of modern times, was also, but primarily, driven by hunger, misery, oppression, discrimination, and a host of other mundane forces. It was only when the hungry and the oppressed (etc.) were empowered that the revolution broke out, allowing posterity, eventually, to see the ideals of the 'Philosophes' embodied. Van Vloten understood this principle and misused it. Wellhausen made a spectacular presentation of how it works. Shaban capitalized on the same principle, but he committed two grave errors. The first is his singling out of the socio-economic dimension as the sole driving force behind the Revolution. The second is a reversed adaptation of the van Vloten—Wellhausen interpretation. He created, specially for the occasion, a class of 'Arab settlers' who, he alleges, shared with the Iranians in their misery, but who, unlike the Iranians, possessed what it took to prepare and launch the Revolution (being Muslims and trained fighters) and to sweep the entire territory of Khurāsān and the rest of the Umayyad realm, right up to victory, with only a total of fifteen thousand settlers.⁴

³ When al-Kirmānī claimed that he rose in the cause of the Book of God, Qaḥṭabah reportedly commented: 'if he were truthful, I would have supported him with a thousand horsemen.' Ṭabarī, II: p. 1930.

⁴ Actually, this is the crux of Shaban's theory, and it does not stand to examination. See Agha, 'Battle of the Pass.'

II. *Revolutionary Ability—
A Question of Quanta*

Whatever the motives of the Arab participants may have been, the question of their quantum remains paramount. For the question to be properly appreciated, the Arab Revolutionary quantum must be seen in perspective, i.e., within the context of the overall Revolutionary quantum. The term 'quantum' is used here to emphasize the reservation with which most of the lump sum figures given by the sources are viewed here (and to distinguish the methodology from that used in part three of this book, which rests on 'exact' numbers and percentages). But such figures, where available, are important indicators of what the real figures may have been. Thus, the demonstrable indicators, along with the quantitative data supplied by the sources in the form of somewhat questionable lump sum figures, may be molded together to provide us with a general indicator of an imprecise, yet conceptually perceivable, quantity, which is characterized here as 'quantum'.

The overall Revolutionary quantum was demonstrably momentarily huge. For the present purpose, the figures which *Akhbār* supplies regarding the Revolutionary forces standing simultaneously on two geographical sites are vital.⁵ In Ṣafar, 131/October, 748, approximately five months after he had launched his campaign, Qaḥṭabah entered Rayy without resistance.⁶ In Rayy he had his original forces counted, those who had come with him from the peoples of Nasā, Abīward, Jurjān and Marw al-Rūdh. They were thirty thousand men.⁷ Additionally, Abū Muslim had reinforced him with ten thousand troops under eleven commanding officers.⁸ Then, Abū Muslim himself advanced from Marw to Nīshāpūr at the head of a force of forty thousand men.⁹ That is a neat sum of eighty thousand standing troops.

This figure does not include the numerous large and small advance expeditions which Qaḥṭabah had fielded in various directions before he took count of his troops, and who were still on the field when he did.¹⁰ It

⁵ If these figures are to be questioned, it must be noted that the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* tends to minimize the numbers of the 'inspired' Revolutionary forces and to maximize those of the demoralized Umayyad forces.

⁶ *Akhbār*, p. 334.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Abū 'Awn with *ahl* Jurjān to Dastabā; Qaḥṭabah's son, al-Ḥasan, with *ahl* Marw al-Rūdh to Hamadhān and on to Nahāwand; two thousand men extra reinforcement to al-

does not include the forces which Mālik ibn al-Haytham led to Sijistān to oust the Syrians,¹¹ and which later joined the rest of the Khurāsāniyyah in the siege of Wāsiṭ.¹² It does not include whatever forces Abū Muslim must have assigned to or actually left in the east, especially in Ṭukhāristān, under Abū Dāwūd, who, as pre-planned, killed 'Uthmān ibn al-Kirmānī in Balkh on the same day Abū Muslim killed 'Uthmān's brother, 'Alī, in Nīshāpūr.¹³ Nor does it include whatever forces he had left in Marw to control the Azd when they learned of the double atrocity in Balkh and Nīshāpūr. *Akhbār* pointedly remarks that Abū Muslim intentionally took 'Alī ibn al-Kirmānī with him to Nīshāpūr so that he could kill him away from his people in Marw.¹⁴ Therefore, and most notably, this figure of eighty thousand does not include the Azd, whose *Khums* numbered ten thousand warriors in Qutayabah's days.¹⁵ If they, or any portion of their number, are to be added to the Arab Revolutionary quantum, they must also be added to this overall quantum.

Therefore, we must be looking at a six-figure-strong standing Revolutionary army—the overflowing ranks of the local militias in the districts excluded.¹⁶

Is it possible then that the quantum of anti-Umayyad Arabs could have reached proportions sufficient to make it the backbone of such a mammoth force, and the determinant of its ethnic character? And, more fundamentally, was the fountain source of Arab participation, i.e., the entire Arab presence in the province, large enough to support even a substantial minority of such a quantum?

Ḥasan; four thousand men with al-'Akkī to Qumm; a contingent under two commanding officers to reinforce al-'Akkī—probably around two thousand men, if each commanding officer's detachment was around one thousand, as may be construed from Abū Muslim's despatch of ten thousand men under eleven C.O.s, and from several other instances; 'Amr ibn Ḥafṣ to Iṣbahān; and 'Āmir ibn Ismā'īl in charge of troops manning the garrisons and roads between Rayy and Hamadhān. *Ibid.*, pp. 335-9.

¹¹ Khalfāh, p. 439; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 285.

¹² Ṭabarī, II: pp. 364-6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1998-2000.

¹⁴ *Akhbār*, p. 337.

¹⁵ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1289.

¹⁶ Shaban asserts: 'In less than a month and a half the number of Abū Muslim's army rose to 7,000' (*Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 158). The figure is indeed reported in Ṭabarī as the number of men present with Abū Muslim in his trench at Mākhuwān, in Marw; Ṭabarī (II: pp. 1967-9). Shaban chose to ignore the fact, which emerges from a careful examination of Abū Muslim's strategy that the major bulk of the Revolutionary forces were not in Marw at the time.

III. *Arab Immigration to Khurāsān*

III.1 *Khurāsān's Particularism as an Outpost of Arab Settlement*

A major difference between Khurāsān (and, slightly to a lesser extent, Egypt and North Africa), on the one hand, and Syria and Iraq, on the other hand, is that the proximity of the latter to the Peninsula permitted the existence in their territory and on its fringes of semi-settled and settled forms of 'civilian' Arab communities, centuries before Islam. After Islam and the conquests, some of these communities joined the Establishment and enlisted in the *dūwān*; others persisted in their *A'rābiyyah* or Christianity, and were joined by more *A'rāb*, thus sustaining an early and uninterrupted civilian Arab presence in the conquered lands, even if only on the margins of the Establishment. This was never the case in Khurāsān. The Arab conquerors in Khurāsān were only that—conquerors, *muqātilah*, members of the *dūwān*, constituents of the middle to upper tiers of the imperial structure. Khurāsān did not witness any significant civilian Arab migration during the Umayyad period. Hence, for a sizable lower tier to have emerged within the Arab sphere in Khurāsān, from which a credible anti-Establishment movement could potentially issue, a massive wave of desertion or expulsion from the *dūwān* would have had to have occurred. This is a fact which Shaban understood only too well; and that is why he unsuccessfully endeavored to forcibly 'mid-wife' the 'birth' of his 'Arab settlers' society from this very institution.¹⁷

III.2 *Building up and Maintaining a Stable Demographic Balance*

It appears that, before Ziyād ibn Abī Sufyān's governorship of Iraq and the East, no serious Arab settlement occurred in Khurāsān. During the campaigning season, the *muqātilah* of Baṣrah, whose colony Khurāsān was, used to invade the territories which had not yet capitulated. Towards the closing of the season, they used to return to their base and leave in Khurāsān a garrison of four thousand men.¹⁸ In the year 45/665-666, Ziyād divided the province into four quarters and appointed to each a sub-governor. Umayr ibn Aḥmar al-Yashkurī, the sub-governor of Marw, was, according to Balādhurī, "the first to settle

¹⁷ See, Agha, 'Battle of the Pass.'

¹⁸ Ṭabarī, I: p. 2906.

the Arabs in Marw.¹⁹ The real significance of Balādhurī's statement cannot be ascertained,²⁰ but Umayr's measure does not appear to have exceeded an intra-province logistical restationing of men already there.

The first substantial and full-fledged Arab settlement of Khurāsān occurred in the year 51/671-672, i.e., around twenty years after its conquest was consolidated by 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Āmir, and eighty years before the eradication of Arab supremacy in the Iranian territories. Ṭabarī reports the move twice, on Madā'inī's authority.²¹ The second transmission is synoptic and short on details, and it leaves the impression that the Arab settlers, accompanied by their families, initiated the move.²² This belies the most important feature of Arab migration to, and settlement in, Khurāsān—namely, that it was a controlled activity.

This is amply clear in Ṭabarī's first transmission on Madā'inī's authority²³ and in Balādhurī's account.²⁴ And it establishes the fact that deciding the volume, composition, frequency and nature of migrating waves to the province was a function of central policy, not an attribute of spontaneous tribal spreading. Scant and sketchy as it is, further information in the sources on subsequent waves never contradict this fact. If anything, where this information does lend itself to inferential reading, it corroborates the fact. In its negative aspect, i.e., its dissociation from spontaneous tribal spreading, the fact is perfectly compatible with the physical and psychological remoteness of Khurāsān. In the Umayyad era, Khurāsān was never transformed into a part of the Arab psycho-geographical continuum.²⁵

¹⁹ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 506. Madā'inī reports Ziyād's arrangements, but makes no mention of Umayr's measure (Ṭabarī, II: p. 79).

²⁰ Cf. 'Alī, *'Iṣṭilāḥ*, pp. 36-83, esp. p. 37.

²¹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 81, 155-6.

²² *'fanaqala al-nās 'iyālātihim ilā Khurāsān wa-waṭanūhā* (people moved their families to Khurāsān and they settled it), Ibid., pp. 156.

²³ Ibid., p. 81, where it clearly states that Ziyād 'sent' these settlers to the province.

²⁴ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 507, where it clearly states that Ziyād 'transferred' these settlers to the province with their families.

²⁵ Although there have been attempts to portray the first forays into nearby Sāsānid territory as incidental and spontaneous booty-seeking binges (e.g. Glubb, pp. 124-5, 131; Shaban, *Islamic History I*, pp. 24, 27), it may be argued that even those early attempts were deliberate and planned enterprises. This is, however, beyond the scope of this study. When it comes to negotiating the farther east, twenty years thereafter and beyond, the question of deliberateness, intent, and even tight control, takes on a more affirmative tenor. A combination of factors governed, and restricted to a standard required level, Arab migration to Khurāsān: (1) Physical remoteness—a natural discontinuum and an inherent repellant; (2) The close finiteness of Arab human resources—naturally restrictive; (3) The almost bottomless pits of more proximate immigration environments, warmer and more hospitable—optionally exclusive; (4) The fine Umayyad sense of strategic tribal balances—affirmatively regulatory (consider Mu'āwiyah's brilliant, albeit ultimately destructive, preclusion of the Qays from Syria and his easing of their

multitudes into al-Jazīrah, Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 211); (5) On the other hand, there was the lure of abundant and sustained sources of booty—a strong but measured attraction, sobered by the previous repellants.

All these factors combined could only facilitate Umayyad choices, whichever they may have been in any given circumstance. By stepping on the right pedals of encouragement, discouragement, enjoining or prohibiting, the Umayyad authorities could almost always favorably influence, and even control the individual and clannish migration decisions such as to produce the required results. If al-Ḥakam ibn 'Amr al-Ghifārī met with difficulties in trying to raise an expeditionary force in 45/665-666, as Shaban suggests, it must have been so because the repellant factors were not diluted enough. If, as Shaban also suggests, he was able to assemble the required force only in 47/667-668, then it must have been so because it took the authorities so long to assemble sufficient factors of persuasion and an adequate number of the persuaded (Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, pp. 30-1; cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 80-1, 84). When, in 77/696-697, 'Abd al-Malik conscripted reinforcements to Umayyah ibn 'Abd Allāh in Khurāsān, the conscripts took to hiring substitutes to fill in for them (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1029).

The lure of Khurāsān was not so overwhelming as to create a stampede, but the repellants were nothing that the authorities could not handle when the situation so required. Perhaps the best symbolic episode is the agonizing deliberation and self-searching which Ṣilah ibn Ashyam al-'Adawī had to endure in his endeavor to reach a decision on whether or not to join Salm ibn Ziyād's expedition (Ṭabarī, II: p. 393). But for psychological significations, nothing outweighs poetry. The 'epic' of the Arabs' incursion into the eastern depths of Iranian territory is not the exclusive domain of history. While historical patterns, substantiated by historical instances, must be sought, the human dimension must not be overlooked. Especially Yāqūt, in his geographical dictionary, and particularly in the Khurāsān entries, illuminated through juxtaposition heaps of gems of poetry, glowing fiercely and tenderly with echoes of the bedouins' experience with remote Khurāsān. From Nahār ibn Tawsi'ah's obsession with the alien cold:

habbat shamālan kharīqan asqāṭat warāqan
wa-sfarra bi-l-qā'i ba'da l-khudrati sh-shiḥu
fa-rḥal hudā wa-lā taj'al ghanīmatanā
thaljan tuṣaffiquhu bi-t-Tirmidhi r-rīḥu

(A piercing northerly wind has blown and caused leaves to fall;
 And, after greenery, wormwood in the plain has turned yellowish;
 So move away, may thou be rightly guided, and make not our booty
 the snow, which in Tirmidh the wind flaps.)

to Mālik ibn al-Rayb's heart-rending self-elegy:

la-'amrī la'in ghālat Khurāsānu hāmātī
la-qad kuntū 'an bābay Khurāsāna nā'iyā
a-lam taranī bi-tu d-dalālata bi-l-hudā
wa-'aṣbahtu fī jayshī Bnī 'Affāna ghāziyā
wa-lammā tarā'at 'inda Marwīn manīyyatī
wa-halla bi-hā suqmī wa-hānat wafātiyā
aqūlu li-aṣḥābī r-fa'ūnī fa-innani
yaqarru bi-'aynī in Suhaylun badā liyā

(Upon my life! why! should Khurāsān destroy my soul,
 verily I was, from the two gates of Khurāsān, aloof.
 Have you not seen me purchase error for right,
 and in Ibn 'Affān's army become a warrior?
 And when at Marw my fate loomed,
 and, there, my ailment alighted, and my death arrived,
 To my companions I say: 'Lift me up; verily,
 it would delight my eye if Canopus shows itself to me.')

Ṭabarī's two transmissions of Madā'inī's account combined, and Balādhurī's account, also agree on the following details of this momentous and epoch-making leap into effective colonization of Khurāsān: (1) The expedition was presided over by al-Rabī' ibn Ziyād al-Ḥārithī, a Baṣran of the Banū al-Ḥārith of the Yamanite tribe of Madhḥij. (2) The expedition numbered fifty thousand warriors. (3) The warriors were accompanied by their families. (4) The warriors were drawn from both garrison cities: Baṣrah and Kūfah.

Balādhurī's account contributes two factors which are absent in Ṭabarī's but which are not necessarily undermined by this absence. One factor is Balādhurī's statement that al-Rabī' settled these warriors "below the river (*dūna al-nahr*)," i.e., south and south-east of the Oxus. This poses no problem, and it is merely an obtainment of the fact that no serious Arab presence took root in Transoxania before Qutaybah's governorship of the province. Therefore, Khurāsān proper and lower Ṭukhāristān are to be viewed as the earlier Arab domiciles in the province.

The other factor, unique to Balādhurī's account, is that it specifically mentions two of the Prophet's companions from the Banū Aslam of Khuzā'ah as having migrated with this wave. Both, Buraydah ibn al-Ḥuṣayb al-Aslamī and Abū Barzah 'Abd Allāh ibn Naḍlah al-Aslamī, apparently stayed in Khurāsān until, according to Balādhurī, they died in Marw. Buraydah's case is not subject to contention.²⁶ Abū Barzah's case is not so straightforward. While his immigration to Khurāsān is not contested, his final settlement there is.²⁷ It is true that these two men

the east comes through with Yazīd ibn Mufarrigh as a vast, remote, impersonal and featureless cemetery—an embodiment of universal death in anonymity:

Kam bi-l-Jurūmī wa-arḍi-l Hindī min qadamin

wa-min sarābīlī qatlā laytahum qubūrū

bi-Qunduhāra wa-man tuktab manīyyatuhu

bi-Qunduhāra yurajjam dūnahu-l khabaru

(How numerous! In the Hot Lands and in the Land of India, limbs
and the armour of the slain! Would that they were buried!

In Qunduhār [it came to pass]; and he whose death is destined to be
in Qunduhār, news of him will be but surmise.)

(Yāqūt, consecutively, Tirmidh, Khurāsān, Marw, Qunduhār = II: pp. 26, 353, V: p. 115, IV: p. 403).

²⁶ There seems to be unanimous agreement that he established a celebrated line of descendants in Marw, and that he died there (Ibn Sa'd, VII: p. 365; Kalābādhī, I: p. 122; Ibn Manjāyah, I: p. 97; Rāzī, II: p. 424). A number of his *mawālī* are also encountered amongst the Revolutionaries.

²⁷ Even Abū Barzah's name is subject to different citations: 'Abd Allāh ibn Naḍlah or Naḍlah ibn 'Abd Allāh or ibn 'Ubayd; his offspring were in Baṣrah, and he died either in Marw or in Baṣrah (Ibn Sa'd, VII: p. 366; Kalābādhī, II: p. 754; Ibn Manjūyah, II: p. 295; Rāzī, VIII: p. 499). Moreover, Abū Barzah is encountered in the year 61/680, ten

were specifically mentioned “because they were companions of the Prophet.”²⁸ Actually, not much should be drawn from these two individual cases. Shaban, however, does tend to infer from them patterns and quanta of tribal settlement.²⁹ In this precarious light, it may also be suggested that some of these settlers may have returned to their original *amṣār*.

While both Balādhurī and Madā’inī agree that the fifty thousand warriors were drawn from both Baṣrah and Kūfah, Madā’inī alone mentions that the two *miṣrs* were equally tapped—twenty five thousand from each.³⁰ Ṣālīḥ Aḥmad al-‘Alī, rather convincingly though not conclusively, argues against Madā’inī’s ratio, postulating that the ratio was more likely to have been forty thousand from Baṣrah and ten thousand from Kūfah.³¹ It is true that the Kūfāns were, in 96/714-715, a minority of seven thousand warriors to the forty thousand Baṣrans in the province.³² But it is also true that when Hishām, in 113/731-732, sent reinforcements to al-Junayd ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, it was once again at a ratio vindicating Madā’inī’s—ten thousand men from each of the two *miṣrs*.³³ It may well have been that the initial despatch was twenty five thousand from each *miṣr*, but that, in normal course, the Kūfān ranks were depleted by death, martyrdom, withdrawals and returning to Kūfah, without ever being replenished before Hishām’s reinforcements were sent.

The issue is very important because it bears directly on other vital issues. Although formally Khurāsān was a Baṣran conquest and, consequently, a Baṣran responsibility and privilege, it must not be forgotten that both Baṣrah and Kūfah were subject to one and the same central authority during much of the Umayyad period. No matter how much emphasis we allow ourselves to place on the decentralized nature of supreme Umayyad authority, we must not forget that the powerful Ziyād was virtually the absolute viceroy of the entire East—Baṣrah, Kūfah, Khurāsān and all their colonies and subcolonies. A strong sovereign like Hishām could and did override provincial will. These strong men were never particularly sensitive to general Iraqi interests, or to the special micro-interests of any of the two *miṣrs* within Iraq.

years after he had immigrated to Khurāsān, in Syria in Yazīd I’s court, when the head of the slain al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī was brought to him (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 283, 383).

²⁸ Shaban, *‘Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 33.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 33-4, 157.

³⁰ Ṭabarī, II: p. 81.

³¹ ‘Alī, *Tanẓīmāt*, p. 44 n.1; idem, *‘Istīlān*, p. 38. Wellhausen accepts Madā’inī’s distribution at face value, p. 415.

³² Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 520; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1291.

³³ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 527; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1545.

Therefore, whenever the strategic imperial imperatives had to be addressed, they were never reluctant to override the regional interests, especially the Iraqi. It appears that such situations emerged whenever huge infusions of man-power were required for the remote territories. In addition to the two aforementioned situations, we have at least one more to corroborate the pattern. Jurjān, Dāhistān and Ṭabaristān were technically Kūfan territories.³⁴ But, when Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab invaded them in 98/716-717, his one hundred thousand or one hundred twenty thousand—strong army was a ‘coalition’ from *ahl* al-Shām, Kūfah, Baṣrah, Jazīrah and Khurāsān.³⁵

When Ziyād resolved to consolidate the Arab rule in Khurāsān, the Baṣran human resources available on site and adequately trained may have been insufficient to raise the force envisioned necessary while keeping the *miṣr* adequately manned. Whether the Baṣrans were unhappy to have the Kūfans share with them the yields of their territory, or the Kūfans were coerced into an unwelcome participation in shouldering a share of the Baṣran remote military burdens, we do not know. What we know is that Ziyād had to pool the resources of both *miṣrs*, at whatever ratio, to be able to meet the demands of his strategic objective. This anticipates the all-important issue of the progressively dwindling reserves of Arab human resources in the light of the *A‘rāb*’s aversion to enlisting in the *diwān*, and the ever growing demands and strains which the continuous expansion and the relentless war consumption placed on these resources.³⁶

The cited size of Ziyād’s despatch fits the emerging stable average quantum of Arab *muqātilah* in Khurāsān. Whenever an estimation is possible, it will be found to hover around the forty to fifty thousand mark, which was apparently adequate and sustainable by self-

³⁴ For a discussion of the conquest rights of the two *miṣrs*, see Blankinship, *Jihād State*, p. 61 ff.

³⁵ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 413, 412; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1318.

³⁶ An analysis of some available figures might be instructive. During ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib’s reign, enrolment in the Baṣran *diwān* was sixty thousand warriors (Ṭabarī, I: p. 3370). During Ziyād’s tenure, a momentous drive to implement the most generous measures of inclusion occurred. Subtracting, from the above sixty thousand, the Khurāsān expedition of twenty five thousand, or forty thousand, leaves between twenty thousand and thirty five thousand *muqātilah* in Baṣrah. Then, we are told that the *diwān*’s enrolment in this *miṣr* during Ziyād’s days was eighty thousand (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 429) or seventy thousand (Ṭabarī, II: p. 433). This means that he enlisted, most probably in his last two years in office, 51-53/671-673, between thirty five thousand and sixty thousand new men. In another account, when Ziyād took charge in Baṣrah, the *muqātilah* were forty thousand, and he raised their number to eighty thousand (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf IV A*, pp.190, 203). Factoring in the Baṣran force which he sent to Khurāsān, his addition to the *diwān*, according to this account, would be between sixty five thousand and eighty thousand men.

replenishment in normal circumstances. Wavelets, or, more accurately, small detachments accompanied new governors appointed to the province from the outside.³⁷ But these detachments hardly affected the overall picture, and, most likely, they accompanied their man back to their base at the end of his tenure. Routine deaths and moderate war casualties may be assumed to have been replenished through the virtually automatic succession of a warrior's son to his deceased father's slot in the *ḍiwān*.³⁸ Of course, periods of hyper-activity and extraordinary expansion called for additional temporary reinforcements.³⁹ And cataclysmic losses, which severely eroded the average level of the province's military power, were compensated by permanent reinforcements, local enlistment from amongst non-*ḍiwānized* members of the families of the *muqātilah*, from Establishment *mawālī*, and, probably, by a measured encouragement of (and a controlled lifting of the regular controls on) mass migration.⁴⁰

To be sure, except for Ibn al-Muhallab's unusual army, and except for the folksy arithmetic which we find in Ibn A'tham's aggregate figures and in Ibn 'Irs' poetry,⁴¹ all other figures pertaining to the numbers of

³⁷ In 56/675-676, Sa'īd ibn 'Uthmān was accompanied by al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufrah, presumably in a detachment of Azdites, and Mālik ibn al-Rayb in a band of *A'rab* robbers (Ṭabarī, II: p. 178); in 61/680-681, Salm ibn Ziyād was authorized to raise a contingent of two thousand or six thousand Baṣrans to accompany him (Ibid., p. 393); in 111/729-730, al-Junayd ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Murri was accompanied by five hundred of his kinsmen (Ibid., II: p. 1527; Ibn A'tham, VIII: p. 100; cf. 'Alī, *Istīlān*, pp. 38-9).

³⁸ Cf. 'Alī, *Tanzīmāt*, pp. 162-3.

³⁹ Al-Hajjāj sent an army to Qutaybah at the zenith of his unprecedented expansion, in 95/713-714 (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1267). Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab's huge army which conquered Jurjān (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 413; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1318) was not destined for Khurāsān. On the contrary, Yazīd tapped the Khurāsānite army for the exploit. Indeed, as is mentioned in Bukayr ibn Māhān's biography and activities, supra, chapter one, a community of the Kūfan tribe of Musliyah, and of the Azd, did settle Jurjān. The bulk of the Syrian, Jazīran and Iraqi divisions must have been repatriated.

⁴⁰ Consider Hishām's measures in the wake of the Battle of the Pass, which Shaban tried to reverse (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1545-6; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 527; cf. Agha, 'Battle of the Pass'). The tribal struggle under 'Abd Allāh ibn Khāzim, during the second civil war, conquered Qays and Bakr first, and then between Qays and Tamīm (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 490 ff., 594 ff.) took a staggering toll on the human resources of all three tribal groups, especially Bakr. Ibn Khāzim reportedly killed eight thousand Bakrites in one single battle at Harāt (Ibid., p. 496). The resulting imbalance was apparently redressed by a double measure. In 77/696-697, 'Abd al-Malik despatched an army, (Ibid., p. 1029). In 78/697-698, the Azdite chieftain al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufrah was appointed to Khurāsān (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 514; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1033-5). Wellhausen concludes, justifiably, that al-Muhallab 'brought with him his tribe' (p. 427 and n.2).

⁴¹ The staggering losses of the Arabs in the Battle of the Pass, in 112 or 113/the summer of 730 or 731, (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1532, 1553) involved mainly the Samarqand garrison led by Sawrah ibn al-Hurr. Ṭabarī puts the garrison, which was almost completely annihilated, at twelve thousand men (Ibid., pp. 1540-6). Shaban's favorite,

Arab *muqātilah* of the *dūwān* in the province will always be found to be comfortably within or edging to approximate the fifty thousand standard mark.⁴² This mark was, rather symbolically, dedicated by al-Mujashshir ibn Muzāḥim al-Sulamī's ominous cautioning to al-Junayd prior to the 'Battle of the Pass'. Said al-Mujashshir: "The governor of Khurāsān never crosses the River [Oxus] with less than 50,000 [men]."⁴³ Therefore, the most notable and direct count of the Arab *muqātilah* in Khurāsān appears to be vindicated. Actually, the record has the appearance of, and probably was, an official extract from the *dūwān*:

At the time [i.e., in 96/714-715], there had been of the *muqātilah* in Khurāsān: from *ahl* al-Baṣrah: nine thousand of *ahl* al-ʿĀliyah, seven thousand of Bakr, whose chief was al-Ḥuḍayn ibn al-Mundhir, ten thousand of Tamīm, whose chief was Ḍirār ibn Ḥuṣayn al-Ḍabbī, four thousand of ʿAbd al-Qays, whose chief was ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUlwān, and ten thousand of the Azd, whose chief was ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥawdhān; and of *ahl* al-Kūfah: seven thousand, whose chief was Jahm ibn Zuḥar or ʿUbayd Allāh ibn ʿAlī; and the *mawālī* were seven thousand, whose chief was Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī.⁴⁴

That is a total *dūwān* enrolment of fifty thousand, seven thousand of whom were *mawālī*. Of the forty thousand Arabs, forty thousand were from the *akḥmās* of Baṣrah, and seven thousand from the mostly Yamanite tribes of Kūfah. This would work out roughly to 40% Muḍar confederates, 36% Yaman confederates, and 24% Rabīʿah confederates.

Ibn Aʿtham, puts the figure at twenty thousand, none of whom escaped (VIII: p. 103). Unreliable as the figures may be, and allowing for poetic exaggeration, the poetry which Ṭabarī cites reflects the magnitude of the loss. Ibn ʿIrs al-ʿAbdī said: '*Khamsūna alfan qutīlū dayʿatan* = fifty thousand were killed in vain' (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1559). In his attempt to twist 'Hishām's organizations' to his purposes, Shaban engages in a dubious arithmetic, selectively combining figures from Ibn Aʿtham and from Ṭabarī, to inflate the number of the *muqātilah* in Marw, and to depress their number in Samarqand (*Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 115-6; see Agha, 'Battle of the Pass,' esp. pp. 347-52).

⁴² ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād, in 54/673-4, crossed the Oxus with an army of twenty four thousand men (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 507). Singling out the Yamanites of the province, Asad ibn ʿAbd Allāh, in 109/727-728, boasted the support of twelve thousand swords (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1498). Allowing for the *mawālī* division of the *dūwān*, at around seven thousand, and for Transoxanian levies, which reached, in Qutaybah's and in Naṣr's tenures, around twenty thousand (Ibid., II: pp. 1291, 1256, 1690), even Ibn Aʿtham's aggregates can be accommodated. Of course, the reference by the poet al-Kumayt ibn Zayd to the 'seventy thousand' supporters of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj is synonymous to Madāʿinī's reference to his sixty thousand such supporters, who swelled into this figure only after the *dahāqīn* of Tukhāristān, with their men, joined his nucleus force of four thousand apparently Arab warriors (Ibid., II: pp. 1575, 1567).

⁴³ Ibid., p. 1291. Of course, the figure must be understood to include the official *mawālī* division and the native levies.

⁴⁴ Ibid., III: p. 568; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 520; and partially, Ibn Aʿtham, VII: p. 268.

Based on these figures, some modern scholars have attempted to assess the overall size of the Arab population in the province—military and civilian. Educated assessments obtained with figures ranging between two hundred thousand and a quarter of a million.⁴⁵ I undertook my own probe of the issue,⁴⁶ applying modern principles of population studies to data gleaned from the classical sources and subjected to a strict comparative approach to modern and medieval demographic balances and trends of positive/negative growth. My computations show that the overall Arab population in Khurāsān during the Umayyad era “could not have been less than 115,000, nor could they have exceeded 175,000.”⁴⁷

III.3 *The Geographical Dispersion of the Arabs in Khurāsān—A Military Archipelago*

Unlike in Baṣrah and Kūfah, and other *amṣār*, where the Arab *muqātilah* were compactly stationed, the Khurāsānite Arabs were dispersed across the landscape, their military punch deployed over few major centers and in remote and isolated garrison stations, *masāliḥ*. In the campaigning season, they used to assemble in Marw, coming from “Nīshāpūr, Abīward, Sarakhs and Harāt.”⁴⁸ Outside the season, and outside the main military centers, they were thinly spread to the limit—⁴⁹ little more than contingents of police forces when it came to contesting their locations with an organized and purposeful adversary. Al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj had proven it across Ṭukhārīstān, before Abū Muslim fatally proved it all over the province.

The settlement of specific tribes in specific localities are sometimes explicitly reported. Certain tribal preponderance in certain areas is also

⁴⁵ Wellhausen, at a ratio of four family members to each warrior, computes that ‘the total number of the Arabs in Khurāsān can hardly have amounted to more than 200,000’ (p. 427, n.3). Obviously, he left out the Kūfāns and based his calculations on the forty thousand Baṣran *muqātilah*. ‘Alī makes up for the oversight by effectively rounding Wellhausen’s calculations to reach 250,000 (*‘Istīlān*, p. 40). Sharon dutifully takes Wellhausen to task on the missing seven thousand Kūfāns and their twenty eight thousand obtaining family members, to the effect of adding thirty five thousand to the total, and to conclude, ‘with great reservation, that the total Arab population in Khurāsān at the zenith of the Umayyad period could not have exceeded a quarter of a million.’ (*Black Banners*, pp. 65-6). There is also a strident and unconvincing attempt by ‘Aṭwān to double the number to half a million (*al-Shi‘r al-‘Arabī bi-Khurāsān*, pp. 62-3).

⁴⁶ Agha, ‘Arab population,’ esp. pp. 217-29.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁴⁸ Thus during Qutaybah’s time, Ṭabarī, II: p. 1207.

⁴⁹ Ya‘qūbī, undoubtedly describing the situation during his time, in the 3rd/9th century, attests to the presence ‘in all the cities of Khurāsān ... except Ushrūsānah, [of] Arabs from Muḍar, Rabī‘ah, and all the Yamanite tribes’ (*Buldān*, p. 294). But references pertaining to the period are abundant.

occasionally stated. On the whole, however, any attempt at charting the geographical deployment of the Arab tribes in Khurāsān must rely heavily on inference. The data in the sources are sketchy, scattered, confused and overlapping. Outside the two singular cases, where Bakr was predominant in the south, especially Qūhistān,⁵⁰ and where Qays was predominant in Nīshāpūr,⁵¹ the other areas were tribally mixed. Especially in Marw, in Ṭukhāristān and mainly in Balkh, and in Transoxania, almost every one of the great tribal alliances enjoyed a comparatively significant presence. The following 'Chart showing Arab Deployment in Khurāsān'⁵² is, at best, a sketchy depiction. For the present purpose, more important than the tribal distribution in this chart is the geographical spread itself, which covers the entire territory, and the last vertical column in the grid, which demonstrates a general, tribally unspecified, Arab presence in the respective locality. The chart is essentially based on inferences made from the sources by al-'Alī and Blankinship.⁵³ Further direct inferences from the sources are also made by us.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 499.

⁵¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1929; cf. Wellhausen, p. 413.

⁵² Figure no.1. Sharon produced an unsubstantiated map of the 'distribution of Arab tribes in Khurāsān', *Black Banners*, p. 59.

⁵³ 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, pp. 42, 48-51, 54-5, 65-77; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 66, 68, 72, 85, 94, 110, 116, 144, 167, 202, 213, 220, 223, 228, 233, 237, 239, 308, 322, 329, 339, 343, 346, 363.

⁵⁴ Such inferences, and our direct verification of 'Alī's and Blankinship's inferences are referred to herebelow opposite the coordinates of the respective square in the grid in figure no1 p. 189. Where no such reference is made, the inference remains supported only by the authority of the above scholars. The letter-numeral combinations between brackets herebelow refer to the grid in Figure No.1: (a.2) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1930; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' p. 85. (a.12) *Ibid.*, p. 94; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 67. (a.19) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2473-5; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 75. (a.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1921-2; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 85, 94; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 75. (a.21) Yāqut, II: p. 385. (a.22) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 72, 94. (a.23) *Ibid.*, p. 72. (a.25) Narshakhī, p. 80; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' p. 94. (a.26) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1251; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, pp. 55, 72. (a.32) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 94, 110. (a.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' p. 72. (b.12) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 279; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1026, 1579; *Akhbār*, p. 311; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 68; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 116, 167. (b.13) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 116, 167, 144, 239. (b.14) *Ibid.*, p. 116. (b.15) *Ibid.*, p. 116. (b.16) *Ibid.* (b.17) *Ibid.* (b.19) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 75. (b.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 75; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 116, 167. (b.21) Yāqut, II: p. 385. (b.22) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 66, 68. (b.24) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' p. 68. (b.25) Narshakhī, p. 80. (b.26) 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 72. (b.32) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 116, 167. (b.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294. (c.6) *Akhbār*, pp. 295, 329, 32; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 220, 223, 228. (c.7) Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 499. (c.8) 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 51. (c.9) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' p. 223; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, p. 51. (c.10) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 491-2; *Akhbār*, p. 309; 'Alī, *'Istīlān*, pp. 49-50; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 144, 202, 223, 228, 237, 239. (c.11) Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*,' p. 202. (c.12) Naṣr ibn Sayyār's poetry: '*abliḡh Rabi'ata fi Marw ...*' (c.13) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1603. (c.19) *Ibid.*, pp. 1473-6; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fi*

IV. *The Arab Revolutionary Quantum*

Any presumed Arab participation in the Revolution must have come from the ranks of the fifty thousand warriors. The rest of the Arab population (according to my figures a balance of sixty five thousand to hundred twenty five thousand dependents) must obviously have comprised non-combatant and effectively non-politicized women and children.⁵⁵

Khurāsān, p. 233; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 50, 75. (c.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' pp. 213, 233; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (c.21) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1604. (c.22) Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 213. (c.25) Narshakhī, p. 80. (c.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294. (d.1) *Akhbār*, p. 224. (d.5) Ibid., p. 218. (d.12) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 279; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1604. (d.19) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (d.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (d.21) Yāqūt, II: p. 385; Muqaddasī, p. 303. (e.4) *Akhbār*, p. 218; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' pp. 308, 322. (e.12) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1951-4, 183; *Akhbār*, pp. 274-6; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 68; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 308. (f.3) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 277; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 339. (f.12) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1026; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 67. (f.26) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1421; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 72. (f.32) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1422. (g.1) Ibid., pp. 2003-5. (g.4) *Akhbār*, p. 218; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 329. (g.5) *Akhbār*, p. 218; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 329. (g.12) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1579; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 67-8. (g.25) Narshakhī, p. 80; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 363. (g.26) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1252; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 363. (g.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294. (h.2) Ibid., p. 278; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1207; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.3) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 277. (h.4) *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289, Ṭabarī, II: p. 1951. (h.5) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1207; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.6) Ṭabarī, III: p. 536; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.8) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 380; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 51. (h.9) 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 51. (h.10) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1207, 1529; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 280; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 50. (h.12) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1028; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 65-9. (h.13) *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289. (h.15) Ṭabarī, IV: p. 37; *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289. (h.17) Ṭabarī, IV: pp. 48-9. (h.18) Ṭabarī, IV: p. 64; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 77. (h.19) Ṭabarī, IV: pp. 16-7; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 74-6. (h.20) Ṭabarī, IV: pp. 16-7; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 61, 73-6. (h.21) 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 77. (h.24) Ṭabarī, IV: p. 16; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (h.25) Narshakhī, pp. 73, 80; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.26) Ṭabarī, III: pp. 551-2, 596; Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, pp. 518-9; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 70-3. (h.27) Ṭabarī, III: p. 615. (h.28) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 529; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 70. (h.29) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 529; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 70, etc. (h.30) *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.31) *Akhbār*, p. 289. (h.32) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 529; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1421; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 69-73. (h.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 42, 48; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' p. 339.

⁵⁵ This would also be true, even within the framework of Wellhausen's ratio, if the assumption is correct that Wellhausen, resting his ratio on an exaggerated demographic balance of dependency, considered the warriors to comprise the entire male adult Arab population of the province, in which case the balance would be two hundred thousand politically neutralized dependants. If, however, the assumption is that the ratio of four to each warrior subsumes the presence of a certain quantum of male adults outside the *d ūwān*, Wellhausen did not suggest it. While such an explanation may clear Wellhausen's ratio from the charge of exaggeration beyond all reasonable demographic trends, it would brand it with arbitrariness and a counter productive lack of specificity and the absence of an explanation of the source of such a 'non-*dūwānized*' presence. It also provides no clues as to how to apportion the two hundred thousand to categories of dependents and able bodied males.

Yet, this is precisely what Sharon appears to have taken for granted: the existence of an 'Arab civilian population', practically isolated from the *muqātilah*, in separate 'permanent settlements', and apparently demographically whole, i.e., age-sex balanced,

It is readily obvious that, even if the entire Arab *muqātilah* force were pro-Revolution, it would not have amounted, in the utmost, to more than 50% of the Revolutionary quantum of six figures, which, as we have already seen, obtains from *Akhbār*'s data. Of course, this was not the case—and not simply because it is self-evidently untenable. A review of the available data on the deployment of the Khurāsānite Arab force at the time would reveal that its bulk was fighting the Establishment's battle. Much of this information may not be statistically accurate yet it is demonstrably indicative.

It must be sufficient here to try to trace, broadly, the whereabouts and, where possible, the numbers of the Khurāsānite Arab forces who were, simultaneously but on different battle fields, fighting the Establishment's battle at any one given time bracket. The best, and probably the only such time bracket for which we possess some quantitative information, is the period shortly following the fall of Marw, when the scattered Arab forces had the chance, or actually were forced to regroup. It was around Sha'bān, 130/April-May, 748; the deployment of the government forces looked roughly as follows: (1) Thirty thousand fighters, with Tamīm ibn Naṣr ibn Sayyār and al-Nābī ibn Suwayd al-ʿIjlī, defending Tūs against Qaḥṭabah's onslaught. Of course, they lost.⁵⁶ (2) Ten thousand men of Qays and other Umayyad

enough to provide the incubating environment for the *da'wah*, 'among the Urban population by local Arab leaders and *mawālī* of Arab tribes who were neither warriors nor directly involved in the armed conflicts,' i.e., intra-tribal conflicts (*Black Banners*, p. 69, see also pp. 65-71). The example Sharon chooses in order to illustrate his point is most unfortunate. Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, although he was not involved in the internal tribal strife, and as thus proves a part of Sharon's point (*Black Banners*, p. 69 n.57), is, nevertheless, explicitly reported to have been himself a member of the *dūwān*, as were his father, his brother Jābir, (or Hārithah), and, most likely, the rest of his adult male family members (*Akhbār*, p. 199; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1480, 1595, 1601). This fact undermines the more relevant and consequential aspect of Sharon's characterization of these leaders as having been 'neither warriors ...' He does not attempt to further explain the source and the principle of differentiation from the warriors' 'society', which this 'Arab civilian population' attained.

By comparison, Shaban, brilliantly aware of the dilemma of postulating an Arab character of a revolution that occurred in a demographic milieu which was devoid of a quantitatively convincing extra-Establishment civilian Arab presence, at least valiantly, if stridently, tried to 'prospect' for some socio-economic factors which may form a *raison d'être* for such a 'necessary' presence. It is precisely this realization, of the necessity of explaining the anomaly of a 'non-*dūwānized*' Arab presence in remote Khurāsān, which singles out Shaban's attempt from the rest of similar attempts—mainly from Sharon's and Omar's. If he failed to make a good case, it is because he tried to prove the existence of a non-existent. Ironically, by putting up the best conceived argument for the 'cause' of the 'revisionists' and yet failing to support it, Shaban succeeds only in confirming that the post-Dennett 'school' has no case. See, Agha, 'Battle of the Pass.'

⁵⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1201. *Akhbār*, pp. 321, 323-4, cites no numbers.

			Muḍar		Rabī'ah	Yaman				Arabs in General	
			Qays	Khindif, Tamīm		Azd	Khuzā'ah	Tayyī	Other		
Western Territory	Jurjān	Jurjān				*			*	*	1
	Nishāpūr Quarter	Abrashahr	*							*	2
		Tūs						*		*	3
		Nasā					*		*	*	4
		Abīward				*			*	*	5
		Sarakhs			*					*	6
Southern Khurāsān	Qūhīstān	Qūhīstān			*					*	7
	Harāt Quarter	Būshanj			*					*	8
		Bādaghīs			*					*	9
		Harāt			*					*	10
		The Area in General			*					*	11
		Central	Marw	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Marw al-Rūdh			*	*					*	13	
Tukhārīstān/Eastern Khurāsān	Balkh Quarter	Jūzjān		*						*	14
		Tālaqān		*						*	15
		Fāryāb		*						*	16
		Andakhūd (Nukhadh)		*						*	17
		Shubūrquān								*	18
		Barūqān	*	*	*	*				*	19
		Balkh	*	*	*	*				*	20
		Khulm	*	*	*	*				*	21
		Tukhārīstān	*	*	*					*	22
Transoxania		Tirmidh	*							*	23
		Ṣaghāniyān	*	*						*	24
		Bukhārā	*	*	*				*	*	25
		Samarqand	*	*				*	*	*	26
		Sughd (general)					*			*	27
		Shāsh								*	28
		Farghānah								*	29
		Āmul								*	30
		Zamm								*	31
		Transoxania (general)	*	*				*	*	*	32
	Passim	*	*	*				*	*	33	

Figure No. 1
Arab Deployment in Khurāsān

supporters in Naṣr's camp at Mūrūshk, outside Nīshāpūr, and fleeing further west, at the time of the battle for Ṭūs.⁵⁷ (3) Roughly at the same time, the battle around and for Balkh was raging. Government forces comprised Arabs and Iranians. The Iranians were, reportedly, the princes of Ṭukhārīstān and Transoxania. Whoever they were, both the Iranians and the Arabs were led by the *mawlā* veteran of the Establishment, Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī.⁵⁸ The Arab forces must have comprised the garrisons of Tirmidh and Barūqān, in addition to the remnants of the Transoxania and Ṭukhārīstān garrisons who were overwhelmed by the orchestrated rising, then ran away and re-assembled at Tirmidh—a complete Arab profile of the Muḍar, Rabīʿah, and Yaman, combined. No figures are cited. But, a figure of ten thousand warriors in these areas should be fairly conservative.⁵⁹

The above rough deployment comes to a total of about fifty thousand men. Not all were Arabs, of course. A rough arbitrary net adjustment of ten thousand men, to account for loyal *mawālī* and other dissident Iranians, would leave around forty thousand Khurāsānite Arabs fighting for the Establishment.

If only these forty thousand men were the only Arabs still loyal to the Umayyad Establishment, it would leave the balance of ten thousand Arabs who failed to make the last stand for their own ethnic cause. This balance must account for the already fallen, for the neutral, for those who had paid allegiance to Abū Muslim only after the fall of Marw,⁶⁰ for the Azdite followers of Ibn al-Kirmānī, who only belatedly allied themselves to Abū Muslim, and for the hard core ideologues who were the established Arab members of the Organization.

The figure ten thousand conveniently fits the 'standard' number of the *Khums* of the Azd, which included other Yamanite Baṣran tribes, but not the Kūfan tribes which may reasonably be considered to have supplied the majority of the hard core Organization Arab constituents.

Of course, none of the above categories, or of any others, may be assumed to have been in its entirety on one side or the other. Some of the '*mawālī* of the Establishment' were definitely on the government side, so were the majority of Muḍar, or, at least, of Muḍarite Qays. The bulk

⁵⁷ *Akhbār*, pp. 324-5.

⁵⁸ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1997-8.

⁵⁹ Judging by the number of Sawrah ibn al-Hurr's garrison at Samarqand, which numbered twelve thousand during the *yawm al-Shūb*, and taking into consideration that Ṭukhārīstān was rather intensively garrisoned, (unknown numbers in, e.g., Jazzah, Shubūrqān, Khulm, Ṭālaqān, Jūzjān, Fāryāb; *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289; cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-5, 1605; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, II: p. 385; Blankinship, '*al-ʿArab fī Khurāsān*,' p. 116).

⁶⁰ *Akhbār*, pp. 307, 315-6, 318.

of the Rabʿah wing of the anti-Naṣr alliance had actually reverted to a pro-Establishment position. And, the majority of the main stream of the 'dūwānized' Arabs had repeatedly tried to patch up their differences. Although the attempts were not opportunely successful, the mere fact that they did occur when they did accentuates the general ethnic character of the Revolution-versus-Establishment divide.⁶¹

While the majority of the Azd alliance may not be considered authentic Revolutionaries, it is likely that many of the Kūfan Khurāsānites were. Therefore, while most figures are viewed as imprecise, it is probably not grossly inaccurate to accept, after corresponding adjustments on both sides, the figure ten thousand as conceptually fairly indicative of the Arab quantum of the anti-Naṣr forces. This would include non-Revolutionary Azdites as well as the original authentic Organization constituents. For lack of information pointing to a better informed allocation, we may suggest a 50-50 split of these ten thousand between authentic Revolutionaries and Ibn al-Kirmānī followers. This would result in 20% of the total Arab warriors having been a mix of ideologically motivated anti-Establishment enthusiasts, and unwittingly anti-government spoilers who ended up being instrumental in bringing about the destruction of their own Establishment, and, eventually, that of their own clannish leadership. That is a 10% authentic Arab participation. But, even if the vital distinction between authentic Revolutionaries and unwitting tribal spoilers is to be celinquished, the maximum Arab participation could not have exceeded 20% of the overall Arab military capability in the province. Within the framework of the entire Revolutionary quantum, this is a quantity of about less than 10%. Prior to the stand-off at Marw, which marked the Azd-Abū Muslim alliance, and after the liquidation of the two sons of al-Kirmānī, it would probably work out to a range of between 5% of the Revolutionary forces and a negligible percentage of the vengeful and empowered Persian multitudes.

Even the highest and most liberal estimation of Arab participation cannot bring its ratio at the level of the popular base even remotely close to its 20% ratio at the leadership level, as reflected in the statistical data discussed in part three below. This is not an anomaly. It is in keeping with two major considerations that governed the composition of the Organization and the nature of the historiographical coverage of its activities. First, politically and structurally, the principle of equitable representation was almost never applied in the 'machinations' of the

⁶¹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1964-5, 1969, 1997-9; *Akhbār*, pp. 275-6, 288-90, 294-6 ff.

clandestine structure. There had always been overriding, politically and organizationally sound reasons to involve more Arabs at the top. However, except for the brief two-year interval between the execution of Khidāsh and the restoration of Kūfan control, when Sulaymān ibn Kathīr became the de facto leader of the Khurāsān Chapter, never had an Arab been the first man. Second, the nature of the historiographical coverage of the Umayyad era largely reflects the imperial tribal structure of the Establishment and the society. Naturally, Arabs, and perhaps to a lesser extent their *mawālī*, enjoyed higher profiles than the extra-Establishment converts. They were more likely to come to the attention of reporters and historians. That is why the reporting on the Arab members is more frequent and abundant. And that is why they crop up in the historical reports in numbers too many to reflect their actual size in the Organization, and, much more so, in the Revolution.

The composition of the Organization's leadership apparatus is the subject of part three herebelow. Staying now with the animated rhythm of the nameless masses, we shall turn to the prime-grade textual material that, better than any other tool, imparts a contemporaneous sense of the period.