CHAPTER EIGHT

BOLOGNA

One of the two oldest universities in Europe, Bologna was especially known internationally for its faculty of Law, but it was also a famous center for the study of medicine rivalled only by Padua. This has justified a number of studies on the medical school of Bologna, in which famous physicians from Taddeo Alderotti († 1295) to Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576) were active.[1] Furthermore, although Paris undoubtedly remained the main Catholic center for the study of theology, Bologna also had a College of Theology authorized to grant degrees, and it too has received some scholarly attention.[2] Arts teaching, which (contrary to the practice in northern Europe) was not independent but part of the combined faculty of Arts and Medicine, has on the whole gotten short schrift.[3] This is especially true of philosophy teaching; only of late have mounting efforts been made to examine the teaching of natural philosophy in sixteenth-century Bologna or to describe in detail the formation of a botanical garden and a museum of natural history during the lifetime of Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522–1605).[4] University moral philosophy has been almost completely ignored.

This oversight is regrettable both because there is a rich wealth of sources on Bolognese Arts teaching available to the archivally inclined,[5] and because philosophy was far from being a sclerotic field

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[1] See especially Siraisi 1981, 1990, and 1997. For a (not entirely satisfactory) listing of the teachers of medicine in Bologna ca. 1400–1550, see Cristiani. Recent studies on the university in Bologna (with bibliographical references) include Grendler 1999a and 1999b.

[2] See, for example, Ehrle 1932. A privilege of Pope Boniface IX (28–X–1392) concerning the Faculty of Theology in Bologna can be found in ASB, Riformatori dello Studio, no. 2, fasc. 39 (see Salterini 1997, p. 5).

[3] An exception is represented by the famous rhetoricians who taught at the university there. See, for example, the essays in *Sapere e/è potere.*

[4] Examples are Matsen 1985 and 1994, Lines 2001b, and Findlen 1994. On the whole, logic has probably received more attention than natural philosophy; see *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna.*

[5] See the inventories relative to the Bolognese *studium* in Cencetti 1938 and Salterini 1997.

whose dependence on Aristotle inhibited change. Indeed, one could say that Bologna's university life matched the richness and complexity of its cultural life.[6] In the sixteenth century, for example, the Bolognese *studium* seems increasingly willing to increase the funding for natural philosophy vis-à-vis medicine; furthermore, developments in the career ladder point to a growing specialization of natural philosophy professors and to changes in the cycle of books to be read in the courses on natural philosophy. Even though one cannot point to revolutionary changes such as the introduction of experimental science, on the whole university natural philosophy in Bologna (as elsewhere in Europe) emerges as far more vibrant than once thought.[7] Thus the question is whether the dynamism observable in natural philosophy (by far the most important of the philosophical branches) was matched in Bologna by changes in the teaching of moral philosophy, which was by comparison a minor subject and probably came near the bottom on the *studium*'s list of priorities. If there were any changes, can one speak of a Bolognese school of moral philosophy, or of a common consensus as to how the subject should be taught? And how does the Bolognese situation compare with our findings for other Italian universities?

After a brief sketch of the institutional context, this chapter examines the Bolognese works connected with the study and teaching of Aristotle's *Ethics*. The focus is on the unpublished lectures of Claudio Betti (second half of the sixteenth century), but attention is also given to the interpretations of Agostino Galesio and Camillo Baldi, from the beginning of the seventeenth century.

8.1 *The Institutional Context*

A translation of Aristotle's *Ethics* into the vernacular by Taddeo Alderotti († 1295) and a commentary on the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics* by Bartolomeo da Varignana († ca. 1318) suggest that, from an early date, some Bolognese professors—especially professors of

[6] A fine study of the literary culture of Bologna and the surrounding region during 1430–1630 is Anselmi *et al.* 1988.

[7] Lines 2001b and 2002a. For indications of the current reevaluation of the relationship between science and the Renaissance universities, see especially Porter 1996, Camerota and Helbing 2000, and the essays in Lines 2001c.

medicine—had a particular interest in Aristotle's moral philosophy.[8] Furthermore, as explained below (§ 8.2.1), during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries several scholars active in Bologna penned works on the *Ethics*.[9] Nonetheless, the first documentary evidence for a steady teaching of moral philosophy in the Bolognese *studium* comes only in 1379, with Pietro da Varignana's appointment to teach the subject along with medicine.[10] Thereafter the subject is recorded quite regularly, so that around ninety teachers of moral philosophy are known for Bologna up to around 1620—considerably more, for example, than for Florence–Pisa. Although over half (fifty-five) of these professors teach moral philosophy for only one or two years, in many cases we are fairly well informed about their academic careers.[11] Unlike the situation in Padua, therefore, something can be said about who they are and the place of moral philosophy in their *Laufbahn.*

As might be expected, given the Bolognese tradition in this matter, moral philosophy is taught fairly often by professors of medicine.[12] In contrast with Pavia, there are very few cases of the subject's being combined with astrology.[13] There are also not many instances of theologians teaching moral philosophy,[14] and the number of regulars (members of religious orders) teaching the subject is surprisingly low when compared with Florence: only eleven cases are documented for Bologna, and in several of these instances moral philosophy is taught jointly with metaphysics (a short-lived occurrence).[15] But especially surprising, when compared with the practice in Florence, is the fact that so few rhetoricians teach moral philosophy in Bologna: we know only of Francesco Filelfo, Lianoro de'

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[8] On Alderotti see Siraisi 1981, pp. 77–82; for Bartolomeo da Varignana, see Appendix A below, no. 1. For general context on philosophy in fourteenth-century Bologna, see A. Maier 1967.

[9] In particular, Giacomo da Pistoia (Appendix C, no. 1), Guido Vernani (no. 7), and Michele Aiguani (no. 17).

[10] See Appendix A below, no. 2.

[11] Details are given in Appendix A.

[12] Some examples are, in addition to Bartolomeo da Varignana (Appendix A, no. 1) and Pietro da Varignana (no. 2): Ugo Benzi (no. 17), Baverio Bonetti (no. 41), Bernardo Garzoni (no. 44).

[13] I have only found two: Guglielmo di Argeli (Appendix A, no. 3) and Giacomo d'Alemagna (no. 4).

[14] The cases I have found are: Fernando da Cordova (Appendix A, no. 9), Andrea Biglia, O.E.S.A. (no. 30), Gaspare di San Giovanni, O.P. (no. 31), Filippo da Bagnacavallo, O.F.M. (no. 74), Angelo da Arezzo, O. Serv. (no. 75), and Girolamo Gaggio (no. 76).

[15] See Appendix A, nos. 30, 31, 46, 55, 56, 59, 69, 74, 75, 76, and 77.

Lianori, Andronico Callisto, and Giulio Valeriano Bonomi.[16] Evaluating this phenomenon requires caution, since we know of some rhetoricians in Bologna who considered themselves to be lecturing on moral philosophy even though they were officially on the rolls for rhetoric.[17] Furthermore, one should not necessarily conclude that philosophy teaching was therefore not affected by humanist interests.[18] Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that in Bologna moral philosophy is mostly taught as a passing part of a professor's career, and by teachers of philosophy who have absolved the initial two- or three-year requirement to teach logic and are on their way toward gaining positions in medicine.[19] It is also notable that, differently from universities such as Padua, it is not uncommon to find two or even three professors appointed simultaneously to teach moral philosophy. This is especially the case in the fifteenth century.

After a hiatus between 1528 and 1562,[20] moral philosophy reappears on the university rolls for Bologna with the appointment of Claudio Betti.[21] Its teaching attests to a transformation on various levels. First of all, in line with a trend toward specialization in philosophy teaching in Bologna during the second half of the sixteenth century,[22] hardly any of the ethics teachers are on a career path toward medicine, although they hold doctorates in both Arts and Medicine.[23] And none is a theologian or a rhetorician. This suggests that moral philosophy is firmly considered a philosophical subject, to be taught in combination or alternation with logic and natural

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[16] For the teaching of Filelfo, de' Lianori, Callisto, and Bonomi, see Appendix A, nos. 35, 52, 61, and 80.

[17] For example, Lapo da Castiglionchio, Jr. delivered a *Praelectio in philosophia morali* in 1436 (see Müllner, pp. 139–42; Celenza 1999, p. 7). For the cases of Codro and Filippo Beroaldo Sr., see below, p. 299.

[18] An example is the teaching of moral philosophy by Andrea Biglia, a humanist albeit not chiefly a rhetorician; see Appendix A, no. 30.

[19] Before 1528 a partial departure from this pattern is represented by a handful of professors who, in the second half of the fifteenth century, spend a substantial part of their teaching career concentrating on moral philosophy rather than going on to teach medicine. Tommaso Marinasi (Appendix A, no. 65), Andronico di Parma (no. 70), and Bartolomeo dalle Rode (no. 72) are the main figures involved. Unfortunately, no written memory of their teaching seems to have survived.

[20] The reasons for this hiatus are not clear; it possibly has something to do with the previous teacher's lack of success in attracting students to the course. For Bonomi's self-testimony concerning this failure, see Appendix A, no. 80.

[21] Betti's teaching is described in Appendix A, no. 81.

[22] See Lines 2001b.

[23] The exception is Gian Battista Montacheti; see Appendix A, no. 82.

philosophy. Second, moral philosophy is no longer a matter of only passing interest: professors do not teach it for just one or two years. The bare minimum seems to be three years,[24] but the norm is to teach moral philosophy for five or more years. In turn, these long-term teaching commitments coincide with the production of commentaries on the *Ethics*—the first substantial evidence of how moral philosophy was taught in Bologna.

Furthermore, this is also the period in which the rolls start to specify what is to be read in the moral philosophy course. The practice starts in the years of Melchiorre Zoppio's teaching (1592–1603).[25] It would seem from this evidence that the *Ethics* is to be covered in a six-year cycle which, starting from a discussion of happiness in general, passes to an examination of the moral virtues (split into two years: *de attinentibus ad virtutes morales* and *de virtutibus moralibus*), of justice, of the contemplative virtues, and of friendship.[26]

Finally, another notable change is that, after 1562, moral philosophy is taught by only one teacher per year. In the absence of documentary evidence, it is not possible to offer any definitive explanation for this phenomenon. Significantly, however, the ethics teachers' salaries receive a measurable boost. Moral philosophy had never accounted for a large proportion of the Bolognese budget in Arts and Medicine;[27] it came, in fact, always near the bottom percentagewise, along with metaphysics and theology. Nonetheless, in the late sixteenth century the teacher of moral philosophy did not (as formerly) have to share the allocations for his field with anyone else. Thus, his average salary was several times higher than those in metaphysics and theology. Indeed, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century an ethics teacher could boast more than double the average salary of a professor of logic, a subject that accounted for 3.7% of the budget of Arts and Medicine versus 2% for moral philosophy.[28] This fact is probably best explained by a staffing difference between the two subjects: ethics teaching was usually assigned to

[24] With Gaspare Melara; see Appendix A, no. 83.

[25] For Zoppio see Appendix A, no. 87.

[26] The first firm evidence I have found for this cycle dates from 1591–1592, when the rolls begin specifying the topics to be taught in the moral philosophy course; see Dallari, II, p. 242.

[27] The high point seems to have been around 3.3% between 1469 and 1505; see Lines 2002a, Table 2-A.

[28] See Lines, *ibid.*

established professors of logic and natural philosophy, for whom a salary cut would have been unacceptable. Logic, on the contrary, was still mainly a subject for fresh graduates.

Taken together, these factors seem to point toward some significant developments. In particular, the staff for moral philosophy was not only better paid, but more senior, more philosophically-minded, and more dedicated in the second half of the sixteenth century than earlier. It is hard to say whether these were the results of a conscious strategy on the part of the university authorities to revive the teaching of moral philosophy in Bologna.[29] But it is no accident that the bulk of the evidence for the study of the *Ethics* in Bologna dates from this period, and it will become clear that the institutional context had a tangible effect on how the *Ethics* was treated. Before examining this evidence in detail, however, the earlier study of the *Ethics* in Bologna also deserves to be mentioned.

8.2 *The Interpretative Background*

8.2.1 *Before 1500*

A survey of the Bolognese production on moral philosophy testifies, first of all, to an early interest especially in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics*. In addition to the works of Taddeo Alderotti and Bartolomeo da Varignana mentioned above,[30] we know, for example, of a *Quaestio de felicitate* by the fairly obscure Giacomo da Pistoia, who possibly disputed this question (after the Parisian fashion and based on the *Nicomachean Ethics*) in Bologna in the 1290s.[31] Furthermore, Guido Vernani, who taught in the *studium* of the Dominican order in Bologna between 1310 and 1324, in the period 1324–1330 authored two works on the *Ethics* as well as a commentary on the *Politics*; predictably, they depend heavily on St. Thomas.[32] Unfortunately, the questions on the *Ethics* attributed to the fourteenth-century Carmelite Michele Aiguani (a teacher of the-

[29] None of the university documents I have examined thus far offers any discussion of the issue.

[30] See p. 290.

[31] On Giacomo da Pistoia see below, Appendix C, no. 1.

[32] On Guido Vernani see below, Appendix C, nos. 7–8 and above, pp. 169–70. For the *Politics* commentaries, see Flüeler 1992, II, p. 22.

ology in the Bolognese *studium*) have not been found.[33] Beyond these works, there are some annotations in a beautiful fourteenth-century manuscript of the *Ethics*;[34] these suggest that the first four books were considered of special interest and display a familiarity not only with Thomas but also with Albert the Great and Jean Buridan.

While these works show that Aristotle's moral philosophy was known and studied in Bologna during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they do not, however, offer any clear evidence as to how the *Ethics* was treated in the university. It is not certain, for example, that Bartolomeo da Varignana's work on the *Economics* is really connected with university classroom teaching.[35] Indeed, it is not altogether clear that moral philosophy was taught in the university during this early period; Arts students desiring to follow a course on the *Ethics* may have been directed to hear the teaching offered by the regulars in their own quarters.[36]

Other fifteenth-century works written in Bologna are more clearly connected with the university context.[37] The theologian Battista de' Giudici da Finali († 1484),[38] who taught in the Dominican convent of Bologna around 1460, later wrote an apology (*Apologia traductionis antique libri ethicorum Aristotelis contra invectivam traductionemque Leonardi Aretini*)[39] for the older Latin translation of the *EN* against the retranslation (ca. 1417) by the chancellor of Florence, Leonardo Bruni († 1444).[40] In this work, datable to around 1481/1484, the bishop of Ventimiglia chastises Bruni for lacking appropriate professional credentials, i.e.

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[33] On Michele Aiguani see Appendix C, no. 17.

[34] Bologna, BU 2252 (s. XIV), 109 ff.; see *AL Codices*, II, no. 1283; Gauthier 1969, p. 20*; *Codices Thomae*, no. 309.

[35] Siraisi suggests that Bartolomeo's work is "most likely a written redaction of lectures he gave in the faculty of arts and medicine at Bologna. . . . It does not necessarily follow that the study of the *Economics* was, in Bartolomeo's day or thereafter, an essential part of the curriculum in arts and medicine. It seems more likely that individual masters enjoyed some liberty to introduce occasional courses upon works of particular interest to themselves or their students, whether or not these works were among those required for examination" (Siraisi 1981, pp. 86–87). It is also possible, however, that Bartolomeo taught the *Economics* privately. I know only of rare instances in Italy of the *Economics* being taught as part of a university course.

[36] See above, p. 84.

[37] The commentary by Ugo Benzi on the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics* is not discussed here, partly because its connection with Bologna remains, to my mind, questionable. See Appendix A, no. 17.

[38] For bibliography, see Hankins 2001, p. 150, n. 17.

[39] In Bologna, BU 1639 (s. XV), ff. 3v–8v. On this work see Grabmann 1926, Hankins 2001, pp. 137–38 and idem (forthcoming); cf. Frati, p. 371, no. 856.

[40] On Bruni's translation see below, Appendix C, no. 26.

for presuming to translate and comment on Aristotle despite his ignorance of dialectic and philosophy. Thus, Battista treats the *Ethics* as a philosophical work, requiring a specialized professional terminology and preparation. Furthermore, according to Battista, literary elegance is not appropriate to the interpretation of philosophical texts; Bruni had therefore erred in giving Aristotle a fluent Ciceronian rendering. On both of these points, Battista's viewpoint coincides with that of Niccolò Tignosi in Florence a few years earlier.[41] Contrary to Tignosi, however, Battista would disapprove of using Bruni's translation as a textbook. Furthermore, he differs both from Tignosi and from former participants in the controversy sparked by Bruni's translation by adding criticisms of literary nature to the customary arsenal of philosophical objections—thus he tries to meet Bruni on his own ground.[42] It is also noteworthy that the theologian freely admits that he has taken up the reading of the *Ethics* in order to overcome summertime boredom and that he had no previous direct acquaintance with this work.[43] Although that of summertime leisure is surely a literary *topos*, it seems unlikely that the author would have admitted his ignorance of the *Ethics* if it was widely considered to be "required reading" for cultured persons or even for university students. This represents a further indication that Aristotle's moral philosophy was not considered a topic of great importance in Bologna around the middle of the fifteenth century.

The case of Battista is particularly relevant here because he was one of several in Bologna for whom Bruni's translation was hard to accept. Already earlier (after 1450?) criticisms against Bruni's translation had been voiced by Francesco da Bologna (like Battista, a reader in the Dominican convent of Bologna) in his marginal annotations to Bruni's preface to his translation of the *Ethics*.[44] Furthermore, Niccolò Fava († 1439), a famous teacher of philosophy and medicine in the Bolognese *studium*,[45] took an interest in Bruni's translation. When Francesco Filelfo, a Greek émigré, was teaching in Bologna

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[41] See above, pp. 207 ff.

[42] Hankins (forthcoming).

[43] Bologna, BU 1639 (s. XV), f. 3r: "Cum nuper vacarem his theologicis studiis quibus ante dare operam consueram, Ethicorum Aristotelis libros, quos usque ad id tempus nunquam legissem, ad depellendas alias molestias aestivo tempore videre ociosus institui."

[44] The glosses, in Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, G III 16 (s. XV), ff. 1r–2v, have been edited and studied in Hankins 2001, pp. 152–55 and 144–45.

[45] See below, Appendix A, no. 19.

(1427–1428),[46] Fava seized the opportunity to quiz him on the meaning of *τἀγαθόν* in the opening lines of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: was the medieval translation correct ("bene ostenderunt bonum esse quod omnia appetunt") or should one rather follow Bruni's version ("bene ostenderunt summum bonum quod omnia appetunt")?[47] In other words, was Aristotle really talking about God as being the final end of all things, or was this an interpretation superimposed on the text by Bruni? Filelfo was unhappy with both translations, but managed to be diplomatic about Bruni's;[48] unfortunately, this does not tell us whether Filelfo, who among other subjects may have been lecturing on the *Ethics* in 1428, actually used Bruni's translation or not for his teaching.[49] But it does say something about the concerns of the philosophers at the *studium* of Bologna and their hesitancy to embrace Bruni's translation. Because of this reluctance to follow Bruni's methodology and the fact that most of the teachers of moral philosophy in Bologna were philosophers, it seems likely that Bruni's translation was adopted for teaching there only late, if at all. From this standpoint, Bologna would have been conservative with respect to Florence during the fifteenth century.[50]

Since other evidence as to the study of the *Ethics* at the University of Bologna is scanty, a series of marginal annotations on the *Ethics* and the *Politics* by Ugolino Pisano is particularly precious.[51] Ugolino, a loquacious but otherwise obscure figure, informs us that he studied civil and canon law in Bologna and that he obtained his license in these subjects in March 1437; his doctorate was awarded to him two months later. Ugolino's numerous annotations, which cover the *Ethics* and the *Politics* in their entirety, are dated; we therefore know that his study of the *Ethics* was finished on August 12, 1435 and that

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[46] See below, Appendix A, no. 35.

[47] We do not have a copy of Fava's inquiry, but we do have the letters written by Filelfo in response to it (see Hankins 2001, pp. 156–59) and from which Fava's concerns can be easily reconstructed. Neither Fava nor Filelfo explicitly attribute the second reading to Bruni, but there was hardly any need to.

[48] Hankins 2001, pp. 135–36.

[49] For Filelfo's Bolognese teaching see below, Appendix A, no. 35.

[50] The Florentine commentaries and lectures on the *Ethics* from the second half of the fifteenth century are all—with the exception of Acciaiuoli's commentary—based on Bruni's translation.

[51] The manuscript containing them is Milan, BAmbr., F.141.sup. (s. XIV), ff. 1r–68r; cf. *AL Codices*, II, no. 1444; *AL Suppl.*, p. 144; Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 299 with bibliography; cf. Gauthier 1970a, p. 151, n. 198.

of the *Politics* on January 13, 1437. Both works are in Moerbeke's translation, in a fourteenth-century manuscript.

Even though Ugolino was a student in Bologna when he wrote his annotations, we have no sure evidence that his glosses are related to university teaching. They could be the result of private study or even of teaching in one of the religious convents in Bologna.[52] Still, the case of Ugolino is interesting because it is a reminder that Arts students were not necessarily the only ones interested in Aristotle's moral philosophy: doubtless students of law and perhaps of medicine too were also among the audience. Furthermore, if the text annotated by Ugolino was the same as the teaching text (or at least as the most commonly used text at the university), this would confirm that Bruni's translation had not yet managed to make its way into the curriculum there. This, however, does not mean that it was completely ignored, for one of Ugolino's annotations (f. 3r) compares Bruni's translation of *τἀγαθόν* ("summum bonum") with the older translation. Thus, even though not necessarily embraced, Bruni's translation was still perceived as an interpretation to be reckoned with. Should Ugolino's annotations really be related to classroom teaching, this would be interesting because they bear witness to an extensive coverage of both the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. This would be one of the few evidences for the teaching of the *Politics* in the Italian universities.[53]

8.2.2 *After 1500*

Around the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, much of the evidence about the *Ethics* in Bologna concerns rhetoricians active there. This dovetails well with what is known about the period 1480–1530 as one of great literary flourishing in Bologna[54] and with the teaching of moral philosophy by the rhetorician Bonomi at the start of the sixteenth century.[55] We know, for example, of the interest in Bruni's translation of the *Ethics* on the part of Benedetto Colucci da Pistoia, a member of Marsilio Ficino's

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[52] A gap in the documents for Arts and Medicine in 1434–1438 makes it impossible to determine whether anyone was teaching moral philosophy in the university then.

[53] It seems, from a prolusion, that Francesco Filelfo lectured on the *Politics* in 1470 (Florence, BNC, Naz. II.IX.14; see Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 115). However, Filelfo was teaching in Milan, not at the *studium* in Pavia. Guglielmo Becchi, in Florence, also lectured on the *Politics* (see Staico 1996, pp. 1301–11, 1319–20).

[54] See especially Anselmi *et al.* 1988, pp. 523–25.

[55] On Bonomi, see Appendix A, no. 80.

circle in Florence who taught grammar in Florence before teaching rhetoric and poetry in the Bolognese *studium* in 1482–1505.[56] A manuscript with Colucci's annotations on the *Ethics* (dating from the young notary's attendance of John Argyropoulos' lectures in Florence in 1457) has already been studied.[57] Of special interest are his copious notes on Books III–V; the rest of the *Ethics* and even the *Economics* are comparatively clean, possibly because Colucci attended Argyropoulos' lectures only for a few months.

The study of Aristotle's moral philosophy by Antonio Cortesi Urceo (Codro, 1446–1500) is also well documented. Codro, who taught rhetoric in Bologna in 1482–1500, not only annotated a copy of Aristotle's *Ethics* in Bruni's translation,[58] but also made numerous references to the *Ethics* in the prolusions to his courses in rhetoric. Of special relevance are his *Sermones* VI, XII, and XIV.[59] *Sermo* XIV (*In laudem virtutis*) draws heavily, for example, on *EN* I and II; *Sermo* XII depends on Books IIIb–V; and *Sermo* VI makes substantial use of Book VI.

Other rhetoricians in Bologna busied themselves with moral philosophy in a more general way. Filippo Beroaldo, Sr. (1453–1505)—who taught in Bologna ca. 1472–1474, 1479–1505—discussed Horace, Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and even Virgil's *Georgics* in connection with happiness and moral philosophy,[60] although he did not necessarily center his discussion on Aristotle's *Ethics*. For his part, Romolo Amaseo (1489–1522), one of the most sought-after teachers of his time,[61] mentioned moral philosophy in his oration *De ratione et ordine*

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[56] On Colucci, see Cosenza, II, pp. 1049–51; Hankins 1991, pp. 445, 466; Chines, pp. 10–11. His teaching of grammar in Florence is documented in Verde, II, pp. 120–23; IV.1, pp. 93–95 and idem 1974, pp. 284–87. For Benedetto's teaching in Bologna, see Dallari, *ad indicem*.

[57] Bologna, BU 2703 (s. XV); see Field 1988, p. 56n; Hankins 2001, pp. 150–51, n. 25; idem (forthcoming), especially Appendix I; cf. Frati, p. 525, no. 1425.

[58] Rome, BVallicell., C. 83 (s. XV). See *Iter*, II, p. 131; Lines 1997, p. 310; also Hankins 1997, p. 164, no. 2242.

[59] In Codro 1506. For a discussion of Codro's orations see especially Poppi 1990, pp. 51–63 (also in idem 1997, pp. 158–75); on Codro in general, see Malagola 1878, Raimondi 1950, *DBI*, XXIX, pp. 773–78 (L. Gualdo Rosa) and Chines, no. 14 (with bibliography).

[60] Beroaldo 1497 and 1499. On these orations, see Poppi 1990, pp. 41–50. On Beroaldo, see Montalbani, pp. 197–99; *DBI*, IX, pp. 382–84 (M. Gilmore), *DCLI* I, pp. 288–90 (G. Gardenal), and most recently Chines, pp. 11–16. Also see Garin 1994, pp. 359–87 and Anselmi 1988, *passim*.

[61] Amaseo was professor of rhetoric in the Bolognese *studium*, ca. 1512–1544 (with a spell in Padua, ca. 1520–1523). Useful information on him is given in *DBI*, II, pp. 660–66 (R. Avesani) and Chines, pp. 4–5.

studiorum.[62] In this work, Amaseo describes the proper order of studies as beginning with Latin and Greek, then progressing to history, geography, military and architectural arts; thereafter follows training in rhetoric and dialectic, after which one should pass to natural philosophy and mathematics. Curiously, moral philosophy is placed at the very end, before the options of law and theology.[63] It is striking that Amaseo says nothing about moral philosophy as a preparation for medicine, nor about combining rhetoric with moral philosophy. As with many such pedagogical programs, however, it is hard to know how much is based on reality and how much remains personal preference. Certainly, Amaseo's inclusion of geography and of the military and architectural arts does not support the possibility that he was describing a current university curriculum.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the professors of philosophy seem to be the main university group interested in the *Ethics* in Bologna. The chief representatives of this group are Claudio Betti, Agostino Galesio, and Camillo Baldi. But others too, such as the famed naturalist Ulisse Aldrovandi, were involved in the study of the *Ethics*. At some point, this man of remarkably broad interests even took the trouble to transcribe Donato Acciaiuoli's commentary (first printed in 1478), which he paraphrased in places.[64] Aldrovandi's manuscript is especially interesting because, as in Betti's lectures, there is a sustained effort to outline the syllogisms of the text. A study of this work and of its relationship to Aldrovandi's other philosophical interests would doubtless shed further light on Bologna's cultural climate during the second half of the sixteenth century. Since Aldrovandi is not known to have taught the *Ethics*, however, such a study will have to be deferred to another occasion. The focus here will be on interpretations of the *Ethics* by Bolognese professors known to have taught moral philosophy there. Although they are later, the works by Galesio and Baldi are treated before the lectures by Betti, since they can be described more briefly.

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[62] The oration is in Bologna, BU 4221 (s. XVI), ff. 1r–18r. It appears to be unpublished.

[63] *Ibid.*, ff. 14v–17v.

[64] Aldrovandi's manuscript is in Bologna, BU, Aldrov., ms. 59 (s. XVI), 223 ff. It is mentioned in Lines 1997, p. 316. For Aldrovandi's career, see Lines 2001b, no. 170 and Findlen 1994, *passim*. On Acciaiuoli's commentary see below, Appendix C, no. 38.

Agostino Galesio

After obtaining his doctorate in Arts and Medicine (1567), Galesio started his teaching career in Bologna in 1568–1569. He taught logic for four years before going on to teach natural philosophy in 1572–1575. After an absence of some ten years, in which he taught in Perugia and elsewhere, he returned to Bologna. There the Senate appointed him, in 1586, to teach moral philosophy, and he is listed on the *studium*'s rolls for this subject until 1592.[65] His later career (which included a period of teaching in Pisa, 1614–1619) concentrated on the teaching of logic and natural philosophy, and his commentaries on both of these philosophical branches survive.[66] Galesio continued his teaching of these subjects right up to his death in February 1621.[67] I have found no documentary basis for Mazzetti's statement that he taught *lettere umane* in 1603.[68]

It is not altogether clear which books of the *Ethics* Galesio taught in the Bolognese *studium*. The rolls specify the subject of his teaching only in 1591–1592, when he is to teach Book V (on Justice). Since the *Ethics* was usually covered over a six-year cycle in Bologna during this period, it seems likely that Galesio covered all of the *EN* during his six-year appointment to teach the subject. Possibly connected with this teaching is the *Notanda excellentis philosophi D. Augustini Gallesii in libros Ethicorum Aristotelis duos.*[69] This work, surviving in a single manuscript,[70] is similar in format to a fascicle on the *Posterior Analytics*, bearing the same shelfmark as this one and also authored by Galesio.[71] Although the pieces are not dated and their connection with the Bolognese *studium* cannot be established beyond doubt (they could instead be related to private teaching, or even to teaching in a different *studium*), they are nonetheless precious documents, testifying both to Galesio's interests and to his methodology. My examination suggests that the work on the *Ethics* is a recopied version

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[65] Fantuzzi, IV, p. 23 states that Galesio taught moral philosophy until his death. This, however, is not confirmed by the university records, although it is possible that Galesio continued to teach moral philosophy privately.

[66] See Lohr, RLAC, p. 157.

[67] On Galesio's career, see Appendix A, no. 85 and Lines 2001b, no. 179.

[68] Mazzetti, no. 1331.

[69] See Appendix C, no. 136.

[70] Bologna, BU 723, fasc. II (s. XVII, chart., 4°), 46 ff.

[71] According to Fantuzzi, IV, p. 24, this work (in Bologna, BU 723, fasc. I) bears a note at the end: "Ex ore Galesii accepit et scripsit quidam auditor." However, I have not been able to find it.

of Galesio's lectures, either by Galesio himself or by a student. It is written very clearly, with hardly any erasures or corrections.

In 46 folios, the *Notanda in libros Ethicorum* covers the first two books of the *Ethics*, which is examined in a Latin translation. After a few brief introductory comments on the definition of moral philosophy, its subject matter, and its division, Galesio proceeds to examine each chapter or section in turn. At the beginning of each division, Galesio offers (often through graphs) an outline of the contents of that section, followed by a short paraphrase with explanatory comments. At the end of each section, an Appendix sums up the most memorable statements made by Aristotle in the text just examined, or gives a few additional explanations.[72]

This work's conciseness does not leave much space for philosophical discussion. On the subject of education, for example, Galesio holds that the young should not hear the *Ethics*; however, we are not offered a detailed justification for his viewpoint.[73] Nonetheless, even in its general limitation to the bare essentials (statement of positions without argumentation), the work offers some insights into Galesio's views. In his discussion of the subject of moral philosophy, for example, Galesio holds that the *Ethics* concerns man in general, inasmuch as he is capable of being happy.[74] Thus, Galesio implicitly disagrees with the traditional opinion that the *Ethics* concerns the individual man; indeed, he seems to side with Francesco Piccolomini's view of the *Ethics* as providing a set of general moral principles foundational to the *Economics* and the *Politics*.[75] Galesio's attention to the Paduan debate between Jacopo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini is also suggested by his reference to the problem of method and order.[76]

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[72] E.g., f. 20v: "Felicitas omnium humanarum rerum est optima."

[73] F. 9r: "Iuvenis disciplinae moralis non est idoneus auditor quippe qui humanarum actionum est imperitus, item quia perturbationes et passiones persequitur."

[74] F. 3v: "Subiectum sive materia subiecta philosophiae activae est homo, quatenus activae felicitatis capax est. Talis aut[em] homo considerari potest vel absolute, quatenus ubi nullis legibus constrictus, aut privatis aliquibus . . . vel qua homo familiaris . . . vel qua civilis . . ." Cf. f. 4r: "Dividitur autem philosophia activa in Aethicam, Oeconomicam et Politicam sive Civilem. Aethica considerat de felicitate hominis absolute. Oeconomica de felicitate hominis familiam regentis. Civilis vero de felicitate hominis civilis."

[75] See above, pp. 270–71.

[76] F. 10v: "Methodus et via in tradenda atque investiganda doctrina felicitatis erit a notioribus nobis. Appendix. Duplex est via pertractandi unamquamquam rem, cuius altera progreditur a principiis ad principiata, quae naturalis dicitur. Altera vero a principiatis effectibusque ad ipsa principia et causas quas nobis insita et innata censetur, quae quoad nos dicitur."

The *Notanda* suggests that Galesio may have limited himself, in his teaching, to offering a summary paraphrase of the work. This would accord well with Galesio's view of the *Ethics* as a fairly elementary subject (to be taught right after logic and dialectic)[77] and would be consistent with what we know about Baldi's teaching as well (see below). Although such a straightforward and unproblematized teaching of the text may not seem especially remarkable, it should be seen in contrast with the teaching approaches to the *Ethics* observable in other Italian universities at the time and even with that of Claudio Betti.

Galesio also wrote two other works on moral philosophy. His *Tractatus de Fortitudine, Prudentia, Iustitia* is in fact a collection of four different manuscripts bound together in Bologna, BU 722.[78] (The fourth manuscript repeats a fragment of the third treatise on Justice, a work which is also contained in Bologna, BU 1991.) One of the most notable characteristics of these treatises, dedicated to and apparently commissioned by Cardinal Francesco Sforza,[79] is the use of watercolors in the emblem tradition to illustrate specific points about the virtues in question. The treatise on Prudence, for example, makes constant use of such watercolors in chapter 12;[80] both manuscripts on Justice also have watercolors, although not always the same ones or in the same order. Neither the works nor the manuscripts are dated; one can only infer from the dedication that the works must have been written after 1583 (and, of course, before Galesio's death in 1621).

It is worth noting Galesio's procedure in these works, which I shall illustrate from his treatise on Justice (in Bologna, BU 1991). Divided in ten chapters and covering 519 pages (plus a detailed index), in many ways the *De iustitia* appears to be a typical scholastic treatise. Indeed, the first six chapters discuss the nature of justice

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[77] Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 314 (s. XVII), f. 11v: "Hisce ergo praemisssis ad rem propositam iam manus conferentes, breviter et resolute dicimus, quod quemadmodum philosophiam moralem addiscendam esse statuimus post disciplinarum instrumentalium (quae sunt logica et dialectica) ne dum sermocinalium perceptionem . . ."

[78] On this work, already signalled in Fantuzzi, IV, p. 24, see below, Appendix C, no. 137.

[79] Sforza became cardinal in 1583 and died in 1624; see *ABI*, II 575, 205 (Argenteri). The colophon to *De iustitia* reads: "Et haec sunt, quae tradenda pro virili nostra indicavimus ad faciliorem intellectionem doctrinae peripatheticae de iustitia explicatae per universum V librum Ethicorum, in gratiam illustrissimi et excellentissimi cardinalis Sfortiae, principis iustissimi, id ipsum nobis imperantis. Authore Augustino Gallesio" (Bologna, BU 1991, p. 519).

[80] Bologna, BU 722, ff. 163r–178v.

and distinguish it in its various kinds according to standard scholastic procedure.[81] Chapter 8 reports a series of twelve main questions (plus five accessory ones) that are usually posed in discussing Justice, several of them taken from good scholastic authors such as Jean Buridan and Gerard of Odo. And there are references throughout to the opinions of other commentators and philosophical authorities. Chapters 7 and 9, however, reserve some interesting surprises. Chapter 7 (*Quae dicta sunt a plerisque illustribus philosophis de iustitia, iusto, iure et contrariis*) is dedicated to listing opinions on Justice taken from ancient and modern authors. It goes well beyond Aristotle and presents gems taken from (among others) Plato, Xenophon, Lucian, Demosthenes, St. Augustine, Euripides, and Virgil. Furthermore, even in the case of Aristotle the sources are broader than usual, since Galesio uses not only the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also the *Eudemian Ethics*, the *Magna Moralia*, and the *Politics*. Chapter 9 (*Quibus iustitia hieroglyfice significari soleat*) employs the watercolors in the emblem tradition referred to above—truly a most unusual feature in a philosophical treatise. Two further methodological features that should be noted are Galesio's extreme fondness for dichotomous tables and his frequent quotations from (and references to) classical authors, especially historians. The mixture of these various elements makes for a slightly odd effect: the treatise falls somewhere between the scholastic, humanist, and popular genres, apparently trying to incorporate the best from each while keeping up with the times through techniques such as the use of tables.[82] It is much less an exposition of the text (which is cited in Latin translation) than a systematic examination of the problems arising out of it.

Galesio also wrote a *Compendium* on moral philosophy, which survives in two very different redactions. One of these is a six-volume work preserved in a series of Vatican Boncompagni manuscripts and (less completely) in several Neapolitan manuscripts.[83] One of the most formidable interpretations of all time (over 800 folios just for the *Ethics*, plus around 750 folios for the *Politics* in the Naples manuscripts), this "compendium" is distributed in 46 chapters covering

[81] The titles of the chapters are indicative: (1) *De quo agendum et qua methodo procedendum*, (2) *Quot modis assumatur iustitiae nomen et de quo sit sermo*, (3) *Quid sit iustitia*, (4) *Quomodo in species dividatur iustitia et quae sit unaquaequae*, (5) *Quae a iustitia perivationem habeat et quid ac quale unumquodque sit*, and (6) *De iustitiae, iusto et iuri oppositis*.

[82] On the use of tables modeled on Theodor Zwinger see below, p. 323.

[83] See, for this work and the manuscripts, Appendix C, no. 139.

four main sections.[84] The longest part is that specifically discussing the content of ethics, and in particular the virtues. After covering, in chapters 9–19, the eleven Aristotelian moral virtues, Galesio treats other minor virtues in chapters 20–28;[85] he then goes on to discuss (chapters 29–34) intellectual virtue and (chapter 35) friendship.

Many of the observations made above concerning Galesio's method in the *Tractatus de Fortitudine, Prudentia, Iustitia* could be repeated for the first redaction of the *Compendium.* Indeed, it is possible that the individual works in the *Tractatus* are actually expansions of the corresponding sections in the *Compendium.* There are, however, some interesting differences between the two works. First, in the *Compendium* Galesio typically concludes each chapter by listing a series of questions usually raised on the topic just examined; there is usually one set of questions posed by the philosophers and another set posed by the theologians. The last set seems to have no counterpart in the works of the *Tractatus.* Second, that of the emblems seems to have been an evolving affair. In the Naples manuscripts, spaces are usually left blank, presumably for drawings, but are not filled in.[86] The Boncompagni manuscripts, instead, include drawings, but they are not colored. The Bologna manuscript of the *Tractatus* is the only one to have the watercolors, and thus presumably represents one of the the later stages in the first redaction's elaboration. Finally, there is a curious feature in the structure of the *Compendium*: the work, which starts by discussing happiness, concludes its examination of the *Ethics* with Friendship before continuing on to the final section on civil society. It hardly seems coincidental that this structure mirrors the six-year cycle for teaching the *Ethics* apparently in use at Bologna during Galesio's time. However, since the *Economics* and the *Politics* were not usually taught in the Italian universities, I would argue for a possible influence of the Bolognese structure of teaching on Galesio's treatment rather than for the *Compendium* as a work related to the

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[84] The first section (Vatican, BAV, Boncompagni, K.1, ff. 3–14) is introductory; after it follows *De principiis moralis philosophiae* (*ibid.*, ff. 15–124), then *De subiecto tractationis moralis philosophiae* (essentially the remaining bulk of the work), and finally, in the last two volumes, *De civili societate.*

[85] The discussion of the minor virtues occcurs according to the following sequence: chapter (20) *De virtutibus moralibus minus principaliter*, (21) *De verecundia*, (22) *De aemulatione*, (23) *De laetitia*, (24) *De tristitia*, (25) *De misericordia*, (26) *De indignatione*, (27) *De hilaritate*, and (28) *De heroica virtute.*

[86] An exception is represented by Naples, BNC, IV.H.138, which—apparently like IV.H.139 (see Fossier, pp. 210–11)—does include watercolors.

classroom. In any case, the freedom with which Galesio treats Aristotle's text (not only in the sequence of the topics, but within the individual topics themselves) suggests that Galesio learned from Francesco Piccolomini a valuable lesson: an interpreter should not be the slave of the text he is teaching.

The second redaction of the *Compendium* is dedicated to Cardinal Maffeo Barberini (later Pope Urban VIII), papal legate in Bologna. The work, datable to around 1611–1614,[87] survives in a single manuscript and is divided in two parts: Book I (ff. 1r–46v) treats the *Ethics*, whereas Book II (ff. 48r–137r) concerns the *Politics* and other Aristotelian works. In turn, Book I is divided into eleven sections, the first nine of which (ff. 1r–29v) discuss general introductory issues such as *Quid sit moralis philosophia* (Section V, ff. 4r–5v) and *Philosophiae moralis divisio* (Section VI, ff. 5v–8r). These chapters are full of interesting comments in which Galesio displays his full grasp of the philosophical issues involved and acquaintance with the commentary tradition. He treats, for example, the question of whether moral philosophy is a science (f. 16r–v) and shows that its practical aim makes it impossible for it to be considered a science in the strict sense of the word.[88] In his discussion of the proper division of moral philosophy he propends, again like Francesco Piccolomini (but without naming him),[89] for a two-fold division: the *Ethics* provides a discussion of the theoretical principles, whose application is then the concern of the *Politics* and *Economics*.[90] He has interesting comments to make about the proper educational curriculum and about the place

[87] The work bears the title *Compendium moralis philosophiae sub titulo De homine civili pars una, auctore Augustino Gallesio bononiensi philosophiam naturalem de sero publice professante in priori loco descripto* and is found in Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 314 (s. XVII), 137 ff. On the work, see Appendix C, no. 138.

[88] Cf. his comments on this in Bologna, BU 723, f. 1r: "... philosophia activa est sapientiae studium in rebus optimis exercendis ordinatum ... docens homines secundum prudentiam recte agere."

[89] On Piccolomini's views, see above, § 7.3.2. Galesio also follows him in considering the proper order of study to be *Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Economics*.

[90] Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 314, f. 7v: "Ethica vero est ea moralis philosophiae pars, in qua tractatur de felicitate humana et principiis atque differentiis ad eandem spectantibus, quatenus acquiri potest ab uno quoque homine nato ad convivendum, in quacumque societate humana, quare ad conversandum cum personis cuiusque conditionis. Politica autem est ea philosophiae moralis pars, in qua tractatur de regimine, seu administratione cuiusque humanae societatis, sive ad unam aliquam privatam domum attineat (hinc oeconomica) sive ad plures domos, eiusdem tamen familiae, quae in una vico attenditur (hinc colonia) sive ad plures vicos simul unitas, unde Civitas consurgere dicitur."

of moral philosophy before contemplative philosophy.[91] However, the most striking feature of Galesio's accomplishment lies in the numerous (and high-quality) watercolors, in the emblem book tradition, of the various virtues, contained in Sections XI and XII of Book I. Significantly, the sections are entitled respectively *Quibus imaginibus hieroglyphice ab Aegyptiis sapientibus et Graecis antiquioribus, necnon Hebreis philosophia moralis representaretur* (ff. 30r–39r) and *Quibus imaginibus moralis philosophia hieroglyphice a nobis commode significari possit* (ff. 39r–43r). Book II also makes use of this device, although this time the subject is not so much moral philosophy, but the *homo civilis.*

It is not known to me whether Galesio was attempting, in this way, to present the cardinal with a coffee-table book, or whether the illustrations were part of a conscious pedagogical strategy on Galesio's part. Doubtless the illustrations had such a prominent place because of the work's character as a present to the cardinal. Nonetheless, it seems significant that such an unusual work was prepared by a university professor in Bologna. Even though the high rank of the dedicatee may have influenced Galesio's presentation of the material (as in the case of the *Tractatus*), the *Compendium* shows that Galesio was able to work both within the academic context and outside of it, thus displaying the remarkable kind of flexibility that one usually associates with the humanists. It also seems important that Galesio explicitly presented his *Compendium* to the cardinal as written by him while a professor of natural philosophy in Bologna (*auctore Augustino Gallesio bononiensi philosophiam naturalem de sero publice professante in priori loco descripto*). This is a reminder that natural philosophers were proud, in Bologna, to declare their interest in moral philosophy and considered it to be part of their field of expertise even when they were not specifically teaching the subject in the *studium.* It may be that they did a great deal more private teaching of the subject than we at present suspect. Nonetheless, there seems to have been a strong sense that moral philosophy should hang together with logic and natural philosophy, and not (as in Florence) with rhetoric. This consideration should be remembered when studying the treatments of the *Ethics* on the part of Baldi and Betti as well.

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[91] In Sectio VIII *De moralis philosophiae lectionis ordine* (ff. 9r–13r, especially ff. 11v–12r).

Camillo Baldi

Of Bolognese family, Camillo Baldi (1550–1637) obtained his doctorate in Arts and Medicine in Bologna on February 4, 1572 and started his teaching in 1576.[92] After the customary three years of logic, Baldi taught *philosophia extraordinaria* until 1586, when he was appointed as *prothologicus* for the years 1586–1590. He returned to teaching natural philosophy in 1590, retaining this post (but advancing from morning to afternoon teaching) until 1636, shortly before his death.[93]

Nowhere in the university documents does Baldi appear as a teacher of moral philosophy. Nonetheless, Baldi's *Ethics* commentary is clearly related to a teaching context: at the end of Book I the author declares that he began his exposition on November 10, 1612 and finished it on February 20, 1613.[94] Even though Baldi, who was actively involved in the Bolognese Accademia de' Gelati, may have given his lectures there rather than in the *studium*, it is significant that the rolls for 1612–1613 do not list anyone yet for the subject of moral philosophy. More than likely, Baldi was assigned this responsibility at the last minute, in addition to (or in replacement of) his planned teaching on the *Parva naturalia*. As we shall see in the case of Claudio Betti, it was not unusual for actual teaching to diverge from the official assignments. Furthermore, the dates of Baldi's teaching,[95] the fact that the university program for moral philosophy in 1612–1613 called for discussing *De felicitate in universali* (the very topic of Baldi's teaching), and the language in which Baldi taught (Latin) strongly suggest a university context.[96]

It took Baldi around three months to cover the first book of the *Ethics* in his teaching, and it seems likely that it would have taken

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[92] This Camillo Baldi should not be confused with his homonym, a Servite, who taught philosophy at least in Siena, ca. 1629; cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 29; the mss. listed in *Cat. mss. filos.*, IX, p. 20, are probably by Baldi the Servite.

[93] See Appendix A, no. 90.

[94] Bologna, BU 2318 (s. XVII), f. 156v: "Haec est ad laudem Dei omnipresentis et etiam Virginis Mariae Christi Dei Matris; perfeci die 20 februarii anni 1613 cum libri huius explicationem die 10 Novembris anni 1612 incepissem, quibus commentationibus si quid boni unquam apparverit, id . . . Dei optimi benignitati tribuendum est . . ." On the commentary see below, Appendix C, no. 140.

[95] It is true that the academic year usually began with the feastday of St. Luke (October 18), but Baldi may have started a bit later than usual. There seems to be no good reason why his teaching in the Accademia should have started more or less at the same time as that of the university.

[96] The only difficulty is that the deliberations of the Senate for 1612–1613 (in ASB, Senato, Partiti, no. 15) do not refer to any changes in Baldi's teaching.

him the rest of the academic year to cover Books II and III, on which he also lectured. This fits in well with what is known about the Bolognese practice of teaching Aristotle's *Ethics* in a six-year sequence (see above, § 8.1). Although some of the books were to be studied for a whole academic year (such as Book V on Justice), the program required a broader coverage of two or three books in other years, so as to finish all ten books within the time of the cycle. It also seems significant that Baldi's commentary is based on a new (as yet unidentified) translation,[97] conceivably the work of Baldi himself. Although this may point to a familiarity, on Baldi's part, with the Greek, the more important point is that the *Ethics* continues to be taught in Bologna based on a Latin translation, and not on the Greek text. It is not clear whether the teachers of moral philosophy in Bologna ever lectured on the Greek text of the *Ethics* (as Marc-Antoine Muret, Pier Vettori, and Ottaviano Ferrari did respectively in Rome, Florence, and Pavia).[98] From this point of view, the teaching in Bologna had something in common with the practice in Padua.

Baldi's work is more important as a possible window into classroom practice in Bologna than as an interpretation of the *Ethics*. In fact, as commentaries go, that of Baldi is not especially noteworthy. Baldi's main purpose, as he goes through Aristotle's work chapter by chapter, seems to be merely that of paraphrasing Aristotle and repeating the salient points of the text, but not really in much detail and certainly without much originality.[99] However, as with Galesio, one should stress that there is more to this technique than meets the eye. As is shown by the short *annotationes* and *dubitationes* that follow every chapter, Baldi is interested primarily in the philosophical aspects of Aristotle's text and seizes the opportunity to explore the topic at hand a bit more deeply. Thus, his emphasis does not fall on the literary or philological aspects of the text as would have been the case in Florence. However, he does not therefore subject his students to a detailed examination of each philosophical problem in typical scholastic style. Like Galesio, he provides a summary of

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[97] See Appendix C, no. 141.

[98] On the teaching of the *Ethics* in Greek in Italy, also see above, pp. 102 ff.

[99] For example, on f. 2v Baldi repeats the common division of *Ethics*, *Economics*, and *Politics*, which concern respectively the *perfectio unius hominis*, the perfection of the family, and that of the city. He adds: "Huius item (?) facultatis subiectum est homo quatenus est activus hoc est natus vivere et operari secundum rationem, cuius perfectionem quaerit civilis sive activa haec facultas; finis est hominis bonum . . ."

Aristotle's points with some occasional (but modest) elaboration. It is interesting to contrast the approach of Galesio and Baldi with that of their predecessor Betti.

8.3 *Claudio Betti*

Claudio Betti (1520–1589), of Modena, was the first to teach moral philosophy in Bologna after the long silence on this subject in the university records during 1528–1562. In 1562, when he was first appointed to moral philosophy,[100] Betti was already a senior lecturer, for he had taught in the Bolognese *studium* since 1545. He would teach moral philosophy on several other occasions (often in addition to natural philosophy) until at least 1579. In 1562–1567, however, he was assigned only to moral philosophy.[101] A teacher of notable fame and an author of numerous Aristotelian commentaries (most of which remain unstudied),[102] Betti's reputation rested in a special way on his mastery of logic; his main work on this topic (the *De recta discurrendi ratione institutio brevissima*, also known as *De syllogismo*) was first printed in 1568, sold well, and was reissued in 1590.[103] At the same time, however, Betti was also remembered for his teaching of moral philosophy, and even produced a work on this subject in Italian.[104] But Betti's most interesting contribution to the field of moral philosophy—at least from the perspective of this study—are his Latin lectures on the *Ethics*, which apparently were never printed.

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[100] On the appointment of Claudio Betti to moral philosophy in 1562, there is a a *Senato consulto* dated October 29, 1562 in ASB, Senato, Partiti, no. 8, f. 15v: "Item ad ornamentum et utilitatem huius almi Bononiensis Gymnasii pertinere existimantes ut in eo publice legatur lectura philosophiae moralis, quemadmodum etiam in aliis studiis fieri consuevit; et ad huiusmodi munus valde aptum et idoneum censentes excellentissimum D. Claudium Bettum, qui alacri animo provinciam suscipere se exhibuit; eum propterea per suffragia XXIV a lectura ordinaria philosophiae naturalis, ad quam descriptus est, amoveri, et ad supradictam lecturam philosophiae moralis transferri, et in Albo sive Rotulo praesenti et futuris describi mandarunt et statuerunt. Reservato tamen ipsi D. Claudio, loco pristino philosophiae naturalis, casu quo a praedicta lectura philosophiae moralis removeri contingeret. Contrariis VI."

[101] See below, Appendix A, no. 81.

[102] For Betti's teaching in natural philosophy and production in the field, see Lines 2001b, no. 166.

[103] Betti 1590. See Fantuzzi, II, pp. 164–65; *DBI*, IX, pp. 713–14 (G. Stabile); Risse, II, pp. 166, 206.

[104] See Betti 1567; Fantuzzi, II, p. 165.

8.3.1 *Formal Aspects*

Discussion of Betti's lectures is complicated both by their dates and by the manuscript tradition. There are four surviving manuscripts, which together reflect Betti's teaching in August through October or November 1570 and during 1579–1580.[105] All of the manuscripts appear to be student notebooks and are thus at times rather hard to decipher. As these are the only manuscripts known to contain Betti's comments on the *Ethics*, we have no record of Betti's teaching on Books VI–X, nor do we know whether Betti ever lectured on them. However, we are fortunate to have what we have: student notebooks on the *Ethics* are extremely rare for Italy; to my knowledge, no other works of this kind survive.[106]

The number and dating of the lectures are of considerable interest. In the 1570 lecture course, Betti delivered forty-eight lectures on Book I (from August 1 to September 19) and thirty-two lectures on Book II (September 20 to October 21).[107] This suggests that the *Ethics* was being taught on a daily basis, for Betti could hardly have delivered so many lectures had he taught only on holidays. Indeed, Betti seems to have taught on every possible day, including holidays. Furthermore, Betti states that he has just finished lecturing on the *De anima*.[108] This kind of progression is sensible, since so much of Aristotle's thinking

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[105] The manuscripts are listed in Appendix C, no. 87. Here it may be noted that Bologna, BArch., B 3427 (*Primi libri moralium Aristotelis lectiones Domino Claudio Betto legente collectae*) is undated but seems to correspond to Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 2 (a. 1570). The Archiginnasio manuscript is more complete than the Biblioteca Universitaria manuscript, since it goes through Book III (rather than Book II) and was even meant to continue to Book IV (see f. 113v, which at the bottom of the page has the catchword "Lib. 4. Moralium Aristotelis"). However, it is badly damaged and mostly illegible. The manuscripts relative to 1579–1580 are Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1 (covering Books I–III) and probably also Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 3 (covering Books IV–V). The assignment of the latter manuscript to 1579–1580 is conjectural, since the notes are not dated, but I have assigned it to the later date on paleographical grounds and because the number of lectures dedicated to each book seems to fit better with Betti's practice in BU 289, X, vol. 1. I have based my observations for Books I–III mostly on BU 289, X, vol. 1, collating its readings where possible with the other manuscripts. Furthermore, note that the shelfmarks for the Bologna, BU manuscripts given in Frati 1909 (i.e., BU 289, XI, XII, XIII) do not correspond to the current ones.

[106] Donato Acciaiuoli's notes on the *Ethics* are not necessarily directly *reportationes* of Argyropoulos' lectures; see Bianchi 1990a, pp. 32 ff.

[107] The Archiginnasio manuscript does not divide the text into lectures.

[108] Bologna, BArch., B 3427, f. 2r: "Cum hactenus de anima, adiuvante deo, cum Aristotele tractaverimus, non alienum existimavi, si interpretandam artem proponerem, quae docet, quomodo vitia ab animis expellantur . . ."

about virtue depends on his theory of the soul. However, both the dating of the lectures and Betti's reference to his previous teaching pose problems, if Betti's teaching took place within the university. The teaching roll for 1569–1570 appoints Betti only to the teaching of *philosophia ordinaria de sero*, and specifically to teaching the *De generatione et corruptione*. Nothing is said there either of the *De anima* or of the *Ethics*.[109] Furthermore, according to the rolls, in 1569–1570 and 1570–1571 the teaching of moral philosophy was assigned to Gian Battista Mantacheti, who was in fact paid for his teaching and apparently did not absent himself.[110] Why should Betti have been covering the course as well? And who was behind the decision to follow up the course on the *De anima* with one on the *Ethics*?

The same kinds of problems apply to the second set of notes from Betti's lectures, which presumably started in October 1579.[111] This time, Book I receives thirty-three lectures; Book II, only sixteen; and Book III, twenty-one. Judging from the pace at which the first book was covered (and assuming that the beginning of the lectures coincided with the opening of the academic year on October 18), Betti was again teaching practically every day. But again, someone else is listed in the rolls as teaching moral philosophy (this time, Antonio Gaggio), and he too is paid regularly, without being fined for absences.[112] During the preceding academic year, Betti really has, according to the rolls, taught the *De anima*, but the notes this time make no explicit reference to that course.

While discrepancies between the rolls and actual teaching can often be explained by last-minute changes (which the rolls, like present-day university course catalogs, did not reflect), it is harder to account for Betti's teaching of moral philosophy while others were appointed to the same subject. Furthermore, one would expect the deliberations of the Senate to authorize changes in Betti's assignments (they do not). The best hypothesis is probably that Betti was giving his *Ethics* teaching privately rather than in the *studium*. This would explain the unusual dates of Betti's first set of lectures as well as his teaching both on holidays and on *dies legibiles*. Furthermore,

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[109] Dallari, II, p. 176.

[110] See Appendix A, below, no. 82.

[111] The lectures on Book I were finished on November 16, 1579; see Bologna, BU 289, X.1, f. 112r. No dates are given for the other lectures.

[112] See Appendix A, no. 84.

it is possible that Betti taught the *De anima* privately in 1569–1570 and decided to teach the *Ethics* immediately afterward.

A problem of a different kind is represented by the difference in the number of lectures between the first and second sets of notes: in 1579, Betti gave only forty-nine lectures on Books I and II; in 1570, the same material had been covered in eighty lectures. It is not clear whether Betti was simply more pressed for time during the second set of lectures, but what is striking is that Betti appears to have considerably reworked his material in 1579: it was not simply a matter of presenting it in larger chunks. There is, for example, an interesting discussion of method in the second set of lectures that is not to be found in the earlier notes. Thus, it seems that Betti was not one of those who offered the same stale teaching time and again.

The student notebooks offer several clues concerning Betti's method of exposition. Although Betti's lectures are based on a Latin translation (yet to be identified and possibly by Betti himself),[113] Betti is familiar with Greek and uses his expertise to critique translations of the *Ethics* at points where Aristotle's meaning seems to have been missed. This becomes a special feature on issues such as the *τἀγαθόν* passage at the beginning of the *Ethics*, and Betti's students dutifully transcribe Greek terms into their notebook. Greek is not often used, however, for philological purposes; it is rather used as a shorthand for concepts more synthetically expressed by the Greek than the Latin. And it is the concepts (or, more precisely, the connections between them) that represent Betti's main interest. As he goes through the *Ethics* chapter by chapter, Betti is especially concerned to explain the sequence of Aristotle's arguments and the reasons for his conclusions.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Betti's approach to Aristotle's text is, indeed, his overwhelming use of syllogisms. The *divisio textus* is unimportant by comparison: Betti spends most of his time showing how Aristotle's conclusions depend on the major premise, and is most careful to show where the minor premise occurs in the text. Sometimes Betti even uses double syllogisms: having demonstrated one conclusion, he immediately uses that as the major premise for another one, so that his commentary could be described as a collection of conclusions with their motivations.

The various manuscripts substantially agree in reflecting this approach. There are, however, differences in arranging the material:

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[113] See Appendix C, no. 88.

in BU 289, X, vol. 1 (a. 1579) the syllogisms are given as part of the exposition of the relevant passage; in BU 289, X, vol. 2 (a. 1570) they tend, instead, to be collected at the end of each section. It is unclear whether this placement represents distinct preferences on the part of the students, or a development in Betti's approach to the material. A second difference is that, in the earlier manuscript, many passages are outlined in syllogisms proceeding both by *resolutio* and by *compositio*. This seems to be a strategy for reaching conclusions based on either syllogistic method.[114]

The pervasive presence of these tropological figures gives the impression of a text used to teach logic rather than ethics. Like the commentaries of Giulio Pace (1550–1635) some years later,[115] Betti's work demonstrates a conviction that all arts and sciences use logical precepts; thus, he emphasizes this aspect of Aristotle's *Ethics*. However, he uses none of the philological ingenuity and attention to historical detail that characterize Pace's work,[116] or for that matter Pier Vettori's.[117] Nor does he care to place his interpretation of the *Ethics* within the context of long-standing disagreements on points of detail in the commentary tradition. For example, Betti gives scant attention to how Thomas or Buridan have explained the *Ethics*: his apparent goal is only to show his students how one proposition leads to the other. There is barely any explanation of the classical figures referred to by Aristotle or of the philosophical doctrines and systems with which he takes issue.

Uninspiring as the work may seem from the formal standpoint, it is nonetheless original, at least for Italy. No Italian commentary I have seen proceeds with the logical determination evidenced by Betti's. Niccolò Tignosi's work, examined above (§ 5.2), used syllogisms occasionally, but they were informal ones, and were certainly not used as a replacement for commentary. Even Donato Acciaiuoli's commentary,[118] which follows more frequently Eustratius' example in its use of syllogisms, does not come anywhere close to this extreme. It appears that we have an Italian parallel to the Ramist tables that were to enjoy such a success in northern Europe toward the end of the sixteenth century. Yet, whereas the function of those tables was

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[114] See, for example, Lib. II, f. 213r.
[115] See, for example, Pace 1584.
[116] On Pace, see Schmitt 1983, pp. 43–44 and Lohr, RLAC, pp. 296–97.
[117] On Vettori, see above, § 6.3.
[118] Acciaiuoli 1478; see Appendix C, no. 38.

to grasp the outline of Aristotle's points and more easily remember his conclusions, Betti's practice of dividing Aristotle's text into a series of syllogisms seems aimed at using the text as an example for training in Aristotle's *Organon*; at the same time, Betti seems aware that he is teaching ethics, and not logic.[119]

What has been said so far about Betti's approach should not, however, give the impression that his work is a *disinterested* outlining of Aristotle's text, unconnected with a particular vision of ethics or of how it should be taught. In fact, to ignore Betti's assumptions would be seriously to misrepresent his method and to misperceive his place in the discussions about method that were so important in the sixteenth century. We turn, therefore, to his philosophical views.

8.3.2 *Doctrinal Issues*

Virtue and Moral Philosophy

On the nature of virtue, Betti has nothing really new to say: he describes moral virtues as *habitus operativi* that make one good if connected with good actions, and wicked if connected with evil ones.[120] He agrees with Aristotle that virtue concerns the passions.[121] As to the location of virtue, he remarks that the higher part of the irrational soul and the lower part of the rational soul are the same part (*appetitus*) considered from different points of view;[122] however, he has little more to say. Betti is likewise terse on the acquisition of virtue, saying only that nature has no part in generating moral virtue,[123]

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[119] He comments on Aristotle's purpose (Bologna, BU 289, X.1, f. 3v): ". . . intentio, quae fuit privatae felicitatis tradere cognitionem, ex cuius assecutione possemus esse felices. Causa intentionis fuit necessitas, de qua dixi, et utilitas, de qua dicemus. Utilitas maxima est, nam ex cognitione boni, quae in hoc opere traditur, aditus maximus patet ad privatam felicitatem, et ad summum bonum privatum et ad probitatem."

[120] Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1 (all references, unless otherwise indicated, are to this manuscript, containing the 1579 lectures), Lib. II, lec. II, ff. 120r–v: "Virtutes morales sunt habitus operativi qui ex operationibus bonis fiunt boni et ex malis mali."

[121] Lib. II, lec. V, f. 131r: "Virtus moralis est circa voluptates, et tristitias corporearum voluptatum; temperantia et fortitudo sunt virtutes morales; igitur, temperantia et fortitudo sunt circa voluptates et tristitias corporearum voluptatum."

[122] Lib. I, lec. XXXIII, f. 110r: "Divisit hic Aristoteles animam in potentiam rationalem et in potentiam irrationalem, et irrationalem in vegetativam et appetitivam; nunc vult discendere ad rationalem, et declarat quod appetitivus continetur etiam sub rationale, sed prius monstrat quod appetitivus suadetur aliquanto a rationale . . ."

[123] Lib. II, lec. V, f. 130r: "Primo ostendit quod natura non sit causa efficiens

and attributing all merit to the repetition of actions. Teaching goes unmentioned, except possibly in relation to intellectual virtue.[124] Since we lack a commentary on Books VI and X, we do not know what exactly Betti thought of the relationship of virtue to knowledge or to the training of youth.

Betti has more to say on the aim, subject, and method of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He begins his introduction by referring to two kinds of principles (internal and external) by which the work can be discussed. Showing a marked penchant for discussing Aristotle's work by means of Aristotelian categories, Betti first discusses the external principles—i.e., the efficient and the final causes of the work. Aristotle is the efficient cause; the final cause (what we might call the aim) is double: knowledge of one's own happiness or of what is supremely good for oneself, and the production of that happiness. The first is the proximate end; the latter, the ultimate one.[125] It is hard to say whether there is a loosening here of the concept of ethics as a *scientia practica*. Certainly the ultimate end is something practical, although Betti does not dwell on this aspect. But there is no clarification of how one passes from a stage of cognition of happiness to one of achievement and fruition.

The internal principles are two: matter and form. The *materia* or subject-matter is individual happiness or, if one prefers, man himself inasmuch as he can attain to it. (Happiness itself is divided, unoriginally, into its two aspects of active and contemplative.)[126] The

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virtutis; secundo, operationes et actiones secundum virtutem esse causam efficientem; tertio passiones harum actionum enumeravit, quae quinque fuerunt . . ."

[124] Lib. II, lec. I, ff. 114v–115r; Betti refers to the need for *disciplina*, whose meaning in this context is not clearly related to teaching.

[125] Lib. I, lec. I, f. 1r–v: ". . . igitur exordiens dico quod cum principia sint in duplici discrimine, alia intrinseca alia extrinseca, intrinseca sunt duo, scilicet materia et forma, quae intrinseca dicuntur, quia sunt de essentia ipsius rei et simul cum ipsa re complicata. Externa ite<m> sunt duo, scilicet effectus (?) et finis, quae dicuntur externa quia non sunt de essentia ipsius rei et sunt extra rem ipsam. Efficiens causa est Aristoteles Stagirita, Peripateticorum facile princeps, de cuius vita nunc esset agendum . . . Brevitatis causa tamen illam missam facimus. Causa finalis est primo privatae felicitatis cognitio, seu cognitio summi boni privati, secundo et ultimo effectio ipsius hominis foelicis (nam huius operi duplex est finis, ut omnium, quae post se relinquant opus, scilicet finis proximus et finis remotus)." Cf. Bologna, BArch. B, 3427, f. 2r: "Nam duo sunt fines, unus cognitionis, alter assecutionis. . . . Qui finis est effectio hominis foelicis . . . Finis igitur ultimus scientiae moralis est consecutio summi boni, summum autem boni cognitio finis proximus."

[126] Lib. I, lec. I, ff. 1v–2r: "Materia propria est duplex, alia dicitur materia propria ex qua, alia materia propria circa quam. Materia propria ex qua sunt rationes et communicationes . . . ex quibus praesens opus constituitur. . . . et hoc [*sc.* subiec-

form instead is described according to the order of Aristotle's teaching, and this is where Betti becomes more interesting for our purposes. In fact, Betti reports approvingly Galen's division of the three orders of the sciences (*resolutivus, compositivus, definitivus*) and concludes that in the *Ethics* Aristotle uses the synthetic order (*ordo compositivus*).

After our discussion of the issue of order in Padua,[127] this viewpoint does not seem especially surprising, except for Betti's reluctance to eliminate the *ordo definitivus*, as the Paduans had done. But matters are altogether different when one examines what Betti means by the *ordo compositivus*. Indeed, Betti states that the synthetic order is the one that starts from the principles and proceeds toward the end. He reasons that the principles are the private good, whereas one wishes to arrive ultimately at the public good (via the domestic one). Although unnamed others have described Aristotle's order as being analytic (*resolutivus*), those who take such a view consider the structure of the *Ethics* only, whereas they should consider the whole of Aristotle's active philosophy if they really want to understand his order.[128] Furthermore, in considering whether Aristotle's moral philosophy follows the *ordo doctrinae*, the *ordo methodi* (i.e., the method of inquiry), or the *ordo naturae*, Betti concludes that it follows the natural order, which leads one to take care first of oneself, then of the household, and lastly of the state.[129] Betti thus shows an interest in considering Aristotle's practical philosophy as a whole, and not just

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tum] primo est felicitas ipsa privata, quae duplex est, contemplativa et activa; activam primo contemplatur Aristoteles; secundo autem subiectum formale est ipse homo, quatenus susceptivus est felicitatis privatae, et summi boni privati."

[127] See above, § 7.2.

[128] Lib. I, lec. I, f. 2r–v: "... dicendum cum Galeno medico in exordio Artis medicinalis, quod ordines scientifici sunt tres, scilicet resolutivus, compositivus, et definitivus; ordo resolutivus est cum inquirentes a fine progredimur ad principia, compositivus cum incipientes a principia progredimur ad finem, definitivus cum progredientes per definitionem tradimus doctrinam ut fecit Galenus libro citato. Aristoteles autem nulli libro hoc fecit, neque praeter hoc est alius ordo scientialis quicquid semient quidam de demonstrativo, et de resolutivo (?), quia tales non sunt ordines scientiales. Ordo itaque scientialis huius operis est compositivus, nam si consideremus unum hoc opus philosophiae activae videbimus quod Aristoteles a principiis ad finem tendit; primo enim agit de bono privato quod quisque primo appetit; secundo de bono domestico, quod secundo quaerimus; tertio et ultimo de bono publico, quod ultimo quaerimus. Quidam tamen dixerunt Aristotelem servare ordinem resolutivum, hoc fortasse ducti, quia vident Aristotelem in libris ethicorum primo agere de felicitate, postea de virtute in genere, et ultimo devenire ad virtutes speciales, sed oportet considerare ordinem scientialem totius operis philosophiae activae. Et haec de principiis internis."

[129] Bologna, BArch. B, 3427, f. 2v.

as confined to the *Ethics*. Furthermore, he seems to favor an ethics built on the law of nature.

Betti better clarifies his thoughts on method and its connection with his own approach in his description of Aristotle's *modus doctrinae* as being *dialecticus*. He elaborates on this definition: the Aristotelian method in the *Ethics* is *dialecticus et contingentibus constans ex syllogismis dialecticis*; it is thus opposed to a method that is *necessarius constans ex rationibus necessariis et ex demonstrationibus*.[130] The major premise used by Betti to prove this point is that matters pertaining to the state's good are extremely unstable and subject to error.[131] This appears to be Betti's major justification for making such a recourse to syllogisms in his teaching, although he nowhere makes an apology for the fact. Perhaps Betti thinks that, given the instability of the subject, too many errors would be committed without the help of a science demonstrating which conclusions are valid.

Proper Audience and Teachers

Betti therefore argues that ethics is not an exact science like natural philosophy, but is rather *contingens*. This consideration (not, in itself, new) leads him directly into a discussion of who can teach and learn the subject. In his only explicit statement about teachers, Betti states: "Doctor moralis est ille, qui debet acquiescere rationibus figuratis et contingentibus . . ."[132] Thus, what Aristotle has described as a prerequisite for students of ethics is also applied—rather obviously—to its teachers. Unfortunately, however, Betti does not much elaborate on the ideal characteristics or training of ethics teachers, preferring to concentrate his attention on the proper audience.

Just as teachers must adjust their approach to the subject because of its contingent nature, so also should students;[133] indeed, students must

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[130] Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1, Lib. I, lec. V, f. 13v.

[131] Lib. I, lec. V, f. 14v: ". . . bona et iusta civilia videantur potius lege et institutione quadam esse, quam natura, et talis est ratio: Bona et iusta civilia habent maximam instabilitatem et errorem . . ."

[132] Lib. I, lec. V, f. 15v.

[133] Lib. I, lec. V, f. 15v: "Quoniam modus doctrinae duobus modis consideratum vel respectu docentis, vel respectu addiscentis, postquam qualis debeat esse modus doctrinae civilis respectu docentis docuit Aristoteles et dixit quod debet esse contingens, nunc docet qualis esse debeat respectu adiscentis, et dicit quod pariter debet esse contingens; ponit autem talem conclusionem, quod disciplinatus in moralibus debet recipere modum disciplinae pro subiecta materia, quam conclusionem probat tali ratione . . ."

learn to expect the proper amount of certitude from any given subject. But Betti gives more detail than this, also offering his view of the proper educational ladder and of the place occupied by moral philosophy.

Moral philosophy, Betti thinks, should be the second branch of philosophy taught, and should therefore come immediately after natural philosophy. The reason is that moral philosophy presupposes many of the concepts taught in that other branch of philosophy.[134] This is not just a theoretical position that Betti takes, for we know that he actually did teach the *Ethics* immediately after the *De anima.*[135] It is hard to know whether this view of learning was shared by other teachers of moral philosophy in Bologna or whether Betti derives it uncritically from others, such as Thomas or some of Betti's contemporaries. There is some evidence, however, that both may have been true. Although the institutional context may not comfort the idea that moral philosophy was considered an advanced subject (see Chapter 2), the former Bolognese professor Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, while giving lectures on the *Ethics* in Rome in 1547, had argued that moral philosophy is subject to natural philosophy.[136] Presumably, such a view entailed that the *Ethics* should be taught after natural philosophy. It does not appear, however, that this was a common view among the Italians, except perhaps at the Collegio Romano.[137]

Consistently with his view of the ladder of studies, Betti insists that the audience of moral philosophy should meet the Aristotelian prerequisites of time and experience of life. Thus, Betti argues that the requirement of being *eruditus circa singulum* has reference to experiential knowledge of private actions or of what may be done. Therefore, young people are not appropriate hearers of moral philosophy.[138] Although Betti's argument is not equally convincing to

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[134] Lib. I, lec. II, f. 4r: "Dico itaque quoad ordinem lectionis quod si nos consideremus totam philosophiam moralem simul, quod secundum locum sibi vendicat, nam philosophia moralis legenda est statim post philosophiam naturalem; nam isti libri multa supponunt declarata in libris philosophiae naturalis . . ."

[135] Bologna, BArch. B, 3427, f. 2r: "Cum hactenus de anima, adiuvante Deo, cum Aristotele tractaverimus, non alienum existimavi, si interpretandam artem proponerem quae docet, quo vitia ab animis expellantur, quae pars est activae philosophiae, quae pars moralis dicitur." Whether this sequence was deliberate or accidental, however, remains to be seen.

[136] Vatican, Ottob. lat. 1914, f. 106v: "Itaque, concludo quod ista civilis facultas subiicitur philosophiae naturali, quia docet dirigere affectus animi." On this lecture commentary, see Appendix C, no. 67.

[137] See below, § 9.2.1.

[138] Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1, Lib. I, lec. VI, ff. 16v–17r: "Primo itaque probat

all of his students, Betti argues that whether the hearers are young of age or morally inexperienced makes no difference to the appropriateness of their hearing the subject.[139]

Rather than being immature then (whether in character or age), a student of the *Ethics* must order his desires and actions according to reason.[140] Betti is not explicit about how this should happen. He agrees with Aristotle that the place of honor should go to those who do what is good out of habit; those who do what is good because of the instruction (*praecepta*) they receive can only claim second place.[141] But how one develops the habit itself of doing good is never explained. Thus, in Betti the connection between upbringing and the practice of virtue remains vague. Nor does Betti make clear how to move from the *knowledge* conferred by ethical teaching to the *attainment* of the good. A bit clearer are Betti's views concerning how ethics should be taught.

Method of Teaching

Betti is aware that ethics is both a science and an art in Aristotle's view. In fact, he is able to construct two different syllogisms (using, respectively, the middle terms *Moralis facultas est ars* and *Moralis est scientia*) to prove (1) that moral philosophy, like other arts, has an end, and that (2) there is an end specific to ethics.[142] Betti insists on

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quod iuvenis non est bonus auditor moralium duplici ratione, sed antequam ponat primam rationem probat duas conclusiones, quarum una facit ad propositum, altera vero nequaquam. Prima est quod qui eruditus est circa singulum bene iudicat singulum, secunda est quod qui eruditus est circa omnia, bene de omnibus iudicat. . . . Qui eruditus est circa singulum agibile est is, qui solus bene iudicat, id est intelligit singulum, hoc est privatum agibile, et privatam actionem."

[139] Here the student recording Betti's lectures in BU 289, vol. 1 has an interesting aside, wishing to prove that actually there is some difference between the young in age and the young in morals, ff. 18v–19r: "Qui moribus iuvenes sunt, sunt ii, a quibus nihil differt iuvenes secundum aetatem quoad non esse proprius auditor moralis. Haec est expositio Betti, sed quia haec non maioris ratio, sed eiusdem conclusionis est, ego huius textus aliam expositionem excogitavi, quae est, quod Aristoteles per verba illa 'Non enim a tempore defectio' occurrat tacitae obiectioni, per illa vero, 'Talibus enim inutile' probet illam conclusionem 'Differt autem nihil etc.' Obiectio sit talis: Iuvenis aetate et iuvenis moribus sunt, in quibus accidit defectio, et qui deficiunt supra a vita honorata et a virtutibus propter aetatem et tempus, et quem iuvenis aetate minoris aetatis est, quam iuvenis moribus; at illi, in quibus accidit defectio aliqua propter aetatem et quorum alter est minoris aetatis alio differunt invicem; igitur iuvenis aetate et iuvenis moribus differunt invicem."

[140] Lib. I, lec. VI, f. 20r.

[141] Lib. I, lec. VIII, f. 25v.

[142] Lib. I, lec. III, ff. 5v–7v. An example of these syllogisms is on f. 5v: "Omnes

this hybrid character of moral philosophy in the following lecture, in which he states that one end of the arts is the good itself—in fact, the supreme good (*summum bonum*). This good, however, is not proper to all the arts in the same way: it is especially the concern of the most architectonic science, which is actually politics (*civilis facultas*). Therefore, politics is the science described by Aristotle in *EN* I.2 as subordinating to itself the other arts and sciences, specifying which ones should be present in the city and what each citizen should learn.[143] It is not clear, however, whether Betti takes the *civilis* to refer to the whole of moral philosophy (as Piccolomini would do) or only to the specific branch of politics.

Betti's comments raise the question of the relationship of the *Ethics* to the *Politics*: which of the two is superior, and in what order should they be studied? Betti thinks that the *Ethics* and the *Economics* should be read before the *Politics*, for he cannot see how anyone can attain to political happiness without having experienced happiness first in the private and domestic spheres.[144] Thus, Betti sees Aristotle's works of moral philosophy as concerning progressively broader spheres, as in a series of concentric circles. Like Thomas, Betti seems especially concerned with the importance of getting to the *Politics*; in fact, he considers the *Politics* as the real end toward which Aristotle's moral philosophy tends.[145] The last branch of moral philosophy therefore seems to be also the most important for Betti, although we do not know that he ever taught the *Politics*.

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scientiae habent proprium finem; Moralis est scientia; igitur Moralis habet proprium finem . . ."

[143] Lib I, lec. IV, ff. 10v–11r: "Cum Aristoteles dixit perquirendum esse cuius disciplinae sit ille finis, nunc dicit cuius sit et dicit quod est scientiae maxime architectonicae, quae est ipsa civilis, id est politica; quod autem finis artium qui est bonum et optimum et summum bonum sit politicae Aristoteles probat tali ratione: Finis artium qui est bonum et optimum, et summum bonum est finis scientiae maxime architectonicae; finis qui est scientiae maxime architectonicae est finis politicae; igitur, finis artium, qui est bonum et optimum, et summum bonum, est finis politicae. . . . Civilis est ars quae ordinat et disponit quae artes et scientiae debeant esse in civitate et quas artes debeat unusquisque addiscere; talis facultas est maxime architectonica; igitur, civilis facultas est maxime architectonica."

[144] Lib. I, lec. II, f. 4r: ". . . si vero hos decem libros respectu alienis philosophiae moralis operum consideremus, primo loco legendi sunt, nam sine felicitate propria nullus neque domesticam, neque civilem assequi potest."

[145] Lib. I, lec. I, f. 2v: ". . . si consideremus universum hoc opus philosophiae activae, videbimus quod Aristoteles a principiis ad finem tendit; primo enim agit de bono privato quod quisque primo appetit; secundo de bono domestico, quod secundo quaerimus; tertio et ultimo de bono publico, quod ultimo quaerimus."

Notabilia

Like other commentators of his time, Betti also feels obliged to make some references to Plato throughout his work. Significantly, however, Betti makes no mention of Plato except for places in which Aristotle himself does. He does not, apparently, feel compelled to take sides in the raging disputes of his time over the superiority of the one or the other philosopher. This would seem to explain the fact that he neither defends nor attacks Plato. When Aristotle, for example, criticizes Plato's Ideas (*EN* I.6), Betti gives only a very brief summary of Plato's position, just long enough to give the reader an impression of what Aristotle must have found objectionable.[146] Furthermore, Betti does not attempt to reconcile Aristotle's teachings with those of Plato; throughout the work, Plato remains very much in the background. This is undoubtedly why Francesco Piccolomini fails to mention Betti in his catalogue of contemporary philosophers who (correctly, in his view) took account of both Aristotle and Plato.[147]

Betti is likewise silent on the question of the relationship of moral philosophy with theology, or even with moral and spiritual betterment. Whether on the subject of the *summum bonum* or on other issues bordering on theology, Betti remains focused on his intent to illustrate how Aristotle builds his arguments, and how the one follows upon the other.

Both in his approach to the *Ethics* and on key interpretative points, Betti seems, in many ways, to stand outside of the sixteenth-century Italian tradition. As has been observed, Betti's definitions of the analytic and synthetic orders would not have been recognized in Padua, his ideas about the place of ethics in the curriculum were shared by few others, and his approach to Aristotle's text was neither the philological one favored in Florence nor the problematized one characteristic of Francesco Piccolomini's *Universa philosophia.* Although Betti may in a sense come close to the early practice, in the Collegio Romano, of associating ethics and logic,[148] his aims seem to be secular and far removed from those of the Jesuits.

There are, however, good reasons for the surprises sprung by Betti's commentary, and I believe these have much to do with French

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[146] See Lib. I, lec. VII, ff. 22v–23r and lecs. X–XI.
[147] F. Piccolomini 1583, p. 273.
[148] See below, pp. 350–52.

(or French-influenced) models available to Betti. The more one studies the interpretation of the *Ethics* in France during the sixteenth century, the more one suspects that Betti had those examples in mind when giving his lectures. Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples may have been one of the authors read by Betti and appreciated by him for outlining Aristotle's arguments (something that Eustratius too had done).[149] However, in both Lefèvre and Eustratius, Betti would have found Aristotle's moral philosophy too much subordinated to (or at least strongly colored by) religious considerations. It is more likely that Betti read and approved two other works: the *Ethics* commentary by the Frenchman Omer Talon (1520?–1562), which was first published in 1550 and reflects the strong influence of Peter Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée, 1515–1572),[150] and particularly the preface to and tables on the *Ethics* by Theodor Zwinger (1553–1588), a Protestant who taught moral philosophy in Strasbourg and Basel, and whose work was first published around 1566.[151] Zwinger had studied in Paris and was a friend of Ramus, so it is not surprising that he too, like Talon, heavily emphasized the need to clarify the logical structure of Aristotle's arguments. But this is not Betti's only borrowing from Zwinger. There are also numerous parallels between the comments on method and order in Zwinger and in Betti; these suggest an influence of the former on the latter, something that will have to be the object of a separate study. What is clear is that Zwinger, despite his Protestant allegiances, was known in Italy;[152] a connection between the two writers should therefore not be excluded.

Perhaps it was this "foreign" influence, plus the fact that Betti's lectures were never given to the press, that contributed to the work's being ignored or forgotten. Although there are ideas in Francesco Piccolomini's commentary, for example, that recall some of those advanced by Betti, Piccolomini never mentions Betti by name (not that he names his sources anyway), and it is also possible that Piccolomini's ideas come from a common source (or via former students of Betti) rather than from Betti directly. In fact, it is remarkable that Betti's lectures seem generally unknown in sixteenth-century

[149] See D'Étaples 1535.

[150] Talon 1575. On Ramus, see especially Lohr, RLAC, pp. 374–76 and two recent works: Oldrini 1997 and *The Influence of Peter Ramus*.

[151] Zwinger 1566.

[152] See, for example, the comments of Antonio Possevino in the document edited in Appendix E, below.

Italy: I have found no references to him in any of the Latin commentaries examined so far. This suggests that Betti was better known as a logician than as a moral philosopher, and rightly so. As his methodology shows, Betti was more concerned with the application of logic to ethics than in the contents of ethics itself. As it turned out, this approach was to find widespread acceptance throughout Europe, as scholars rode the wave of Ramus. In Italy it found for the *Ethics* only a lonely representative, whose work was soon forgotten in the wake of greater men. But that one work testifies—like the works of Agostino Galesio—to the flexibility that was possible in approaching Aristotelian works, even on the part of professors at Italy's oldest university. The works by Betti, Galesio, and Baldi also point to the difficulty of identifying a local school of moral thought or even a common approach to Aristotle's *Ethics* in Bologna. Many varieties of Aristotelianism may thus be observed within the same institutional context, which did not necessarily impose on teachers a specific (or even necessarily a conservative) pedagogical method. It might be objected, of course, that at least the commentaries by Betti and Galesio arise more likely out of private contexts than out of university teaching. While this is true, it in no way lessens the freedom and creativity that these university professors exercised with respect to Aristotle's work.