

CHAPTER FIVE  
THE 'ABBĀSID COUP AND THE DEMISE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION

*I. A Methodological Interlude*

Over and above its being a decisive historical landmark, the advent of the Khurāsāniyyah in Kūfah drastically changed the historiographical rules of the propaganda game for the doctors of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. Prior to this juncture, most of what it took to weave the 'Abbāsīd thread into the strand of events was simply to naively thrust the 'Abbāsīd *Imām* onto the historical theater—dark enough under the thick blanket of the clandestine phase. Most of what it takes the modern historian in order to neutralize these interpolations, and to restore a semblance of coherence to the historical narrative is to perform a simple 'surgery' to remove the 'Abbāsīd 'appendix'.

It is from this juncture on that the propaganda game became more demanding, and the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* most aggressive, transparently abrasive, and all-pervasive. The mainstream of events had started to unfold under the public eye—the army alleged to be the *Imām's* entered the new capital city but could not proclaim its *Imām* before two or three months had elapsed!<sup>1</sup> To bridge this conspicuous gap, the doctors of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* did not spare any detail from their crude interference, be it 'cosmetic' or 'bone surgery'. It is not, therefore, so startling to find that a careful examination of the body of accounts which were produced or tolerated by the 'Abbāsīd propaganda machine, and of the very few accounts which escaped its censorship,<sup>2</sup> brings to light some ludicrous

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<sup>1</sup> The Khurāsāniyyah entered Kūfah on 10 Muḥarram 132/29 August 749 (Khalīfah, II: p. 423; Azdī, p. 119; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 57; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 334), or on 11 Muḥarram (Jahshayārī, p. 84; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 344-5). Abū al-'Abbās was proclaimed caliph on 12 Rabī' II 132/28 November 749 (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 141). Other dates are also given to the proclamation of the caliph; the earliest is 3 Rabī' I 132/20 October 749 (Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 335; Suyūfī, p. 257); and the latest is 28 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 132/7 August 750 (Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 349. See also other dates in: Ṭabarī, III: p. 23; Azdī, p. 123; Khalīfah, p. 262; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 349). Be that as it may, even the latest date of the Khurāsāniyyah's arrival, and the earliest date of Abū al-'Abbās' proclamation, leave a gap of more than fifty days for the 'Abbāsīd propaganda machine to explain.

<sup>2</sup> In this respect, the source material may be classified in three general categories. The first category comprises the majority of early sources, which carried basically the general corpus of accounts which represent the 'Abbāsīd version. The uncritical

assertions, incredible incompatibilities and unbridgeable contradictions which render the situation in Kūfah, as painted by these accounts, absolutely untenable.

From this point on, history and historiography become so intertwined that a viable reconstruction of history can scarcely be achieved without an in-depth and step-by-step, probe of the historiography. Here, what it takes the modern historian in order to expose the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* and to restore a semblance of coherence to the historical narrative is no longer a simple surgery. On this turf, the modern historian can scarcely establish a fact within his proposed scheme before demolishing a number of falsehoods and extracting from their rubble the elements which would go into the composition of one of his more credible hypothetical 'facts'. Essential as it is, this exercise can be disruptive, possibly distracting, and potentially conducive to opacity. In this book, we have already had a share of such disruptions; and we shall have more. But, at this specific juncture, the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* becomes especially too dense and too prolific to allow us to take it to task on the details within the scope which a book admits.<sup>3</sup> However, a perceptive

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approach of these sources to the accounts which they transmit does not entirely undermine the basic credibility owed to the bare skeletal structure of events which forms the substructure of this tradition. Once stripped of 'Abbāsīd interpolations and prejudiced interpretations, this underlying structure of events will be seen to fit with the logic of the struggle between the historical Revolutionary legitimacy of the militarily weaker adherents to the doctrine of *al-riḍā*, and the legitimacy of triumph of the stronger militant faction which represented the victorious will of the independent-minded Khurāsāniyyah, who opted for a feeble figure-head who would owe his position to their favors. This category of sources includes Balādhurī, Ṭabarī, Ya'qūbī, Mas'ūdī, Jahshayārī and Azdī. Except for the relatively tempered and delicate phraseology of Madā'inī, in Ṭabarī, which does not drastically interfere with the overall plot of events, the tradition carried by these sources rests on the main allegation that Abū Salamah 'hid' the 'Abbāsīd troop and concealed their presence in Kūfah from the generals and the partisans until, by accident, one of these generals met a *mawlā* of the clan. The second category reflects a cautious and hesitant critique of the above tradition, delivered indirectly by diluting the conspiratorial tones in Abū Salamah's role, and by omitting any reference to the dramatic events associated with the accidental meeting and subsequent events. This is mainly offered by Dhahabī, who appears to have capitalized on Madā'inī's delicate phraseology. Certain aspects of Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā's account also belong to this category. The third category comprises few early and late sources which carry traditions diametrically opposed to the suggestion of a conspiratorial role played by Abū Salamah and narrate stories completely different from the one carried by sources of the first category. These include Dīnawarī, Ibn A'tham, one unique account by Dhahabī in *Sīyar*, and certain aspects of Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā's confused account. The three categories are critically examined at length in, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 217-34; and in the remainder of this present chapter.

<sup>3</sup> The exercise has been undertaken in part one, chapters VI and VII of the dissertation, which is the origin of this book. Independently, a number of readers have, however, concurred on criticizing these two chapters as being opaque, and distracting. I concur. Therefore, I decided to restructure—through omission, relocation,

look, cognizant of the socio-psychological dynamics that govern the modes of political conduct in the post-victory era of a coalitive revolutionary movement, may provide an insight through the thick camouflage superimposed on historical events by the 'Abbāsīd propaganda manipulations.

Within a revolutionary coalition which had been built around an agreement to seek consensus within a general framework of lowest common denominators, certain dynamics govern the behavior of the various players in the immediate aftermath of victory and during the crucial period of attempting to arrive at the desired consensus. Some players would probably be disposed to suspend their prejudices and honestly play the game by the rules, in faithful adherence to their pledges. Other players may be relatively secure in their knowledge—or their illusion—that their preferences are the preferences of the majority. These types of players tend to be the more relaxed, open and benevolent. They are normally oblivious or dismissive of what they deem to be an unnecessary application of factors of coercion. On the other hand, there may exist some players who harbor the will to override the basic agreement on seeking consensus, by imposing their own preference—especially if their preference is less likely to be that of the majority. When such players do exist, they tend to be more nervous, secretive and lethal, and they would normally try to mobilize and apply a battery of coercive factors. Such are the dicta of sociological and historical common sense. However, this is not how the all-pervasive historical 'doctoring' of the 'Abbāsīd tradition painted the situation in Kūfah during the period between its capture and the accession of Abū al-'Abbās al-Saffāh. Nor could it be expected to have done otherwise.

The 'Abbāsīd false claims had technically committed their later propagandists to perform a complete reversal of facts. By twisting the doctrine of *al-riḍā* into a code word standing for the 'Abbāsīd *Imām* in particular, they dislocated the Revolutionary legitimacy from seeking consensus to seeking the installation of an 'Abbāsīd. This reversal automatically placed Abū Salamah, along with the 'silent majority', in the nervous camp, which then, allegedly, sought to carry out its designs by secretive, conspiratorial means. By the same token, it placed the remote Abū Muslim, along with the operative lieutenants loyal to him in Kūfah, in the relaxed camp. Thus, in the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*, the three most logical consequences of the momentous and complex upheaval were transmuted into absurd occurrences:

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condensation, and relegating to footnote status. If I am wrong, it is my responsibility alone, and the cumbersome material, intact, is accessible in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 192-256.

(1) Abū Salamah's assumption of his role, by conducting consultations aiming at the selection of a *riḍā*, was transmuted into a childish conspiracy to abduct and hide the 'lawful' 'Abbāsīd *Imām*, and to transfer the fruits of the Revolution to the 'Alīds.

(2) The coup which installed al-Saffāh—a natural outcome of Abū Muslim's victory and his ability to project his military might in Kūfah—was painted as the happy result of a stroke of luck which restored 'poetic justice'.

(3) And, the elimination of the loser, Abū Salamah—an objective obtainment of the violent politics of revolutionary upheavals—was muddled beyond historical comprehension.

In the historiography of the clandestine phase, the formative forces of history had given way to the 'Abbāsīd apocalypitics. Now, at the outset of open history, these live and objective forces give way to ludicrousness.

## II. *Abū Salamah's Search for a Riḍā*

As far as the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* goes, there was no need to search for a *riḍā*, because *al-Riḍā* had all along been known, ever since Abū Hāshim ibn al-Ḥanafīyah bequeathed his 'inheritance' to Muḥammad ibn 'Alī the 'Abbāsīd; or, according to later elaborations, since Ibn al-Ḥārithīyah, i.e., Abū al-'Abbās, was born; or even earlier. Abū Salamah's dispensation of his duty, as the chief coordinator of the process of seeking the candidate most satisfactory to the Revolutionary coalition, must, therefore, be characterized as anything but what it truly was. Actually, Abū Salamah, after taking charge in Kūfah, settled into his required role. The 'Abbāsīd propaganda doctors would later take care of how the natural course of events should be reshaped and retold—as follows.

The 'Abbāsīd troop arrived in Kūfah sometime<sup>4</sup> after the Khurāsāniyyah had captured the city. 'Confident' of their being *the* Al

<sup>4</sup> In Ṣafār (Ṭabarī, III: p. 27; Mas'ūdi, IV: p. 97) or Muḥarram 132/August-September 749 (Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 345). The more probable is a date in Muḥarram close to, but after, the Khurāsāniyyah's arrival in town on Muḥarram 10/August 29 (Agha, 'Agents,' p. 214, cf. also pp. 206-13). Taken together, Balādhurī's statements, that the 'Abbāsīds had arrived in Kūfah before the Khurāsāniyyah, and stayed for forty days before Abū al-'Abbās was proclaimed caliph on 12 Rabī' II/28 November (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 122, 139, 141), do not add up; for this makes for a period of more than 90 days. The fact that the general tendency of the sources of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* is to shorten as much as possible the period between Abū al-'Abbās' availability in Kūfah and his accession (Ṭabarī makes it forty days, III: p. 27; others make it two months: Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 345; Mas'ūdi, IV: p. 97; Jahshayārī, pp. 85, 87) is in unison with the attempt to shorten the period between Ibrāhīm al-Imām's death, or the

Muḥammad, they 'innocently' sought out 'their' *wazīr*, only to fall in his 'trap'. The 'sinister' Abū Salamah 'hid' them for an extended period of time from those who, in the 'Abbāsīd cause, had "come out from the bottom of Khurāsān." Despite the Khurāsāniyyah's clamor, he persisted in denying the *Imām's* presence in the Khurāsāniyyah infested city!<sup>5</sup>

In the meantime, according to all varieties of the 'Abbāsīd version, Abū Salamah was actively involved in carrying out the more lethal part of his conspiracy. He had met in Kūfah with members of the 'Alīd Shī'ah and deliberated with them concerning the issue of transferring the fruits of the enterprise to the descendants of 'Alī, and specific names were mentioned.<sup>6</sup> He wrote to the most prominent two or three amongst them: Ja'far al-Šādiq ibn Muḥammad al-Bāqir ibn 'Alī Zayn al-'Ābidīn ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, and 'Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ ibn al-Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī;<sup>7</sup> other sources add a third, 'Umar al-Ashraf ibn 'Alī Zayn al-'Ābidīn ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī,<sup>8</sup> brother of the celebrated 'Alīd martyr, Zayd ibn 'Alī, and uncle of the above candidate, Ja'far al-Šādiq. Abū Salamah's messenger, Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Aslam, grandson of a *mawlā* of the Prophet,<sup>9</sup> went to al-Madīnah either twice, first to Ja'far al-Šādiq, then to 'Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ,<sup>10</sup> or only once, with all two or three letters, copies of the same text, and with the instructions to go first to Ja'far, then, if Ja'far declined, to 'Abd Allāh, and last to 'Umar.<sup>11</sup> The letter invited the first respondent of the three to come to Abū Salamah in Kūfah, so that he would transfer the *da'wah* to his benefit and make the people of Khurāsān pay homage to him. 'Umar, the third candidate to whom the invitation should not have arrived, since the second candidate responded favorably, is irrelevantly

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Revolutionaries' knowledge of it, and the succession of Abū al-'Abbās to the *Imāmate* (supra, Introduction). Both ploys were necessary to deal with the interregnum problem which plagued the 'Abbāsīd claims.

<sup>5</sup> Except for Sābiq al-Khwārizmī (who mysteriously enjoyed the gift of being unbound whenever his masters happened to be bound by the sinister—but stupid—anti-'Abbāsīd forces), the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* maintains that Abū al-'Abbās and his entourage were 'abducted' by the sinister Abū Salamah, who detained them in a secret place, and concealed the fact of their presence from their Shī'ah, from the time they had arrived until their Shī'ah rescued them and immediately proclaimed Abū al-'Abbās. (For the variations on this story, see: Khalīfah, II: p. 424; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 122, 139; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27, 34-5; Azdī, pp. 120-1; Jahshayārī, pp. 85-6; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 96-9; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 345-349; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 57). We shall not be detained further by this issue; for a full exposition of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* of these crucial events, see Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 198-234.

<sup>6</sup> Jahshayārī, p. 86; Azdī, pp. 120-1.

<sup>7</sup> Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 97-8; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 349.

<sup>8</sup> Jahshayārī, p. 86; Azdī, p. 121; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 154.

<sup>9</sup> Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 97.

<sup>10</sup> Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 349.

<sup>11</sup> Jahshayārī, p. 86; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 97-8; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 154.

given further attention only by Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā. He reportedly commented: "I do not know the sender that I may reply to him."<sup>12</sup>

The responses of the other two prominent candidates merit a closer look. If the report is essentially true—and there is no reason to reject the bare basic fact that Abū Salamah did communicate with the ‘Alīds—then the ‘Abbāsīd interpolations form an exquisite and almost flawless piece of propaganda. That Ja‘far al-Šādiq rejected the lure of the Revolution while Marwān II was still alive and fighting is perfectly compatible with the ideological and political position of the later Imāmiyyah Shī‘ites. Ja‘far himself was responsible for the elaboration of the doctrine of *taqiyyah* (dissimulation) under duress, which justified the pacifism which characterized the political conduct of his father, Muḥammad al-Bāqir, and his grandfather, ‘Alī Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. They had kept their relative peace with the Umayyads. Ja‘far also did the same with the Umayyads, as he soon would with the ‘Abbāsīds; and the political stance of the sect which evolved around this tradition would eventually be transformed into a prolonged act of peaceful waiting and expectancy of *al-Mahdī al-Muntazar*. Ja‘far was not to be expected to volunteer or to coalesce with revolution.

‘Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ, on the other hand, represented a different legacy. Although, ironically, he was a descendant of the pacifist al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib—not of his fire-brand martyr brother al-Ḥusayn, whose descendant is the now pacifist Ja‘far—to him and to his sons, Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah and Ibrāhīm, fell the legacy of the latest of the Ḥusaynid revolutionary martyrs, their cousins: Zayd ibn ‘Alī Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, Ja‘far’s uncle, and his son Yaḥyā ibn Zayd. Contrary to the pacifist policies of his father and his brother, Zayd had eventually risen in revolt and was martyred, followed by his son Yaḥyā. The Zaydite dogma of an active ‘Faṭimid’ *Imāmate*, and Zayd’s policy of mandatory revolt, were elaborated and perpetuated by Ḥasanid revolutionaries. The first to pick up the claim and actively resume Zayd’s struggle on behalf of the descendants of Fāṭimah was ‘Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ in the cause of his son, Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah. ‘Abd Allāh’s promotion of his son’s cause is reported to have started while the Umayyads were still reigning, and his efforts continued into the ‘Abbāsīd reigns of Abū al-‘Abbās and Abū Ja‘far, until armed revolt broke out, led by his sons, first Muḥammad and then Ibrāhīm. As the patriarch of the foremost and perhaps only ‘Alīd activist of the time, ‘Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ can be expected to have accepted Abū Salamah’s invitation.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

Thus far the report is acceptable; and the fact that Abū Salamah sounded out more than one 'Alīd, from both the Ḥasanid and Ḥusaynid lines, and from both the pacifist and militant 'denominations', plays into the argument that he was not particularly a partisan of any one specific contender, line, or intra-'Alīd factionalism; rather he was reaching out, in search for *al-riḍā min Āl-Muḥammad* in the most logical pool of potential candidates. Even Ja'far's comment on Abū Salamah's endeavor, as reported by al-Jahshayārī, that "the people of Khurāsān are not Shī'ites, and Abū Salamah is deluded and [shall be] slain,"<sup>13</sup> if it must be accepted, may be interpreted as a manifesto of his political analysis of the situation and his understanding of the real composition of the effective Khurāsānian base of the Revolution, together with its true motives and goals.

But the 'Abbāsīd interpolators did not miss such a golden opportunity; and an animated dramatic dialogue was fabricated between Ja'far and 'Abd Allāh, where only Ja'far's genealogical identity as an 'Alīd is preserved; but, beyond that, he is transformed into an unwitting 'Abbāsīd mouthpiece, confirming, in every utterance of his, the 'Abbāsīd claims of 'owning' the Organization, while 'Abd Allāh is depicted as a naive, gluttonous and opportunistic enthusiast, a mean donkey-rider who would not have any qualms about stealing the fruits of the efforts of others. Abū Salamah's messenger informed Ja'far that he was dispatched by Abū Salamah, and gave him the letter:

Ja'far said: 'What is [the connection between] me and Abū Salamah? Abū Salamah is someone else's partisan (*Shī'ah li-ghayrī*).' The messenger said: 'I am but a messenger; you read his letter and answer him as you see fit.' [Ja'far burnt the letter] and said to the messenger: 'Inform your master of what you have seen.' ... The messenger went to 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan and gave him the letter, so he kissed [or accepted (*qabbala, or qabila*)] it and read it and was overjoyed by it. On the next day ... 'Abd Allāh mounted a donkey to the house of ... Ja'far al-Šādiq ... [Ja'far] said: 'Oh, Abū Muḥammad! Something [of consequence must have] brought you!' ['Abd Allāh] said: 'Yes, it is too momentous to be described.' [Ja'far] said: 'What is it Oh Abū Muḥammad?' ['Abd Allāh] said: 'This is Abū Salamah's letter inviting me to what he [controls], our Shī'ah of the people of Khurāsān have come to him.' [Ja'far] said: 'Oh Abū Muḥammad! Since when were the people of Khurāsān partisans of yours (*shī'ah laka*)? Was it you who sent Abū Muslim to Khurāsān? Was it you who ordered him to don black [clothes]? And those who came to Iraq, was it you who was the reason they came, or who sent for them? And do you know anyone of them?' 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan argued with him until he said: 'Indeed, the [Revolutionaries] want my son Muḥammad because he is the *mahdī* of

<sup>13</sup> Jahshayārī, p. 86.

this nation.’ Ja‘far said unto him: ‘By God, he is not the *mahdī* of this nation; and, if he draws his sword, he shall be slain.’ ‘Abd Allāh argued with him until he said: ‘By God, nothing but envy prevents you from [admitting] that.’ [Ja‘far] said: ‘By God, this is but sincere advice from me to you. Abū Salamah has written to me with [an invitation] similar to what he has written to you, but his messenger did not find with me what he found with you; and I burnt his letter before reading it.’ ‘Abd ‘Allāh left Ja‘far’s place in anger. Abū Salamah’s messenger did not reach him until al-Saffāh had been proclaimed.<sup>14</sup>

The last statement is perhaps one of the truest in the above account. Consultations, led by Abū Salamah, but conceivably much wider than reported, and aimed at implementing the doctrine of *al-riḍā*, were aborted. Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, whether or not he intended it, formulates the eventual outcome in an obliquely curt statement, a blend of the passive voice and a no less ambiguous active voice sentence, where the action and the agent of the action require further definition: “*thumma ghuliba Abū Salamah ‘alā ra’yih, wa-‘amalat al-da‘wah ‘amalahā, wa-būyī‘a al-Saffāh* (then Abū Salamah was prevailed over in his view, and the *da‘wah* performed [or, perpetrated] its act, and homage was paid to al-Saffāh).”<sup>15</sup> What the ‘act’ exactly was, and what forces within the *da‘wah* brought about this outcome, Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā does not say; but other sources do.<sup>16</sup>

### III. *The ‘Abbāsīd Coup*

#### III.1 *The Unfolding of the Drama According to the ‘Abbāsīd Riwāyah*

The outline of the plot is simple, and very naive. The generals accidentally found out Abū al ‘Abbās’ ‘detention’ place and immediately paid homage to him and proclaimed his accession. But the details and the drama, with its variations and personages, are intensely interesting and significant.

The five major players are: two *mawlās* from Abū al-‘Abbās’ entourage, and three generals from the Khurāsāniyyah who were encamped with Abū Salamah at Ḥammām A‘yan on the outskirts of Kūfah. They are, in order of appearance: Abū Ḥumayd Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥimyarī al-Marwrūdhī al-Ṭūsī al-Samarqandī (no. 272),

<sup>14</sup> Mas‘ūdī, IV: pp. 97-8; cf. Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rikh* II: p. 349; Jahshayārī, p. 86; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, pp. 154-5.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

<sup>16</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf* III, p. 139; Madā’inī in Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27-8; and Ṭabarī, III: pp. 34-7; Azdī, p. 121; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rikh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Mas‘ūdī, IV: pp. 98-9; Jahshayārī, pp. 86-7.

Sābiq al-Khwārizmī (no. 44), Abū al-Jahm ibn 'Aṭīyyah (no. 85), Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah (no. 26), and Mūsā ibn Ka'b (no. 292). Abū Ḥumayd is reported to have been an ethnic Arab only by Ibn al-Kalbī. Nothing much can be made from the confusion arising from giving him three different geographic affiliations. Later roles ascribed to him depict him as an 'Abbāsīd loyalist rather than as an Abū Muslimite. He was a veteran of the Organization and one of the seventy *du'āt*. Sābiq al-Khwārizmī, a black *mawlā*, had featured in some dubious roles: as the unbound *mawlā* of the captive Ibrāhīm al-Imām, the only witness to Ibrāhīm's *waṣīyyah*, and the foremost confidant of Abū al-'Abbās in his planning to leave Ḥumaymah.<sup>17</sup> If one is prone to seek conspiratorial signs in these mysterious coincidences and inexplicable situations, one is tempted to assume for Sābiq a role much greater than what the explicit texts allow. A straightforward hint, however, does seem to corroborate the suspicion that Sābiq was an Abū Muslim 'plant', or liaison, in the 'Abbāsīd household, perhaps with standing instructions as to what he should do in certain circumstances. Jahshayārī identifies him as a *ghulām*, a slave, whom they, i.e., the people of Khurāsān, had given to Ibrāhīm al-Imām as a gift.<sup>18</sup> Abū al-Jahm, a *mawlā* of Bāhilah, was Abū Muslim's man, and his spy on Qaḥṭabah all through his campaign, and in the 'Abbāsīd court until Abū Ja'far reportedly killed him. Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah was a *mawlā* and a liaison between Ḥumaymah, where he was assigned to reside, and the Kūfan Organization. Mūsā was the highest-ranking general in the drama, an ethnic Arab, and one of the twelve *naqībs*. His specific ideological identity within the coalition, if not lacking, is very difficult to ascertain; and his political loyalties were always bland. He appears to have been willing to unquestioningly lend his distinguished services and celebrated veteran status to the party within the Organization who had the upper hand or the established legitimacy. It must be remembered that when Abū Salamah, two or three months before this episode, had asked Abū Muslim to send military support to Abū 'Awn, Mūsā was at Rayy with his forces. Abū Muslim ordered Mūsā to dispatch his son to Abū 'Awn, and himself to report to Abū Muslim at his Marw headquarters.<sup>19</sup> Now, during these events, he was at the military camp of Ḥammām A'yan in Kūfah.

One day Abū Ḥumayd left the camp to the city, or specifically to Kunāsah.<sup>20</sup> By mere chance he came across a *ghulām* of the 'Abbāsīds,<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Akhbār*, pp. 402-409-10; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27, 34-5; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 123, 139; Azdī, p. 121; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 95, 98-9; Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 200-3.

<sup>18</sup> Jahshayārī, pp. 86-7.

<sup>19</sup> *Akhbār*, p. 378.

<sup>20</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 34; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 98-9; Jahshayārī, p. 86.

none other than Sābiq,<sup>22</sup> and a suckling-brother of Abū al-‘Abbās’, namely Ṣāliḥ ibn al-Haytham,<sup>23</sup> one of their *mawālī* who had left Ḥumaymah with them. Abū Ḥumayd recognized them because he used to visit the *Imām*; or he recognized Sābiq because he was a slave they had given as a gift to the *Imām*. He enquired about the ‘Abbāsīd household. Abū Ḥumayd (and by extension the entire Khurāsāniyyah) had either known of Ibrāhīm’s demise, in which case his enquiry was about Abū al-‘Abbās, alias Ibn al-Ḥārithiyyah,<sup>24</sup> or he had not, in which case his enquiry was about Ibrāhīm himself, and Abū Ḥumayd, only then, learned of Ibrāhīm’s slaying and the succession of Abū al-‘Abbās to the *Imāmate*.<sup>25</sup> The description of the encounter ranges from the synoptic statements of al-Ya‘qūbī, Madā’inī, Azdī and al-Jahshayārī, to the more detailed recountings of Balādhurī and Ṭabarī, and culminates with the vivid dramatization of al-Mas‘ūdī:

[Abu Ḥumayd] asked [Sābiq] about Ibrāhīm al-Imām. [Sābiq] said: ‘Marwan [II] killed him in prison.’ Marwān, at the time, had been in Ḥarrān. Abū Ḥumayd said: ‘In whose favor is the *wasīyyah*?’ [Sābiq] said: ‘His brother, Abū al-‘Abbās.’ [Abū Ḥumayd] said: ‘And where is he?’ [Sābiq] said: ‘With you in Kūfah, he and his brother and a group of his uncles and members of his family.’ [Abū Ḥumayd] said: ‘Since when have they been here?’ Sābiq said: ‘Since two months’.<sup>26</sup>

In the meantime, Abū al-‘Abbās had dispatched Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah to the military camp with a message. Ibrāhīm entered the camp in disguise and went directly to none other than Abū al-Jahm. He first asked him for a promise of security, which was granted. Then he told Abū al-Jahm that he was Abū al-‘Abbās’ messenger; he told him of the ‘Abbāsīd troop and their location, and that Abū al-‘Abbās had sent him to Abū Salamah asking for a hundred dīnārs to pay the camel-driver who had brought them to Kūfah, and that Abū Salamah had not sent the money.<sup>27</sup> Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah would now stay in the camp to join the next stage of the action, or, according to Madā’inī, he would at that stage make his first appearance in this episode.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, II: pp. 345, 349.

<sup>22</sup> Madā’inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27; and Ṭabarī, III: p. 34; Mas‘ūdī, IV: pp. 98-9; Jahshayārī, p. 86; Azdī, p. 121.

<sup>23</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139.

<sup>24</sup> Azdī, p. 121; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139; Madā’inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, II: pp. 345, 349.

<sup>25</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 35; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 99; cf. Jahshayārī, p. 87.

<sup>26</sup> Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 99; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139; Ṭabarī, III: p. 35.

<sup>27</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 35.

<sup>28</sup> Madā’inī in Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27-8.

Immediately concluding the chance encounter, Abū Ḥumayd went with Sābiq to Abū al-'Abbās,<sup>29</sup> or he asked Sābiq to take him there, and Sābiq, not wishing to disclose the 'Abbāsids' location without their permission, gave him an appointment for the morrow.<sup>30</sup> In all cases, Abū Ḥumayd went to Abū al-Jahm with his discovery—he either took Sābiq to him,<sup>31</sup> or Sābiq and Ṣālih Ibn al-Haytham,<sup>32</sup> or the news of his appointment with Sābiq,<sup>33</sup> or a first-hand report of his audience with Abū al 'Abbās.<sup>34</sup>

Whichever it may have been, the ball was now with Abū al-Jahm, apparently Abū Ḥumayd's immediate operative superior in the official ranks and/or in the para-Organization circle of Abū Muslim loyalists. Now, Abū al-Jahm either went immediately to Abū al-'Abbās, accompanied by Abū Ḥumayd, Sābiq, and Ṣālih ibn al-Haytham,<sup>35</sup> or he dispatched Abū Ḥumayd with Sābiq to the 'Abbāsids,<sup>36</sup> or awaited Abū Ḥumayd's return from his appointment with Sābiq.<sup>37</sup> Abū Ḥumayd came back and brought with him Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah, who conveyed to Abū al-Jahm the location of their residence and their complaint against Abū Salamah.<sup>38</sup> Now, Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah was firmly on the scene, whether by Madā'inī's or Ṭabarī's account.

Mūsā, according to Ya'qūbī, Jahshayārī and Mas'ūdī, had been immediately informed of the discovery, along with Abū al-Jahm and a number of other officers.<sup>39</sup> But, according to Madā'inī and Ṭabarī,<sup>40</sup> the news was not relayed to him until Abū al-Jahm could apparently muster a good argument. Abū al-Jahm and Abū Ḥumayd then went to Mūsā with the enraging information about Abū Salamah's treachery, and with Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah as corroborator. Even then, Mūsā appears to have been hesitant; he moved with a considerable measure of deliberateness. He did not immediately storm to Abū al-'Abbās. He only ordered that two hundred dīnārs be sent to him, a sum which Abū al-Jahm gave to Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah. It took further action by Abū al-Jahm to persuade Mūsā to make the decisive move. He pressed the issue with Abū

<sup>29</sup> Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Jahshayārī, p. 86.

<sup>30</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 35; Azdī, p. 121; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

<sup>31</sup> Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27.

<sup>32</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139.

<sup>33</sup> Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

<sup>34</sup> Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Jahshayārī, p. 87.

<sup>35</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139.

<sup>36</sup> Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27.

<sup>37</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 35-6.

<sup>38</sup> Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27.

<sup>39</sup> Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 349; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

<sup>40</sup> Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 35.

Salamah, asking him about the *Imām*, and Abū Salamah stayed his course of denial.<sup>41</sup> In the hitherto most strikingly open confrontation between Abū Salamah and the Khurāsāniyyah,

Abū al-Jahm said to Abū Salamah, after the news of Marwān ibn Muḥammad's slaying of the *Imām* had spread in the camp: 'If he is slain, then his brother Abū al-'Abbās is the caliph and the *Imām* after him.' Abū Salamah replied: 'O Abū al-Jahm! Prevent Abū Ḥumayd from entering Kūfah, for they are people of malice and false rumors'.<sup>42</sup>

Abū al-Jahm went back to Mūsā with the further enraging news of Abū Salamah's obstinate denial.<sup>43</sup>

The next night, Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah came back to the camp with a letter from Abū al-'Abbās to Abū al-Jahm and Mūsā; and this time he wandered with his news amongst the generals and the 'Shī'ah'.<sup>44</sup> Now, conceivably, Mūsā could not postpone matters any longer. He met in his house with the other generals, and they resolved to go to Abū al-'Abbās.<sup>45</sup> The next day they 'slipped away' from the camp to Kūfah, i.e., to Abū al-'Abbās; their leaders were, in order of seniority, Mūsā, Abū al-Jahm, and Abū Ḥumayd;<sup>46</sup> or, in another account, at the helm was the singular and ceremonial Mūsā.<sup>47</sup>

There was now open mutiny in the camp. Abū Salamah learned of the riding party and enquired about them; he was told that they went to Kūfah on some business of theirs. When they came back, Abū Salamah sent for Abū al-Jahm and asked him: "Where have you been, O Abū al-Jahm?" Abū al-Jahm curtly replied: "I rode to my *Imām*."<sup>48</sup>

The reports of the generals' meeting with Abū al-'Abbās, and of their paying homage to him, span the range from dignified and serene "greetings with the title of the caliphate,"<sup>49</sup> to the melodramatic crying and kissing of the *Imām* between the eyes and on his hands and feet.<sup>50</sup> But they are unanimous in that the generals did not know who, amongst the 'Abbāsids, Abū al-'Abbās was. Invariably they asked: "Who of you is Abū al-'Abbās," or 'the caliph', or 'the *Imām*'? But most interesting is the

<sup>41</sup> Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28.

<sup>42</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 35-6.

<sup>43</sup> Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28.

<sup>44</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 36.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.; cf. Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28.

<sup>46</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 36.

<sup>47</sup> Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

<sup>48</sup> Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; and Ṭabarī, III: p. 36.

<sup>49</sup> Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 36-7; Ya'qubī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 59; Dhahabī, *Tārikh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336.

<sup>50</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Ṭabarī, III: p. 35; Azdī, p. 121; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

wide reference to him as Ibn al-Ḥārithiyah, his distinguishing name, the name by which he is referred to in the apocalyptic traditions, that which distinguished him from Abū Ja'far, his brother by another woman, who carried the same name, 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad.<sup>51</sup>

The generals took the necessary military measures to secure the temporary caliphal residence and to ensure that Abū Salamah would not be able to enter with a threatening company. Abū al-Jahm's explicit orders to Abū Ḥumayd were to execute Abū Salamah should he refuse to enter alone.<sup>52</sup> Abū Salamah came in a hurry, saying: "You acted too soon; I hope it is all for the best."<sup>53</sup> Abū Ḥumayd obscenely insulted him, and Abū al-'Abbās magnanimously objected to the insult.<sup>54</sup> Abū Salamah apologized, trying to make his case by saying that he only wanted to "consolidate the matter for *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*,"<sup>55</sup> he knelt down towards the *qiblah*, and then kissed Abū al-'Abbās' hands and feet.<sup>56</sup> Abū al-'Abbās' act of forgiveness was one more opportunity to depict Abū Salamah's actual ideological position as a mere revisionist lapse; said Abū al-'Abbās:

We forgave you, O Abū Salamah! You [shall] not be reproached; your entitlement is greatly recognized by us; your [favorable] precedence in our realm is praiseworthy, and your lapse is forgiven. Go to your camp lest disorder befall it.<sup>57</sup>

Madā'inī and Ṭabarī, however, do not relate such a dramatic encounter. In their accounts, Abū Salamah simply greeted Abū al-'Abbās by the title of the caliphate.<sup>58</sup>

### III.2 *Exposing the 'Abbāsīd Rūwāyah and Reconstructing a Plausible Scenario*

This bewildering array of details (which cross, intersect and run parallel to one another, sometimes in contradiction, sometimes in complimentary constellations, and sometimes neither necessarily contradictory nor conceivably complementary) is a camouflage. Part of

<sup>51</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: p. 139; Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Azdī, p. 121; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 345; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 59; Dhahabī, *Tārikh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 146. And as Shaban correctly remarks: 'make no mistake', the caliph sought was the one of the two brothers who was born to the woman from the Banū al-Ḥārith, 'Ibn al-Ḥārithiyah', (Shaban, *Islamic History II*, p. 2).

<sup>52</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 36; cf. Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: pp. 139-40; Jahshayārī, p. 87.

<sup>53</sup> Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 345.

<sup>54</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 140; Ṭabarī, III: p. 28-9.

<sup>55</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 140.

<sup>56</sup> Jahshayārī, p. 87.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.; cf. Azdī, p. 123.

<sup>58</sup> Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 36.

this confusion is intentional, and, yet, part of it may be owing to the nature of the impaired retentiveness of oral transmission. Very few of these variant details can be critically examined in order to be either accepted or rejected. The suggestion that Ibrāhīm's death was still unknown to the Khurāsāniyyah until they met Sābiq, and some of the conspicuous melodramatic exaggerations, may be pointed out as examples of such few details. And, even when such critical examination is possible, not much can be made out. The intentional part of this confusion is only a part of what undermines the veracity of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. But this is not to say that it was created *ex nihilo*. A great measure of truth about what actually happened is preserved in some of the logistics buried in this maze. However, trying to determine what really happened by sifting through this maze is like trying to pick the authentic trail from amongst innumerable pseudo-tracks left, on a wind-swept sandy terrain, by the haphazard wanderings of lost travelers and by the intentional misleads of obliterators. Impossible as it is, such an attempt is also not necessary; for, the general direction of events and the commanding landmarks are still extant, although submerged under the haze of a major falsehood. So pervasive was this falsehood that no measure of comparative historiographical examination can unearth the solid truth. Only by resorting to commonsense can the haze be dispelled and a semblance of reasonableness restored to the events of the period.

The rather unbelievable allegation of the chance encounter at Kunāsah ending Abū Salamah's conspiracy of detention, concealment, and denial, does not stand up to the simple question: was Abū Salamah a moron? If he meant to keep the news of the 'Abbāsīds' presence from the Khurāsāniyyah, how could he detain the princes and let loose their *mawālī* and messengers free to roam the Khurāsāniyyah infested Kūfah, bearing physical witness to the fact he so desperately tried to conceal, and carrying their masters' messages and news of their ordeal even to the heart of the military camp? A moron Abū Salamah was not; and the 'Abbāsīd mendacity proves so very transparent and naive. The very choice of Sābiq, with his amazing mobility when his masters happen to be detained, is indicatively reminiscent of his carrying Ibrāhīm's letter and bearing verbal witness in favor of al-Saffāh, under the glare of Marwān II's men. With the exposure of this falsehood, the whole 'Abbāsīd 'dressing' of the events of the period collapses.

There was no detention; nor was there a prolonged period of concealment and denial during which the 'doped' Khurāsāniyyah were helplessly waiting for Abū Salamah and innocently nagging him to produce for them their pre-anointed *Imām*. Nor did Abū Salamah enjoy an empty turf where he went about, under the unsuspecting gaze of the

Khurāsāniyyah, carrying out his conspiracies to transfer the fruit of their struggle to an *Imām* of his own choice, to the exclusion of the *Imām* in whose name they had launched their Revolution. Nor, in the final analysis, was Abū Salamah, whatever his endeavors may have been, at odds with the entire leadership structure of the Organization. That is to say, the coup perpetrators, who allegedly discovered and proclaimed al-Saffāḥ were the party which did not represent the historic Organization. The actual 'ingredients' of the situation were two trends represented by two wings: (1) the trend faithful to the established strategy of the historic Organization, i.e., keeping their options open until victory, then seeking a *nida*; and, (2), the secret and unsanctioned revisionist strategy—that of wresting final control and proclaiming a caliph who would fit into the designs of the power which had, only three years earlier, wrested decisive but only regional control of the Organization. The first trend was physically represented by Abū Salamah and others who were later either slain or silenced. The second trend was represented by Abū Muslim's men in Kūfah.

The eligible candidates, for whom the representatives of the first trend would naturally look, were mostly in the Ḥijāz, in al-Madīnah. And the 'Abbāsids alone were in Kūfah—their physical presence very much in sight, their appetite for the hunt very much honed, and their lure to Abū Muslim's wing very much vociferous, let alone its being sanctioned by Abū Muslim's standing instructions to his men. But the 'Abbāsids had nothing going for them except the will of Abū Muslim's wing, which, indeed, was backed by the necessary military power, but which also lacked the sufficient historical Revolutionary legitimacy.

Victory afforded both wings an open turf for the race. But, on the same open turf, two completely different agendas were competing: an unsuspecting open agenda, against a cunning hidden agenda.

Abū Salamah's agenda naturally required time and open consultations toward the building of a consensus. His communications with the 'Alīds of al-Madīnah must have been in full sight of the entire military leadership of the Khurāsāniyyah; and Abū Muslim's men must have given his efforts lip-service consent. The content of his communications could not have been an invitation to accept the office, whereby, if the first accepted, the remaining two would be excluded ... etc. This is too assuming and childishly unpolitic. Nor could it have been, as Shaban suggests, an offer of "the office of Amīr al-Mu'minīn on certain conditions."<sup>59</sup> Such multipartite negotiations could not, and,

<sup>59</sup> Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 164.

even with our modern facilities today, cannot be conducted by correspondence. What if one or more of the invited candidates replied with conditional acceptance, or had some comments or enquiries? It, most probably, was an attempt by Abū Salamah to convene, in Kūfah, a *Shūrā* conclave where all the candidates would be present before the 'electoral body', i.e., before those who would seek informed satisfaction, on the basis of which they would chose a *riḍā*. Abū Salamah's communications with the three 'Alīds must have been mere invitations for them to be present in Kūfah for this purpose. Abū Salamah was not the conspiring party working in the dark; after all, what good would it do him to try to impose a caliph whose installation he could not ratify with the seal of necessary force!

The hidden agenda of Abū Muslim's wing also required time to implement, but time of a different quality. Although they controlled the most effective military force, in terms of sheer numbers within the rank-and-file of the Khurāsāniyyah, and in terms of unity of purpose and solidarity in the ranks of the leaders of the close-knit clique which was aware of its distinct partisan identity, they did not command, in this capacity, the loyalties of the Kūfan, mainly 'Alīd Shī'ite public opinion; and they did not control the different perceptions amongst many sectors of the established *mawālī* veterans of the Organization; and, above all, they were not sure of the positions of the Arab contingents of the army and their senior Arab leaders. Negotiating this state of affairs required time, if not to secure control over all pertinent factors, then at least to shore up the situation within the army—enough to preclude a disastrous rift in the ranks. Unlike the open deliberations of Abū Salamah, their movements had to be in the dark. And, when the time came, their blow had to be administered swiftly, resolutely, irrevocably.

Mūsā ibn Ka'b had been recalled from Rayy to Marw around two months before the decisive move—no doubt to be handled by Abū Muslim personally, by persuasion, coercion or other means. His cooperation must have been secured, for he was immediately sent to Kūfah. There, he was the highest ranking officer, and the most senior veteran present in the ranks, a leader whose Arab descent and celebrated stature as a *naqīb* qualified him to play the role of a statesman, thus lending respectability to the movement and counterbalancing Abū Salamah's historical legitimacy and esteemed stature. Meanwhile, Abū al-Jahm must have been busy with Abū Ḥumayd and other members of their wing in recruiting other officers. The 'Abbāsids themselves, especially through their own men, such as Sābiq, Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah and Ṣālih ibn al-Haytham, were probably directly involved in these

efforts, conceivably dispensing promises of future favors and prominent appointments in the regime-to-be, as indeed came to pass.

The absence from the field of military powers such as, especially, the majority of the Ṭayyī' contingent, and of Arab men of stature, such as al-Ḥasan and Ḥumayd, sons of Qaḥṭabah, may have made it all the easier for Abū Muslim's men to recruit some Ṭā'īd Arab celebrities and *mawālī*.<sup>60</sup> Other officers reported to have taken part in the final move may have also been members of the 'council' of leaders who met at Mūsā's house the night before. They were a mix of confirmed Abū Muslim loyalists,<sup>61</sup> and other officers whose original loyalties cannot be ascertained and who were, therefore, either new recruits to the 'council' or originally Abū Muslim loyalists.<sup>62</sup>

Thus, the eventful period did witness an extensive clandestine operation, but it was not Abū Salamah's. On the contrary, what was kept as a supremely guarded secret was not the 'Abbāsīd presence and location, but rather the very early establishment of contact between them and Abū Muslim's men, and their joint efforts to secure a wide military coalition to support their move. With this simple and obvious readjustment of the later 'Abbāsīd dislocation of secretiveness, all the makings of an Abū Muslim-'Abbāsīd coup become manifest, even in, or especially in, all the component accounts of the 'Abbāsīd version. The rest of the jumbled details can be taken in any sequence, order or combination that may provide the most sensible and coherent process, but they would not be anything more than the remnants of the record of communications among the coup perpetrators.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Such as: Abū Ghānim 'Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Ribī (no.104), 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Uthmān (no.100), Salamah ibn Muḥammad and Salm *mawālā* Qaḥṭabah (nos.326 and 329, the two were probably the same person).

<sup>61</sup> Such as: Abū Sharāḥīl (no.82), a non-Arab and the leader of the slaves contingent, Muḥammad ibn Ṣūl (no.275), a *mawālā* who was dispatched by Abū Muslim to Kūfah after it had been captured, 'Abd Allāh ibn Bassām (no.95), probably a member of the Bassām family, the *mawālī* of Naṣr ibn Sayyār who betrayed him, and uncle of Aḥlām ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām (no.119), who claimed to have killed Qaḥṭabah, Ḥājib ibn Ṣaddān (no.163), probably a non-Arab, and Abū Muqāṭil al-Khurāsānī (no.74), probably a non-Arab.

<sup>62</sup> As most probably was the case with the majority of them: Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥuṣayn al-'Abdī (no.271), Nahār ibn Ḥuṣayn al-Sa'dī (no.297), Abū Hurayrah Muḥammad ibn Farrūkh (no.259), a *mawālā*, Ishāq ibn Ibrāhīm (no.209), Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥārith (no.260), Shabīb ibn Wāj al-Marwūdī (no.320), Sulaymān ibn al-Aswad (no.334), and Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad (no.370).

<sup>63</sup> It is interesting to note the striking parallelisms even with modern coups, complete with the unwitting respectable senior officer in the facade, the strong junior officer holding the reins in his shadow, and the other executive and field officers—members of the standard 'Revolutionary Command Council.'

Nor was it merely a superficial coup d'état involving a faction of the same ruling elite. It was a much more profound movement. Under the circumstances of Abū Muslim holding the overwhelming military edge, it was an inevitable extension, and the final triumph of the grass-roots Revolution within the Organization, which Abū Muslim had led three years earlier. Abū Salamah was swept away in the wake of the successful implementation of Abū Muslim's ideological revisionism—not the other way around.

It was also a premeditated and preconceived coup. Planning for the coup must have been the subject of continuous communications between Abū Muslim and Abū al-Jahm. It is probably not too far-fetched to suggest that a rough and general master plan had been drafted between Abū Muslim and Abū al-Jahm in Marw. Abū al-Jahm would have thus received his strategic standing instructions, on which he could only tactically improvise, even before he had marched with Qaḥṭabah. Shaban's suggestion that "the decision to nominate Abū al-'Abbās was taken on the spot by Abū al-Jahm,"<sup>64</sup> and that "Abū Muslim must have consented to this action because it was accomplished through the manipulation of his agent in Kūfah,"<sup>65</sup> cannot be accepted.<sup>66</sup> Abū al-Jahm, a *mawlā* of Bāhilah and a crony of Abū Muslim's, did not have a known intrinsic power base of his own. Neither could he have taken such a decision of his own accord; nor could such a momentous decision have been left by Abū Muslim to the discretion of his representative; nor did any of them have to. Certain guidelines must have existed, and, realistically, nothing precluded that.

Abū Muslim's relation-of-sorts with Ibrāhīm and the House of al-'Abbās readily points out the kind of standing instructions Abū al-Jahm must have received before leaving Khurāsān. As far as nominating Abū al-'Abbās specifically from amongst others in the House of al-'Abbās, this feat also could not have occurred without Abū Muslim's prior approval. It is more likely that Abū Muslim himself was responsible for

<sup>64</sup> Shaban, *Islamic History II*, p. 2.

<sup>65</sup> Shaban, *'Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 165-6.

<sup>66</sup> Shaban demonstrates a profound understanding of the real meaning of the doctrine of *al-riḍā* as an 'important ideal of the Revolution,' and an appreciation of Abū Salamah's 'endeavoring to find *al-riḍā*.' Yet, he simply attributes the grave and strategic action which aborted Abū Salamah's efforts to superficial factors: '... the military leaders [in Kūfah], assured by their success, had no patience for the deliberations of the vastly experienced Abū Salamah. Their political experience was limited ... they decided ... to take matters into their own hands ...' (Shaban, *Islamic History II*, p. 1; cf. Shaban, *'Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 165). Further obscuring the issue, Shaban inexplicably accepts the *'Abbāsīd riwāyah* which claims an uninterrupted 'Abbāsīd leadership of the Organization since 98/716, under Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, up to 132/749, under Abū al-'Abbās (Shaban, *'Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 150-3, 164)! See, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 252-6.

the specific nomination. Ibrāhīm's likelier early death, in the course of 130-131/748-749, resolves any possible misgivings. But even if Ibrāhīm died as late as Muḥarram 132/August-September 749, it would still have allowed Abū al-Jahm enough time, around two to three months, to confer with Abū Muslim and to receive his specific instructions—the theatrics of Abū Ḥumayd's belated discovery of Ibrāhīm's death notwithstanding. Alternatively, nothing precludes the possibility that Mūsā ibn Ka'b brought Abū Muslim's instructions with him to Kūfah.

#### IV. *The Demise of the Organization*

##### IV.1 *In the Aftermath of the Coup: A Precarious Power-Sharing Arrangement*

Abū Salamah had held the reins of power, 'single-handedly', for two and a half months,<sup>67</sup> or probably a couple of weeks more. Except for the fact that Āl Muḥammad, whose *wazīr* he had been, had now been forcibly narrowed down to Āl al-'Abbās, the immediate aftermath of the coup brought no visible drastic changes to his public and official status. The coup perpetrators were, for the moment, content with having had their way regarding the installation of the new dynasty. Indeed, according to the principles to which all parties within the Organization still publicly adhered, Abū Salamah must have still enjoyed a good standing; at least, his opponents had nothing on him, i.e., nothing that could stand against him in a Revolutionary tribunal. In a 'court' of 'public opinion' in Kūfah, and within Arab and veteran contingents of the Khurāsāniyyah, had matters been immediately brought to a head, Abū Salamah would have probably been found to be the wronged party; and it appears that this was still the case up to the moment of his elimination. For the time being, the coup perpetrators appear to have decided that, since Abū Salamah himself made no waves, the most prudent course of action would be not to rock the boat, and to maintain a semblance of unity behind the new caliph.

Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā's assertion that Abū Salamah's pre-proclamation position had not been known to al-Saffāḥ until later, after he had confirmed Abū Salamah as his *wazīr*, cannot, obviously, be entertained.<sup>68</sup> Dīnawarī's unique tradition is also unacceptable. In consistency with his account of an amicable relation between the two parties, Dīnawarī depicts an absolute 'Abbāsīd confidence in Abū Salamah, and thus reports that Abū al-'Abbās, after consolidating his

<sup>67</sup> Jahshayārī, p. 87.

<sup>68</sup> Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

power, appointed him as his *wazīr*, in charge of “everything beyond his door ... so that he used to carry out matters without consultation.”<sup>69</sup> It is also unlikely that Abū al-‘Abbās declared his forgiveness of the loser,<sup>70</sup> who was alleged to be visibly ‘despondent’ during the proclamation procession;<sup>71</sup> for, at least publicly, there was nothing to forgive. The animated attempt by some sources, to fuse a great measure of sincerity into al-Saffāh’s declared forgiveness of Abū Salamah, is a complex but transparent attempt to instill the belief that Abū Salamah did wrong the lawful *Imām*, to prove the *Imām*’s magnanimity, and to exonerate him from the suspicion of complicity in an act which must have been seen, at least by some, as disgraceful. This same tradition, carried at variance in detail by these sources, inexplicably portrays al-Saffāh as being full of *schadenfreude* upon learning of Abū Salamah’s assassination, and, at the same time, describes his real disposition in an articulate, and more politically feasible statement: “[Abū Salamah] assumed the post of [al-Saffāh’s] *wazīr*, while [one or the other or both of them mutually] secreted in the heart a grudge (*wazara lahu wa-fi al-nafs shay*).”<sup>72</sup> The likelihood is that both men had a grudge against one another, but each had to swallow his grievance. An equilibrium of sorts still governed the situation; so much so that the tactical move of al-Saffāh to the military camp did not dislodge Abū Salamah from the distinguished quarters of command. In a further show of harmony, they shared the quarters.<sup>73</sup>

Thus, Abū Salamah’s assumption of the post of *wazīr al-Saffāh* was on the surface a qualified continuation by inertia of his rather absolute designation as *wazīr Āl Muḥammad*, and, apparently, the old title was maintained. Although we possess no ‘job description’ of Abū Salamah’s office after al-Saffāh’s accession, his previous, almost absolute authority, is not likely to have been retained. Ibn A‘tham’s account of an inconsiderate and tyrannical Abū Salamah cannot be entertained.<sup>74</sup> The military coup leaders must have acquired, on behalf of Abū Muslim, considerable *de facto* powers. But no official distribution of jurisdiction was yet possible in the context of the situation which was still in a state of flux.

<sup>69</sup> Dīnawarī, p. 368.

<sup>70</sup> Azdī, p. 123; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 115; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: pp. 7-8; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

<sup>71</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 140.

<sup>72</sup> Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 7; cf. Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 115; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

<sup>73</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 37; Azdī, p. 124; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 100.

<sup>74</sup> Ibn A‘tham, VII: pp. 208-9.

On the surface, a complex tripartite equation of power sharing appears to have emerged. In reality it was not so complex.

(1) The first element of the equation was Abū Muslim and his protégés in Kūfah. In Khurāsān and the rest of the Persian territories, he enjoyed uncontested absolute mastery. His men in Kūfah were acquiring what powers they could readily and gradually amass from the disintegrating domain of Abū Salamah.

(2) The second element, the ostensibly still unviolated historical Revolutionary legitimacy represented by Abū Salamah, had definitely lost the battle. It would only be a matter of few months before the results of the silent battle would be physically translated into spilled blood.

(3) The third element was the hitherto unknown quantum of the new royal family. Potentially, they were the germ of the future antithesis which will emerge in the dialectics of the struggle for supreme power. But that still required years of 'fermentation' before the shattered Umayyad instruments of power, and the leaderless non-Abū Muslimate elements of the Khurāsāniyyah, would re-group and crystallize into a constellation that would provide a viable, independent power base. For the time being, the new dynasty had to content itself with the attainable spoils, but *only* in Iraq and, shortly later, in other western parts of the empire. The only attributes of sovereignty Abū al-'Abbās could exercise were some administrative and military appointments which he gave to family members, overriding or superseding some of Abū Salamah's earlier appointments.<sup>75</sup>

When Abū al-'Abbās, instead of expecting or even demanding Abū Muslim's appearance in his court to pay him homage, sent him his brother Abū Ja'far to receive that homage on his behalf, at Abū Muslim's convenience, the latter treated Abū Ja'far with extreme disrespect. When Abū Ja'far complained to the caliph, this latter helplessly said: "What can be done about him? You know [what] his status [used to be] with the *Imām* [i.e. Muḥammad ibn 'Alī], and with Ibrāhīm. [Furthermore] he is the founder of the realm, and its support (*ṣāhib al-dawlah wa al-qā'im bi-'amrihā*)."<sup>76</sup> So much for the psychological dynamics of the relationship. But, when Abū al-'Abbās dared to transgress beyond his limits, into Abū Muslim's Persian territories, his appointee to Fars, his uncle 'Isā' ibn 'Alī, was prevented from assuming his office.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 143; Ṭabarī, III: p. 37; Azdī, pp. 124-5; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 351; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 100; Khalīfah, II: pp. 424, 427; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā'ārif*, p. 372; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 482.

<sup>76</sup> Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 351.

<sup>77</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 71; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 343.

The territorial integrity of the realm was but a deceptive facade. The tradition attributing to Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī an early division of the anticipated territorial gains between Abū Salamah and Abū Muslim,<sup>78</sup> was now being effectively practiced, with the only difference being that the dynasty inherited Abū Salamah’s share. If there was any manifestation of any measure of integral sovereignty, it was the extent of Abū Muslim’s sharing with the ‘Abbāsids in their own share, through his men in Iraq, and directly through the psychological projection of his own formidable personal presence.

#### IV.2 *The Assassination of the Marginalized Loser*

That is why the suggestion of any active ‘Abbāsīd involvement in the episode of Abū Salamah’s assassination is highly doubtful. Abū Ja‘far’s statement, “we fear Abū Muslim more than we used to fear Ḥafṣ ibn Sulaymān,”<sup>79</sup> reflects the mood that must have prevailed within the dynasty. Deprived of a power base of their own, they must have felt insecure; and they must have felt that they were at the mercy of those who did have such power bases. The possibility of reshuffling alliances in the instable circumstances of immediate post-victory politics, and the not unthinkable scenario of such re-alignments taking place at their cost, must have instilled real fear in their hearts and prompted them to cautious and apprehensive inaction, especially where sensitive intra-Organization politics was concerned.

A momentous act such as the killing of Abū Salamah can not be attributed to al-Saffāḥ, as Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih does.<sup>80</sup> Even an ‘Abbāsīd initiative of proposing to Abū Muslim such a course of action is very remote. Some of the sources which carry this tradition ascribe to Dawūd ibn ‘Alī, or to someone else of their number, that he had alerted al-Saffāḥ to the possibility of Abū Muslim’s complicity with Abū Salamah. Abū Ja‘far related:

One of us said: ‘What do you know? Maybe, what Abū Salamah has done had been approved by Abū Muslim.’ None of us made an utterance. Then *Amīr al-Mu‘minīn* Abū al-‘Abbās said: ‘If that had been approved by Abū Muslim, we are in serious trouble, unless God should save us from it’.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>78</sup> *Akḥbār*, p. 270.

<sup>79</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 201.

<sup>80</sup> Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 482, V: p. 113.

<sup>81</sup> Madā‘inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 58; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 88, 154-7; Jahshayārī, p. 90; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

So frightened were they that Balādhurī and Madā'inī relate that, even after Abū Muslim had given them permission to execute Abū Salamah, they refrained and asked Abū Muslim to dispatch his own executioner.<sup>82</sup>

As Abū Muslim could not have been the last to know of what had occurred during the tug-of-war for the nomination, the theatrics of the dialogue between Abū Ja'far and Abū Muslim cannot be taken seriously. Abū Ja'far informed Abū Muslim of Abū Salamah's role, "... then[Abū Muslim] said: 'Did Abū Salamah do it?' Abū Ja'far said: 'Yes, he did it.' Abū Muslim said: 'I shall protect you from him'.<sup>83</sup> Nor was Abū Muslim wanting in strategic insight, nor, perhaps, in personal vindictiveness.

Equally untenable, or even more so, is the tradition which ascribes to al-Saffāḥ an impassioned defense of Abū Salamah, on grounds of his precedence in the service of the *da'wah*, that his revisionism was merely a forgivable lapse, and that al-Saffāḥ was confident of his sincerity. When Abū Salamah was, nevertheless, murdered, Abū al-'Abbās was not loathe to express his *schadenfreude* by versifying:

*Ilā n-nārī fa-byadhhab, wa-man kāna mithlahu*  
*'alā ayyi shay'in fātānā minhu na'safū*

To hell let him go! What is there, in his likes,  
which if we miss we should regret?<sup>84</sup>

What is more likely to have happened is none of the above; it is scattered therein. Both parties, realizing their inability to resolve the untenable situation of cohabitation, had to settle into a sociable relationship. Abū Salamah was reportedly a nightly entertainment companion of al-Saffāḥ.<sup>85</sup> In the political context, both parties must have been impotently apprehensive, and anxiously expectant of the final verdict to be passed by the real power holders. When Abū Muslim's men reported to him, as should be expected, that Abū Salamah's elimination had become possible, or imperative, he signaled to the 'Abbāsids, and to whomever it may have concerned, in no uncertain

<sup>82</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*: pp. 155-6; Ṭabarī III: p. 60; also, Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 352.

<sup>83</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 155; cf. Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: pp. 59-60; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 60; an interesting and far more dramatic variation is in Ibn A'tham, VIII: pp. 207-9.

<sup>84</sup> Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 115-6; for variations on this tradition, cf. Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 7-8; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Ibn Khallikān confuses the two traditions in one account, II: p. 196; for other 'Abbāsīd expressions of gloating, cf. Jahshayārī, p. 90; Azdī, p. 145; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 155-7; in Dīnawarī's unique account, Abū Muslim, learning of Abū Salamah's favored position with al-Saffāḥ, took the initiative and ordered his executioner to drag Abū Salamah from al-Saffāḥ's court and kill him, p. 368.

<sup>85</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 59; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 116; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 195; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 70; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

terms, his displeasure with Abū Salamah, “because he infringed [on] and changed [his pledges] (*nakatha wa ghayyara wa baddala*).”<sup>86</sup>

This must have coincided with Abū Muslim’s remark to Abū Salamah, in his comment on one of his letters, accusing him of hypocrisy,<sup>87</sup> and it must have immediately preceded al-Saffāh’s sudden and conspicuous estrangement with Abū Salamah before he changed his headquarters from the military camp at Ḥammān A‘yan, or al-Nukhaylah, to al-Hāshimiyyah.<sup>88</sup>

The reasons behind Abū al-‘Abbās’ relocation to al-Hāshimiyyah may be too complex to simplify by relegating them to a tactical attempt to pre-absolve himself from complicity in the impending slaying; but seeking absolution is also too obvious not to be counted as one of the reasons. For, when the time came for implementing the plot, Abū al-‘Abbās, in a further and more explicit attempt to camouflage the conspiracy and his complicity, sent out an announcer to announce publicly that he had rehabilitated Abū Salamah and awarded him his caliphal presents. Abū Salamah resumed his nightly audience with the caliph, and shortly thereafter was *assassinated*, in the late hours of the night.<sup>89</sup>

It was neither an official nor a public execution, nor did any of the regime cronies claim responsibility. It is significant that the allegation put in public currency was that the Khawārij killed the hapless *wazīr*.<sup>90</sup> It is also significant that, of the enormous numbers of men Abū Muslim had in Kūfah, any of whom could have carried out the assassination, none was chosen. The task was not even left to Abū al-Jahm to handle. Instead, Abū Muslim personally entrusted the task to one of his otherwise inconspicuous men in Khurāsān, al-Marrār ibn Anas al-Ḍabbī (no. 245), with some assistants.<sup>91</sup> The rationale was probably to avoid any potential association with any of the respectable ‘comrades’ of the slain, should anything have gone wrong. It is also significant that nothing further is known of al-Marrār’s own fate. It is tempting to speculate that, somehow, it was ensured that his momentous secret

<sup>86</sup> Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 115.

<sup>87</sup> Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 218-9.

<sup>88</sup> Ṭabarī, III: pp. 37, 59-60.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59; cf. Jahshayārī, p. 90.

<sup>90</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 15-6; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 59-60; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 8, 79; Dhahabī, *Tārkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Jahshayārī, p. 90.

<sup>91</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: pp. 155, 156; Ṭabarī, III: p. 60; Azdī, p. 145; Dīnawarī, p. 368; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta‘rīkh*, p. 352; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 8, 60; Dhahabī, *Tārkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 341; the unique report by Jahshayārī, that the well known Usayd ibn ‘Abd Allāh (no.353) was among the assassins is probably an error, p. 90.

would not be known first-hand, from him in person. Thicker camouflage was further ensured by giving the fallen Abū Salamah a respectable funeral. Prayers for his comfort were led by the caliph's brother, Yahyā ibn Muḥammad,<sup>92</sup> and he was buried in the caliph's then current seat of government, al-Madīnah al-Hāshimiyah.<sup>93</sup>

Of course, the 'Abbāsids were happy. And although, pragmatically, there were good and objective political reasons for the atrocity, the personal dimension in Abū Muslim's motives cannot be ignored. The vindictive Abū Muslim, who was never known for the grace of forgiving any personal affront, probably never forgave Abū Salamah for having once been his master.

Abū Salamah stayed alive in the 'Abbāsīd realm for three or four months,<sup>94</sup> and was assassinated in Rajab, 132/February-March, 750,<sup>95</sup> only six months after a life-time struggle in the cause of *al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad* had come to fruition, ironically, with the eventual imposition of the branch of Āl Muḥammad whose triumph necessitated his own undoing.

Although Abū al-Jahm gave the military commanders a glimpse of the real story,<sup>96</sup> the public at large, and probably the rank-and-file of the Khurāsāniyyah, had only the official version. But the irony was not lost on at least one poet—Sulaymān ibn Muhājir al-Bajalī poetized the verses which have become almost synonymous with the story of the assassination. Sardonicly, but obliquely, he mourned the fallen *wazīr* in a 'constipated' passion which tells of the untold treachery:

*Inna l-masā'ata qad tasurru wa-rubbamā  
kāna s-surūru bi-mā karihta jadīrā  
inna l-wazīra, wazīra Āli Muḥammadin,*

<sup>92</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 156; Ṭabarī, III: p. 60; Azdī, p. 145.

<sup>93</sup> Ṭabarī, III: p. 60.

<sup>94</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 157.

<sup>95</sup> Jahshayārī, p. 90; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, pp. 8, 79; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

<sup>96</sup> Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 156.

*awdā fa-man yashnāka kāna wazīrā*

Verily, offense may delight; and, sometimes,  
that which you hate may be of delight worthy!  
Verily, the *wazīr*, *wazīr* Āl Muḥammad [I mean],  
has perished. May a *wazīr* be[come] he who hates you!<sup>97</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 116; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 79; cf. Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: p. 156; Ṭabarī, III: p. 60; Azdī, p. 145; Dinawarī, p. 368; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 353; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 8; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, pp. 156-7; Ibn A'tham, VIII: p. 209; Dārquṭnī, II: p. 905.