

Human Beings as Emotional Subjects: The Study of Their Experiences in the Middle Ages

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Human beings are emotional subjects because they face challenges in life by managing their emotions in accordance with the values of the society in which they live. In earlier times, such as the Middle Ages, humans lived emotionally different lives, not because their society was “primitive,” but rather because of the values around which each society was structured. That is why our analysis must take into consideration the experiences of its men and women, because they reflect the specific code of values assumed by that society in the search for unity, founded upon shared memory. It is no coincidence then that the historiographic revisions of the historical memory and the analysis of the life experiences have led historical science to pay attention to the men and women who experienced emotionally the course of history. Despite different interpretative approaches, from the eighteenth century onwards studies concerning medieval society have paid attention to the emotive nature of medieval men and women. Research that focuses on the emotional experience of human beings will help us to understand what the men and women of the Middle Ages were really like.

1 The Historiographic Tradition

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the triumph of the bourgeoisie stigmatised the Middle Ages. After all, the disruptive nature of a revolution like the one that began in Paris in 1789 was visualised as a break with the medieval tradition. Feudalism was officially abolished in August 1793¹ with a sense of liberation that was immediately projected onto Voltaire's memory. The thinker had died on the eve of the revolution, but then, in 1791 he was given a place

1 John Markoff, *The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords and Legislators in the French Revolution* (University Park, 1996), pp. 516–559.

of honour in the Pantheon among “the great men recognized by the fatherland,”² as the inspiration for the ideas that guided the change, given that “he claimed the rights of man against the servitude of feudalism” (“*il réclama les droits de l’homme contre la servitude de la féodalité*”), as engraved on the side of his tomb. At that time, medieval feudalism was interpreted as the root of all evils, even, as Henri Grégoire emphasised, the fragmentation of France itself, both territorially and linguistically.³

Contempt for the Middle Ages came at a huge cost in terms of the loss of documentary and monumental heritage. As early as 1793, Henri Grégoire warned that there was a common public heritage that had to be preserved and integrated into collective memory.⁴ This is the path that led the Guizot government under Louis Philippe to create the post of Inspector of Historic Monuments in 1830, first filled by Ludovic Vitet and then, Prosper Mérimée. An appreciation for the architecture and works of art created in the Middle Ages, one that was distanced from their original ideological meaning spread from this attitude. This approach is what, in different ways, would be accepted simultaneously in European countries and included in their legislation, with varied fortune.⁵ Romanticism had already encouraged a new appreciation for landscapes and romantic ruins⁶ and shown admiration for the ideals attributed to Christian knights, as Chateaubriand pointed out.⁷ In Europe at that time, universalist models derived from enlightened thought were set aside and, in contrast, national authorities instead gradually imposed a political model based on the State-nation understood in an ethnographic sense, as a ‘nation-génie’.⁸ In order to foster some consistency, the historical roots of a supposed common national identity based in the past, especially in the Middle Ages, in each European country.⁹ This supposed shared national history was anchored

2 “Aux grands homes la patrie reconnaissante.” Alexia Lebeurre, *Le Panthéon. Temple de la nation* (Paris, undated), pp. 20–21; Alain Garrigou, “Panthéon, on y entre, on en sort,” *Le Monde diplomatique* 68/812 (November 2021), 22.

3 Henri Grégoire, *Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir le patois, et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue française* (Paris, 1794), p. 2.

4 Joseph L. Sax, “Heritage preservation as a public duty: the Abbé Grégoire and the origins of an idea,” *Michigan Law Review* 88/5 (1990), 1142–62.

5 For example: Joan Ganau Casas, *La protección de los monumentos arquitectónicos en España y Cataluña 1844–1936: legislación, organización, inventario* (Lleida, 1988), pp. 11–29.

6 Núria Perpinyà, *Ruins, Nostalgia and Ugliness. Five Romantic Perceptions of the Middle Ages. And a spoonful of ‘Game of Thrones’ and Avant-garde Oddity* (Berlin, 2014), pp. 15–95.

7 François René de Chateaubriand, *The Beauties of Christianity* (London, 1813).

8 Patrick Cabanel, *La question nationale au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1997), pp. 13–14.

9 Patrick J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations. The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton-Oxford, 2002), pp. 37–40.

in the memory of a certain set of glorious traits that were intended to build the national soul of the state's population, and which constructed a specific historicist narrative. This specific historicist narrative dominated the conceptual environment, the emerging school system, and a physical landscape shaped by street names, monuments and all kinds of artistic expression.¹⁰ In this context, there was real, and even popular, interest in the customs of earlier men and women, how they dressed,¹¹ what their homes were like and how these were decorated,¹² in short, what their *moeurs et usages* were, to put it in Paul Lacroix's words¹³ So, knowledge of the Middle Ages not only had to contribute arguments for a teleological continuity in the national story, but it also had to feed popular curiosity for the traits that aspects of medieval life furnished, like leisure, superstition, culture, the family as well as paternity, love, friendship and the religious experience.¹⁴

Inquiry into the emotional perspective of medieval men and women was not unknown in the nineteenth century. On the contrary, the emotional values attributed to the Middle Ages, especially the chivalrous code of values, religious fervour and the bonds of feudal solidarity not only permeated literature¹⁵ and art,¹⁶ but also influenced thinkers as varied as Karl Marx, who valued the paternalism of feudalism,¹⁷ or Wilhelm Dilthey, who highlighted the era's mysticism.¹⁸ All this together shows that, in the nineteenth century, the Middle Ages were perceived as a historical period with their own emotiveness.

10 Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La création des identités nationales. Europe XVIIIe–XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2001), pp. 23–235.

11 José Puiggarí, *Monografía histórica e iconográfica del traje* (Barcelona, 1886); Albert Charles Auguste Racinet, *Le coutume historique*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1888); José Puiggarí, *Estudio de indumentaria española* (Barcelona, 1890).

12 Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, *Dictionnaire raisonné de l'Architecture française*, 9 vols. (Paris, 1856–1869); Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, *Dictionnaire Raisonné du Mobilier Français de l'époque carlovingienne à la Renaissance*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1868–1875); Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, *Histoire de l'habitation humaine depuis les temps préhistoriques jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1875).

13 Paul Lacroix, *Le Moyen Âge et la Renaissance. Histoire et description des moeurs et usages, du commerce et de l'industrie, des sciences, des arts, des littératures et des beaux-arts*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1847–1851).

14 Flocel Sabaté, "Emotions, Feelings and Middle Ages," in *Defining and Perceiving Feelings in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. Flocel Sabaté (Leiden-Boston, forthcoming).

15 Among others: Walter Scott, *Ivanhoe* (Barcelona, 1982); Ramon López Soler, *Los bandos de Castilla* (Geneva, 1973); Enrique Gil y Carrasco, *El señor de Bembibre* (Geneva, 1974).

16 William Gaunt, *El sueño prerrafaelista* (Mexico City, 2005).

17 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London, 2002), p. 222.

18 Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected Works, Volume 111: The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences* (Princeton-Oxford, 2002), pp. 257–64.

In this context, Dilthey saw history as being the sum of its people's experiences, duly interrelated: "the course of life consists of parts, of lived experiences that are inwardly connected with each other. Each lived experience relates to a self of which it is a part."¹⁹ The experiences of human beings, including their thoughts and emotions, were thus at the core of understanding historical pasts. Interest in specific experiences – "what is singular, what happens only once" – might lead to fragmentation, which Dilthey avoided by resorting to statistical and comparative methods, as Robert Bonnaud has emphasised.²⁰ In any case, if history is assumed to be a succession of individual events, it would be necessary to find the cohesive intersections of society. The idealist perspective encounters these intersections in the transcendent values that make up shared culture, as Heinrich Rickert proposed when contrasting "cultural science" and "natural science."²¹

The possible subjectivism inherent in these idealistic approaches is contrasted with the emergence of positivism at the end of the nineteenth century.²² Anchoring the history in the document turns the historian into a kind of judge, because he or she has to choose which figures and events are worthy of being told. In any case, the documents place the roots of history in human beings; they are the protagonists, even when they can only be sensed behind the fiscal pressures, seigneurial demands or working practices. Thus, basing history on the document also allows widely differing varied readings, while shining light on individuals affected by the historical events.

Two works were published at the beginning and the end of the second decade of the twentieth century (respectively, 1911 and 1919) that, from different perspectives, sought to understand medieval society by investigating the emotionality that permeates culture, seeing this as the backbone of society. I refer to the contributions by Henry Osborn Taylor²³ and Johan Huizinga,²⁴ two books whose fates were very different, as the former, after enjoying various reprints in the first third of the century, has since been unfairly marginalised,

19 Dilthey, *Selected Works, Volume III: The Formation of the Historical World*, pp. 214–15.

20 "Ce qui est singulier, ce qui ne se produit qu'une fois." Robert Bonnaud, *Histoire et historiens depuis 68. Le triomphe et les impasses* (Paris, 1997), pp. 109–10.

21 Manuel Cruz, *El historicismo* (Barcelona, 1981), pp. 52–59; Pelai Pagès, *Introducción a la Historia. Epistemología, teoría y problemas de método en los estudios históricos* (Barcelona, 1983), pp. 195–97.

22 Estevão de Rezende Martins, ed. *A história pensada. Teoria e método na historiografia europeia do século XIX* (São Paulo, 2010), pp. 187–215.

23 Henry Osborn Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind. A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (London, 1911).

24 Johan Huizinga, *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* (Harlem, 1919).

while the latter, fortunately, enjoys a strong presence a century later, judging by the continual translations and reprints.

In 1929, the Spanish philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset, stated that “we live under the brutal rule of the masses,” noting a dominance of the crowds (*aglomeraciones*) in which it was necessary to ask “who rules the world?”²⁵ Aldous Huxley responded in 1936 by drawing attention to the fact that the equilibrium, between the set of population that apparently decides its own fate and the elites who hold the reins of power (both political and economic), is balanced by propaganda. Propaganda does not encourage rational thinking but rather appeals to their emotions, the primary stimuli of the population. Feelings, like fear, continue to mobilise living beings, whether human or animal.²⁶ The ideologies consolidated from the third decade of the twentieth century invoked grand ideals, such as homeland or an egalitarian society, but sought to garner popular support through emotional appeals. However, these same ideologies required people to dilute themselves within the whole of the so-called ideal society, because the individual in himself or herself is unimportant; what is important is the supreme entity, that is, the society, the political party, the nation or the state. The idealistic philosophical approach inherent in all totalitarian ideologies from the first half of the twentieth century interpreted the human being as a part of the social whole. That is how this higher collective body, called the ideal state or society, fully justified its political behaviour and, if necessary, the sacrifice of individuals.²⁷

Political evolution seems to accentuate this path. The evil protagonist of Graham Green’s novel, *The Third Man*, published in 1950, tries to justify himself by echoing the generalisation of this situation: *Nobody thinks in terms of human beings. Governments don’t. Why should we?*²⁸ All sociology—from its emergence with Émile Durkheim, and continuing with Max Weber’s rethinking and the later structuralist concerns about detecting the infrastructure of each social system—agreed with the statement by Juan Francisco Marsal that,

25 “Vivimos bajo el brutal imperio de las masas”; “¿Quién manda en el mundo?” José Ortega y Gasset, *La rebelión de las masas*, (Madrid, 1960), pp. 49–264 (1st edition, 1929).

26 “By appeals to such well-organized sentiments as snobbery and the urge toward social conformity; by playing on the animal instincts such as greed, lust, and especially fear in all its forms.” Aldous Huxley, “Notes on Propaganda,” *Harper’s* (December 1936), 32.

27 Diverse approaches to ideological dissemination among the affected population testify to this: Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Europe of the Dictators, 1919–1945* (London, 1966), pp. 243–54; Conxita Mir, ed., *Jóvenes y dictaduras de entreguerras* (Lleida, 2007); Hans Magnus Eizensberger, *Hammerstein ou l’intransigeance. Une histoire allemande* (Paris, 2010).

28 Graham Green, “The Third Man,” *The Third Man & Other Stories* (London, 2017), p. 121.

“the ‘actor’s point of view’ is irrelevant.”²⁹ From this perspective, what the individual feels or thinks is an insignificant anecdote that must be avoided in order to avoid losing sight of society as a whole, that which guided the sense of the history.

This is the context in which Lucien Febvre, writing in 1941—when history was being experienced under the invocation of emotional adhesions and through the pain of many humans—called for linking sensitivity and history in order “to reconstitute the emotional life of the past” in his article published in the journal *Annales*, so often cited by later historiography.³⁰ By combining the rigour of the documentary base, with a contextualisation based on knowledge of the values around which the society under study was built and a historical approach that does not ignore the sensibilities of each of the people involved, these three ideas together became an integrative and recommended path for those wishing to undertake research into earlier societies. This is how the *Annales* school emerged, founded on the so-called history of mentalities, which sought to go in depth into the fundamental and emotional axes of human beings. The perspectives of authors like Duby, Ariès, Vovelle, Delumeau, Mandrou or Le Roy Ladurie, among others, are varied, but they all delve into the values that governed human behaviour in the period and scope studied. Their perspectives have familiarised the historiography with such terms as culture, imaginary, ideology, the unconscious or forms of consciousness. In any case, it is clear that the history closest to the real past is that which seeks knowledge of the men and women of the period studied. This is because this approach leads us to understand what guided them in aspects that earlier researchers could have considered insignificant, beginning with valuing the daily life of all members of society.³¹ Peter Burke pointed out that in doing so, “the territory of the historian [expanded] to unexpected areas of human behaviour and to social groups neglected by traditional historians.”³² In reality, these are places where light needs to be shed to grasp the societies studied fully. It is not a matter of increasing the number of social strata to be studied—to avoid excluding certain sectors of the population—but rather of finding a

29 “El ‘punto de vista del actor’ carece de importancia.” Juan Francisco Marsal, *La sociología* (Barcelona, 1975), p. 124.

30 “Reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois.” Lucien Febvre, “La sensibilité et l’histoire: Comment reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois?,” *Annales d’histoire sociale*, 3 (1941), 5–20.

31 Carlos Antonio Aguirre Rojas, *La Escuela de los Annales. Ayer, Hoy, Mañana* (Vilassar de Dalt, 1999), pp. 141–70.

32 Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution. The Annales School 1929–1989* (Stanford, 2015), p. 142.

better approach to the study of society by examining the values with which it was regulated. These values generated a code of emotional behaviour that was followed or challenged by the contemporary population.

This approach sees the study of the past as the actions of men and women whose interactions generate society. That is why historical research delves into the interconnections between people. Changes within the discipline of philosophy have also contributed to a renewal of perspectives. Foucault's warnings about the traps of power³³ and Derrida's distrust of the texts that historicism presented as a guide, while at the same time warning about incorporating 'the difference' in the analysis,³⁴ forced us to rethink how history should approach the subject of its research.³⁵ The past is always made up of emotive humans, and the incorporation of new perspectives, either such emerging fields as environmental history³⁶ or a more balanced view that includes other beings, like animals,³⁷ does not alter, but rather highlights even more, the emotional traits that make up the human being.

At the same time, these approaches also encouraged us to look at the relationships established by the subjects studied. Both the philosophy of history and ethics³⁸ invited researchers to look at the course of history not as the construction of a particular teleology but as the analysis of the relationships between human beings in each historical period. Thus, the study of societies based on the analysis of the connectivity between their members involves integrating the transversality of perspectives and leads to talking about individuals and assessing the effects of the sensitivity inherent in their relations.³⁹

With all this behind us, the historiography in the early twenty-first century is mature enough to grasp that medieval society was made up of emotional subjects who acted collectively.⁴⁰ It is necessary to emphasise the collective sense of the human being in the Middle Ages, because at that time a person was always seen as belonging to a group, thus included into circles of solidarity and identity that could be intertwined or overlap. These groups could be family,

33 Miguel Morey, *Lectura de Foucault* (Madrid, 1983), pp. 231–358.

34 José María Ripalda, "Derrida, Foucault y la Historia de la filosofía," *Anthropos* 93 (1989), 57–63.

35 Jan Goldstein, ed., *Foucault and the Writing of History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).

36 Manuel González de Molina, Juan Martínez Alier, eds., *Historia y ecología* (Madrid, 1993).

37 Eric Baratay, *Le Point de vue animal. Une autre version de l'histoire* (Paris, 2012).

38 Miguel Bueno, "Ética y filosofía," *Tareas* 1/1 (1960), 95–107.

39 Among the works that have focused on studying the relationship in the Middle Ages, it is worth highlighting María Milagros Rivera Garretas, ed., *Las relaciones en la Historia de la Europa medieval*, (Valencia, 2006).

40 Piroska Nagy, Damien Boquet, eds., *Le sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2008).

faction, municipal, feudal or other types, but there always existed a shared sense of belonging.⁴¹ Medieval humans, then, only made sense when viewed as one piece of a larger whole, which, when sharing the same reactions, acted as an emotional community.⁴² Some of the difficulties experienced by the historiography may be due to the historian's own baggage, given that he or she lives in a very different environment, characterised by the social model based on the contract between the individual and the society that Hobbes proposed and that spread after the French Revolution.⁴³ However, it is undoubtable that the correct analysis requires placing the perspective on the point where the men and women under study found themselves, in this case, the Middle Ages.⁴⁴ The authors at that time did not hesitate to write about emotion,⁴⁵ precisely because they fitted into the values inherent in the contemporary interpretative framework.

On the other hand, the dramatism of the twentieth century, with so many conflicts in different parts of the world, with confrontations not only between armies but also societies either in a state of total war or that have subjected individuals to the omnipotent and arbitrary behaviour of state powers, has increased the perception that historical events affect humans in the depths of their identity and in the way they perform their emotionality.⁴⁶ It is history as pain. When political and social history are filled with pain, this conjunction brings views of our past and present closer together.⁴⁷ The historian can find himself or herself faced with the dilemma about how to write about trauma.⁴⁸ A historical investigation under these parameters forces us to consider pain and death as a fate that conditions our lives, according to Teo Ruiz: "We

41 Flocel Sabaté, "Identities on the move," in *Identities on the Move*, ed. Flocel Sabaté (Bern, 2013), pp. 14–22.

42 Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca-London, 2006).

43 Josep Olives i Puig, "Del pactisme medieval al contractualisme modern," *Finestrelles* 6 (1994), 205–41.

44 Damien Boquet, Piroska Nagy, *Sensible Moyen Âge. Une histoire des émotions dans l'Occident médiéval* (Paris, 2015).

45 Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feelings. A History of Emotions, 600–1700* (Cambridge, Eng., 2016).

46 We can mention here the famous—and painful—account by Zweig in his posthumous book, *Die Welt von Gestern: Stefan Zweig, El mundo de ayer. Memorias de un europeo* (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 9–16.

47 Keth Wailoo, *Pain. A Political History* (Baltimore, 2014).

48 Dominick Lacapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore-London, 2001), pp. 181–219.

survive, against time and history, in memory, in earth, air, water, plants, and other men."⁴⁹

Writing history under these parameters of the uncertainties of life requires valuing emotion, but also forces us to fit the memory of the past into our current society.

2 Managing the History Experienced: Memory and History

The last third of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of an obligation to remember, based precisely on history as anguish for the many silenced victims. Massacres and cruel ideological confrontations have accompanied all humankind's progress through history,⁵⁰ although it is true that the combination of ideology and technical means in the twentieth century has enabled a greater capacity to exterminate.⁵¹ Moreover, the twentieth century gave birth to a truly global information network.⁵² Access to information has not given the population real access to the management of power, but rather to participation in the circulation of opinion on a global scale.⁵³ In this way, the characteristics of identity and social cohesion most widely accepted among the people incorporate a certain memory, one which strengthens the link between history, experience and emotion. Historical accounts of recent painful events refer to social treatment very close to individual behaviour, where emotions, procedural memories and trauma are intermixed.⁵⁴ Not only is history expected to judge the past, but history itself is judged. From this position,

49 Teofilo F. Ruiz, *The Terror of History on the Uncertainties of Life in Western Civilization* (Princeton-Oxford, 2011), p. 172.

50 David El Kenz, ed., *Le massacre, objet d'histoire* (Paris, 2005); Elie Barnavi, Anthony Rowley, eds., *Tuez-les tous! La guerre de religion à travers l'histoire, VIIe-XXIe siècle* (Paris, 2006).

51 "The Shoah is an exceptional, unique and monstrous phenomenon. The permanent proximity of programmed death gave the deportation a particularly atrocious and unforgettable character." ("*La Shoah est un phénomène exceptionnel, unique et monstrueux. La proximité permanente de la mort programmée a donné à la déportation un caractère particulièrement atroce et inoubliable*"). Simone Veil, "Préface," in *Les juifs de France dans la Shoah*, Jacques Fredj (Paris, 2011), p. 5.

52 Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass. 1996–98).

53 Zygmunt Bauman, *Dentro la globalizzazione. Le conseguenze sulle persone* (Rome-Bari, 2006), pp. 9–31.

54 Peter A. Levine, *Trauma and Memory. Brain and Body in a Search for the Living Past* (Berkeley, 2015), pp. 27–48.

society becomes co-responsible for the evil committed by its predecessors,⁵⁵ in an attitude that not only recalls the “infinite responsibility” of which Lévinas spoke,⁵⁶ but which has clear links to the Christian tradition of original sin as well as Freudian thinking.⁵⁷ Thus, memory is assumed with a restorative will that involves the promotion of civic values that make it impossible to repeat previous horrors,⁵⁸ thus contributing to a social model for “living together” in democratic societies.⁵⁹

Memory as a social practice fulfils two goals. First, memory is a reparation for the silenced victims, generally doubly victims: for the unjust actions that mistreated them or took their lives, and often for the later official accounts that have tried to ignore them. It is necessary to reconstruct the historical narrative to reincorporate these victims into society to stabilise a historically objective account of past events.⁶⁰ The connection between the historical past and the present feeds a specific model of social cohesion. However, in the opposite

55 This can be appreciated in museographic stories. Here are two examples: in the Museo Etnográfico in Buenos Aires, “Juan B. Ambrosetti” begins the story of the extermination of the Selk’nam or Ona, who lived in the south of current Argentina, warning on a panel: “Those peoples who fascinated Westerners are gone, they were massacred in a few decades, and not by the conquerors of the sixteenth century, but by our grandparents, and less than one hundred years ago.” (“*Esos pueblos que fascinaron a los occidentales, ya no están, fueron masacrados en pocas décadas, y no por los conquistadores del siglo XVI, sino por nuestros abuelos, y hace menos de 100 años*”). And in Paris, in narrating the serious crimes against Jews committed in France between 1940 and 1944, the Memorial of the Shoah exposes the link between historical events and present-day society: “this story is close to us, it took place in our country, in our towns and villages [...] It is up to all of us to appropriate it, to live and to build with this crime, and despite this crime.” (“*cette histoire est proche de nous, elle s’est déroulée dans notre pays, dans nos villes et nos villages (...) À nous tous de nous l’approprier, de vivre et de construire avec ce crime, et malgré ce crime*”). Jacques Fredj, *Les juifs de France dans la Shoah*, (Paris, 2011), p. 11.

56 In an informative way it can be seen summarised in: Rafael Narbona, “Emmanuel Lévinas, la huella infinita,” *El Cultural* (August 2020), <<https://elcultural.com/emmanuel-levi-nas-la-huella-infinita>>.

57 Alain Houziaux, “La péché original, Freud et le devoir de mémoire,” in *La mémoire pour quoi faire?*, ed. Alain Houziaux, (Paris, 2006), pp. 13–46.

58 Joan Wallach Scott, *On the Judgment of History* (New York, 2020), pp. 1–88.

59 Alicia Maria de Mingo Rodríguez, “Nación cotidiana, democracia creativa e interculturalidad. El cuidado por lo irrepresentable como espíritu de la Comunidad,” *Recerca. Revista de Pensament i d’anàlisi* 10 (2010), 141–61.

60 There are several areas where social reintegration must take place: Elizabeth Jelin, ed., *La conmemoraciones: Las disputas en las fechas ‘in-felices’* (Madrid, 2002); Elizabeth Jelin, Victoria Langland, eds., *Momentos, memoriales y marcas territoriales* (Madrid, 2003); Elizabeth Jelin, Federico Guillermo Lorenz, eds., *Educación y memoria. La escuela elabora el pasado* (Madrid, 2004).

sense, this connection also provokes political interference from those who wish to maintain their position by disseminating a distorted historical narrative, whether in Latin America, Spain or the countries of Eastern Europe. Second, memory becomes a selection of the values of the past that current society seeks to embrace as references. In this sense, not only each society but also each generation must adopt the elements of the past that are interpreted as evocative of the construction of its own cohesive story. The figures, facts and explanatory profiles fluctuate with the evolution of societies. Street names, the images on banknotes, or monuments thus transmit the specific memory with which the social majority identifies itself.

Memory alone will not achieve the desired social cohesion; more important still, it will damage the historical account and all related elements, such as heritage. In the early decades of the twenty-first century, when the Afghan Taliban destroyed the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan and people in Western Europe and the United States of America removed statues of historical figures that had hitherto decorated streets, they were clearly demonstrating a change in the memory with which society wanted to mirror itself. However, at the same time, it is evident that they were reliving the ravages suffered by the heritage in the years following the French Revolution and after the subsequent liberal revolutions in Europe. This is why we should also expect to see a resurgence in appreciation for the value of heritage. The management of monuments began not because of what they meant ideologically nor what values people projected upon them, but because monuments are like artistic objects and referents of a historical past that should not be forgotten but rather integrated into the research and the narrative of the history of society. In this way, each item should be displayed where it might have greater sense in a 'vital landscape' in terms of the values and emotional evocations of each society.⁶¹

Is a society so based on memory socially viable? "Without at least the option of forgetting, we would be wounded monsters, unforgiving and unforgiven ... and, assuming that we have been paying attention, inconsolable," David Rieff concluded on writing "*In Praise of Forgetting*."⁶² Various people have testified that they suffer from an excessive burden of memory weighing on their shoulders. In his delightful play, *Monsieur Ibrahim et les fleurs du Coran*, Eric-Emmanuel Schmitt portrays a character who experiences his Jewish identity as a painful burden of memory ("To be Jewish is simply to remember. A bad

61 Emmanuel Fureix, "Débouloonnages et dévoilements: l'histoire en morceaux," *Écrire l'histoire* 20–21 (2021), 229–32.

62 David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting. Historical Memory and its Ironies* (New Haven-London, 2017), p. 145.

memory”). Therefore, his happiness increases as he detaches himself from this memory by ridding himself of the books associated with this identity: “Every time I sold a book, I felt freer.”⁶³ José Luis Borges also proposed an ideal world, in which there would be no libraries or museums, because “We want to forget yesterday, except for the composition of the elegies. There are no commemorations, no centenaries or effigies of dead men.”⁶⁴ However, the truth is that the absence of memory does not lead to objectivity, not even when it invokes purely technical aspects,⁶⁵ which is why it always becomes a synonym of complicity with those in power who seek to dominate the historical narrative.⁶⁶ Therefore, managing memory must recall the past while caring for the challenges of today’s society⁶⁷ and must fulfil a restorative function by combining an epistemological renewal, a psychological requirement and an impact on the story accepted by society.⁶⁸ All this indicates that memory has a duty with a specific social function,⁶⁹ but memory alone cannot manage the past. Thus, Antoine Prost pointed out that, “History should not be put to the service of memory, but, on the contrary, it should accept the demand for memory, but only to transform it into history.”⁷⁰ In this sense, on talking about the Jews in France under the Shoah, Jacques Fredj presents memory as a prerequisite to writing history: only after recovery and resettlement can memory become history: “from memory to history.”⁷¹ But it is a necessary step in order to secure an objective version of history that integrates the circumstances experienced (normally, suffered) by the men and women of the period studied.

The recovery and study of memory through this path requires integrating the emotional experience of human beings into historical analysis. The social

63 “Être juif, c’est simplement avoir de la mémoire. Une mauvaise mémoire”; “à chaque fois que je vendais un livre, je me sentais plus libre.” Eric-Emmanuel Schmitt, *Monsieur Ibrahim et les fleurs du Coran* (Paris, 2001), pp. 40–51.

64 “Queremos olvidar el ayer, salvo para la composición de las elegías. No hay conmemoraciones, ni centenarios ni efigies de hombres muertos.” José Luis Borges, “Utopía de un hombre que estaba cansado,” *Prosa completa*, 4 vols. (Barcelona, 1985), 4:163.

65 Félix Duque, *El mundo por de dentro. Ontotecnología de la vida cotidiana* (Barcelona, 1995), pp. 36–54.

66 “Every technical act, every scientific gesture, oozes ideology” (“*Tot acte tècnic, tot gest científic, regalima ideologia*”). Pere Casaldàliga, *A l’aguait del Regne* (Barcelona, 1989), p. 29.

67 Tzvetan Todorov, *Les abus de la mémoire* (Paris, 2004), pp. 9–61.

68 Paul Ricoeur, *La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli* (Paris, 2000), pp. 167–369.

69 Johann Michel, *Le devoir de mémoire* (Paris, 2018), pp. 9–120.

70 “La historia no debe ponerse al servicio de la memoria, sino que, por el contrario, debe aceptar la demanda de memoria, pero solo para transformarla en historia.” Antoine Prost, *Doce lecciones sobre la historia*, (Valencia, 2000), p. 302.

71 “De la mémoire à l’histoire.” Jacques Fredj, *Les juifs de France dans la Shoah*, pp. 196–201.

assumption of memory has had several positive effects. On the one hand, it has established reconciliatory links between the past, the present and future proposals that have to coexist in society. On the other hand, it has become another path towards the requirement that the historical account of the past should incorporate the emotional experience of the people of the time studied. As is logical given their social function, treatments of memory have focussed mainly on recent historical periods, but, in any case, they have offered a clearly humanised view of the past. Thus, the dissemination of specific treatments of memory have contributed, even if indirectly, to accepting history not as an abstract narrative but one filled with the real (and thus, emotive) experiences of men and women.

3 Emotiveness and Experience

As Reinhart Koselleck highlights, historians share much with other social researchers, but what most clearly distinguishes them is that the subject of their study involves temporal experience: “if we, the historians, want to develop a genuine theory that is to be distinct from the theories of the social sciences in general, it obviously has to be a theory that makes it possible to accommodate the changes in temporal experience.”⁷² Indeed, experiences reflect human beings who feel, in one sense or another. Michel de Certeau called for studying “the practices” precisely to reach the true reality. To do so, he adapted the “wander lines” mapped and popularised by Fernand Deligny in his work with autistic children.⁷³ As François Dosse explained, “De Certeau resumed what Deligny called ‘The Wander Lines’, that is the paths traced outside the paths travelled by autistic children, solitary itineraries, efficient wanders that cut the path of adults.”⁷⁴ Thus, the “practices” refer to specific facts that provide an unusual perspective, based on “the inner experience,” which allows the development of a fresh perspective.

These approaches, with a strong epistemological content, link easily to the above-mentioned incorporation of the everyday path into historical research,

72 Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, 2002), p. 121.

73 Fernand Deligny, *Oeuvres* (Paris, 2017).

74 “De Certeau retomaba lo que Deligny llamaba ‘las líneas de errancia’, o sea los trayectos trazados fuera de los caminos transitados por lo niños autistas, itinerarios solitarios, vagabundeos eficades que cortan el camino de los adultos.” François Dosse, *Paul Ricoeur – Michel de Certeau. La historia: Entre el decir y el hacer* (Buenos Aires, 2009), pp. 119–20.

that is, the interest of historians in people's everyday experiences, in interpreting that these were the places where the structures of domination and exploitation that governed society were visible.⁷⁵ From this perspective, before the end of the twentieth century, the study of experience had become a well-established field of social⁷⁶ and gender history.⁷⁷

In this context, Joan W. Scott claims that the past must be studied through "historising 'experience.'" Putting human experience at the centre of the analysis requires a review of perspectives. The source used to know the past must be the subject of specific questioning, because it is necessary first to investigate its use and the circumstances of its creation and management to respond to the central point: how the reality of the subject of study has been experienced. This becomes the starting point that enables the reality experienced by the men and women of the period under study to be reached: "when experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision of the individual subject (the person who had the experience or the historian who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of evidence on which explanation is built."⁷⁸

This way, a specific history of experiences can be defended, because history is, at the end, a reconstruction of the lives of the men and women who preceded us. Over recent decades, various initiatives have been undertaken in this sense by different research groups. For instance, two examples far removed from each other can be mentioned. In 2018 in Finland, the University of Tampere promoted the Centre of Excellence in History of Experiences, financed by the Finnish National Research Council, in order to delve into such concepts as lived religion, the lived nation, and the lived Welfare State.⁷⁹ The following year at the University of Lleida in Spain, the research project *Power experienced in the Late Middle Ages* was launched with financing from the Spanish ministry of research (PID2019-104085GB-I00). This was aimed at enquiring into the experience of power in late-medieval society, both by those who wielded it and those subjected to it. This research project was the natural continuation of an earlier project between 2016 and 2019 that studied emotion: *Expression*,

75 Geoff Eley, "Labor History, Social History 'Alltagsgeschichte': Experience, Culture and the Politics of the Everyday—a New Direction for German Social History?," *Journal of Modern History* 61/2 (1989), 297–343.

76 William H. Jr. Swell, "How Classes are Made: Critical Reflections on E. P. Thompson's Theory of Working-Class Formation," in *E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives*, Harvey J. Kaye, Keith McClelland, eds. (Philadelphia, 1990), pp. 50–77.

77 Kathleen Canning, "La història feminista després del gir lingüístic. Historiar el discurs i l'experiència," *Afers* 33–34 (1999), 303–41.

78 Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17/2 (1991), 777.

79 <<https://www.tuni.fi/en/research/hex-centre-excellence-history-experiences>>.

feelings and emotion (12th–15th centuries) (HAR2016-75028P).⁸⁰ Emotion and experience have thus come to be accepted as two lenses through which to interpret the management and experience of power.

The connection between emotion and experience has deep roots, as Keith Oatley states when noting that since the nineteenth century, the study of emotions has adopted two pillars: culture and experience.⁸¹ Indeed, in 1985 Peter and Carol Stearns proposed the term “emotionology” to cover “the collective emotional standards of a society,” while contrasting this with “the emotional experiences of individuals or groups.”⁸² They understood the concept “emotional experience” as intertwining a strong cognitive and introspective capacity with the cultural standards of the time studied.⁸³ Similarly, since then, various initiatives have focussed research on delimiting and conceptualising the elements that constitute emotional experiences within different fields and perspectives.⁸⁴ In the end, what really motivates human beings, and often sticks in their memories, is the experience of an instant. As Joseph Ratzinger has written, “there are times that should not pass. What you achieve there should never end. That it passes yet it is only the experience of a moment, therein lies the real melancholy of the human experience.”⁸⁵

4 An Approach to the Experience of Emotion in the Middle Ages and the Evidence of Explicit Management Thereof

In the Middle Ages, the term “experience” was very common and usually associated with memory. What we remember happening becomes the template for decision-making. That is the origin of an oft-repeated expression: “experience

80 <<http://www.medieval.udl.cat/en/Research-projects/Projects-from-Spanish-instituti-ons/>>.

81 Keith Oatley, *Emotions. A Brief History* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 19–38.

82 Peter N. Stearns, Carol Z. Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards,” *American Historical Review* 90 (1985), 813–36.

83 Peter N. Stearns, *American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style* (New York, 1994), p. 3.

84 Javier Moscoso, “La historia de las emociones, ¿de qué es historia?,” *Vinculos de Historia* 4 (2015), 23–24.

85 “*Il y a des instants qui ne devraient pas passer. Ce qu'on y atteint ne devrait jamais finir. Que cela passe pourtant et ne soit que l'expérience d'un instant, là se trouve la véritable mélancolie de l'expérience humaine.*” Joseph Ratzinger, *La mort et l'au-delà* (Paris, 2005), p. 101.

which is the teacher of all things,”⁸⁶ or “because experience is an effective teacher of things.”⁸⁷ If we follow the lead of the unpublished Catalan documentation, we see that the experience of previous events was often invoked in the exercise of power. In Vic in 1403, the phrase “from experience that is a true teacher and mother of knowledge” was invoked when the king had to intervene to pacify the tensions between the divided factions of the city.⁸⁸ Similarly, experience was invoked as a series of specific facts from the past that supported the most diverse provisions in public management.⁸⁹ The experience of the past thus justified present decisions.⁹⁰ When a public appointment was made, it became formal practice to invoke the experience of the person designated, as the monarch often did,⁹¹ along with such other values as proficiency and ability.⁹² Thus, experience became synonymous with expertise: “*pro assidua experientia.*”⁹³ In order to justify a post being given to someone who lacked enough experience, authorities drew attention to complementary experiences which might compensate for the shortcomings.⁹⁴ In fact, experience laid the foundation for other merits that, beyond expertise in the specific job, also justified an appointment, as the king detailed in 1388: “trusting fully confident in the often proven experience of your loyalty and sufficiency.”⁹⁵

These examples show that the men and women of the Middle Ages had various reasons to scrutinize and invoke specific experiences. From the start, they perceived their surroundings and built the framework of their lives through memory and the evocation of specific events, above all those events worthy of mention, experienced personally or by others and that remained in the memory. This is very clear in the mechanism used to remember time, based not on a sequence of years but on experiences worthy of remembrance. These were

86 “*Experientia qui és mestra de totes coses.*” Among others: Próspero de Bofarull, *Procesos de las antiguas cortes y parlamentos de Cataluña, Aragón y Valencia custodiados en el Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón*, 8 vols. (Barcelona, 1850), 6: 72.

87 “*Quia Magistra rerum efficax experientia edocuit.*” *Cortes de Cataluña*, 26 vols. (Madrid, 1900), 3: 305.

88 “*Per experientia que est verum magistra et mater cognice.*” Vic, Arxiu Municipal de Vic, Llibre de Privilegis X, pergamí 189.

89 Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó, Cancelleria, reg. 221, fol. 42v; 2220, fol. 7v.

90 ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 1912, fol. 140r; 2218, fol. 145r.

91 ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 952, fol. 150r; 1912, fol. 108v; 1913, fol. 5v, 37v; 40v; 1914, 165r, 167r; 1915, fol. 1r, 1916, fol. 136r; 2217, fol. 17v-175v; 2219, fol. 41v-42r; among many others.

92 ACA, reg. 1915, fol. 70v.

93 Lleida, Arxiu Capitular de Lleida, Llibre Verd, fol. 59b r.

94 ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 951, fol. 129r.

95 “*Confiants plenament per experientia moltes vegades provada de la leyltat e suficiència de vós.*” ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 1913, fol. 178r.

often painful events, in the form of shared experiences that remained as milestones in the memory, both private and shared. In 1399, in the Catalan town of Igualada, a judicial process was initiated to find out if a person who wanted to act as attorney for another had the required minimum legal age of twenty-five years. A large number of the inhabitants of the village where this man has lived since he was born attended the court to answer the same question regarding how old he was. No one remembered the year in which he was born, but all remembered that it was the year that French troops passed through the village, alluding to the company under Bertrand du Guesclin in 1366. Similarly, another one who had dealt with this person did not remember when he maintained this relationship, but knew that it was the earthquake's year (*l'any que fou la terratremol*), in reference to the earthquake that affected Catalonia in 1373.⁹⁶ This case shows us that the men and women of that age remembered time through a series of emotional experiences that were retained in the memory.

In 1357, when King Peter the Ceremonious explained to his uncle, Prince Peter, how he was preparing to face the recent Castilian invasion, he hoped to model his approach on dynastic memory, mentioning how each of his predecessors (his great grandfather, Peter the Great, his grandfather, James II, and his father, Alfonso the Benign) had faced similar events.⁹⁷ It is clear that this explanation was part of the Crown's discourse of affirmation based on the continuity of the dynasty, which is why it pursued a specific memory,⁹⁸ but it also demonstrates a reasoning based on the analysis of specific events, facts worthy of memory which, after all, were one's own and other's experiences. In short, the Crown drew on life and models of life as a sum of experiences deserving to be recalled.

James I, king of the Crown of Aragon between 1214 and 1276, was the first monarch to dictate, in the first person, his own record of events worthy of being remembered from his long reign.⁹⁹ The account that he presents of his reign is a sum of emotive experiences. That is why he entertained himself, "to record small scenes of his daily life, seemingly lacking in any other interest than the purely personal, and not to hide from exposing his emotional reactions or

96 Flocel Sabaté, "Quina edat té l'Arbert Sescorts? Memòria, fama pública i alletament," in *Histoire et archéologie en Pays catalans. Mélanges offerts à Aymat Catafau*, ed. Nicolas Berjoan, Olivier Passarrius (Perpignan, 2024), pp.176–178.

97 Ramon Gubern, *Epistolari de Pere III* (Barcelona, 1955), pp. 142–43.

98 Flocel Sabaté, "L'invisibilitat del re e la visibilitat della dinastia nella corona d'Aragona," in *Il principe invisibile*, eds. Lucia Bertolini, Arturo Calzona, Glauco Maria Cantarella, Stefano Caroti, (Turnhout-Mantua, 2015), pp. 27–64.

99 Josep Maria Pujol, "Composició oral interactiva en el 'Llibre dels feits': el testimoni de la retòrica," in *Jaume I. Commemoració del VIII centenari del naixement de Jaume I*, ed. Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 2011), 2: 741–59.

those of the people.”¹⁰⁰ If, in a dictated narrative, the monarch flaunts his feelings, it is because these form part of the contemporary expressive code. What he reveals, above all, is having cried in various situations. The king cried when he was nine years old and, while held in Monzón castle, the count of Provence presented a plan to free him. Both cried: “and we cry with him.”¹⁰¹ However, the king also wept when he was an adult and had achieved a heroic feat, such as when he conquered the island of Majorca. In 1230, when gathered with all the participants in the conquest—“we convened a general council, that is, a meeting of all the knights and all the settlers who were in Majorca” (*faem justar consell general, ço és, tots los cavallers e tots los pobladors que eren en Mallorques*)—on bidding farewell to the island to return to Catalonia, the king, according to his own story, burst into tears and found it difficult to talk because of the pain he felt upon leaving Majorca: “and we cried when they tried to say goodbye. We and they were unable to speak because of the pain felt. And when we could recover we proclaimed that we appointed Bernat de Santa Eugènia as their head, and they should respect him as they would myself.”¹⁰² Ferran Soldevila describes it as “the weeping of the heroes.”¹⁰³ However, the weeping of monarchs was fully incorporated into the management of their relationships with their subjects. A little over a century later, Peter the Ceremonious, mentioned above,¹⁰⁴ returned to the autobiographic model pioneered by his great-great-grandfather when he wrote in the first person in the vernacular to describe his 1337 stay in Borriana, a town eager to remain under royal jurisdiction, which is why emotion dominated everything when the king crossed the town to meet his subjects in the town’s church. According to the monarch’s tale, both sides melted into tears of joy:

100 “A deixar constància de petites escenes de la seva vida quotidiana, aparentment mancades de cap altre interès que el purament personal, i que no s’amagui d’exposar les reaccions emocionals seves o dels personatges.” Josep Maria Pujol, “Jaume I, ‘rex facetus’: notes de filologia humorística,” *Estudis Romànics* 25 (2003), 215.

101 “E nos ploram ab ell.” Jaume I, *Llibre dels fets del rei En Jaume*, ed. Ferran Soldevila (Barcelona, 2007), p. 67.

102 “E ploram nós, e ells preseren llur comiat. E, quan haguem estat una peça, nós e ells, que no podíem parlar per la dolor que haviem, dixem-los que els lleixàvem per cap En Bernat de Sancta Eugènia, e que faessen per ell així com farien per nós.” Jaume I, *Llibre dels fets del rei En Jaume*, p. 198.

103 “El plor dels herois.” Ferran Soldevila, “Prefaci al Llibre dels fets del rei En Jaume o Crònica de Jaume I,” in *Llibre dels fets del rei En Jaume*, Jaume I, ed. Ferran Soldevila (Barcelona, 2007), p. 22.

104 Jaume Aurell, *Authoring the Past. History, Autobiography, and Politics in Medieval Catalonia*, (Chicago-London, 2012).

Going to the church we found all the people on the streets, some here, others there, and all of them feeling huge pleasure because of seeing us, which is why they were crying and showing so great reverence that they touched the ground with their elbows. They said: 'Lord, don't forget us!' And we went right to the church. In the church all the people cried, and we also cried with them, as well as all our entourage that went to the church with us.¹⁰⁵

On the other hand, both James I in the thirteenth century¹⁰⁶ and Alfonso the Magnanimous in the fifteenth¹⁰⁷ boasted about being likable and ingenious, each as an "amusing king" ("*rex facetus*"). However, neither of them would display uncontrolled laughter. Francesc Eiximenis cautioned against royal displays of excessive humour in 1392 to the man who would become King Martin four years later:

You should always have a cheerful face. This does not mean so much laughing but a kindly expression, because too much laughing, too much speaking and moving the eyes and head too much are reasons why the prince is scorned. The opposite behaviour leads the prince to be loved, because this is a sign of wisdom, which adding a composed joy show him as an amiable prince.¹⁰⁸

This advice was fully coherent with the Christological model: Jesus Christ's face always appeared serene, not sad but thoughtful, without laughing ostentatiously.¹⁰⁹ These models of emotional behaviour were suitable for all society.

105 "E nós, anant a l'esgleia, trobam tot lo poble per les carreres, los uns deçà, los altres dellà, qui hagué de nos gran goig, plorant e faent-nos reverència, amb los colzes en terra, dient-nos: -Senyor, no ens vullats oblidar! E anam-nos-en dret a l'esgleia, e com fom dins l'esgleia, plorà tot lo poble, e nós ab ell ensems, e aquells qui ab nós eren entrats." *Crònica de Pere III el Cerimoniós*, ed. Ferran Soldevila (Barcelona, 2014), p. 110.

106 Pujol, "Jaume I, 'rex facetus,'" p. 215.

107 Alberto Montaner Frutos, "La palabra en la ocasión. Alfonso V como 'rex facetus' a través del Panormita," *e-Spania* 4 (2009), <<http://e-spania.revues.org/1503>>.

108 "*Detvez esser tostemps ab cara alegre, mas no molt rient, mas bé acuyllent, car masa riura e masa parlar e masa moura los uyls e-l cap fan menysprear lo príncep, e-l contrari lo fa prear, car és indici de saviea, la qual ab composta alegria fa lo príncep amabbla per excés.*" Ramon Ferrer Navarro, *Eiximenis i la seva obra* (Valencia, 2010), p. 34.

109 Albert G. Hauf, "La 'Vita Christi' de Fr. Eiximenis O.F.M. (1340-1409) como tratado de Cristología para seglares," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 71 (1976), 37-64; Albert G. Hauf, *D'Eiximenis a Sor Isabel de Villena. Aportació a l'estudi de la nostra cultura medieval* (Valencia-Barcelona, 1990), pp. 19-55.

Feelings must be shown, but it is better to cry than to laugh because weeping purifies the soul, which is why, softly, sweetly and abundantly, it is a gift that mystical women possess, the benefits of which any good Christian can also access through worship.¹¹⁰ Vincent Ferrer was moved to hold mass until he wept during the consecration, his crying shared with all those in attendance.¹¹¹ Similarly, nobles and members of the people shared in mourning the death of the corresponding lord, each expressed their sadness according to their estate,¹¹² ostentatiously enough that they were often accompanied by the sorrowful whinnying of horses and howling of dogs.¹¹³ Openly crying and shedding tears was part of the explicit expressive code that was naturally shared and spread in late-medieval European society.¹¹⁴

The expression of sentiments was part of the reality of a studied and interested game of political strategies in the fifteenth century. In this context, attempts by municipal governments to force the whole population to participate in ceremonies designed to express grief for the death of the sovereign, and then the care taken in writing detailed reports about these displays of emotion to send to the new sovereign, as done in the major Catalan towns and cities, was part of these strategies.¹¹⁵ Late-medieval power was a game of emotional experiences, played according to political interests. Communication between rulers and the ruled was at the centre, and full of emotional messages. Depending on the circumstances, the monarch, like other lords, would choose between “producing terror”¹¹⁶ or showing that his was a “soft lordship.”¹¹⁷ Governing through fear and attracting the love of the lord were strategies adapted depending on which was calculated to be more effective. These were not rhetorical resources, because the messages were transmitted through gestures. To pressure the municipal government of Vic in 1366, the king not only threatened the local magistrates explicitly with death but also had gallows built in the main square

110 Piroska Nagy, *Le don des larmes au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2000), pp. 171–420.

111 Joan Fuster, “L’oratòria de Sant Vicenç Ferrer,” *Obres Completes* (Barcelona, 1968), 1: 46–7.

112 Francesca Español, “El ‘correr las armas’, un aparte caballeresco en las exequias medievales hispanas,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 37/2 (2007), 867–905.

113 Flocel Sabaté, *Vivir y sentir en la Edad Media. El mundo visto con ojos medievales* (Madrid, 2011), p. 89.

114 Elina Gerstman, ed. *Crying in the Middle Ages. Tears of History* (New York–Abingdon, 2012).

115 Flocel Sabaté, *Lo senyor rei és mort! Actitud i cerimònies dels municipis catalans baix-medievals davant la mort del monarca* (Lleida, 1994), pp. 247–63.

116 “Donar terror.” Flocel Sabaté, “Por política, terror social,” in *Por política, terror social*, ed. Flocel Sabaté (Lleida, 2013), pp. 13–14.

117 “Suau senyoria.” Flocel Sabaté, “Discurs i estratègies del poder reial a Catalunya al segle XIV,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 25 (1995), 642–43.

for that purpose.¹¹⁸ In general, instilling fear of terrible punishment was considered the best way to rule a society. That is why late-medieval Catalonia was a forest of gallows, because each of the numerous jurisdictions displayed these beside roads or even in central squares at moments of tension.¹¹⁹

As physical representations of power, gallows provided a means of emotional communication between rulers and the ruled, whether it was between lords and their subjects, or municipal councillors and townspeople. Similarly, the ideological guidance provided by Christianity, was carried out by transmitting the religious message emotively. In no other historical period did preachers enjoy such prominence and popular acceptance – “perhaps never had so many people based their prestige on the power of seduction of their words as in this time!”¹²⁰—, precisely because religion was at the centre of social behaviour and the transmission of codes of behaviour, not through intellectual reasoning but rather blunt emotional reaction. Language, expressions and even liturgy were centred almost exclusively on gestures and expressions of emotion—that included suffering—experienced and shared.¹²¹

The shared nature of these experiences exacerbated the effects on society as a whole. As stated, in the Middle Ages, human beings were rarely alone. They were part of multiple groups within society, beginning with the family and then continuing into other circles of collective solidarity, such as the faction, feudal ties or the municipal collective, and they could even share a wider common identity through the concept of nation.¹²² When the death penalty was applied and, with it, the rupture of the social fabric that so displeased God was repaired, popular participation was required to visualise how society as a whole participated in the satisfaction of recuperating the lost order and shared in the indignation towards those who had dared to break it. As a whole, the people jeered as the accused passed through the streets and suffered the torture meted out.¹²³ In this way, people acted in group solidarity, as an emotional community sharing the traits with which it identified.¹²⁴ In this concatenation

118 Eduard Junyent, *La ciutat de Vic i la seva història* (Barcelona, 1976), pp. 104–05.

119 Flocel Sabaté, “Les fourches patibulaires en Catalogne au bas Moyen Âge,” *Criminocorpus* (2015), <<http://criminocorpus.revues.org/3062>>.

120 “Jamais peut-être autant d’hommes ne durant leur prestige à la séduction du verbe !” Francis Rapp, *L’Église et la vie religieuse en Occident à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1999), p. 133.

121 Noël-Yves Tonnerre, *Être chrétien en France au moyen Âge* (Paris, 1996), pp. 145–48.

122 Flocel Sabaté, “Els referents històrics de la societat: identitat i memòria,” in *L’Edad Mijana. Món real i espai imaginat*, ed. Flocel Sabaté (Catarroja-Barcelona, 2012), pp. 48–49.

123 Flocel Sabaté, *The Death Penalty in Late-Medieval Catalonia Evidence and Significations* (London-New York, 2020), pp. 183–214.

124 Flocel Sabaté, “Identity in the Middle Ages,” in *Identity in the Middle Ages. Approaches from Southwestern Europe*, ed. Flocel Sabaté (Leeds, 2021), pp. 9–25.

of identities, the outer circle was marked by religion: the “common hatred” (*comune odium*) of Jews united Christians,¹²⁵ because they perceived the Jews as being obsessed with deicide and as enemies of the faith. In all cases, joint displays of solidarity and aggression erupted sporadically from specific events – experiences – that allowed emotion to burst free from containment.

Humans interrelate at a given time and in a specific place, anthropomorphising the landscape. History can thus be likened to cartography, where everything is a matter of scale. From a certain distance, we can explain the Middle Ages according to their structures, and describe the main features of the economy, institutions, cultural forms and social structure. But, as the scale widens and approaches the living space, we will appreciate, without any contradiction, that the structural supports equate to specific people who preceded us, endowed with names and feelings, who shared emotional experiences according to a code of values commonly accepted at the time, and derived from a specific adaptation to the Christian ideology adopted to regulate society.

This may seem obvious, but it may be worth noting that, when studying the past, what one finds is people who shared, emotionally, vital experiences. Surely it should not be necessary to state this, because it is too obvious amongst almost all historians that these people were not mere data in a database, but rather human beings not very different from us, yet it is also good to remember it.

125 Perpignan, Archives Départementales des Pyrénées-Orientales, 1B-94, fol. 45v.