CHAPTER 4

Moral Education in Central Asia, 19th–21st Centuries: The Foundations for Sufi, Jadīd, Soviet, National, and Islamist Ethics

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The present article attempts to provide a framework for analyzing moral education on the territory of what is today the Republic of Uzbekistan, and what in Tsarist times was the government of Turkestan and the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. It highlights several types of ethics that were taught in Muslim schools and discussed among scholars and educators; these ethics are compared as to their religious and philosophical foundations and motivations.[1] In the course of the last 150 years, the Central Asian region witnessed several important changes, in particular increased Russian influence from the late 1860s, the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The writings I analyze here have much in common with those spread in neighboring areas, and so the patterns discussed in this overview can, to a certain extent, also be taken as indicative of the general development of moral teachings in Central Asia as a whole.

Education, and moral education as one of its important constituents, has hitherto mostly been considered over shorter time-periods, and usually from the perspective of identity building. Recent scholarship has provided insights into learned Muslim identities,[2] such as what it means to be a Muslim

1 For their comments on drafts of this paper I extend my sincere thanks to Michael Kemper, Hisao Komatsu, Frank Peter, and Jindřich Strnad. Many thanks also to Nicole Custer for her critical revision and the adjustment of the bibliographical data. For an annotated bibliography of recent studies on the region, see *Central Eurasian Reader—A Biennal Journal of Selective and Criticial Bibliography*, ed. by Stéphane A. Dudoignon, 2 vols (Berlin/Paris: Klaus Schwarz Verlag/CNRS, 2008–10).

2 Michael Kemper, Raoul Motika, Stefan Reichmuth (eds), *Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States* (London: Routledge 2009); Raoul Motika, Michael Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen (eds), *Repression, Anpassung, Neuorientierung: Studien zum Islam in der Sowjetunion und dem postsowjetischen Raum* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2013).

 | DOI 10.1163/9789004349841_006

Turkestani,[3] a Soviet citizen,[4] or an Uzbek.[5] Such studies have mostly focused on socio-political circumstances. Additionally, in the past two decades several scholars have investigated the formation of "the moral self" in contemporary Central Asia, producing in-depth studies based on field research.[6] These studies have put practices and individual experiences at their center, and highlight the various inner and outer aspects of moral education in or for a given community. Yet to this day there has not been a comparative study of moral teaching in the region, and none that looks at its long-term development.

The proposed comparison started with my observation that, in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, several types of ethical norms and values are propagated at the same time, and are thus in competition. These different ethics are propagated in "moral education" schoolbooks commissioned by the state, in sermons of Islamic "fundamentalist" groups and in texts used in the traditional Muslim schools. I argue that this competition has its roots in the struggles for the correct form of ethics that started with the attempt at a "moral reform" by the Central Asian Muslim educational reformers, the Jadīds, at the turn of the 20th century. In the subsequent Soviet period, the state-promoted ideal of a Soviet citizen ran parallel to what might be called the formation of a Soviet Muslim citizen, with either "traditionalist" or "fundamentalist" underpinnings. I aim at identifying continuities, similarities, and differences between these various kinds of moral education, and I highlight resemblances between schools of thought and ideologies that consider each other as rivals or worse. Some of the

3 Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Djadidisme, mirasisme, islamisme", *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 37.1–2 (1996), 13–40; Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Le réformisme musulman en Asie Centrale, du 'premier renouveau' à la soviétisation 1788–1937", *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 37.1–2 (1996), 133–210; Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1998).

4 William K. Medlin, William M. Cave, Finley Carpenter, *Education and Development in Central Asia: A Case Study on Social Change in Uzbekistan* (Leiden: Brill, 1971).

5 Laura L. Adams, *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2010); Peter Finke, *Variations on Uzbek Identity: Strategic Choices, Cognitive Schemas and Political Constraints in Identification Processes* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2014).

6 Annette Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität und islamische Gesellschaft im Wandel. Studien über Frauenälteste* (*otin und xalfa*) *im unabhängigen Usbekistan* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2002); Manja Stephan, *Das Bedürfnis nach Ausgewogenheit: Moralerziehung, Islam und Muslimsein in Tadschikistan zwischen Säkularisierung und religiöser Rückbesinnung* (Wiesbaden: Ergon, 2010); Johan Rasanayagam, *Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan: The Morality of Experience* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).

texts I selected for this study date back to the 13th century but are still in use, or were re-introduced in the late Soviet era; others are from the 19th century or later, up to today.

The questions I am interested in derive from the discipline of moral philosophy, and therefore I use some of the conceptual tools of normative and meta-ethics. I do so in a rather experimental way, since there are only a few comparative systematic text-based analyses of coexisting or rivaling ethics from the viewpoint of moral philosophy. The comparisons that are done in descriptive ethics are usually based on empirical research of attitudes or practices of people.

The sources that I introduce below are not theoretical texts, and usually do not reflect on their own moral theoretical premises. Accordingly, they give us only limited insight into the concerns of normative and meta-ethics. Nevertheless, the texts illuminate aspects of the differences as well as the similarities between the various types of moral education.

Four sets of questions determine the structure of this paper. In the first step, I discuss the scope of ethics in public schools and private Islamic instruction in Uzbekistan and its predecessor political entities, and identify eight types of moral teachings. The second set of questions addresses the foundations of the ethical sentences and their concrete justification. Based on these findings, I turn to the motivational aspects of the morality as well as to its forms and methods. The final part of this paper thematizes the range of moral teachings and their universality. It should be noted that my paper is not an in-depth study but an attempt at testing a new approach with just a limited number of cases and examples. In particular, the moral teachings under consideration call for more research on the centers of their respective normativity, whether norms derive from moral duty, the consequences of actions, or the building/edification of a person's character.

Scope and Types of Moral Teachings

The texts under consideration (see the sub-chapters below) are all concerned with how people ought to act, either generally or in specific circumstances. Their style, and how they are used in schools, private lessons, or sermons, allow us the assumption that they serve didactic purposes, and that their goal is that of moral education. To what extent can their content be subsumed under ethics? Undoubtedly, the texts do not develop any moral philosophy in the strict sense of the word. Even if they include quotes from individual Greek, Central Asian, or European philosophers, they contain no references to the moral

systems that these philosophers stood for. What they do is teach norms, rules, and principles for good or correct behavior, and they convey commands, prohibitions, duties, values, and conventions without differentiating between these elements. I claim that they constitute *moral* factors and have a *moral* force, even when the various elements mentioned are not presented as an imperative for humans as such.[7] Whenever they are bound to a specific community or society, or presented in some other way as particular duties assigned to particular roles within them, they generally follow the principle of fair play by which Shelly Kagan aptly explained the moral force of conventional duties.[8] With the Central Asian Muslim reformers (Jadīds) of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, educational texts began being marked with a clear nationalistic tone, and the Jadīds addressed the human as such; the Jadīd teachings are intended to form a good child, mother and father, worker or citizen, on behalf of the respective nation or union. However, in the texts that are mainly or solely religious/Islamic, the duties and acts (including acts of worship) commanded are qualified as "required", "permitted", "good", or "right", and the goal is the purification of the soul. Furthermore, these categories are associated with attributes or consequences that are widely regarded as belonging to the field of ethics.[9]

In what follows, I will discern eight types of moral teachings in view of their intellectual origins, and I will mention the schools or Islamic private instruction institutes in which they were or are in use. The settings selected here are the public school in Soviet and today's Uzbekistan and the primary school for the Jadīds—the "new-method" (*jadīd*) *maktab*[10]—as well as the traditional

7 For an explanation of the major positions in the debate about the scope of ethics, see Dieter Birnbacher, *Analytische Einführung in die Ethik*, 2nd edition (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2007), 1–63.

8 Shelly Kagan, *Normative Ethics* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1998), 140–43.

9 Islam is often—and mistakenly—regarded as a religion where ethics and law are not distinguished. For a discussion of the main arguments, see Florian Zemmin, *Islamische Verantwortungsethik im 17. Jahrhundert—Ein weberianisches Verständnis der Handlungsvorstellungen Kātib Čelebis (1609–1657)* (Berlin: EB-Verlag 2011), 149, 152–56. For humanist thinking in Islamic culture see Stefan Reichmuth, "Humanism and Mysticism—Inspirations from Islam", *Humanism and Muslim Culture—Historical Heritage and Contemporary Challenges*, ed. by Stefan Reichmuth, Jörn Rüsen, Aladdin Sarhan (Goettingen/Taipei: V&R unipress/Naional Taiwan University Press, 2012), 115–26.

10 See Kiriak E. Bendrikov, *Ocherki po istorii narodnogo obrazovaniia v Turkestane* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR, 1960), 247–82; Khalid, *The Politics*, 167–76; Dudoignon, "La question scolaire", especially 165–68.

"old-method" (*qadīm*) *maktab*, the *madrasa* (as the Islamic high school),[11] and the *khānaqāh*, the Sufi convent.[12] I also look at Islamic private instruction in the form of the lessons given by the "traditional" *otin*s or *xalfa*s, that is, female teachers of religious praxis and ethics who are often invited to lead commemorative ceremonies in the communities; equally taken into consideration are the sermons of the so-called Mujaddidiyya, i.e. "the renewers [of Islam]" that started appearing in the late 1970s,[13] and who conducted clandestine teaching in the Soviet era.[14] This Mujaddidiyya should not be confounded with the Sufi Naqshbandī branch that bears the same name. Their texts often serve as teaching materials for the "new" or "young" *otin*s, who often refer to themselves as *da'vatchi*, i.e. missionaries. There is a new, Islamist trend of female teachers for religious practice, but since the late 1990s the state has constrained their missionary teachings.[15]

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11 Guido Hausmann, "Bildung/Alphabetisierung", *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897*, A: *Quellenkritische Dokumentation und Datenhandbuch*, ed. by Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler, Brigitte Roth (Stuttgart: F. Steiner 1991), 324–76, esp. 348–60; Bendrikov, *Ocherki*, 27–60; Medlin et al., *Education and Development*, 26–45. The main sources for the traditional schools remain the descriptions of the *Jadīd*s that are marked by harsh criticism; see Jiří Bečka, "Traditional Schools in the Works of Sadriddin Aynī and Other Writers of Central Asia", *Archiv Orientální* 39 (1971), 284–321, and 40 (1972), 130–63.

12 Anke von Kügelgen, "Die Entfaltung der Naqšbandīya muǧaddidīya im mittleren Transoxanien vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ein Stück Detektivarbeit", *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, Vol. 2: *Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations*, ed. by Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, Allen J. Frank (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1998), 101–51, pp. 142–51.

13 B. Babadjanov and M. Kamilov, "Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892–1989) and the Beginning of the 'Great Schism' among the Muslims of Uzbekistan", trans. from Russian by Stephen Hegarty, *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia* (*Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries*), ed. by Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Hisao Komatsu (London/New York/Bahrain: Kegan Paul, 2001), 195–219; Bakhtiar Babadzhanov, "Islam in Uzbekistan: From the Struggle for 'Religious Purity' to Political Activism", *Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?* ed. by Boris Rumer (New York/London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 299–330. For the Mujaddidiyya's teachings see Allen J. Frank and Jahangir Mamatov, *Uzbek Islamic Debates: Texts, Translations, and Commentary* (Springfield, VA: Dunwoody Press, 2006).

14 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 74–75, 78–80, 89–239; Sigrid Kleinmichel, *Ḫalpa in Choresm* (*Ḫʷārazm*) *und Ātin Āyi im Ferghanatal—Zur Geschichte des Lesens in Usbekistan im 20. Jahrhundert*, 2 vols (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 2000), vol. 1, 12–17.

15 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 241–325.

Sufi-inspired Anthropocentric Moral Teaching

As examples of what may be labeled the Sufi-inspired anthropocentric moral teaching, I selected Saʿdī's (d. 1292) *Gulistān* ("The Rose-Garden"),[16] [Pseudo-] ʿAṭṭār's (d. between 1190 and 1230) *Pandnāma* ("The Book of Counsel"),[17] and Navāʾī's (d. 1501) *Maḥbūb al-qulūb* ("The Beloved of the Hearts"),[18] as well as some of the latter's poems. They represent a culture of very broad learning and life experiences that come from beyond the circles of Islamic erudition and Sufi practices. Extracts of these works, with the exception of *Maḥbūb al-qulūb*, were read in the traditional *maktab* until the closing of all Muslim schools at the end of the first decade of Soviet rule in 1928.[19] But during the Soviet regime, Navāʾī's *Maḥbūb al-qulūb* and extracts from Saʿdī's *Gulistān* were printed as expressions of national cultural heritage, and were also translated into Russian.[20] Since independence in 1991, these works have been reprinted par-

16 *The Gulistan of Sa'di: Bilingual English and Persian Edition with Vocabulary*, trans. by Wheeler M. Thackston (Bethesda, MD: Ibex Publishers, 2008). Saʿdīs poems and tales have been especially popular among the Tajik-speaking people (cf. Stephan, *Das Bedürfnis*, 137, 141, 218).

17 Férid Ed-Din Attar, *Pend-namèh ou livre des conseils*, Persian text, trans. into French by Antoine Isaac Silvestre de Sacy (Amsterdam: APA-Oriental Pr., 1981 [first ed. Paris 1819]). ʿAṭṭār's authorship is disputed in Western scholarship; cf. C.A. Storey, *Persian Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey*, Vol. v: *Poetry of the Pre-Mongol Period*, ed. by François de Blois (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1997), 308–9.

18 ʿAlī Shīr Navāʾī, *Maḥbūb al-qulūb* (Bukhara, 1325/1907), lithograph. Apparently it has not yet been translated into any 'West European' language.

19 According to the Orientalist and Russian diplomat Nikolai V. Khanykov in his report from 1843, ʿAṭṭār's *Pandnāma* was read at the *maktab*s of Bukhara as part of the *Ch*(*ah*)*ār kitāb* (see below), while in schools where Uzbeks exceeded in number the Tajiks, the *Dīvān* of Navāʾī was taught alongside poems from other Turkic works (Nikolaj Khanikoff, *Bokhara: Its Amir and Its People*, transl. Clement A. de Bode [London: James Madden, 1845], 275–76). Even if not recited at the *maktab*, *Maḥbūb al-qulūb* has been copied throughout the centuries, as have most of Navāʾī's works; cf. *Alisher Navoiy asarlarning qo'lyozma va toshbosma nusxalari bibliografik ko'rsatkichi*, ed. by G.Kh. Dalili and Sh.M. Aminov (Samarkand: Alisher Navoiy nomidagi Samarkand Davlat Universiteti, 1990). The Orientalist and envoy in the Russian service Petr I. Demaison (who took courses at a *madrasa* in Bukhara in 1833/34 under the pseudonym of Mullā Jaʿfar) reports that, among other Sufi poetry, poems of Saʿdī were read alongside theological and juridical works; cf. *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve* [*Otchety P.I. Demezona i I.V. Vitkevicha*], ed. by N.A. Khal'fin (Moscow: Nauka, GRVL 1983), 44–45.

20 Elisher Navaiy, *Mahbubul Qulub*, ed. Yunus Latif (Tashkent: OzSSR Davlat ilmiy-texnika va sosial-ekonomik adabiyatlar nashriyati, 1939); Alisher Navoi, *Vozliublennyi serdets*, ed. A.N. Kononov (Moscow/Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1948); Alisher Navoi, "Iz poemy 'Vozliublennyi serdets'", *Antologiia pedagogicheskoi mysli Uzbekskoi SSR*,

tially or in full, and extracts are included in the moral teaching at state schools. These or similar didactic narratives and poems are also used for private lessons by traditional *otin*s or *xalfa*s.[21]

Sufi Theocentric Ethics

As examples of Sufi theocentric ethics I selected two collections of aphorisms and counsels: The *Dīvān/Ḥikmatlar* ("The Wise Sentences") ascribed to the Sufi Shaykh Aḥmad Yasavī (who died in the late 12th or early 13th century),[22] and *Thabāt al-ʿājizīn* ("The Firmness of the Weak") by the Naqshbandī Sufi Allāhyār (d. around 1720).[23] These collections, in their present-day usage, feature noticeably more narrow intellectual horizons than the texts of the first type of Sufi-inspired writings. My sources do not reveal to what extent the poems of Aḥmad Yasavī were taught in the traditional Muslim educational institutions, but it is striking that the traditional *otin*s in post-Soviet times often recite poems ascribed to Yasavī at ceremonies; this might indicate the continuity of their use.[24] Some Jadīds tried to present Yasavī as a nationalist, socialist, or proletarian thinker, but after Stalin's mass repression in the 1930s, Yasavī was officially considered as a reactionary and feudal thinker. Since independence,

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ed. by O.S. Abbasova (Moscow: Pedagogika, 1986), 124–28. Among the many poems and aphorisms of Muslim "wise men" several ones of Navāʾī and Saʿdī were published in *Oz-oz o'rganib dono bo'lur*, trans. Shorasul Zunnun, intr. and comm. Saidbek Hasanov (Tashkent: Sharq Nashriyot-Matbaa, 2006) (previous editions: 1977, 1982).

21 ʿAṭṭār's *Pandnāma* as fourth part of the *Chahor kitob*/*Chahār kitāb* (Dushanbe: Adib, 1990, in Cyrillic script). For the various texts used by these female teachers, among them the *Chahār Kitāb* and poems from Nawāʾī, see Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 130–48, and Kleinmichel, *Ḫalpa*, vol. 2, 227–338.

22 Devin DeWeese, "Aḥmad Yasavī in the Work of Burhān al-Dīn Qïlïch—The Earliest Reference to a Famously Obscure Central Asian Sufi Saint", *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 67/3 (2013), 19 n. 2. There exist many different versions of the *Dīwān/Ḥikmatlar*. The authenticity of the work and its spread is much disputed: Devin DeWeese, "The *Mashāʾikh-i Turk* and the *Khojagān*: Rethinking the Links between the Yasavī and Naqshbandī Sufi Traditions", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 7/2 (1996), 180–207; Devin DeWeese, "Ahmad Yasavi and the *Divan-i Hikmat* in Soviet Scholarship", *The Heritage of Soviet Oriental Studies*, ed. by Michael Kemper and Stephan Conermann (London/New York: Routledge, 2011), 262–90. Apparently, the only translation into a "European" language is Khodzha Akhmed Iassavi, *Khikmety, izlozhenie perevoda na russkii iazyk N.Zh. Sagandykovoi*, trans. Z. Zhandarbek (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2000).

23 For early prints, see Martin Hartmann, "Das Buchwesen in Turkestan und die türkischen Drucke der Sammlung Hartmann", *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen an der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin* (Berlin, 1904), 69–103, p. 95.

24 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 138–39; Kleinmichel, *Ḫalpa*, vol. 2, 228–29.

he has been seen as a national hero in all the Turkic republics of Central Asia, and his *Dīvān-i ḥikmat* is revered as a manual of ethics.[25] The *Thabāt al-ʿājizīn* of Ṣūfī Allāhyār was one of the most widespread introductions to Islam in the 19th century,[26] and also seems to have been used in Naqshbandī *khānaqāh*s.[27] It still enjoys great respect in the private lessons of traditional *otin*s,[28] and has been reprinted several times.[29]

Another group of Sufi theocentric ethics is formed by the eight or eleven guiding principles (or dicta, *ʿibārāt*/*kalimāt-i qudsiyya*) of the Naqshbandiyya, eight of which were attributed to ʿAbd al-Khāliq Ghijduvānī and the additional three to Bahāʾ al-Dīn Naqshband.[30] In contemporary Uzbekistan, these dicta are often repeated as "lessons" (*saboqlar*) in booklets dedicated to Sufism in general or to Bahāʾ al-Dīn Naqshband in particular. There is, however, one that does not belong to the eleven dicta, namely *dil ba yor-u dast ba kor* ("the hand at work, and the heart with God"). Since 1991, it is this motto that has been most often reproduced in state-sponsored publications and at official conferences, with the purpose of engraining a thorough work ethos.[31] It is said to have the same meaning as the dictum *khalwat dar anjumān* ("solitude within society"), one of the dicta linked to ʿAbd al-Khāliq Ghijduvānī. There are several interpretations of the *dil ba yor-u dast ba kor* dictum. In genuine Sufi literature its meaning is explained as being that the Sufi shall outwardly be with the people, but inwardly with God, enabling the Sufi disciple (*murīd*) to go to the bazaar without being diverted from his commemoration of God.[32] In an Uzbek state schoolbook for moral education, having "the heart with God" is explained

25 Thierry Zarcone, "Aḥmad Yasavi, héros des nouvelles républiques centrasiatiques", *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 89/90 (2000), 297–322.

26 Hartmann, "Das Buchwesen", 95. It even appears in an academic program for new method schools in Tashkent in 1910, but apparently was soon replaced by moral teaching schoolbooks written by Jadīds themselves (Khalid, *Muslim Cultural Reform*, 168, 171).

27 von Kügelgen, "Die Entfaltung", 116–17.

28 Kleinmichel, *Ḥalpa*, vol. 2, 323; Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 133.

29 So'fi Olloyor, *Sabotul ozhizin—Manzuma*, ed. Rashid Zohid (Tashkent: Cho'lpon, 1991) (Uzbek, in Cyrillic script); repr. 2000.

30 Khwāja Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Pārsā Bukhārī, *Qudsiyya* (Tehran: Kitabkhāne-e Ṭūrī, Ādharmāh 1354/1975), 55–64.

31 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 86; Zarcone, *Aḥmad Yasavī*, p. 314.

32 Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandī Order. A Preliminary Survey of its History and Significance", *Studia Islamica* 44 (1976), 123–52, p. 133; Thierry Zarcone, "Le 'Voyage dans la patrie' [safar dar watan] chez les soufis de l'ordre naqshbandi", *Le Voyage initiatique en terre d'islam—Ascensions célestes et itinéraires spirituels*, ed. by M.A. Amir-Moezzi, (Louvain/Paris: Peeters, 1996), 301–15, pp. 310–15.

as seeing the result of a work before one's eyes, just as God who created everything for a specific purpose.[33] That is, man is here taught to take God as his model, and to always work in a goal-oriented way. The theocentric expression is thus deprived of its essential characteristic, namely man's binding and submission to God's will, and the incentive to prepare oneself for the life hereafter.

Moral Teaching According to Ḥanafī and Māturīdī Traditions

Under Type 3, I subsume moral teaching according to Ḥanafī and Māturīdī traditions.[34] My examples are three books that form part of the *Chahār kitāb* ("The Four Books"), a popular compilation that, next to some Qur'ānic verses combined in the genre of *Haftyak*, forms the basis of learning in at least the Tajik-speaking traditional *maktab*s: book one of the *Chahār kitāb* (entitled *Nām-i Ḥaqq*), book two (an introduction to "knowledge about faith [*imān*], commandments [*aḥkām*] and pillars [*arkān*] of Islam"), and book three (*Muhimmāt al-Muslimīn*). They teach the correct performance of the five pillars of Islam, the basic Islamic dogmas, and the genealogies of the first four rightly-guided caliphs, in addition to some prayers (*du'ā'*) and imperatives for good behavior.[35] These anonymous imperatives are, in many cases, presented as commands of the prophet Muḥammad.

It can be assumed that these teachings were regarded as being in conformity with the norms of Ḥanafī law and Māturidī theology, or at least did not

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33 "Even the smallest insect contributes to the balance of the world, as modern science has corroborated" (M. Qarshiboyev, S. Nishonova, O. Musurmonova, R. Qo'chqorov, *Milliy istiqlol g'oyasi va ma'naviyat asoslari, 7-sinf*, 3rd ed., Tashkent: Ma'naviyat, 2007, 20). In a post-Soviet presentation of the life and work of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband, *dil ba yoru dast ba kor* is put in the context of the political and social activism of the Naqshbandiyya (Veron James Schubel, "Post-Soviet Hagiography and the Reconstruction of the Naqshband Tradition in Contemporary Uzbekistan", *Naqshbandi in Western and Central Asia. Change and Continuity. Papers Read at a Conference Held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul June 9–11, 1997*, ed. by Elisabeth Özdalga (Istanbul: Svenska forskningsinstitutet Istanbul/Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999), 73–87, p. 79); for the reconstruction of Naqshbandī traditions after 1991, see also Bakhtiyar Babajanov, "Le renouveau des communautés soufies en Ouzbékistan", *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 5–6 (1998), 285–311.

34 For their spread and character in Central Asia, see Ashirbek Muminov, "Traditional and Modern Religious-Theological Schools in Central Asia", *Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia*, ed. by Lena Jonson and Murad Esenov (Stockholm: Utrikerspolitiska Institutet, 1999), 101–11.

35 For the arrangement and scope of the four texts that form the *Chahār kitāb* or *Kullīyāt*, as it is also called, see M. Nazif Shahrani, "Local Islam and Social Discourse in Afghanistan and Turkistan in the Modern Period", *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, ed. by Robert L. Canfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 161–88, pp. 172–75.

contradict them. In present-day Uzbekistan, these books are widely used for private lessons by the traditional *otin*s, and are considered to represent the Ḥanafī school of Islamic law.[36]

As far as the judgement (*ḥukm*) of deeds is concerned, the Central Asian jurists seem to have measured them according to the common classical scale of the five commandments (*al-aḥkām al-khamsa*) of Islamic jurisprudence:[37] 1. The obligatory (*wājib*, *farḍ*) act (he who neglects it will be punished by God or the authorities); 2. The recommended (*mandūb*) act (he who performs a recommended act will be rewarded, but he who neglects it will not be punished); 3. The indifferent, permissible (*mubāḥ*) act (he who performs it will be neither rewarded nor punished); 4. The reprehensible (*makrūh*) act (he who neglects it will be rewarded, and he who performs it will not be punished); 5. the forbidden (*ḥarām*) act (he who performs it will be punished).

Jadīd Moral Teaching

Starting in the 1890s, the Jadīds established what is called the "new-method" schools, without, however, establishing one unified program. Gradually, the teaching of acts of devotion and fundamental dogmas was separated from moral education. Thus, moral education was often no longer presented as a religious subject, but became a subject of its own. It was reformed and considered as an "indispensable means of identity construction".[38] The Jadīds in the Turkic-speaking areas of Central Asia used schoolbooks of Tatar Muslim reformers, written in the Turkic language. Others produced new schoolbooks in their local languages, not least to foster patriotism.[39]

As an example, I chose the *Tūrkī gulistān yākhūd akhlāq* ("The Turkic Rose Garden, or Morals") by ʿAbdallāh Avlānī (Avloniy, 1878–1934).[40] The title is, for sure, a reminiscence of Saʿdī's famous "Rose Garden", of which some parts were taught in traditional schools. Avlānī emerged from a family of craftsmen and was educated in traditional institutions such as *maktab*s and *madrasa*s. Over

36 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 131–32.

37 Theodor Willem Juynboll, *Handbuch des islamischen Gesetzes* (Leiden/Leipzig: Brill, 1910), 59–61; Majid Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 48–49.

38 Dudoignon, "La question scolaire", 165.

39 Bendrikov, *Ocherki*, 247–82; Khalid, *Muslim Cultural Reform*, 167–76; Dudoignon, "La question scolaire", esp. 165–68.

40 The first edition in sovereign Uzbekistan by M. Maxsumov (Tashkent: O'qituvči, 1992; I use this edition) presents a version in contemporary Uzbek written in Cyrillic script, and also contains a reprint of the original in Arabic script (Tashkent: Tipo Lit "Par. Sots. Revoliuts", 1336/1917; apparently the first edition dates back to 1913).

the years, he directed several of these new-method *maktab*s in Tashkent, and he also ran one of the first benevolent societies, and was very active as a journalist, poet, and author of theater-plays.[41] With *Tūrkī gulistān yākhūd akhlāq*, he addressed the upper classes of the new-method primary school. Ethics, as he explained, is a science, and "those who study it are able to judge man according to his acts, and will understand why God has created man and what man's duties are on earth".[42] He harshly criticized the use of works from authors such as Navāʾī, Ṣūfī Allāhyār, and also of the *Chahār kitāb*, as schoolbooks, mainly because of their poetic language. Nevertheless, he did not go so far as to regard them as a threat to the morality of little children, as did other Jadīd writers; the latter rejected them on the grounds that these verses were composed in Persian, and thus unintelligible to the Uzbek pupils, or that such poetry effeminates the youth.[43]

After the forced closure of Muslim schools in 1928, Avlānī's *Tūrkī gulistān yākhūd akhlāq* seems not to have been taught anymore, although some extracts have been re-published at least since 1986.[44] After independence, the booklet has been reprinted in full, and some passages have also been included in Uzbek State schoolbooks for moral education.[45]

Islamic "Fundamentalist" Moral Teaching

I define "fundamentalist" as the approach to teach Islam mainly with direct reference to the Qurʾān and the Sunna of the prophet Muḥammad and his companions, and the rejection of everything that is considered a deviation from these sources. This approach seems to have been introduced to Central Asia during the early Soviet times through the activities of the Syrian scholar Shāmī-Dāmullā (d. 1932).[46] Shāmī-Dāmullā was expelled from Ottoman territory for propagating "Wahhābism", and found refuge in Central Asia. It was in Tashkent that he gave classes on the *ḥadīth* compilations of the sayings of the prophet Muḥammad, held sermons, and issued fatwas. In 1922, at a congress of

41 Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Awlânî, ʿAbdallâh", *Dictionnaire biographique des savants et grandes figures du Monde Musulman périphérique, du XIX^e siècle à nos jours*, ed. by Marc Gaborieau, Nicole Grandin, Pierre Labrousse, Alexandre Popovic, 2 (January 1998), 38–39.

42 ʿAbdallāh Avlānī, *Turkī gulistān*, 2 (Arabic script), 11 (Cyrillic script).

43 Khalid, *Muslim Cultural Reform*, 171.

44 Abbasova, *Antologiia pedagogicheskoi*, 182–93, 302.

45 X. Sultonov and M. Qarshiboyev, *Vatan tuyg'usi, o'rta maktablarning 5-sinflari uchun o'quv qo'llanmasi*, 3rd ed. (Tashkent: Ma'naviyat 2007), 37, 42.

46 Ashirbek Muminov, "Chami-damulla et son rôle dans la constitution d'un 'Islam soviétique'", *Islam et politique en ex-URSS* (*Russie d'Europe et Asie centrale*), ed. by M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), 241–61.

Muslim jurists in Tashkent, he proposed that the rich should share their property with the poor, and his name became linked with the concept of "Islamic socialism".[47] As Ashirbek Muminov has shown, Shāmī-Dāmullā's teaching strongly influenced the Uzbek scholars who established two distinct Islamic groups in Tashkent, the *Ahl-i Qur'ān* and the *Ahl-i ḥadīth*. Most members of both groups were killed during Stalin's terror regime, but their ideas survived, even in SADUM (*Sredneaziatskoe Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man*), the official Islamic administration set up in the 1940s, and from the late 1970s onwards in Mujaddidiyya circles.

Most of the Mujaddidis' sermons and lessons were recorded on audio-tapes and have largely influenced the proselytizing "new" *otin*s.[48] As an example for Mujaddidiyya moral teaching, I chose a lecture by Abduvali Qori Mirzoyev (b. 1950); Mirzoyev is counted among those who renewed the teachings of the *Ahl-i ḥadīth*.[49] The lecture was apparently held in the Jome Mosque of Andijon sometime after 1992.[50]

Moral Teaching of "Soviet Islam"

The expression "Soviet Islam" designates here the opinions of the Central Asian Spiritual Directorate for Muslims (SADUM). Established in Tashkent in 1943, SADUM was linked to the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, on both Uzbek and Soviet levels; it was thus largely state-controlled. For decades, the leadership of SADUM was in the hands of one learned family, the Babakhanovs, and its religious policy was shaped by Mufti Ziyauddin Babakhanov (head of the SADUM 1957–82), a disciple of the above-mentioned Shāmī-Dāmullā. Ziyauddin Babakhanov, as well as his son and successor Shamsuddin-Khon Babakhanov (SADUM Mufti 1982–89) and their team, tried to keep the Islamic religion alive by propagating rules that did not conflict with Soviet ideology.[51] They worked towards a "rationalization" of some ritual duties in light of what was expected from a Soviet citizen, and emphasized the progress and welfare

47 Muminov, "Chami-damulla", 248.

48 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 276–78. For examples of the Mujaddidiyya's teachings see Allen J. Frank and Jahangir Mamatov, *Uzbek Islamic Debates: Texts, Translations, and Commentary* (Springfield, Va: Dunwoody Press, 2006).

49 For his life and teaching, see Frank and Mamatov, *Uzbek Islamic Debates*, 1–94.

50 Frank and Mamatov, *Uzbek Islamic Debates*, 3.

51 For the Muftis of the Babakhanov family, see B.M. Babadzhanov, "Babakhanovy—dinastiia", *Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii—Enciklopedicheskij slovar'*, ed. by S.M. Prozorov (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2003), fasc. 4, 12–13. That Ziyauddin was a pupil of Shāmī-Dāmullā is demonstrated by Muminov, "Chami-damulla", 250.

of Soviet socialist society.[52] They did so by leaning on fundamentalist interpretations of the Qurʾān and the Sunna, for these seemed to correspond best to Soviet interests; the Babakhanovs thus produced fatwas condemning pilgrimage to the tombs of Sufi shaykhs, or the practice of commemorative ceremonies—which were also a major concern for the Soviet authorities.[53] When SADUM was abolished, the new Uzbek national Muftiate (Directorate of Uzbekistan's Muslims; O'zbekiston musulmonlar idorasi, O'MI) pursued a quite similar policy.[54]

I chose as an example a sermon on cleanness (*naẓāfa*) that Shamsuddin-Khon Babakhanov gave on a Friday at a mosque in Tashkent, in 1984.[55]

Moral Teaching According to the Soviet State Ideology

Secular moral teaching, according to the Soviet state ideology, did not continue as such after the breakdown of the USSR, and some of its core concepts—such as the promotion of "the struggle uniting all workers against any kind of exploitation" and "militant internationalism"[56]—have simply been buried. However, other features of Soviet moral education have continued in the official moral teaching programs of independent Uzbekistan, and likewise in neighboring Tajikistan; in particular, this holds true for the representation of patriotic duties, the moral basis for the preservation of the family, and the fostering of a work ethos, next to the promotion of physical education. Furthermore, many methods of ethical instruction used in Soviet state schools

52 Mark Saroyan, *Minorities, Mullahs, and Modernity: Reshaping Community in the Former Soviet Union* (Berkeley: University of California, International and Area Studies, 1997), 65–69.

53 Bakhtiiar Babadzhanov, "O fetvakh SADUM protiv 'neislamskikh obychaev'", *Islam na post-sovetskom prostranstve: vzgliad iznutri*, ed. by Marta Brill Olcott and Aleksei Malashenko (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 2001), 170–84; cf. Mark Saroyan, *Minorities*, 43–56.

54 Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, "Islam officiel contre Islam politique en Ouzbékistan aujourd'hui: La direction des Musulmans et les groupes non-hanafî", *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 31/3 (2000), 151–64.

55 Published in the same year in the official organ of the Spiritual Directorate, the journal *Muslims in the Soviet Orient*, which appeared in a number of languages. I rely on the Arabic issue: "Khuṭbat al-jumʿa allatī alqāhā Samāḥat al-Muftī Shamsaddīnkhān ibn Ḍiyāʾaddīnkhān ibn Īshān Bābākhān fī Jāmiʿ 'Ṭillā-Shaykh' bi-madīnat Ṭashqand", *al-Muslimūn fī l-sharq al-sūfyātī* 3 (1404/1984), 3–4. For the biography and work of Shamsuddin-khon Babakhonov see Babadzhanov, "Babakhanovy", 13–14.

56 Hermann Rajamaa, *The Moulding of Soviet Citizens: A Glance at Soviet Educational Theory and Practice* (London/Stockholm: Boreas Publishing, 1948), 14, 16, 21.

have been maintained.[57] I therefore distinguish this as a special type of moral teaching.

Since the end of the 1930s, Soviet primary and secondary state schools had been well established in the regions mentioned, and school attendance was obligatory. For sure, neither religious nor moral instruction was formally part of the curriculum. Still, the Department of Moral Education of the Institute of Theory and History of Pedagogy developed several curricula for moral education that were meant to be applied in all schools. The teachers were ordered to include moral education in courses of literature, history, geography, and languages, for these were subjects that provided "political education". For the purpose of the present study I rely on Medlin, Cave and Carpenter's analysis of these instructions and of their implementations in Uzbekistan.[58]

Moral Teaching According to Uzbek State Ideology

In 1997, the Uzbek parliament enacted a law of educational guidelines that demanded special attention to spiritual and moral education (*ma'naviy va axloqiy tarbiya*) and instructions for good behavior (*axloq va odob ilmi*).[59] State schoolbooks for moral education existed before 1997,[60] but now its teaching was unified and made obligatory. The law was accompanied by guidelines for teachers. In the year 2007, from which I have a complete set of class-books, the state schools provided moral education for 9 years of schooling, with one hour per week. The schoolbooks for the first four years are entitled *Odobnoma* ("Manual for Decent Behavior/Morality"), those for classes 5 to 6 bear the title *Vatan tuyg'usi* ("The Sentiment of the Homeland"), and those for the last three classes run under *Milliy istiqlol g'oyasi va ma'naviyat asoslari* ("The Concept of National Independence and the Foundations of Spirituality").[61] With a

57 Cf. Sébastien Peyrouse, "La gestion du fait religieux en Asie centrale: poursuite du cadre conceptuel soviétique et renouveau factice", *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 13–14 (2004), 77–120; Stephan, "Das Bedürfnis nach Ausgewogenheit", 252–57.

58 Medlin et al., *Education and Development*, 1971.

59 O. Hasanboeva, M. Turopova, R. Yunusova, *1-sinfda odobnoma darslari: Metodik qo'llanma* (Tashkent: O'zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq ta'limi Vazirligi / Respublika Ta'lim Markazi, 1999), 6.

60 Tursunali Qurbonov, *Odobnoma—Umumta'lim va hunar maktablarining o'qituvčilari va sinf rahbarlari učun qo'llanma* (Tashkent: O'qituvchi, 1991) (Cyrillic script); O. To'raeva and M. Turopova, *Odobnama, O'zbekiston Respublikasi xalq ta'limi vazirligi VI sinflar uchun o'quv ko'llanmasi sifatida tavsiya etgan* (Tashkent: O'qituvchi, 1996) (Cyrillic).

61 I rely on the following classbooks: O. Hasanboyeva, *Odobnoma 1-sinf, O'zbekistan Respublikasi Xalq ta'limi vazirligi 1-sinf uchun darslik sifatida tavsiya etgan* (Tashkent: O'qituvchi, 2000); Q. Abdullayeva, M. Yusupova, S. Rahmonbekov, *Odobnoma 2-sinf,*

progressive increase of conceptual thinking, these textbooks introduce pupils to the rules of decent social behavior, and the values of one's homeland and its traditions. They also dwell on the benefits of nature as well as science and technology, with the goal to serve one's own nation and humanity as a whole.

The Foundations of the Ethical Sentences and their Concrete Justification

From a meta-ethical point of view, all the aforementioned moral teachings share one essential feature: they assume that ethics have an objective or real foundation, presenting the given version of morality that they defend as either empirical or metaphysical fact—and not as relative to subjective opinion. This falls into the realm of what moral philosophy calls moral objectivism, or moral realism.[62] Within this category they can be distinguished by means of models of moral reality that understand moral facts as facts *sui generis*, as in the case of Kant's categorical imperative or Scheler's ethics of value.[63] Hence, with respect to the wide range of existing meta-ethical approaches, the Central Asian ethics under consideration are all related to each other; differences only pertain to the question of where they see the assumed objective foundation of moral truth. In this regard, we can identify three approaches.

O'zbekistan Respublikasi Xalq ta'limi vazirligi 1-sinf uchun darslik sifatida tavsiya ėtgan, 3rd ed. (Tashkent: Mehnat, 2003); O. Hasanboyeva, A. Ne'matova, M. Turopova, *Odobnoma 3-sinf, O'zbekistan Respublikasi Xalq ta'limi vazirligi tasdiqlagan*, qayta ishlangan va to'ldirilgan beshinchi nashri (Tashkent: O'zbekiston, 2007); O. Hasanboyeva, A. Ne'matova, G. Ibragimova, *Odobnoma—Umumiy o'rta ta'lim maktablarining 4-sinfi uchun o'quv qo'llanma*, 5-nashri, O'zbekistan Respublikasi Xalq ta'limi vazirligi tasdiqlagan (Tashkent: Davlat ilmiy nashriyoti, 2006); X. Sultonov, M. Qarshiboyev, *Vatan Tuyg'usi—O'rta maktablarining 5-sinflari uchun o'quv qo'llanma* 3rd ed. (Toshkent: Ma'naviyat, 2007); X. Sultonov, M. Qarshiboyev, *Vatan Tuyg'usi—Umumiy o'rta ta'lim muassasalarining 6-sinflari uchun o'quv qo'llanma*, to'ldirilgan va qayta ishlangan 5th ed. (Tashkent: Ma'naviyat, 2007); M. Qarshiboyev, S. Nishonova, O. Musurmonova, R. Qo'chqorov, *Milliy istiqlol g'oyasi va ma'naviyat asoslari 7-sinf*, 3rd ed. (Tashkent: Ma'naviyat, 2007); R. Qo'chqorov, S. Nishonova, O. Musurmonova, M. Qarshiboyev, *Milliy istiqlol g'oyasi va ma'naviyat asoslari 8-sinf*, qayta ishlangan beshinchi nashri (Tashkent: Ma'naviyat, 2007); O. Musurmonova, R. Qo'chqorov, M. Qarshiboyev, *Milliy istiqlol g'oyasi va ma'naviyat asoslari 9-sinf*, qayta ishlangan beshinchi nashri (Tashkent: Ma'naviyat, 2007).

62 I follow Birnbacher in counting what he calls "religious voluntarism" among moral realism and not among moral anti-realism and subjectivism (*Analytische Einführung*, 358, 371–72).

63 Birnbacher, *Analytische Einführung*, 357–81.

One approach derives moral truths from a metaphysical supposition, i.e. from God's will. To derive moral truths exclusively from God's will is commonly called "divine voluntarism", or "divine objectivism". Believers might even agree with the term "divine objectivism", because the undoubted existence of God makes his commands an 'objective' truth for them. The Sufi theocentric ethics, the moral teachings according to the Ḥanafī and Māturīdī traditions, and Islamic fundamentalist moral teachings, suppose that God's will is absolutely binding, because only God knows what is good or bad, right or wrong. Included in God's will are the commands of his prophet Muḥammad, because following Muḥammad is repeatedly mentioned in the Qur'ān as a divine commandment.[64]

Another approach derives moral truths from empirical facts and observations; for instance, from the laws of nature or from traditions and conventions, that is, from observing society and the consensus on how to behave. This approach is thus established on the principle of "empirical objectivism". Right or wrong, good or bad, are thus objective qualities of deeds, and specifically of the interrelation between actions in accordance with specific circumstances. They can be conceived by experience and reason without any reference to other authorities. On this principle rests the moral teaching according to Soviet state ideology.

The third approach asks to distinguish between moral truths that derive from empirical facts and truths that can be derived only, or also, from God's will. I shall call this position "harmonizing objectivism". It seems to be the basis of Sufi anthropocentric ethics, Jadīd moral teaching, the moral teaching of "Soviet Islam", and that of the Uzbek state. Which side dominates, God's will or the "objective facts", is a question that is answered differently. Whereas in Sufi anthropocentric ethics "divine objectivism" seems to be predominant, in the other systems of morality teaching it is the objective circumstances that decide.

An observer will find that all approaches of "objectivism" in fact imply subjectivity, insofar as in practice the divine commands or empirical facts call for interpretation. Whether by inspiration or by reasoning, Sufis, jurists, and theologians will always specify their respective commands, just as scientists interpret their observations to impose their own view.

In textbooks or sermons, the three approaches, "divine objectivism", "empirical objectivism", and "harmonizing objectivism", appear in many different variants, with a great diversity of social facts that they refer to as examples and contexts.

64 Cf. Q. 4:13–14 and 80.

Those ethics that rely on "divine objectivism" refer to the words of God and his messenger Muḥammad in a more or less direct way. While the texts attributed to Aḥmad Yasavī and Ṣūfī Allāhyār rarely ever reference the Qur'ān or *ḥadīth* verbatim, they do refer constantly to God and Muḥammad, though in the authors' own poetical language. This re-phrasing (or re-representation) of the Islamic fundamental sources in the works of Yasavī and Ṣūfī Allāhyār has some new *otin*s dismissing their teachings as worthless.[65] In the teaching of the new *otin*s and of the Mujaddidiyya, both God's and Muḥammad's words are constantly, and almost exclusively, quoted verbatim.

The first book of the *Chahār kitāb* is also composed in rhyme, while the second and third ones are written in prose and composed as questions ("if one asks…") and answers. This format implies that everything said in these books also represents the binding religious tradition in its entirety. The respondent occasionally cites a Qur'ānic verse, a saying by the prophet Muḥammad, his companions, Abū Ḥanīfa (Imām-i Aʿẓam, d. 767, the eponym of the Ḥanafī school), or the pre-Islamic Arab sage Luqmān, who was sanctioned by the Qur'ān.[66]

The moral teachings that rely on "harmonizing objectivism" refer to a broader spectrum of authorities, namely those of religious and non-religious figures (by name or anonymously) and to reason or common sense. Saʿdī, for instance, often illuminates his advice by examples from pre-Islamic and Muslim sages or wise kings, such as the Persian Sassanid Anūshirvān Khusraw (531–79 CE). The Jadīd Avlānī quotes from the Qur'ān or from sayings of the Prophet, but he also reproduces wisdom from Muslim or Greek philosophers, primarily Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), Socrates, and Plato. In addition, Avlānī appeals to reason by disclosing the sense and consequences of each virtue and vice.

In the sermon of the official Soviet Mufti, God and Muḥammad's words concerning a moral rule are cited alongside rational explanations of their usefulness:

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65 Cf. Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 273.

66 The versions of the *Chahār kitāb* differ, however, quite strongly from each other. To give an example, a copy of 1990 (*Chahor-kitob* [Dushanbe: Adib, 1990], in the Tajik language and Cyrillic script) does not mention the "spiritual testament" (*Waṣīyat-nāma*) of Luqmān that apparently forms part of the second book of the *Chahār kitāb* (Shahrani, *Local Knowledge*, 173). A lithograph from Peshawar (without date and publication year, Nourānī Kutubkhāna) does feature this testament (pp. 26–28), which contains the following "imperatives": The things you don't like, don't do them to others, and don't act thoughtlessly, and don't defer what you can do today to tomorrow; and don't do anything without planning, do not betray anybody, and do your work with deliberation" (27).

> Cleanliness is a means to satisfy the Lord, and it encompasses the human limbs and clothes and what one has at home or elsewhere. Cleanliness strengthens the human intelligence and increases man's [*insān*] beauty and magnificence, and it also protects him from illness; cleanliness is the source of health [...]. In order to lead a blessed life and spend it on good deeds [*aʿmāl ṣāliḥa*], one has to be healthy and sane, and this can be achieved only by the observance of the rules of hygiene.[67]

While the Soviet mufti Babakhanov referred not only to the Prophet but also to the latter's companions as being human authorities, in the first half of the 1990s the new Uzbek State schoolbooks for moral teaching referred to a great variety of authorities from East and West, including Plato, Hippocrates, Navāʾī, Ibn Sīnā, Tolstoy, Gorki, Theodor Fontane, and George Sand.[68] After 1997, the textbooks shifted to predominantly Central Asian personalities, with Timur and Islam Karimov at the forefront. Nevertheless, classical Greek and Muslim philosophers and religious scholars continue to be referenced, as well as some Jadīd authors, and in rare instances even the Avesta is mentioned. In contrast, God and the prophet Muḥammad appear only occasionally.

The moral teachings that rely on "empirical objectivism"—in our case the Soviet State instructions—have, likewise, a broad spectrum of authorities to draw from. They clearly favored Russian heroes, like Lenin and well-known scientists. Role-models of other nationalities are mentioned as well, especially Navāʾī, but always disconnected from the Islamic faith. Also prominent are references to reason and scientific experience. In the late Soviet period appeared the first moral wisdom compilations in Uzbek that left modern Western (and Russian) models completely aside. A 1977 booklet with the title *Oz-oz o'rganib dono bo'lur* (perhaps best rendered as "Many a Little Makes a Mickle") provided counsels, aphorisms, didactic stories, and fables exclusively attributed to renowned pre-Islamic and Islamic wise men, "people of the Orient". Uzbek wisdoms are presented next to wisdoms transmitted from Socrates, Luqmān, Saʿdī, Avicenna, Aristotle, Anushirwan, the Arab poet al-Mutanabbī, the Tatar Muslim reformer Rizaetdin ibn Fakhretdin (Riḍāʾ al-Dīn b. Fakhr al-Dīn, d. 1936), Plato, and many others, in no certain order. The compilation was reprinted in 1982 and again in 2006, with a popular-scientific foreword.[69]

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67 Shamsaddīnkhān, *Khuṭbat al-jumʿa*, 3, 4.

68 O. To'raeva and M.Turopova, *Odobnama* (1996), 118–24.

69 *Oz-oz o'rganib dono bo'lur*, mod. Uzbek trans. Shorasul Zunnun, preface and comm. Saidbek Hasanov (Tashkent: Sharq nashriyot-matbaa aksiyadorlik kompaniyasi Bosh tahririyati, 2006).

Forms and Methods of Teaching

There are striking differences with regards to the forms and methods of teaching in the texts under consideration. I propose four qualifications:

- *Prescriptive*, when a deed is imposed or forbidden as an order by a named or unnamed authority;
- *Appelative*, when a certain way of acting (an act or its omission) is presented as an appeal or a request. This is mostly achieved by counsels and maxims;
- *Cognitive*, when the reasonableness or usefulness of a certain way of acting (an act or its omission) is explained; this is done by definitions or exemplary stories, i.e. by narrated experience;
- *Emotive*, when an act or its omission is presented in a way that evokes hope for prestige or other rewards, or fear of dishonor or other punishments.

Psychologically, mere prescriptions or appeals seldom have an intense effect on people. This effect can only be reached through emotions and/or explanations that make precepts or principles reasonable in view of a particular or general purpose. Unfortunately, field material is available to me only through the existing anthropological literature; most of my statements about emotive characteristics are deduced from the texts.

The moral teachings that are founded on "divine objectivism" are taught in different ways. Aḥmad Yasavī's and Ṣūfī Allāhyār's style is predominantly appelative, although God and the Prophet are constantly referred to; the emotive side is weak. In contrast, books one to three of the *Chahār kitāb* and the teachings of the Mujaddidiyya and the new *otin*s are predominantly prescriptive, and their emotive side is strong. To give an example, in the lessons of the Mujaddidis[70] and the new *otin*s,[71] as well as in the third book of the *Chahār kitāb*, Paradise and Hell are very lively depicted. And while corporal punishment of children was common in the traditional *maktab*,[72] neither the "traditional" nor the "new" *otin*s seem to have recourse to it. Emphasis is laid on the punishment or the reward one has to expect from God. Some new *otin*s even teach how many rewards one has to expect for one or another good deed, e.g. 20 rewards (*thawāb*) for the simple greeting "assalom" and 30 for "assalom

70 Frank and Mamatov, *Uzbek Islamic Debates*, 75, 85.

71 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 268, 307.

72 Bečka, "Traditional Schools", 300.

ʿalaykum".[73] For these accounts they are using, perhaps unconsciously, the aforementioned scale of judgments of acts as elaborated by jurists and theologians. In fact, the scale embodies what is commonly called "work ethics", that is, the idea that we are judged, rewarded, and punished by God according to our actions. It presupposes the idea that man is responsible for his deeds, and that he has—at least to a certain extent—free will. It further presupposes the idea that God will stick to the order he established.

The moral teachings based on "harmonizing objectivism" mainly impart appelative and cognitive methods; here, too, the emotive side is weak. Saʿdī, Navāʾī, and ʿAṭṭār express their moral teaching through counsels or maxims that are often brought to the recipient in the form of poems or stories in order to make the bad or good results of a given act comprehensible, in order to instigate reflection. Navāʾī also gives definitions for the virtues he mentions in his *Maḥbūb al-qulūb*. The form of presentation chosen by the Jadīd writer Avlānī does not significantly differ from these, except for the fact that he emphasizes more the explanation of each virtue and vice he presents. Apparently, the Jadīds also avoided corporal punishment in their schools, and depicted Hell and Paradise not in their classes on ethics but in courses on dogma/theology. The morality teaching by educators of Soviet Islam seems to have principally used the appelative, not the prescriptive words of God and Muḥammad, and explained them in support of what man has found to be right or useful by reason. The state schoolbooks of the independent Uzbek Republic are designed in a very modern way, with explicatory sections alternating with poems, songs, stories, and pictures, and with references to television programs and films. Usually, each section ends with questions on what has just been taught. I did not find instigations for corporal punishment, although only fieldwork can provide a definite answer.

The Soviet state ideology, resting upon "empirical objectivism", displays the broadest spectrum in regard to the forms and methods of moral teaching. In fact, Soviet publications for teaching ethics in schools rely on prescriptions, appeals, and explanations, and have a strong emotive side. In the official Soviet schools, the duties of the pupil towards the school were imparted as orders, whereas mutual help, for instance, was taught as a request. As effective ways to awaken and implant virtues as well as rules of conduct and moral feeling, the Department stressed the teacher's role as a model and the conduct of famous personalities, in addition to explanations, discussions, encouragements, and punishments.

73 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 310.

The Range of the Moral Teachings: Universality at Stake

The fact that the moral teachings under consideration do not clearly distinguish moral norms and values from cultural norms, values, conventions, rules of behavior, and etiquette suggest that they could be subsumed under ethical particularism. This classification seems all the more likely—in view of the moral justifications just presented—if we consider that the moral teachings in the region that nowadays constitutes Uzbekistan have been bound to one religion, one political union, or one nation alone. With regard to their foundations, though, all types claim to represent the objective truth and hence purport a kind of universalism. I do not want to enter the great debates among moral philosophers about particularism and universalism at this point.[74] My aim is merely to show that an investigation into the universalizability of norms and values would be worthwhile in order to differentiate—even in cases where there is no clear distinction between moral and cultural norms—in what respect a teaching can be labeled as particularist in the sense of "nationalist" or "culturalist", or otherwise "exclusive". The fruitfulness of such an undertaking in this special case, and my argument, is that it can help highlight what is at stake in moral teachings in contemporary Uzbekistan. *Universalizability* implies that a precept can be expressed in a logical and general form that is bare of any personal pronoun like "I" or "you" and of any personal name, as well as without reference to God or a specific nation. The intrinsic value of the moral norm must be independent of who, where, and when it has been put into effect.[75]

In the texts that I classified under the heading "divine objectivism", the teaching of ethics and the harvest of its fruits is essentially linked to what is considered to be the right faith. The Mujaddidī preacher Abduvali Qori put it the following way:

> In the Holy Qur'ān—[and in] all of the communities [that have a book of divine revelation]—the essence of the summons made by the prophets is: *Worship God, for you have no other god but Him* […]. The communities that maintained that creed found progress and were happy. All of the communities that did not maintain that creed encountered decadence

74 Klaus Peter Rippe, *Ethischer Relativismus. Seine Grenzen—seine Geltung* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1993); Bernward Gesang, *Kritik des Partikularismus* (Paderborn: Mentis, 2000); Richard A. Shweder, "Relativism and Universalism", *A Companion to Moral Anthropology*, ed. by Didier Fassin (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 85–102.

75 Birnbacher, *Analytische Einführung*, 31–39, 245.

> and were unhappy. Know that every licit and correct thing you see that exists in irreligious nations came into being as a result of the prophets' summons.[76]

Thus, Abduvali Qori leaves no doubt that man depends on revelation to be able to discern good from bad. This dependency is more or less explicit in the moral teaching according to Ḥanafī and Māturīdī traditions, and implicit in the Sufi theocentric ethics. None of these moral teachings meets the demands of the principle of universalizability, since "God" in their understanding denotes a specific and not a general term.[77] This is most obvious in the teachings of the Islamic fundamentalist Abduvali Qori, for in contrast to the mainstream of the two other types of "divine objectivism" under discussion, he disqualifies Christians and Jews as "polytheists" (*mushrik*), restricting monotheism (*tavhid*) to Muslims.[78]

"Harmonizing objectivism" and "empirical objectivism" are moral teachings founded on the conviction that the distinction between what is good or bad, right or wrong, is completely, or at least to a large extent, conceivable by human experience and reason. Such is the case with Saʿdī, Avlānī, the propagators of Soviet Islam, of the Uzbek state positions, and of Soviet ideology—they do not consider a religious faith or the Muslim creed as a necessary condition to develop ethics. Avlānī, for instance, places the "prescriptions of the *sharīʿa*" on the same level as "the law of humanity (*insoniyat qonuni*)", and does not derive the latter from the former.[79] As we shall see in the following examples, a number of moral teachings of these types of ethics can be universalized even though their defenders often exemplify or justify them by recourse to specific authorities.

Leaving aside the eminent distinction with regard to the cognition and development of ethics, all moral teachings agree on the surface on the "virtues" (Uzb., *yakhshi akhloq*) that every man and woman should strive to develop; in the terminology of "divine objectivism", they agree on the "duties" (*fariza*) that are incumbent on every man and woman. The most frequently mentioned virtues are: knowledge, patience, modesty, truthfulness, honesty, kindness, respectfulness, thankfulness, industriousness, frugality, economy, friendship, hospitality and helpfulness. This list shows that in the Central Asian moral teachings of "harmonizing objectivism"—as in ancient Greece and some

76 Frank and Mamatov, *Uzbek Islamic Debates*, 34.

77 Birnbacher, *Analytische Einführung*, 35–36.

78 Frank and Mamatov, *Uzbek Islamic Debates*, 23, 51, xv.

79 ʿAbdallāh Avlānī, *Türkī gulistān*, 33 (Arabic script), 26 (Cyrillic script).

modern philosophies—the concept of "virtue" encompasses not only character values that are connected with our acts, but also intellectual virtues. Let us take an intellectual virtue, namely knowledge, to demonstrate how differently this is understood. In the teachings of Yasavī, Ṣūfī Allāhyār, and the first three books of *Chahār kitāb*, "knowledge" (*ʿilm*) is restricted to "religious knowledge", and includes what Ḥanafī and Māturīdī scholars and Sufi shaykhs have taught.[80] In Sufi anthropocentric ethics at least, belletristic literature is included in what one should know. For the Mujaddidīs and the "new" *otin*s, i.e. the Muslim female missionaries, the sources for religious "knowledge" are only the Qur'ān and the Sunna and those teachings of the jurists and theologians that directly rely on these sources. The term "knowledge" (*ʿilm*) is used by them also with respect to religious practices. Regular praying and wearing of the veil (*hijob*) is understood as "having entered the knowledge". *The* knowledge is thus a religious one. However, this understanding does not prevent the "new" *otin*s from aspiring to have a profession in a secular field of knowledge such as pharmacy, medicine, or education, which they consider licit and useful.[81]

In order to be considered a man or women of knowledge, the Jadīds, the propagators of Soviet Islam and those of the Uzbek state ideology also require knowledge in the main fields of non-religious sciences, such as geography, history, mathematics, and physics, in addition to knowledge of Islamic rituals and dogmas according to the Central Asian tradition. The Soviet State's ideology required familiarity with the aforementioned secular sciences and knowledge of Soviet politics, economics, socialist patriotism, and proletarian internationalism. To what extent the precept of acquiring knowledge was understood as universalizable is an open question. If formulated as the question of whether everybody should acquire the knowledge needed in his environment, the answer would be "yes".

As an example of how young Uzbeks are nowadays instigated to search for knowledge, I quote from the *odob-noma* for the second class:

> In order to become a real child of our free country, you have to prepare yourself from now onwards. Right now, not much is demanded from you. The most important thing is to study. Also, the Qur'ān and Muḥammad appeal to study. It is not done in vain. Only knowledge opens the way to

80 The third part of *Chahār kitāb* opens with the sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad that the search for knowledge is a religious duty for every male and female Muslim and enumerates some basic religious knowledge depicting Paradise and Hell as the future for those who follow or do not follow the divine commands respectively.

81 Krämer, *Geistliche Autorität*, 253, 404.

> the good and to the light. You will learn that the Japanese and American scientists have learnt cybernetics from our forefather al-Khorazmiy.[82]

Here, religion is merely presented as encouraging science and scientific knowledge, and as a way to the good, but not as a condition *sine qua non*—earlier Muslim philosophers and the Jadīds interpreted the Qur'ān and the Sunna in that way. "Knowledge" is here presented as a universal asset. The claim that Uzbekistan is the homeland of science gives the whole appeal a strikingly nationalistic tone but does not violate the principle of universalizability.

There are also differences in the conception of other virtues, for instance in the case of friendship and kindness: with whom should we be friends, and should I be kind to my enemy? Furthermore, there are virtues that are peculiar to some moral teachings only. These virtues often regard subjects that are of special concern to a collective and not to the individual. Hence, they have no distinguished place in Sufi theocentric and anthropocentric moral teachings, since these teachings display, almost exclusively, the advantages of ethics in view of the individual happiness, either of God or the specific human, and not of the community.

A very prominent virtue or duty in other moral teachings that apparently has collective happiness as its ultimate goal is "the love of one's homeland" (*vaṭannī sūymak*). Avlānī made this dictum the title of a chapter in his *Tūrkī gulistān yākhūd akhlāq*, and he linked it to the "patriotic" dictum that "to love one's homeland is part of the faith", which is ascribed to the prophet Muḥammad.[83] The virtue of patriotism seems to have been introduced into Central Asia by the Jadīd thinkers in order to link an Islamic identity to a national, civic awareness.[84] During Soviet times this was replaced by Soviet

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82 Q. Abullayeva, M. Yusupova, S. Rahmonbekova, *Odobnoma—O'zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq ta'limi vazirligi 2-sinf uchun darslik sifatida tasdiqlagan*, 3rd ed. (Tashkent: Mehnat, 2003), 10 (referring to the mathematician and polymath al-Khwārizmī, d. around 847).

83 *Ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān*; 'Abdallāh Avlānī, *Tūrkī gulistān*, 37 (Arabic script), 28 (Cyrillic script). This saying was widely used to religiously legitimize patriotism in Muslim reform circles in last quarter of the 19th century; cf. Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: University Press, 2011), 66. It is not part of the six canonical collections of the sayings ascribed to the Prophet Muḥammad.

84 Dudoignon, "La question scolaire", 165; cf. Hisao Komatsu, "The Evolution of Group Identity among Bukharan Intellectuals in 1911–1928: An Overview", *Memoirs of the Research Department of The Toyo Bunko* (*The Oriental Library*) 47 (Tokyo, 1989), 115–44.

patriotism, civic-mindedness, and Party loyalty.[85] Nowadays, "love for one's homeland" ranks at the top of the virtues imparted in Uzbek state schoolbooks, and the latter explicitly refer to Avlānī's in this context, arguing that this patriotism is a sentiment shared by all humans,[86] and consequently universal. Yet the virtue of patriotism is explained mainly with regard to Uzbekistan, and always with its consequences or values in view—the motivation to take care of one's homeland, to let it prosper and to preserve its sovereignty.

It is obvious that the nationalist "love for one's homeland" comes into conflict with the virtue of patriotism in the sense of the Islamic *umma* that has no national borders. The latter is the position of the Mujadiddiyya and similar fundamentalist teachings. These different understandings of "homeland" are not made explicit in schoolbooks but in governmental guidelines against "religious extremism". In one example of this thriving genre, "to love one's homeland is part of the faith" and sayings and deeds of "our ancestors", such as the Ḥanafī scholar Burhān al-Dīn Marghinānī (d. 1197) and the ruler Bābur (d. 1530), are mobilized against the threat of a borderless Islam.[87]

Such claims are, however, not intended to show that the heritage of Central Asia meets the universal moral norms and general human values. Unfortunately, in their campaign against "extremism" the Uzbek authorities imprisoned and killed hundreds of innocent people.[88] The state established a control over Islam, and over religions in general, as well as over the nonviolent opposition in a manner that blatantly violates the schoolbook ethics it prescribes.

85 Medlin et al., *Education and Development*, 105.

86 X. Sultonov and M. Qarshiboyev, *Vatan tuyg'usi, o'rta maktablarning 5-sinflari uchun o'quv qo'llanmasi*, 3rd ed. (Tashkent: Ma'naviyat, 2007), 37, 42.

87 O'zbekiston Respublikasi Vazirlar Mahkamasi huzuridagi din išlari bo'yiča qo'mita, O'zbekiston Respublikasi Vazirlar Mahkamasi huzuridagi Toškent Islom Universiteti, O'zbekiston Musulmonlari Idorasi, *Dinij baġrikenglik va mutaassiblik* (*yuz savolga—yuz žavob*) (Tashkent: Toškent Islom Universiteti Našriyot-Matbaa Birlašmasi, 2007), 114–26. This booklet is obviously part of the "Program for the Defense of our Sacred Religion, for the Struggle against Fundamentalism and against Diverse Extremist Tendencies" that was launched in 2000 (cf. Babadjanov, "Islam officiel", 151, 154–56).

88 Adeeb Khalid, *Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2007), 168–203; Rasanayagam, *Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan*, 1–5.

Conclusion

With its comparative approach and long-range perspective, this contribution searched for continuities, similarities, and differences between moral teachings of different schools of thought and ideologies in the region that nowadays constitutes the Republic of Uzbekistan. The goal was to develop a comprehensive approach to the various trends of teaching morality in public schools and Islamic private instruction over the past 150 years. The eight types of moral teachings that I discerned according to their intellectual origins share the assumption that ethics have an objective or real foundation, and thus claim to represent the objective truth and a kind of universalism. With regard to the nature of the presumed foundation of the moral truth, however, they differ quite considerably. I distinguished the teachings by differentiating between *divine*, *harmonizing*, and *empirical objectivism*. We saw that only the moral teaching according to the Soviet state ideology decisively supports empirical objectivism; this is a clear sign that religious justification has remained indispensable for moral education. Religious authority explicitly justifies the moral precepts, but to various degrees: in the "moral teaching according to the Uzbek State ideology" the religious component is low, but in the "Islamic fundamentalist teaching" it is exclusive. Even among the types of moral education subsumed under *harmonizing objectivism*, the range is wide, and what side of the harmonizing scale dominates obviously depends on the context and the target audience. The Sufi-inspired anthropocentric moral teaching—though not prescriptive but appelative and cognitive—puts examples of pre-Islamic Iranian kings and sages side by side with Muslim references, and appeals to humanity as its frame of reference; yet here, too, we have to keep in mind that the authors lived in a space where *divine objectivism*, with its prescriptions and the emotional imageries of Paradise and Hell, dominated jurisprudence and theology. In fact, this is also the case in the traditional *maktab* and *madrasa*, as well as in the teachings of the "traditional" *otin*s in today's Uzbekistan. On the other hand, a reader of the Sufi-inspired anthropocentric moral teachings who received no religious education in Soviet times or in present-day Uzbekistan would certainly understand their counsels as very beautifully expressed appeals to man in general to foster virtues irrespective of a person's faith or disbelief. This new possibility to understand a Navāʾī or a Saʿdī seems to be the reason why they were included in pedagogical manuals in Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbekistan, and why the defenders and propagators of *divine objectivism*, such as the Mujaddidiyya and "new" *otin*s, so vigorously reject this kind of literature. Yet, the "moral teaching of Soviet Islam", that is of the Central

Asian Spiritual Directorate for Muslims and its Uzbek successor organization, have had no difficulty in adopting some fundamentalist interpretations of the Qur'ān and the Sunna when these interpretations correspond to state interests. It is a trite statement that the context of the recipients and their interpretations of recognized norms and values are decisive elements in the design of moral education. However, the claim to moral objectivity is to be taken seriously, and is crucial for the effectiveness of education in a society where moral relativism or particularism have no established ground. The striking nationalist tone of the Jadīd and present-day Uzbek ethical manuals (with "the love for one's homeland") appears as "particularistic" only at first glance. A further look reveals that it has been justified in universal rational terms, and with authorities that mark their *harmonizing objectivism*, that is, by sayings of the prophet Muḥammad and of non-Muslim thinkers.