

PREFACE

Panenmentalism is a novel metaphysics that I first introduced in my *Saving Possibilities: A Study in Philosophical Psychology* (Gilead, 1999). The present book should be read independently, as it introduces entirely novel panenmentalist ideas and opens new areas for panenmentalist studies. The term “panenmentalism” or “panenpossibilism,” which I coined, means “everything is comprised within the mental-possible.” Analogously, “panentheism” means that the whole (*pan*), the universe or all that exists, is comprised in (*en*) God, while God is wider or more comprehensive than the whole. In an analogous vein, panenmentalism argues that since any actuality must be possible but not every possibility is actual, then the mental-possible is wider or more comprehensive than the physical-actual and comprises it. All possibilities constitute the realm of the mental. A special part of the mental-possible consists of singular possibilities. This part is the psychical, and, as the reader will shortly realize, panenmentalist singularity pertains to psychical possibilities alone. Each of the following chapters is associated, directly or indirectly, with the panenmentalist idea of singularity, which is the leitmotiv of the book.

Since what comprises all possibilities cannot be closed or final, the mental-possible as a whole necessarily keeps its open nature. Accordingly, panenmentalism does not construct a final, closed system, and the adequate way to introduce its ideas is in essays. In English, the transitive verb “essay” means to attempt, to try, to put to a test, or to make an often tentative or experimental effort to perform. Essays do not constitute a final, closed system. They habitually keep their open nature, and their themes should be rethought and reworked repeatedly. I hope that the following chapters retain this nature, and first save further possibilities. Besides the leitmotiv of singularity, they all share basic panenmentalist principles and assumptions, which I briefly represent in what follows. Sharing these principles and assumptions, these chapters all belong to a coherent study. As the reader will ascertain, the particular links of this study relate to each other.

Before representing these basic principles and assumptions, I must clarify that although I occasionally employ terms that analytic philosophers frequently use in different writings, I do not peruse the subjects discussed in the book through set-theoretical or other logico-mathematical spectacles. Considering matters from these logico-mathematical viewpoints, philosophers may capture quite a lot and may make important distinctions, as the living tradition of analytic philosophy demonstrates. Alas, these viewpoints do not

save many quite significant possibilities; they leave them out of any serious discussion, and even exclude them entirely. The reality of pure (mere) possibilities that are individuals (particulars or singulars), existing independently or regardless of any actualization, is a most significant possibility that set-theoretical viewpoints often neglect or exclude. To argue, as I do, for this sort of reality quite independently of the idea of possible worlds, is all the more against the majority of the analytic currents and, some would say, even against them all. Also, speaking of actualism and possibilism or of modality in general, I do not consider them from a set-theoretical viewpoint. As a rule, the possibilities I attempt to save and elaborate in this book are kept outside the realm of set-theoretical considerations.

We should bear in mind that philosophical terms are not the exclusive property of any philosophical school whatever. Baruch Spinoza, for instance, employs many Cartesian terms, yet he habitually understands them in an entirely different way from René Descartes and other Cartesians. The same holds for Aristotle in relation to his predecessors, especially Plato. Thinking philosophically in an original or novel way entails constructing a new philosophical language that by no means becomes private or incommunicable. Employing current or traditional terms, such a language should ascribe new meanings to them. Yet such innovation, even revolution, should not necessarily end in unintelligibility, incommunicability, or getting lost. I wish to save also the possibility of a fruitful dialogue with the analytic tradition despite all the disagreements.

As to the basic panenmentalist principles and assumptions, the first is that the mental is the realm of the possible, whereas the physical is the realm of the actual. Independently or regardless of their actualization, possibilities are pure (possibilities as such). No possibility as such, no pure possibility, can affect the actual, but pure possibilities do determine the mental and affect the psychical. Just to think of possibilities, even if unactualized, affects us psychically. Only the psychical can be affected or determined by pure possibilities. Only for psychical beings do pure possibilities mean something. That the objects of our psychical attitudes can be pure possibilities is a received view. But one of the bold novelties of panenmentalism is that the psychical as such (in itself) is a pure possibility and not an actuality, and that only the purely mental or the psychical as such consists of the determinacy of pure possibilities alone. Our body is just an actuality, an actualization of our mind. For reasons clarified below in this Preface, this actualization must be partial, and, as a result, mind and body cannot be identical. Any actualization must be physical (purely material, energetic, strictly physical, chemical, or biological). This crucial point is clarified next.

This first principle, like other panenmentalist basic principles and assumptions, serves major ends. I have suggested these principles and

assumptions first to render the psychophysical problem solvable, without paying the unbearable cost of reductions, materialist or idealist, and without falling into the dualistic trap or impasse (Gilead, 1999, pp. 5–39). No less problematic are the approaches seeking some psychophysical identity. Although mind and body are undoubtedly united, they are not identical. In my view, mind and body are not “one and the same thing” under different descriptions or aspects. Yet being intimately and intrinsically united, mind or body cannot make a separate substance. Assuming that the mind is a psychical possibility and that the body partly actualizes this possibility, panenmentalism sustains the real difference and distinction between mind and body, as much as it sustains their undeniable intimate unity.

Sustaining so, panenmentalism does not solve the psychophysical problem, nor does it answer the psychophysical question. Instead, panenmentalism keeps the road, possibly an endless road, open and clear, and thus renders the psychophysical problem solvable. We must look forward to innumerable empirical answers to this old question, but the possibility of attaining the answers-solutions heavily depends on the antecedent assurance that from the outset no conceptual impasse blocks the way leading to them. Panenmentalism makes a grand attempt to remove such a conceptual block, whose ground is in the traditional philosophical categories in which the psychophysical question has been cast so far.

The psychophysical question is not the only problem with which the panenmentalist principles and assumptions cope; epistemological problems too engage me, in my earlier book and in this one. But panenmentalism attempts to save no less essential a possibility: the psychical singularity and the subjectivity of each of us. The reality of individual pure possibilities may also explain why fantasies and fictions can be so meaningful, even quite real, for us. As I hope the reader may realize, I employ the panenmentalist principles and assumptions to save or refreshingly renew further significant possibilities in different philosophical areas, especially metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, psychology, and ethics.

By pure possibility I do not mean potentiality. Potentiality (such as the Aristotelian matter) entails dependence on the actual (such as the Aristotelian form, *eidos*) that is ontologically and epistemologically antecedent and prior. Existing independently of and prior to the physical-actual, pure possibilities are not potentialities, Aristotelian or otherwise. Nor are they dispositions, behavioral or otherwise. Pure possibilities are *a priori* individuals, particulars, or singulars. By contrast, dispositions, especially behavioral, must have general nature and must, at least epistemologically, depend on (or be after) *a posteriori*, actual facts, circumstantial or contingent. No pure possibility is dependent on any *a posteriori* facts or actualization.

Possibilities, pure or otherwise, are by no means abstract or general. By all means, any pure possibility is individual, particular, or singular. What is general or universal about possibilities can be only of their relationality or significance, which is established only on the basis of the particularity or singularity of the related possibilities. Since no two possibilities can be identical, each possibility, as particular and different from any other possibility in the entire realm of possibilities, must relate to all the other possibilities and must bear a universal significance. Generality has to do with specific relations, connections, or representations of individual possibilities. This holds for “general” concepts, paradigms, types, models, laws, and rules. All such “general” possibilities, serving as a relationality or significance of individual possibilities, are senseless unless entirely dependent on these individual possibilities.

Panenmentalism turns any paradigm or type into a paradigm-case or into a type-token. Any model or type is a particular possibility relating to similar tokens. Similarity is a specific relation among individual possibilities sharing a generic relationality, relatedness, or significance. Since any word is general, having a general significance or meaning within a language (which cannot be private), each word must generally represent individual possibilities, which as such are not general. For instance, the word “book” is general, yet we must have a particular possibility, or particular possibilities, in mind that this word generally represents. In reality, no book “in general” can exist, since no possibility of a book can be general but must be particular. Only the significance or meaning shared by the possibilities of all books can be general, and all these possibilities share a specific relationality relating them under a common, general concept. Hence, panenmentalism holds to “nominalism.”

Possibilities are no less real than actualities, at least as regards the mental and the psychical. The purely possible and the mental as such make one and the same ontological realm that is independent of the actual-physical. Pure possibilities are ontologically prior and epistemologically *a priori*. We can know them by imagination and reflection alone, although in practice knowing or being aware of them may also require experience or intersubjective means, such as dialogue, interaction, and learning. The apriority or innateness of pure possibilities is absolutely compatible with such a requirement, because apriority and innateness may not entail analyticity at all, and because the *a priori* or innate standing of a pure possibility is entirely independent of the way in which it becomes known to us. No matter how you know about such a possibility, in itself it must be *a priori* and innate. Still, you may imagine or think of mere possibilities about whose possible actualization you know absolutely nothing.

As for the physical, it is undoubtedly actual, and not only possible. As actual, the physical is subject to spatial, temporal, and causal conditions,

whereas no pure possibility is subject to any of these conditions. The actual-physical makes the *a posteriori* realm, which can be known empirically only, by external, public experience.

To exempt the purely mental and the psychological from any spatial condition or localization may sound quite reasonable to you. But to argue that the mental and especially the psychological are exempt from any temporal condition appears to oppose most, if not all, received views about the psychological. Can we imagine our psychological life without time and temporality? By all means, provided we realize that all the temporality about our psychological life is not of it as such but only of its actualization in the body. Time and temporality have to do with the physical realization, namely, actualization, of our mind, not with our mind as such, as purely possible-psychical. Everything psychological as such, as purely possible, must be atemporal, and only the physical-actual is subject to time and temporality.

Our sense of actuality is simply our contact with the physical. This contact alone endows us with the experience of time and temporality. Without experiencing the physical-actual, we would have nothing of that experience. Without the only possible actualization, the physical realization, of our mind as a body, time and temporality would remain just mere ideas or pure possibilities for us. This is so, because our psychological life in itself, including our memories and recollections, is necessarily atemporal and not subject to temporal conditions. Atemporality is a necessary condition for remembering. Things remembered are quite different from actual things, which are inseparable from temporality. We do not experience things remembered as events in the past. To recall them we must first remove all temporal distance. Associations, undoubtedly psychologically indispensable, blur all temporal distinctions and fuse them into an atemporal mixture. Such is also the nature of imagination, fantasy, and dreaming, all the *moreso* of anything unconscious. As for the unconscious, no temporal distinctions are applicable at all. The distinction between inner-psychical and external-actual reality brings back temporal distinctions to our awareness, also in remembrance.

If someone asks you where are you at a particular moment when you are remembering something and at what time the remembering experience occurs, all such questions make sense only because they refer to your physical, bodily condition alone. Your body, the actualization of your mind, is there and then at the place where you are at that moment, whereas your thoughts, memories, feelings, and experiences, and your psychological being as a whole, cannot be located at any place or time. Your psychological states as physically realized, as actualities taking place in your body, can be spatiotemporally located. But as psychological alone, as purely psychological, spatial or temporal location (or condition) is not applicable to them. No thought or experience takes time unless as an actuality in our brain. As an actuality, such a thought or

experience is an event in our brain, occurring at a particular time in a particular place that can be precisely located. Yet this event is by no means our thought in its psychical being, namely, as a pure possibility. Panenmentalism leaves changes, processes, events, and occurrences to the physical alone, whereas the mental and the psychical as such are exempt from all these.

In sum, nothing of the mental or of the psychical as such, as pure, is temporal or temporally conditioned. Hence, Only the physical is actual, nothing purely psychical can be actual but only purely possible, and the only possible actualization is physical realization.

Since any actuality is possible too, whereas not every possibility is actual, panenmentalism does not allow any reduction of the possible to the actual. Actualism reduces any possibility to an actuality or, at least, to a property of an actuality, which obviously cannot exist or have any sense independently of the actuality. Panenmentalism consistently opposes actualism.

Just as the realm of the possible is wider or more comprehensive than that of the actual, so more exists to the possibility of a thing than to its actuality. A pure possibility, say, *A*, comprises all the possible modifications or changes, actualized or not, that *A* can undergo and still keeping its identity as *A*. The mental realm as a whole comprises all the possibilities as such, actualized or not. The actualized part of the mental-possible is the physical, yet all that is independent of the physical is the mental-possible as such, the purely mental-possible, which is no less real than the actual-physical. Regardless or independently of its actualization, the actual-physical too, as necessarily possible, is necessarily comprised within the purely mental-possible. In this sense, the purely mental-possible comprises all that exists, which is what panenmentalism is all about.

Any actualization limits, confines, restricts, or qualifies the relevant possibility, although not as pure but only as actualized, and so subjects it to causal and spatiotemporal conditions. Like any possibility as such, the possibilities of these conditions and restrictions are also comprised within the purely mental. As purely possible, these possibilities are necessarily exempt from any spatial, temporal, or causal condition.

To think of something is to conceive or discover its pure possibility. Whether something is actual or not, its possibility must *a priori* exist, independently of any actuality or actualization, and must be *a priori* thinkable. The peculiar expression “*a priori* exist” is not a mistaken result of confounding ontology with epistemology. As Chapter Ten shows, this expression adequately reflects the way in which panenmentalism associates ontological with epistemological considerations. As you will realize, panenmentalism associates necessity with pure, *a priori* possibilities. Purity,

necessity, and apriorism refer, each in its own way, to the ontological and epistemological independence of pure possibilities, their independence of actual, empirical, or *a posteriori* matters. "Necessity" is habitually considered a modal-metaphysical term, while "*a priori*" is habitually considered an epistemological term. Yet panenmentalism associates these two terms without blurring the difference between them. Pure possibilities are thus necessarily, *a priori* exist, and their independence is both ontological and epistemological.

The psychical makes a special domain in the possible-mental, which besides and independently of the psychical, consists of concepts, ideas, structures, theories, systems, meanings, significance, and values, unless subjective, private meanings, significance, and values are concerned, all of which are necessarily psychically dependent. Being psychical most closely relates to the possible. Our thinking, willing, wishing, planning, fantasizing, our fears, anxieties, hopes, intentions, or expectations have to do with possibilities, actualizable or not. What makes us psychical and conscious beings is our ability to experience, to be affected by, to conceive, and to be aware not only of the actual but, most of all, of the purely possible. Things are meaningful or valuable for us owing to their possibilities (actualized or not) and the relationality, attachment, or association of these possibilities to our psychical possibilities.

Our psychical life is made of singular possibilities, partly actualized in our brain and nervous system. But our mind or psychical life is not identical with our brain and nervous system nor with anything biological-physical pertaining to them: structure, organization, properties, potentiality, functions, operation, and activity. Our psychical being is irreducible to our actuality, which must be physical. Materialist-actualist reduction is entirely incompatible with our deep-rooted experience of psychical life, an experience that has nothing of the nature of illusion in it. To identify or characterize anything psychical as a biological being or activity makes no sense, for any physical property cannot be attributed to anything mental or psychical. For instance, any mental thing, any pure possibility, cannot have weight, colors, figure, dimensions, any spatial, temporal, and causal properties. Yet the reverse is quite possible: the physical may bear mental or psychical properties, which are possibilities. The psychophysical unity by its nature cannot be considered an identity. All that we are capable of finding out in the brain and nervous system in themselves must be biological-physical alone, and no purely psychical factors can be considered causes, operations, and effects within the brain and nervous system.

Psychical life is actualizable, owing exclusively to the functioning or activity of the brain and nervous system. Yet no actualization entails identity. The possibility of *A*, even the possibility-identity of *A*, is not identical with its actuality, for no actualization can exhaust its possibility, because the actual

case could always be different and because not all the possible modifications or changes under the same possibility-identity are actualized. Equally, cerebral activity makes our psychical life actual and endows it with causal power and efficacy, but this life is not identical with cerebral activity. A novel as a mental being has nothing of the properties or characteristics of the physical-actual book, yet the printed book is the actuality of this novel. The same holds for our psychical life. We are made of psychical possibilities more than of their actualities, which are but physical facts, states, events, or actions. Much more exists to your personality than what your body, including all its physical manifestations, can actualize.

In the causal chain actualizing our psychical life, no psychical factor can be found; only biological-physical factors can exist there. This causal chain would be meaningless without our psychical life, yet no meaning and nothing psychical can be found within this chain. What unites mind and body into one being is not causality whatever but only the actualization of the mind, which is a singular, psychical possibility. No causal connection can exist between mind and body, for causality is the matter of actualities alone, of physical beings alone, all of which are subject to spatiotemporal conditions. Pure possibilities cause nothing, yet causes actualize possibilities and the relationship or connection attaching them together. Anything purely possible-mental is entirely exempt from spatial and temporal conditions. We cannot spatially or temporally locate anything purely possible, mental, or psychical. Causality cannot do without spatiotemporal, at least temporal, conditions and location. Only the physical, the actuality of anything mental or psychical, can be spatiotemporally conditioned or located and causally conditioned.

Against this panenmentlist view, you may argue that psychophysical interaction or inter-causation is an incontestable fact. Innumerable everyday experiences, familiar to each of us, appear to indicate that our psychical determinations cause bodily and behavioral changes and *vice versa*. But, under panenmentalism, this is only a matter of appearance or wrong interpretation. Besides temporal conditions, causation requires energy, power or force, and specific mechanisms, while causality attempts to subject all these to patterns or laws. Yet we can coherently envisage any causal mechanism, any energy, or any power or force only under physical terms, not under an obscure or enigmatic mixture of both mental and physical terms. Since any cause, effect, or event as temporally or spatiotemporally conditioned must be physical, whereas no event, cause, or effect can be mental, since anything purely mental is exempt from temporality and spatiality as well, then physical factors alone can cause events. Unlike events, actions are explicable under psychical possibilities, but this does not render actions psychical or mental. As actualities, actions just like events can be only physical.

Any causation or causality we veridically know of, publicly observe, or can coherently conceive, is necessarily and exclusively under physical terms. We can intersubjectively, publicly, or objectively detect, follow, observe, and describe causal links only under spatiotemporal and physical terms or distinctions. Energy, power, force, and mechanism of mental nature are just prevalent fictions or beliefs that cannot be rationally conceived or specifically, concretely detected or followed. You cannot put such fictions or beliefs to any valid or objective test, and we should commit them to magical thinking instead. The physical chain of causes, under which all that takes place in our brain and nervous system occurs, is entirely made of actual, spatiotemporal factors, none of which is mental or psychical. As a pure possibility, no mental or psychical factor can be temporally or spatially located or serve as a link in any causal chain. To argue to the contrary rests on the obviously wrong assumption that mental or psychical factors and physical factors (say, events) are identical (although under different descriptions).

As a result of the above, panenmentalism cannot save the possibilities of psychophysical interaction, but this does not undermine psychophysical unity and interconditionality. All that causally takes place in our nervous system is an actualization of mental and psychical possibilities. Our actions as a whole and especially what occurs within our nervous system and muscles are senseless or meaningless without these possibilities or without what is meaningful and significant for us. Although our motives, which are psychical possibilities, do not cause our actions, they make them possible, meaningful, and significant. Psychical possibilities, such as our emotions or feelings, can serve as causal possibilities, but not as any actual causes whatever. Our psychical possibilities determine the identity, meaning, and significance of our actions, which are actualized by physical means alone. The causes of my writing this text are not my thinking, intention, or will, but only particular events in my brain, nervous system, or muscles. Yet my writing would make no sense at all, and would be utterly meaningless or reasonless, were it not an actualization of my thinking, intention, or will, which are only psychical possibilities.

Panenmentalism thus excludes psychophysical interactionism. Since psychical possibilities and their actualities are not identical, panenmentalism also excludes psychophysical identity of any sort. Under panenmentalism, psychophysical unity is entirely committed to the dependence or supervenience of the physical-actual upon the psychical-possible in all concerning identity, meaning, and significance, whereas the psychical-possible is dependent on the physical-actual only to the extent that actualization or causation is concerned. The causation of our actions draws from two sources: (1) it draws the possibility, identity, meaning, significance, motivation, intentionality, reason, aim, and value from the mental or the psychical alone;

and (2) it draws the energy, power, mechanism, and actualization as a whole from the physical-actual alone. Without the first source, no causal explanation for our actions can exist.

Although the relationship between the psychical-possible and the bodily-actual, namely, the living, functioning body, is by no means causal, it is by all means modal, which makes it logical too. Yet the main point about this modal relationship is not its logical but its ontological-metaphysical significance, at least to the extent that the possible is no less real than the actual. Also secured under panenmentalism is the psychophysical conditioning, as the psychical-possible is a necessary condition for the bodily-actual, and as the living, functioning body is the sufficient condition for the psychical-possible, which is the identity of the actual body.

In sum, since everything actual is possible too, but not the other way round, the realm of possibilities as a whole includes the realm of actualities. Everything actual is also possible, whereas not every possibility is actual too. Consequently, the actual is dependent or supervenient on the possible, whereas the purely possible is entirely independent of the actual. Pure possibilities are *a priori*, atemporal, and no less real than actualities, whereas actualities are spatiotemporal and under causality. Since any possibility is wider and more comprehensive than its actuality, no possibility is completely actualizable, and something of any possibility, actualized or not, must remain pure, even if actualization is still under consideration. Also, any possibility as such, as considered independently or regardless of its actualization, is necessarily pure.

Values and meanings are not actualities. Facts or actualities may bear meanings entirely drawn from the pure possibilities concerning these facts or actualities. Yet no meaning is a fact or an actuality. Values have reality of their own, entirely independent of the actual-physical as a whole. Whenever we think, feel, or believe that things should be or ought to be different from what they actually are, we bear pure possibilities, values, in our mind. If the possible "ought" and the actual "is" are compatible, the "ought," as a pure possibility-value, is still entirely independent of the actual "is." No doubt should exist that values and meanings are pure possibilities, belonging to the realm of the purely possible-mental, without which no value or meaning could be real at all. Meanings and values may bear actual or practical consequences or implications, many of which are not specifically predicted or *a priori* known, but this by no means renders values and meanings actual matters of fact. In the light of *a priori* pure possibilities we identify, value, and evaluate anything actual or empirical. We also conceive its meaning and significance.

Any possibility must be different from all the others, and no two possibilities whatever can be identical. Any possibility is an individual, which is particular or singular. Panenmentalism leaves generality or universality only to the relationality of particular or singular possibilities. Types, species,

genera, kinds, or sorts are just the matter of specific relations among individual possibilities. On the ground that any possibility must relate to all the others, from which it must differ (despite all possible similarities if they exist), universal relationality implies that each particular or singular possibility bears a universal significance or meanings.

What is so special about psychical possibilities is their singularity, for no two psychical possibilities, each of which “belongs” to another person, can be even similar. Each psychical possibility exclusively, singularly pertains to a person, by no means to any other person. Each psychical possibility that pertains to one person cannot be intrinsically similar to any psychical possibility that pertains to another person. As singulars, two persons cannot be intrinsically similar; each one of them is singularly unique. Yet similarity can be an interpersonal, intersubjective relation. Lacking any intrinsic similarity to another psychical reality, each psychical reality is internal and not accessible from without. Only a person, who “has” or consists of an inner, private, personal, or subjective reality, “has” private access to this reality that is his or hers alone. No other person can experience the thoughts, emotions, feelings, or volitions of a person but he or she alone.

Although no psychical reality is accessible from without, communication between all psychical beings, between persons, is possible. As any singular possibility too must relate to all the others, from which it must be different, even an entirely idiosyncratic possibility, like any singular possibility, is communicable to all the rest. The primary means of communication is language, and no language is private, but must be interpersonal or intersubjective. The interpersonal, intersubjective realm cannot do without similarity, which is yet perfectly compatible with private accessibility, as I argue in Chapter Two.

Before elaborating on my view of singularity, let me briefly comment about similarity and intrinsic similarity. Unlike singular possibilities, particular possibilities are similar, although each of them is different from the others despite all their possible similarities. Many particular possibilities are intrinsically similar, and so they are of an entirely opposite nature to singular possibilities.

Typical intrinsically similar possibilities are mathematical. Each one of these possibilities is different from the other intrinsically similar possibilities, and each one of them is a different individual. Under panenmentalism, each particular number, geometrical figure, and so on, and the relations between them are the subject matter of pure possibilities. Mathematicians, unless under Pythagorean metaphysics, do not deal with physical-actual entities but only with pure particular possibilities and their relationality, entirely regardless of any actualization. Mathematical pure possibilities are obviously actualizable, which leaves a lot of work to physicists and other natural scientists but not to

theoretical mathematicians. For brevity's sake, in mentioning numbers, geometrical figures, or cases below, I consider them all pure possibilities, without using this term explicitly.

Any particular triangle, say, a right-angled triangle, is different from any other right-angled triangle, yet they all are intrinsically similar. The relationality of intrinsically similar possibilities has an instructive significance. What holds for the intrinsic nature of one of them necessarily holds for all other possibilities of the same sort. That Pythagoras' theorem holds for an individual right-angled triangle, however particular it may be, is sufficient to make it necessarily hold for all right-angled triangles, owing to their intrinsic similarity and despite all the possible differences between them. The universal significance of each right-angled triangle is "palpable" for every beginner in mathematical studies. Every person who is familiar with Pythagoras' theorem knows about this significance, although not under these panenmentalist terms.

From the panenmentalist viewpoint, the universal significance of each right-angled triangle relies on the relational nature of this individual possibility, which is intrinsically similar to other individual possibilities of the same nature. Equally, we are familiar with mathematical proofs that need to prove one case alone to prove "them all." Many mathematical proofs rely on the relational nature of numbers, in which one possibility leads naturally to all the other similar possibilities (the "domino effect"). As for particular possibilities that are similar but not intrinsically, they are not submitted to mathematical proofs of this sort, if at all, yet they too are all initially relate to all similar possibilities, and secondly to all the rest.

Much more is to be said about the ways, in which mathematicians practically deal with the universal relationality of one possibility to all of the relevant possibilities, even if they are infinite in number. Mathematical equations practically capture the universal relationality of mathematical possibilities, which is, under panenmentalist terms, the universal significance of these possibilities. Mathematicians illustrate a particular possibility to signify universally insofar as all the relevant possibilities are concerned, and on this ground the mathematical language proceeds. What mathematicians practically deal with are not the particular possibilities for their own sake but the universal significance of these cases. Mathematicians deal with the general or universal significance of numbers and geometrical figures, which necessarily are pure particular possibilities. Under similarity, intrinsic or not, mathematical or not, to conceive or capture the general, even the universal, significance of a particular possibility without much trouble, or with no trouble at all, is quite common. A most difficult thing is to recognize the universal significance of possibilities that are intrinsically not similar, that is, to capture the significance of singular possibilities. In Chapter One, I attempt to challenge this intricate problem.

Let me elaborate now on my view of singularity. A most prevalent received assumption is that any relationship or relationality should rest on common background, a common denominator, or commensurability. Panenmentalism constitutes a major exception, for it stipulates that particularity or singularity is good enough to secure universal relationality. How is this possible at all? Think, analogously, of the “singularity” of the Big Bang or of black holes. Although no lawfulness can be applied to the “singularity” of such a universally significant event as the Big Bang, the whole universe that begins with it, including all natural laws and order, necessarily relates to this “singularity,” and *vice versa*. Analogously, even though no two possibilities can be identical and no two psychical possibilities of two persons can be intrinsically similar, but each one of them is singular, yet any possibility whatever universally relates to all the others. On the ground of particularity or singularity alone, this universal relationality must follow.

Not to be identical, to be individual or particular, signifies difference; not to be even similar, to be singular, signifies difference to the utmost. Difference, diversity, or dissimilarity provides ground enough and is sufficient for relationality or relationship. Since in the entire realm of the possible no two possibilities can be identical or even similar (in the case of two persons), the difference, diversity, or dissimilarity in question has universal significance, and the relationality under discussion is universal.

Panenmentalism leaves singularity exclusively to psychical possibilities, not to physical possibilities such as the Big Bang or black holes. The analogy made above should only help you to follow to some extent my ideas concerning singularity. But do not let this analogy mislead you. The “singularity” of the Big Bang or of black holes is meaningful and significant, or makes any sense, only under particular physical-mathematical theories. Not so is the genuine singularity of persons, which is altogether theoretically independent and ontologically primary.

Everyday experience instructs us repeatedly that persons are singulars, for no person can experience or “have” what exists in other minds, for each person “has” access to her or his mind alone. By contrast, the “singularity” of the Big Bang or of black holes is discoverable only under physical-mathematical theory, and the meanings and significance of this singularity are theoretically dependent. Their “singularity” has nothing of subjectivity or personality, nor any psychical reality. Being ontologically primary, the singularity of persons is the ground for any interpersonal relationality or relationship, whereas the status of anything “singular” under mathematical or physical terms cannot be primary or prime. Mathematical or physical “singularity” draws all it has from, or against the background of, the mathematical or physical relationality under the relevant theories. This kind of singularity must be ontologically secondary or derivative.

Since psychical possibilities are singular, the singularity of each of them necessarily imbeds or nests them in a common realm in which universal communication between them is possible in principle. To be singular signifies or entails to be dissimilar from any other possibility, hence singularity of possibilities bears universal significance that in turn comprises universal meanings. As an intersubjective or interpersonal relationship, any language necessarily relies on the singularity of each person who can be involved in utilizing the language. Yet no language is private, and no language can exist that is exclusively accessible to one person. As much as natural laws and patterns are not applicable to the “singularity” of the Big Bang or of black holes, so the intersubjective rules or patterns, for instance, logical or grammatical rules or patterns, psychological patterns or structures, do not determine any inner, psychical reality intrinsically. Instead, no intersubjective, interpersonal relationship is possible, unless singular persons, each of whom consists of an exclusive inner reality, exist.

Any language whatever is supervenient on intersubjective, interpersonal ground, and any intersubjectivity or interpersonality is necessarily supervenient on subjects or persons who are singulars. Since any word or name is general (proper names included, insofar they may refer to different persons by the same name), no language can capture the singularity of psychical possibilities, without which no intersubjective relationship and especially no language can be. Analogously, physics as a whole and all natural laws cannot capture physical “singularity,” although nowadays cosmology cannot do without such a “singularity.” But this is only an analogy meant to assist me to communicate my idea of singularity to you. My metaphysical view leaves singularity to psychical possibilities or beings alone. Language can capture only the intersubjective or universal significance or meanings of singular possibilities.

Thinking is a property of psychical beings only. No machine, such as computer, can think or have private, inner, psychical reality. Nor can machines have any psychical properties whatever; all that takes place in machines is publicly accessible (Gilead, 1999, pp. 137–158).

The following chapters share these principles and assumptions. I believe that these essays show how prolific, profound, unexpected, complicated, and comprehensive panenmentalism may be.

Chapter One deals with love and singularity, as this most valuable theme appears comparatively in Proust’s literary masterpiece, Spinoza’s philosophy, and panenmentalism. In this context, I criticize the Kantian idea of the kingdom of ends for its lack of love for singular persons. Love makes a unique kind of knowledge, genuine knowledge “about” singularity. Singularity cannot be intrinsically captured by any knowledge, which necessarily is general or universal. Yet the knowledge of the universal significance of the singularity of

each person is attainable on the ground that panenmentalism attempts to ascribe this knowledge to genuine love.

Each personal identity or personality is a singular possibility that makes an inner reality exclusively “of” its own. This inner reality is privately accessible. As Chapter Two shows, this reality is accessible only to the person who consists of it. I discuss the special meaning that panenmentalism ascribes to the concept of private accessibility and to the concepts of intersubjective and public accessibility. Discussing these different types of accessibility, I raise the question of the possibility of referring to pure possibilities in general and to those that are personal, subjective, or intersubjective referents in particular. This leads to the intricate question of identity and naming. In opposition to Ruth Barcan Marcus and Donald Davidson, I suggest a panenmentalist solution to these intricate questions. Contrary to some Wittgensteinians and Davidson, I argue that although one mind is absolutely not accessible to another, intersubjective communication is well secured on the panenmentalist ground. Finally, I show how private, subjective accessibility serves as our gate to the accessibility to the mental-possible (mental accessibility), and, as a result, to intersubjective accessibility and to objective, public accessibility. Yet this does not blur the distinction between possibilities and their actualities, or between inner and external reality.

Whether multiple personality—the existence of several personalities or subjects (“selves,” alters, and so on) within one person—is just an iatrogenic (physician-produced) fiction or a real psychical disintegration or dissociation, pathological or not, it is worthy of a serious philosophical discussion. Psychopathology aside, the multifariousness and flexibility of human personality make a philosophical question. Is each of us a person under one and the same personal identity, or a psychical subject bundling up, however loosely, several personalities or subjects? Does multifarious personality contribute to creativity? What is the difference between multifarious and multiple personality as a dissociative identity disorder? In Chapter Three, I deal with these questions on the basis of the panenmentalist meaning of psychical singularity and private accessibility, and on this basis I attempt to save the possibility of personal identity as well, strongly challenging Humean skepticism about it. However multifarious the human personality may be, each person can “have” only one and the same personality under one and the same personal identity.

Chapter Four draws special ethical conclusions on the panenmentalist ground that any person is a singular possibility, inaccessible from without, and that each value is a particular possibility bearing a universal significance, positive or negative. On this ground, I show why inflicting torture must be morally absolutely forbidden. In the name of security, torturers shamefully

attempt to justify torture. I expose the deception and fallacies in such attempts and the fears behind inflicting torture, especially the “fear of singularity.”

Treason, betrayal, unfaithfulness, or disloyalty is a serious matter. Great debate over it prevails, and a most annoying question is whether the concept of betrayal should be validly applied to marital or love life. In Chapter Five, I attempt to show that “betrayal” cannot be validly applied to marital or love life, for an intersubjective relationship, especially intimate, should be unique, and only the persons involved can share it. Hence, applying “betrayal” to marital or love life is to commit a fallacy, to mistake intersubjective, interpersonal for public accessibility. Equally, we cannot share a dialogue, a real communication between two persons, with others, for it is not publicly accessible. In any case of interpersonal or intimate relationship, the singularity of each person is indispensable. The root of all unfaithfulness is self-betrayal, betrayal of a person’s own singularity.

Real interpersonal communication is induplicable, whereas communication by computers is duplicable. Chapter Six deals with the problem of the prevalent cyber communication: virtual communication. This illusion of communication creates serious philosophical, psychological, or other problems we need to face. To save the possibility of real communication or dialogue, the persons involved need a solid intersubjective, interpersonal relationship on the basis of the singularity of each of them. Otherwise, virtual communication, especially by cyber net, will remain an actual, practical possibility for many more people, for whom it will continue to be a dangerous trap of illusion, serving as a false shelter from the “fear of singularity,” which undermines real interpersonal communication.

Personal, psychical singularity has to do with the crucial possibility of freedom and of free choice. Chapter Seven is devoted to the reality of our freedom and to a novel view on the question of determinism. In it, I show that the freedom of our will or choice is real and intelligible, owing to the panenmentalist view that determinism is only of pure possibilities, not of actualities as such. Under panenmentalism, psychological determinism rests on the ground that anything psychical is necessarily a meaningful, significant, or motivated possibility, which cannot be random, casual, or a matter of chance. Free will or choice is perfectly compatible with this kind of determinism, according to which any genuine choice could be otherwise and still would be meaningful, significant, and intelligible, whereas causal determinism excludes free will or choice, for under this kind of determinism nothing could be otherwise. The correct idea of motivated or determined will does not exclude the freedom of our will or choice and our full responsibility for our decisions.

Chapter Seven also associates free choice with creativity as a personal discovery of pure possibilities, and with necessity. Necessity is a matter of pure possibilities, whereas the actual-physical is contingent, and causality, as

actual, is casual or contingent too. Panenmentalism excludes causal determinism of actualities and subjects no psychological possibility to causality or to actualities. In concluding, free will is not a conundrum or an illusion but a real possibility that is most meaningful, significant, and valuable for us.

As the freedom of our will is real and intelligible, the old problem of *akrasia* (“weakness of will,” “incontinence”) should be re-discussed. Chapter Eight is devoted to the panenmentalist possibility of *akrasia*. The possibility of *akrasia* is of deliberate, intentional, conscious, and voluntary action that is nevertheless wrong and shameful, unwanted, irrational, and unjustified in the eyes of the agent. The problem of *akrasia* has bothered philosophers since the time of Socrates and Plato and has left many philosophers puzzled and frustrated. Relying, among other things, on the possibility of a personal, singular attachment of the agent to the action, an attachment that consists in emotions serving as causal possibilities, I venture to tackle the *akrasia* problem in a new way, different from the classical or current views known to me. This chapter is based on an elaboration of a much shorter version that was published in *Ratio*, 12:3 (September 1999).

On the ground of the modal distinction between the possible and the actual, the familiar problem of different possible narratives of the same actuality takes a new turn in Chapter Nine. The postmodernist stance challenges the belief in objective or intersubjective truth. In Chapter Nine, I counter-challenge this on a panenmentalist ground that grants ontological and epistemological independence to pure possibilities-identities, which are *a priori* knowable.

Each possibility-identity is distinct from all the others, and each precedes its actuality and the meanings, significance, narratives, descriptions, interpretations, and names of this actuality. The same holds for the identity of anything possible. On this ground, we can make sure that different narratives can be of one and the same actuality and that different interpretations can be of one and the same text, story, or event. Owing to our sense of actuality (on which I further elaborate at Chapter Ten), our viewpoints or interpretations are transparent enough not to deny us access to the facts themselves, which are publicly, objectively accessible. All this strongly opposes postmodernism.

As the reader may realize, this book as a whole opposes not only actualism in its various manifestations, but also some of the central views of postmodernism. The spirit of Chapters Two, Three, Four, Six, and Nine, implicitly or explicitly, is unlike many postmodernist views. A most precious asset of panenmentalism is pluralism, especially as to pure possibilities, and this kind of pluralism radically opposes postmodernism. Still, the book introduces all its arguments entirely independently of postmodernist views, and generally without discussing or directly addressing them at all.

Having discussed the ontological and epistemological independence of pure possibilities-identities, which are *a priori* knowable, another epistemological issue arises: the standing of apriority and aposteriority in our knowledge. This naturally leads to the empiricist-rationalist conundrum, for which Chapter Ten suggests a way out. Panenmentalism keeps and maintains both apriorism and aposteriorism. Apriorism has to do with what is purely mental-possible; while aposteriorism has to do with what is physical-actual, which can be only empirically known. The purely possible and the actual are irreducible to each other, because the purely possible is necessary, whereas the actual is contingent and subject to spatiotemporal and causal conditions, from which the purely possible is entirely exempt. This irreducibility leads to two conclusions. The first is that empiricism and rationalism must both fail; the second is that, under panenmentalism, each of them is indispensable, although for different reasons and objectives. The panenmentalist way out of the empiricist-rationalist conundrum lays down a new modal metaphysics. This metaphysics differs in principle from Kantian, rationalist, or empiricist (classical or contemporary) philosophies. I briefly clarify in what ways my view of these matters differs from the views of W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Saul Kripke.

In Chapter Eleven, I reject ontologism and especially ontological proofs, for pure possibilities cannot necessitate or cause any actuality or actual existence. From the concept or meaning of God, from the possibility of God, we cannot infer or deduce any actual existence of God. Under panenmentalism, God is a pure possibility of an exclusive, unique nature. It is the only possibility that is absolutely and entirely unactualizable, which by no means diminishes its universal meaningfulness. The possibility of God serves as an indicator or reminder that something of anything mental should be considered over or beyond actualization. This possibility serves as a reminder that no actuality can exhaust its pure possibility, that the gulf between the ought and the is must be inescapably unbridgeable in the end, and that philosophical satisfaction is far beyond any of our actual achievements, however notable. From the panenmentalist view on the possibility of God, I draw further surprising or novel conclusions, especially as to singularity.

I am grateful to my friends, Saul Smilansky and Daniel Statman, for reading parts of the manuscript and commenting on them. I am greatly indebted to Peter Redpath for significant stylistic improvements. Robert Ginsberg's encouragement and endless efforts to improve the style and his meticulous copy-editing are far beyond what I can express in words of gratitude. A devoted, yet critical, editor like Bob is the best I can wish myself. The love of my wife, Ruthie, was indispensable to make the possibility of this book actual.