

PREFACE

At the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophers proposed a new field of philosophy, namely, axiology. They produced a considerable literature in which the central problematic for philosophy consists of issues in value and value theory. However, the prominence of value theory at the beginning of the twentieth century has been so eclipsed that this history is almost lost to contemporary philosophy. Since the time that the project of this book was conceived, over twenty-five years ago, the submerged problematic of values has become even more removed from the central focus it should have. A tacit consensus has emerged in many quarters that the issues raised by value theory are not of fundamental importance and of little but personal interest. The fate of value theory in our age has been its eventual trivialization under the regime of metaphysical epistemology in its latest incarnation as “philosophy of science.”

The attempt has been made by science worshippers to capture philosophy: a new Scholasticism in which philosophy is reduced to a handmaiden of science. These figures have been so bedazzled by their New God that they have extended their vision across all the divisions of traditional philosophy. In this view “science” should define the field of modern philosophy even as the latter pretends to “humanism,” a concern with the entire field of human endeavors as a field in the humanities. Quine stated that “philosophy of science is philosophy enough.” Husserl characterized his phenomenology as a “strict science.” Of course, Heidegger and his followers reversed this evaluation. Heidegger’s judgment that philosophy is an “art” is a model that rivals philosophy as a science (Husserl) or handmaiden of science (the positivists, explicit and latent). However, both rivals define philosophy by a field outside it. Heidegger remains very much within the tradition of metaphysical epistemology, despite his critique of it. The problematic of being that he attempted to resurrect and that provided his central focus is an echo of the Aristotelian model, of being *qua* being. Thus it cannot provide a true alternative to the tradition by which it is determined.

What is the relation of “philosophy of science” to the tradition of metaphysical epistemology? Philosophy as science envy is the descendent of Aristotle’s model of contemplative wisdom as *episteme*. Wisdom as science is the origin of the model of “philosophy as a strict science” of Husserl and the positivists. Aristotle invented the notion of philosophy as science and thereby is the ancestor of all attempts to reduce the former to the latter. Of course Aristotle had a different notion of science than the modern one. Nevertheless, his formal notion of a science as a distinct field of study remains. The tendency to fall into such an instrumental role in relation to the reigning

problematic of an age, the cheerleader view of philosophy, whether the queen be theology or physics, the model science or art, is latent in the problematic of metaphysical epistemology. The model of first philosophy created by Aristotle and its subsequent transformation into a metaphysic of the subject is problematic. It would seem that this also requires marginalization of value to a reduced and ever shrinking sphere: Aristotle failed to distinguish value from science.

Philosophy has again been forced into a handmaiden role, playing servant to the queen, by these attitudes. Philosophy in this mode is narrow, dependent, and even parasitical: it is not viewed as having its own problems, methods, and insights, as it did in its origin and much of its now considerable history. The envy of the physical sciences that has fueled such attitudes, despite the origin of these same sciences in “natural philosophy,” has resulted in a truncated, instrumental philosophy. Truncated because if philosophy is itself a “science” it is one branch of the sciences, thus not distinctly philosophic: what is distinctly philosophic is lost and philosophy merges with science. Philosophy as autonomous, independent of the problematic of science, can never emerge from the “physics envy”¹ prevalent in many quarters. Philosophy as “philosophy of science” can never be genuine philosophy but only crypto-science, an apologetic mutant. Only now is it possible to begin to question these evaluations of the role of philosophy.

The attempt to ignore issues of value has meant that philosophers debate issues of little value to anyone, with little purpose, no meaning, and few results. Some kinds of philosophy in our age have become so removed from the problems of everyday life that they have become trivial. The subtle linguistic abstractions that form its stock in trade are meaningless, since they do not even affect lexicography or actual usage. Such philosophy is soon forgotten: it does not matter if it had ever been written. The result is that the “death of philosophy” is seriously debated in both analytic and Continental circles. The handmaiden role, the envy of physics, and the Continental attempt to reduce philosophy to fable are indeed the prelude to the death of such philosophy. This narrow view in which everything must pass through the reduced lens of an ideological model of science is a misreading of science and a distortion of the actual world. The idea never seems to have occurred to these philosophers that maybe philosophy is neither a science nor an art. That perhaps philosophy is a field without a rival, *sui generis*.

The wisdom that philosophy pursues in its proper role as philo-*sophia* has been subordinated and forgotten by both of these handmaiden approaches. The issue this raises is whether such a model for philosophy is wise. The capture of philosophy by neo-scholastics has meant that these cannot guide human life, as guiding principles are neither studied nor elaborated: rather, scholastic interests are. The exclusive pursuit of scholastic interests has meant irrelevance. But if philosophy in its critical role is not liberation from such

subordination to a reigning authority, then what value does and can it have? How can an unexamined subordination—unexamined because accepted dogmatically on faith, and without question—be the basis for a worthwhile life? What would such a philosophy look like?

Philosophy's history has included a long dialogue on the proper role of philosophy as "love of wisdom": is love of wisdom merely contemplative (Aristotle, Epicurus) or does it have practical implications? Is it primarily theoretical or practical, science or a way of life, which can include the insights of knowledge in a broader context of a plurality of values? Is it a "detached gaze" or can it provide guidance, and an ethic, a way of life reflecting a love of wisdom?

The most important distinction in Western philosophy is the separation of *theoria* as wisdom and *praxis* as moral virtue in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Heidegger argued that the distinction that was decisive for later Western thinking was the separation of being and becoming which occurs in Plato's *Republic*. However, this involves an idiosyncratic reading of ancient philosophy: it was Parmenides, the originary philosopher of "being," who conceived of being completely removed from becoming. I would argue that this distinction is also less important than the theory-practice distinction. Wisdom is autonomous from morals in the light of the latter view and love of wisdom, equated by Aristotle with metaphysics, involves intellectual virtues without reference to moral virtue. In this model contemplation has its autonomous realm free of moral constraints: the origin of the model of "value-free" science. Epistemological metaphysics begins with the fatal equation of wisdom with knowledge and the later equation of knowledge and science. The denouement of this way of thinking is Auschwitz, the Gulag, Hiroshima, and the "value-free" knowledge of mass destruction. It is also the view of Mengele. Logical Positivism is merely a late phase of this most unwise love, which brings the implicit logic of epistemological metaphysics to its inevitable conclusion.

The fatal equation of wisdom and knowledge developed through the separation of theory and practice into the exclusive emphasis on knowledge, in which wisdom is forgotten. The outcome is the perverse notion of "value-free" knowledge, as if knowledge and truth are not themselves values in contradistinction to falsity, error, and lies. Such a dichotomy is foreign to Plato, for whom wisdom is a moral virtue. The latter view is more complete as it is larger than a mere vision: it includes a vision actualized in a way of life. Mere contemplation contains a narrow vision of philosophy and of life. If the objection is made that philosophy as science is the *vita contemplativa*, then the narrowness and impotence of this way should be stressed. The *vita contemplativa* is less a way of life than the contemplation of one: of an object of the contemplative gaze. Despite Aristotle's attempt to portray the contemplative life as a form of activity, it is not a life valuable for its own

sake. Contemplation is a spectator view of life in which life is not lived but observed. Life is sacrificed to the contemplation of the other. Thus it is not, contra Aristotle, self-sufficient, as other-dependent and as aiming at something beyond itself: knowledge of something else. Aristotle could be interpreted as following Socrates' connection of virtue as knowledge and the Pre-Socratic cosmocentric speculations. However, as Aristotle himself noted, Socrates was "mainly concerned with ethics," and did not separate wisdom as knowledge from practice, as in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The same can be said of the Pre-Socratics, as even Heidegger admits.

Philosophers have lost the vocation of wisdom, since the very idea of wisdom has become problematic in our age. The idea of living a philosophy, of wisdom as a way of life strikes us as perhaps quaint, at best a remote ideal to be invoked at convocations, then hastily forgotten. Philosophy today is careerist: "professional" on the model of detached experts, or fee-for-service specialists rather than generalists. The ancient notion of the wise sage as knowing the ultimate principles and reality of the world, and being able to treat human life in terms of it, wise foresight, of living in accordance with philosophy, appears archaic. This idea of philosophy as special way of life, and not a "career" is likely to bring smiles of dismissal to our more sophisticated contemporary philosophers. The result has been that philosophy is not a love of wisdom for contemporary philosophy. In an echo of a previous captivity, it has become for most the handmaiden of science.

Of all things to forget, philosophy, the love of wisdom, has forgotten wisdom. Yet practical wisdom is needed in our time, perhaps as never before. No previous age had the equivalent of such evils as concentration camps, mass extermination, and "total domination" of the earth. The ancients did not have philosophers out of the contemplative tradition endorsing genocidal irrationalism and being hailed as great thinkers. Philosophy now has the chance to influence the moral debate over the fundamental issues, pivotal for future human development, which face us: genetic transformation, cloning, managerial-corporate and consumer society, overpopulation, and the increasing disappearance of the wild. As ethics it can influence the debate over the total transformation of the world that technology has made possible. Or it can retreat to a stance of "changing nothing," of doing nothing, and thus hastening the retreat into irrelevance: in effect cheerleading this fundamental and pivotal transformation of the world without influencing it. It can cling to the past as the latest version of "philosophy of science," or it can bring critical evaluations to bear on public events in the world as ethical philosophy. Much of the writing in "applied ethics" has already gone beyond the "scientific" model without acknowledging it: the debate is framed over norms, values, rights, and different ethical approaches, that is, axiological issues. Thus there is a subtle sea change in the air...

The question facing us in the twenty-first century is what philosophy as the love of wisdom means to us. Wisdom as problematic for philosophy in its present state means that what it is to be wise must be worked out for the twenty-first century, or any other century, as a pro-ject. Wisdom sets its eye on the future, knowing the past cannot be changed, as much as this past may provide lessons in folly. Insight into the future is of the character of wisdom, for if wisdom cannot guide our future, what is its value? and what could replace it? The form wisdom takes in our time is axiological, including critical evaluation and morals as regulative of all value, actual as well as potential. The problematic of our age is ethical, centered around environmental ethics. The ancients, who knew the meaning of wisdom, viewed ethics as a way of life,² not as a study in abstract concepts or manners. In Plato's dialogue *Parmenides*, Parmenides tells the young Socrates that he thinks that philosophy has not yet gotten its hold on him but that he thinks it will. Philosophy as love of wisdom, the pursuit of wisdom as a project in which he has not yet attained wisdom is a lifelong quest. Socrates has the promise and prospect of becoming wise, but is not yet wise. He has the courage of his convictions in loving wisdom and pursuing this beloved by rising above his surroundings and developing as a philosopher.

Ethics was a way of life for the ancients: the sage lived by a critical ethic, which could be justified. For ethics is the ultimate guide to our future conduct.³ Historicism, another influential force in the philosophy of the twentieth century, dwells on the past. But the past cannot prescribe the future—the past is mere “evidence.” By contrast with historicism in its various forms, radical axiology is oriented toward the future. Radical axiology evaluates future consequences as practical changes, which will include actual changes in moral practice.

Philosophy as a love of wisdom involves an evaluation of the best in life and the priorities of life as lived by philosophers, if only for culture, the life of the mind, and enlightenment over barbarism. Philosophy should cease its “physics envy,” and the attempt to become a science without a field, “linguistic analysis,” the odd hybrid of semantics and logic, and return to its roots. As it stands it has become trivial, with the unseemly obsequiousness involved in its claim to be a science in the face of the accomplishments of the genuine sciences. Such philosophy has delegitimized itself, while envy at the results of science has subverted the philosophic task and function. A genuine philosophy evaluates what is most worthwhile in distinction from spurious values. A genuine philosophy must issue from an ethic, which gives life meaning. Ethics as a wise way of life should not be restricted to petty, personal affairs, as it has largely been treated by certain contemporary philosophers, but ought to be expanded beyond the self as the basis for wise institutions. As a general field philosophy should have practical consequences.

The wisdom of the philosopher involves evaluation of what is ultimately good for humans, and more, of what is good for the world. Wisdom is not restricted to intellectual life, or to knowledge alone, which is only one category of good. The idea that wisdom only means being educated, in the sense of having a degree and mastery of a technical field, is a misappropriation of wisdom. Wisdom should include justice to all the values in life, in all aspects of life, not only the cravings of curiosity or the need for practical information. Philosophy is the love of wisdom and wisdom guides life and the decisions within it. Wisdom should be critical of inferior decisions, evaluative, and evaluation involves a valuetive schema in terms of its ground and what should be brought about, made actual. Ethics regulates both potential and actual values, the supreme values in wisdom and critical evaluation of superior consequences. Wisdom, then, is primarily evaluative: questioning received and conventional values is the precondition of projects and activities of worth: the examined life. What is the value of thinking, science, reason, and so on for humans? How can their use in particular circumstances be wise?

Our actions ultimately require the use of wisdom: of wise evaluation of alternative choices. Evaluation involves a critical appraisal of alternatives, the office of wisdom. Critical evaluation is within moral limits and utilizes categorial standards of value in appraisal. Wisdom includes the evaluation of pragmatics in the sense of foreseen consequences that can be brought about, created. Since what is actualized is created in some sense, wisdom has a part in creation of world. If it does not it should. The creative life aims at something valuable in itself. Wisdom can be characterized as excellent evaluation of the novel: good judgment in decisions regarding value conflicts in relation to the future. As such, wisdom is oriented toward future possibilities, not merely present realities. Wisdom is timely, not timeless.

Wise priorities should replace apologies for knowledge as the new philosophic problematic. Wisdom should evaluate the more important and valuable priorities through critical evaluation of alternatives. Ethics and values are not a province, but apply to the whole: they are general. Wisdom makes optimum use of them. The narrowing of philosophy, whose genealogy originates in "know thyself" and ends in physics envy, is, from this perspective, ideological: the part represented as the whole, reduction of philosophy to another field, whether science or art. Radical axiology includes a thoroughgoing evaluation and reevaluation of this epistemological problematic. Science is a problematic value, not a self-evident value in this view. Otherwise, philosophy has surrendered its critical independence. The question for radical axiology is not "what is knowledge," but why do we value knowledge?⁴ Why is knowledge valued most highly by some philosophers? Is pursuit of knowledge to the exclusion of all other values always a good? A truly radical philosophy would break completely with the viewpoint that

culminates in the “death of philosophy”: it would not linger in the metaphysical problematic of knowledge in its latest incarnation as philosophy of science. Radical axiology goes to the root in a comprehensive break with this tradition and involves a comprehensive and systematic alternative: a thoroughgoing reevaluation. This book is an attempt at such a radical philosophy, at a reevaluation of metaphysics and knowledge. The attempt at a radical reevaluation subsumes metaphysical problematics in the process of revaluing them. Their reevaluation involves the radicalization of value in a radical axiology: values as the root of philosophy.

Values at the root also imply reevaluation of the relation of contemplation and action: of theory less detached from practice, a pragmatic outlook. The dichotomy by which contemplative philosophies divorce theory and practice has, of course, been noted and criticized before, especially by Dewey. Contemplative or “pure” philosophy—which includes purely theoretical paradigms, that is, being, the subject, and language as removed from practice—builds formal systems in the mind that have no relation to practice and the actual world created by it. The ultimate form of subjectivity: the imaginary is taken as the actual! Actual humans are not some dubious, detached subjects of theory but practicing agents who create valued solutions to problems. Formal, “pure” philosophy is a metaphysic, a “beyond” neither applicable nor relevant to the world of cultural and historical values. In actuality, “reality” is cultural and historically created, not a priori. The absorption of history into philosophy in the nineteenth century is the attempt to make the latter more concrete and relevant, a project that unites very different philosophers, including Hegel, Comte, Marx, and Nietzsche.

The stipulative metaphysical world created by ideological epistemology, in its obsession with an ideal world of pure theory, has little resemblance to the actual world. The priority of action in value theory over mere perception has created the actual world of value, of goods. In this actual world, values are not derivative but at the root: the ultimate ground. The field created by action—the actual practical world of humans, civilization, and science—is the proper domain of values. To accept the alien model of metaphysical epistemology based on Cartesian premises for values ignores the actual world, the world constructed by practice, for a fictitious, ungrounded, thus false world of misplaced theory. With a few exceptions, covered in chapter one, previous ethics and value theory has been derivative from ontology and epistemology: an alien model imposed on values. The project of a radical axiology is insubordinate: to reverse this relation to contemplative philosophy, a project first suggested by the English pragmatist, F.C.S. Schiller.⁵

In chapter one I discuss the history of philosophy conceived systematically as a succession of historical problematics. My argument is that no philosophy is free of system, structure, or a historical context (or

paradigm). This chapter also introduces the problematic of first philosophy in the notion of different paradigms of first philosophy, a notion borrowed from Apel. I have attempted to establish the legitimacy of treating such paradigmatic first philosophies topically and thematically in subsequent chapters by showing in brief outline the history of such paradigms and their internal logic in relation to identity and difference. As paradigms are historical, foundations are historical, but independent of historical determination. Chapter one also includes an argument against Rorty's notion that philosophy can be non-foundational in the sense of paradigm-free or free of system. The paradigms of first philosophy constitute an argument that all philosophy is systematic, although as I will note, it would be better to keep the "foundation" metaphor for a specific philosophical structure, and not as a generic term, which is how Rorty uses it.

The notion of paradigms of philosophy includes the Platonic-Sophistic project of "the Good" as well as the more recent and related project of a philosophy of value. The project of a radical axiology is not entirely new, although I would argue that it has never actually been carried through thoroughly or with consistency. It shares a first philosophy of value with Platonism but rejects the ontological treatment of values in Platonism as well as the structure of hierarchy in Platonic transcendence and its mathematically influenced theory of values. Prior attempts at a first philosophy of values made too many compromises with competing paradigms, whether being (Plato), or the subject (Lotze and the Neo-Kantians). A truly radical axiology would not involve ontology or a subject but would evaluate these free from a metaphysical perspective.

I will outline the hidden archeology of the contemporary marginalization of value, due to the emphasis on the value of knowledge, in chapter two of this book. The history of the problematic of knowledge as metaphysical is rarely acknowledged or discussed. However, the more recent history of this tendency—in the rise of the neo-positivist outlook in Austria, spreading slowly to Germany, Britain, the United States, and finding echoes in the epistemological school in France from Bachelard onward—is the latest development of this outlook. The epistemological problematic even lies in the background of figures who are not positivists, for example, Husserl and his numerous followers on the Continent and Latin America.

With a few exceptions, axiologists accepted the systematic place assigned to value by the psychological school of Meinong and Von Ehrenfels, also Austrian in origin, namely, that value can be reduced to desire, feeling, or other subjective, psychological states. Even so-called value naturalists contributed to this subjectivization and internalization of values, for example Perry's "interest" theory of value. The implicit Cartesian metaphysics of this school remained as the basis of value theory long after the critique of the

Cartesian model in psychology, epistemology and metaphysics had made subjective-psychologistic philosophizing in the Cartesian mode obsolete.

Chapter two attempts to radically revalue the fields of philosophy and present a comprehensive alternative to metaphysical epistemology. In this chapter I have outlined a systematic philosophy of values without recourse to ontology, psychology, or the subject. Radical means avoiding such a metaphysical grounding for values: values are independent of metaphysics and, in a radical revaluation, a ground for metaphysics. Values as the ground also entails that values are the historical context for the other paradigms. Values are not in an ideal, trans-historical realm of theory. They are the basis for historical changes. Revaluation explains change. Values as the ground of action mediate the possible and the actual: what can be actualized. Values are not primary only in the order of discovery, in the form of the ultimate justification of philosophy as an activity that philosophers pursue. Instead, the value of an inquiry must in some sense be stipulated or projected, for example, as a pursuit of knowledge, in satisfying curiosity, practical consequences, and so on. Philosophy has the task of articulation and critique of values, either its own, or those implicit in a culture. This task includes examination of the value of a value: critical evaluation.

Philosophy cannot be equivalent to science in this view, for it deals with the wise actualization of the possible, including the ethics of actualizing alternative “options.” The realm of the “ought” or norms, of ideals, and standards, and also of possible changes and alternatives, differentiate evaluation from science: the potential from actual knowledge. The possible along with the actual also encompasses a larger realm than the “real,” the province of metaphysics. The metaphysical problematic of knowledge consists in only one field, one problem: knowledge is but one category of value. To read all value through this lens is unjust to other values: unjustified. Philosophy is larger than science for it includes evaluation of the possible, the normative, and the ideal. Since I am including ideals, I am bound to be read as an idealist, but this would be an error. The inclusion of ideals as within the province of philosophy does not make anyone an idealist. In the model of philosophy as the most general discipline, all fields of human endeavor involve the evaluation of competing possibilities, none of which are value-free as evaluated. Business “philosophy” and economic life are as subject to philosophic wisdom as science and art: special cases of the wise evaluation of possibilities. Economic life involves the pursuit of specialized values to the exclusion of others, for example, profit, prosperity, wealth, and so on. These activities involve strategies for evaluating optimum outcomes in relation to these overall ends. Philosophy is the wise evaluation of new possibilities: the possibly valuable and the possibilities that will become actualized based on judgments of value. Only such a model of philosophy can be general enough to do justice to the tradition of philosophy as the most general discipline.

In the modern period, values were reduced to a small part of the inner world of the subject—their emotions and desires—in a strange Stoic internalization of the modes and dimensions of value. Value was trivialized by this reduction in which its derivative place was systematically based on an epistemological interest with dubious premises. A further consequence was devaluation of the world, especially the world of non-human animals and plants, since value was confined to a limited kind of subjective state. Value was marginalized in a meaningless universe.

Why should values be radicalized? The other paradigms have proven inadequate, whether as paradigms or as “the basis” of value. The modern subordination of the issues raised by a comprehensive philosophy of values follows from treating values as systematically derivative, not of basic importance as the measure of importance. Such an eclipse of the problematic of value echoes a prior episode in philosophy with striking similarities: Aristotle’s subordination of good to being in the *pros hen* relation⁶ of attribute to substance. In effect, values have been treated from a non-axiological and often hostile, skeptical perspective that has been arbitrarily hoisted upon them, precisely because they are based on first philosophies that were not first philosophies of value, including the “metaphysical basis” of value, the “ontology” of value, or the “experience” of value. This book will make a sustained case that the metaphysical approach to value is a mistake. Contemporary discussions in axiology have made this mistake at the root, since they locate value metaphysically beyond value, whether in being, the subject, or language. Value has been subordinated to alien and inadequate grounds for value.

In chapter three, I have defended evaluation in relation to and in the context of competing paradigms of philosophy. Axiology separated from the confines of another paradigm must be radical axiology. *The book does not present a metaphysical notion of value*, since it constitutes a critique of the metaphysical approach to value. In this project, values must be separated and retrieved from being, the subject, and analytic treatments of language that treat values in terms of being. The priority of values as regulative of practice includes the judgment that what “is” now in the world reflects past values and norms, in some respect, even for theory. I have made the case for value as ultimate grounding, not being or the subject; issues of ultimate grounding cannot be separated from issues of value.

As soon as a philosopher ranks the ontological model of the “given” as having ultimate importance, and evaluates “being” prior, the game is up and values are marginalized. The fundamental mistake of most value theory—and its most important philosophic domain, ethics—was to accept the logic connected with “things,” whether being, *res extensa*, the perceived, facts and so on. Even Plato made this error. He lived at a time when the ontological

problematic was paramount, despite the critique of Sophists like Gorgias of the whole problematic of being. The Platonic school, including the Neo-Platonists, never overcame this problematic, as one of the last major works of the school indicates. John Scotus Eriugena's magnum opus spoke of God in terms of being, not the Good as Plotinus and Augustine (*De Natura Boni*) had conceived him. Radical axiology argues against this approach, which ultimately trivializes value by judging theory of greater value than practice, and being of more importance than the good, the measure of importance.

The subjective-objective distinction presumes a Cartesian model, that is, the metaphysics of the subject as a first philosophy. The objectivity of the object or the objectivity of value, as in Scheler, is an object for a subject: a subject conceiving or perceiving objects. Offering a new value theory within the Cartesian problematic of a subject confronting an object is not enough. Values are neither "subjective" nor "objective" in a radical axiology, as such a dichotomy is axiologically false. "Subjects" in the actual world are reflective of historical values, not a fictional world of subjects detached from the world. Radical axiology as radical involves the rejection of such a Cartesian problematic and framework at the root. A radical philosophy of values would abandon this subject-object dichotomy as inadequate for, alien to, and a distortion of value. An approach to value that uses a model of value that is not itself axiological, based on value problematics, cannot do justice to value.

At its origin, analytic philosophy argued that the good was a "non-natural predicate," but also that everything is natural. This fundamental contradiction meant that values were suspect to the analytic school: they were treated as irrational and thereby beyond the scope of philosophy. However, the "naturalistic fallacy" is itself fallacious since it contradicts the naturalistic thesis. More, naturalism itself has never been questioned by this school.⁷ However, to ask, "what are values?" implies a relation between the copula and the world: that is, presumes an Aristotelian framework or approach to issues of value, which means the paradigm of being as determinative of language. To ask, "what are values" in any form reduces questions of value to ontology (or in a later version, consciousness or concepts: substance as subject). To think or conceive value in terms of such questions validates the priority of the relation between "to be" and the world, or unmediated language and the world. To raise the question of the "ontological status" of values, or whether they are "subjective or objective," or "what we mean" by the "concept of value" is concedes the *value* of another paradigm: the legitimacy of treating value in its terms.

Such questions do not arise for radical axiology, but only for other paradigms. Radical axiology requires that values be examined without reference to being, desire, nature, and so on. Certain issues are thereby ruled out by the project of radical axiology. The subordination of values to being as attributes; the reduction of value to desire, feeling, will, and other subjective

states (a problematic derived from the paradigm of the subject: a subject who wills, desires, or feels value); or “meta-ethical” conceptual analysis (the paradigm of language); or the naturalist, non-naturalist debate of Moore, which is Sophistic in origin, are pseudo-issues for a radical axiology.

Chapter four will cover value analysis: the archaeology of hidden values. Value analysis reveals disguised value judgments and covert justifications in superficially value-neutral philosophic propositions and in scientific models. The endless disputes between the schools reveal hidden evaluations: the buried value judgments in the cheerleader model of philosophy, which has emerged from the tradition of metaphysical epistemology, have been disguised. Such models for philosophy have covered up a value dispute over the role of philosophy itself. The attempt to create a separate field for philosophy as “conceptual analysis” has not ended the essentially normative and axiological disputes over philosophic issues. A value conflict with many levels has been disguised by philosophy in this mode, including professional standards vs. social relevance, intellectual vs. other needs, and so on.

One of the hidden value judgments made by proponents of the model of philosophy based on a field outside philosophy is that only science, among all human endeavors and activities, is worthy of philosophic concern and treatment; or it is more worthy than the others, thus of first rank, a standard of values. An ostensive epistemology actually consists in an evaluation. The judgment also involves a value fallacy in that special values are revalued as general: a revaluation of subordinate values as basic. “Science” as knowledge, and art are special fields that are ranked supreme in this model, despite their specialized role. They are not general and therefore cannot be philosophical. Finally, I have engaged the debate over “value-neutral” science; the argument will be made for the universality of value.

The remaining three chapters present a critical evaluation of the paradigmatic metaphysical first philosophies: being, the subject, and language. I begin by arguing against their inadequacies as first philosophies by their own standards. Then their defects are evaluated. This insubordinate approach of questioning the value of metaphysical first philosophy has rarely been attempted in philosophy except by Nietzsche, a reflection of the marginalization of value theory. That it follows from the project of a radical axiology should be evident from what a radical project entails.

In the conclusion, the argument will be made for value as the ground of change, and thereby of transformation of the world. What “is” will be analyzed in terms of prior evaluations: the “real” as a consequence of a prior ground, a first: evaluations of potential worth. Radical axiology separates first philosophy from the “real” as its ground, and evaluates the relation of potentiality and actuality as prior to a *pros hen* relation to the “given.” I will

then sum up by arguing that value measures superiority in comparative terms, and provides the ultimate ground of evaluation.

A second part of radical axiology will be written next. I will cover value theory proper. *The primary topic of the present work is first philosophy, not theories of value*, although the latter are treated also, where appropriate. A *first philosophy* of values is logically independent of a *theory* of values, since different theories of value could be used as first philosophies. But also, such theories of value need not be first philosophies, as they are not for most of the tradition. Similarly, a theory of evaluation could be formulated that is not part of a (first) philosophy of values. In the present work, I have incorporated a theory of values and evaluation into a whole philosophy of values. But the book is primarily a critical examination of first philosophy and the presentation of a philosophy of values. The argument in the book is a sustained critical evaluation of first philosophy and the “metaphysic of value” it entails. Subsequent books will cover freedom and determinism, evaluation, psychology, ethics, and other topics. These will be treated in terms of a radical philosophy of values.

Anyone who reads this work in the light or from the perspective of another paradigm—who sees an implicit ontology, psychology or any other basis for value in radical axiology—will miss the spirit in which I have worked. I have engaged in a prolonged intellectual struggle to evolve a value philosophy that did not refer back to existents, being, and so on. My attempt has been to search out the hidden values in all other paradigms, and to develop evaluation as a method, as a prelude to philosophical reevaluation and reform.

When the handmaiden version of philosophy as “philosophy of science”—explicit or latent—is evaluated against the liberated and liberating philosophy exhibited by the ancients, taken as a whole, it is obvious which has greater value. A philosophy with a healthy, independent status takes a more critical stance toward science and technology. Unfortunately, the more detached attitude toward science that evolved in the sixties has not survived, and many younger philosophers have also become, in effect, cheerleaders of scientists. This evaluation should not be taken as a critique of science itself, apart from the use some philosophers have tried to make of science, scientism. Nor do I object in the least to philosophy of science as one field within philosophy, as opposed to all of philosophy. Ancient philosophy gave us the model of wisdom free from subordination to something of lesser importance and worth and of smaller scope. Whatever its shortcomings, this model provides a far more inspiring and intriguing standard than philosophy as subservient to religion, as physics envy, or as a branch of literature, and philosophers as the uncritical apologists and cheerleaders of science, theology or poetry. Toward a resurrection of that wisdom, that free spirit in the origin of philosophy as a love of wisdom, I hope my philosophy is a contribution.