INTRODUCTION

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Philosophers are natural educators. There is a trivial sense in which this is so. Most philosophers today, at any rate most professional philosophers, are academically employed by colleges or universities. Such employment has not always been sought by philosophers, though it is significant that when ancient philosophers found venues for teaching to be meager, they were at the ready to create venues of their own, whether at the Academy, the Lyceum, the *stoa poikile*, or the garden. In so far as education involves more than the transmission and acquisition of information, there is a more important sense in which philosophers are natural educators. It has to do with the sorts of qualities that make for good educators: clarity of thought, skill in argumentation, impartiality, conviction in ends tempered by skepticism in means on some matters and skepticism in ends tempered by conviction in means on others, and, dare I add, love of wisdom. These are all, equally, qualities that make for good philosophers.

As might be expected, philosophers have much to say on the subject of values and education. When it was announced that values and education would be the theme of the 21st Conference on Value Inquiry, philosophers responded with avidity. The conference, which was held at Drew University in 1993, provoked sometimes passionate, always reasoned discussion. The eighteen essays in this book are drawn from some of the work first presented at the conference. The authors were encouraged to revise their work. All of them did so, many taking the opportunity to reconsider arguments in light of discussions that took place at the conference.

Education has two sides, teaching and learning. All manner of values enter into both, including intellectual values, economic and political values, cultural and aesthetic values, and moral values. The first essay, "Where Values and Education Meet," opens with a brief discussion of the varieties of value in education, followed by a synopsis of three broad types of value inquiry: disciplinary value inquiry, interdisciplinary value inquiry, and meta-disciplinary value inquiry. My main aim in the essay, however, is to distinguish between teaching and learning

as tasks and achievements, and to provide reasons to conclude that for learning, the greatest inherent value lies in the task, not the achievement, great as that may be. This is brought out, in part, with a thought experiment over a powerful pill, *Edacin*, that can reduce or eliminate the task of learning. Much as Edacin might be sought out and beneficial in limited doses, too great a reliance on it would come at high cost. In reducing or eliminating the task of learning, Edacin would keep users from experiencing the value of learning as a task.

A position similar in some respects is advanced by Predrag Cicovacki in "On the Ideals of Education." He too discusses learning as an achievement with regard to the acquisition of knowledge through formal education as measured by grades. Society may set goals for achievement of this sort largely for its utilitarian value. As an alternative, Cicovacki outlines what may be called cultural education. He sees this as a life-long process to develop a person's potential. As more of a person's potential is realized, more of the responsibility for this type of education falls on the shoulders of the student. The emphasis is on understanding and humanistic values, with learning actively pursued beyond the classroom.

None of this should be taken to denigrate achievements in learning. But if we are to set students to tasks, just what tasks should we set them to? This is the concern of Jan Narveson in "What Does the Educated Person Learn Now?". To deal intelligently with this question, we need to have some understanding of the point of knowledge in general. Narveson finds the point in the contribution of knowledge to the good life, broadly construed. Knowledge is more or less specific and, for each of us, inevitably limited. Narveson concludes that if we are to have a chance at living the good life, we need basic, factual knowledge of the world we find ourselves in, higher-level instrumental knowledge for acquiring further knowledge, and knowledge of ends in themselves. For all of this an educated person cannot help but draw on the arts and science, and the humanities. Above all, being educated, an educated person will know how limited all claims of knowledge must be, and so embody the Socratic virtue of true humility.

On the teaching side of education, at the college and university level, are the responsibilities professors have to their students. In "What Is the Ethics of Teaching?", Robert Paul Churchill examines the grounds for the professional obligations of professors. After presenting a number of views on the duties of professors that have been advanced in recent years, he offers a model of obligation that brings together a morality of aspiration regarding virtue and character, a notion of goods internal to practices, and empirical evidence on intellectual development. He uses the model to argue for increased moral accountability for professors and makes specific recommendations on four practical matters: evaluations of students, overall classroom conditions, disciplinary training due students, and promotion of critical self-awareness among students.

Critical self-awareness is a prerequisite of moral autonomy. Inasmuch as some degree of moral autonomy is a presupposition of moral agency, it is sure to have

a role in moral education. The moral education of children has generally been thought to be an important part of a good upbringing. And rightly so: for unless every aspect of moral reasoning is innate, moral reasoning has be learned. It is no less a matter for education than mathematical, scientific, or historical reasoning, and no less important. I cannot help but think it even more important. Innumerate clerks may be an inconvenience; scientifically recalcitrant preachers may be a nuisance; historically naive television personalities may be a bore; but morally ignorant citizens are a danger to everyone. Yet in our own time, moral education has been allowed to languish, largely, perhaps, because it has seemed suspect as a form of indoctrination.

Moral education is the underlying concern of Joseph Kupfer and Uma Narayan. In "Education, Indoctrination, and Moral Character," Kupfer argues that moral autonomy should be placed at the center of moral education. Much of our effort in morally educating children should be directed at enabling them to continually increase their sphere of morally self-directed action. This, he suggests, will foster virtues of self-mastery such as courage, patience, and determination, which are instrumental for developing other virtues such as loyalty, generosity, and kindness. Uma Narayan discusses moral education in relation to justifications offered for punishing lawbreakers. In "Moral Education and Criminal Punishment," she challenges the view that punishment of criminals should be thought of as a form of moral education aimed at moral reform. She finds the view patronizing and psychologically implausible in its assumptions. Part of the motivation for the view may come from the morally mature thought that even criminals are deserving of moral respect, and so are beings whose own good ought to be promoted. But criminal punishment, she points out, may be inflicted for reasons other than promoting a criminal's own good. Protection of law-abiding citizens is one obvious reason that comes to mind.

Preventing individuals from harming and being harmed by others is a legitimate function of the state on any view that accords legitimate functions to states. For liberals in the tradition of Locke and John Stuart Mill, the scope for intrusive action by a state is circumscribed by a harm principle out of respect for the autonomy of individuals. Where there is no consensus on values, promotion of one set of values over others by the state might seem to violate the autonomy of individuals esteemed by liberal theorists. With the advent of state education, the role of the state in condoning or promoting values through education takes on added significance. Robert N. Van Wyk takes up the role of the state in education in "Is Value Education the Achilles' Heel of Liberalism?". Van Wyk sets out several ways that a state might attempt to be value neutral with respect to education. They range from eliminating state education, to banning value-laden discussions in state-supported schools, to restricting discussions by imposing strict conditions of neutrality that laud all values equally in state-supported schools. He finds such attempts at being value neutral to be shallow and self-defeating. He

urges that we must leave room in education for promoting values that foster personal and civic excellence. More than that, we would be remiss if we refrained from trying to pass on to the next generation values we have grounds to hold.

The view that one of the goals of education should be to promote civic excellence goes back to Plato. As Kenneth Keulman observes in "Civic Education," it has generally found favor in American colleges and universities. He offers a historical perspective on the ideals and practices of higher education in America. If the practices have not always conformed to the ideals, the ideals themselves have not always seemed to be wholly compatible in practice. Ideals of educating for democracy and educating for excellence may diverge in practice, as in current curricular discussions over what has come to be known as multiculturalism, with proponents of multiculturalism starting from the ideal of educating for democracy and an outlook that stresses differences among individuals. But education for democracy, Keulman concludes, needs to promote skills of discernment that are essential for a well-measured life. The outlook popular among some academics that gives emphasis to differences among individuals is also discussed by Kevin E. Dodson in "Multiculturalism and the Teaching of Virtue." Dodson points to the need for a unifying agent in a society that is increasingly perceived to be diverse. He suggests that with broadened multicultural curricula, education can become a unifying agent by increasing understanding of differences that keep people apart. In becoming an instrument of unity, education can also promote the virtue of respect for others.

If some differences are promoted as sources of pride, others are regarded as products of historical inequities. In an effort to redress certain socio-economic differences that remain prevalent in America, policies of affirmative action or preferential treatment have been set into place. But are they fair and effective? Parker English addresses this question in "Education and Preferential Treatment," in part by relating his experiences in leading classroom discussions on policies of preferential hiring. In his classroom discussions, he found that students were troubled by reallocations of social goods that disproportionately shift burdens to the young in groups that are not preferred without affording commensurate advantages to the old in groups that are preferred. Finding this a serious problem, he puts forward a proposal for a modified policy of preferential treatment designed to meet it.

If we wish to address disparities between the rich and poor, we do not have to resort to policies of affirmative action for preferential hiring. Julian Lamont explores two of the alternatives in "Equality of Educational Opportunity versus Higher Transfer Payments to the Poor." On the assumption that incomes of individuals can be correlated, at least roughly, with levels of formal education, whether primary, secondary, or through college or even graduate work, we could increase educational opportunities to the poor by lowering their costs of education with state expenditures. Alternatively, we could simply make sizable transfer

payments directly to the poor by employing state powers of redistribution. Making direct transfer payments has the merit of simplicity. Moreover, as Lamont notes, if increasing the income of the poor is our only concern, there are reasons to think that direct transfer payments might do the most to realize it. Despite this, he argues that wider concerns make state outlays to equalize educational opportunities the better of the two alternatives.

Educational opportunities in America are greater now than at any time in the past, if only because of the remarkable increase in the size and number of academic institutions that has more than matched the growth of the country. Changes in expectations have accompanied the increases. In "American Higher Education: The Product of Individual versus Community Interests," Nancy Simco traces a pattern of cyclical shifts in value bases that reflect, from the earliest days, alternating ascendency in individual interests and community interests. The establishment first of liberal arts curricula and later of graduate and professional schools in the nineteenth century, she suggests, illustrates one shift. The recurring call in recent years for professors to devote more time to teaching and less time to scholarship and research may be evidence of another shift. Simco finds little evidence of a general failure of professors to meet their obligations to students. In the repeated oppositions of values, however, she sees added reason to safeguard academic freedom.

Along with the increase in the size and number of American educational institutions came institutionalized ways of thought. Regimentation in teaching and learning, if to some extent inevitable, is not without danger. It can usher in conventionally minded teaching that stifles robust, original thought. In "Peirce, Veblen, and the American University: How Is an Ethical Education Possible?", William Pencak offers case studies in the lives of Charles Sanders Peirce and Thorstein Veblen to show how being an outsider academically and socially may be necessary to produce a certain kind of intellectual independence. Like the Cynics who condemned conventional goods as nominal only, he finds merit in flouting established conventions.

Educational systems have expanded greatly in other countries as well in the twentieth century. The expansions in two, Italy and Canada, are discussed by Myra Moss and Frederick Kraenzel. Moss examines the large-scale educational reforms instituted by Giovanni Gentile in Italy in the 1920s in "Values and Education: Fascist Italy's *La Riforma Gentile*, 1922-1924." She places the reforms in the philosophical context of Gentile's idealism as well as the political context of his appointment as Minister of Education under Benito Mussolini. Gentile's reforms extended schooling in Italy in several ways while also introducing national goals for instruction, a notion not far removed from the current idea of national standards for testing. For Canada, the expansion of the college and university system in the second half of the twentieth century has been led by an ideal of universal access to higher education. Kraenzel notes the extent of the

expansion in "Quality and Universality in Canadian Higher Education" and maintains that the ready access to higher education that has been realized has resulted in a general lowering of educational standards. He suggests that professors have become too easy with students and considers the possibility that the laxity reflects a broader decline in standards.

Among the many standards which affect our conduct and the conduct of others toward us, are standards of privacy which block off parts of our lives, as it were, from public intrusion. Actual standards vary from culture to culture, and within a culture over time. In the last several decades, standards of privacy for politicians and celebrities have weakened to shrink their spheres of privacy almost to dimensionless points. As Shyli Karin-Frank argues in "Moral Education, the Value of Privacy, and the Threat of Loneliness," privacy is not only valuable in itself, but also valuable as a necessary condition of moral education. Privacy is required to develop a sense of self that is itself requisite for the autonomy that is an aim of moral education. She points out that too much privacy may lead to loneliness, which is normally not desired, and maintains that it is morally wrong to allow pathologies of loneliness to develop.

Looking backward at one of the earliest essayist's thoughts on education, Robert Ginsberg turns to the ideas of Montaigne. In "On Montaigne's 'Of the Education of Children'," Ginsberg presents a textual analysis of Montaigne's essay. He finds several ways to read the essay and concludes that it should be conceived as a multi-form piece of work. Its autobiographical nature, he suggests, offers psychological and philosophical insights into Montaigne's recommendations. Like Plato, Montaigne viewed education in the highest terms as the means of securing wisdom and the prospect of goodness itself. Unlike Plato, Montaigne does not provide cumulative arguments to support tightly packed sets of theses. If Montaigne's work is less unified than Plato's, it maintains a unity of style in the writer's self-conscious development of the essay form.

Looking forward to a future very different from the present, Paul Allen, III asks us to consider a world where bionic research succeeds in developing the wherewithal for producing a new kind of sapient being. In "The Silicon Stage in Human Evolution: A New Focus for Educators," he proposes a possible course of development in which flesh and blood human beings come to be replaced by mechanical beings with electronic computers for brains, which he calls *compumans*. He characterizes compumans as fully conscious, sentient beings capable of virtuous actions and aesthetic judgments, but lacking in feelings of the flesh. We might decry a future in which human beings are made redundant by compumans. But is this just a prejudice, a form of human chauvinism? If it is, we need to look beyond our displeasure at the prospect of a compuman future. In any event, there is much to be gained from a broad, informed discussion of the possibilities. Such a discussion requires educational effort directed at understanding human realities and compuman possibilities. The task is largely philosophical, with evaluative

concerns paramount.

All the essays underscore the importance of education. This is to be expected from authors who put on the robes of academe. Be that as it may, for ourselves, our children, and the society of which we are a part, we cannot help but make evaluative assessments about education. Life is short and resources are limited. Except for the uninteresting sense in which all activities may be said to pertain to education, education cannot be pursued without limit. We must make choices on just what we are willing to devote to education. Even when we can settle on overall allocations, we are not free of decisions, since some things may do more for education than others. All this is plain when it comes to formal education: In addition to the costs of instructors at all levels, just how much are we ready to allocate to books, beakers, blackboards, buildings, and bootable binary boxes? The life-long learning that goes beyond formal education also forces choices: Who among us has the time to learn all that we might, in some sense, want to learn? The priorities we make reveal who we are and contribute to what our society may become. As great is the need to choose wisely, so is the need to reflect on values and education.