

CHAPTER X

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the preceding chapters an attempt was made to offer an explanation of the whole background and the range of developmental stages of the Banten rebellion in 1888. Our explanation indicates that this Banten uprising, viewed as a social movement, was determined by many factors, as are all social phenomena. It can be placed in the context of economic, social, political and religious institutional developments. In order to obtain a clear insight into the revolt we have to take into account the multiplicity of the factors involved and the mutually dependent variables. To ascribe relevance to only one variable would be fallacious. The analysis of the complex of factors operative in the social situation in 19th-century Banten was made to ensure more adequate comprehension of the conditions which resulted in the occurrence of the insurrectionary movement. As has been shown, the interplay of these factors precipitated a structural conduciveness to the outburst of the revolt.¹ This approach to the history of the Banten revolt is simply a logical consequence of the multi-dimensionality of the insurrectionary movement as a conceptual construct.²

THE SCALE OF THE MOVEMENT AND RELEVANT FACTORS

An explanation of the scale of the insurrectionary movement and its operations should comprise several factors which may be tabulated as follows: (1) there was a tradition of revolt in Banten; (2) there was a

¹ By structural conduciveness is meant the structural arrangements which permit a given type of protest movement rather than other kinds of outbursts; see Smelser (1962), pp. 319-338. In Banten society the available means of redress or of expressing grievances were limited; one of the few outlets for feelings of aggression was the religious protest, i.e. protest movements in terms of religious values.

² For a good analysis of approaches based on the multi-dimensionality of social movements, see Yonina Talmon, in *AES*, Vol. III (1962), pp. 15-148; also Meadows, in *SSR*, Vol. XXVII (1943), pp. 223-228; and in *SF*, Vol. XXIV (1945-1946), pp. 408-412.

continuing aspect of tension in the region, compounded of political deprivation and a state of disprivilege of a large segment of the population; (3) the impact of the penetration of colonial domination gradually disrupted parts of religious life; (4) a revolutionary leadership was available, which gave the insurrectionary movement its rationale; (5) an organizational device was created by means of which operations could be directed and both human and material resources could be mobilized over space and time.

As has been shown, the idea of redressing felt grievances, resentment or alleged oppression through armed rebellion was traditional in Banten. The 19th century saw the rise of traditional revolutionism and especially between 1800 and 1850 rebellious outbreaks followed each other with a certain regularity, and reached a peak of intensity in 1850. They were still endemic during the next two decades. The period which then followed was a time of further movements which culminated in the great outburst of 1888. The rise of peasant revolutionism was not simply a reflex of conditions brought about by colonial domination, for during the pre-colonial period protest movements had also taken place, though presumably not with the same frequency as in the colonial period. The periodical recurrence of insurrectionary outbreaks stimulated the rise of a revolutionary élite whose members played a more or less prominent role from generation to generation in subsequent revolts. They not only constituted a potential reservoir for revolutionary cadres, but could also serve as primary rallying-points for all forces of social discontent. There were prominent families of revolutionaries, like the Djakarias, the Urips, and the Wachias, around which Banten rebellions were traditionally centred. In fact, the idealization of revolutionaries became a popular tradition.³

Because of the nature of the transitional stage in which Banten society found itself during the 19th century, long-standing tensions were stirred up, especially among the groups which had lost their traditional position. The painful facts of loss of privilege and collective humiliation that inevitably accompanied colonial rule generated intense resentment and frustration among these groups.⁴ In short, the condition of persisting

³ See above, Chap. IV, *passim*; see *Sedjarah Hadji Mangsur* (MS), esp. as regards Tubagus Buang and Mas Djakaria.

⁴ For explanations in terms of states of mind, see Aberle, in *CSSR*, Supplement II (1962), pp. 208-214, where he gives a survey of the so-called "Relative Deprivation Theory".

malcontent and deep distrust certainly provided fertile ground for turmoils.

In the setting of colonial society, a sharp disagreement existed between certain aspects of traditional religious practices and colonial institutions, which aroused bitterness among the natives, who felt that their own culture would deteriorate. Imbued with ideas of religious warfare against infidel rule, the defenders of tradition desired the restoration of the traditional order and fanned the hostility towards the colonial ruler. These people could not reconcile themselves to the new organization of Banten society, which they felt to be forcibly superimposed by governmental authority. Consequently, their way of assessing the colonial situation engendered a psycho-cultural tradition of resistance to whatever group represented the forces of colonial authority.⁵

The religious élite has been assigned the leading role in the insurrectionary movement of 1888 and their charismatic authority certainly was an important element in fostering the movement.⁶ The charismatic leadership required in the insurrectionary movement was the consequence of a complex combination of various conditions. Besides the high degree of social unrest and the lack of lawful means of expressing protests or grievances in Banten society, the undifferentiated religious outlook of the Banten population tended to define political protests against the colonial ruler in religious terms.⁷ The leaders therefore bolstered the possibility of the restoration of the sultanate as an Islamic state and stressed the Holy War theme. In fact, the Tjilegon affair clearly illustrates the emergence of the *gurus tarekat* as political leaders, and how these men used the *tarekat* to create a politico-religious organization.

One of the main strengths of the rebellious movement lay in the fact that it could employ the Sufi brotherhood as its organizational base.

⁵ The psycho-cultural tradition of resistance refers to the continual inculcation of feelings of hatred towards the infidel rulers, see above Chap. V.

⁶ For the concept of charismatic authority, see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (1964), pp. 359-392; cf. the criticism made by Worsley (1957), pp. 266-272. The present author's contention is that the ideal type of charismatic, traditional and rational-legal authority can throw light on the conflict situation in 19th-century Banten society, although the authority possessed by the various élite groups should be placed along the line of a continuum ranging from charismatic to rational-legal authority. It would be irrelevant to look for pure types of authority.

⁷ For an account of political and other types of protest expressed in religious terms, see Engels (1927), Bodrogi (1950-1951), Balandier (1953), Worsley (1957), Köbben (1959), Cohn (1961), Lanternari (1963).

This added a new dimension to the pattern of revolt in Banten.⁸ It enabled internal cohesion to be solidified along lines of brotherhood discipline. The discipline not only had a binding effect on its followers, but it also imbued them with revolutionary zeal. Furthermore, the organizational structure of the movement enabled operations to be undertaken over large areas which transcended the village sphere, and over a considerable span of time, because these operations could be co-ordinated and controlled. It enabled a "holy cause" to be promulgated and a sense of fulfilment to be developed among the more militant segment of the population. From the description of the preparatory stage of the revolt it is plain that, in spite of the available organizational means, the mobilization of the movement's forces still took considerable time. Besides tactical and structural impediments to cohesion, dissension on strategical matters during the last stage of the preparations considerably reduced the scale of the rebellion, in both its spatial and temporal aspects.⁹

SOME ASPECTS OF THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS

Of special interest with regard to traditional revolutionary movements is the transformation from traditionality to modernity, also called modernization. In fact, the Banten rebellion of 1888 can be conceived of as an expression of social protest against or negative adjustment to social change imposed by Western domination.¹⁰ The apparent consequences of modernization in traditional society include the disturbance of traditional institutions, social maladjustment, and widespread feelings of insecurity and frustration. The disruption of the traditional ways of living brought about a revival among the Muslim peasants, who in a collective endeavour strove for the retention of traditional and religious values and ideals and various aspects of the traditional patterns of life.

⁸ Except for the Djajakusuma case in 1869, there are no indications that previous rebellious movements were organized by making use of religious institutions like the *tarekat*.

⁹ Besides leadership and internal cohesion, other components of social movements are ideology, goals, strategy and tactics. In order to decide to what extent the various elements were immediately related to actual development, one must appraise the particular situation in which a movement occurred; for an analysis of the internal factors of social movements, see King (1961), pp. 66-84.

¹⁰ For accounts of various reactions to social change, see Wilson (1945); Hagen (1962); especially as regards the analysis of reactions to Western domination, see Malinowski (1945), Burger (1949-1950), Bodrogi (1950-1951), Frazier (1957), Balandier (1959), Wertheim (1959), van Baal (1960).

Their attention again centred on the sacred symbols associated with Islam and the past, and on the establishment of an Islamic state and the restoration of the sultanate. Indispensable for this revival was the moulding of group solidarity by means of the revitalization of religious-magical rituals and ceremonies. Feelings of resentment towards the alien ruler and aggressive sentiment were fostered by means of religious indoctrination, magical practices and mystical exercises. In the socio-cultural setting of 19th-century Banten this nativistic movement undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development of resistance against modernization.¹¹ In terms of socio-cultural change, the Muslim community in Banten, headed by the religious élite, attempted to immunize itself against the penetration of new forces which accompanied the process of modernization; it found itself lagging behind the secular-urban élite which managed to retain its social status by proper adaptation to modern institutional settings. The process of modernization and its concomitants, secularization and acculturation, certainly engendered social cleavages ranging from conformity to rejection.¹² Solidarity groupings representing the various cultural forces generated potential friction and along with other factors undermined the fabric of traditional society. An examination of the political dimension of the socio-cultural change will shed more light on the conflict brought about by the resistance of the religious élite against the process of modernization.¹³

As has been indicated, in the course of the 19th century the colonial administration was gradually organized in accordance with Western notions of government, which involved the imposition of Western institutions as well as the enforcement of norms according to the same standards that the Dutch set for themselves. This transformation consisted of the establishment of bureaucratic administration, a hierarchy of civil servants, more rational modes of recruitment to office, etc. These innovations inevitably resulted in the weakening of the bonds

¹¹ For a classification of nativistic movements, see Linton (1943); cf. Köbben (1959), Smith (1959), Voget (1959). According to Linton's criteria the Banten revolt of 1888 can be regarded as a magical, revivalistic nativistic movement; according to Köbben's distinctions it can be identified as an eschatological-nativistic movement against foreign domination.

¹² For a typology of adaptation comprising conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion, see Merton (1957), pp. 140-155.

¹³ The resistance to modernization was actually offered by a large section of the religious élite, while a small section of this group, commonly consisting of the official elements, was more adaptive. Although the resistance movement was mainly traditional in character, it also exhibited as a by-product a pre-modern feature, namely its integrative role, see below, pp. 323 f.

of traditional order. Traditional authority was threatened by the intrusion of secular-modern bureaucracy centred in the colonial authority.¹⁴ The most conspicuous effect of the new bureaucracy was that the centre of authority and responsibility was shifted from the regents to the Dutch administrators. The regents became mere figure-heads whose authority was dependent on the colonial power.¹⁵ In short, the colonial government modified the political mechanism so as to be able to control the regents' activities and prevent the traditional channels of leadership from being turned into mechanisms for the organization of resistance to the regime. The native civil servants were left in nominal possession of their functions and prerogatives only if they exercised their powers in accordance with the will of the colonial ruler. Their continued power was a source of resentment to the orthodox Muslim population. Indeed, large segments of the Muslim population became dissatisfied with the worldliness of their rulers or felt frustrated because of the rapid progress of modernization and the concomitant secularization. With the development of secularism in government and society, an increasing number of the members of the religious élite lost their traditionally sanctioned channels of gaining or maintaining status and the means of controlling the social order of the community. This naturally resulted in a propensity among the majority of the religious élite to direct their power in opposition to the colonial ruler and his collaborators. They were predisposed to develop extreme political orientations and to lead radical political movements. Their antagonism towards the infidel ruler evidently differed from their opposition to the traditional Muslim ruler.¹⁶ From its very nature the charismatic leadership of the religious élite was radical and it had always formed a potential threat to traditional authority in the old order; it now challenged the established practices of the civil service and the rational-legal order of the colonial government as well.¹⁷ Their revolutionary

¹⁴ For an account of the bureaucratic aspect of political modernization, see Eisenstadt (1961); also Hoselitz, in *La Palombara* (1963), pp. 168-169.

¹⁵ See Snouck Hurgronje's note on the Banten situation of 15 August 1892; it refers to the degradation of the position of the native civil servants in Banten.

¹⁶ In the pre-colonial period a persistent antagonism could be observed between official and non-official segments of the religious élite; the latter group commonly formed a potential threat to the traditional ruler's authority; see above, Chap. III. See also Pigeaud (MS, 1943-1945), pp. 125-126.

¹⁷ For an explanation of the nature of charismatic authority, esp. its radical and revolutionary character, see Bendix on Max Weber (1962), pp. 300-301.

zeal was sanctioned by the charismatic nature of their authority. Viewed in this perspective, social conflict within the context of a colonial situation appeared in the form of conflict between discrete groups committed to opposing norms and values. To be more specific, Banten society under colonial rule became divided into opposed groups on the basis of adherence to traditional-religious institutions or modern secular ones; the different social groups found themselves at different points in the modern political hierarchy. Successive impulses toward modernization intermeshed with the existing social structure and gave rise to differential patterns of political behaviour, ranging from conformity or innovation to rebellion, and adhering respectively to rational-legal, traditional and charismatic authority.¹⁸

THE NATIVISTIC ASPECT

A further problem in this rebellious movement is its nativistic feature.¹⁹ In our opinion, due consideration should be given to the appeal of the idea of the restoration of the sultanate on the one hand, and the appeal of the Islamic eschatological idea on the other. The glorification of the past as an appurtenance of the *Mahdi* idea provided a convenient compensatory mechanism in the face of adverse conditions such as physical distress, frustration through the presence of alien rulers or moral decadence. An attempt was made to revive certain aspects of a past culture which, employed as symbols of a period of glory, served to emphasize common values and basic loyalties; these aspects also displayed the main ingredients of regeneration or revitalization, such as the overthrow of alien rulers and the re-establishment of traditional order, which was conceived of as a renovated world, where the righteous nation would live in harmony and prosperity.²⁰ Viewed in this perspective, the rebellious movement in Banten can be classified as a nativistic phenomenon, embodying both revivalistic and millenarian aspects.²¹

¹⁸ See Max Weber (1964), pp. 328 ff.

¹⁹ For a description of typical features of nativistic movements, see Linton (1943), Balandier (1953), Herskovits (1958), Köbben (1959).

²⁰ One aspect of nativism is shown by the ascendance of one or more of the rebels to the position of *radja*; see Chap. VII, *passim*.

²¹ If we employ the functional-comparative approach of Köbben, the rebellious movement of 1888 may be classified as an eschatological-nativistic movement against foreign domination; the eschatological aspect can be discerned from the co-called "Last Letter of the Prophet"; see above, Chap. V, pp. 167 f., although during the actual outbreak there were no indications of expressions of an eschatological character. As regards its form (Köbben distinguishes 4 types of forms besides 5 types of contents), it can be

Eschatological undertones could also be discerned. Because they found no possible alternatives for redress, people were prone to join this nativistic movement which promised to eliminate foreign rule and to restore pre-colonial conditions. The violent and explosive movement can be viewed as an irrational flight from reality — a kind of escapism — and was doomed to failure because it relied wholly on supernatural forces and operated along mystico-magical lines which were completely inadequate in facing colonial forces with modern techniques and organization.²²

THE DEPRIVATION ASPECT

Another problem directly connected with this nativistic phenomenon, and concerned with the socio-psychological aspect of the movement, is the relevancy of explaining the movement in terms of “a state of deprivation”.²³ It is generally assumed — the assumption has frequently been referred to — that the sense of blockage constitutes one of the causes of millenarian or nativistic movements. One must acknowledge that not only economic evils such as hunger, pauperism or landlessness, but also deprivations caused by social displacement, political disfranchisement or cultural disinheritance may bring about acute frustration. One must not disregard the fact that the sense of political or cultural blockage is sometimes more important than the sense of economic distress. During the period of physical catastrophes — the cattle plague, the fever epidemic, the famine and the eruption of Mt. Krakatau — no social disturbances of any importance could be observed, whereas in the year of the outburst there was no severe economic stringency.²⁴ The evidence given by the captives clearly shows that the leaders of the movement were in quest of dignity and self-respect in the context of the colonial situation. The desire for the return of the sultanate and the establishment of the Islamic state kept their sense of identity intact, while the launching of the movement gave them the sense of fulfilling a holy mission.²⁵ Although from the economic point of view

identified as a movement led by a “prophet” — in our case, a *wali* or saint — and organized in part.

²² The belief in invulnerability is an outstanding feature of this sort of millenarian movement; see Chap. IV, *passim*.

²³ For the explanation of the “Relative Deprivation Theory”, see Aberle, in *CSSH*, Supplement II (1962), pp. 208-228.

²⁴ See above, Chap. II, *passim*.

²⁵ The sense of holy mission is inherent to charismatic leadership, see Max Weber (1964), pp. 360-361; see also Bendix (1962), p. 301 f.

the religious élite in Banten belonged to the more well-to-do class of peasantry, they remained painfully aware of the fact that there was a discrepancy between their economic standing and social prestige on the one hand, and their political status on the other. Within the framework of the political organization of colonial society they had no access to political functions. Owing to the liberal policy of the colonial government on religious matters, there were still social arrangements in Banten which were conducive to building up political power through religious institutions, so that the religious élite was able to emerge as a powerful "interest group".²⁶ They suffered not so much from severe hardships but rather from the effects of a sense of blockage in the political field. The religious revival movement satisfied their need for cultural re-orientation and the re-discovery of their tradition. In fact, during a period of strain caused by socio-cultural change a social movement frequently tends to adhere to traditional values.²⁷ In the case of the Banten movements the religious values formed an important element, which intermingled with the traditional values.

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT

It is not surprising that the social movements in Banten readily took on a religious shape, for the world view of the Bantenese was religious, and consequently social protests invariably became defined in religious terms.²⁸ As has been pointed out before, the religious components in the millennial idea of the movement were quite prominent; the people could be mobilized by a religious appeal. Political protests therefore took on a religious form, and the boundaries of political and religious issues became more or less co-terminous. It can also be said that political and religious movements were found together. Since the Muslim community

²⁶ The term "interest group" here does not refer to the well-organized and bureaucratized pressure groups familiar in modern industrial societies, but simply refers to a social group that reflected interest tendencies of a segment of the population. For an account of interest groups, see Almond (1961), pp. 85-101.

²⁷ The sense of change among the people was reflected in prophecies, see Hoetzoo, in *MNZG* Vol. XIII (1869), pp. 307-356; Vol. XXVII (1883), pp. 1-42.

²⁸ For explanations of the religious character of peasant struggles, see also Engels (1927), and Bodrogi (1950-1951); these authors already recognized that material class-interests were at play, but that the movement did not take the more realistic line of class struggle. In the African case Balandier identifies the movements on this level as total reactions, see Balandier (1953); Köbben prefers the term "prophetic movement"; see Köbben (1959).

made no distinction between political and religious issues, in contrast to the modern Western world, the protest movements tended to involve a total commitment to religious values. In many respects the insurrectionary movements may therefore be regarded as religious expressions of secular conflicts, either economic, social or political. It is also obvious that the hostile component in the religious orientation of the movement intensified the violence which accompanied its outbursts.²⁹ For this reason the hostile outburst that took place during the rising should be seen as a religio-political attack on colonial authorities rather than an eruption of racial violence. As has been noted before, hostile expressions were directed towards the colonial rulers as infidels rather than as Europeans. Furthermore, co-religionists who had attained the status of civil servant, also fell victim to the assault; the anti-civil servant sentiments found their justification in the idea that the category of civil servants was to be regarded as *kafir indanas* or half-infidels, and therefore as impure, for they had contact with infidels. In addition it must be recalled that some members of Dutch families in Tjilegon were spared because they stated that they were ready to embrace the Muslim faith.³⁰

THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

Attention must also be paid to the integrative role of religion in the development of the social movement. In fact, the movement showed a marked tendency towards modern development at least in its structural aspect. Solidarity groups comprising the leaders of the conspiracy developed a communication system in the supra-village sphere on an inter-regional scale. Furthermore, their political allegiance transcended their kinship loyalty and their loyalty to the local community. Lastly, the pilgrimage and the organizational structure of the Sufi orders made possible a "nation"-wide contact with co-religionists. Consequently, Islam became a rallying point for social forces opposing colonial domination. In this respect the rebellious movement under study, like similar social movements that took place elsewhere in Java during the same period, can be viewed as a proto- or pre-nationalist

²⁹ The hostile component refers to the idea of the *djihad* or *perang sabil*; for a study of the Holy War, see Obbink (1901).

³⁰ Mention should also be made of a Dutch convert of German descent, Handle, who was in the area during the rising and who was concealed from the rebels by a *hadji* whom he had befriended; his life was saved but he was later regarded with suspicion by the government and expelled from the country; see MS containing his autobiography.

movement, which anticipated the national struggle for independence.³¹ But this development is of course a modern trend with respect to its integrative role rather than its goal-orientation and organizational aspects. Indeed, compared with modern nationalist movements, fundamental differences can easily be pointed out: modern political doctrines, programmes, and ideals were missing.³² Nor can modern organization, tactics and strategy be observed in 19th-century social movements. They may therefore, be identified in the main as traditional, religious and millenarian movements.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BANTEN INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Having summed up the main aspects of the insurrectionary movement of 1888 in Banten, we shall now very briefly consider the general features of the risings which took place in the same region before and after the 1888 rebellion. In this way light will be thrown on the peculiar nature of the Tjilegon rebellion as the convergence of various characteristics found in previous movements on the one hand, and as a half-way situation between the preceding movements and the rebellion of 1926 on the other.

In the first place, the predominant feature of these earlier movements is the rejection of and active resistance to foreign domination and its concomitant institutions. The wide variety of manifestations of this characteristic ranged from violent opposition to taxation or forced labour to open propaganda for the overthrow of Dutch rule.³³ A fundamental element of many of the movements, which was connected with the rejection of foreign domination, was the idea of the restoration of the old order, i.e. of the sultanate. Even PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) promoters in 1926 still hinted at the possibility of the realization of an Islamic state.³⁴ As has been shown before, in the revolts of 1888 and 1926 the nativistic character was linked with another very noticeable feature, the Holy War theme, which, of course, had a great effect on the Banten population. At this point one should not overlook the fact that in the two different revolts, two different types of connection

³¹ For more extensive explanations of movements on this level as pre-nationalist movements, see Wertheim (1964), pp. 85-101.

³² For studies dealing with the characteristics of modern social movements, see Heberle (1951); also King (1962).

³³ For an assessment of the promises made by the Banten rebels in 1926, see Benda and McVey (1960), p. 42; cf. Tan Malaka's statement, pp. 14-16.

³⁴ Benda and McVey (1960), p. 42; members of the Banten nobility were promised the establishment of a new sultanate.

existed between religion and politics. In the case of the Tjilegon affair Islamic ideologies were the real objectives which the chief rebels envisaged, while during the 1926 revolt the communist credo was preached very much in the style of the religious teachers and the PKI aims were presented to the various segments of the population in the light of their own particular ideas.³⁵ This means that in the latter case religious concepts were only used as a cloak and as a useful device by a movement which was essentially secular. With the actual situation and conditions prevalent in Banten at that time in mind, it is not surprising that Bantenese social movements evidently bore religious earmarks. Another recurrent feature common to the movements was the belief in invulnerability,³⁶ which in traditional society held a strong appeal and could function as a potent instrument in arousing aggression.

The Banten insurrectionary movements were based largely on the rural population, no matter which leadership faction dominated them on the different occasions. The rank-and-file unmistakably consisted mainly of peasants and other categories of rural inhabitants.

A general consideration of the *avant garde* of the various movements in Banten clearly shows that in the course of the 19th century there was a constant shift of leadership or a circulation of the revolutionary élite. In the early 19th century the predominant elements in social convulsions comprised dispossessed noblemen and members of the rural gentry, and wandering armed bands composed of outlaws, exiles and brigands. Certain members of the traditional revolutionary élite, e.g. the Djakarias, figured prominently. After the banishment *en masse* of these rebel leaders, the revolutionary élite was replenished through the rise of the religious leaders, i.e. the *kjais* and *hadjis*, in the rebellious movements. The ascendancy of the religious leaders culminated in the insurrectionary movement of 1888.³⁷ It is quite remarkable that a considerable number of leaders in the Communist revolt of 1926 also bore the *hadji* title.³⁸

³⁵ Benda and McVey (1960), p. 17; further also pp. 43-47.

³⁶ Even in the Banten revolt of 1926, the doctrine of invulnerability still played an important role, Benda and McVey (1960), p. 44.

³⁷ As regards the rebellion of 1888, the growth of the mystical schools should be stressed; this was the basic difference with the former movements, which were not pre-nationalist. See above, pp. 323-324.

³⁸ Benda and McVey (1960), pp. 88-89. There were 145 *hadjis* listed as executive members and promoters of the PKI out of a total number of 341 men. Furthermore, the number of religious teachers in the PKI amounted to 23, and that of farmers, 184; see Benda and McVey (1960), pp. 60-61.

The Banten revolt of 1926 showed novel features which differentiate it from previous rebellious movements: its type of leadership, its organization and its strategy. These features clearly showed modern patterns, common to modern movements.³⁹ In other respects, however, this revolt can be regarded as a modern version of the traditional rural unrest that prevailed in the region.

If the general characteristics of these movements are compared with those of movements in other regions in Java, we can safely draw the conclusion that in Banten society no long-established tradition existed which was comparable to traditional messianic expectation met with in the Javanese cultural realm. As has been pointed out above, the Banten movement took its colour from a version of the Islamic eschatology and from Mahdism, blended with nativistic elements of Bantenese culture. The Messiah figure, *Ratu Adil*, around which endemic Javanese messianic movements in the 19th century were focused, was totally unknown in Banten. The limited scope of this study does not allow us to undertake a further examination of this historical phenomenon. Our knowledge of social movements in 19th-century Java will remain incomplete and fragmentary as long as this category of millenarian movements has not been investigated. As stated at the very beginning of this study, the neglect of these movements had always been a typical feature of Indonesian historiography.⁴⁰ Judging from the abundance of historical records on this particular subject, much work is needed on the many millenarian movements that flourished in Indonesia, especially in Java, in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, before any comparative study of social movements can be made.

We conclude by pointing out that the historical study of social movements will certainly add a new dimension to Indonesian historiography on the one hand and promote the shift of interest toward Indonesia-centrism on the other.

³⁹ Benda and McVey (1960), *passim*.

⁴⁰ Dingley's work deals mainly with movements of the 20th century and is not based on primary sources; mention should be made of more recent works dealing with millenarianism, i.e. those of Sartono Kartodirdjo (1959), Harjaka Hardjamandjaja (1962), and Dahm (1963).