

Specific Religious Developments around the Turn of the 2nd Century

The conflict between determinists and adherents of predestination, on the one side, and Qadarites and advocates of free will, on the other, continued for generations. By contrast, other questions were already settled in the Umayyad period and later were scarcely ever raised again in a controversial manner. Already early on, the aversion to pictorial representation of a plastic or two-dimensional nature manifested itself. But Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, after the conquest of Ctesiphon, was not yet disturbed by the fact that in the audience hall of the Sassanian palace, the so-called Īwān Kisrā, where he had a prayer-niche installed, there were stucco ornaments of men and horses on the walls.¹ In Kūfa at the time of Ibn Mas'ūd, mosques existed that contained frescos (*masājīd munaqqasha*).² But the mosaics, with which Walīd I had the walls of the Great Mosque of Damascus decorated, already show only houses and gardens – an indication of Paradise but without its inhabitants; it has rightly been remarked that what in the Byzantine model provided the background has here been made into the foreground.³ Although at this same time in the Ḥijāz miracles of the Prophet are beginning to be spoken of,⁴ nonetheless these have never played a role iconographically, just as with his death. Instead, calligraphy blossoms to the same extent that the Koran – “Scripture” – embarks upon its triumphal march. The much discussed prohibition of images by Yazīd II here only adds an especially strong tone; it comes in the wake of the anti-Christian measures of 'Abd al-Malik, even though in this respect it remains no more than an episode.⁵

1 Ṭabarī I, 2443, ll. 16 ff.; on this Morony, *Iraq* 432.

2 Ṭurūshī, *al-Ḥawādīth wa'l-bida'* 95, ll. 2 f. from bot.

3 O. Grabar, *Formation of Islamic Art* 92 f. On this in greater detail B. Finster in: *Kunst des Oriens* 7/1972/83 ff., above all 117 ff.; differently H. Stern in: *Cahiers archéologiques* 22/1972/217 ff. Briefly also K. Brisch in: Akten XIX. DOT, ZDMG Suppl. III₂, p. 1574. Did 'Umar II himself have this decoration draped with fabrics? (cf. Jāhīz, *Ḥayawān* I, 57, l. 1; unfortunately the passage is not entirely unambiguous.

4 On this R. Sellheim in: *Oriens* 18–19/1965–66/53 ff.

5 It was never later forbidden for the Christians to use images in worship; the aversion of the Muslims concentrated on the cross or the ringing of bells. The transition from 'Abd al-Malik to Yazīd II is very well portrayed by King in: BSOAS 48/1985/267 ff. On the literature about

One must reflect on the extent to which this was already connected to a rejection of anthropomorphism.⁶ It may be said, however, that God's image did not yet attract much interest. One still adhered to the historical symbols: the Prophet and, more and more, the Koran as well. Towards the end of the 1st century the apse-shaped prayer-niche became generally accepted, the *mīhrāb mujawwaf*, with which one marked the *sutra*, the place where the Prophet performed his prayers; in this way the believers would be reminded of his continued invisible presence.⁷ Already on a coin from the period of 'Abd al-Malik, before his reform, there appears, as it seems, the short-spear (*'anaza*) of the Prophet within an arch which is supported by two spiral-shaped columns.⁸ Whether, at the time on Friday, the preacher left free the highest step of the pulpit on which the Prophet had sat, cannot be inferred from the sources with certainty. In the Maghrib and on the Indian Subcontinent this usage has survived until today; for the early period, however, the evidence is not straightforward.⁹

iconoclasm in Byzantium and in Islam, and the old controversy about who started it, cf. *ibid.* 267, fn. 1, and R. M. Haddad in: *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 27/1982/302, fn. 1. On the problem now also Griffith in: *JAOS* 105/1985/68 ff. in argument with P. Crone (in: *JSAI* 2/1980/59 ff.); on the archaeological findings R. Schick, *The Fate of the Christians in Palestine* 296 ff. The authoritative Arabic texts on the prohibition of images are found in Paret, *Schriften zum Islam* 213 ff. The contribution by Nagel, "Die religionsgeschichtlichen Wurzeln des sogenannten Bilderverbots im Islam" (in: H. J. Klimkeit, *Götterbild in Kunst und Schrift* 93 ff.) only gives a general entry into the subject on the basis of the Koran.

6 On this in detail Chpts. D 1.2–1.2.1.5.

7 On this E. Whelan in: *IJMES* 18/1986/214 f.; similarly already O. Grabar, *Formation* 121.

8 On this C. E. Miles in: *Archaeologica Orientalia in memoriam E. Herzfeld* 156 ff.; also *idem* in: *EI*² 1, 482 s v. *Anaza*. On this now Whelan, *op. cit.*, 215 f. The *mīhrāb mujawwaf* is only attested since 95/714 (cf. the list in Whelan 221 f.).

9 F. Meier in: *Festschrift Spuler* 225 ff.

4.1 The Image of the Prophet

In a clearly discernible manner the belief spreads that after Muḥammad until the end of time there will be no other prophets. As we saw, the first beginnings of this were early; the idea is rooted in the way Islam sees itself. In any case, for a while one seems to have been satisfied with the vicarship of the caliph.¹ Gradually, however, in this regard one discovered the formula of “the seal of the prophets” which is applied in a quite special connection to Muḥammad in a passage in the Koran.² The first instance of this that we have from the Umayyad period is not yet wholly reliable: an alleged communication from Ḥajjāj to ‘Abd al-Malik.³ We are on considerably firmer ground when it comes to an edict of Walīd II from the year 125/743, especially as an interpretation is also provided in it; with the Prophet, so it states in this passage, God has “sealed (*khatama*) revelation and given him everything He bestowed on the prophets before him”.⁴ Moreover, this sounds like “seal” means what it presumably means in the Koran: confirmation but not necessarily end;⁵ one had understood the formula in this manner in Manicheism as well.⁶ However, it appears once again a few lines later in connection with the death of the Prophet;⁷ there scarcely any doubt is still possible. Then an attempt was soon made to supplement the words by the addition of *lā nabīyya ba’dahū*.⁸ This at first met with resistance; many objected that actually Jesus would still come back.⁹ The latter were presumably from Syria where this expectation

1 Thus the thesis of Crone/Hinds, *God’s Caliph* 27 ff.

2 Surah 33/40. It is there a question of Muḥammad’s marriage to the wife of his adopted son Zayd which needed a special justification.

3 Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, *ʿIqd* V, 40, l. 6.

4 Ṭabarī II, 1757, 9 f.; on the text also Nagel, *Rechtleitung* 82 f. and now the translation in Crone/Hinds, *God’s Caliph* 119.

5 On the meaning in the Koran cf. Speyer, *Biblische Erzählungen* 422 f. and Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies* 64 f.; in general F. J. Dölger, *Sphragis* (Paderborn 1911) and W. Bauer, *Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* 1577 s. v.

6 On this G. G. Stroumsa in: *JSAI* 7/1986/61 ff. Whether Muḥammad took it from Manicheism, as is often assumed, becomes doubtful because it is only met with in connection with Mani in Islamic sources (ibid. 70 ff.; also Colpe in: *Festschrift Rundgren* 71 ff.). On the development in general and on a possible beginning in Tertullian cf. Colpe in: *Berliner Theol. Zs.* 4/1987/2 ff.; now also idem, *Das Siegel der Propheten* (Berlin 1990).

7 Ṭabarī II, 1758, ll. 3 f.

8 *Conc.* II 9 b. A reflection of this already in Quṭāmī (d. 101/720?); cf. the *Dīwān*, ed. Barth, p. 6, verse 37.

9 Ibn Abī Shayba, *Muṣannaḥ* IX, 109 f., no. 6704 f.; also Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 235, 3 ff. = 187, ll. 3 ff. from bot./transl. Lecomte 207 f. § 205–206.

was most widely disseminated.¹⁰ It then occurred there as well that somebody, once the supplementary words had gained acceptance, further added a quick *in shā'ullāh*. As it turned out, in the middle of the 2nd century he was executed at the order of Maṣṣūr.¹¹

Objections to this way of understanding the *khātām al-nabiyyīn* continue to be raised later on as well; but mostly they occur in a special context. Abū 'Abdallāh al-Shīrī, the champion of the Fāṭimids in the Maghrib, is supposed not to have applied the formula to Muḥammad (Qāḍī 'Iyād in Talbi, *Tarājim aghlabiyya* 356, ll. 6 ff.); probably he thought of his Imam. For this reason, Abū Yazīd, "the man with the donkey", when he launched his revolt against the Fāṭimids in the Maghrib, had stamped on his coins the formula *Muḥammad khātām al-nabiyyīn* (A. Launois in: *Gedenkschrift Wiet* 121). Likewise, the mystic Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī expressly rejected the interpretation; but he actually introduced the theory of the *khātām al-awliyā'* (on this see now Takeshita, *Ibn 'Arabī's Theory of the Perfect Man* 145 ff. and previously). For him "the seal of the prophets" is a seal of prophethood which first appears to the Prophet in the Beyond and shines forth from him between his shoulders (*K. Khatm al-awliyā'* 338, ll. 10 f., and 341, ll. 10 ff.). Here he takes up an old idea; one also claimed to observe this sign of prophethood, for instance, on the 'Alid pretender al-Nafs al-zakiyya (van Arendonk, *Opkomst* 50, ftn. 10; cf. *ḥadīths* regarding this in *Conc.* II, 9 b). According to the *K. al-Ulūf* of Abū Ma'shar, every thousand years a new prophet comes; this stands within the framework of Iranian national expectations (Pingree in: *Eliran* I, 338). Extensive materials on the question in general are offered by the previously cited article of Y. Friedmann in: *JSAI* 7/1986/177 ff. (now reprinted in *Prophecy Continuous* 50 ff.); there on p. 213 (= 81) he also states his position with regard to earlier explanations.

If there was not to be any other prophet after Muḥammad, then it was actually implied that his message was directed to all mankind; he is "a sign of mercy for people throughout the world", as Walīd II, along with surah 21/107, said in his edict.¹² On the other hand, if right at the outset it says that Islam is the religion of the best of God's creatures,¹³ the Arabs at the time will above all have taken

10 See above p. 5.

11 More on this below pp. 157 f.

12 Ṭabarī II, 1757, l. 9.

13 *Ibid.* 1757, l. 1; corrected with Crone/Hinds, *God's Caliph*, 118, ftn. 1.

this to mean themselves. As the Koran commentator Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāḥim (d. 105/723) related, Gabriel presented Muḥammad to the angels during his heavenly ascension with the words: “This is Muḥammad, the Prophet of mercy, whom God has sent as a prophet to the *Arabs*, the seal of the prophets and the lord of *mankind*”.¹⁴ The boundaries between the two conceptions were still fluid; they were only first clearly established once the social tension between Arabs and clients that stood in the background was resolved.¹⁵ That Muḥammad had spoken Arabic was the merit which distinguished him the most in the eyes of his first followers. But precisely this could easily turn into a sign of his limitations. When Abū ʿĪsā al-Iṣfahānī, presumably in the first half of ʿAbd al-Malik’s caliphate, proclaimed the arrival of the Jewish Messiah in Fārs, he was able to make Muḥammad the latter’s precursor with the argument that after all he had only been sent as a prophet to the Arabs.¹⁶ Later, in the 2nd century, Iraqi Jews had attempted to escape the pressures for conversion with the same argument; for this purpose they referred to surah 62/2.¹⁷ The Apocalypse of Shimon ben Yoḥay, which was produced at the time of the Abbasid revolution, is based on the same assumptions.¹⁸ But whoever acknowledged Muḥammad as God’s Messenger for all mankind, for “the white and the black and the red”, to cite Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāḥim again,¹⁹ if he had not grown up with the Arabic language, often had to submit to being told that he was not able to appreciate the beauty of the Prophet’s message. Apparently, in the early Abbasid period there was already conflict over this issue in the case of Ibn al-Muqaffa’.²⁰

It does not appear that this Prophet, who with his Arabic message had also addressed the non-Arab world, was at that time already considered to be illiterate; the framework of dogmatic conditions which led to this idea, especially the *ijāz* concept, was not yet on hand.²¹ The idea in itself is apparently attested for the period in question: it was said about Abū ʿĪsā al-Iṣfahānī that

14 Suyūṭī, *Laʿālī* I, 67, ll. 3 f. from bot., in an extensive text which begins p. 63, l. 9 (on this below Chpt. B 3.1.2.1.1).

15 Does this issue also lie behind the idea that a whore’s child, i.e. the son of a female slave, can not enter Paradise? (See above p. 23). – For how Muḥammad stood regarding this question cf. Buhl in: *Islamica* 2/1926/135 ff.

16 On this see my contribution in: *Festschrift Gabrieli* 301 ff., there p. 308. For more see below Chpt. B 3.2.1.1.

17 Goldziher, *Ges. Schr.* III, 338 f., following Shaybānī; also Kister in: *JSAI* 5/1984/43.

18 Goitein, *Jews and Arabs* 170; on the text cf. Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden* 4v, 464 ff.

19 Suyūṭī, *ibid.* 75, l. 8 from bot.

20 See below Chpt. B 2.2.1.4.2.

21 More on this below Chpts. C 8.2.2.3.1.3,1 and D 4.2.1.

he was not able to read and write,²² and likewise later about the Kūfan gnostic Abū Maṣṣūr al-ʿIjlī, who was executed around 125/743.²³ But at least in the latter case this was meant pejoratively; obviously one did not copy this from the contemporary image of Muḥammad. Otherwise, generally speaking it was not deemed a compliment to be an illiterate.²⁴ The adjective *ummī* which is applied to Muḥammad in surah 7/157 f. and also in other passages in the Koran, is often still understood differently in the exegesis of the time, i.e. as a description of persons who until then had not had a divine book bestowed on them.²⁵ Moreover, no value was placed on the Islamic revelation for being new and direct because of its complete independence; one had no fear of exterior influences as the Isrāʿīliyyāt attest.²⁶ Nor was the reproach that Muḥammad took his revelation from someone else in any way refuted in the Koran by referring to his illiteracy but rather with a somewhat embarrassed admission that at any rate he had brought it forth in Arabic, whereas his teacher spoke another language (Hebrew? Aramaic?).²⁷

22 See above fn. 16.

23 Nawbakhtī, *Firaq al-Shīʿa* 34, l. 9; translated in Halm, *Gnosis* 86. Abū Maṣṣūr advocated the idea of *revelatio continua* (Ashʿarī, *Maq.* 9, ll. 14 f.).

24 Grohmann, *Arabische Paläographie* II, 6.

25 On this I. Goldfeld in: *Der Islam* 57/1980/58 ff. Thereby one was still rather close to the original meaning (cf. Paret, *Kommentar* 21 f. on surah 2/78 and Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies* 53 f.).

26 On this also cf. below pp. 144 f.

27 Surah 16/103; on the situation cf. Buhl, *Leben Muhammeds* 164.

4.2 The Koran

The authority of the Prophet was based on his having transmitted the Koran and not in fact on what he had said himself. Nonetheless, since early on, opponents of the government authorities refer to “the Book of God and the *sunna* of His Prophet”; but the formula in question was never filled in as to its contents. One used it simply to plead for justice; the *sunnat al-nabī* as a corpus of specific *exempla* did not yet exist.¹ Yet similarly with regard to the Koran itself, it is by no means certain whether it had already assumed its canonical form and when this definitively occurred. At any rate, Khārijites in Iran were able to raise doubts about surah 12 or surah 42,² and in one place in Egypt an ivory table from the year 70 was preserved on which surah 5/121 was recorded in a somewhat deviant form;³ likewise, the inscriptions on the Dome of the Rock paraphrase the Koran rather than citing it word-for-word.⁴ But these examples – to which others might be added – can be interpreted in various ways. At any rate, it is reported that in Damascus, at a time when the old Church of St John still existed, the Koran reciter ‘Atīyya b. Qays sat on its steps and recited from a standard Koran so that his listeners could correct their own copies (which were not necessarily complete).⁵ The inscriptions on the Dome of the Rock are provided with rudimentary diacritical marks, as they were expressly introduced at the time to safeguard the Word of God.⁶ As is known, for some years now the question of how the Koran was edited has been very controversial;⁷ nor is this the place to settle the matter. However, the question

1 Crone/Hinds, *God's Caliph* 59 ff. and previously; also for one subject area see already HT 56 ff.

2 See below Chpt. B 3.1.3.1.

3 Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī, *Tibyān* IV, 75, ll. 2 ff.

4 On Koranic quotations and allusions in the poetry of the Umayyad period cf. Zubaidi in: CHAL I, 322 ff.; for Farazdaq cf. also Bellamy in: *Festschrift Watt* 151 f.

5 AZ 346, no 699; Fasawī II 398, ll. 3 ff.; Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ṭabaqāt al-qurrā'* I, 513 f., no. 2125. His *nisba* is here given as al-Kilābī but elsewhere as al-Kalā'ī (cf. Khalifa, *Tab.* 798, no. 2955 and Fasawī II, 332, l. II; TT VII, 228, no. 418.

6 Moreover right inside the building, on the side of the arcade which faces towards the rock.

7 The points of view of the main opponents in the debate (J. Wansbrough, J. Burton, A. Neuwirth; without much evidence also Crone/Cook, *Hagarism* 17 f.) are well known. On the formulation of the problem cf. K. Rudolph in: ThLZ 105/1980/3 ff.; A. Neuwirth in: *Vorträge XXI. DOT* (ZDMG, Suppl. 5), pp. 183 ff. and A. Rippin in: *Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies* (ed. R. C. Martin), pp. 151 ff. The dispute is essentially ongoing in the Anglo-Saxon world but in part is being fought out with categories that were developed in German Old-Testament research. It has remained unnoticed up to now that in more recent Soviet Arabist works the Koran has been viewed as the fruit “of collective effort” (cf. Batunsky in: *Religion*

is posed alongside a problem to do with the history of dogma which at this point we cannot pass over, i.e. the theory concerning the abrogation of certain scriptural passages.

Abrogation (*naskh*) is a typically Islamic theologoumenon. In the Old Testament there is only one known case that might be interpreted this way, and typically it had also only recently arisen in anyone's awareness.⁸ The Word of God was unalterable; yet one had to take precautions against the falsifying intervention of man. This one had done from time immemorial most emphatically with the so-called formula of Ptahotep, as it occurs in Deuteronomy for instance: "Do not add anything to what I order you, and do not remove anything, so that you observe the commandments of the Lord . . ."⁹ The Apocalypse had adopted the idea;¹⁰ thus it had become binding for the Christians.¹¹ It was likewise repeated in the Talmud;¹² and then it remained important for the Jews. The Christians claimed that they had left the law behind them; in so doing, for the first time they made the distinction that men should not tamper with the sacred text but God most certainly can abolish it.

Muslims were in the same position as the Christians; the Koran also abolished the earlier "laws". Yet this is not the reason why they developed the theory of abrogation; the dialectical-theological aspect only arose later in debate with Jews.¹³ For the Christians "the Word of God" had actually become a person; for Muslims, on the other hand, as in the case of the Jews it once more took on the form of a scripture. Consequently, it was not able to adapt itself so easily to different situations as was the message of Jesus; it was rather a decree. If the situation changed, it required another word. The canonization of the transmitted text continually stood in the way of this. The process of canonization was nothing new in itself for Muslims; for this reason they completed it more

12/1982/376 f.). Presumably new insights are to be expected from the Koran fragments that have been found in the chief mosque of Şan'ā' (on this H.-C. Graf von Bothmer in: *Pantheon* 45/1987/4 ff.; also *Maşāḥif Şan'ā'*, Cat. Dār al-Āthār al-Islāmiyya Kuwait, 1985).

8 H. Donner, "Jesaja lvi 1–7", in: *Supplements to Vetus Testamentum*, vol 36, pp. 81 ff.

9 Deuteron. 4, 2: similarly *ibid.* 12, 32; Prov. 24, 29. On the ancient Egyptian model cf. A. Erman, *Die Literatur der Ägypter* 98: "Nimm kein Wort weg und füge keines hinzu und setze auch keines an die Stelle eines andern. [Do not add or remove a single word, nor replace one word with another.] More on this in J. Leipoldt/S. Morenz, *Heilige Schriften* 56 ff.

10 Apoc. 22, 18 f.

11 Irenaeus uses the formula in connection with one of his own writings (Eusebius, *Church History* v, 20, l. 2).

12 *bTalmud Sotā* 20 a; additional material in Strack-Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum NT* 1, 601.

13 See below Chpt. C 3.2.2.2.4.1.2 for *Nazzām*.

quickly than the earlier “people with scriptures” who had shown them the way. But they handled the process too mechanically; they did not take into account that canonization does not precede recognition of scripture’s authority but follows upon it.¹⁴ This process of recognition was now still in flux; there where it should have become most important, in the field of jurisprudence, it had not yet really started. Legal practice, as has been repeatedly emphasized since Schacht, at the time oriented itself to a great extent according to other criteria, and if one had recourse to the Koran, one could not avoid confirming that it contradicted itself in important points. The Koran contained instructions for specific historical situations and questions with which the Prophet had been confronted; if one made it into a law book, one must be prepared to eliminate certain passages. But one was no longer in the position to do this in a radical sense because one had already accepted the concept of a canon. Thus the only way out was the assumption that God Himself had in part corrected Himself, precisely through abrogation.

In his dissertation J. Burton has shown by what complicated convolutions the theory developed and how much in individual cases it did violence to the facts and to tradition.¹⁵ Likewise, he makes it clear how early this process had already begun: namely, the documentation mostly consists of *ḥadīths* which later become recognized in their own right as canonical and scarcely can have been invented earlier than the beginning of the 2nd century. These materials are all the more important since otherwise we scarcely dispose over any early evidence on the subject. The theoretical treatises that were written before the time of Shāfi‘ī are either no longer extant or, as regards their authenticity, are not absolutely secure against the criticism of sceptics.¹⁶ On the other hand, Muḥāsibī, one generation after Shāfi‘ī has at his disposal the complete array of conceptual instruments of astounding subtlety; one can hardly explain this phenomenon other than by means of a long tradition.¹⁷ Already in the *Sīra* of the Ibāḍīte Sālim b. Dhakwān, which presumably cannot have been composed later than the beginning of the 2nd century, one finds a theoretical statement

14 This is rightly emphasized by Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies* 202.

15 *The Collection of the Qur’ān*; Cambridge 1977. Cf. now also Powers in: *Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur’ān* (ed. A. Rippin), pp. 117 ff.

16 Cf. for instance A. Rippin in: BSOAS 47/1984/22 ff. on the *K. al-Nāsikh wa’l-mansūkh* of Zuhri there edited by him (the same text has now also been edited by Ḥātim Šāliḥ al-Ḍāmin in: MM’YI 38/1987/312 ff.).

17 The classification that he undertakes only deviates in details from the later usual one (see below Chpt. C 6.2).

concerning the problem.¹⁸ Thereafter one is not so surprised to see that Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’, towards the end of the Umayyad period, is already meant to have developed a distinction which since then, on the Sunnī side, has never again been questioned: namely, that only commands and prohibitions, i.e. legally relevant passages, can be abrogated, but not *akhbār*, narrative passages.¹⁹ Statements, in contrast to imperatives, are either true or false; consequently, if one of them is abrogated by another, this implies that the earlier one was “a lie”. But God cannot lie.²⁰ By contrast, He may well decree that from a particular moment onwards men should act differently than before. God has shown this most clearly in the change of the direction of prayer.²¹

On the other hand, if this distinction is really so old,²² one is tempted to assume that alongside – or even instead of – this epistemological discussion something else is concealed, something more relevant. Later sources actually place it in opposition to the teaching of the Shī‘ites.²³ Indeed, the latter, at least in Kūfa, early on held the view that parts of the Koran – nine-tenths of the text as their adversaries said²⁴ – had been suppressed by their Sunnī opponents. Here they were not thinking of legally relevant verses but statements about the rank of ‘Alī and his right to the caliphate. But whoever believed that many Koranic passages had been abrogated likewise felt compelled to admit the possibility that such statements could have completely disappeared from the

18 Cf. Cook, *Dogma* 93; on the dating see below p. 174. A theoretical preamble is also contained in *K. al-Nāsikh wa’l-mansūkh* of Abū ‘Ubayd (d. 224/838) who was about one generation older than Muḥāsibī; but this opening section is quite short, and the terminology is different (Ms. Istanbul, Ahmet III 143, now published in facsimile, Frankfurt 1985; with it cf. the edition by J. Burton, Cambridge 1987, and the analysis of the contents *ibid.*, Intro. 57 ff.). On the other hand, the text edited by Rippin simply enumerates the individual cases without any systematization. The same is true for the treatise by Qatāda (d. circa 117/735; on this below Chpt. B 2.2.3.3) and probably also for the treatise of ‘Aṭā’ al-Khurāsānī (d. 135/753) who is cited several times by Abū ‘Ubayd.

19 See below Chpt. B 2.2.6.1.9.1.

20 Thus the later Mu‘tazilite justification (Ash‘arī, *Maq.* 206, ll. 12 ff.; also 53, ll. 10 ff.).

21 A list of abrogated verses still found in the Koran is provided by J. W. Sweetman, *Islam and Christian Theology* I₂, 238 f.; in general cf. also ‘Abd al-Muta‘āl Muḥammad Jabrī, *al-Naskh fī’l-sharī‘a al-islāmīyya* (Cairo 1961).

22 It is likewise found in the treatise of Qatāda although there – as an addition? – it is traced back to Suddī who was perhaps younger than Qatāda (d. 128/748; cf. edition Beirut 1984, pp. 46 f.). Wansbrough notes it first for Naḥḥās (d. 338/950; *Quranic Studies* 197). But he does not know the Wāṣil-tradition nor the explanations of Muḥāsibī.

23 Ash‘arī, *Maq.* 478, ll. 12 ff. and 53, ll. 7 ff., also implicitly Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* 227, ll. 1 f. and Shirāzī, *Tabṣīra* 251 ff.; on this cf. the material presented by Pines, *Atomenlehre* 127, fn. 2.

24 Thus according to the *K. al-Irjā’* (Text II 1, u).

Koran. Yet this was no more than a possibility; most of the abrogated verses, as it turned out, had remained in the Koran and were still used in recitation.²⁵ But it held true, for example, for the so-called verse on stoning (*āyat al-rajam*). The Azraqites, with consistency, had rejected stoning as a punishment for fornication because it is not mentioned in the Koran.²⁶ Whoever wished to retain this sanction and did not feel that the *sunna* was sufficient justification, could not avoid maintaining that it had once been in the Koran; here the situation was the other way round, the recited text was abrogated but the commandment had been kept in force.²⁷ Here was something the Shī'ites could point to: if a verse had disappeared in this case, then why not in the case of 'Alī as well? Wāṣil clarified the position with his distinction: historical statements could not be abrogated; if they are not found in the Koran, then they had never been there.

This situation in the discussion is reconstructed and, for the time being, is hypothetical in many respects. It assumes that the Shī'ites whom Wāṣil had in mind no longer spoke of a commonplace falsification or mutilation of Scripture but they accepted it as a closed canonical text; but then argument on the basis of abrogation was the only viable path. In fact, the Shī'ite testimonies from the 2nd century are already much more moderate than the above-cited – quite polemical – remark in the *K. al-Irjā'* (see below p. 326). Kalbī, on the basis of the transmitted text of the Koran, attempted to demonstrate that even straightforward statements in it had been abrogated (see below p. 347 f.). The Sunnīs saw in this assumption a justification of the Shī'ite doctrine of *badā'*; God, in their opinion, could not only abrogate a certain kind of verse in a calculable manner but at any moment He could change His mind (cf. the passages mentioned above in fn. 23; more on this below pp. 365 f.). However, this only led to the Shī'a actually using abrogation as an argument for *badā'* (Khayyāt, *Intiṣār* 93, ll. 14 f.). The Sunnīs encouraged this further by understanding abrogation in connection with surah 2/106 as causing-to-enter-oblivion: God caused Muḥammad or the editors of the Koran to forget the verse

25 Here one later spoke of *naskh al-ḥukm dūna'l-tilāwa* (Burton 49 ff.).

26 Cf. Ash'arī, *Maq.* 89, l. 3, with 127, l. 3; Malaṭī, *Tanbīh* 142, l. 4/185, l. 5 from bot.; on this E1² I, 811 a.

27 So-called *naskh al-tilāwa dūna'l-ḥukm* (cf. Burton 89 ff.). Naturally, the concept of abrogation does not entirely apply here; rather one had to speak of the suppression of a verse. The whole theoretical discussion suffers from the fact that different issues are included under the word *naskh*.

on stoning, without stoning having thereby become abolished. So why should the verses referring to ‘Alī also not have become forgotten?

One will have to examine the chronology of the assumed dialectical development of thought by means of an analysis of the *ḥadīths* used by Burton and their relationships of dependence. For his part, in his dissertation he unfortunately bases himself extensively on late compilations and lets himself be too strongly distracted by the scholastic classification scheme which we have also occasionally referred to above. Moreover, on “forgetting” cf. his article in: *Der Islam* 62/1985/5 ff. – It is interesting that in Spain still in the 4th century it was grounds for prosecution if one believed in *naskh*; Khushanī (d. 361/971 or 371/981) was thrown in prison when he brought back with him from a trip to the East the work of Abū ‘Ubayd (Ibn Ḥayyān, *Muqtabas*, ed. Makki 254, ll. 7 ff.; on this subject see now Fierro, *La heterodoxía en al-Andalus* 88 f. So up until then one had still not become acquainted with the idea.

The abrogation model belongs in the larger framework of a wide-ranging and quite complex discussion about authority.²⁸ Whoever allotted importance to the community’s tradition alongside the Koran did not have to make use of the fiction of “a verse on stoning”; ‘Umar II, when he was informed about the attitude of the Azraqites, referred to a *ḥadīth* in which stoning was prescribed.²⁹ Nor in these circles did one balk at the idea that the *sunna* could abrogate the Koran.³⁰ Here, to begin with, *sunna* did not so much mean the *sunna* of the Prophet but rather local usage or the newly established right of the caliph; the rulers for a while handed down rulings concerning general principles on the basis of their absolute power.³¹ Once again herein lay the seed of diverse conflicts. ‘Umar I is supposed to have warned against a new Mishna, the uncontrolled proliferation of the oral tradition; as caliph, he did not want to let himself be talked into this.³² By contrast, groups that kept their distance from the ruling dynasty or the authorities tended towards a fundamental scripturalism: the Khārijites and, to begin with, the Mu‘tazilites. They attempted a

28 According to Schacht, Wansbrough in an original manner has brought this subject back into the discussion (*Sectarian Milieu* 50 ff., but also in *Quranic Studies*, passim). Much of what has been published on this question in recent years in English is influenced by him.

29 TTD IV, 143, ll. 15 ff.; cf. also Burton, *Collection* 74 ff. The Khārijite polemic designated such *ḥadīths* as isolated (*khabar al-wāḥid*; Rāzī, *Maḥṣūl* II, 482, ll. 4 ff.).

30 Ash‘arī, *Maq.* 479, ll. 3 ff.

31 On this Schacht, *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* 190 ff.

32 Goldziher in: ZDMG 61/1907/865 ff. = *Ges. Schr.* v, 91 ff.

completely new blueprint for society; where they were able to distance themselves sufficiently, like the Azraqites, they even rejected widely held customs such as stoning. In any case *Ḥadīth* experienced just as difficult a time with them as with ‘Umar I.³³ For a long time one still pleaded, even among traditionists, for *Ḥadīth* at least not to be written down; in a world where writing was still a luxury, only “Scripture” should enjoy this privilege.³⁴ On the other hand, whoever wished to urge caution with regard to the Koran referred to the fact that according to its own testimony (surah 3/7), there were likewise ambiguous verses in it; ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yaḥyā already said that one should use one’s intelligence to distinguish between *muḥkamāt* and *mutashābihāt*.³⁵ The 2nd century brought all these beginnings to a flowering; but it was Shāfi‘ī who first established the valid standards for the later Sunnī awareness.

33 How tenacious this tendency was in maintaining itself among the Khārijites is shown by a subgroup of the Ibādites in the Tunisian Jarīd (cf. Cuperly in: BEO 32–33/1980–1/30). On this in general now Cook in: JSAI 9/1987/165 ff.

34 On this now cf. Schoeler in: *Der Islam* 66/1989/221 ff. Tradition by being written down naturally became rigid; “the letter kills” as Paul said (2 Corinthians 3.6).

35 *Rasā’il* 219, l. 6. On the interpretation of these terms cf. now Kinberg in: *Arabica* 35/1988/143 ff.