

CHAPTER SIX

ACEH, THE REBELLION OF THE ISLAMIC SCHOLARS

The last area in Indonesia in which a rebellion against the Indonesian Republic broke out, and where the rebels joined Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State of Indonesia, at least in name, was Aceh. This rebellion erupted in September 1953, when one of the most influential Islamic leaders of the region, Daud Beureu'eh, declared Aceh and adjacent areas part of the Islamic State of Indonesia. His followers simultaneously attacked a number of towns, for a while occupying some of them, and seized control of the surrounding rural areas.

In the first weeks the rebels gained control of almost the whole of Aceh. Only the major towns and cities, such as Banda Aceh (or Kutaradja, as it was still called at the time), Sigli and Langsa in the north, and Meulaboh on the south coast remained in Republican hands. Within a few weeks the *Darul Islam* troops were driven out of the urban centres again, however, and were forced to continue their struggle in the rural areas. For years they were especially strong in the northern part, in the *kabupatens* of Greater Aceh, Pidie and North Aceh.

Contrary to the other *Darul Islam*-inspired revolts, this particular rebellion ended peacefully through conciliation instead of military defeat. This was after the Central Government in 1959 finally gave in to a persistent demand of the people of Aceh and granted the region the status of a Special Province, with autonomy in the fields of religion, customary law and education. Moreover, the most important leader of the rebellion by far, Daud Beureu'eh, who was one of the last rebels to return from the bush in 1962, was not killed in combat or executed, but was granted a pardon.

As with the other *Darul Islam* movements, the origin of the Acehnese one can be traced back to the struggle for independence — when Aceh constituted one of those parts of the Indonesian Republic that was never occupied by Dutch troops — and, after the achievement of independence, to the problems created by the compromise that had to be struck between the conflicting

demands of regional autonomy and Central Government interference. In Aceh the situation was complicated by the bloody confrontation between two opposed social groups: the traditional elite and the religious leaders.

1. *The Acehese Islamic Scholars' Association*

In May 1939 the *Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Aceh* (PUSA), or Acehese Islamic Scholars' Association, was founded. One of its founders was Teungku Mohammad Daud Beureu'eh, a prominent Islamic leader, born around 1900 at Beureu'eh, in the district of Keumangan (present-day Mutiara), near Sigli. Co-founders were Teuku Haji Chik Djohan Alamsjah (Johan Alamsyah), Teuku Mohammad Amin and Teungku Ismail Jacob (Ismail Yacub). Daud Beureu'eh was elected general chairman of the Association.

In time the PUSA developed into the main vehicle of the Acehese Islamic scholars (*ulama*), who styled themselves *Teungku* (Tgk), in their fight against the traditional elite – the district chiefs or *ulèëbalang* – who used the title *Teuku* (T.). When after the Second World War the *ulama* dealt their adversaries a decisive final blow, it was particularly the former founders and prominent members of the PUSA who played a key role and took over the administration of Aceh. These included Teungku Amir Husin al Mudjahid (Amir Husin al Mujahid) and Husin Jusuf (Husin Yusuf), chairman and secretary respectively of the *Pemuda PUSA*, the youth section of the PUSA, and Teungku Ismail Jacob, Teungku Mohammad Nur el Ibrahim (son-in-law of Daud Beureu'eh) and Teungku Said Abubakar, all three of them teachers at the *Perguruan Normal Islam*, a teachers' training college founded by the PUSA.

At first the PUSA did not look like becoming a strong anti-Dutch and anti-*ulèëbalang* bulwark. There were *ulèëbalang* among its founders or acting as advisors, and for a time the PUSA was merely a modernist Islamic organization. Soon, under the influence of Amir Husin al Mudjahid, however, it grew more radical. In the latter days of the Dutch East Indies it developed into a genuine nationalist organization, aiming at ousting not only the Dutch, but also the local *adat* chiefs, the *ulèëbalang*, through whose instrumentality the Colonial Government ruled the area.

The PUSA in those years was, in fact, the only nationalist movement of importance in Aceh. A secular nationalist move-

ment was lacking. Few of the *ulèëbalang*, rooted as they were in the colonial system, could be expected to provide the leadership for such a secular anti-colonial movement. Those *ulèëbalang* who were opposed to the Colonial Government had the PUSA to turn to.

Another alternative was provided by the *Muhammadiyah*. In Aceh this had been in existence for longer than the PUSA, but, like the latter had a modernist Islamic origin. In contrast to the situation in other parts of Indonesia, and because of the absence of a nationalist movement in Aceh, the Acehnese *Muhammadiyah* branch functioned partly also as a political organization, and not solely as a religious or educational one. Yet it did not appeal to the Acehnese Islamic leaders and their followers. This was partly because it lacked roots in Acehnese society and remained an urban phenomena. Its members came mostly from outside the region, or were Acehnese with a formal education who had outgrown their traditional environment. And it was partly also because, having links with many other parts of Indonesia, it extended beyond the local boundaries, thus possessing the character more of an all-Indonesia than of an all-Aceh movement.

The PUSA, on the other hand, was strongly rooted in Acehnese society. It could count on the support of the Islamic scholars there, and through them could exercise an influence in the villages. Its leaders had an open eye for the advantages of modern education in the attempt to bridge the gap in knowledge and administrative experience that separated them from the *ulèëbalang*. At the same time they were careful not to lose touch with their Acehnese cultural and religious background and to avoid the mistake of putting up a barrier between themselves and the people. The PUSA remained "purely Acehnese", as it is put by Pluvier (1953:84). Its frame of reference was Aceh, not Indonesia.

The PUSA's adoption of an anti-Dutch and anti-*ulèëbalang* policy coincided with the extension of Japan's hegemony in Southeast Asia. In Japan the PUSA sought and found an ally against the Dutch. Through the agency of Acehnese living in Malaya contacts were established with the Japanese, and plans laid for an anti-Dutch rebellion on the eve of the Japanese landings in the Dutch East Indies.

Instrumental in the execution of these plans was to be the so-called F-Organization, named thus after the Japanese Fujiwara family. The core of this F-Organization was made up of Acehnese living in Malaya who gradually re-infiltrated into Aceh, where

they co-ordinated their actions with those of other movements of malcontents. In February and March 1942 this F-Organization did, in fact, initiate a rebellion against the Dutch. Telephone wires were cut, train services disrupted, and a number of Dutch citizens killed. Members of the organization appeared in public wearing a white arm-band with the letter F inscribed on it. Although primarily an Acehnese, and moreover *ulama* uprising, other groups participated as well, such as people from the Minangkabau and Batak areas, and *ulèëbalang*.

The leadership of this rebellion was provided predominantly, though not exclusively, by Islamic scholars. It included not only Teungku Said Abubakar, a leading PUSA figure who was later to play an important part in attempts to supply Acehnese *Darul Islam* rebels with arms, but also Teuku Nja' Arif (Nya' Arif), Member of the Dutch East Indies Parliament and after the war first Republican resident of Aceh, and Teuku Panglima Polim Mohammad Ali, who after August 1945 became deputy resident of Aceh.

The uprising made Aceh the only area in Indonesia where the Japanese invasion drew active armed support from the population. It was not exclusively inspired by anti-Dutch feelings. The Islamic leaders hoped that by staging and participating in a rebellion they would be rewarded by the Japanese with appointments to functions in the administration hitherto occupied by *ulèëbalang*. To some extent their expectations were fulfilled. The *ulèëbalang*'s monopoly was broken. Nevertheless, as in other parts of Indonesia, the Islamic scholars, although benefiting from the Japanese occupation, did not manage to secure a position of supremacy during it. The *ulèëbalang* lost their hold over the administration of justice, no longer presiding over the law courts, including the Islamic ones, but were kept on as local officials in the Civil Administration. The Japanese upheld the former Dutch colonial policy of dealing with the population through the *ulèëbalang* and leaving routine affairs to them.

The Islamic scholars of Aceh even so emerged from the Japanese occupation much strengthened and very confident, waiting for a chance to deal their adversaries a final blow. In this they were able to rally widespread popular support. The *ulèëbalang*, because of their position in the Colonial Administration, were identified with the much hated infidel colonial power. There were apprehensions that after the Japanese surrender they would go over to the Dutch to try and regain and preserve their former position in society. They moreover constituted the

wealthier segment of society, many of them owning considerable areas of land. In Pidie, for instance, *ulèëbalang*, according to Siegel (1969:27), owned between a third and half of the total ricefields. So where the *ulèëbalang* hoped for the return of the Dutch, the *ulama*, on the other hand, were quick to side with the Indonesian Republic, styling the Indonesian revolution a holy war against the Dutch.

2. *The Social Revolution of Aceh*

Civil war erupted in Aceh a few months after the Japanese surrender. *Ulèëbalang* were attacked by *ulama* and their followers all over the province. An explanation of the upheaval merely in terms of a conflict between custom and religion or between the lackeys of the Dutch and the advocates of Indonesian independence is too facile. In the former case too sharp a distinction is drawn between custom and religion, which are actually both conceived of as being Muslim in a society of which all members profess to be Muslims. A classification of the two opposing parties into a group of adherents of a purer or stricter form of Islam and one of persons professing more heterodox ideas would be more to the point, but still not absolutely appropriate. Likewise the distinction between advocates and opponents of the Republic cause, although of some use, does not explain everything. In the conflict in question economic and political motives even so did play a major part, and were actually even more important than the religious ones. As Boland (1971:70) writes: "It was in fact in no way a religious conflict, merely a political and social one".

Be that as it may, through the social revolution the *ulama* definitely succeeded in eliminating the *ulèëbalang*'s social, political and economic lead. Within two months, namely from December 1945 and January 1946, the latter were virtually exterminated, while the survivors were made to renounce their hereditary rights and had their possessions confiscated. By the end of another three months all *ulèëbalang* who had come to occupy important positions in the Indonesian Republic's Civil and Military Administration in Aceh had been forced to resign.

The positions vacated by the *ulèëbalang* were mostly seized by the *ulama*, in particular the PUSA leaders. The same probably happened with the *ulèëbalang*'s land and other possessions. It was evidently the Islamic leaders, and not the common people, who benefited by the confiscation of the *ulèëbalang*'s wealth. Accord-

ing to Alers (1956:90–91), “Their property and prerogatives were divided among the victorious ulamas . . . a feudal adat class was destroyed, a priestly class substituted . . .”.

In retrospect the “social revolution in Aceh of 1945”, as the event is commonly referred to, is frequently justified by describing it as a punishment inflicted on traitors to the Indonesian Republic. This is only partly correct, however, as the branding of all *ulèëbalang* alike as opponents of the Indonesian struggle for independence is of course a distortion of the facts.

In the first months following the declaration of independence many *ulèëbalang* actively supported the Republic. Because the Republican Government, like the Japanese and the Dutch before it, in Aceh looked to the better-educated and more experienced *ulèëbalang* to represent it, *ulèëbalang*, in fact, assumed a leading role in the initial stages of the struggle for independence here. The first Republican governor of Sumatra was Teuku Muhammad Hasan, who had represented Sumatra in the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee. The first Republican resident of Aceh was Teuku Nja’ Arif, a former leader of the F-Organization, who was later replaced, first unofficially and in January 1964 officially, by Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah (Mohammad Daudsyah). Deputy resident of Aceh in those early months, moreover, was Teuku Panglima Polim Mohammad Ali, while the National Committee of Aceh was headed by Tuanku Mahmud, a member of the Sultan’s family.

As a consequence of the important position occupied by the *ulèëbalang* in the — still rudimentary — Republican Administration, the first steps towards the formation of a Republican Army in Aceh were also taken by them. About one week after the proclamation of independence, which in Aceh did not become known until after August 20th, Nja’ Arif, in his capacity as resident of Aceh, invited officers of the *Gyu Gun*, an Indonesian volunteer corps dating from the Japanese occupation, to discuss the constitution of a Republican Army here. Subsequently, on August 27th the *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* (API), or Indonesian Youth Force, was founded. According to the latter’s first commander, Sjammaun Gaharu (Syammaun Gaharu), the word *pemuda* was deliberately chosen. For the Japanese, responsible as they were for public order, would never have permitted the formation of an army. Later, as soon as conditions became more favourable, the name of the organization might be changed without much trouble from *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* to *Angkatan Perang Indonesia*, Indonesian War Force (Gaharu 1960:31). At

the time of its foundation, API headquarters announced that the API was to constitute "the cornerstone of the Indonesian Republican Army" in Aceh. In the same proclamation it invited the Acehnese population to form auxiliary units to assist the API in its struggle (Dua Windhu 1972:83–84). In December 1945 the API officially changed its name to *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*, the current name of the Republican Army. Still under Sjammaun Gaharu's command it became the Fifth Division of the Sumatra Command.¹

Meanwhile other armed organizations had also been founded. Because the API represented the official Republican Army, however, these other armed units operated independently of it, and became the *lasykars* of Aceh. The two most important of these were the *Mujahidin* (Fighters in the way of Allah) and the *Barisan Pemuda Indonesia* (BPI), Indonesian Youth Corps.

The *Mujahidin* was formed by leading Islamic scholars around the time of their declaration of the struggle against the Dutch as a Holy one. Its most important commander by far was Amir Husin al Mudjahid, viz. Amir Husin, the Fighter in the Way of Allah. He was the same person who before the war had been leader of the PUSA Youth. The *Mujahidin* was obviously a PUSA and *ulama* organization.

The political and social colouring of the BPI is more difficult to assess. *Barisan Pemuda Indonesia* was the name bestowed on November 6th on the *Ikatan Pemuda Indonesia* (IPI), or Indonesian Youth League, which had been founded in Banda Aceh a month previously. In an account of its genesis BPI leader A. Hasjmy (A. Hasymy) (1960:56) writes: "Youth from the Gyu Gun, Heiho and Tokubetsu Keisatsutai [Special Police Force] formed the API . . . others formed the IPI (Ikatan Pemuda Indonesia), which subsequently became the B.P.I. (Barisan Pemuda Indonesia), P.R.I. (Pemuda Republik Indonesia), and finally the Pesindo with its Kesatria Dipisi Rencong". Hasjmy does not specify who these "others" were, however. The information on the background of the BPI members in other sources points in two different directions. A contemporary Dutch report, written by the then governor of Sumatra, Spits (NIB II:519), states that "the Ulëëbalang are for 75% members of the PRI . . .". Nasution (1956 I:79), on the other hand, writes that, "Besides the API, there also existed the Barisan Pemuda Republik Indonesia, mainly as a result of the efforts of PUSA people".² The supposition that the BPI may have been a PUSA organization is strengthened by the personal background of its commander, A. Hasjmy,

who before the war had been a PUSA Youth leader in Greater Aceh. The BPI's other leaders, too, came from the circle of Islamic scholars. Its regency representatives were, for instance: in Greater Aceh Teungku Abdul Djalil Amin (Abdul Jalil Amin), in Pidie Hasan Aly, in North Aceh Teungku Abdul Gani, in East Aceh Teungku Usman Peureula, and in West Aceh Teungku Hasan Hanafiah and Teungku Muhamad Abduh (Sumatera Utara 1953:30–31). Finally, the very first meeting of the BPI, at that time still called IPI, was attended by Amir Husin al Mudjahid, among others.

The Acehnese *Pesindo* shared only the name with *Pesindo* groups in other parts of Sumatra and in Java. The BPI or PRI followed suit when it was decided in Java to change the name of the organization to *Pesindo*, but not when the *Pesindo* elsewhere adopted a leftist course. In fact, in mid-1947 it dissociated itself from the mother-organization.³ It is still asserted today that the Acehnese *Pesindo* was made up of Muslims, while in other areas it was Communist-influenced.

The main source of arms for the API, the BPI and the *Mujahidin* alike was the Japanese. Arms were obtained from them in a variety of ways. In some instances individual Japanese were persuaded to hand over their weapons. In other cases important Japanese civil and military authorities were sent threatening letters by an organization styling itself NICOI (short for *Nihilis Communisme Indonesia*), which in reality, however, formed part of API. These warned the addressees that, because of their past conduct, their safety was no longer ensured except on their way to and from work. Thereupon the telephone connections with their homes would be cut. Finally, groups of youths would call upon them demanding their arms – a demand that could generally not be refused with impunity. In other cases again small groups of Japanese soldiers were forced to hand over their arms in almost the same way. API followers would be directed to towns and cities where Japanese were stationed in groups carrying all kinds of weapons – such as spears and sabres – to threaten the Japanese. The latter, in fear of their lives, would beseech the API group for mercy, which would reply that they would not be harmed, but on the contrary, would be protected and provided with food if its demand for arms was satisfied. In some instances the weapons had to be seized from the Japanese by force, giving rise to hand-to-hand fighting (Gaharu 1960:35–39; Dua Windhu 1972:88–102).

This mode of disarming Japanese constituted the immediate

cause of an armed conflict between *ulama* and *ulèëbalang*. A quarrel over weapons thus seized from Japanese at Sigli at the end of 1945 set in motion a course of events which eventually led to the local *ulèëbalang*'s downfall.

The stories of what happened at Sigli are mutually contradictory. According to a number of Indonesian publications fighting started after Aceh Republican Army and *lasykar* units tried to disarm a group of *ulèëbalang*, who in turn had come by their weapons by seizing them from the Japanese. This version is given in a book published by the Regional Government of Aceh entitled *Revolusi Desember '45 di Atjeh atau Pembasmian Penchianat Tanah Air* (The December '45 Revolution in Aceh, or the Extermination of Traitors to the Fatherland).⁴ According to it a number of *ulèëbalang*, shortly after the Japanese surrender, started preparing for the return of the Dutch with a view to strengthening their personal position. They established their own political organization, the *Pembangunan Indonesia* (Development of Indonesia), and their own army, the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* (Security Guard).⁵ Commander of the latter was Teuku Daud Tjumbok (Daud Cumbok), from the village of Cumbok, near the town of Lammeulo, about ten miles from Sigli. His name is also mentioned as that of the person who, through the agency of a former KNIL soldier, Sukardi, together with another Indonesian, named Ibrahim Pane, contacted the former Dutch district officer Van Swier in Medan (Sumatera Utara 1953:64).

Amin (1956:13), then deputy governor and at the time of the *Darul Islam* rebellion governor of North Sumatra, is of the opinion, on the other hand, that "no facts or circumstances have been discovered to justify" the accusation that the *ulèëbalang* were traitors. He mentions that people sympathizing with the cause of the Islamic scholars and defending the action taken by them against the *ulèëbalang* generally like to point to a letter from the *ulèëbalang* at Pidie to the Dutch at Medan asking the latter for help. This letter was allegedly intercepted by *Pesindo* (BPI) soldiers checking train travellers at Bireuen. According to the same account the persons carrying the letter had tried to destroy it by tearing it up. But the *Pesindo* soldiers had discovered its contents by pasting the pieces together again. Those referring to this incident only knew of it from hearsay, however, and never saw the letter. It is further likely that the story of Daud Tjumbok's contacts with the Dutch is a later concoction.

The fighting in and around Sigli began as one of the many instances in the early history of the Indonesian Republic of rival

armed groups striving each to assert its authority in a particular area. In the earliest phase the principal rivals were the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* and local BPI/*Pesindo* groups, who engaged in skirmishes around Lammeulo, Daud Tjumbok's stronghold. Republican Army units did not participate in these fights, no Republican soldiers being stationed near Lammeulo, because the Army command was fully aware of the strength of the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* and feared defeat in the event of an armed clash (Revolusi n.d.:17–18). Serious fighting broke out after the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* left Lammeulo to march on Sigli with the aim of seizing arms from the Japanese – although their enemies accuse them of having had another motive as well, as the possession of Sigli meant control of all the roads in north Aceh and the certainty of a landing-base for a Dutch invasion force (Revolusi n.d.:19–23) – and proceeded to occupy strategic positions in the town. The other armed groups, including the Republican Army units, could not tolerate the existence of a rival army, all the less one which by securing Japanese arms was becoming too well equipped. They in turn laid siege to Sigli in an attempt to disarm the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan*. As a result the Japanese forces in Sigli were confronted with two mutually opposed forces, each pressing them to hand over their arms to it. In the town itself the *ulèëbalang* put them under pressure. The Republican Army units and other armed groups encamped all around Sigli tried to induce the Japanese to hand over their weapons to the representatives of the Republican Government of Aceh instead of to the *ulèëbalang*, threatening that they would otherwise attack Sigli. These other armed groups, as on previous occasions when they had wanted to seize Japanese arms, had directed their members to Sigli en masse. Here they posed a threat to the Japanese as well as to the *ulèëbalang*.

The authors of “December Revolution” (n.d.:20–21) depict the situation as follows: “To prevent Japanese arms falling into the hands of the *Ulèëbalang*, people in the end came in their hundreds of thousands and, because they were unable to enter the town, surrounded it on all sides so that subsequently the *Ulèëbalang* army occupying the town appeared to be hemmed in by hundreds of thousands of people and in the end dared not leave the town”. As the *ulèëbalang* tried to break through the beleaguering circle, firing at the enemy with carbines and machine guns, fighting broke out. After a while a cease-fire was called. The Republican Army thereupon allowed the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* to retreat to Lammeulo on condition that

they hand all the arms taken from the Japanese at Sigli over to it. The *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* left Sigli, but without surrendering its weapons. According to the account in "December Revolution" (Revolusi n.d.:21–22) it in fact retreated to Lammeulo, murdering and plundering all the way. On arrival there it resumed its attacks on members of the other armed groups, notably the BPI/*Pesindo*, and tried to occupy the surrounding villages.

In the meantime the *Markas Besar Rakyat Umum*, or People's Headquarters, had been established by the other armed groups on December 22nd, 1945. These headquarters thereupon coordinated the operations of the Republican Army, the BPI/*Pesindo* and the *Mujahidin* among others. A number of political parties, such as the PNI, PKI and PSI, also participated. It was these People's Headquarters which, in joint statements with the Republican Government of Aceh, first declared the *ulèëbalang* traitors of the Indonesian Republic, and on January 8th, 1946, issued an ultimatum, signed by Teuku Panglima Polim Mohamad Ali in his capacity as deputy resident of Aceh and Sjammaun Gaharu (Syammaun Gaharu) as chairman of the People's Headquarters, demanding that the *ulèëbalang* at Lammeulo surrender before noon on January 10th. On expiry of this term Lammeulo was attacked and three days later occupied, thus putting an end to the hostilities which had lasted twenty-two days. Daud Tjumbok fled, but a few days later was captured and killed. In commemoration of the battle, Lammeulo was renamed Kota Bakti, City of Devotion.

The battle around Lammeulo provided the starting-signal for the persecution of *ulèëbalang* all over Aceh. Many of them were killed, and others thrown in prison or taken into protective custody.

Nevertheless, the top officials of the Republican Regional Government and Army, who had provisionally sanctioned the actions against the *ulèëbalang* at Lammeulo, were not for the time being dismissed. The Central Republican Government, as yet unaware of what was happening in Aceh, in fact even strengthened their position. For in January it proceeded to appoint Teuku Nja' Arif to the staff of the Republican Army general headquarters in Sumatra in the rank of major-general and at the same time to make him Republican Army "organizer and coordinator" in Aceh. It furthermore consolidated Sjammaun Gaharu's position as commander of the Fifth (Acehnese) Division, making him chief of defence for Aceh.

Teuku Nja' Arif and Sjammaun Gaharu were not destined to

hold these functions for long, however. In March 1946 they were seized by Amir Husin Al Mudjahid and his *Mujahidin*. The latter's coup was preceded and triggered off by *ulèëbalang* risings around Lhokseumawe in North Aceh and around Langsa in East Aceh in February. After the suppression of these risings most of the *ulèëbalang* who had so far escaped death or imprisonment were put under arrest (Revolusi n.d.:30–31).

A short time after this units of the *Mujahidin* – about one thousand men in all – marched on Banda Aceh, making for the headquarters of the Republican Army's Acehnese Division. According to an "Insider" [S.M. Amin] (1950:20), Amir Husin al Mudjahid felt that there were still too many members of the traditional elite left in the administration, and began a campaign to root them out in his place of residence, Idi, where he formed the *Tentara Perjuangan Rakyat*, or People's Struggle Army. Starting off with only a few men, this army grew in size as it marched along the coast to Banda Aceh. On this march, according to the same "insider", it killed or captured every person crossing its path who was believed to belong to the traditional elite.

In Banda Aceh Amir Husin al Mudjahid's troops continued taking so-called "corrective measures" against senior members of the Administration and the Army (Dua Windhu 1972:113). The Republican Army surrendered without a blow, Nja' Arif giving orders not to offer any resistance. This course of action was of little avail to him, however. Nja' Arif was captured and imprisoned at Takengon, a place where other *ulèëbalang* had also been taken. There he died early the next month, March 1946; the cause of his death was identified as diabetes. Amir Husin al Mudjahid's action represented the final blow to the *ulèëbalang*. In August 1946, the resident of Aceh, T.M. Daudsjah, assigned a special residential area to the persons suspected of involvement in the Daud Tjumbok incident, ostensibly to protect them against the revenge of the masses (Sumatera Utara 1953:90). The arrests of these people were ordered by him because "It is impossible at present for relatives or close friends of the victims of the social revolution to remain amongst the rest of the population", and "it is the Government's duty to maintain public order and ensure the safety of the people as well as of the afore-mentioned party". He thus ordered the arrests of 62 people and their relatives (Ke te tapan Residen Atjeh 13 Augustus 1946 in S.M. Amin 1975:69–70), including Sjammaun Gaharu, who according to the list attached to the resolution in question had already fled (S.M. Amin 1975:70).

Ulèëbalang who were not killed, voluntarily resigned their functions and renounced their hereditary rights for fear of repercussions.⁶ Their places were taken mostly by PUSA men. In the words of the Central Government after the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* revolt, "A large majority of important functions came into the hands of PUSA people and their followers . . . Only to positions requiring expert skills were people from outside the area appointed" (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:100).

Nja' Arif's function as resident of Aceh was taken over by the above-mentioned Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah, also an *ulèëbalang*, but since long a loyal PUSA member. Another *ulèëbalang* PUSA member, Teuku Mohammad Amin, was appointed deputy resident. The same function was also given to Daud Beureu'eh, who later in addition became head of the Religious Department of Aceh. Nja' Arif was replaced as member of the Republican Army General Staff in Sumatra by Amir Husin al Mudjahid, who promoted himself from the rank of major to major-general in early March, when he issued a statement announcing a number of changes in the composition of the Republican Army Command of Aceh. His close associate, Husin Jusuf, former secretary of the *Pemuda* PUSA, for instance, was promoted from the rank of major to colonel, replacing Sjammaun Gaharu as commander of the Fifth Division. These changes were introduced at the wishes of the population as represented by the *Tentara Perjuangan Rakyat*, so it was emphatically stated.⁷

At the end of 1946 Amir Husin al Mudjahid himself fell victim to a plot. He was kidnapped from the "Hotel Atjeh" in Banda Aceh and taken to Sigli. Allegedly his kidnappers intended handing him over to a local Islamic scholar by name of Husin Sab, who wanted to revenge the murder of his brother on the orders of Amir Husin al Mudjahid. In the end, however, he was handed over to the authorities and was sentenced to imprisonment by a military court (Insider 1950:25–26; Amin 1975:79), but was soon released again.

Teungku Amir Husin al Mudjahid's intention had been not only to take over the command of the Republican Army in Aceh, but also to join the Military and Civil Administrations together. Opposition from non-*ulèëbalang* and non-PUSA organizations, and perhaps also from within the PUSA,⁸ thwarted these plans. For a proposal by the Army, now headed by himself, to bring the Civil Administration under military control was rejected after being discussed at a meeting attended by, besides the new resident, representatives of the Army, the *Komite Nasional*

Daerah, Pesindo, Mujahidin, Masyumi, the PSI, the PKI and a number of minor organizations on April 6th, 1946. They decided that for the moment the situation was such that "the Civil Government need not yet be replaced by a military one" and that "the time had not yet come for a proposal to be made to the authorities to change the Civil Government into a military one" (Sumatera Utara 1953:116).

Although the Civil Administration remained separated from the military one and some of the principal civil administrators still originated from *ulèëbalang* circles, the *ulama* and the PUSA had gained firm control of both. They had also made considerable advances in the economic field. The possessions of the defeated *ulèëbalang* were confiscated and divided up, most of them probably going to the *ulama*. These latter further claimed the most lucrative positions in the economy for themselves. Said Abubakar, for instance, became a manager of both foreign- and state-owned estates, while Amir Husin al Mudjahid was rewarded with the function of general director of the North Sumatran oil company. Another PUSA leader, Njak Neh (Nyak Neh), carved out a career for himself in commerce (Meuraxa 1956:261).

The changes aroused much opposition on the part not only of relatives of the deceased *ulèëbalang* whose possessions had been confiscated, but also of commoners and Islamic scholars who did not belong to the inner PUSA circle. Two of the latter, Teungku Hasan Krueng Kale and Teungku Hasbullah Indrapuri, proceeded to condemn the appropriation of the wealth of the *ulèëbalang* as *haram*, or forbidden by Islamic law. To placate the critics of the redistribution of power and wealth somewhat, the Regional Government of Aceh instituted *Majelis Penimbang*, Councils of Review, in the *kabupatens*.

These Councils had to see to it that the distribution of the confiscated goods was fair and just. Their institution was provided for and the rules for the distribution of the confiscated goods laid down in the "regulations for the control and ownership of the property of deceased traitors to the State of the Republic of Indonesia in Aceh" (Keresidenan Republik Indonesia daerah Atjeh. Peraturan daerah no. 1). The Councils were put in charge of all the former possessions of the late *ulèëbalang*, from the proceeds of which the damages inflicted by the *ulèëbalang* in the past as well as in the months immediately before and during the social revolution were to be compensated. Goods unrightfully seized by the *ulèëbalang* were to be returned to their rightful owners. Likewise the original owners of goods purchased by the

ulèëbalang at unrealistically low prices were to be given the opportunity to buy these goods back at the price originally received. The balance, according to the regulations, was to be shared out among the heirs of the deceased *ulèëbalang*.

There does not seem to have been much money left to return to these heirs at the end of 1949 when the Councils began to function properly, however. For at the time of their institution the Councils faced the problem not only of the difficulty of collecting the *ulèëbalang*'s possessions — which in many cases had already been seized by the people in the course of the “social revolution” — but also of a shortage of funds resulting from a resolution that allowances should be paid to all invalids as well as to the wives and children of those killed during the social revolution out of the *ulèëbalang*'s collective wealth. So little money was left, in fact, that especially the Council of Review of Pidie, where the “social revolution” had been most violent, was obliged to ask the Government to take over responsibility for the payment of the allowances.

The institution of the Councils of Review in July 1946 did not fail to arouse opposition, either. For one thing they were made up almost entirely of Islamic leaders. Secondly, they appear to have failed in the performance of the task for which they were appointed (Alers 1956:92; Meuraxa 1956:20–21).⁹ The Councils' failure is admitted by their own members, by whom a number of factors are cited in extenuation, e.g., the war against the Dutch and the fact that registration of the property of the *ulèëbalang* commenced almost a whole year after the social revolution, making a reconstruction of events and the determination of what goods had been illegally seized extremely difficult, as well as the galloping inflation, which made determining the amounts of the compensation for damages virtually impossible.¹⁰

The confiscation of the *ulèëbalang*'s possessions and the functioning of the Councils of Review continued to be controversial issues in later years as well. At the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* rebellion in Aceh in 1953, the Republican Government and those political parties which disapproved of the rebellion continually harped on these two issues to put the leaders of the rebellion in a bad light and to draw attention to the supposedly still strong popular opposition to them. Passive sympathizers of the uprising, on the other hand, disputed the allegations that the confiscations and redistributions had been unfair and in turn accused the *ulèëbalang* of wrongful dispossession of the people ever since their integration into the Colonial Administration, and

of misappropriation of the *bait al-mal* (funds of the Islamic community) and mismanagement of the *wakaf* (religious foundations) entrusted to their care.¹¹

3. *Opposition to the PUSA Administration*

Even if the redistribution of the property of the *ulèëbalang* had taken place in a fair way and the Councils of Review had functioned properly at an earlier stage, opposition would still have been inevitable. Criticism was levelled not only at the *ulama*'s seizure of the *ulèëbalang*'s possessions, but also at the advance of leading PUSA members in the Military and Civil Administration. Many of the new administrators were accused of incompetence, which judgment, though not unjustified, was a little on the harsh side. The problems with which the new, inexperienced administrators had to cope were manifold and complex. The transition from colony to independent state was not in any way an easy one. A new government apparatus had to be built up from scratch. And to make matters worse, there was a Dutch blockade which led to a rapidly deteriorating economic situation and rising inflation.

The dissatisfaction both with the current economic situation and at the alleged usurpation of power by PUSA leaders found concrete expression in early 1948. In that year the opposition to the Regional Government of Aceh, led since August of the previous year by Daud Beureu'eh as military governor, reached a climax. Accusations of large-scale corruption — illicit trading, murder of political opponents, disregard of the Central Government's instructions and embezzlement of the proceeds from the oil-fields and plantations — were levelled against people who had recently acquired seats on the Regional Government.

The opposition rallied around Sajid Ali Alsaqaf (Sayid Ali Alsaqaf) and Waki Harun. These two leaders in March and April 1948 sent letters to the governor of Sumatra urging for the introduction of measures designed to improve the quality of the Regional Government of Aceh. A few months later, in August 1948, in the course of Soekarno's visit to the area, they attempted to organize a demonstration. This attempt was frustrated by the authorities, however.

In the intervening months the criticism of government officials had assumed such proportions that Amin, the then governor of North Sumatra, saw himself obliged to announce that "The desire of a section of the population of the area for improvement

of the Regional Government through the replacement of existing officials coincides with a wish which the Government has since long entertained . . .". "Nevertheless", Amin continued, "the Government cannot agree with a wish for immediate changes on the basis of accusations which are either unfounded or are founded on anything but clear, well attested evidence" (Sumatera Utara 1953:202).

Early in August Said Ali Alsaqaf and his associates were put under arrest and prosecuted for defamation of senior Regional Government officials. A few days later, following their release, they made their first attempt at a coup d'état. They had stated their intention accordingly in a letter to the Regional Government of Banda Aceh announcing a "Revolution directed against unprincipled persons, because the Government itself evidently would not purge them out" (Amin 1975:83). In the following night a crowd assembled at Lam Baro to receive orders directing them to Banda Aceh to capture a number of officials. Before this plan could be carried out the Regional Government, which was informed of it, sent Tjek Mat Rachmani (Cek Mat Rakhmani) and Teungku Hasbullah Indrapuri to Lam Baro to placate the potential rebels and prevent them from going ahead with it.

On November 4th Sajid Ali Alsaqaf and Waki Harun made a second attempt to seize the power. They tried to take advantage of the presence on that day of almost all the senior government officials of Aceh in Banda Aceh for the purpose of discussing government matters to arrest them all in one stroke. Again, however, the Government had been warned of these plans beforehand and so arrested the conspirators. They were released again and were temporarily banished from Aceh in November 1949, on the eve of the official transfer of sovereignty (Sumatera Utara 1953:202–209; Amin 1956:15–16, 262–266; Insider 1950: 26–32).

The attempted coup of Sajid Ali Alsaqaf and Waki Harun has been described as an *ulèëbalang* affair as well as an affair of discontented religious scholars whose access to power had been blocked. Amin (1956:15) describes it as "the best organized of the many attempts by the Ulubalang to seize back the power". Alers (1956:92), on the other hand, following the Government's statement in Parliament in 1953, writes: "Discontented *Ulamas* formed an illegal organization under the leadership of Sajid Ali . . . to gain control of the PUSA". Yet another explanation, put forward by Teuku Jusuf Muda Dalam (Yusuf Muda Dalam), is that the attempt was an internal PUSA affair and is illustrative

of the divisions within that organization (Sekitar n.d. I:292).

None of these interpretations appears to be entirely correct, however. Although Sajid Ali Alsaqaf, in his confrontations with the regional authorities, did plead in the imprisoned *ulèëbalang*'s favour, this does not imply that he headed an *ulèëbalang* movement. It may just be that, like many others, he had more faith in the administrative talents of the *ulèëbalang*. Conversely, Islamic scholars were in the majority in the leadership of the organization.

4. *The Status of Aceh*

Within a few weeks of Sajid Ali Alsaqaf's arrest a new conflict broke out, this time over the Central Government's intention to incorporate Aceh into the province of North Sumatra. Like the "social revolution" and the quarrels over the distribution of the economic, political and military power, the difference about Aceh's administrative status remained to be a cause of discontent and division for many years. Opposition to the province of North Sumatra and to the growing interference of the Central and Provincial Governments was even to become one of the immediate causes of the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* rebellion here.

Aceh had emerged from the Japanese occupation as a virtually autonomous area. In 1945 it constituted one of the residencies making up the province of Sumatra. Although the Provincial Parliament of Sumatra — which included only ten Acehnese among its hundred members — resolved in its first session that Sumatra was to be divided into three sub-provinces, of which North Sumatra, comprising Aceh, Tapanuli and East Sumatra, was to be one, Aceh continued functioning as an almost independent area. In the confused years following the Japanese occupation the Acehnese conducted their own administrative and military affairs without much interference from outside. For a short time between August 1947 and June 1948, after the launching of the first Dutch military action, this situation was even officially confirmed through the declaration of Aceh, together with Langkat and Tanah Karo, as a military region headed by a military governor. The situation changed, however, as the administrative structure of the Indonesian Republic assumed a clearer outline and the influence of the Central and Provincial Governments was increasingly felt. In April 1948 the sub-provinces were given provincial status, and the new province of

North Sumatra, likewise made up of Aceh, Tapanuli and East Sumatra, had as first governor S.M. Amin, hitherto deputy governor of the sub-province of North Sumatra. Hence at first sight nothing seemed to have changed. The move was, however, an indication of the normalization of administrative life and of the growing influence of the Central Government.

Governor S.M. Amin, in his opening speech at the first meeting of the Regional Parliament of North Sumatra, testified to a sound insight into the problems inherent in the creation of this particular province by stating: "The changes which will be introduced in the administration will be radical, fundamental changes. Up to now the basis of the Regional Government has been the unity of the residency, this unity of the residency in turn being based above all on ethnic factors. So the residency of Aceh was founded on the unity of the Acehnese, the residency of Tapanuli on the unity of the Batak and the residency of East Sumatra on the unity of the Malays. It is obvious that this kind of unity is defined by a restricted sense of national unity, which is no longer valid in our Republic. That is why the formation of the projected province will no longer be based on the old foundations but on new ones, namely foundations connected with economic and political unity, and so on" (Sumatera Utara 1953:188–189). He further remarked: "Our State is based on amongst other things the nationalist feelings of a united Indonesian people; there is no room in it for an Acehnese people, a Batak people or a Malay people. As far as the State is concerned there is only one people, the Indonesian people, which is made up of a number of groups, namely of people from Tapanuli, from Aceh, from East Sumatra, and so on. Religious difference should not become a problem for us, as we shall be free to adhere to whatever religion we believe in. Religious differences shall not destroy the unity of our nation" (Sumatera Utara 1953:1901). The two factors to which S.M. Amin drew attention in this address, namely the ethnic and religious differences between Aceh and the other two regencies of North Sumatra, were, in fact, to play a key role in Aceh's demands for regional autonomy.

The regional government issue was temporarily relegated to a place of secondary importance when in December 1948 the Dutch launched their second military action and put the entire Republican Government in Yogyakarta under arrest. In the arrangements for the area's defence against Dutch attacks Indonesia's administrative division of the end of 1948 was abrogated and the system in force prior to that re-introduced. Under this

latter system Indonesia was divided into military regions, one of which comprised the regencies of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo. In 1947, and so again at the end of 1948, Teungku Daud Beureu'eh was military governor in the honorary rank of major-general. A major change which this involved was that Daud Beureu'eh as military governor now was head of the Civil Administration as well as the Army, whereas in 1947 the military governor had only possessed authority in military affairs and those civil affairs which were connected with defence.

The new arrangement was officially confirmed in May 1949 by an Emergency Government headed by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (Syafruddin Prawiranegara) which had been formed after the arrest of Soekarno and his Cabinet and which had its seat first at Bukit Tinggi and later in Banda Aceh. This Government announced on May 16th that in the special military regions all civil and military powers would be vested in the military governors (Keputusan Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia no. 21). The next day the function of provincial governor was abolished in Sumatra, and changed into that of government representative (Keputusan Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia no. 22).

Upon the old Cabinet's resuming office in July 1949, after the release of its members by the Dutch and the dissolution of the Emergency Government, a special deputy premiership for Sumatra was created. This function was given to Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. In view of the still very poor communications between Java and Sumatra he was given wide powers. So he had the right to enact regulations having the force of laws after due consultation of an Advisory Council, whose members were to be appointed by the President. He could also issue "ordinary" government regulations without consulting the Council (Undang-undang no. 2, 1949).

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara visited Aceh in August 1949, and was immediately confronted there with a number of problems, such as the aftermath of Sajid Ali Alsaqaf's attempted coup and the strong demands of PUSA leaders to grant Aceh provincial status. The pressure was so great, in fact, that he was forced to commit himself to the creation of the province of Aceh. As it is put in the Government's statement to Parliament in 1953 (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:101), "the autonomous province of Aceh was created through force majeure".

Exercising his special powers, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara on December 17th, 1949, issued a regulation having the force of a government regulation in which North Sumatra was divided into

two new provinces: the province of Aceh (including a part of Langkat), and the province of Tapanuli/East Sumatra (Peraturan Wakil Menteri Pengganti Peraturan Pemerintah no. 8, 1949). The preamble to this regulation stated that the creation of the province of Aceh had been a matter of urgency in which the usual legal procedure had not been followed. So it pointed out that, whereas the creation of a new province should normally have taken place by Act of Parliament, in the present case this had been substituted by a regulation of the Deputy Prime Minister without consultation of the Advisory Council, firstly because no such Council had as yet been formed, and secondly in view of the urgency of improving the administrative structure.

The appointment as governor of the new province of Aceh was at first refused by Teungku Daud Beureu'eh, who suggested Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah, who during Daud Beureu'eh's term as military governor of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo had held the function of resident of Aceh, for the position instead. The reason stated by him for his refusal was that he found it impossible to judge his own qualifications, although the real reason may well have been that he foresaw considerable opposition. In any case, he changed his mind the next day. He was installed as governor of Aceh on January 30th, 1950.

In the light of the developments in Aceh from 1945 to 1950, it is not surprising that there was considerable opposition to the installation of Daud Beureu'eh as governor, and a strong suspicion that the creation of the province of Aceh was just another attempt by PUSA members to consolidate and extend their hold on Aceh. Conversely, it is quite understandable that the Government and its supporters, after Daud Beureu'eh's proclamation of Aceh as a *Darul Islam* area, should have been drawn attention to the popular opposition to Daud Beureu'eh's appointment as governor of Aceh. The Government statement of 1953 (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:101) claims, in fact, that the reaction of Acehnese society to the appointment was quite cool. It further points in this connection to the failure of the attempts of Zai-nuddin, one of Aceh's most prominent businessmen, to form a committee to organize festivities in celebration of Daud Beureu'eh's installation, the meeting called for the purpose of forming such a committee being extremely poorly attended because of lack of interest and support.¹²

In addition to internal regional opposition to what was described by S.M. Amin (1956:28) as "a transfer of all the power in the region to the PUSA party, without any control or super-

vision from a higher regional authority", the Central Government had the necessary reservations. Instead of endorsing Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's regulation and duly enacting a law declaring Aceh a separate province, it set up a Commission of Inquiry chaired by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Susanto Tirtoprodjo (Susanto Tirtoprojo).

This Committee, during a visit to Banda Aceh, proceeded to inform the Acehnese leaders that the Central Government had not made up its mind whether Aceh should, in fact, constitute an independent province. Naturally the announcement was not well received. The PUSA tried to lend force to their pleas for a separate province by threatening that if Aceh should again be made part of a province of North Sumatra they refused to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order any longer. In addition they tried, like Amir Husin al Mudjahid, to rally popular support for the continued existence of the province of Aceh (Amin 1965:30). Reportedly Daud Beureu'eh himself hinted repeatedly at a likely rebellion by publicly stating that he and his supporters would take the mountains to build up Aceh in their way (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:103).

Notwithstanding Acehnese opposition, a new preparatory committee for the creation of the province of North Sumatra was formed on August 1st, 1950. It was headed by S. Parman Reksodihardjo (S. Parman Reksodiharjo) and included Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah among its members. Again political developments beyond the control of the Acehnese had influenced the Central Government's attitude to the administrative division of Sumatra. One and a half years previously the second Dutch "military action" had prompted the Republican Government to postpone the creation of the province of North Sumatra. Now the negotiations between the Indonesian Republic and the United States of Indonesia provided an excuse to re-form this province.

On August 15th, 1950, the United States of Indonesia were officially abrogated and the unitary Republic of Indonesia proclaimed. This had been preceded by the issuing of a number of regulations governing the administrative division of Indonesia into provinces by the Indonesian Government the previous day, among them government regulation no. 21 (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 21, 1950). This regulation stated in its first article that the territory of Indonesia was to be divided into ten provinces, one of which would be North Sumatra. At the same time the government regulation in substitution of law no. 5 was issued, revoking Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's regulation whereby the

province of Aceh had been created (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang no. 5).

The legal basis on which the province of North Sumatra was created was very precarious. Again a province had been formed not by law but by government regulation. Moreover, both regulations — probably to take the wind out of the sails of any opposition — made reference to the agreements between the United States of Indonesia and the Indonesian Republic, including an agreement of July 20th regarding the division of Sumatra into three provinces. As Logemann (1955:163) points out, this agreement was never made public, however.

Acehnese reaction was prompt. A motion rejecting incorporation into the province of North Sumatra was carried unanimously by the Regional Parliament. It was supplemented in September by an explanatory statement drawn up by the Regional Government of Aceh (Sumatera Utara 1953:400–409). The motion, and more especially the statement in explanation of it, was very lengthy, listing all the arguments for giving Aceh independent status. The area's special position and specific problems are described at length, and arguments are advanced for the need to treat Aceh differently in many respects.

Aceh's distinctive situation and special problems in the educational, economic, legal and religious fields set it apart from the rest of North Sumatra, it argued. The region was different not only because of the special nature of these problems, but also on account of their magnitude. For Aceh had to cope with an enormous educational lag, while the irrigation system and the roads were in extreme disrepair, and the fishing industry in need of great improvement. It went on to claim that the problems were too enormous to be dealt with effectively by a regency administration, but required the attention of a provincial-level government. At the same time it stressed the necessity for the people working on the solution of these problems to be well aware of and familiar with Aceh's special situation, expressing the fear that, if Aceh became part of North Sumatra, the second of these conditions would not be met, so that as a consequence the problems would not be dealt with properly. The statement concludes with the threat that "if Aceh does not become an independent province under the sovereignty of the Central Government, we, the Sons of Aceh, who currently occupy positions in the Administration and all share these same ideals, the day the Central Government rejects the afore-stated demands will leave the Government institutions and will ask for the return of

our mandate by the head of the Regional Government to the Central Government". Nevertheless Daud Beureu'eh intimated, stressing that the Acehnese were no Moluccans, that the civil servants would simply resign and that Aceh would not proclaim itself an independent state (N 21-10-1950).

This threat was repeated on the occasion of a visit to Aceh by a Central Government delegation from Jakarta headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Assaat, at the end of September. Here leading Acehnese administrators issued a statement at the conclusion of a meeting between the delegation and themselves at which the status of Aceh had been discussed that if the Central Government went on refusing to recognize the Acehnese people's claim to autonomy in the widest sense of the word, they would resign, as would a great many of their subordinates. Assaat's delegation failed to talk the regional leaders round. Nor did the Indonesian Vice-President, Mohammad Hatta, succeed in this on his visit to Banda Aceh in November.

A solution was finally found in January 1951 by the then Prime Minister, Natsir. On January 23rd he made a radio speech in Banda Aceh announcing the conclusion of an agreement in the matter. Here Natsir stated that the creation of the province of North Sumatra now no longer was regarded "by our brothers in Aceh as a bolt forever locking out all other possibilities" (Sumatera Utara 1953:422-430). Teungku Daud Beureu'eh issued a statement on the agreement reached at the same time. This statement adduced a number of reasons why Aceh had ceased its opposition to incorporation into the province of North Sumatra, including the fact that the Central Government was not rejecting Aceh's claim to autonomy, the agreement that the matter would be settled in a nation-wide context, and Aceh's reluctance to obstruct the functioning of the administration of North Sumatra. At the same time it indicated that the struggle for autonomy would be continued and that "the notion of resignation from office as one form of non-cooperation if Aceh's claim to autonomy is not satisfied is still resolutely adhered to" (Sumatera Utara 1953:430-431).

On January 25th, 1951, Abdul Hakim was installed as governor of North Sumatra, with Medan being made the seat of the Provincial Government, to which city the personnel of the former province of Aceh subsequently had to be moved. For the region of Aceh a resident-coordinator was appointed to supervise the functioning of the regional administration.

The creation of the latter function at first gave rise to some

misunderstanding. Daud Beureu'eh claimed not to have been informed of it. It is even possible that the Government had intended him for it, with or without his knowledge. In any case, all letters addressed to the resident-coordinator of Aceh were returned to Medan unopened on Daud Beureu'eh's orders (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:104). The official appointment of R.M. Danubroto to the function of resident-coordinator of Aceh put a definitive end to this situation, however. Daud Beureu'eh was hereupon called to Jakarta by the Central Government to be appointed as governor attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although he never went to Jakarta to take up this position. At the same time a number of other changes were effected in the Civil Administration of Aceh – e.g. a number of *bupatis* were replaced – without this arousing opposition for the time being.

5. *Causes of Discontent*

The period of quiet in Aceh resulting from the solution worked out by Natsir and Daud Beureu'eh did not last long. As early as April the first indications of renewed unrest were to be noted as a new anti-PUSA movement gained momentum.

On April 8th, 1951, the *Badan Keinsyafan Rakyat* (BKR), People's Awareness Organization, was founded in Aceh. It resembled in many ways the Sajid Ali Alsaqaf movement. Aiming to all appearances at the establishment of an incorrupt and capable government, the principal target was the PUSA leaders. Also as in the Sajid Ali Alsaqaf movement, *ulèèbalang* and Islamic scholars joined forces in it. The stated aims of the BKR were to assist the Government, "wherever necessary", in giving out information on its policies and strengthening the ties with the people.

A more concrete programme was outlined in a resolution adopted by the BKR on April 15th. It opened with the statement that the population of Aceh had become alienated from the Government, "or, to be more exact, from the majority of those styling themselves representatives or leaders of the people, who at the moment hold seats in the Administration of Aceh, and that the people's awareness in this respect has become increasingly clear since their experiences during the time those same leaders were fighting for their own ideals and competing in the amassing of personal wealth".

As a way of restoring the people's confidence the BKR urged

the Government to dismiss those of its officials who were obstructing the execution of Government decisions or who were corrupt or incompetent. It further called on the Government to supply proof that it was indeed exerting itself to protect the citizens and their property. The measures proposed by the BKR included the restoration of the property administered by the Councils of Review to the orphans of deceased *ulèëbalang*, and a clarification of the Government's attitude to the crimes committed during the "social revolution" and its aftermath. The BKR in addition requested the Government to dismiss the – allegedly PUSA-dominated – committee set up for the preparation of the general election in Aceh, and to take steps to improve the economic situation. If necessary, finally, the Civil Administration should be replaced by a military one (Sumatera Utara 1953:439–440; Amin 1956:267–269). Although the BKR resolution mentioned no names, it was obviously directed against the PUSA and its leaders.

Both the BKR and the PUSA had ample opportunity to attract the public attention during President Soekarno's visit to Aceh. On his arrival in Banda Aceh on July 30th, 1951, he was greeted by both PUSA and BKR demonstrators. The latter's signs read: "Do not try only the people, but also the embezzlers of the people's property", "The chicken thief goes to jail, the big thieves continue in office", and "Teungku Daud Beureu'eh, the sucker of the people's blood". All these slogans clearly alluded to alleged malpractices on the part of the Acehnese leaders, who exploited their positions as such to acquire personal wealth and cover up their crimes. The PUSA demonstrators carried boards displaying signs like "Aceh must not be treated as a stepchild", and "We love the President, but we love religion more". With this latter slogan the PUSA demonstrators were expressing their distrust of Soekarno, whom they believed to have betrayed Islam by propagating the *Pancasila*, instead of Islam, as the basis of the Indonesian State.

The next issue that made feelings in Aceh run high was that of the Indonesia-wide mass arrests the next month. The Cabinet then in power, the *Masyumi*-PNI coalition Cabinet headed by Sukiman, was characterized by a strong anti-communist attitude. This reached its climax in the so-called "August razzias", in which on the pretext of the discovery of a plot to overthrow the Government about 15,000 people were put under arrest. These included a number of *Masyumi* politicians, presumably on account of contacts with *Darul Islam* groups. As Feith

(1973:189) points out, however, "Apparently the greatest number of those arrested were either Chinese or supporters of the PKI". Feith (1973:190) further writes that "the choice of persons to be arrested had been made hastily, with a high degree of discretion being left to the local authorities, especially the *bupatis*, to arrest whomever they considered dangerous to security in their areas". His assessment is correct, generally speaking. There was indeed a high degree of discretion left to local authorities. But it was precisely this factor that set the arrests in Aceh apart from those in the rest of Indonesia.

In Aceh, as elsewhere, the military authorities were strongly anti-communist. But, unlike those in other parts of Indonesia, they felt that they had a more dangerous enemy still to contend with: the PUSA. Another point on which Aceh differed was sharp cleavage between the military of the province of North Sumatra and the local Civil Administration in Aceh. The latter, in spite of earlier changes in personnel, was still PUSA-oriented. As a consequence it was in the main members of the PUSA rather than members or supporters of the Communist party, PKI, who were arrested or interrogated in Aceh. They included some of the PUSA's top leaders, such as Daud Beureu'eh, Teungku Sulaiman Daud, the current *bupati* of Pidie, and Teungku Hasan Hanafiah, head of the Office of Religion of West Aceh. Furthermore, it was alleged by the Council of Review of Pidie that its members were a special target of the August raids (Sekitar n.d. I:240, III:83). The arrests were interpreted by the victims, in fact, as an *ulèëbalang* attempt to get even.

As a State of War and Siege (SOB) still continued in North Sumatra, the arrests were carried out by the Regional Military Command. Those arrested were described in a monograph on North Sumatra (Sumatera Utara 1953:448) as "elements who disturbed the peace and security, who engaged in activities of an anti-national nature, and who undermined the authority of the Government". The Army of North Sumatra, for its part strongly denied having acted on its own authority, without orders from or the prior knowledge of its superiors.

In the subsequent situation again the troubles in Aceh were viewed in the light of the long-standing conflict between *ulama* and *ulèëbalang*. A distinction was drawn between the military and the Civil Administration of North Sumatra, or more precisely speaking of Aceh, which ran along the same line as that between the *ulèëbalang* and the *ulama* or PUSA. In this interpretation, which itself contributed to the tension, the Civil Administration

was still PUSA-dominated, while the Army was increasingly becoming an instrument of the *ulèëbalang*.

In 1953, during the parliamentary debates on the *Darul Islam* rebellion in Aceh, the arrests by the Army were defended by PNI member Abdullah Jusuf (Abdullah Yusuf), who also referred obliquely to the cleavage between the Army and the Civil Administration of North Sumatra. Criticizing the Civil Government for ignoring the complaints lodged with and the information passed to it concerning the activities of Daud Beureu'eh and other PUSA leaders in the early 1950's, he praised the Army as being the only institution to act on this information and again and again thwarting the PUSA in its designs (Sekitar n.d. I:279). Another spokesman for the secular parties, PKI member Sarwono S. Sutardjo (Sarwono S. Sutarjo), likewise put the blame for the rebellion partly on the laxity of the Civil Administration. According to him the governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, had put "more faith in his subordinates in Aceh — who were known to be PUSA/*Masyumi* champions — than in the actual facts . . ." (Sekitar n.d. I:178).

The members of parliament representing the Islamic parties in the debate, rather than stressing the connection between the PUSA and the Civil Administration, like Abdullah Jusuf and Sarwono S. Sutardjo, laid emphasis on that between the *ulèëbalang*, or the *Badan Keinsyafan Rakyat*, and the military. A former secretary of PUSA, Nur el Ibrahimy, for instance, lodged the accusation that the BKR had actively cooperated with the Army during the August arrests (Sekitar n.d. I:142). Amelz likewise hinted at the connections between the Army and the *ulèëbalang*. He claimed that the people's distrust of the Army had increased since observing that the Army and Police maintained contacts with persons whom they labelled obstructors of (Indonesia's) independence (Sekitar n.d. I:262).

Even so, by identifying the Civil Administration with the PUSA and the military with the *ulèëbalang* one ignores the complexity of the problems involved. The conflicts in Aceh were not exclusively the outcome of a struggle for power between the two social classes of the *ulama* and the *ulèëbalang*. The Acehnese claims for regional autonomy and the Central Government's efforts to extend its influence also played a role here. The Central Government, in its attempts to extend its influence, looked to the enemies of the PUSA as possible allies, and tried to reduce the PUSA's grip over the Civil Administration and Army in the area. In the latter attempt it was far more successful with the Army

than with the Civil Administration. Although it had had a number of senior civil servants replaced after the creation of the province of North Sumatra, at the local level the Government had failed in establishing its control over the Civil Administration by appointing loyal pro-government officials. In the Army, on the other hand, the problem had been much easier to tackle. The Government had succeeded in purging the Army of PUSA influence through a policy of replacements, the dissolution of particular army units, and the stationing of troops from other regions in Aceh as early as 1950.

Consequently the loyalties of the Army in Aceh at this time were quite different from those in the period immediately following the social revolution. For just after March 1946, after the replacement of Sjammaun Gaharu by Husin Jusuf as commander of the Division V, the Republican Army Division in Aceh, following Amir Husin al Mudjahid's coup PUSA control had been strongest. Husin Jusuf had subsequently become commander of the *Gajah* I (First Elephant) Division, as the Division V was renamed in February 1947, and a month after that commander of the Division X, in which the *Gajah* I Division merged with the *Gajah* II Division of East Sumatra, and of which Colonel Sitompul, a former commander of the *Gajah* II Division, was appointed Chief of Staff.¹³

In June 1947 the Central Army Command had decreed that the many irregular guerilla units should be incorporated into the Republican Army. This decision had been greeted with reserve if not outright refusal by the Acehnese guerilla organizations, which at first were strongly opposed to such integration. Their opposition was so strong, in fact, that, as Nur el Ibrahimy later stated in Parliament (Sekitar n.d. I:132), there had been fears of bloodshed. Only after the attempt at mediation of Daud Beureu'eh, then military governor of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo, had the guerilla organizations given in. The negotiations about integration had started in December 1947, with talks taking place not only between Daud Beureu'eh and the commanders of the guerilla organizations, but also within the guerilla units themselves. So on December 14th a special internal meeting had been held by both the *Mujahidin* and the *Dipisi Rencong Kesatria Pesindo* (the continuation of the BPI), at which incorporation into the Republican Army had been one of the subjects of discussion.¹⁴ Earlier, on December 8th, a commission for the preparation of incorporation had been formed in Aceh. As its head had been appointed Colonel R.M.S. Surjosurarso (R.M.S. Suryosurar-

so), one of Daud Beureu'eh's military advisors, while its members included Amir Husin al Mudjahid and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Teungku A. Wahab. At the end of December the Republican Army Provisional Command, or *Dewan Pimpinan Sementara TNI*, had been set up in Aceh at the suggestion of this Commission, with A. Wahab as chairman, and R.M.S. Surjosurarlo as deputy chairman. The latter in addition had become Chief of the General Staff, which further included the Commander of the Republican Army Division in Aceh, and the Commanders of the three local irregular guerilla organizations: the *Dipisi Rencong Kesatria Pesindo*, *Dipisi X Teungku Chik di Tiro* (formed in 1947, after a reorganization of the *Mujahidin*), and the *Dipisi Teungku Chik Paya Bakong* (founded by Amir Husin al Mudjahid).

It had taken six months for the merger to become a fact, and the institution of the new Division X had been officially announced on June 13th, 1948. Its first commander had been Daud Beureu'eh, in his capacity as military governor, followed in October by the old commander, Husin Jusuf. In November 1949 the Acehnese Division had changed its name to *Komando Tentara & Territorium Aceh*, or Army and Territorial Command of Aceh, with Husin Jusuf remaining in command (Sumatera Utara 1953:165–169; Dua Windhu 1972:140–144).

Thereupon some major changes had been effected. First of all, in December 1949, the *Komando Tentara & Territorium I*/North Sumatra had been formed under the command of Kawilarang, who five months later had been succeeded by Sitompul, a Christian Batak. Subsequently the *Komando Tentara & Territorium Atjeh* had become the Brigade CC of the Army and Territorial Command I/*Bukit Barisan*, under the command of Hasbullah Hadji (Hasbullah Haji), as Husin Jusuf, after a conflict with Kawilarang, had by that time left the Army.

Probably because of these changes the guerilla leaders of Aceh at the end of 1950 had revived the various irregular guerilla organizations, this giving rise to persistent rumours that a rebellion was afoot. In Aceh itself the move had been justified by saying that these organizations had been called into being again so as to be prepared for a third World War (N 6-11-1950).

The transformation of the Republican Army Division of Aceh into a brigade had brought a number of important personnel changes in its wake and greatly boosted the authority of the Central Army Command. The Acehnese army had fallen victim to the Republican Government's demobilization policy, with the

demobilized in Aceh including prominent commanders such as Husin Jusuf, Amir Husin al Mudjahid, Njak Neh (commander of the *Dipisi Rencong Kesatria Pesindo*) and Said Abubakar. To their great indignation the sacked Acehnese civil and military leaders had been openly described as “mere illiterates” (which in many cases was not true) and “*madrasah* party people” (Husin Jusuf 1954 in a letter to S.M. Amin in Gelanggang 1956:135).

Moreover, the Central Army Command had stationed troops from Aceh in other parts of Indonesia and moved non-Acehnese troops into Aceh. The latter included Bataks and former KNIL soldiers. The Brigade CC, for its part, was ordered to East Sumatra and to Tarutung in North Tapanuli, while Acehnese troops were further sent to the Moluccas. Later, as the signs of an impending *Darul Islam* rising grew stronger, units of the Mobile Brigade were sent to Aceh.

These moves on the one hand assured the Army Command of the presence of loyal troops in Aceh. At the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* rebellion, in fact, few regular soldiers stationed in Aceh participated. On the other hand, this assurance was paid for with a further alienation of the former guerillas in Aceh. There were suspicions that the Bataks were trying to gain the upper hand in the North Sumatran army, and accordingly in Aceh the Batak soldiers were looked upon almost as enemies. It was further thought that the new commander for North Sumatra, Maludin Simbolon, wanted to gain control of Aceh, and was aided in his designs by fellow-Bataks in Jakarta, namely the generals Nasution and Simatupang.¹⁵

Thus, where the Central Government was more or less successful in building up a loyal army in Aceh, it failed in its attempt to gain influence in the civil service. Estimates of the number of civil servants joining the *Darul Islam* movement here vary, but are all quite high. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Sutikno P. Sumarto, at the time a member of the security staff of Aceh, stated as early as October 24th, 1953, that about seventy per cent of the civil servants in Aceh were active participants in the rebellion (Sekitar n.d. I:78–79). At about the same time Amin stated that ninety per cent of them might quite reasonably be estimated to have sided with the rebels, because “they all came from the same group” (Sekitar n.d. I:80).

6. *Preparations for Rebellion*

During the first months of 1953 the tension steadily mounted in Aceh. There were rumours of new arrests, secret meetings, and contacts between Daud Beureu'eh and Kartosuwirjo circulating. PUSA members commenced their campaign for the general election and in their speeches stressed the need for regional autonomy and an Islamic State.

The names that crop up most frequently in connection with the preparations for a rebellion in this period are those of Daud Beureu'eh, Hasan Aly, Husin Jusuf and Amir Husin al Mudjahid. The latter two exerted themselves especially to enlist the support of demobilized guerillas, towards which end they founded the (*Persatuan*) *Bekas Perjuang (Islam) Aceh* (BPA), (Association of) Former (Islamic) Fighters of Aceh. This organization was headed by Husin Jusuf, and had Daud Beureu'eh as patron. Amir Husin al Mudjahid is said to have entertained relations with another organization of former guerillas, the *Biro Bekas Angkatan Perang*, Bureau of Former Members of the Armed Forces, as well in an attempt to win over discontented former guerilla fighters in East Sumatra.¹⁶ Contacts were also established with Acehnese troops with a view to inciting them to desertion (Gelanggang 1956:38).

That there were connections between Daud Beureu'eh and the *Darul Islam* movement before September 1953 is certain. It is less certain, however, who had taken the initiative: the rebels in Aceh or Kartosuwirjo. According to a secret report, Daud Beureu'eh and Amir Husin al Mudjahid allegedly had travelled to Java to confer with Kartosuwirjo in Bandung after a secret meeting called by Daud Beureu'eh on March 13th, which was attended by Amir Husin al Mudjahid, Husin Jusuf, Sulaiman Daud, Hasan Aly (Director of Public Prosecutions in Aceh, at that time on official leave), Said Abubakar and A.R. Hanafiah (an employee of the Office of Religion of East Aceh), and at which the conspirators had delegated the two to go to Java to establish contact with leaders of the *Darul Islam* movement there (Sekitar n.d. I:302–303). According to the same report, Amir Husin al Mudjahid on his return from Java had stayed a few days in Medan to meet representatives of other Islamic organizations there, such as the *Masyumi* and its youth branch, the GPII.

Daud Beureu'eh and Kartosuwirjo remained in touch with each other through envoys. So Kartosuwirjo decided to send Mustafa Rasjid (Mustafa Rasyid) to Aceh to discuss the integration of this territory into the Islamic State of Indonesia and to appoint Daud

Beureu'eh chief of the Aceh Command. Mustafa Rasjid, whose real name was Abdul Fatah Tanu Wirananggapa and who styled himself *chargé d'affaires* of the Islamic State of Indonesia for Aceh, had been arrested on his return to Java in May 1953. There an envoy of Daud Beureu'eh had also been captured (Meuraxa 1956:32; Sekitar n.d. I:547–553; PR 28-9-1953). The Central Government, which tried to keep these arrests a secret, did not proceed to put Daud Beureu'eh under arrest, and only increased the number of Mobile Brigade units in Aceh.

In North Sumatra, meanwhile, two important congresses had taken place in April 1953. First a congress of Islamic scholars was held at Medan from April 11th to 15th. Secondly a congress to evaluate the results of the Medan congress was organized by the PUSA at Langsa from April 15th till 29th. Both meetings were chaired by Daud Beureu'eh, who was thus provided with an excellent opportunity to inform those he trusted of his plans and to discuss the possibility of a rebellion with them.

The two congresses provided the starting-point for a comprehensive Aceh-wide campaign in which the Islamic leaders urged the population to vote for an Islamic party in the coming general elections (which at the time seemed close at hand), and for Islam as the constitutional basis of the Indonesian State. They moreover raised a number of issues which had for a long time aroused the resentment of an important section of the Acehnese population, viz. the alleged anti- or un-Islamic attitude of the Indonesian Government, the latter's neglect of Aceh, and the replacement of Acehnese with people from outside the region in the Regional Administration and Army. At mass meetings and in sermons they further accused the Javanese and Bataks of harbouring intentions to take over Aceh, alleged that the Republican troops sent to Aceh were made up of former KNIL soldiers and infidels, and attacked Soekarno for wanting to promote Hinduism. One monograph on the Acehnese rebellion (Gelanggang 1956:13) states that the Islamic scholars "resolutely vowed . . . that on their return to their region they would leave no stone unturned to persuade the people to fight for an Islamic State in the coming elections for Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, and that if a victory was not won in this way, then they would not shrink from employing illegal means towards this end".

The two congresses not only provided the starting-point for the Aceh-wide campaign to expound the Islamic leaders' view on the Islamic State and to incite the people to rebellion against the

Central Government. It also provided the impetus for renewed efforts to extend the PUSA's influence in society. The latter's organizational structure was strengthened by the institution of mass organizations to mobilize its supporters. Thus the PUSA's youth branch, the *Pemuda* PUSA, which had for years been dormant, was revived, the above-mentioned *Persatuan Bekas Pejuang Islam Aceh* was founded, and the PUSA strengthened its hold over the Acehnese Boy Scout movement, the *Pandu Islam*, by appointing A.G. Mutiara as its head. These three organizations played an important part in the military preparations for the coming rebellion. Besides providing the Acehnese *Darul Islam* with the bulk of its troops, they greatly facilitated the planning for the coordinated actions at the outbreak of the rebellion, whereby the major towns of Aceh were attacked simultaneously. The former guerillas united in the *Persatuan Bekas Perjuang Islam Aceh* constituted the principal shock troops, supported by the youths from the *Pemuda* PUSA and the *Pandu Islam* as auxiliaries.

This *Pandu Islam* was more than just a Boy Scout movement. Apart from the normal quasi-military drill, it provided its members with a rudimentary military training. "The *Pandu Islam* grew healthier and gained more followers day by day. It then appeared that its members were receiving military training from specially selected experienced soldiers and were taught methods of attack and assault. They received this training not only by day but also by night" (Gelanggang 1956:18). A proportion of the Boy Scouts, whose number was estimated by the Government at 4,000 (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:107), were former guerillas, moreover.

With the preparations well under way, the moment finally arrived when a date for the start of the rebellion had to be fixed. From an ideological point of view the most suitable day would have been August 7th, the date on which Kartosuwirjo had proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia. There are, in fact, indications that the *Darul Islam* leaders of Aceh considered this an appropriate day. And according to the Singapore magazine *Asia Newsletter* (quoted in *Waktu* Vol. VIII, n.37, Oct. 10, 1953; Sekitar n.d. I:493) the rebels had originally decided to start the rebellion on August 7th, but had changed their mind after information reaching the Central Government, where upon Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, a devout Muslim, had persuaded the ring-leaders to give up this plan. Another possible date mentioned was August 17th, the anniversary of the declaration of Indone-

sian independence. According to the above-mentioned secret report (Sekitar n.d. I:303), August 17th had been decided upon at a meeting of August 1st, at which twelve people, including i.a. Amir Husin al Mudjahid (but not Daud Beureu'eh)¹⁷, assembled at the house of Zainy Bakri, *bupati* at Langsa. It had also been agreed at this same meeting, according to the report, to postpone the start of the rebellion until mid-September at the latest if the preparations were not yet completed by August 17th.

To ease the situation in Aceh visits had been paid to the region by President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta, the former in March 1953. His visit did not do much to decrease the tension, however, being too much dominated by his speech at Amuntai, which had also enraged devout Muslims in Aceh. As during his earlier visit in 1951, Soekarno was greeted by signs bearing such slogans as "We love the President but we love Religion more" (Feith 1973:346). More successful on the face of it was Hatta's endeavour. During his visit, which took place in July, he had conferred with, among others, Daud Beureu'eh. He had subsequently returned to Jakarta in an optimistic frame of mind, confident that he had worked out a solution and that the situation was still under control. Daud Beureu'eh and his associates were not put under arrest, in spite of the Government's knowledge of their contacts with Kartosuwirjo. Later the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the political party which was most critical of the rebellion, accused Hatta of having personally interfered in the affairs of the Government by instructing Prime Minister Wilopo (whose Cabinet resigned at the end of July) not to take preventive action in Aceh. According to PKI spokesmen, Hatta's attitude had been no different before and after his visit to Aceh. Before setting off he had felt confident about being able to deal with the problems in Aceh; after his return he had told Wilopo that nothing was going to happen and that he was sure peace and order could be preserved (Sekitar n.d. I:178, 281-286).

The Government was attacked not only by the PKI for its lack of alertness. The Islamic parties too, notably *Masyumi*, criticized it for failing to act upon information supplied it. Both groups had, in fact, pointed to the growing unrest in Aceh, with the communists drawing attention to the preparations for the rebellion and the PUSA's efforts to extend its influence, and the *Masyumi*, on the other hand, trying to convince the Government that the mounting feeling of dissatisfaction was a result of its own faulty policy. The *Masyumi* still pleaded for a change of policy after the outbreak of the rebellion, asking for greater

financial assistance for Aceh, the replacement of the troops from other areas by Acehnese soldiers, and the reinstatement of Acehnese officials in high military and civil functions.

The Regional Government authorities in North Sumatra and Aceh followed the line of the Central Government in Jakarta and did their utmost to remove any impression that a rebellion was brewing. They repeatedly denied that the situation was serious or that there was a rebellious movement taking shape. In some cases these statements were made out of genuine ignorance, in others they were inspired by a desire to set people's mind at ease, while in yet other cases they were deliberately intended to deceive other government officials and to cover up the many intrigues.

In early September a number of official meetings were held to discuss the security situation in Aceh. One of these took place at Medan on September 14th – exactly one week before the outbreak of the rebellion. It was attended by the *bupatis* of East Aceh, Zainy Bakri, of Pidie, T.A. Hasan, and of North Aceh, Usman Azis, who briefed the governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, on the situation in their respective regions and assured him that all was well and that there was no immediate threat to the peace. This meeting was also attended by Sulaiman Daud, acting resident-coordinator of Aceh (Gelanggang 1956:19–25), who a few weeks later turned out to be the commander of the rebel force in Greater Aceh. At that same time it transpired that the *bupatis* of Pidie, T.A. Hasan, and of East Aceh, Zainy Bakri, had gone over to the *Darul Islam*.¹⁸ Of course Abdul Hakim also received information that contradicted the views put forward by the *bupatis*. Such information was passed on to him by, among others Nja' Umar (Nya' Umar), Police coordinator for Aceh, who judged the situation to be so grave that he had ordered the stationing of guards at important public buildings (Alers 1956:270). Abdul Hakim may actually have attached more credence to this latter kind of information, in fact. At the end of September, when he was free to disclose the truth, he admitted that the atmosphere had been "hot" in August, whereupon things cooled off again, only to reach a new climax in mid-September, at the outbreak of the rebellion (Sekitar n.d. I:8).

In the month of August people began preparing themselves to flee Aceh or to go into hiding. While the Government continued to turn a deaf ear to warnings of growing tension by people from both the left and the right, private citizens began leaving the area for Medan and East Sumatra in large numbers. They were mostly

relatives of *ulèëbalang* and members or sympathizers of the secular parties, in particular the PKI. But members of the Islamic parties, including the PUSA, also felt insecure. Their fear of renewed repressive measures by the Republican Army, as witnessed by them in August 1951, mounted as rumours that the Government had compiled a list of names of prominent Acehnese who were earmarked for arrest circulated. This list according to some contained three hundred, according to others one hundred and ninety names (Sekitar n.d. I:263).

Some authors claim this list to have constituted the immediate cause of the rebellion. Boland (1971:73) writes, for example: "According to information acquired in Atjeh, left-wing politicians in Djakarta had earlier in 1953 begun to spread the rumour that Atjeh was indeed organizing a rising. As a result of this rumour 'Djakarta' listed 190 prominent Atjehnese who were to be arrested. In July 1953 this became known in Atjeh; later on it turned out that this list of names had probably been leaked on purpose. As these leading Atjehnese had the feeling that they might be arrested, they decided to take to the mountains on September 19th, 1953. This was the official break with 'Djakarta', and the beginning of the so-called Darul Islam revolt in Atjeh." A similar view was put forward by Amelz in a parliamentary debate at the outbreak of the rebellion. Basing himself on an article in the Indonesian daily *Lembaga*, he put the leaking of the list at a much later date, however, namely after the occurrence of the first rebel actions on September 20th and 21st. But he shares Boland's view that the presence of their names on the list induced a number of leaders to join the rebellion. Those who had intended not to act until the government did so first, now, after being informed of the list, according to Amelz, decided to defect (Sekitar n.d. I:263).

Although there is some truth in Boland's and Amelz' assessment of the importance of the black list, both authors overlook, or underestimate, the difference of opinion between later *Darul Islam* leaders about the urgency of an armed rebellion. The confidence displayed by Hatta after his return from Aceh was in part due to a miscalculation of Daud Beureu'eh's position. The latter was regarded by Hatta as the leader of the discontented elements in the region, of which elements he believed him to be in full control. It is of course quite possible that Daud Beureu'eh was regarded by a large proportion of the Acehnese population as the only person suitable for and capable of leading a rising against the Central Government. It is also true, on the other hand, that

Daud Beureu'eh had considerable difficulty in restraining the die-hards impatient for action.

Thus the rebellion may well have been triggered off by over-hasty armed actions undertaken by agitated youths with the aim of stealing arms off the Police, thereby forcing the implementation of a plan devised in early 1953 whose realization had been postponed after the talks between Hatta and Daud Beureu'eh. The latter, realizing that he would be among the first to be arrested at the first sign of a rebellion, then was left with no alternative but to join and assume the leadership of the rebellion.

That Daud Beureu'eh indeed experienced difficulty in restraining the young radicals was revealed by Amelz, according to whom there were voices demanding quick action to be heard in the month preceding the outbreak of the rebellion. This plea for action by the young had been prompted by the increasingly tense situation as well as by the fear of possible repressive measures on the part of the Government (Sekitar n.d. I:262). The older leaders had succeeded in temporarily silencing these voices, however.

The theory that some of the leaders themselves were caught unawares by the outbreak of the rebellion would explain some of the developments of the first weeks following this. Although seemingly well prepared, with simultaneous attacks being launched on towns cities all over Aceh, there are some facts testifying to a definite lack of preparation of this event. At the time of the attack on the police station at Peureulak by *Darul Islam* troops led by Chazali Idris (Khazali Idris) on September 19th, which marked the actual start of the rebellion, Daud Beureu'eh was still in Banda Aceh. Other leaders had not yet returned from Medan, where they had been attending a national sports festival, moreover.

7. *The Rebellion*

During the first two weeks of the rebellion various towns and cities were attacked, including Banda Aceh. Plans for the attack of the latter came to the notice of the Police only on the day preceding the night in which the insurrection started (Akers 1956:271), namely that of September 19th. On the east coast the attacks were concentrated on the towns and cities located on the railroad from Banda Aceh, via Seulimeum in Greater Aceh, Sigli and Meureudu in Pidie, Bireuen and Lhokseumawe in North Aceh, and Idi, Peureulak and Langsa in East Aceh, to Medan.

The small police post of Peureulak, which was manned by about ten officers, was among the first to be attacked. Both the police station and the town of Peureulak were occupied by a rebel force commanded by Chazali Idris without encountering any resistance within two hours. Guards were stationed at strategic points and the *Darul Islam* flag was flown from important buildings in the town.¹⁹ On that and the next few days also the nearby towns of Idi and Bayeuen were seized, again without any resistance being offered. The occupation of all of these towns was much facilitated by the support lent the rebels by a number of local civil servants. At Peureulak it was the assistant *wedana*, A.R. Hassan, and in Idi police inspector Aminuddin Ali, who assisted the rebels.²⁰

After capturing Idi, Bayeuen and Peureulak and bringing all railway traffic to a standstill, the different rebel forces linked up to march on Langsa, the capital of East Aceh. Towards this end buses and private cars were confiscated for the transportation of troops. Up to that moment the rebels had met with very little opposition, and had disarmed local Police units without much trouble at all. For a short while it looked as though it might be possible also to take Langsa without a shot being fired. For the population of this town, in the absence of the *bupati* of East Aceh (who would have sided with the rebels anyway) and of the chief of Police, who were both of them still at Medan, was strongly in favour of surrender. Accordingly delegates were sent to Peureulak and to Bayeuen to sound out the rebels as to their intentions and to discuss the terms of surrender with them. These returned with the message that the *Darul Islam* troops in any case would march on Langsa to collect the arms of the Army and Police units stationed there. A stopper was put on these plans for surrender when the chief of Police returned from Medan and in turn imposed an ultimatum on the rebels to hand over their arms. *Darul Islam* troops approached Langsa from the west and the north and launched a concerted attack on the Military Police and Mobile Brigade barracks on September 21st. The Republican Army, supported by fresh troops from Medan, was able to repulse this attack. The defeat of the rebels at Langsa marked the turning-point in the fighting in East Aceh. On September 23rd Republican troops recaptured Bayeuen, and in the next two days Idi and Peureulak.

In North Aceh the regional capital of Lhokseumawe was violently attacked in vain a number of times, the first time on the morning of September 21st, when the rebels were obliged to

retreat after a battle of about four hours. They renewed their attack several times the next few days, but again without success, although at one point the situation became so critical that the evacuation of the civil population was contemplated. Another town in North Aceh, Bireuen, was occupied by them for a short time. So was Seulimeum in Greater Aceh, which was taken on September 21st. Upon the rebels' attacking it the Republican Police garrison offered no resistance.

In Pidie the rebels failed to take the capital, Sigli. They were more successful at Tangse, Geumpang and Meureudu, which latter town gave them a lot of trouble, however. It only fell after an assault by what may be described as the Acehnese *Darul Islam*'s crack troops, after its defenders ran out of ammunition, moreover. The troops occupying Meureudu comprised a unit of regular Republican Army soldiers originating from Aceh, commanded by Hasan Saleh, who at the outbreak of the rebellion had deserted and marched from Sidikalang in Tapanuli, where they had been stationed, back to North Aceh. Hasan Saleh himself had been sent on long furlough before the outbreak of the rebellion.

In Central Aceh the *Darul Islam* forces occupied Takengon. As at Meureudu, they were able to enter the town only after the Republican troops had run out of ammunition. Another town that fell was Tapak Tuan in South Aceh (Amin 1956:48-61; Keterangan Pemerintah 1953; Ariwiadi 1965:3-7).

The rebels did not accomplish a great deal by the occupation of these towns. Their leaders might have hoped that they were strong enough to drive the Republican Army out of at least a major part of the territory of Aceh and to repulse any counter-attacks, but this proved an over-estimation of the strength of the *Darul Islam* forces. They were not able to hold the towns and cities they had taken for very long. A counter-offensive by Republican Government troops drove the *Darul Islam* troops out of them with obvious ease. Some towns were reoccupied within days. Others held out longer. With the fall of Takengon, Tangse and Geumpang at the end of November, however, the rebels were definitively dislodged from the urban areas. They retreated to the countryside, where, notably in the *kabupatens* along the north coast, they put up a fierce resistance.

The government officials showed themselves extremely pleased at the speedy success of the first military actions. So S.M. Amin (1953:4), who was soon thereafter to be appointed governor of North Sumatra, stated that from a military point of view the

rebellion was over and that all that remained for the Government to do was to launch a pacification campaign. Even so, it must have been obvious at the same time, in the light of the situation in West Java, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, that pacification was no easy matter. This was certainly realized by the commander of the *Bukit Barisan* Division of North Sumatra, Colonel Maludin Simbolon, who from the start expressed the opinion that the situation was and continued to be very grave and that the rebels would be impossible to subdue by military means alone (Sekitar n.d. I:37; ANP-Aneta 1954:126).

The outbreak of the rebellion had moreover made the administration of the area very difficult for the Republican Government, and had seriously disrupted the functioning of the regional government and economy. In the former it was the departments harbouring the most PUSA sympathizers which suffered most, owing to the defection of their personnel. Amin, in a tentative assessment of the situation (1953:7), estimated that about seventy per cent of the employees of the Regional Government Departments of Religion, Social Affairs, and Information had left their jobs and joined the rebels. The Department of Education had to cope with a different though equally serious problem, namely that a large proportion of the teachers had fled to Medan or had been evacuated. For the first few months of the rebellion they refused to return to Aceh, saying that they would rather be dismissed (Amin 1953:8). There were similar problems in the local administration. A number of *bupatis*, as we have seen, had sided with the rebels. The situation at a lower level was worse still. Many of the lowest-level administrators, the *keuchiks* and the *imeums* (heads) of the *mukims*, had gone over to the rebels.²¹ Worst affected by this was Pidie, where the *bupati*, all three *wedanas*, all but one of the twenty *camats*, and 99 of the 188 *imeums* changed their allegiance (ANP-Aneta 1954:106). As in other areas affected by *Darul Islam* risings, it was the lowest officials who felt the impact of the rebellion most directly. The exercise of their function in areas where *Darul Islam* influence was strong was outright dangerous. So it is not surprising that the Republican Government, in its efforts to build up its local administration again, had difficulty in finding people prepared to represent it on the village level. Although it succeeded in filling vacancies and replacing officials whose loyalty was under suspicion in the higher administrative echelons, it failed to find enough loyal candidates for these lower positions. By April 1954 the Republican Government had succeeded in building up its

administration again from the *camat* level upwards, i.e. in the relatively safe urban areas. Even so, a parliamentary commission visiting Aceh in early 1954 was obliged to report that the newly appointed *bupatis*, *wedanas* and *camats* in Greater Aceh and Pidie were still not able to make inspection tours in their areas and were only safe in the towns and in places where Republican troops were stationed. Some *camats* had to be conveyed to their posts under armed escort in the mornings and taken back to the city in the same way at night (ANP-Aneta 1954:107). At the same time twenty per cent of the functions of *imeum mukim* and *keuchik* were still vacant (Pendapat pemerintah 1954:2). In a number of villages, moreover, the Republican *imeum mukim* and *keuchik* were also secretly working for the rebels.

Economically the region suffered greatly from the disruption of traffic. Many parts of Aceh showed the at that time very familiar scene of ruined bridges and impassable roads. Sometimes road travel was only possible under convoy. In other cases the permission of local *Darul Islam* troops was required, which was usually received only after payment of a fee. This applied not only to private travel but also to bus and truck traffic. Some entrepreneurs in fact paid the rebels regular sums of money just to be able to continue operating.²² The railways also experienced difficulties. Apart from the hazard of train hold-ups, there were frequent damages to rail-tracks and stations. For a number of years it was impossible to have trains run to schedule, especially in Pidie (Keterangan pemerintah 1954:11; Gelanggang 1956:113–115; Junus 1955:3). The safest way to travel was by boat, but the shipping facilities were far from sufficient to compensate for the decrease in land transport facilities (Amin 1953:8).

Initially the rebellion does not seem to have brought about any sudden shortage of food or drop in the productivity of the agricultural estates. There were some alarming reports circulating about the negative effects of the rebellion on the estate economy, such as that labourers had fled in large numbers and that the agricultural work and administration of the plantations had suffered badly. Foreign personnel were advised to evacuate the estates, while in some cases in addition the Indonesian management fled to join the rebels. There was one report of Said Abubakar, who had leased an estate at Langsa, having disappeared, taking with him Rp. 300,000.— in wages. In the East Acehnese oil-fields furthermore, the entire management, including general manager Amir Husin al Mudjahid, disappeared.

According to official government sources all this did not affect productivity, however. The oil fields were still functioning normally (which meant very poorly), while estate yields had even increased by 15 per cent, so Amin noted (Keterangan pemerintah 1953:110; Amin 1953:10).

The problem which caused the government the most headaches at the time, apart from the military actions themselves, was that of the care and accommodation of prisoners. By the end of March 1954 a total of 4,666 persons had been arrested. The capacity of the existing prisons was far from sufficient to cope with this huge number, and schools and other public buildings had to be converted into internment camps. Even then there was not enough room and prisoners had to be taken to places outside Aceh (Pendapat pemerintah 1954:4–5). By this latter means the Republican Government also hoped to speed up the interrogation of prisoners, there being an insufficient number of qualified personnel for this in Aceh, but the measure failed to have the required result. The prisons and camps in Aceh continued to be filled to overflowing and the interrogation of prisoners to be an extremely slow process. When the interrogations got really under-way, most of the prisoners proved to be innocent and to have been arrested on only the slightest of suspicions. By 1956 all but about 400 were released again (Amin 1956:130–132).

8. *The Islamic State of Aceh*

At the outbreak of the rebellion Daud Beureu'eh issued a proclamation in which, in the name of the Islamic community of Aceh, he declared Aceh and surrounding areas part of the Islamic State of Indonesia. He justified the proclamation and the repudiation of the Indonesian Republic by arguing that the Republican leaders in Jakarta had deviated from the right course. The Republic had not developed into a state based upon Islam, in his eyes the only possible implication of the principle of Belief in the One and Only God, the first pillar of the *Pancasila*. On the contrary, it had become increasingly clear to him that the Republican politicians were moving further and further away from this ideal. By this he was alluding to the attempts to place greater emphasis on another *Pancasila* pillar: Indonesian nationalism, which he had discerned. Hereby he picked out some of the main elements of Soekarno's ill-fated speech at Amuntai. Taking up Soekarno's statement that he gave preference to a national state from fear lest, in the event of the creation of an Islamic State, some regions

break away from it, Daud Beureu'eh posited that Aceh had taken the lead in breaking away from a state that was based only on nationalism. His words testify that, for some at least, the difference between a religious or Islamic and a national state was no longer a matter of terminology but had developed into an important factual opposition. Daud Beureu'eh claimed that the people of Aceh understood the real meaning of the words "religion" and "nationalism", and that anyone who believed that religious people did not love their country probably misunderstood Islam. He further asserted that the Indonesian Republic did not, in fact, guarantee freedom of religion in the true sense of the word. It did not accept the fact of Islam's non-differentiation between the religious and the secular fields or the Muslim view that Islamic principles should be applied in all spheres of life. If there existed real freedom of religion, then Islamic law would be operative in Aceh, considering that one hundred per cent of the population of Aceh were Muslims. In this sort of situation it would be absolutely impossible for the Attorney General to prohibit sermons with a political content, he claimed, as politics and religion were indistinguishable.

Another point on which Daud Beureu'eh attacked the Central Government was that it had never acceded to any of Aceh's requests and that it now regarded Aceh, which during the revolution had been the Republic's "capital" area, as a wayward region.²³ Nor had it made any concessions to Aceh's pleas for autonomy, then still conceived within the framework of the Republic. Daud Beureu'eh wondered why a debate on this had had to await the formation of the Constituent Assembly, and whether this was perhaps because the Government and Central Parliament only wanted to shelve the issue. That the latter were capable of speedy action had been demonstrated at the time of the conversion of the federal United States of Indonesia into the unitary Indonesian Republic. Daud Beureu'eh underlined the fact that the people of Aceh had patiently waited for the formation of the Constituent Assembly for years, but that the Government and Parliament had not realized this and had now even decided to postpone the general elections. He expressed the supposition that perhaps the government put its own interests before those of the people. He further wondered if the government might possibly be giving more help and encouragement to the small group of believers in the One and Only God of another creed, or to people who did not believe in God at all, in flagrant contempt of the ideas and wishes of the majority.

The people of Aceh did not want to become separated from their brothers, Daud Beureu'eh stressed, but neither did they want to be treated like a stepchild. In this connection he pointed to the lack of good educational facilities and job opportunities for the children of Aceh, while the absence of a satisfactory transport system was hampering people in their economic activities.

His proclamation of the Islamic State of Aceh did not mean that a state within a state had been created, he added. In the past the Indonesian Republic had been regarded as a golden bridge towards the realization of an ideal of the state that had been cherished from the beginning. Now, however, the bridge was no longer looked upon as a means of communication, but rather as an obstacle. Loyalty to the Republic, based as it was on nationalism, had disappeared, while further the people no longer felt themselves united by a common legal system.

In response to the claims that the proclamation of the Islamic State would give rise to chaos and was in conflict with the law, Daud Beureu'eh asserted that on the contrary, the prevailing legal chaos had provoked the rebellion. He advised the Republican leaders not to use violence, but to tackle the crux of the matter and correct the foundations of their state as well as rectify their policies (Gelanggang 1956:45–51).

In other statements the rebellion was characterized as a movement to free Aceh from Javanese colonialism. Here the leaders in Jakarta were depicted as infidels out after the destruction of Islam, e.g. through reforms of the educational system. They were further branded as corrupt administrators, appointing their own friends to positions of importance, and allegedly firing or retiring at will anyone who did not belong to their circle, "because their health was not one hundred per cent, because they had no education, there was something wrong with their appearance, in short, for a thousand and one reasons" (cited by Amin 1956:88). This latter quotation testifies, incidentally, that the Central Government's policy of applying fixed standards for admission to the Civil Service and Army aroused strong resentment in Aceh as well.

The Republican leaders in Jakarta were accused of trying to promote the interests of Java and the Javanese. Much was made of their alleged Hinduist background. In April 1954, for instance, Daud Beureu'eh described the Republican Government as a Hinduistic one clothed in a nationalistic jacket which very closely resembled Communism (Gelanggang 1956:54). Its chief desire, in

the eyes of the Acehnese rebels, was to bring back the time of the Javanese empire of Majapahit in its hey-day. It was allegedly bent on disseminating its ideas through the medium of the laws, ordinances, etc., issued by the Indonesian Republic, which all breathed a spirit of Hinduism. The PNI and a number of smaller parties were accused of being instrumental in these efforts. For these parties all emphasized the *Pancasila* pillar of Indonesian nationalism as a political cover for their attempts to further Hinduism. Many Muslims had reportedly fallen into the trap and had supported individuals who were actually bent on the destruction of Islam.

Besides identifying the Javanese Muslims with Hinduism, these statements expressed fear at and lashed out against the advance of Communism. The change of government of July 1953 was interpreted as a clear sign of the growing influence of Communism in the political sphere. This change had involved the replacement of the Wilopo Cabinet, supported by *Masyumi* and the PNI, by the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, which included no *Masyumi* ministers and had PKI's support in Parliament. The change was indicated as one of the immediate causes of the rebellion. With the *Masyumi* being forced into the opposition, the government had fallen into the hands of the enemies of Islam.

The rebellion was further represented to the people of Aceh as a continuation of their pre-war resistance to Dutch colonialism and their struggle for independence. The Indonesian Republic was explicitly stated to have forfeited the right to act in the name of the proclamation of independence. Not only had it failed to give Islam its due place in society, but worse still, it was actually a Dutch product. In the tradition of the other rebellious movements it was dubbed the "Round Table Conference Republic". The true heir of the August 1945 proclamation was the Islamic State of Indonesia, which had taken over the struggle for independence after the Indonesian Republic had ceased to exist as a result of the arrest of its Government by the Dutch in December 1948 (Amin 1956:87–94; Gelanggang 1956:33–34).

In putting forward the latter argument, the leaders of the rebellion had some difficulty in explaining why they had joined the Islamic State of Indonesia only now and not from its inception in 1949. Hence the emphasis on the postponement of the general elections and on the change in government. Although the people of Aceh had continued to hope and had patiently awaited the granting of their requests by Jakarta, these two incidents had been the last straw.

Initially Aceh was envisaged as a province of the Islamic State of Indonesia with wide autonomy. Head of this province was Daud Beureu'eh, who, as during the struggle for independence, fulfilled the function of civil and military governor and in this capacity was also commander of the Fifth Territorial Division of the Islamic Army of Indonesia, the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division, and representative of the Central Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia. In civil matters he was assisted by an Administrative Council, called *Dewan Syura*, alongside which the formation of a Parliament, the *Majlis Syura*, was announced.²⁴ In military matters he was assisted by a Military Council, the *Dewan Militer*, which was made up of three persons: Daud Beureu'eh himself, Amir Husin al Mudjahid, as vice-chairman of the *Dewan Syura*, and Husin Jusuf, as Chief of Staff of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division. At the lower levels, those of the *kabupatens* and the *kecamatans*, military and civil affairs for the time being remained separated, in principle at least. The commanders of local army units did not necessarily have to be the heads of the Civil Administration, and vice versa.

Within the next two years the administrative structure was changed twice. The first adjustments were made upon the rebels' recovery from the shock sustained as a result of the failure of the plan to occupy the towns and cities and the driving back of the *Darul Islam* forces into the forests. They were prompted by the realization that the strategy had to be changed from one of frontal attacks on Republican troops to one of guerilla warfare, and the awareness that the number of people who in one way or another assisted the enemy was increasing day by day (Pendjelasan penting Komando Tentara Islam Indonesia Terr. V Divisi Teungku Tjhik Ditiro 5-4-1954).

For the sake of waging a more effective guerilla war, the Military and Civil Administrations were brought together into the one hand through the institution of *Komandemens*. There was such a command for Aceh as a whole as well as for each of the *kabupatens* (divided into a number of subcommands) and *kecamatans*. The commander of the relevant military unit became the first commander of the *Komandemen*, and his Chief of Staff its Chief of Staff. The heads of the Civil Administration, the *bupati* or *camat* (and in the case of the *kabupaten* sub-commands the *wedana*), were made second commanders. These three functionaries, of whom the first commander was the supreme head, thus constituted the executive of each *Komandemen*.²⁵

These changes further strengthened Daud Beureu'eh's position,

as he now headed both the Civil and the Military Administration. For the Command of Aceh as a whole this meant that he was almost the entire executive committee. Moreover, the *Dewan Syura*, *Majlis Syura* and *Dewan Militer* were declared "passive", while the *Komandemen* was given legislative powers. Admittedly, it was decreed at the same time that all decisions of a legislative nature should be discussed with a newly instituted consultative body. This body, however, was made up of the *Komandemen*'s executive, supplemented with the heads of the government agencies of the region concerned — who all belonged to the *Komandemen* staff and were subordinate to its first commander — and at most three outsiders, usually religious leaders (Gelanggang 1956:63–71; Amin 1956:72).

To effectuate the changes, the structure of the Islamic Army of Aceh had to be changed as well. Originally the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division was made up of five regiments, each divided into a number of battalions. As early as the end of 1953 these regiments were styled bases (*pangkalan*), and were supposed in theory at least to comprise both mobile and territorial troops (Buku 1956:9), the latter being made up for the greater part of local people armed with machetes and knives and the like. Now, in June 1954, the division was redivided into six regiments, one for each *kabupaten*. Later on a seventh regiment, the *Tharmihim* Regiment, was formed, to carry out guerilla operations in East Sumatra.²⁶

Further changes were introduced in September of the next year, when the rebels held a conference at Batèë Kurèng, in Greater Aceh. This conference was attended by ninety people, of whom two represented East Sumatra. It was organized a few months after Daud Beureu'eh's appointment by Kartosuwirjo as Vice-President of the Islamic State of Indonesia in January 1955. Other people from Aceh besides had been included in the new all-Indonesian Cabinet of the Islamic State of Indonesia. So Al Murthadla (Amir Husin al Mudjahid) was appointed Second Deputy Minister of Defence, Hasan Aly Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Teungku Nja' Tjut (Nya' Cut) Minister of Education. At the Batèë Kurèng conference the position of Aceh within the Islamic State of Indonesia and the region's administrative structure were discussed. Originally Daud Beureu'eh had intended conferring only with his closest advisors, the members of the consultative body of the Aceh *Komandemen*, about the area's relations with the Islamic State of Indonesia and the Indonesian Republic. He advocated the creation of a separate state of Aceh,

still within the framework of a (federal) Islamic State. The actual presence at Batèë Kurëng of a larger number of *Darul Islam* leaders in connection with the plans for celebrating the second anniversary of the proclamation of 1953 forced Daud Beureu'eh to convene a larger meeting. At this second meeting the leaders agreed on the formation of a separate state, though some, such as T.A. Hasan, did so with a certain reluctance. In return they pushed through their wishes for a more democratic structure of this state, in which the civil administration was again to be free from military supervision and in which a parliament would be formed. The conference culminated in the Batèë Kurëng Charter, whereby the status of Aceh was changed from that of a province to a state within the Islamic State of Indonesia.

The Charter, which served as a kind of provisional constitution, again provided for a separation of the executive and legislative powers. The Head of State, or *Wali Negara*, who was to be elected by the people of Aceh, was to be the head of the executive. For the time being Daud Beureu'eh was designated as such by the delegates, however (par. 3). He was assisted in his function by a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister. The Cabinet and ministers were to be accountable to the Head of State (par. 4). In this Charter the *Majlis Syura* made its reappearance. Although the members of this parliament were to be elected by the people, for the time being they would be appointed by the Head of State (par. 5). The *Majlis Syura* as agreed upon at Batèë Kurëng was to consist of a Chairman (Amir Husin al Mudjahid), two vice-chairmen and sixty-one members.²⁷ No special provisions were made as regards the term of office of its members or its powers. Besides the *Majlis Syura*, the *Majlis Ifta*, a council for the deliverance of *fatwas* to be headed by Teungku Hasbullah Indrapuri, was created. On the subject of the relation of the area to the Central Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Batèë Kurëng Charter stated that the Acehnese State was to conduct its own affairs except in matters of foreign policy, defence and economic policy (par. 6). At the same time it emphasized that as long as the Islamic State of Indonesia was at war and went on fighting in the defence of Islam, the units of the Islamic Army of Indonesia operating in Aceh were to remain an instrument of the Acehnese State, as were the Police Force and *lasykars* (par. 8). In the newly created Cabinet, which was headed by Hasan Aly as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Husin Jusuf occupied the function of Minister of Security, and T.A. Hasan held the portfolios of Finance and Health, while T.M. Amin was appointed

Minister of Economic Affairs and Welfare, Zainul Abidin Muhammad Tiro of Justice, M. Ali Kasim of Education, and Abdul Gani Mutiara of Information.²⁸

The new Cabinet drafted a nine-point programme in which it undertook to re-organize and improve the Civil Administration, the Army and the Police Force, and to ameliorate the social conditions of its civil and military personnel, as well as of the population at large. Steps in this direction had already been taken through the foundation of a Military Academy in East Aceh and the establishment of hospitals.²⁹ The new Cabinet further pledged in its programme to expand the judiciary, which was explicitly stated in the Batèë Kurèng Charter to form a power apart. But, as in the case of the Civil Administration, it made the reservation that in concrete realization the fact that the country was still in a state of (guerilla) war would have to be taken into account (Gelanggang 1956:202–207; Amin 1956:72; Meuraxa 1956:49–57; PR 4-1-1956).

The Cabinet lacked a Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Charter leaving foreign affairs to the Central Government. Still, just as it had its own defence policy, so Aceh maintained its own foreign relations. In this respect it was much more fortunate than any of the other *Darul Islam* areas. Partly this was the result of its proximity to the Malaysian Peninsula, which facilitated the smuggling of arms and other goods and money, as well as the maintenance of close relations with representatives and sympathizers on the opposite coast. From time to time rumours circulated that Daud Beureu'eh had crossed the Straits to enlist Malaysian support. Moreover, Said Abubakar was frequently mentioned as being in Penang or Singapore to solicit financial aid or even to establish contact with the Communist rebels in Malaysia (Sekitar n.d. III:127–128).³⁰ Most active in enlisting foreign support for the Islamic State of Indonesia, and later on for the United Republic of Indonesia, however, was Hasan Muhammad Tiro, a brother of Minister of Justice Zainul Abidin Tiro.

Hasan Muhammad Tiro, described by an American journalist as “intelligent, well educated, well informed, and endowed with a seldom met combination of charm and firmness” (Burham 1961), was born at the village Tiro, near Lammeulo in Pidie. In the Dutch period he was one of Daud Beureu'eh's pupils at the *Blang Paseh madrasah* in Sigli, while during the Japanese occupation he studied at the *Perguruan Normal Islam*, where he became a “favourite” of Said Abubakar. After the proclamation of

independence he went to Yogyakarta to study at the Faculty of Law of the *Universitas Islam Indonesia*.

He returned to Aceh for a short while to work for the Emergency Government of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Back in Yogyakarta, he became one of the two students of the *Universitas Islam Indonesia* who in 1950 received a grant to continue their studies at Columbia University. In the United States Hasan Muhammad Tiro worked with the Department of Information of the Indonesian United Nations Delegation for a time (BI 13-1-1950, IB 11-9-1954).

In the second half of 1954 he caused the Republican Government considerable embarrassment. Styling himself “Plenipotentiary Minister” and “Ambassador to the United Nations and United States” of the Islamic Republic of Indonesia, as he called the Islamic State, he sent an ultimatum to Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in early September of that year. In this he accused the “communist-fascist” government of leading the Indonesian nation to the brink of economic and political collapse, poverty, dissension and civil war, and of committing aggression against the people of Aceh, West Java, Central Java, South and Central Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and further of pursuing a policy of *divide et impera* and colonialism, and of stirring up the various ethnic and religious groups against each other. He asked Ali Sastroamidjojo whether perhaps a new age of colonialism had set in in which only the Communists reaped the fruits of independence, while the rest would simply be killed off. He then demanded that the Ali Sastroamidjojo Government cease its aggressive policies, release its political prisoners, and start negotiations with the *Darul Islam* rebels. If not, then he personally would take a number of measures. For instance, he would open embassies all over the world – in the United States, Europe, Asia, and all the Islamic countries, as well as at the United Nations – and expose the Republican Government’s savagery and cruelty and its violation of Human Rights in Aceh before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and ask the latter to send a Committee of Inquiry to Aceh. Let the international forum be informed, he said, of the most vicious acts of cruelty committed in the world since the times of Genghis Khan and Hulagu (the latter’s grandson, who ruled Iran from 1251–1265).

Other steps Hasan Muhammad Tiro was contemplating were to bring a charge of genocide against the Republican Government before the United Nations, to inform the Islamic world of the cruelty committed against religious scholars in Aceh, West and

Central Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi and to fight for international recognition of and moral and material support for the Islamic Republic of Indonesia. He moreover announced that if the Republican Government failed to satisfy his demands, he would try and effect an international diplomatic and economic boycott of the Republic, as well as discontinuation of the aid provided it through the Colombo Plan or by the United Nations and the United States (PR 7-9-1954; Sekitar n.d. III:445-447).

The Republican Government brushed Hasan Mohammad Tiro's demands aside and gave him till September 22nd to return to Indonesia. When he disobeyed the order, his passport was withdrawn. Hasan Muhammad Tiro was thereupon taken into custody by the American Immigration Service and detained at Ellis Island. He was released again after paying a bail of US\$ 500.--. He retaliated by publishing a letter in the New York Times drawing attention to the advance of Communism in Indonesia since the Ali Sastroamidjojo Government had come into power, and by submitting to the United Nations a report on "Violations of Human Rights by the Sastroamidjojo regime in Indonesia".

The Republican Government was unable to silence Muhammad Hasan Tiro, or to get him extradited from the United States. Hasan Muhammad Tiro thus was able to continue his anti-Republican propaganda campaign in New York. Early in 1955 he sent letters to twelve Islamic countries asking them to boycott the Afro-Asian Conference, a Republican Government show-piece, which was to be held in Bandung in April. In justification of his request he claimed that Islamic leaders and their followers, except for those who bowed to the Communists, were being persecuted and killed by the Army and Police of the "communist-dominated" Ali Sastroamidjojo Government (Sekitar n.d. III:443-488; PR 18-9-1954, 30-9-1954, 9-2-1955).

9. Conflicts and Negotiations

Immediately following Daud Beureu'eh's proclamation of the rebellion the governor of North Sumatra applied to the Central Government for military assistance. His request was promptly granted, and troops from Central Sumatra and the remainder of North Sumatra were brought into action. Later on units of the Central Javanese *Diponegoro* Division were also ordered to Aceh. The Government was determined to deal with the situation with firmness and to quash the rebellion quickly. As it was put by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo: "When the house is on fire,

put the fire out without stopping to ask questions" (Sjamsuddin 1975:63). Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for the security operations continued to lie with the civil authorities. This was because of the special character of the region, and more particularly in view of the strength of Islam, as Ali Sastroamidjojo explained in Parliament in 1955. No martial law, whereby the military would take charge, was declared. The Government moreover promised from the start of the rebellion to study the question of autonomy for Aceh and to give more attention to the area's economic development. The Government, in framing its policy, had to consider on the one hand the PNI and PKI demands for stronger military action, and on the other hand the voices pressing for negotiations and for giving in to some of the rebels' demands.

Proponents of both views were to be found in Jakarta as well as in Aceh. Some political parties and organizations in Aceh urged the Government not to discuss any of the rebels' demands until order was restored. In addition a number of Islamic scholars deplored the rebellion and branded it as prohibited by Islam and in conflict with Islamic law (Amin 1956:106-107; Sekitar n.d. III:17). These denunciations by Islamic scholars reached their peak in early 1955, when two of them, Teungku Haji Sani and Teungku Haji Ismail, founded the *Gerakan Keamanan Rakyat Muslimin Daerah Aceh* (Peace Movement of the Muslim People of Aceh). In leaflets dropped by plane over Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe they explicitly denied that Islam advocated insubordination against the legitimate government, however despotic that government might be. And they pointed out, appealing to the Indonesian translation of *Basic concepts of the Islamic State* by the Pakistani author Khalif Abdul Hakim, that if one did not succeed in defending one's basic human rights by peaceful means, then the only course left open to one was *hijrah*. They further tried to convince the population that the Republican Government guaranteed all its citizens freedom of religion and attacked Hasan Muhammad Tiro for his activities at the United Nations (Gerakan Keamanan Rakjat Muslimin Daerah Atjeh, Siaran Kilat no. 1, 2, 3 and 4). The Movement's campaign backfired, however. There were strong suspicions that it was actively supported by the Central Government, while some strict Muslims took offence at leaflets with Koranic texts written on them ending up in the gutter, seeing in this an insult to Islam (Sekitar n.d. III:193-200).

Those people in favour of negotiations also organized themselves. In Aceh they instituted a *Badan Kontak Pribadi Peristiwa*

Aceh (Private Contact Committee in the Aceh Affair) for the purpose of keeping in touch with the rebels and transmitting the latter's grievances to the Central Government, on the initiative of a leading merchant, D.M. Djuned (D.M. Juned), in November 1953.³¹

In Jakarta there was a strong pro-rebel lobby centered around the Members of Parliament Amelz, a former PSII member now acting independently, and Nur el Ibrahimy, a member of *Masyumi* and ex-secretary of PUSA, to plead their case. They were in general supported by the *Masyumi* politicians, who also urged the Government not to try to solve the situation through military measures alone, but to seek a political solution and remove some of the causes prompting the rebels to take up arms. The Government thus was advised to carefully investigate the pros and cons of granting Aceh some form of regional autonomy, and even of giving it the status of a special region.

Because this latter was a question bearing upon the second of the Indonesian Republic's major constitutional problems, that of whether the Indonesian state structure should be unitary or federal, it had extremely wide implications. Those in favour of granting Aceh greater autonomy were the same parties and groups that advocated a federal state structure or greater decentralization. They included not only the *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI) but also a party with a regional basis like the *Serikat Kerakyatan Indonesia* (SKI), or Indonesian People's Association, of South Kalimantan. Together they formed a group capable of rallying considerable support. This became clear in February 1954, when a parliamentary commission which had visited Aceh the previous month submitted its resultant report. This report extensively quoted the Acehnese Islamic scholars whom the members of the commission had talked to. Among the recommendations made by these scholars the report mentioned that for the adoption by the Government, with a view to the ideal of an Islamic State in Aceh, of part of the Islamic law, for instance the civil law, and so forbid everything that was in conflict with this law, such as gambling, dancing, and the sale of liquor. The report moreover quoted the Islamic scholars as being of the opinion that the Central Government should send a mission to Aceh to meet Daud Beureu'eh, and should pay attention to the demands for autonomy of many Acehnese (ANP-Aneta 1954:113-114).³²

The commission remained completely impartial in its report, contenting itself with simply quoting the views put forward by

people in Aceh. However, its members, on their way back to Jakarta, had formulated a proposal of their own urging the Government to change the administrative subdivision of Indonesia and to make Aceh one of the nineteen (new) autonomous provinces of Indonesia (Sekitar n.d. III:14-15).³³ Because the Government needed more time and had already started making preparations for a new provincial division the proposal was not tabled.

Nevertheless, during the discussion of the report another proposal was submitted, this time by a group of members of parliament headed by Djuir Muhammad (Juir Muhammad) of the PSI.³⁴ It cited Aceh as an illustration par excellence of the artificial way in which provinces had been created in the past, and argued that the only way of solving the problems in Aceh was by granting it autonomy (Sekitar n.d. III:2-4).

In the subsequent debate representatives of the PNI and PKI, both of which had their largest followings in Java, rejected the proposal. They argued that the ordinary people in Aceh had not expressed themselves in favour of autonomy, and that it was not the question of autonomy but the ideal of the Islamic State that was behind the rebellion. The Government for its part rejoined that the proposal was superfluous as it was already preparing a provincial redivision of Indonesia and in this connection was considering granting Aceh the status of a province (Sekitar n.d. III: 14-54). In the end the proposal was shelved, as it turned out indefinitely, awaiting the results of the debates on a bill on regional administration introduced by the Government which had just begun. There continued to be great dissatisfaction at the Government's policy and its inability to subdue the various rebellions successfully. The Government's security policy thus remained under attack, prompting Jusuf Wibisono of the *Masyumi* party, for instance, to bring a motion of no-confidence against the Government. This motion, which was defeated with the slight majority of 115 against versus 92 for at the end of 1954, kept the controversy over Aceh alive.

The Government was criticized for the continuing insecurity of Aceh as well as for the misconduct of its troops there. Although military actions initiated by it had had some success, the situation was still far from satisfactory. The effects of the operations of the Republican Army and the Mobile Brigade had been such that by mid-1954 almost half of Aceh was safe enough for the military assistance to be withdrawn, leaving the maintenance of law and order to the regional Police Force. Only in the *kabu-*

patens of Greater Aceh (where the rebels were operating within a few miles of Banda Aceh), Pidie (where Daud Beureu'eh had established the centre of his civil and military administration), North Aceh and the region of Takengon in Central Aceh – the areas in which the rebels were strongest – was military aid continued.

In these latter areas the *Darul Islam* remained extremely active. In the villages under its control here it imposed taxes – in some cases also on schoolteachers and officials of the Republican Government whom it continued in office –, registered marriages and divorces, and generally administered the law, adjudicating routine criminal cases and cases involving the violation of Islamic law, such as the breaking of the fast, and sometimes also passing sentences on waverers unable to make up their minds as to whether to side with the Islamic State or with the Republic (Soeyatno 1977:71; Sekitar n.d. III:103).

From their positions in the mountains and forests the rebels continued harassing traffic and attacking army patrols and outposts, operating in groups of sometimes a few hundred. Occasionally they also launched attacks on towns and cities. On the visit to Aceh of the parliamentary commission in January 1954 several exchanges of fire were noted by its members just outside Banda Aceh and Sigli. During the commission's stay in Banda Aceh the rebels threw incendiary bombs and tried to start fires in the town (ANP-Aneta 1954:105). On August 17th, 1954, furthermore, *Darul Islam* troops entered and occupied Lamno, holding the town for two days. Around the same time they attacked Seulimeum, also in Greater Aceh. The next year the rebels tried to enter Idi and moreover fired on Sigli. The attack on Idi was one indication that these other parts of Aceh, too, still had to reckon with *Darul Islam* activities, which after 1954 became more frequent again. In West, Central and East Aceh as well – which areas the Republican Government considered to be relatively safe – the *Darul Islam* became more active, as a consequence partly of resentment at the behaviour of Republican troops and partly of Islamic Army troop movements.

In early 1955 Hasan Saleh moved from Pidie to West Aceh. After leaving his brother Ibrahim Saleh in command there, he then proceeded to East Aceh, with as ultimate destination Tapanuli in East Sumatra. In East Aceh his troops were reinforced by units commanded by Banda Chairullah (Banda Khairullah), who also came from Pidie. Other troops from Pidie, commanded by A.G. Mutiari, marched in West Aceh (Sekitar n.d. III:130, 132).

The *Darul Islam* in Aceh now also tried, more than ever before, to harm the Republican Government economically. It not only continued its attempts to disrupt communications, but also began to direct attacks at plantations and industrial plants. In Central Aceh a number of resin estates were attacked and set on fire. In East Aceh the oil-fields became a target of rebel attacks. The guerillas scored one of their biggest successes in March 1955, when they attacked the harbour of Kuala Langsa, setting fire to all the warehouses (only that of the Dutch KPM was mysteriously spared), and inflicting considerable damage (Gelanggang 1956:115-119; Sekitar n.d. III:121-122; Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:37).

The Republican Army had the greatest difficulty in suppressing the guerillas' activities. As late as 1956 the Military Command of North Sumatra was obliged to admit that the morale of the rebel army — whose strength was estimated at 1,400 — was high, and that the enemy had supporters and sympathizers in almost every village. In Aceh, it stated, the one major condition for waging a successful guerilla war was met, namely the support of the local population. Even people who at first had been opposed to the Islamic State of Indonesia, or had been neutral, had been won over to the rebels' cause by the propaganda made by them.

The Army Command admitted that the misconduct of its own soldiers had contributed to this success of the *Darul Islam* propaganda (Buku 1956:12-13, 46). Soldiers from outside the region — Batak, Minangkabau and Javanese — had sometimes gravely offended the Acehnese by their conduct. To remedy this the Army issued instructions to its personnel on the correct treatment of the local population, giving them information on Acehnese society as well as advice on how to behave in this society. So it warned them against entering mosques wearing shoes and against gambling and drinking alcoholic beverages, exhorting them to respect local custom. In this connection it informed them on the proper conduct vis-à-vis Acehnese women, advising them, if they wished to marry a local girl, to approach her parents and relatives and become acquainted with the relevant rules first (Buku 1956:54-63).

The conflicts that occurred did not stem exclusively from sheer ignorance, however. There were also instances of deliberately offensive behaviour, as well as cases of alleged torture and murderous assault. A number of accusations were in fact lodged against the Republican Army for alleged war crimes and misconduct, and as early as February 1954 the *Masyumi* Member of

Parliament Mohammad Nur el Ibrahimy proposed the institution of a parliamentary commission to inquire into what he called the cruel and arbitrary behaviour of Republican soldiers (ANP-Aneta 1954:124). Some cases involved violations of the (strict) moral rules of the region. In early 1955, for instance, some Minangkabau soldiers entered a village near Banda Aceh and ordered all the women to assemble, whereupon they lowered their trousers, exhibiting their private parts, and asked the women if they were not as fine as those of Acehnese men. On another occasion some Acehnese prisoners of war were forced to compare their genitals with those of Republican soldiers to show them that there was no difference, and that the latter, too, were circumcised and hence should not be branded infidels (Gelanggang 1956:94, 103).

Other incidents involved looting by Republican troops, the burning down of houses abandoned by their occupants on suspicion that the latter had gone over to the rebels, and the killing and torturing of prisoners and of innocent villagers (Gelanggang 1956:81-112).

Reportedly the two most serious of these incidents took place at Cot Jeumpa and Pulot Leupung, two villages near Banda Aceh in Greater Aceh, an area which was considered safe by the Republican troops, in February 1955. The two incidents were exposed by the newspaper *Peristiwa* which was published in Banda Aceh. According to the *Peristiwa* report, Republican troops on February 26th had taken all the inhabitants of Cot Jeumpa prisoner and shot them dead. A similar incident had occurred at nearby Pulot Leupung two days later. *Peristiwa* alleged that in the two incidents about one hundred people in all had been killed, including children. The version put forward by the Army was different, however. Not denying the high number of deaths, it tried to justify these by saying that the victims had all fallen in battle. A few days before the incidents, the Army spokesmen explained, shots had been fired at an army truck on a brigade near Cot Jeumpa. One of the bullets had hit the petrol tank, setting the truck ablaze, as a result of which fifteen Republican soldiers had burnt to death. The ambush had been laid by one Pawang Leman, an ex-major of the revolution and a former local *camat*. Information gathered by the Republican Army had shown that the local population on the fateful day had turned all traffic – with the exception of the army truck – back on the pretext that the bridge was broken. Pawang Leman, according to the same source, had incited the population to start a holy war. The Republican commander had subsequently decided to act on this

information, and sent a patrol to Cot Jeumpa. Here it had been shot at and attacked by *Darul Islam* troops (by which was meant the local population) armed with machetes and knives. Likewise at Pulot Leupung an army patrol had been attacked by the villagers. Another statement put out stressed that it had been almost impossible to tell the guerillas apart from ordinary villagers, as the former had mingled with the local population or forced the villagers to advance in the front line.

The killings at Cot Jeumpa and Pulot Leupung provoked a great many protests from Islamic and Acehnese organizations. The *Front Pemuda Aceh* (Acehnese Youth Front) threatened to report the incidents to the United Nations and the Afro-Asian Conference countries if justice was not done and an investigation instituted by the Government. In Parliament questions were asked by Mohammad Nur el Ibrahimy, Amelz and Sutardjo Kartohadikusuma. On the side of the Government the Minister of Internal Affairs was sent to Aceh, while representatives of the Central Army Staff and the Attorney General also visited the area. Furthermore, the governor of North Sumatra, S.M. Amin, started an investigation. On his visit to the two villages he found Cot Jeumpa completely deserted, while in Pulot Leupung all the men who had escaped the massacre had fled into the mountains. Following this Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo made a statement to Parliament on behalf of the Government in mid-April, the account of events in which was no different from that put forward by the Republican Army (Sekitar n.d. III:272–442; Risalah 1955; ANP-Aneta 1955:208–211).

The *Darul Islam* forces for their part were also accused of crimes and mass murders. So they had allegedly killed over 200 prisoners near Lammeulo, the area in which the social revolution had begun, upon being forced to retreat here in October 1953. Speaking of this same incident, the parliamentary commission reported the cruel murder of 123 member of the PNI, 120 of the PKI and 28 of the *Perti* following its visit to Aceh (ANP-Aneta 1954:115; Sekitar n.d. III:149).

The incidents involving Republican Army troops were seized upon by those in favour of a peaceful settlement to press once more for negotiations and for concessions to some of the rebels' demands. So far the attempts to persuade the *Darul Islam* rebels in Aceh to give up their struggle and negotiate with the Republic had failed. The new governor of North Sumatra, S.M. Amin, had been engaged in an exchange of letters with prominent rebel leaders since the end of 1953. Although not himself an Acehnese

(he was a Mandailing Batak), Amin's relation with Daud Beureu'eh and his close associates was good. In fact, his appointment in the place of Abdul Hakim, who had alienated the Acehnese leaders by his attitude, had been partly prompted by his close acquaintance of these leaders.³⁵ For during the Japanese period he had been headmaster of a secondary school at Banda Aceh, while later he had been a member of the court of justice at Sigli together with Usman Raliby and Hasan Aly. After the proclamation of independence he had become first a member and later, in January 1946, chairman of the Republican Parliament of Aceh. Later still his appointment as governor of North Sumatra had followed.

From the initial outbreak of the rebellion Amin had shown himself an advocate of negotiations with the rebels as a means of arriving at a peaceful solution (Sekitar n.d. I:67). True to this principle, he had established contact with Said Abubakar. He had further entered into the said exchange of letters with *Darul Islam* leaders in secret, without at first informing the Central Government, in December 1953. In these letters, which he explicitly stated himself to be writing as a private citizen, he indicated that he agreed with the aims of the rebels as representing the ideals of all Muslims, and that he felt that the events that had triggered off the rebellion had been a result of misunderstanding. The methods chosen by the rebels, however, were not approved of by all Muslims. He accordingly asked the rebels to put forward their ideas on how to end the bloodshed (Gelanggang 1956:126, 129–130).

Amin received replies from Husin Jusuf and Daud Beureu'eh. Both underlined the duty of every Indonesian Muslim to participate in a *jihad* in defence of the Islamic State of Indonesia, which, they pointed out, had become a reality that could not be ignored. They thereupon indicated that the conflict might end as soon as the Republican Government took note of the aspirations of the Islamic community. They denied that the social revolution or the desire for autonomy had inspired their rebellion, asserting that its root cause lay in religion. Nor did they share Amin's view that the trouble had been caused by misunderstandings. The policies pursued by the Republican Government, its reaction to the Cumbok Affair and to the demands for autonomy, the Army reorganizations in Aceh, and so on, constituted ample evidence to the contrary (Gelanggang 1956:132–157; Amin 1956:198–200).

Amin replied to this in August 1954. Refusing to meet the

guerilla leaders in person, he sent a draft of a letter for signing by Daud Beureu'eh and Hasan Aly, in which the two promised to end their resistance, to lay down their arms and to meet representatives of the Republican Government if the latter for its part was prepared to recognize their right to strive for an Islamic State in a non-violent way, to give more attention to the interests of Aceh in future, and to grant the rebels an amnesty. If Daud Beureu'eh and Hasan Aly signed the draft, then he, Amin, would personally go to Jakarta to fight for acceptance of the agreement by the Government.

Daud Beureu'eh and Hasan Aly did not sign, however. They in turn drafted a government regulation for signing by Ali Sastroamidjojo, which they asked Amin to take to Jakarta with him. Herein the Republican Government undertook to open negotiations with the founders of the Islamic State of Indonesia in Java, Aceh, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and to protect and assist the members of the delegation of the Islamic State for the duration of these negotiations. In their accompanying letter, dated October 5th, 1954, they made it clear that what they wanted was not an amnesty but negotiations (Gelanggang 1956:157-167).

Amin sent all these letters on to Jakarta. The Government did not react, however. He thereupon discontinued his correspondence for the time being, to resume it after the fall of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet and its replacement by a new government headed by Burhanuddin Harahap of the *Masyumi* in August 1955 (Amin 1956:205).

The formation of a new Cabinet under the leadership of a *Masyumi* Prime Minister, and in which the PNI was not represented, made the prospects of a reconciliation more likely. Burhanuddin Harahap, moreover, was known to be in favour of ending the rebellion in a peaceful way. He had already some months before come to an agreement with Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, the highly controversial Deputy Chief of Staff of the Republican Army at the time, that everything possible should be done to find a political solution to the problem of the various rebellions.³⁶ He subsequently requested Daud Beureu'eh's son, Hasballah Daud, to go to Aceh to get in touch with his father and make him an amnesty offer. Hasballah Daud left Jakarta on July 5th, 1955, with letters from Hatta and from the Ministry of Information in his pocket, and accompanied by Abdullah Arif, an employee of the Ministry of Information. He returned at the end of August. Neither the Ali Sastroamidjojo nor the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet took

official responsibility for the trip, and both stressed that it had been a private initiative. Nevertheless, Abdullah Arif went to Aceh once more to meet Hasan Aly in February 1956. This attempt, too, was futile. The *Darul Islam* leaders in Aceh were not yet to be tempted with amnesty offers, while the Republic refused the rebels' demand for negotiations on a government to government basis. The attempts at mediation, of which it was not clear to what extent they were backed by the Republican Government in Jakarta, only irritated the rebel leaders. The latter remained prepared to negotiate, but only on a formal basis.

The Republican Government's proposals were discussed by the *Darul Islam* leaders at Batèë Kurëng. They had, in fact, constituted the immediate cause of Daud Beureu'eh's wish to consult with his close advisors. The concrete outcome of the discussions, as formulated in one of the points of the new Cabinet's programme was the resolution that it should be tried to solve the conflict with the "*Pancasila* government" not only by force of arms but also by political means.

As a consequence Hasan Aly in November sent a letter to Amin urging that the Republican Government publicly state its standpoint and in addition that all future negotiations be conducted by official delegations from both sides, and no longer be informal. Only if there were pressing reasons preventing the Republican Government from doing so would Hasan Aly be prepared to continue informal discussions. In that case, however, the Republican Government should make it known as soon as possible that there were such pressing reasons (Amin 1956:301).

10. *Settlement or Further Conflict?*

The Batèë Kurëng conference provided one of the most unmistakable signs of the existence of disagreement among the *Darul Islam* rebels in Aceh. It testified to dissatisfaction at the way in which all the decisions were made by Daud Beureu'eh with a small group of advisors, and at the subordination of civil to military affairs.

Although there definitely existed rivalry and conflict among the leaders of the Islamic State in Aceh, here, in contrast to the other areas, this does not appear to have led to frequent clashes between troop commanders.³⁷ Where some of the leaders of the first hour had been removed from the centre of power, the Batèë Kurëng conference brought a certain redress. The concentration of power and the elimination of certain leaders went back to

1954, when the *Dewan Syura*, *Majelis Syura* and *Dewan Militer* had been dissolved. At that time Husin Jusuf had lost his function as Chief of Staff of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division to Amir Husin al Mudjahid. Although he had been appointed security coordinator for Aceh, this promotion meant the loss of control over most of the combat troops. The same thing happened later to his successor, Amir Husin al Mudjahid, who was replaced by Hasan Aly.

There had moreover been opposition to Daud Beureu'eh's reaction to the peace overtures from the Republican side. Some people disapproved of his outright rejection of a possible amnesty offer, and notably in the Islamic Army proper there was a large, powerful group in favour of accepting such an offer (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:39–40).

In view of the above and of the large number of soldiers who had already returned to their villages, one of the regimental commanders, Ilias Lebai (Ilyas Lebai) from Central Aceh, in November 1955 issued a communique announcing that no action would be taken against those soldiers of his regiment who returned home, provided this did not harm the struggle. He himself had also been invited to report to the authorities, he said, but he wanted to await the results of the elections. He was contemplating duly so reporting because the Cabinet currently in power, the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet, came close in ideology to the ideals of the struggle in Aceh (Pengumuman 20 November 1955).

Generally speaking the *Darul Islam* rebels in Aceh adopted a moderate attitude to the elections. At first, at the outbreak of their rebellion, they had taken an ambivalent view of them. On the one hand they had accused the Republican Government of trying to put them off indefinitely, while on the other hand they branded the elections as a Republican Government device for getting its own way. Now that the elections were actually about to take place, they did nothing to obstruct them (Feith 1971:42).

The satisfactory results of the elections in Aceh, where the *Masyumi* gained two thirds of the votes, provided those in favour of ending the rebellion with yet another argument in support of their cause. Their case was further strengthened when, this time again under an Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, at the end of 1956 a bill was passed into law whereby Aceh was granted the status of an autonomous province. The Act became effective in January 1957. A. Hasjmy, the pre-war leader of the PUSA Youth of Greater Aceh and former Chairman of the BPI/*Pesindo*, became the province's first governor.

Yet another factor favouring the termination of hostilities was that in the military field as well a former guerilla leader was appointed to the supreme command in Aceh. He was Sjammaun Gaharu, commander of the Republican Army in Aceh for a short period during the revolution and one of the two signatories to the ultimatum to the *ulèëbalang* at Lammeulo (before his function was seized by Amir Husin al Mudjahid).

By his own account Sjammaun Gaharu owed his appointment to the support he received from Nasution for his ideas on ending the rebellion in Aceh. He had had frequent meetings with Nasution in the period between 1952 and 1955, when the latter had been removed from his function as Chief of Staff of the Republican Army, to provide him with information for the books he was writing on the Indonesian revolution and on guerilla warfare in general. During these interviews Sjammaun Gaharu had gradually unfolded his views on the best ways of solving the problems in Aceh. The gist of his theory was that the Acehnese situation was different from that elsewhere and was very complicated, and that it could best be solved by the Acehnese themselves in an Acehnese way. Vice-President Mohammad Hatta was also interested in Sjammaun Gaharu's ideas on this subject and asked him to put them in writing. He presented the result to Hatta in October 1955, and when a few days later Nasution was re-appointed Chief of Staff of the Republican Army, he sent him a copy as well.

Nasution subsequently reacted by offering him the function of military commander of Aceh. Sjammaun Gaharu had at first wanted to decline the offer, because he felt that his views were incompatible with the policy of the commander for North Sumatra, Maludin Simbolon. At Nasution's promise that Maludin Simbolon would be transferred in the near future he accepted the position, however. The opportunity to put his ideas into practice presented itself to him when at the end of 1956 Maludin Simbolon, who had been Nasution's major rival for the function of Chief of Staff, in an attempt to prevent his transfer broke off relations between the Territorial Command of North Sumatra and the Central Army Command. Sjammaun Gaharu immediately dissociated himself from Maludin Simbolon and remained in close contact with Nasution (Gaharu 1958:40-43).

Sjammaun Gaharu was now free to put his plans into execution. Together with the newly appointed governor, A. Hasjmy, and with the explicit backing of Nasution, he embarked upon a policy of reconciliation. In mid-April 1957, in the middle of the

fast, negotiations were held with a number of prominent *Darul Islam* leaders at Lamteh, a village a few miles from Banda Aceh. The discussions culminated in a charter, the *Ikrar Lamteh*, in which both sides pledged themselves to promote Islam, to stimulate the development of Aceh in the broadest sense of the word, and to try and bring prosperity and peace to the people and society of Aceh. On the Republican side the charter was signed by Sjammaun Gaharu and by his Chief of Staff, Teuku Hamzah, by A. Hasjmy, and by the chief of Police for Aceh, M. Insja (M. Insya). The *Darul Islam* leaders who signed it were Hasan Aly, Hasan Saleh, and Ishak Amin (the *bupati* of Greater Aceh). Later, accompanied by A. Hasjmy and M. Insja, Sjammaun Gaharu also met Daud Beureu'eh, who at that time still did not want to hear of a settlement (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:40–41; DM 23-3-1959).

In accordance with his policy, which he had styled *Konsepsi prinsipial dan bijaksana* (Blueprint for a fundamental and well-considered solution), Sjammaun Gaharu together with A. Hasjmy continued his efforts to find a solution. Both remained in touch with the *Darul Islam* leaders and visited Jakarta a number of times to find out how far they could go in their negotiations with the rebels. In September 1957 Prime Minister Djuanda (Juanda) told them that they might give the concept of regional autonomy the widest possible interpretation, even to the extent that Aceh was treated as a separate state, providing that they remained within the limits of the Indonesian Constitution, which still provided for a unitary Republic (Hasjmy 1958:57–58).

No settlement was reached at that time, however. This was due partly to the fact that the PRRI/Permesta rebellion was attracting attention, and partly to the presence within the Islamic State of Aceh of a powerful faction headed by Daud Beureu'eh which did not want to hear of any compromise and stuck to the principle of formal negotiations between the Islamic State of Aceh and the Indonesian Republic.

Daud Beureu'eh's standpoint nevertheless met with increasing opposition. Notably within the Acehnese Islamic Army of Indonesia there were many who contemplated surrender. This group was headed by Hasan Saleh, the Commander of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division and Chief of Staff of the Islamic Army. He accused Daud Beureu'eh of trying to plunge Aceh into a new war without considering the fate of the ordinary soldiers and the population at large, who had to put up with the consequences (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:41–42).

As a result the fighting decreased considerably after the Lamteh Charter. Even so the end of the rebellion was still not in sight. It took Daud Beureu'eh's opponents two years to make up their minds and definitely break away from him.

This happened in March 1959, when, charging Daud Beureu'eh with arbitrary, despotic behaviour, Hasan Saleh and his supporters toppled him. They formed their own government at a meeting in Pidie attended by about a thousand people on March 15th. The dissidents, styling themselves the *Gerakan Revolusioner Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Movement), subsequently instituted a *Dewan Revolusi* (*Negara Bagian Aceh*) or Revolutionary Council (of the State of Aceh). It was chaired by Abdul Gani Usman, and its vice-chairman was Hasan Saleh, with Abdul Gani Mutiara becoming its secretary general and head of the Information Section. It counted among its members such prominent *Darul Islam* leaders as Amir Husin al Mudjahid, T.A. Hasan, Ibrahim Saleh, T.M. Amin and Husin Jusuf.

Abdul Gani Usman's first step in his capacity as chairman of the Revolutionary Council was to make an announcement to the effect that the function of Head of State would for the time being be fulfilled by a *Dewan Pertimbangan Revolusi* (Revolutionary Consultative Council), of which Amir Husin al Mudjahid was appointed chairman. At the same time he ordered his followers to stop collecting taxes in the villages, threatening to take action against anyone continuing to do so. With respect to the Islamic Army, Hasan Saleh confined the soldiers of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division to their barracks, withdrawing them from the villages where they had been stationed. He further announced that the Revolutionary Council would send a delegation to Jakarta to discuss the termination of the rebellion with the Republican authorities. In the course of the next few months the Revolutionary Council was joined by troops from West Aceh commanded by T.R. Idris and by the Commander of the Seventh Regiment of East Sumatra, Haji Hasanuddin.³⁸ In August Abdul Gani Mutiara claimed the *Dewan Revolusi* to be supported by 24,000 *Darul Islam* members (DM 18-3-1959, 23-3-1959, 28-3-1959, 25-5-1959, 6-8-1959, 7-8-1959, 25-8-1959).

These developments initiated a new series of negotiations. In early May Sjammaun Gaharu and A. Hasjmy again went to Jakarta, this time on the invitation of Prime Minister Djuanda. They explained the new situation to the Cabinet and to President Soekarno and made a number of recommendations as to what

steps were to be taken with regard to it. Subsequently Djuanda issued a resolution (Keputusan Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia no. 1/Missi/1959) to the effect that as of May 26th the Province of Aceh could style itself *Daerah Istimewa Aceh*, or Special Region of Aceh. This placed Aceh in rather a unique position, as of the other provinces of Indonesia only the capital, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta enjoyed special status. Aceh was further promised the widest possible autonomy, in particular in the fields of religion, education and customary law, with the proviso, however, as Djuanda stated in his resolution, that this should not be in contravention of the existing legislation.

At the same time the Central Government sent a mission to Aceh to confer with the Revolutionary Council. This mission was headed by the First Deputy Prime Minister, Hardi, and included the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Republican Army, Major-General Gatot Subroto, and the Minister for Economic Stability without Portfolio, Colonel Suprajogi (Suprayogi). Two days later, on May 26th, 1959, after the mediation of A. Hasjmy and Lieutenant-Colonel T. Hamzah in attempts to break the deadlock, a provisional agreement was reached with the leaders of the Revolutionary Council accepting the proposals of the Central Government. For their part they pledged themselves in writing to return to the fold of the Republic and to swear an oath of loyalty to its constitution.

The precise nature of the compromise remained vague. As Djuanda had stipulated beforehand, autonomy was not to be interpreted in such a way that any new regulations introduced would contravene the existing legislation. Hardi added in Banda Aceh that the question of whether or not the Islamic community of Aceh could be forced to observe Islamic law was a matter for the Constituent Assembly, which at that time was discussing the return to the 1945 Constitution, to decide. He linked it to the Jakarta Charter, which was currently again the subject of much heated debate in the Constituent Assembly in Jakarta. As it turned out, the Islamic politicians were not strong enough to get it passed this time either. The only thing achieved by them was Soekarno's acknowledgement in the Decree proclaiming the return to the 1945 Constitution that the Jakarta Charter had inspired this Constitution and formed a unity with it (Boland 1971:90–100).³⁹

It was further agreed in principle that a proportion of the soldiers of the Islamic Army, after due screening, would be admitted to an emergency militia. Later, on October 1st, it was

agreed that a *Teungku Chik Ditiro* unit would be constituted as a special section of the Army Division in Aceh. The *Darul Islam* civil servants who joined the Revolutionary Council were treated in more or less the same way. An undertaking that where possible they would be integrated into the Republican Administration was confirmed by the central military authorities at the end of October, who thus empowered the Regional Administration of Aceh to appoint former rebels who had sworn allegiance to the Republic to positions in the Civil Administration.⁴⁰

The agreement of May was formally accepted by the supporters of the Revolutionary Council at a major conference held in the first week of November. At the end of that same month Nasution went to Pidie, where he took the salute of five thousand supporters of the Revolutionary Council (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:43; DM 28-5-1959, 25-11-1959, 26-11-1959, 27-11-1959, 1-12-1959).

11. *The Die-Hards Refuse to Give in*

Daud Beureu'eh was no party to the agreement. He and Hasan Aly continued the struggle. According to the then governor of Aceh, A. Hasjmy, they could still count on the support of about thirty per cent of their original followers (DM 20-5-1960). Like his counterpart in South Sulawesi, Kahar Muzakkar, Daud Beureu'eh joined forces with the remnants of the PRRI/*Permesta* troops. First his force was joined by a number of individual PRRI Commanders and their men. Then it was reinforced with rebel units commanded by Major Nukum and Captain Hasanuddin, a former captain of the Military Police.⁴¹ Both the latter were offered ministerial posts by Daud Beureu'eh to fill up the positions vacated by those who had defected to the Revolutionary Council (DM 20-5-1959, 21-5-1959, DP 20-5-1959).

At the same time discussions were held by the leaders of the PRRI and of the *Darul Islam* in Aceh. These resulted in the proclamation of the federal *Republik Persatuan Indonesia* (RPI), United Republic of Indonesia, in February 1960, which represented a coalition of losers, of people who found themselves fighting a lost war in the jungle.⁴² The RPI, moreover, united people who in the past had been in two different camps and at best had had some sympathy for each other's cause, and at worst had been outright enemies. In addition the United Republic of Indonesia was exclusively a Sumatran and Sulawesi affair. It dropped the claim, still made by the Islamic State of Indonesia

and the PRRI/*Permesta*, that its territory encompassed the whole of Indonesia.

The RPI was made up of ten states, all but two of them located in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Aceh, as the *Republik Islam Aceh* (RIA), or Islamic State of Aceh, was one of the six Sumatran states, and South Sulawesi one of the two states in that island.⁴³ Apart from these eight states there were, probably as a propitiatory gesture to the RMS, a State of the Moluccas and a State of the South Moluccas. Conspicuously absent were states in Java, such as a State of West Java, the cradle of the *Darul Islam* movement, and in South Kalimantan, where Ibnu Hadjar was operating.⁴⁴

Both parties entered the new federation with great reluctance. Earlier negotiations between *Darul Islam* and PRRI/*Permesta* leaders had had almost no result. While mutual military cooperation and support had been promised, this had never materialized. Both camps also included people who outright rejected every form of formal cooperation. In South Sulawesi Kahar Muzakkar's flirtation with the *Permesta* was partly responsible for the surrender of Bahar Mattaliu, while in Aceh such relations constituted one of several factors stimulating the formation of the Revolutionary Council. The defections at the same time forced the remaining *Darul Islam* rebels into closer cooperation with the PRRI/*Permesta*.

The PRRI rebels in Sumatra at the end of 1959 fell into three different groups advocating different courses. One group simply wanted the PRRI to continue, however insignificant it might have become as a result of the Republican Army actions. Another group, with Zulkifli Lubis and Maludin Simbolon as its main representatives, was in favour of the proclamation of a Federal Republic of Indonesia while opposing cooperation with the *Darul Islam*. The third faction advocated joining forces with the *Darul Islam*. Its principal spokesmen were two former Prime Ministers, Mohammad Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap, and the influential *Masyumi* politician Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, all three of whom had fled from Jakarta to join the discontented regional commanders in Sumatra in December 1957 (DM 23-11-1959; Feith and Lev 1963:38; Mossman 1961:229).

The RPI did not count for much either in the military or in the political sense. The uneasy alliance between Muslims like Daud Beureu'eh and Kahar Muzakkar who for many years had fought to establish and defend an Islamic State in Indonesia, Muslims who for long times on end had served in key functions in the

Indonesian Republic, and military commanders like Maludin Simbolon, Kawilarang and Warouw who for prolonged periods had led the Republican military actions against the *Darul Islam*, and of whom some were moreover Christians, was extremely precarious. The RPI may have represented, as Hasan Muhammad Tiro described it, an act "to insure their sacred rights of self-government which has been denied them by the Sukarno dictatorship in Djakarta, which is imposing Javanese colonialism upon more than a dozen nationalities" (1961b:1), or a rejection of the "new, brown Javanese colonialism" (1965:1), but their hatred of Soekarno and the Javanese was all they had in common.

As a result the RPI was extremely short-lived. In April 1961 Maludin Simbolon and another military commander, Achmad Husein (Akhmad Husein), disassociated themselves from it to establish the *Pemerintah Darurat Militer* (Military Emergency Government) (Feith and Lev 1963:43).⁴⁵ Hereupon they issued an appeal to the rebels to cease their resistance and surrender themselves in June and July. The civilian leaders of the PRRI followed suit after receiving a promise of pardon from Soekarno (Peraturan Presiden no. 13/1961). Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Prime Minister of the rebels, subsequently advised his followers to surrender, himself reporting to the authorities at the end of August.⁴⁶

This spelt the virtual end of the rebellions, including that of the *Darul Islam*, in Aceh, where in the previous months many had surrendered. Peace was completely restored in Aceh in May 1962, when Daud Beureu'eh, too, ceased his resistance.

To celebrate Aceh's change from a *Dar al-harb*, or territory of war, to a *Dar al-salam*, region of peace (to use the current phrase of those days), and furthermore to give formal expression to the restored unity of the Acehnese a grand ceremony was held at the end of that year, namely the *Musyawaharah Kerukunan Rakyat Aceh* (MKRA, Solidarity Conference of the People of Aceh), which took place at Blangpadang from December 18th to 22nd, 1962. It culminated in the Blangpadang Charter, which was signed by all of the seven hundred prominent Acehnese attending the conference. They pledged to maintain and foster a solidarity radiating unity and eternal friendship (DM 20-11-1962, 28-12-1962, 29-12-1962, 31-12-1962).

Aceh thereafter remained quiet for fifteen years or so. In early 1977, when *Darul Islam* activities were reported again also in Java and in other parts of Sumatra, Hasan Muhammad Tiro pro-

claimed Aceh an independent state. Styling himself Chairman of the National Liberation Front and Head of the State, he returned to Aceh to personally lead the struggle of the Free Aceh Movement, but his movement did not gain much momentum.