

CHAPTER FIVE

COMPENSATION OF PAIN

We have seen¹ that ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that pain that is not produced by humans or other living beings must be brought into existence by God. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theology all acts of God are good. This implies that also those acts of God that entail suffering for living beings must be good. A key question to be answered is the purpose for which God inflicts pain on humans and animals in this world. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine says that God’s infliction of pain must have a purpose, otherwise it would be a useless act (*‘abath*), which implies that it is bad. To answer the question of purpose, ‘Abd al-Jabbār relates God’s infliction of pain to the theory that God imposes obligations on those living beings that can be made responsible for their actions: adults of sound mind.

1. *Taklīf and Luṭf*

The theory that God imposes obligations on all adults of sound mind (*‘uqalā*) is an important issue in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine. The Arabic term for God’s imposing of obligations is *taklīf* (charging). *Taklīf* is the verbal noun of the verb *kallafa* which is used in the Qur’ān, in the statement that God does not impose the impossible on man². According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine, several of God’s actions towards humans have a relation to God’s *taklīf*: they are done with the purpose of informing people about which obligations are imposed on them or to motivate them to fulfil these obligations. ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to these acts of God as *alṭāf* (plural of *luṭf*). According to him, God’s sending of prophets to the people in order to inform them about the obligations imposed on them is a *luṭf*. Equally, he considers God’s infliction of pain a *luṭf*. For a good understanding of how this can be a *luṭf*, I will first discuss ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of *taklīf*.

¹ See above, 106-107.

² See Qur’ān 6: 152, 7: 42, 23: 62, 2: 286, 65: 7 and 2: 233.

1.1. *Definitions of Taklīf*

For a definition of *taklīf*, ‘Abd al-Jabbār³ refers to Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī, who said that *taklīf* means: “willing an act [to be done] that involves discomfort (*kulfa*) and trouble (*mashaqqa*) to the person on whom it is imposed” or “commanding and willing something that involves discomfort for the person who is commanded to do it” (*Mughnī* XI, 293: 5-7). From these definitions it becomes clear that *taklīf* implies that someone (the *mukallif*) wants someone else (the *mukallaf*) to do something and that he tells (or commands) him to do it. An essential element of *taklīf* is that the *mukallif* informs the *mukallaf* about what he wants him to do. Further, what is imposed on the *mukallaf* involves discomfort for him: the act to be done is not easy and agreeable but, rather, difficult and unpleasant. With reference to God’s *taklīf* it means it is His will (*irāda*) that particular troublesome acts are done by humans and, according to Abū Hāshim’s definition, God makes this known to them by commanding them to do these acts.

According to Ibn Mattawayh, ‘Abd al-Jabbār said in *al-Muḥīṭ bi-’l-taklīf* that *taklīf* means “making known (*i’lām*) and willing (*irāda*)”. In this definition the term “commanding” from Abū Hāshim’s definition is replaced by the term “making known”, which is a term that includes more than “commanding”. The explanation for the use of “making known” is that ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that the *mukallaf* can know obligations imposed on him not only from the revelation, in which God’s commands are found, but also by deduction or by the intuitive knowledge which is created in him by God⁴ (*Majmū’* II, 189: 7-10). Examples of rationally known obligations are gratitude for a benefaction (*shukr al-ni‘ma*) (*Mughnī* XIV, 161: 6-7), refraining from injustice and usurpation⁵, returning what is entrusted to one’s custody, and paying debts (*Mughnī* XIII, 423: 8-9).

³ ‘Uthmān (1971, 17-44) gives a detailed description of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine of *taklīf* basing it on the texts of the *Mughnī* and Ibn Mattawayh’s *Majmū’*. See also McDermott (1978, 57-69), Peters (1976, 32-33) and Sander (1994, 66-67).

⁴ See above, 117, note 13.

⁵ In his review of my dissertation in *Bulletin Critique des Annales Islamologiques* 14 (1998, 46) Prof. Daniel Gimaret suggests that in *Mughnī* XIII, 423: 9 “*ghaṣb*” should be read in stead of “*ghaḍab*”.

Ibn Mattawayh thinks that in the definition of *taklīf* the term “making known” is to be preferred to the term “commanding” (*amr*) (*Majmūʿ* II, 191: 4-7). Schwarz⁶ supposes that the reason for Ibn Mattawayh’s objection to the term “commanding” is that it may conflict with the principle that a (divine) command cannot be the reason why acts are good: the use of the term “commanding” with respect to *taklīf* may suggest that those acts that make up part of the *taklīf* are good because of God’s command. However, this does not seem to be the main reason why Ibn Mattawayh objects to the term “commanding”: he points out that “commanding” suggests that the obligations of God’s *taklīf* can only be known from God’s revelation, which would imply that people who are unfamiliar with this cannot know that God imposes obligations on them. The term “making known”, however, includes what is known intuitively by all adults of sound mind, whether or not they believe in God. God’s obligations are also imposed on people who do not believe in Him.

According to the definitions given by Abū Hāshim and ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *taklīf* also means “willing something to be done”. Ibn Mattawayh also objects to the use of the term “willing”, arguing that this only refers to what God wants people to perform and does not take account of what He does not want them to perform; yet, God’s *taklīf* also concerns the prohibition of particular acts, which means that these acts are not willed by God. He further objects to the term “willing” because it does not exclude constraint (*iljāʾ*): it leaves open the possibility that God constrains people to act in accordance with His will (*Majmūʿ* I, 1: 12-13). Ibn Mattawayh points out that the idea of constraint conflicts with the principle of *taklīf*. Imposing obligations presupposes freedom of choice for those on whom the obligations are imposed. Ibn Mattawayh therefore gives the following definition of *taklīf*: “making known (*iʿlām*) to the *mukallaf* that there is profit (*naʿf*) or harm (*ḍarar*) for him in what he, with trouble (*mashaqqā*), performs or does not perform, provided it does not reach the extent of constraint (*iljāʾ*)” (*Majmūʿ* I, 1: 14-15).

Mānkḍīm’s definition of *taklīf* bears a strong resemblance to Ibn Mattawayh’s definition⁷. He defines *taklīf* as: “Making known (*iʿlām*)

⁶ Schwarz (1976, 237).

⁷ When we compare the definitions of Ibn Mattawayh and Mānkḍīm with the definitions of Abū Hāshim and ‘Abd al-Jabbār, we see that Ibn Mattawayh and Mānkḍīm do not use the term “willing”, but they do use the term “making known” (*iʿlām*). On this point it may appear that they agree with ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s

to the other that there is profit (*naḥ*) or averting of harm (*daḥ* *ḍarar*) for him in what he, with trouble, performs or does not perform, to the extent that the situation does not reach the point of constraint (*iljāʿ*)” (*Taʿlīq*, 510: 4-5).

1.2. *The Purpose of God’s Taklīf*

ʿAbd al-Jabbār asserts that God’s purpose in imposing obligations on all adults of sound mind is that He wants to give them the opportunity to earn a reward (*thawāb*)⁸ (*Mughnī* XIII, 420: 8). He argues that God’s purpose cannot be that He wants particular acts to be done or to be refrained from. If this was His purpose, He could achieve it in another way, by forcing humans to act accordingly. Only by constraint would God achieve His purpose with certainty: imposing obligations is not a safe way to achieve this because it is always possible that people will choose not to do that which is imposed on them (*Mughnī* XIII, 420: 16-421: 1). ʿAbd al-Jabbār therefore concludes that by imposing obligations on humans, God’s purpose must be to give them the opportunity to earn a reward.

Taking into consideration that God usually bestows many favours on His creatures without first imposing obligations, one may wonder what the difference is between these favours and the reward that God holds out. ʿAbd al-Jabbār explains that this reward is much greater than God’s usual favours. A divine favour may be small because it is a purely gratuitous act (*taḥaddul*). It is always good to give a gift, however small it may be. This does not apply to a reward because it is not good to reward someone by giving him a trifle: a

definition. However, Mānkḍīm and Ibn Mattawayh apparently do not understand by *ʿilām* “making known which acts are obligatory and which acts are bad”—as ʿAbd al-Jabbār said—but rather “making known that by doing certain acts a reward can be acquired and a punishment can be averted”. Another new element in their definitions is the emphasis on freedom of choice. Although, as we will see, ʿAbd al-Jabbār shares with them the opinion that freedom of choice is a condition for *taklīf*, he does not mention this in his definition of *taklīf*. The fact that Mānkḍīm’s and Ibn Mattawayh’s definitions of *taklīf* closely resemble each other but differ from ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s definition makes one wonder whether they both adopted their definitions from a Muʿtazilite master other than ʿAbd al-Jabbār. As they do not mention the source of their definition, and I did not find any information about this in other works, I am unable to answer this question at the moment.

⁸ See also Sander (1994, 64-66).

reward must be more than a gift (*Mughnī* XIII, 392: 17-393: 4). Another difference that ‘Abd al-Jabbār sees between a gift and a reward is that a reward is given with honour and respect for its receiver, and a gift is not (*Mughnī* XIII, 393: 4-5). The honour and respect are given because something difficult has been done: it is not considered good to reward someone for doing what is easy for him (*Mughnī* XIII, 425: 14-17). This means that if God’s purpose is to give people the opportunity to earn a reward, He must impose on them something difficult. This difficult thing is to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by Him. This is difficult to do, but not so difficult that it is impossible⁹. ‘Abd al-Jabbār refutes the idea that divine obligations cannot be fulfilled, arguing that it is bad to impose an impossible task (*Mughnī* VI/1, 61: 6-9) and God does not perform bad acts.

1.3. *The Mukallaf*

‘Abd al-Jabbār takes it for granted that God does not impose the impossible and he therefore believes that God is obliged to do certain things to enable people to fulfil that which He has imposed on them (*Mughnī* XI, 292: 5-293: 3). He points out that thus, it is obligatory for God to give people able bodies so that they can perform their task (*Mughnī* XI, 292: 7-8). But this alone is not enough: people also need the power to use their bodies. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion God is obliged to give people the power (*qudra*) to act before He imposes the obligations on them (*Mughnī* XI, 367: 18-368: 1). He argues that imposing obligations on someone who is not able to perform them is a bad act.

‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes from this that a person on whom God’s obligations are imposed (*mukallaf*) must have the following qualities: able to act (*qādir*), knowing (*‘ālim*), perceiving (*mudrik*), living (*ḥayy*) and willing (*murīd*) (*Mughnī* XI, 309: 13). The ability to act, the possession of life and perception are closely related to each other. The ability to act is given only to living beings: inanimate beings cannot act. The characteristic of living beings is their ability to perceive. This means that one who is able to act must also be living and perceiving. A *mukallaf* shares these qualities with all living beings, including those who are not *mukallaf*.

⁹ This is what is said in the Qur’ān. For the places where this is said, see above, 142, note 2.

‘Abd al-Jabbār goes on to say that it is necessary for a *mukallaf* to feel desire or aversion for certain things. He explains that this is closely related to the purpose of God’s *taklīf*, which is to hold out a reward for doing something difficult. It is not difficult to do something one has no aversion to or to refrain from something which one feels no desire for: it would not be good to be rewarded for doing such a thing. A *mukallaf* must therefore feel desire or aversion (*Mughnī* XI, 387: 7-12).

A *mukallaf* must also know and have a will¹⁰. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that a *mukallaf* must know which obligations are imposed by God and he must know the particular way in which these acts must be performed. He must have the will to do these acts in the required way. Only someone with a sound mind (*‘āqil*) is able to acquire knowledge about God’s *taklīf* and to distinguish between that which does and that which does not belong to the obligations of the *taklīf* (*Mughnī* XI, 371: 18-20). This means that only those who have a sound mind can be *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XI, 375: 14-15); children (*Mughnī* XIII, 430: 11-12), insane adults (*Mughnī* XIII, 410: 13-14) and animals cannot be a *mukallaf*. God does not impose His obligations on them and this implies that they cannot deserve a reward or a punishment from God.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, God must provide those who are *mukallaf* with the knowledge they need in order to be able to fulfil the obligations. We have seen that some obligations are known by the intuitive knowledge that is created in people by God (*Mughnī* XI, 371: 19-372: 2). Other obligations are known by deduction after reflection on indications (*adilla*, plural of *dalīl*) that God has placed in this world. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore thinks that reflection (*naẓar*) and learning (*ma’rifā*) are the most important obligations imposed on a *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XIII, 422: 13).

There is a clear relation between God’s obligation to make the obligations known and a *mukallaf*’s obligation to reflect and learn: doing so, he acquires the knowledge about all that God has imposed on him. Another way in which God makes His commands and prohibitions known is by sending prophets who bring a message from Him about these things. They inform humans about the

¹⁰ ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that not only humans but also angels have the qualities mentioned by him but, although God has imposed obligations on the angels, too, they are not described as *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XI, 309: 17). The qualification *mukallaf* applies only to a human being.

contents of the obligations and about the reward or punishment that God will give for fulfilling or failing to fulfil them (*Mughnī* XI, 375: 5-13).

1.4. *Lutf*

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, the prophets not only inform people of the obligations imposed by God, but also motivate them to fulfil these obligations. In his opinion, God is obliged to motivate those on whom He has imposed His obligations (*Mughnī* XV, 22: 9-10 and *Mughnī* XI, 292: 16-17). He thinks that adults of sound mind choose to perform a particular act on the basis of motives that exist in their hearts. Such a motive (*dā‘ī*) is not the cause of this act: it urges (*iqtaḍā*) someone to choose to perform the act but does not make performance necessary (*laysa bi-mūjibin li-dhālika*)¹¹ (*Mughnī* VI/1, 188: 18). If the motive were the cause of the act, the act would have to happen as soon as the motive existed and the conditions for performing the act were fulfilled. That the motive is not the cause of the act means that it is possible for the motive to exist in somebody without the act being actually performed.

‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that the knowledge (*‘ilm*), supposition (*ẓann*) or conviction (*i’tiqād*) that a particular act is good is a motive to choose to do this act¹². Similarly, the knowledge that a particular act is bad is a motive to refrain from doing it (*Mughnī* VI/1, 196: 1-5). Why then do people sometimes choose to perform bad acts¹³? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this is because they feel the need (*hāja*) for a particular profit, or the need to avert a particular harm. Need is another motive (*dā‘ī*) to choose to perform an act: it can urge people to choose to perform a particular act even if they know that the act is bad¹⁴ (*Mughnī* VI/1, 187: 17-188: 5). However, this need

¹¹ Hourani (1971, 83) points out that by declaring that the motive does not necessarily cause the performance of an act, ‘Abd al-Jabbār avoids the position that the acts of man are determined by God creating motives in the hearts of people.

¹² See Madelung, 1991b, 246-248.

¹³ On this question and how ‘Abd al-Jabbār answers it, see Hourani (1971, 92-97).

¹⁴ The theory that bad acts are done because of a particular need for something can be used as an argument that God does not perform bad acts. ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that God, unlike human beings, is without need or desire (*Mughnī* IV, 25: 20-21 and 30: 8-9; *Mughnī* V, 247-248). One of the reasons why all God’s acts are good is that He is without needs (*Mughnī* VI/1, 177).

must be real and they must know that there is no other way to obtain the needed thing. ‘Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that had the doer of a bad act not needed to do it, he would have refrained from doing it. Similarly, he would have refrained from doing the bad act if he had known that he could obtain the needed profit in another way (*Mughnī* VI/1, 181: 7-13). According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, the knowledge that there is no real need to perform a bad act prevents someone from choosing to do this act (*Mughnī* VI/1, 188: 2-6).

The motive to choose to perform an obligatory act can be reinforced by the knowledge that a profit can be acquired by doing it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore says that God strengthens the motives of those on whom He has imposed His obligations by holding out a reward and by threatening them with punishment (*Mughnī* VI/1, 187: 3-4). Apart from reward and punishment, there are other ways in which God motivates the *mukallaf*. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, everything that motivates a *mukallaf* to choose to fulfil the obligations of God’s *taḳlīf* is a *lutf*¹⁵.

Taking into account the sense in which *lutf* is used by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, it is difficult to find an adequate translation for this term. I agree with Abrahamov¹⁶ that translating *lutf* as “divine assistance” is preferable to translating it as “grace”, but it can be objected that this translation suggests that *alṭāf* (plural of *lutf*) are only produced by God. However, we will see that a human act, for instance performing the *ṣalāt*, can also be a *lutf* in the sense that it motivates people to fulfil the obligations imposed by God. *Lutf* may therefore be translated as “assistance in fulfilling the obligations of God’s *taḳlīf*”, but this translation is not workable because it is too long. I therefore prefer to use the Arabic term or nevertheless to translate *lutf* as “divine assistance”, taking into consideration that most *alṭāf* come from God.

For his definition of *lutf* ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to the Mu‘tazilite masters (*shuyūkhunā*), who defined *lutf* as “that which motivates [a person] to perform an act of obedience so that at its occurrence

¹⁵ On *lutf*, see also Schwarz (1972, 427), who explains that ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of *lutf* does not conflict with his theory of constraint (*iḥṣā*). *Lutf* induces human beings to do an act, but does not necessarily entail the action. Abrahamov (1993b) gives an annotated translation of the chapter on *lutf* in Mānkḏīm’s *Ta’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* (*Ta’līq*, 518-525).

¹⁶ Abrahamov (1993b, 43, note 16).

this act is chosen or is most likely to be chosen” (*Mughnī* XIII, 9: 3-4). A *lutf* is an act done by God or a human being that motivates someone to perform an act; it is not the motive itself: as we have seen, a motive (*dāʿi*) is knowledge that exists in a person’s heart. Like the motive, the *lutf* does not cause an act, but it urges someone to perform it¹⁷. It is possible that someone knows a *lutf* but does not choose to do that which the *lutf* motivates him to do¹⁸.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s definition of *lutf* does not explicitly relate it to God’s *taklīf*. But although ‘Abd al-Jabbār admits that the term can be used in a general sense, he declares that the Muʿtazilite masters usually applied this term with respect to God’s *taklīf* (*Mughnī* XIII, 9: 10). They used *lutf* in the sense of that which motivates a person on whom God’s obligations are imposed (*mukallaf*) to choose to do an act of obedience to God, although some said that they also used the term *lutf* with respect to immorality (*mafsada*) and referred to immorality as a *lutf fi ʿl-qabīḥ*: that which motivates someone to choose to perform a bad act (*Mughnī* XIII, 9: 13). ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that it is out of the question that a *lutf fi ʿl-qabīḥ* is an act of God: it is bad to motivate someone to choose a bad act and God does not perform bad acts (*Mughnī* XIII, 23: 6-7)¹⁹.

Not only God can do a *lutf*, an act that motivates people to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by Him, but a human act can also function as a *lutf*. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of a prophet. It is a *lutf* from the side of God to send a prophet with a message from Him. When this prophet teaches the religious law and holds himself to its prescriptions, the prophet’s action is a *lutf*, as well: his action motivates others to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by God (*Mughnī* XV, 22: 5-6). This *lutf* is an act done by a human being. This makes it clear that it is not a condition that a *lutf* be done by God.

‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore distinguishes three sorts of *lutf*: firstly, a *lutf* that is done by God, secondly, a *lutf* done by the *mukallaf* for whom it is meant, and thirdly, a *lutf* not done by God nor by the

¹⁷ Subḥī (1983², 64-67) points out this aspect, explaining that the Muʿtazilites were of the opinion that a *lutf* does not force the *mukallaf* to perform an act of obedience to God but only motivates him to perform this act.

¹⁸ Thus, I think that the description that ʿUthmān (1971, 386) gives of *lutf* as “the act of which God knows that man obeys at its occurrence” is not precise, because it rules out the possibility that a *lutf* does not result in an act of obedience.

¹⁹ See also Abrahamov (1993b, 56, note 62).

mukallaf for whom it is meant (*Mughnī* XIII, 27: 4-6). As we have seen, adhering to the prescriptions of religious law, for instance performing the *ṣalāt*, is a *lutf*. This *lutf* is an example of the second sort of *lutf*: it is done by the person for whom the *lutf* is meant. ‘Abd al-Jabbār also gives an example of a *lutf* that is not done by God nor by the person for whom the *lutf* is meant: when a prophet teaches the religious law his teaching is a *lutf* meant for people other than himself. However, ‘Abd al-Jabbār observes that although the *lutf* is not meant for the prophet, the prophet himself also profits from it as he is also motivated by what he teaches (*Mughnī* XIII, 46: 12-15).

2. *Why God Imposes Pain*

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār pain from God is an important *lutf*. In the *Mughnī* the discussion of pain follows immediately on the discussion of *lutf* in general. When ‘Abd al-Jabbār discusses pain inflicted by God, he not only discusses illnesses and other sorts of physical pain imposed by God, but he also includes sorrow caused by acts of God, such as sorrow about the death of a loved one. In his view this sorrow is caused by God because He made the beloved die (*Mughnī* XIII, 106: 10-12). ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not explain how a *mukallaf* (a person on whom God’s obligations are imposed) is motivated by pain or sorrow from God, but as he refers to pain as including a warning, he probably thought that pain and sorrow warn people of a painful punishment in hell if they fail to fulfil the obligations imposed by God.

2.1. *Illnesses*

‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects the idea that illness is a punishment from God, as was believed by several different groups whom ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to as “the adherents of the transmigration of souls” (*aṣḥāb al-tanāsukh*). According to him, they believed that humans suffer because of their bad acts in their previous lifetimes. They maintained that pain that comes from God is good because it is deserved as a punishment²⁰. They believed that pleasure can also

²⁰ On them, see above, 75, note 13. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that these people

be deserved and that both reward and punishment are given in this world. Because of this, they denied that there is a hereafter. In their view, cattle and birds were also living beings on whom God's obligations are imposed, and they said that God has sent a prophet to each sort (*jins*) of them. Consequently, many of them said that reflection and learning do not belong to the obligations imposed by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 379: 14-381: 3). 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions the Khurramiyya as one of the groups who adhered to this doctrine (*Mughnī* XIII, 380: 7). However, mentioning this name does not make clear whom he refers to because Khurramiyya was a name that was used for several extremist Shī'ite religious movements that existed mainly in Iran²¹.

Although Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī did not believe in the transmigration of souls, he did believe that many illnesses are a punishment from God. In his opinion, they can be a divine punishment that God inflicts in this world, like the *ḥadd* punishments. *Ḥadd* punishments are only given to Muslims, and Abū 'Alī thought it possible that illnesses which unbelievers suffer from are a punishment inflicted on them instead of *ḥadd* punishments (*Mughnī*, XIII, 431: 4-15). He made an exception for illnesses suffered by living beings that according to his doctrine cannot have deserved punishment, such as prophets and animals. Prophets cannot have deserved punishment from God because they do not commit grave sins (*kabā'ir*) (*Mughnī* XV, 300-303). Abū 'Alī therefore believed that the prophets' illnesses are a trial imposed on them by God. 'Abd al-Jabbār reports that although Abū 'Alī believed that God compensates for undeserved illnesses, he did not consider them as a *lutf* but rather as a trial (*miḥna*)²² (*Mughnī* XIII, 431: 2-4, 104: 8-9, 105: 5-6). (The difference between *lutf* and trial is that a *lutf* can motivate not only the person who suffers but other persons, as well,

believed in God's imposing of obligations, but they maintained that at first God imposed easy obligations. Then, when the human beings were disobedient to God, He punished them by imposing difficult obligations on them. They said that therefore, nowadays, God's *taklīf* is difficult, as a punishment for humans. They also believed that humans can be without obligations imposed on them by God if they are completely obedient to God. In that case, for them the acts of devotion are permitted but not obligatory. If they perform them, they are an expression of their thanks to God (*Mughnī* XIII, 380: 5-10).

²¹ Madelung (1986).

²² 'Abd al-Jabbār says that it is reported that later Abū 'Alī changed his opinion to that of Abū Hāshim (*Mughnī* XIII, 104: 11).

whereas a trial only concerns the person who suffers.)

Abū 'Alī's son Abū Hāshim rejected his father's opinion that illnesses can be a punishment from God. In his opinion, illnesses cannot be intended as punishment. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār, he argued that it is wrong to punish someone unless he knows what he is being punished for. Someone who is ill does not know whether his illness is a punishment, and even if he did understand that it was a punishment, he would not know which offence he was being punished for. Abū Hāshim concluded from this that each illness is a *lutf* that motivates adults of sound mind to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 431: 16-432: 19, 104: 9-10, 105: 6-17).

'Abd al-Jabbār agrees with Abū Hāshim and defends his opinion that illnesses cannot be intended as punishment. He points out that prophets and pious people suffer from illnesses, although they cannot have deserved punishment from God. This is an indication that illnesses are not a punishment. (*Mughnī* XIII, 407: 7-10). 'Abd al-Jabbār also agrees with Abū Hāshim that someone who is punished must know which offence he is being punished for. He adds that if this person does not know this, he may think that an injustice is being done to him and this may prompt him to do bad acts. This makes it clear that illnesses are not a punishment from God (*Mughnī* XIII, 415: 13-416: 4).

'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that even the illnesses of people who are aware that they have failed to fulfil the obligations of God's *taklīf* and know that they deserve punishment are not a punishment. He points out that inflicting illnesses on them as a punishment conflicts with the theory of God's *taklīf*. According to this theory, God threatens those who fail to fulfil the obligations with a severe punishment²³. This means that their punishment must be more than only suffering illnesses in this world. It implies that they will be punished in the hereafter (*Mughnī* XIII, 417: 9-418: 9).

²³ In the Qur'ān it is said that the punishment in the hereafter will be heavier than the punishment in this world (Qur'ān 39: 26 and 68: 33). For verses of the Qur'ān in which it is made clear that there is a great difference between reward and punishment in the hereafter, see Qur'ān 22: 19-24, 56: 11-56 and 78: 21-36. Apart from this, several descriptions are given of the horrors of the punishment in hell (for instance, Qur'ān 40: 71-76 and 4: 56) and the delights of the reward in paradise (for instance, Qur'ān 36: 55-57, 52: 17-27, 55: 46-78 and 76: 5-22).

2.2. *Ḥadd Punishment*

Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār defends the opinion that illnesses imposed by God are not a punishment, he does not deny that there is pain in this world inflicted by God, or on His command, that is meant to be a deserved punishment. However, in these cases the punished persons know why they are punished²⁴. An example of such a deserved punishment from God is a *ḥadd* punishment: although it is carried out by humans, it is considered to come from God because it is done on His command. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers a *ḥadd* punishment a punishment from God that is given here and not in the hereafter, in hell (*Mughnī* XIII, 417: 16).

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think that a *ḥadd* punishment can be both a punishment and a trial (*miḥna*) for someone in the same way as an illness is an trial. He defends his opinion by pointing out that the law allows a person to escape a *ḥadd* punishment²⁵ and that it is not considered good to expose oneself to a *ḥadd* punishment. This indicates that the *ḥadd* punishment is not a trial because it is considered good to bear a trial (*miḥna*). In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, a *ḥadd* punishment is meant to be a deserved punishment and, therefore, it cannot at the same time be a trial for the punished person (*Mughnī* XIII, 433: 15-18), although, it is a *lutf* for people other than the punished person (*Mughnī* XIII, 459: 1-3).

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, it is different if the person on whom a *ḥadd* punishment is inflicted has genuinely repented of his offence. In that case he no longer deserves to be punished (*Mughnī* XIII, 432: 5). Still, in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, the sentence must be carried out all the same and in that case the *ḥadd* punishment will, indeed, be a trial (*miḥna*) for this person. In that case the *ḥadd* punishment is not only a *lutf* for others but becomes a *lutf* for the “punished” person himself, too (*Mughnī* XIII, 408: 15-16 and 497: 16).

²⁴ An example of punishments given by God in the present world is to be found in the Qur’ān where it is said that the people of Thamūd and Madyan were killed by an earthquake after they had been warned by a prophet (Qur’ān 7: 78 and 7: 91). The Qur’ān says that God only punishes after He has warned by means of a prophet (Qur’ān 17: 15). ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to this verse in order to defend his opinion that children, and even the children of unbelievers, do not deserve punishment from God. See *Mukhtaṣar*, 251 and Heemskerck (1992, 60).

²⁵ On escaping a punishment, see above, 132-133. Evidently, the punishment of someone who escapes the punishment for a *ḥadd*-offence will be given in the hereafter, unless he repents.

2.3. *Children's Illnesses*

From the preceding we may conclude that in 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion an illness or other pain that comes from God is a *lutf*. If a *mukallaf* suffers an illness, it is a *lutf* not only for himself, but also for other people who live near him. 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks it possible that pain inflicted on one *mukallaf* by God can motivate another *mukallaf* to refrain from doing an injustice to this person (*Mughnī* XIII, 370: 14-16). Similarly, pain suffered by a non-*mukallaf* can be a *lutf* for a *mukallaf*. For instance, the illness that a child suffers from is a *lutf* for its parents (*Mughnī* XV, 22: 11-12).

Explaining that the illness of a child is a *lutf* for its parents, 'Abd al-Jabbār gives a solution to the difficult question of why innocent children suffer from illnesses. We have seen that adherents of the transmigration of souls explained these illnesses as a punishment for sins committed in an earlier life. People who do not believe in the transmigration of souls have to find another explanation. Apparently, some people in 'Abd al-Jabbār's time did not know how to explain this and simply ignored the problem. 'Abd al-Jabbār reports that some Muslims declared that children do not feel pain, or that they only feel pain inflicted on them by humans and not pain inflicted by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 382: 9-383: 2). 'Abd al-Jabbār refutes the opinion of these people, pointing out that every adult knows that during his own childhood he suffered pain in the same way as in his adulthood (*Mughnī* XIII, 382: 4-8). Children become ill just as adults do. These illnesses cannot be produced by other living beings. From this 'Abd al-Jabbār concludes that children suffer from illnesses produced by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 385: 15-19).

We have seen that 'Abd al-Jabbār considers each illness a *lutf*. Adults of sound mind can profit from the motivation contained in illnesses and deserve a reward by fulfilling the obligations of God's *taklīf*. After having reached maturity children become *mukallaf* so that they can also profit from the *lutf* contained in their illnesses. However, children who die before reaching maturity cannot do this: they cannot deserve a reward, as they never become *mukallaf*. We have seen that according to 'Abd al-Jabbār their suffering is not useless: adults living near to them can profit from the *lutf* contained in their illnesses. Yet, there must be a profit for the children as well. It would be bad if God inflicted illnesses on them from which only other people can profit and not they themselves. The question is what kind of profit children can get from their illnesses. 'Abd

al-Jabbār's solution to this problem is found in a compensation (*'iwad*) that is given by God.

'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God's infliction of pain is good because it involves a profit. However, we have seen that there are two other grounds on which the human infliction of pain can be good: these are the averting of a greater harm and the supposition that the pain involves a profit or averts a harm. This leads to the question of whether pain inflicted by God can be good because it averts a greater harm, or because it is done on the supposition that it involves a profit or averts a harm. 'Abd al-Jabbār rejects this. He points out that God's omniscience implies that supposition (*ẓann*) is impossible for Him. It is therefore not possible that God's infliction of pain is good because of a supposition made by Him (*Mughnī* XIII, 356: 10-11 and 369: 1-6).

'Abd al-Jabbār also does not consider it possible that God's infliction of pain is good because a harm is averted by it. He points out that this would be in conflict with God's omnipotence. Suppose that the harm to be averted by God's infliction of pain comes from God: it would be bad if God averted this harm by a second harm because in that case both harms are done by the same person. In our world it is not considered good if a person inflicts a harm in order to avert a harm to be inflicted by himself. This also applies to God (*Mughnī* XIII, 369: 11-15).

If the harm to be averted comes from someone other than God, 'Abd al-Jabbār explains that there are two possibilities: the harm to be averted is either good or bad. If the harm is good, it need not be averted. If the harm is bad, there are again two possibilities: the harm is done by a *mukallaf* or it is done by a non-*mukallaf*. If the harm is done by a *mukallaf*, 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks that God should not intervene and prevent this *mukallaf* from inflicting the harm because, as a *mukallaf*, he has freedom of choice (*Mughnī* XIII, 370: 6-8). He must be given the choice between doing an act and not doing it, even if his choice implies that he will be punished for it. However, a non-*mukallaf* does not need freedom of choice. God could prevent him from inflicting harm because He has the power to prevent every living being from doing any act: there is no need for God to inflict pain in order to achieve this. 'Abd al-Jabbār concludes from this that God does not inflict pain in order to avert a harm (*Mughnī* XIII, 370: 1-6).

3. *The Compensation of Different Sorts of Pain*

3.1. *Compensation for Pain Imposed by God*

To explain that God compensates for illnesses and pain inflicted by Him, ‘Abd al-Jabbār draws an analogy between the present world and the “absent” (divine) world. He points out that in the present world humans who have damaged the possessions of another human being must compensate him as restitution for the damage. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of someone who spoils someone else’s garment. It is considered obligatory that the spoiler compensate the owner for the harm. This means that the owner has a claim²⁶ on the spoiler for an amount equal to the value of the garment (*Mughnī* XIII, 387: 16-388: 4). It should be noted that ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not take into consideration whether the damage is done deliberately or by accident. It is evident that in both cases restitution should be made to the owner.

As pain is a sort of harm, ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that pain must also be compensated for. He makes an exception for good infliction of pain that meets the conditions that we saw earlier²⁷. Although, in a manner of speaking, spoiling a garment is “made good” by compensating the owner, the act of spoiling does not become a good act even if the compensation is much more than the value of the garment. This is, firstly, because the spoiling is not done with the intention of providing the owner of the garment with a profit. We have seen that harming someone else is only good if it is done for the purpose of obtaining a profit for him (*Mughnī* XIII, 488: 4-6). Secondly, the owner did not give his consent. If harm is done to an adult of sound mind with the intention of providing him with a profit, he must give his consent beforehand. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of an employer who imposes work on an employee for agreed pay—the imposition of fatiguing work on the employee can be equated with doing harm to him and the pay can be equated with compensation given for the harm done to him. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that the act of the employer is good, be-

²⁶ ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the Arabic verb *istahqqa*. He speaks of *istihqāq* ‘*iwad*’ (having a right to be compensated) along with *istihqāq thawāb* (deserving a reward), but points out that deserving compensation is not quite the same as deserving a reward, because in order to get a reward one has to perform difficult acts.

²⁷ See above, 126-137.

cause the employee has previously given his consent to be “harmed” for the agreed “compensation”.

‘Abd al-Jabbār applies this to God’s infliction of pain. It is clear that there is a difference between a human who compensates someone else for a spoilt garment and God who compensates for pain inflicted by Him. Spoiling someone’s garment is a bad act, whereas God’s infliction of pain must be a good act. The two acts of doing harm are therefore not really comparable. What they have in common is that the person to whom the harm is done “deserves” to be compensated. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore compares God’s compensation for illnesses to the “compensation” given to an employee for fatiguing work imposed on him (*Mughnī* XIII, 188: 9-10). Yet, these two acts are not completely comparable. The employee has given his consent to be “harmed”, whereas those who suffer from illnesses have not given their consent to God. When God imposes illnesses on adults of sound mind, He does not ask them whether they agree to bear the pain for the profit that He will give them. Yet, God’s imposition of illnesses must be a good act.

We have seen²⁸ that ‘Abd al-Jabbār allows two exceptions to the rule that the person to be harmed must give his consent beforehand. One exception is pain inflicted on children and other living beings without intellectual faculties by someone whose care they are in. Another exception is harming adults of sound mind for a profit that is so great that every adult of sound mind (*‘āqil*) would choose to bear the harm for it. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, God’s imposition of illnesses is done in accordance with the latter exception. From this he concludes that the compensation that God gives for pain inflicted by him is so great that all people of sound mind (*‘uqalā*), however different their circumstances may be, would choose to bear the pain for it. This implies that God gives a large quantity of compensation for illnesses and other sorts of pain that He imposes on living beings in this world (*Mughnī* XIII, 453: 19-454: 1, 401: 2-5, 402: 1 and 542: 4-11).

With respect to the question of the infliction of pain on adults without their consent, Ibn Mattawayh disagrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār. He believes that those who are *mukallaf* have given God some kind of silent permission to inflict pain on them. His opinion is that if they know God, they also know that God will certainly compen-

²⁸ See above, 128-129.

sate them for the pain He inflicts on them²⁹, and that He will make a compensation so great that each of them would choose to bear the pain for it. In his view this amounts to giving permission to God to inflict pain (*Majmūʿ* III, 69: 11-16).

ʿAbd al-Jabbār reports that Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī believed that God inflicts pain because He wants to provide people with a compensation³⁰ (*Mughnī* XIII, 390: 1-8). However, his son Abū Hāshim disagreed with him and asserted that God's purpose was not only to provide a compensation but also to give a warning (*iʿtibār*) to the *mukallaḥfūn* (plural of *mukallaḥf*). He agreed with his father that God compensates for pain inflicted by Him. God's act would be an injustice (*ẓulm*) if no compensation was given. However, he pointed out that, notwithstanding the compensation, God's infliction of pain would be a useless act (*ʿabath*) if it was not a warning³¹ (*Mughnī* XIII, 390: 9-11). If God's only purpose was to give a compensation, He could give this as a gift, without first inflicting pain. Abū Hāshim concluded from this that God's infliction of pain must be done with a second purpose: to warn those who are *mukallaḥf* that they should fulfil the obligations imposed on them by God. In Abū Hāshim's opinion, God's infliction of pain is good because of the combination of compensation and warning.

ʿAbd al-Jabbār's opinion on this question differs only slightly from Abū Hāshim's. According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, God's purpose is to provide a benefit (*maṣlaḥa*). By "benefit" he does not mean God's

²⁹ It should be noticed that what Ibn Mattawayh says can only apply to someone who believes that God compensates for illnesses. It does not apply to people who think differently.

³⁰ This is confirmed by Ibn Mattawayh, who reports that Abū ʿAlī was of the opinion that God inflicts pain because of the compensation (*Majmūʿ* III, 13: 12-14). However, it should be noticed that Abū ʿAlī had a different notion about God's compensation. As opposed to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, he was of the opinion that compensation will be provided everlastingly (*Mughnī* XIII, 508: 3-4). For this reason, he rejected the suggestion that God may provide the compensation as a gift, without first inflicting pain. In his opinion, the compensation must be deserved by first suffering pain, the way a reward must be earned by doing what is difficult. Probably, the Ikshīdiyya adopted Abū ʿAlī's opinion. Ibn Mattawayh reports that they said that at the moment that God inflicts pain He wants to provide a compensation (*Majmūʿ* III, 83: 19).

³¹ ʿAbd al-Jabbār observes that Abū Hāshim said that Abū ʿAlī shared this opinion, but that he himself could not discover this in Abū ʿAlī's books, although he did find that Abū ʿAlī thought it possible that pain is a benefit (*maṣlaḥa*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 390: 11-13). The way in which ʿAbd al-Jabbār checks the correctness of Abū Hāshim's report on Abū ʿAlī shows his critical use of sources.

compensation for pain but the *lutf* contained in pain inflicted by Him on His creatures. He considers the fact that pain is a *lutf* as the main reason why God's infliction of pain is good and the compensation for the pain as a secondary reason. In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, God is obliged to produce acts that motivate a *mukallaf* to fulfil the obligations of His *taklīf*. If God does so by inflicting pain on this *mukallaf* or on other living beings, He does what is obligatory (*wājib*) for Him and this is the main reason why the infliction of pain is good (*Mughnī* XIII, 390: 14-391: 3).

Inflicting pain without compensating for it is a bad act. 'Abd al-Jabbār is therefore convinced that God compensates for the pain He inflicts. However, he does not consider this to be the purpose for which God inflicts pain. The compensation is only the corollary of God's motivating people by the infliction of pain: God gives the compensation in order to ensure that His infliction of pain is not a bad act. We see that 'Abd al-Jabbār does not disagree with Abū Hāshim that God's infliction of pain is good because of the compensation and the warning, but his emphasis is different.

Ibn Mattawayh agrees with 'Abd al-Jabbār that the first reason why it is good that God inflicts illnesses is that, by giving a warning (*ītibār*), God does what is obligatory (*wājib*) for Him with respect to His imposing of obligations (*taklīf*) and that the second reason is the compensation given for this pain (*Majmū'* III, 42: 5-8).

With respect to those who are *mukallaf*, the question may arise whether it is at all necessary for God to compensate them for pain that He inflicts on them. Is it not sufficient that this pain contains a warning (*ītibār*) for them? If they take the warning to heart and fulfil the obligations of God's *taklīf*, they will be rewarded in the hereafter. This reward can be seen as a profit that outweighs the harm, so that God's infliction of pain is good because of it. 'Abd al-Jabbār rejects this suggestion. He points out that both a *mukallaf* and a non-*mukallaf* can be compensated for harm done to them. He concedes that a *mukallaf* and a non-*mukallaf* differ with respect to the divine reward: a non-*mukallaf* cannot deserve this reward. However, with respect to being entitled to compensation for harm done to them he sees no difference between them. 'Abd al-Jabbār therefore thinks it unlikely that only the non-*mukallaf* would be compensated while the *mukallaf* was not. He believes that both will be compensated for pain inflicted by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 398: 6-9).

3.2. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Humans*

‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that pain inflicted by God is compensated for by Him. But what about pain inflicted by humans or animals? In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion justice must be done to whoever has suffered damage, whether this damage concerns his possessions or his body. He therefore thinks that, except for pain that is deserved and pain that involves a greater profit or averts a greater harm, each pain must be compensated for. The question is, who must make this compensation. The manner of compensation will be discussed later³².

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion living beings are accountable for harm that is done on their initiative, regardless of whether this harm is inflicted intentionally or by accident, or whether it is done by a living being that does not know that doing harm is bad. This means that both *mukallaf* and non-*mukallaf* must compensate for the pain they inflict on another living being, except for pain that is not inflicted on their initiative (*Mughnī* XIII, 483: 3-5). The initiative to inflict pain determines who compensates. This implies that living beings must not only compensate for pain that they themselves inflict on someone else, but also for pain that is inflicted by others on their initiative. If someone forces someone else to inflict pain on a third person, he, and not the person who actually inflicted the pain, must compensate this third person (*Mughnī* XIII, 492: 19-493: 1). This also implies that if a human being inflicts pain with the permission or on the command of God, God is considered to have taken the initiative and God will therefore compensate the suffering person for his pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 493: 1-2). ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s arguments for this opinion will be discussed later³³.

How this is to be applied is explained by ‘Abd al-Jabbār using the example of an imām who wrongly condemns someone to be punished with a *ḥadd* punishment. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion justice must be done to the wrongly condemned person. He must be compensated for his undeserved pain, but by whom? Several persons are involved in a *ḥadd* punishment. ‘Abd al-Jabbār first pays attention to the executioner who carries out the sentence. In his opinion the executioner does not have to compensate for the pain he inflicted on the wrongly condemned person because he acts on

³² See below, 176-190.

³³ See below, 166-169.

the orders of the imām. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that inflicting a *ḥadd* punishment is an act of obedience to God and he therefore thinks that the executioner did not act wrongly in obeying the imām carrying out the sentence. In his opinion, it is the imām who must compensate the wrongly condemned person for his pain, supposing he made the mistake. If the mistake was not made by the imām but by the witnesses, the witnesses must compensate the wrongly condemned person for his pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 493: 6-10).

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, the compensation to be paid by someone who, on his own initiative, inflicts pain on another living being must be equal to the quantity of pain. To defend his opinion, he uses the example of stealing a garment. Someone who has stolen someone else’s garment must return it to him. If this is impossible, he has to give him a compensation that is equal to the value of the garment (*Mughnī* XIII, 484: 8-7). If a human being does an injustice to someone else, inflicting pain on him, his act is comparable to the act of someone who steals a garment. Both acts are bad and involve harm to the person they are done to. ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes from this that compensation for human infliction of pain must be equal to the pain. This implies that this compensation is considerably less than the compensation given by God for illnesses and other pain inflicted by Him (*Mughnī* XIII, 453: 19-454: 4). The reason for this is that the human compensation is given as a restitution for harm whereas God’s compensation is given in order to make His infliction of pain a good act and is so great that each would choose to bear the pain for it.

‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that giving compensation is not a punishment; it is not a fine. Compensation must be given because justice must be done to someone who is harmed. A thief who compensates for that which he has stolen will still be punished for his offence, if not in this world, then in the hereafter. One should not think that this means that he is punished twice: first by the compensation that he must pay to his victim and, secondly, by a punishment in hell. The compensation is not meant to be a punishment. Similarly, the punishment of a criminal does not abolish his obligation to compensate for the pain he has inflicted on his victim, nor is the quantity of the compensation reduced by the punishment. ‘Abd al-Jabbār also rejects the suggestion that punishment by God implies that God will compensate the victim for the pain inflicted on him by the criminal to be punished. He argues that

God does not compensate for bad acts. Yet, the person on whom the pain is inflicted is entitled to be compensated for his pain. This means that the criminal must compensate him (*Mughnī* XIII, 525: 3-5, and 558: 9-11).

Paying blood-money (*diya*) is a way in which murder and bodily injury are compensated for in this world. Can paying blood-money for murder take the place of compensation for the pain suffered by the victim? ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think so. His opinion is that paying blood-money to the family of the victim does not exempt the murderer from his obligation to compensate his dead victim for his pain. As he is dead, the victim cannot profit from money which is paid in this world. Yet, he must be compensated for the harm done to him (*Mughnī* XIII, 497: 10-12 and 497: 17-19). ‘Abd al-Jabbār makes an exception for bodily injuries. He thinks that paying blood-money can compensate for bodily injuries, but only if the required quantity of blood-money is known, for instance, from the divine revelation (*Mughnī* XIII, 498: 1-14). If the quantity of blood-money is not known, the paying of compensation must be done in the manner to be described later.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, pain that is not inflicted intentionally must also be compensated for. In the example of the man who was wrongly condemned to be punished, ‘Abd al-Jabbār speaks of a mistake (*khata*), by the imām or the witnesses. His use of the term “mistake” indicates that the imām did not intentionally pass a wrong sentence, nor did the witnesses intentionally give wrong declarations. ‘Abd al-Jabbār takes into consideration that justice must be done to the person who suffers the pain: he must be compensated for his pain, even if it is inflicted in a state of unawareness, by mistake, or in sleep (*Mughnī* XIII, 494: 19-495: 2).

3.3. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Children, Insane People and Animals*

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that children, insane people and animals must also compensate for the pain they inflict on other living beings. He points out that for the obligation to compensate for pain to exist, it is not necessary that a person must know that pain must be compensated for. This means that those who do not know this must also compensate for the pain they inflict on other living beings. Regardless of who inflicts pain, justice must be done to those who suffer this pain, whether they are human or animal. Every living

being must be compensated for its pain, whether or not it knows that it is entitled to compensation. As for the quantity of compensation that must be given, it also makes no difference whether the pain is inflicted by an adult of sound mind or by a living being that does not possess mental faculties: in both cases the compensation is equal to the quantity of pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 481: 2-7).

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that animals must also compensate for pain they inflict on other living beings raises questions with respect to carnivorous animals. One might object to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion by saying that they cannot help inflicting pain on other living beings because God has given them sharp claws and teeth and thus enabled them to inflict pain: it is therefore God who should compensate for the pain they inflict on other living beings. ‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects this suggestion. He argues that enabling (*tamkīn*) someone to inflict pain does not lead to an obligation to compensate for the pain he inflicts.

To explain this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives an example from human experience: somebody provides someone else with a knife to slaughter sheep but, instead, he uses the knife to kill somebody. This does not imply that the man who provided the knife must compensate for the murder. On the contrary, it is the murderer who has to compensate for it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that the idea that one must compensate for enabling someone else to do a particular act would imply that the ironsmiths and the polishers have to compensate for all the murders and pain inflicted by the knives and swords produced by them. It is clear that this is not right, hence one does not have to compensate for enabling someone to do harm. Further, ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that if this holds for the human world, it must also hold for the divine world, which leads to the conclusion that God does not have to compensate for enabling living beings to inflict pain on other living beings (*Mughnī* XIII, 468: 8-16).

Some people might object that because of His omniscience, God knows that when He enables a living being to harm other living beings, this living being will do that what it has been enabled to do and harm some other living beings. They think, therefore, that if God does not intervene and prevent this living being from doing harm, He must compensate for the harm inflicted by it (*Mughnī* XIII, 468: 4-6). ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not agree with them. He points out that enabling does not mean that God approves of the act of the living being. There is a difference between enabling (*tam-*

kīn) and giving permission (*ibāḥa*)³⁴. Just because a person is enabled to inflict pain does not mean that he is given permission to do so. Permission implies approving of someone being harmed. If God gives permission, He will compensate for the harm He permits. As we will see later, ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that the person who permits (and thus approves of) pain being inflicted is the one who takes the initiative in this infliction of pain, which implies that he must compensate for it.

‘Abd al-Jabbār also explains that enabling is not the same thing as forcing. Forcing someone to do something limits his freedom of action, whereas enabling does not have this effect. Someone who is enabled to inflict pain is free to choose between doing and not doing it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that for the same reason, invoking a desire in someone is not the same as forcing him. Invoking a desire means motivating someone to perform a particular act. Motivating does not limit freedom of action. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore thinks that one who instigates someone else to inflict pain does not have to compensate for this pain, supposing that the instigation does not reach the point of constraint (*Mughnī* XIII, 476: 2-6).

The way in which carnivorous animals are created by God, with claws, sharp teeth, and a desire to eat meat is considered by ‘Abd al-Jabbār as enabling and instigating them to inflict pain, but not as forcing them to do so. He therefore thinks that God does not have to compensate for pain inflicted by these animals (*Mughnī* XIII, 475: 4-476: 2). In his opinion, these animals are free to choose between inflicting pain and not inflicting it. This implies that if an animal, whether it is carnivorous or not, hurts another living being, it must be considered as acting of its own free will (*ikhtiyār*) and not under constraint. This implies that the animal must compensate for the pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 475: 14-17 and 476: 2-20). Perhaps ‘Abd al-Jabbār takes into consideration that predatory animals, although they must eat other living beings, are free to choose how to kill these living beings: in a painless way or with great pains.

Although Ibn Mattawayh agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that God does not compensate for pain inflicted by predatory animals, he gives one exception to this rule. He believes that God compensates for pain inflicted by predatory birds used for hawking, as long as the hawking is done in the way permitted by God. He argues that

³⁴ On giving permission, see below, 166-167.

God has given His permission for this and the pain inflicted by these birds is therefore compensated for by Him. If the hawking is not done in the manner permitted by God, then either the bird or the hawker must compensate for it, depending on the circumstances (*Majmūʿ* III, 104: 3-6).

3.4. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by God's Command or Permission*

According to 'Abd al-Jabbār's theory, God's command or permission (*ibāḥa*) to humans to inflict a particular pain on other living beings implies that inflicting this pain is a good act as God does not give a command or give permission to do something bad. 'Abd al-Jabbār explains that what makes inflicting pain with God's permission a good act is that God will give compensation for the pain. Without divine compensation the act would be bad, in spite of the permission given (*Mughnī* XIII, 456: 10-14)³⁵. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār, the compensation given by God for pain inflicted by humans with His permission or on His command is on a par with the compensation given by Him for pain inflicted by Himself. This means that God compensates generously for this pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 452: 16-17).

God's permission or command is also taken into consideration if the profit fails to eventuate of pain that is inflicted on the supposition that it will yield a profit. In that case, justice requires that the living being on whom this pain was inflicted must still be compensated for his pain. 'Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of a father who disciplines his son on the supposition that it will lead to a profit for the son. If it turns out that the desired profit does not

³⁵ Reading *Mughnī* XIII, 456: 13, *fa-jā'alnāhu* as written in the manuscript, and not *fa-jā'alnāhā* as suggested by the editor. 'Abd al-Jabbār declares that the slaughter of cattle is good because God will compensate the cattle for being slaughtered. He explains that this compensation is the reason why the slaughtering is good: if God did not compensate the cattle, the slaughtering would not be good, even though He had permitted it. Similarly, if we know that God compensates for slaughter of cattle, we know that this act is good, even if we do not know that He permits it. *Hu* in *fa-jā'alnāhu* refers to *al-'iwaḍ*. *La-sabab* does not make sense in this sentence. It should be read as *laysat*, as has been pointed out by Gimaret in his review of my dissertation (*Bulletin Critique des Annales Islamologiques* 14, 1998, 46), so that the sentence is "*fa-jā'alnāhu dalālatan 'alā ḥusnihi li-annahā bi-nafsihā laysat tūgibu ḥusnahū* (So we made it [the divine compensation] an evidence that it [the slaughter] is good because it [the permission] itself does not necessarily cause that it [the slaughtering] is good)" (reading *tūgibu* for *yūgibu*).

happen, who will compensate the son for his pain: God or the father? 'Abd al-Jabbār believes that God will compensate the son, because He has commanded fathers to discipline their sons. However, if the expected profit results, no compensation is needed (*Mughnī* XIII, 403: 16-404: 1 and 462: 1-17).

Another case of inflicting pain by divine permission is the slaughtering of cattle. In Qur'ān 5: 3 it is said that the eating of all cattle (*bahīma*) is permitted, with these exceptions: carrion, swine, animals that have been dedicated to a god other than God, animals that have been strangled, beaten down, fallen to their deaths or been gored, animals that have been eaten by savage animals (except those that were slaughtered by Muslims), animals that have been sacrificed to idols, and animals that have been used for divination. From this it can be concluded that slaughtering cattle is permitted by God. This means that it is a good act: God does not give permission for bad acts (*Mughnī* VI/1, 64: 11-13).

In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, slaughtering cattle is good because of the divine compensation given to the slaughtered animals. He explains that the pain these animals suffer cannot be a deserved punishment: animals cannot deserve punishment as God has not imposed any obligations on them. Nor can the slaughtering be meant to avert a greater harm to the cattle, since what could be a greater harm for them than slaughter? It must be concluded from this that slaughter is good because the cattle are given a divine compensation. 'Abd al-Jabbār explains that with respect to the cattle God's permission to slaughter them can be equated with God's imposition of obligations on humans. The possibility to acquire divine compensation for being slaughtered is comparable with the possibility to deserve a reward (*thawāb*) from God offered to humans by God's imposition of obligations (*Mughnī* XIII, 459: 9-11). 'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God's permission to slaughter cattle is good because it is a *lutf* for the slaughterer himself and for others who are *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XIII, 457: 13-18 and 458: 18-459: 3). The slaughter contains a warning (*ʿtibār*) for them (*Mughnī* XIII, 458: 4-6). He does not explain this any further but probably means that it warns people only to slaughter those cattle which God has given permission to slaughter. It warns them to obey God and to fulfil the obligations imposed on them.

'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God does not compensate for the illegal slaughter of cattle. This implies that God does not compen-

sate for slaughtering stolen cattle. In that case, the slaughterer must compensate the cattle for being slaughtered and, in addition, he must also compensate the owner of the cattle for the loss of his cattle. Nor does God compensate for slaughtering cattle in a way prohibited by Him. A slaughterer who slaughters in a prohibited way performs a bad act and he himself must therefore compensate the cattle for being slaughtered (*Mughnī* XIII, 550: 5-7). Of course, this means that cattle slaughtered in a prohibited way gets less compensation than cattle slaughtered in a permitted way. This seems to be unfair with respect to the cattle: the cattle cannot help being slaughtered in a prohibited way. However, we should realize that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s way of thinking the opportunity for cattle to earn a generous compensation by being slaughtered in a permitted way can be equated with the opportunity to earn a compensation for illnesses. Only those living beings on whom God imposes illnesses can acquire compensation for those illnesses: healthy living beings are not given this opportunity.

In this way ‘Abd al-Jabbār justifies the slaughter of cattle. However, in his time there were people who opposed the slaughter of cattle. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that they said: “If cattle could speak and understand things, they would say: ‘What is the wrong that I have done and what is the crime that I have committed? What enmity is there between you and me? Why do you want me to die, although no harm has been done to you? Why do you satisfy your thirst for revenge (*ghalīl*) on me, although I have not committed a crime against you?’” (*Mughnī* XIII, 460: 3-6). ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to a book on this subject called *al-Nawḥ ‘alā ’l-bahā’im* (The lamentation on the animals)³⁶ (*Mughnī* XIII, 459: 4). He reports that in this book it is said that it cannot have been revealed that God permits to slaughter cattle: the transmitters (*ruwāt*) must have made a mistake, since it is more likely that they made a mistake than that God (*al-Hakīm*) is wrong (*Mughnī* XIII, 460. 12-13). ‘Abd al-Jabbār comments that this is a misconception (*jahl*).

³⁶ Ibn Mattawayh says that its author was Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq (*Majmū’* III, 14: 7-9). Ibn al-Nadīm indeed mentions among the books of Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq a book called *Kitāb al-gharīb al-mashriqī fī ’l-nawḥ ‘alā ’l-ḥayawān* (*Fihrist*, 216). Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq is reported to have belonged to the Mu’tazila first, but later he was accused of being a Manichean. He is said to have died in 247/861 but Madelung (1987b, 375, note 7) points out that this must be wrong, since he wrote his famous *Kitāb al-maḡālāt* after 250/864.

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not explicitly discuss killing animals other than cattle. It is likely that he thinks that killing animals is bad unless it is permitted by God³⁷. He probably knew that in *ḥadīth* literature it is said that in the holy territory of Mecca some sorts of animals, such as mice, scorpions and crows, must be killed. On the other hand, the killing of certain other sorts of animals, such as honeybees, ants, frogs and swallows, is prohibited³⁸. However, opinions differ on this subject.

3.5. *Compensation for Self-Inflicted Pain*

If we ourselves destroy our belongings, we get no compensation for this loss. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that, similarly, we are not compensated for self-inflicted pain that does not involve a greater profit or avert a greater harm. He considers that in that case the self-infliction of pain means doing an injustice (*ẓulm*) to oneself and an injustice is compensated for only if it is done to someone else. To explain this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār compares self-compensation with selfpraise. We do not praise ourselves for acting well towards ourselves and, similarly, we do not compensate ourselves for doing injustice to ourselves (*Mughnī* XIII, 489: 3-15).

It is evident that self-inflicted pain is mostly done for the purpose of obtaining a profit or averting a harm. ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that pain that leads to a greater profit need not be compensated for, whether it is done to oneself or to someone else. The profit that is acquired, or will be acquired, replaces the compensation (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 5-6). ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that exerting oneself in order to fulfil the obligations of God’s *taḳlīf* is a form of self-inflicted pain. This pain need not be compensated for because a reward is given for it (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 3-4).

However, if someone inflicts pain on himself in order to avert a harm, he does not obtain a profit that can take the place of compensation. Will he be compensated for this self-inflicted pain? ‘Abd al-Jabbār answers this question in the affirmative. He thinks that in that case compensation must be given by the person who threatened the other person with harm, since this person forced the other

³⁷ On which animals are allowed to be slaughtered or killed, see Eisenstein (1990, 14-17).

³⁸ Eisenstein (1990, 15).

person to inflict pain on himself. It is not only humans or animals that can threaten other living beings with harm: it is also possible that a threat of harm comes from God. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of someone who is very hungry and exerts himself trying to still his hunger and to avert starvation. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God compensates this person for his exertion, which is a form of self-inflicted pain. He explains that by making him hungry, God forced this person to inflict pain on himself (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 7-9). He adds that the compensation implies that God will not reward this person for his exertion: deserving a reward presupposes freedom of choice, which is impossible if one acts under constraint (*Mughnī* XIII, 558: 5-9).

It is possible that self-inflicted pain is the result of being threatened by a creature, for instance, a lion. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that if someone sees a lion in his way and hurts himself taking flight through a thorny bush, the lion must compensate him for the pain caused by the thorns because the lion forced him to act in this way (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 11-12). ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that this only applies to cases of real constraint. However, if the person in question is able to avert the harm without pain, and yet averts it by inflicting pain on himself, he harms himself unnecessarily. This is seen as pain for which the fleeing person himself took the initiative and he therefore is not compensated for it, either by the lion or by anyone else (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 17-491: 1).

We have seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers it good that a person inflicts pain on himself on the supposition (*ẓann*) that it will yield him a profit in the future. However, the expected profit may not eventuate. ‘Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that even in that case the infliction of pain is good. Even if the expected profit does not eventuate, the pain involves a profit: at the moment that someone chooses to inflict pain on himself in order to obtain a profit he feels gladness about the expected profit; this gladness may be greater than the pain. In that case, the harm need not be compensated for (*Mughnī* XIII, 491: 3-5).

But what if the gladness is less than the harm? ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that in that case God will compensate for the self-inflicted pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 491: 5-8). He argues that God made the person in question believe that it was good to harm himself in order to obtain a future profit. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this self-inflicted pain can be equated with self-inflicted pain for which God has given

permission. In both cases one chooses to inflict the pain because one is convinced that it is good to do so. However, ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that one is not compensated for this pain if the self-infliction was unnecessary and the expected profit could have been obtained in another way (*Mughnī* XIII, 491: 10-11). This is comparable to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that one is not compensated for inflicting pain on oneself to avert a harm which could have been averted in another way³⁹. In both cases the self-infliction is unnecessary and is not compensated for. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that unnecessary self-infliction of pain is not compensated for, implies that an attacker is not compensated for pain inflicted on him by the defender. We have seen⁴⁰ that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that pain inflicted by someone on an attacker to defend himself against the attack should be seen as pain that the attacker inflicts on himself. This means that the attacker is not compensated by the defender, nor by anyone else, for his pain because it is considered to be unnecessary self-infliction of pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 493: 3-6 and 465: 5-10).

3.6. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Exposing Someone Else to Harm*

‘Abd al-Jabbār considers coldness, fire, and other natural phenomena to be acts of God. This means that if somebody exposes a child to the cold and the child dies, in his opinion the death of the child is an act of God. Yet, ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that the person who exposes a child to the cold, and not God, must compensate the child for its pain. He argues that coldness belongs to those acts of God that always happen in the same way. The person who exposes the child to the cold therefore knows that the normal course of events (*‘āda*)⁴¹ is that this child will suffer or even die. Because he knows this, it is as if he himself inflicts the pain and therefore he must compensate the child (*Mughnī* XIII, 450: 4-11). This principle applies to all acts of God that always happen in the same way, according to the normal course of events: someone who exposes someone else to such an act must compensate this person if he is harmed.

This principle is also applied by ‘Abd al-Jabbār with respect to

³⁹ See above, 170.

⁴⁰ See above, 139-140.

⁴¹ For the meaning of *‘āda*, see above, 87, note 48.

the pain that is the result of a scorpion sting. We have seen⁴² that in his view only the prick of the sting is the scorpion's act but the normal course of events is that pain produced by God is added to the pain of the sting. As the additional pain is something that belongs to the acts of God that always happen in the same way, 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks that the scorpion must compensate for the total quantity of pain, included the additional pain from God. He explains that when pricking someone, the scorpion exposes this person to an act of God; therefore it must compensate for the additional pain as well (*Mughnī* XIII, 450: 14-16). 'Abd al-Jabbār comments that in the case that the additional pain from God is more than is normal, God compensates for the extra quantity of additional pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 450: 16-18 and 500: 1-3).

3.7. *Compensation for Sorrow*

We have seen⁴³ that by "harm" 'Abd al-Jabbār understands both pain and sorrow (*ghamm*). In his opinion, a person in sorrow (*mughtamm*) is someone who knows or supposes that harm happens or will happen to him (*Mughnī* IV, 15: 5-6). Sorrow is the knowledge or supposition that harm has happened or will happen. Sorrow being knowledge or supposition implies that, according to 'Abd al-Jabbār, humans can produce sorrow in themselves, for instance, by acquiring knowledge about harm that has happened to them, but sorrow can also be produced in them by God. However, regardless of who produces a particular sorrow, what is taken into consideration is who produces that which gives cause for this sorrow.

If someone's father or son dies, or if someone loses something which he used to take advantage of, he feels sorrow about this loss. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine, such things as the death of living beings or the destruction of one's possessions by a flood, a fire or other natural disasters are acts of God. 'Abd al-Jabbār therefore equates sorrow about such losses with illnesses: in both cases people suffer as a result of God's action. This leads him to conclude that God compensates his creatures for their sorrow about misfortunes that are the result of divine acts, just as He compen-

⁴² See above, 107-108.

⁴³ See above, 114.

sates them for their illnesses (*Mughnī* XIII, 437: 4-8).

To explain this, 'Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of the death of a child. He asserts that both the child and its father are entitled to compensation from God. The child is compensated for the pain it suffers when dying and the father for his sorrow about the loss of his child. 'Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that the sorrow felt by the father is not produced by God, but it is an act of the heart⁴⁴ produced by the father himself: it is the knowledge that his son has died. However, he would not have had this knowledge if God had not made the child die. His sorrow is the result of God's action and can therefore be equated with physical pain inflicted by God. God therefore compensates the father for his sorrow (*Mughnī* XIII, 437: 11-17, 438: 3-4)⁴⁵.

In the above case, the father's sorrow is produced by himself, but sorrow can also be produced in someone by God. 'Abd al-Jabbār believes that if a child's father dies, some of the child's sorrow about this loss is intuitive knowledge (*ilm ḍarūrī*) produced in the child by God. God will compensate the child for this sorrow: if He compensates for sorrow produced humanly, He certainly also compensates for divinely-produced sorrow (*Mughnī* XIII, 438: 6-8).

'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that the quantity of compensation that God gives for sorrow is commensurate with the quantity of sorrow rather than commensurate with the extent of that which gives cause for the sorrow. People differ from each other with respect to the sorrow they feel. Adults may feel more sorrow than children, and one adult may feel more sorrow than another. 'Abd al-Jabbār explains this, using the example of a miser (*bakhīl*). He points out that a miser feels more sorrow about losing one of his possessions than a generous person (*jawād*). As a result, the miser gets more compensation for losing something than a generous person who loses the same thing because the miser feels more sorrow. One may think that compensation should be commensurate with the value of the thing that is lost and think it unfair that the miser gets more compensation. Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Jabbār believes that God compensates the miser for all of his sorrow, however great it may be. He argues that God made the miser the way he is. It is therefore due to

⁴⁴ On acts of the heart (*af'āl al-qulūb*), see above, 89.

⁴⁵ In the text of *Mughnī* XIII, 438: 4, the word *al-imāna* should be corrected to read *al-imāta*.

an act of God that the miser feels more sorrow than the generous person (*Mughnī* XIII, 438: 13-17). Probably, ‘Abd al-Jabbār reasons that the miser has no choice with respect to the sorrow he feels: he cannot choose to feel less sorrow⁴⁶.

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God does not compensate for sorrow that is not the result of a divine act. For instance, if somebody feels sorrow despite the fact that none of his loved ones has died, God will not compensate him for his sorrow. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that if somebody feels sorrow without reason (*min ghayri sababīn*), his sorrow is considered as being produced on his own initiative. ‘Abd al-Jabbār equates this form of sorrow—he may be thinking of depression or melancholy—with unnecessarily self-inflicted pain and asserts that a person is not compensated for it unless it is produced by divine permission (*ibāḥa*)⁴⁷ (*Mughnī* XIII, 438: 19-439: 4). He does not clarify what kind of sorrow he means by “sorrow produced by divine permission”.

‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that if there is a reason for sorrow but people do not feel sorrow, God does not compensate them. We have seen that in his opinion, God does not compensate for the loss of possessions but rather for the sorrow about the loss. This implies that if there is no sorrow, no compensation will be given. For example, if a person’s property is destroyed by fire without his knowing—for instance because he died before someone could tell him about the loss—he is not compensated for this by God, although the fire is an act of God. This is because this person did not feel sorrow. To clarify this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār equates this sorrow with physical pain that is not felt by a person, although something is done to him that should hurt him. This person is not compensated for what has been done to him, because there is no pain. The same applies to sorrow that does not take place (*Mughnī* XIII, 439: 5-16).

But should God not compensate for the loss of the property that is destroyed by fire without his owner knowing it? ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think so. He argues that no harm has been done to this

⁴⁶ We may observe that ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks differently about predatory animals. We have seen (above, 165) that in his opinion, God does not compensate for pain inflicted by them, although He made them as they are, arguing that animals can choose their acts.

⁴⁷ In *Mughnī* XIII, 439: 1-2, *atāḥa* should be corrected to read *abāḥa* and *al-itāḥa*, *al-ibāḥa*.

person: being dead he is no longer able to profit from his property. This raises the question of God's purpose when destroying the property of this person. As the owner is dead, God's purpose cannot have been to provide him with a profit. Then why has God destroyed his property? 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks that God's intention must have been to benefit someone other than the owner (*Mughnī* XIII, 439: 13-17). It is likely that he means that God's act is a *lutf* for a *mukallaf* other than the owner.

Until now, the discussion has been about compensation for sorrow caused by acts of God but what does 'Abd al-Jabbār think about sorrow that is the result of human acts? We have seen that when discussing good and bad infliction of pain, he equates physical pain to sorrow. For instance, he argues that it is good to blame a person although he is grieved by this and concludes from this that the infliction of pain is good if the pain is deserved (*Mughnī* XIII, 344: 9-14). However, discussing compensation of pain, he does not discuss compensation for sorrow caused humanly. It is not clear why he ignores this subject.

'Abd al-Jabbār does discuss another aspect of the loss of possessions by human acts: the loss of profit. For instance, if someone takes something that belongs to someone else, he harms the owner because he prevents him from deriving a profit from this possession. 'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that if a thief steals something he must compensate the owner not only for the stolen thing itself but also for his loss of profit (*Mughnī* XIII, 555: 4-19 and 559: 7-11). In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, this compensation cannot be given in this world because we cannot know how much compensation must be given for a loss of profit. We will see later how this compensation can be given.

In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, loss of profit must be compensated for even if the owner does not know about the loss of his possession. He disagrees with Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī on this question. Abū Hāshim considered that if the owner is not grieved or harmed by the loss, no injustice is done to him and therefore no compensation is required (*Mughnī* XIII, 439: 17-19). 'Abd al-Jabbār refutes this and points out that taking what belongs to someone else harms the owner, regardless of whether he knows this or not. In his opinion, the occurrence of the harm is to be taken into consideration and not whether the harm is known. He asserts that it is an injustice (*zulm*) to take the possessions of a child or a madman or some-

one who is absent, even though they do not know that their possessions are taken. He therefore thinks that these people must be compensated for the harm, notwithstanding the fact that they do not know that they have been harmed. However, he adds that they need not be compensated for sorrow about the loss of their possessions: sorrow is a kind of knowledge and if this knowledge does not exist, it is not compensated for (*Mughnī* XIII, 440: 4-7).

Ibn Mattawayh discusses a particular case of sorrow not discussed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār: sorrow about being slandered. He thinks that somebody who slanders somebody else does not have to compensate the other person if this person does not know he has been slandered. However, as soon as he knows this and feels sorrow about it, the slanderer must apologize to him and compensate him for his sorrow (*Majmū‘* III, 90: 5-8). It is also possible that the slandered person suffers harm as a result of the slander: the ruler, hearing the slander, may confiscate his property. Ibn Mattawayh thinks that in this case the slanderer must only compensate the slandered person for his sorrow about being slandered and not for the harm that is the result of the slander. He argues that the ruler who confiscates the property acts of his own free will and that it is therefore the ruler who must compensate for the confiscation (*Majmū‘* III, 112: 21-113: 4).

4. *The Administration of Compensation*

We have seen⁴⁸ that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, humans and animals must compensate other living beings for the pain that they inflict on them, even if these living beings do not know that they are entitled to compensation. He asserts that having knowledge is not a condition for the obligation to compensate for inflicted pain, nor is it a condition for deserving to be compensated for pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 493: 17-19). However, as he points out, we cannot know how much compensation we must make for pain. This means that we ourselves are not able to fulfil the obligation to compensate for pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 454: 8-9). Yet, as ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts, this does not imply that the obligation is inapplicable to us (*Mughnī* XIII, 494: 2-3). How, then, can humans and animals compen-

⁴⁸ See above, 161-166.

sate each other for pain? ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God will mediate in the making of compensation. God is omniscient and therefore knows exactly how much compensation must be given for each pain. God will take the required quantity of compensation from the person who inflicted the pain and transfer this to the person who suffered the pain. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this mediation is obligatory for God. He explains that after having enabled a wrongdoer (*ẓālim*) to wrong someone else and not having prevented him from doing so, God is obliged to pass a verdict on this wrongdoer and to administer justice (*intaṣāfa*) to him and the person wronged (*mazlūm*) by him (*Mughnī* XIII, 472: 2-3).

This is in accordance with ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that God is the manager (*mudabbir*) of the affairs of his worshippers. He argues that God has an insight into their interests that is better than their own insight. God’s transferring quantities of compensation from one person to another without their knowing this can be compared to a trustee (*wālī* or *qayyim*) who takes care of the financial interests of a minor⁴⁹ and administers justice between two or more of them until their insight has grown and they are able to take care of their affairs themselves (*Mughnī* XIII, 472: 5-7 and 526: 4-8). The trustee is entitled to be a creditor in the name of his clients and to collect for them the money that others owe them. He is also entitled to pay on their behalf the money that they owe to others. This collecting and paying of money is what ‘Abd al-Jabbār has in mind when he speaks of God’s administration of justice (*Mughnī* XIII, 526: 8-9).

⁴⁹ The idea that God can be compared to a trustee who takes care of the interests of minors was used by some Mu’tazilite masters, who are not mentioned by name, to defend their opinion that God can inflict illnesses on his creatures without their consent. They pointed out that God has created humans and animals. He gives them life, food and all kinds of benefits. Therefore, the relation between God and His creatures can be compared with that between a guardian and an orphan. The guardian knows better than the orphan himself how to take care of the orphan’s interests. This holds even when the orphan is an adolescent (*murāhiq*). Notwithstanding the fact that the orphan is no longer a child, his guardian knows better than he himself which things will profit and which will harm him. Reasoning in this way, and comparing God with the guardian of an orphan, these Mu’tazilite masters declared that it is good that God inflicts pain on His creatures without asking their consent because, as their guardian, He knows best what is good for them. Therefore, they did not say that illnesses are good because they are a *lutf*. Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār differs with them about this last point, he agrees with them that God can be seen as the guardian of His creatures (*Mughnī* XIII, 454: 17-455: 9).

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory, living beings can be considered to own the compensation that they are entitled to receive from God for illnesses, sorrow and pain that He made them suffer (*Mughnī* XIII, 485: 14-486: 2). If one living being inflicts pain on another, he owes this living being a quantity of compensation equal to the quantity of inflicted pain. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God will subtract this quantity from the total quantity of divine compensation that the former is entitled to receive and transfer it to the quantity of divine compensation that the latter is entitled to: it is as if God takes a quantity of compensation that He would have given to the former and gives it to the latter instead (*Mughnī* XIII, 530: 8-16).

From ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory it can be concluded that he believes that God is a sort of bookkeeper, who keeps the accounts of the compensation that each creature is entitled to receive from Him and transfers amounts from one account to the other. Every pain inflicted by one creature on another is compensated for. If an animal hurts a human, this human will be given a part of the compensation that the animal is entitled to receive from God (*Mughnī* XIII, 482: 6-13). The same applies to animals that are hurt by humans in a way that God has not given permission for⁵⁰.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory that God transfers compensation from one creature to another raises the question of what happens if a wrongdoer (*ẓālim*) commits many acts of injustice. Is it possible that a tyrannical ruler who oppresses and terrorizes people does not have enough compensation to be transferred to all those who are wronged by him? Answering this question, some Mu‘tazilite masters started from the principle that people who are wronged must be compensated anyhow. They said that if these people cannot get compensation from the tyrant, God will ensure that they are compensated. He will provide the tyrant with a gift (*tafaḍḍul*) from Him and transfer this as a compensation to the people who are wronged by the tyrant (*Mughnī* XIII, 540: 1-8 and 473: 11-15).

‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects this idea. He reasons that this implies that God would be obliged to make a donation to this tyrant because God would fail to mete out justice if He did not do so. However, being obliged to make a donation is a contradiction in terms. The

⁵⁰ If a human hurts an animal in a way that God has permitted, God will compensate the animal for its pain. See above, 167.

characteristic of a donation is that one is free to make it: one may also not make it (*Mughnī* XIII, 540: 4-541: 5). 'Abd al-Jabbār also argues that it is unthinkable that God would make donations to wrongdoers (*Mughnī* XIII, 543: 17-544: 2).

On his side, 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks that a tyrant definitely has enough divine compensation to compensate for all his acts of injustice. He points out that we cannot know how many sorrows, pains, misfortunes and terrifying events have happened to this wrongdoer. Even if we knew this, we could not know how much compensation he will be given by God for these sufferings (*Mughnī* XIII, 542: 7-543: 4 and 472: 17-473: 107). 'Abd al-Jabbār considers it unthinkable that God would allow a wrongdoer to commit his acts of injustice if He knew that this wrongdoer did not have enough compensation. He thinks that in that case God would somehow prevent him from committing an injustice, for instance, by distracting him with some preoccupation (*ḍarb min al-shawāghil*)⁵¹ (*Mughnī* XIII, 543: 9-17, 472: 12-15 and 494: 14-18).

Ibn Mattawayh agrees with 'Abd al-Jabbār that God only enables a wrongdoer to commit injustice to somebody else if He knows that this wrongdoer has enough compensation to be transferred to the person wronged (*Majmūʿ* III, 116: 8-14). He also gives a solution of his own to the question of the tyrant. He thinks it possible that if a wrongdoer does not have enough compensation to also compensate for crimes that are done on his orders, he must only compensate for crimes he has committed with his own hands. In that case, those who acted on his command must themselves make compensation for these acts, unless they acted under constraint⁵² (*Majmūʿ* III, 103: 11-12).

⁵¹ 'Abd al-Jabbār does not consider the possibility that God stops the wrongdoer by force, probably because this would conflict with the principles of God's *taḳlīf*. Stopping by force would imply that the wrongdoer no longer has freedom of choice. However, if God distracts him by means of some preoccupation, he is still free to choose to commit the injustice, although God stimulates him to do another act in place of the injustice.

⁵² Ibn Mattawayh probably reasons that this wrongdoer's subordinates could have refused to obey him. However, his solution conflicts with the rule that someone who commands someone else to inflict pain on a third person must compensate for this pain himself.

5. *The Provision of the Compensation*

‘Abd al-Jabbār is certain that God does not provide compensation for pain before the pain occurs. He points out that in this world it is not good to give compensation before the harm is done unless some agreement is made about the amount of compensation, for instance, when an employee is paid a wage agreed on beforehand for work to be done by him. From the fact that no such agreement is made with respect to pain inflicted by God, ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that God gives the compensation after the harm is done and not beforehand (*Mughnī* XIII, 520: 8-521: 3). This does not preclude the fact that God may already compensate living beings during their lifetimes for illnesses and sorrow that He has made them suffer.

However, there are some particular cases of pain for which compensation cannot be given in this world. Living beings who suffer pain while dying can be compensated for this pain only after their deaths. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God therefore has to revive at least those living beings that died in pain since it is only then that He can compensate them for this pain. This means that not only the *mukallaḥūn* are revived to be rewarded or punished by God but also animals, children and other non-*mukallaḥūn* that cannot have deserved reward or punishment (*Mughnī* XIII, 520: 9-10). God must also revive those living beings who in long-lasting illnesses suffered so much pain that their compensation is too great to be received in its entirety during their lifetimes (*Mughnī* XIII, 520: 14-521: 3).

Apart from these special cases, ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it rationally possible that God already compensates His creatures during their lifetimes for sorrows, illnesses and other pain inflicted on them by Him (*Mughnī* XIII, 520: 8-10), although he deems it also possible that the compensation is provided in the hereafter because it is permissible to postpone the provision of compensation. Drawing an analogy between the existent world and the divine world, ‘Abd al-Jabbār argues that the entire compensation for a spoilt garment can be made immediately, but can also be paid later (*Mughnī* XIII, 494: 3-5). From this, he concludes that God’s provision of compensation can be postponed until the hereafter. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God determines whether a person will be compensated in this world or in the hereafter. As God is omniscient, He knows what is best for each creature. He will compen-

sate each creature at the best moment for him. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that if it is better for a living being to be compensated in this world, God will provide the compensation in this world, during this living being’s lifetime. If it is better for this living being to be compensated later, in the hereafter, He will provide it in the hereafter, after having revived this living being (*Mughnī* XIII, 526: 2-527: 3).

Mānkḏīm agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that God provides the compensation either in this world or in the hereafter. He adds that if God provides His compensation in this world, it may all be given at one time, or spread over several periods (*Ta’līq*, 498: 8-13). He even thinks it possible that God provides compensation in this world without the receiver feeling or knowing that what is given to him is compensation for pain (*Ta’līq*, 497: 9-13).

In this world one may require compensation for a delay in the payment of a debt because of the impossibility of profiting from the money during the delay. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion this does not apply to God’s delaying the provision of compensation because God does what is best for the receiver, which means that he is not harmed by the delay (*Mughnī* XIII, 496: 17-497: 3).

If we are entitled to compensation for a spoilt garment, we may remit this compensation and tell the person who destroyed the garment that he need not compensate us. Is this also possible with respect to the compensation that God will provide us with? ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think so. He points out that the possibility of remitting compensation is related to the possibility of claiming it. Compensation provided in this world, such as for a spoilt garment, can be claimed and can therefore also be remitted. Compensation that is to be given or transferred by God in the hereafter cannot be claimed in this world. From this ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that this compensation cannot be remitted. This means that, with respect to the compensation that will be transferred by God, one who is wronged cannot release the wrongdoer from his obligation to compensate him.

Similarly, the wrongdoer cannot discharge himself beforehand. ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that if a wrongdoer gives the wronged person a sum of money with the intention of already compensating him in this world, this money will be considered to be a donation by him to the wronged person and not the payment of compensation. Despite his payment, God will take from the wrongdoer

the amount of compensation that is due and transfer it to the wronged person.

This seems unfair at first sight, but ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains its justice by the example of an orphan (*yatīm*) whose affairs are managed by a trustee. If the trustee decides that the payment of a debt should be delayed, it is not possible to pay the orphan at once. Similarly, it is not possible for the orphan, even if he is an adolescent (*murāhiq*), to let his debtor off his debt if the trustee has decided differently. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion this also applies to the compensation that is administered by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 532: 3-533: 3).

Ibn Mattawayh agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that compensation that is to be given or transmitted by God cannot be remitted. He is more explicit than ‘Abd al-Jabbār in his explanation, mentioning a blow (*laṭma*), an insult (*shatīma*) or slander (*ghība*) as examples of harm for which compensation cannot be remitted (*Majmū‘* III, 82: 1-4). He says that he disagrees with Abū ‘Abdallāh who reportedly said that compensation for offence that people commit against each other can be remitted if it is known how much compensation must be paid⁵³. As for the compensation for illnesses and other pain inflicted by God, Abū ‘Abdallāh said that we cannot remit God from His obligation to compensate us, even if we knew the quantity of compensation, because the amount of the divine compensation is so great that we are, so to speak, forced not to remit it (*Majmū‘* III, 82: 7-10). However, according to Ibn Mattawayh, most Mu‘tazilite masters believed that compensation for offence such as a blow, an insult or slander may not be remitted because we are considered to be placed under the guardianship of God (*Majmū‘* III, 82: 11-14).

5.1. *The Compensation of People in Paradise*

We have seen that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, the provision of compensation for both divinely and humanly inflicted pain is delayed until the hereafter if God knows that this is the better thing for the recipient. *Mukallafūn* will be rewarded or punished in the

⁵³ Probably, he refers to compensation for bodily injuries. We have seen (above, 163) that ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that paying blood-money can compensate for bodily injuries if the required quantity of blood-money is known, for instance, from the divine revelation.

hereafter, which means that if compensation is delayed until the hereafter, they will receive it together with their reward or punishment.

In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, God's giving of compensation in the hereafter should not lead to a situation where someone who has not fulfilled the obligations of His *taklīf* receives something that amounts to a reward from God. He therefore stresses the difference between compensation and reward. A reward is given with respect and honour for the recipient because it can only be earned by fulfilling a difficult task. Compensation, on the other hand, is given without honour and respect. 'Abd al-Jabbār therefore rejects the idea that in the hereafter God may take a part of a wrongdoer's reward—after having committed acts of injustice he may have deserved a reward—and transfer this to the person wronged by him. 'Abd al-Jabbār argues that the wronged person is not entitled to the honour and respect included in the reward (*Mughnī* XIII, 545: 4-7).

Another difference between compensation and reward is found in their duration. 'Abd al-Jabbār believes that the people of Paradise will be given their reward everlastingly, whereas the giving of compensation will end at the moment that the amount that is due has been given (*Mughnī* XIII, 508: 5-17 and 515: 19-516: 3). In his opinion, the giving of compensation is limited (*munqaṭi'*)⁵⁴. However, other Mu'tazilites⁵⁵ believed that compensation was also given everlastingly. They argued that it is impossible that in the hereafter the giving of compensation comes to an end because, as soon as God stops providing a particular compensation, its recipient would be displeased. As this displeasure is the result of an act of God, God would have to compensate the recipient for it. This would lead to a never-ending obligation for God to compensate, because each time compensation was stopped, a new displeasure would result that had to be compensated for.

Adherents to the opinion that compensation is given everlastingly also argued that displeasure about the compensation being ended

⁵⁴ The term *munqaṭi'* is used, for instance, in the title of the chapter of the *Mughnī* that deals with this subject. This title is: *Faṣl fī bayān al-dalāla 'alā anna 'l-'iwaḍ munqaṭi'* (Chapter on the evidence that the compensation is limited) (*Mughnī* XIII, 508: 1-2).

⁵⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbār says that Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī and many other masters believed that the divine compensation is provided everlastingly (see above, 159, note 30). Mānkdīm and Ibn Mattawayh say that Abū 'l-Hudhayl and a group of Mu'tazilites of Baghdād were of this opinion (*Ta'līq*, 494: 15-18 and *Majmū'* III, 70: 2-4).

conflicts with the theory of God's *taklīf*. According to this theory, pain from God—and this displeasure is equated with pain from God—is either a deserved punishment or a warning from God that the obligations imposed by Him must be fulfilled in order to deserve a reward in the hereafter. However, after the Last Day it is no longer possible to deserve a reward from God and therefore there will be no *taklīf* in the hereafter. If there is no *taklīf*, there are also no grounds for God to inflict pain as a *lutf* for the *mukallafūn*. This means that if God causes displeasure by stopping the provision of compensation, this act cannot be a good act, even if He compensated for the displeasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 511: 8-18).

‘Abd al-Jabbār agrees with his opponents that it is impossible that people in Paradise would feel displeasure about something. If he nevertheless sticks to his opinion that compensation ends after the quantity that is due has been given, he must find a solution for the displeasure about the compensation being ended. His solution is that the recipient will not be aware that the provision of compensation has ended and that he will therefore feel no displeasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 511: 20). However, this unawareness is only possible if the recipient is also not aware that he is receiving his compensation. How can this be done? Receiving compensation without being aware of it is certainly possible for those recipients of compensation who do not possess mental faculties (*Mughnī* XIII, 512: 3-9). But what about adults of sound mind in Paradise who, in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, obtain their compensation together with their reward? Can they be unaware of receiving their compensation? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that God may break the compensation up into many parts and give these parts over a long period. If the recipients are given a small part of their compensation added to their reward each time, they do not distinguish this part of compensation from what they receive as reward. In this way, they will not miss the compensation when it is no longer given and so they will not feel displeasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 513: 3-6).

Mānkḏīm pays a great deal of attention to the question of the duration of the giving of compensation. He reports that ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s patron, al-Šāhib al-Kāfī [b. ‘Abbād]⁵⁶, asserted that

⁵⁶ He was the Būyid vizier who appointed ‘Abd al-Jabbār as his chief judge. On al-Šāhib b. ‘Abbād, see above, 42-43.

compensation is given everlastingly. However, Mānkdīm himself agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that the giving of a particular compensation ends as soon as the amount that is due is given (*Ta’līq*, 495: 6-496: 3)⁵⁷. As for how to avoid displeasure about the compensation being ended, Mānkdīm also gives a solution that ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not mention. He points out that the people in Paradise know the amount of compensation they are entitled to receive, so when the giving of compensation ends they do not feel displeasure (*Ta’līq*, 496: 9-13). As for Ibn Mattawayh, he, too, adds a solution that is not mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār: after the recipient in Paradise has received all of his compensation, God distracts him, so that he does not notice that the compensation has ended and is not displeased about it (*Majmū‘* III, 75: 21-22).

People who suffer in this world may find little comfort in the thought that they will be compensated in Paradise but without being aware that they are being compensated. Two other of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s solutions may give more comfort. The first is that God may give those who are rewarded in Paradise all of their compensation in one instant before they enter Paradise (*Mughnī* XIII, 513: 10-12). Mānkdīm disagrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār about giving the whole amount of compensation in one instant, arguing that this would imply that someone who has been ill for a year receives the compensation for this illness in one instant, “and it is known that someone of sound mind does not choose an illness of a year to [obtain] profits that reach him in one instant, large as the amount of profit may be” (*Ta’līq*, 499: 4-13).

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s other solution is that after the giving of compensation has ended, God may continue to provide those things which comprised the compensation, but then as a donation (*tafaḍḍul*). In this way, the recipients do not have to miss those things that make part of the compensation and so they will not feel displeasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 513: 13-17).

⁵⁷ In the text of *Ta’līq*, 495: 19, *al-luṣūṣ*, should be corrected to read *al-mu’awwad*. Mānkdīm declares that if divine compensation was given everlastingly, the state of someone who is compensated would sometimes be equal to the state of someone who is rewarded.

5.2. *The Compensation of People in Hell*

‘Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that people in hell will also receive the compensation that they are entitled to. He argues that the fact that these people deserve punishment does not nullify their right to be compensated for pain and illnesses they suffered. As opposed to reward, compensation is not given with honour and ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore sees no reason why it should not be given to them (*Mughnī* XIII, 524: 3-12). He thinks it rationally possible that God, to the extent that He has not given them their compensation during their lifetimes, compensates them in the time after their revival and before they enter hell. However, although this is rationally possible, it would contradict what is revealed about the Day of Resurrection. In the revelation it is said that unbelievers (*kuffār*) will feel sorrow and grief on the Day of Resurrection. If they received their compensation on that day, they would not feel sorrow but happiness about the pleasures and profits that normally comprise compensation. Thus, although providing them with their compensation before they enter hell is rationally possible, ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers this unlikely (*Mughnī* XIII, 522: 16-20).

The consequence is that people in hell who have not been compensated in this world must receive their compensation together with their punishment in hell. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that this is indeed possible, but he thinks that it cannot consist of the same things that are given to people in Paradise. He points out that, rationally, giving pleasure can be equated with taking away pain. He also points out that it is possible that God diminishes (*khaffafa*) the punishment of a malefactor (*fāsiq*) with that amount of reward that he has deserved for being obedient to God. This means that this person receives a lighter punishment than he would have received if he had not been obedient. From this ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that, similarly, someone’s punishment can be diminished in proportion to the compensation he is entitled to receive. In his opinion, this also applies to unbelievers: their compensation for pain will also be in the form of a diminution (*takhfīf*) of their pain in hell (*Mughnī* XIII, 523: 1-6 and 486: 15-16)⁵⁸.

If all the diminution of punishment were given at the same time, the result could be that someone who deserves to be punished is

⁵⁸ In the text of *Mughnī* XIII, 523: 1, *tahqīqan* should be corrected to read *takhfīfan*.

no longer punished during that time. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this is not right and therefore believes that the diminution will be spread over a long period, so that the punished person will not find complete relief from his or her pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 518: 1-6). Like the compensation for people in Paradise, the diminution of punishment will end at a certain moment. After this, the punishment will be as heavy as it was intended to be (*Mughnī* XIII, 524: 15-17).

5.3. *The Compensation of Animals*

Animals and children who die before reaching maturity are not *mukallaḥ*: God has not imposed obligations on them. Therefore they cannot deserve a punishment or a reward from God. As we have seen⁵⁹, ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that if they have not received all their compensation in this world, it is inevitable that God will revive them⁶⁰, together with the *mukallaḥūn*, on the Day of Resurrection so that they can receive their compensation in the hereafter. (*Mughnī* XIII, 486: 6-13). He refers to an account that says that God will revive some cattle as a reward for the people in Paradise so that they can enjoy the beautiful forms of these animals, whereas other animals, such as snakes and scorpions, will be revived as a punishment for the people in hell (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 8-10).

One question is what the animals revived on the Day of Resurrection will be given as compensation. This was a problem for Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī who, as ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports, was of the opinion that compensation consists of the same things as reward: things that people have a desire for⁶¹. This would imply that the revived animals receive a compensation that consists of what humans have a desire for, but what they themselves may not like. Is it permissible that the compensation for the pain that animals have suffered

⁵⁹ See above, 180.

⁶⁰ Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that God will revive the animals, he does not say that they will be judged on the Day of Resurrection. Several Muslim theologians believed this because of Qur’ān 6: 38, where it is said that the animals will be gathered to their Lord (Bousquet, 1958, 39-40). Mānkḍīm asserts that animals are revived on the Day of Resurrection in order to receive their compensation in the hereafter. He quotes a *ḥadīth* in which the Prophet said: “On the Day of Resurrection God does justice (*intaṣafa*) between wrongdoer (*ẓālim*) and wronged (*mazlūm*), and even between the hornless (*jammāʾ*), and the horned (*qamāʾ*)” (*Taʿlīq*, 505: 4-9).

⁶¹ For instance, in Qur’ān 47: 15, it is said that in Paradise there are rivers of water, milk, wine and honey, and all kinds of fruit.

consists of things they have no desire for? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it is permissible because, in his opinion, a compensation need not consist of things that the recipient has a desire for: it is sufficient if the compensation consists of profitable things. However, he also gives another solution: he thinks it possible that God creates in these animals a desire for the food that is given to them in the hereafter so that they eat what people like to eat, although in this world they have a desire for different things (*Mughnī* XIII, 521: 4-18).

Ibn Mattawayh says that there is no reason why water could not be given as compensation to an animal (*Majmūʿ* III, 78: 12). He explains that eating other living beings is out of the question in Paradise because it involves pain, which is impossible in Paradise as there is no *taklīf* anymore. He thinks that the predatory animals in Paradise will therefore not desire to eat other living beings: God will create in them the wish for other profitable things (*Majmūʿ* III, 78: 13-17).

Another question with respect to revived animals is what happens after an animal has received the whole amount of its compensation. Their compensation is not given in combination with a reward. We have seen before⁶² that animals probably do not know that what they are receiving is a compensation, but as they will not receive something else—they are not rewarded—they will certainly notice if the giving stops and feel displeasure about this. We have also seen⁶³ that according to the doctrine of God’s imposing of obligations there will be no pain (or displeasure) in the hereafter, except for pain that is a deserved punishment. Then how can it be avoided that an animal feels displeasure when the giving of its compensation ends?

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s solution to this problem is that God continues to give the animal the same things, but then as a donation⁶⁴ (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 10-14). Another solution he gives is that God ends the life of the animal in a painless way by saying “Be dust”, and then it stops living. ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that in that case God’s act would

⁶² See above, 176.

⁶³ See above, 184.

⁶⁴ Like ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Mānkḏīm thinks it possible that God does not end the lives of animals after they have received all their compensation. He points out that this agrees with the opinion of people who say that after the Day of Resurrection (*al-ḥaṣhr*) there will be no death (*Taʿlīq*, 497: 7-8). Mānkḏīm does not specify who these people are.

not be a useless act (*‘abath*) because the death of the animal can be a cause of joy for someone in Paradise (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 17-515: 3). He does not specify which kind of joy he has in mind. Mānkḏīm explains that people in Paradise may be gladdened by the forms of animals whose lives have ended in this way (*Ta’līq*, 496: 15-17). He thinks that not only the forms of the dead animals may be a joy for people in Paradise but also that they may be gladdened by the realisation that, unlike the compensation of an animal, their reward is given everlastingly. People in hell who see the end of an animal’s life may wish that their lives had ended because they know that their punishment will go on for ever (*Ta’līq*, 496: 18-497: 6). Mānkḏīm refers to a verse from the Qur’ān about the Last Day that says: “and the unbeliever shall say: O would that I were dust” (Qur’ān 78: 40).

5.4. *The Compensation of Children*

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not explicitly discuss how children who have died before reaching maturity receive their compensation from God. From what he says about the compensation of other non-*mukallaḏūn* such as animals, it can be concluded that he believes that, similarly, children who have not received their compensation in this world will be revived on the Day of Resurrection in order to receive their compensation. The question is what happens to these children after they have received the whole amount of their compensation. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it possible that from that moment God will for ever donate to them the things that they received as compensation, so that they will not feel displeasure when the giving of compensation ends (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 3-4).

‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that some people thought differently on this subject and maintained that in the hereafter God will give these children a complete mind so that they will have knowledge of God. It is not clear who these people are. ‘Abd al-Jabbār views them as opponents, but he does not describe their opinions completely and he does not mention their names. It is known that there were Ḥanbalites who believed that children will be questioned in the grave after God has completed their mental faculties⁶⁵. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that, from a logical point of view, the Mu‘tazilites

⁶⁵ Smith (1981, 174).

do not think it necessary for God to complete the mental faculties of children who have not reached maturity and that no indication of this is found in the revelation either, but even if this were necessary, it would not contradict the idea that children receive their compensation in the hereafter (*Mughnī* XIII, 513: 17-514: 33).

‘Abd al-Jabbār agrees with people who think it possible that in the hereafter God makes children like adolescents in this world. He thinks that this is the most likely thing to happen, considering the fact that it is said that the children will be the servants of those in Paradise (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 4-7). ‘Abd al-Jabbār probably refers here to the Qur’ān 52: 24, 56: 17-18 and 76: 19, where it is said that in Paradise young boys move around presenting drinks to the inhabitants⁶⁶. However, whether or not children are given a complete mind, they probably feel displeasure if the giving of their compensation stops after the full amount that is due has been given to them. We have seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it possible that after this moment God will donate everlastingly that which they used to receive as compensation.

6. Conclusion

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine of God’s *taklīf* includes an explanation for the existence of pain and suffering. His doctrine says that God has imposed obligations on humans because He wants to reward them in the hereafter. A reward is earned by carrying out a difficult task of one’s own free will and not under constraint. God has therefore given people freedom of choice so that they can choose between fulfilling the obligations and not fulfilling them. Probably as a corollary of the freedom given to humans, animals are also given freedom of choice, although God has not imposed obligations on them. Freedom of choice implies that God does not intervene if creatures hurt each other. He therefore does not prevent creatures from committing crimes and inflicting pain on each other, giving blows, kicks and stings. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that because God does not intervene, He takes care that all who suffer from in-

⁶⁶ Smith (1981, 178). She also quotes a tradition in which the Prophet said that children will be the servants of the inhabitants of the Garden (Smith, 1981, 175).

justice are compensated for this by those who have wronged them.

Creatures also suffer pain as the result of illnesses and plagues. In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, this pain is brought into existence by God and also has a relation to His *taklīf*. He believes that God motivates people to choose to fulfil the obligations that He has imposed on them. 'Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that illnesses are a warning from God to remind people that they must fulfil the obligations He has imposed on them. In his opinion, God will give a generous compensation to all those creatures that He uses in this way—that is, inflicting pain on them in order to give a warning. This compensation may be given to them in this world or in the hereafter in the form of a temporary provision of things they like or in the form of a temporary mitigation of their punishment. God also uses this compensation in order to mete out justice between wrongdoers and their victims. The compensation of wrongdoers is diminished and the compensation of their victims is increased.

This means that according to 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine all pain in this world is related to God's imposing of obligations (*taklīf*). Pain inflicted by living beings on their initiative is the corollary of the freedom of choice given by God because of this *taklīf* and pain from God is a warning for all adults of sound mind that they must fulfil the obligations imposed by Him. This pain is copiously compensated for. The doctrine of *taklīf* enables 'Abd al-Jabbār to justify why God has created a world in which pain exists.