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Planting the seeds
Java, the nationalist movement and Kartosuwiryo in the 1920s

> *In 1918 Kartosuwiryo was a dear friend. We worked side by side with Tjokro[aminoto] for our country. In the '20s in Bandung we lived, ate, and dreamed together. However as I [Soekarno] progressed on nationalistic principles, he worked solely along Islamic principles.*[1]

FROM DESA TO KOTA: A NATIONALIST LEADER IN THE MAKING

Colonial perspectives

The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by deep changes in the social structure and political configuration of colonial Indonesia. The emergence of a new administrative local elite, the increase in urbanization, the formation of workers' unions and the reforms in the religious sphere all contributed to the rise of what Takashi Shiraishi has defined as the *pergerakan*, or 'movement', of the indigenous population towards achieving social, cultural, economic and political advancement.

Sekarmaji Marjan Kartosuwiryo was born in 1905 in Cepu, a small town between East and Central Java. Kartosuwiryo's family belonged to what in the early twentieth century was called the 'low-*priyayi*' class, a status earned through employment in the colonial administration rather than through aristocratic birth. His father was an opium trade supervisor. Kartosuwiryo, educated in the Dutch system from primary school to the tertiary level, is representative of a new social group in the Indies that emerged from the government-promoted 'Ethical Policy'.

During the 1800s, the Dutch colonial administration had maintained a system of indirect rule, in which 'Europeans' and

1 Cindy Adams, *Soekarno: An autobiography* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 272. The date mentioned by Soekarno might be wrong.

'Natives' were separated. However, after a hundred years of domination, the central government in The Hague had called for a new approach, what they called 'Ethical Policy'. Aimed at uplifting the indigenous population, the Ethical Policy promoted education, tackled irrigation challenges and encouraged migration to relieve over-populated areas of the archipelago. A major outcome of the expansion of Western-style schooling promoted by the Ethical Policy was the dissemination of European history, politics, culture and values among local elites. Dutch advocates of this policy promoted the pursuit of higher education in the Netherlands (especially in Amsterdam and Leiden), further exposing this new generation of indigenous intelligentsia to ideas about self-determination, nationalism, workers' rights and student organizations.[2] The anti-colonial nationalist awakening which in the mid-twentieth century would eradicate colonial domination had emerged from within this circle of Western-educated elites. Nonetheless, Western ideals were not solely responsible for motivating these anti-colonial efforts.

While some sectors of the population in the Netherlands inveighed against the capitalist system and other Europeans engaged in anti-imperialist debates, Muslims in Mecca and Cairo discussed the issue of independence from 'infidel' colonial rule and the possibility of establishing a transnational Islamic state. The debates in Europe were considered innocuous by colonial governments, who saw these as a source of intellectual enrichment for indigenous populations.[3] Yet at the same time, the pilgrimage to Mecca and the spread of pan-Islamism were perceived by the authorities as threats, fostering fears of a pan-Islamic anti-colonial movement. This resulted from the fact that Java and Sumatra were integral part of trans-oceanic networks of Islamic authority, education and political activism.

Advances in seafaring greatly increased the numbers of *Jawi* visiting the holy places of Islam. *Jawi*, the collective name used in the Middle East to describe Southeast Asian Muslims, had been undertaking the journey to the Arabian Peninsula for centuries, and by the late 1800s *Jawi* constituted the largest group of pilgrims.[4] It was a long-established tradition that pilgrims would extend their stay in

2 R. van Niel, *The emergence of the modern Indonesian elite* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1960), Chapter 2. This is still the most exhaustive treatment of the Ethical Policy and the formation of an indigenous intelligentsia in the early twentieth century. Specifically on *Ethici* and Islam, see Laffan, *Islamic nationhood*.

3 Van Niel, *The emergence*, p. 57.

4 R. Michael Feener, 'New networks and new knowledge: Migrations, communications, and the refiguration of the Muslim community in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries', in Robert Hefner (ed.), *The new Cambridge history of Islam*, vol. 6 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 63.

the region to meet other Muslims who came from different corners of the world, to exchange experiences and opinions, and to share their knowledge about religious matters. For centuries Mecca had been the destination *par excellence* for religious studies when, at the turn of the twentieth century, Cairo made its appearance on the map of Islamic learning. At this time, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) developed an innovative discourse engaging both religion and modernity, which would soon be described as 'Islamic reformism,' attracting increasing numbers of students to al-Azhar University.

Though at the end of the 1800s approximately 5,000 *Jawi* were based in Mecca,[5] Egypt's appeal was slowly increasing. In 1912 there were only twelve *Jawi* in Cairo,[6] in 1919 there were roughly fifty or sixty Indonesians, and by 1925 more than two hundred Southeast Asian students were living in the Egyptian capital.[7]

Although it is at the juncture of Western education and Islamic networks that we find most leaders of the religious nationalist movement in the Indies, including Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934), Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993), Ahmad Hassan (1888-1958), Hadji Agoes Salim (1884-1954), and several others who received both secular and religious education,[8] Kartosuwiryo was a product of the Indies' Dutch schooling and society. When in the late 1920s he expressed concerns about the weakness of the Indies' independence movement, Kartosuwiryo pointed to the negative effects of Dutch educa-

5 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, 'The intellectualisation of Islamic Studies in Indonesia', *Indonesia Circle* 58 (1992): p. 21.

6 Michael F. Laffan, 'An Indonesian community in Cairo: Continuity and change in a cosmopolitan Islamic milieu', *Indonesia* 77 (April 2004): p. 7.

7 William R. Roff, 'Indonesian and Malay students in Cairo in the 1920s', *Indonesia* 9 (April 1970): p. 74. On the impact of al-Azhar Islamic reformist movement on Indonesia see Azyumardi Azra, *The origins of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004). M.C. Ricklefs's *Polarizing Javanese society: Islamic and other visions (c. 1830-1930)* (Singapore: NUS, 2007), pp. 57-60, offers a valid overview of the dynamics and data related to the *hajj*, whilst the formation of a self-conscious religious intelligentsia in Java and Sumatra resulting from this network has been thoroughly examined in Laffan's *Islamic nationhood*.

8 Tjokroaminoto, Muhammad Natsir, Ahmad Hassan and Hadji Agoes Salim are all further discussed at various stages in this book. It is important to keep in mind that they all had key roles in shaping Islamic views in Indonesia in the 1920s-1960s, and substantially interacted with Kartosuwiryo. Tjokroaminoto and Salim were Kartosuwiryo's teachers within Sarekat Islam, whilst he came in contact with Natsir and Hassan through Persatuan Islam (Persis) in Bandung. As Persis gathered most of the religious-oriented nationalist intelligentsia in Bandung, Ahmad Hassan soon became a close friend and peer of Kartosuwiryo. Natsir, who was already a member of the Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB) in Sumatra, moved to Bandung and joined the local youth branch before entering the more active Persis. In more recent years, Natsir has admitted that it had been Kartosuwiryo who had introduced him to the 'Negara Islam' and 'Darul Islam' terminology in the 1930s (in 'Mereka yang dikecewakan', *Panji Masyarakat*, 24 November 1997, p. 20.)

tion on the Indonesian youth: it alienated them from their original social and cultural contexts.

Kartosuwiryo compared the indigenous elite to 'a locomotive pulling the carts from far ahead', as the leaders had been separated from society and were unable to act 'for the people' and to 'mix with them'.[9] It is from this perspective that we should consider Kartosuwiryo's choice to write in Malay and to give his speeches in local dialects, even though at times it entailed the employment of a translator, as in October 1929. But as soon as June 1930 Kartosuwiryo delivered his first speech in Sundanese. Thirty years later, Van Niel and Benda would suggest a similar idea, commenting that these elites acted as an 'isolated social group',[10] a group of intellectuals removed from indigenous society and only representing their own interests and aspirations.[11]

In 1911 Kartosuwiryo entered the Tweede Klasse Inlandsche School (Second-Class Native School), and after four years there he was admitted to the Hollandsch-Inlandsche School (Dutch Native School). This kind of institution had existed since 1914 for the children of natives employed within the colonial administration. Classes were taught in both Malay and Dutch, and attendance gave its pupils access to Dutch secondary schools. After following his father to Bojonegoro, in 1919 Kartosuwiryo enrolled at the Europeesche Lagere School (European Elementary School). Attending this school was considered a high privilege, as here European and high-status native pupils sat in the same classes.[12]

Thanks to this curriculum, at eighteen Kartosuwiryo succeeded in being admitted to the Surabaya Medical School, the Nederlandsch-Indische Artsen School (NIAS), commonly known as Sekolah Dokter Jawa.[13] There is no information available about this period of Kartosuwiryo's life. What is known is that he attended the medical school until 1927, when he was expelled under uncertain circumstances, possibly for his involvement with communism. This was not the only time Kartosuwiryo would be linked to communism, as various accusations were made throughout the 1940s-1960s. However,

9 Kartosuwiryo, 'Politiek djadjahan dan igama IV', *Fadjar Asia*, 14 June 1928. All translations from Indonesian and Dutch languages are my own.

10 Van Niel in Harry Jindrich Benda, 'Non-Western intelligentsias as political elites', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 6 (1960): p. 96.

11 Benda, 'Non-Western intelligentsias': p. 97.

12 For more details on Western-style education in Java and Madura, including statistics, see Shiraishi, *An age in motion*, pp. 28-9.

13 Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo* (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Aryaguna, 1964), pp. 20-1, 35. The data on Kartosuwiryo's life until 1923 are based on Pinardi's book, as no other source is available.

these charges seem unfounded and largely aimed at discrediting his commitment to creating a social and political order that conformed with Islamic values.[14]

Reflecting the complexities of Islamic belief in Java, Kartosuwiryo's religiosity has been depicted in many, often contrasting, ways. He has been perceived both as a 'fundamentalist', because of his commitment to Islamic politics, and as a Sufi, because of his propensity towards mysticism and popular beliefs. Others have argued that Kartosuwiryo used religion as nothing more than a thin veil masking his ambition for political power. If on the one hand Islam emerges in the sources as the core of his political ideology and as his main strategy to achieve independence and establish a post-colonial state, on the other hand Kartosuwiryo's individual religious experience can only be understood through such contested representations. These representations are addressed later in this chapter to further illustrate his leadership patterns, and then again in the last chapter of this book.

Surabaya

By the early twentieth century, Surabaya had become one of the major cities in Java – and, by default, of the Indonesian archipelago. Between 1900 and 1914, Surabaya underwent a sudden increase in industrial employment, with colonial statistics suggesting that by 1915 there were at least ten thousand workers employed in industrial establishments across the city and its residency. World War I pushed the colony to change its production patterns, and the manufacturing of materials that had typically been destined for the export market – like sugar, tobacco and textiles – was largely replaced by the metallurgical, machinery and building-materials sectors. All told, these industries employed around twenty to twenty-five thousand workers in 1920.[15]

14 This point is further discussed in Chapter 6. Pinardi mentions that whilst attending NIAS, Kartosuwiryo was boarding with his uncle Marco Kartodikromo, and claims that it was Marco who initiated Kartosuwiryo to politics, thus leading to his expulsion from NIAS in 1927 (Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan*, p. 21). Marco was an early member of the reformist movement, who soon shifted from pan-Islamism to communism. He had entered the Semarang Sarekat Islam branch with Semaoen in 1917 and had steadily gained authority in 'red' SI circles to the point that in 1924 he was nominated chairman of the Surakarta PKI and 'red' SI branches. It must be mentioned, though, that between 1923 and 1927 – the years that Kartosuwiryo spent in Surabaya – Marco was first based in Surakarta; then, after the 1926 communist revolts, he was exiled to the Boven Digoel prison, from which he never returned (Shiraishi, *An age in motion*, pp. 81, 299). This timeline indicates that Kartosuwiryo could have not possibly been living with Marco.

15 Howard Dick, *Surabaya, city of work: A socioeconomic history, 1900-2000*, Research in International Studies (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2002), pp. 262-70.

In Soekarno's often-quoted words, 'In 1916 Surabaya was a bustling, noisy port town, much like New York. […] [A] key industrial area with […] a large influx of mariners and merchantmen who brought news from all parts of the world. […] The town was seething with discontent and revolutionaries.'[16] It is partly because of its overwhelmingly proletarian population and partly because of its distance from the colonial administration that Surabaya became host to a lively intellectual (mostly socialist) anti-Dutch movement, in much the same way that Bandung would in the 1920s-1930s for the Islamic movement.

In 1912, Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto transformed Surabaya's batik traders' union, the Sarekat Dagang Islam, into a political organization known as Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union). Together with Boedi Oetomo, Sarekat Islam constituted the groundings for the anti-colonial movement. Though Boedi Oetomo is generally considered the first nationalist organization in the Indies, the group had originally been an association advancing Javanese cultural values. Van Niel has described it as the first Indonesian organization structured along Western lines, but, as it was aimed at representing the interests of one particular cultural group, this organization had 'no pretensions about establishing a nation'.[17] Boedi Oetomo, literally meaning 'beautiful' or 'noble' endeavour, was established in 1908 under the leadership of STOVIA (School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen, Training School for Native Doctors) alumnus and village aristocrat Dr Wahidin Soedirohoesdo in Weltevreden, which is now known as Menteng, in central Jakarta. Aimed at the advancement of both Javanese aristocrats and the Javanese people (*bangsa Jawa*) in the fields of education and culture, Boedi Oetomo's only nationalist aspiration was at the ethnic level.[18]

The desire to see the natives advance to the same level as the Europeans was to take different forms. For the colonial establishment, this advancement was to be achieved through education and integration into the administrative system. For some local aristocrats, progress involved the promotion of ethnic culture and values. For others, especially those who in the long run would become advocates of the nationalist movement, mobilization was aimed at social and political change. Raden Mas Tirto Adhi Soerjo (1880-1918), who founded the Sarekat Priyayi (Priyayi Union) in 1906, soon joined Boedi Oetomo, hoping that this group would be a

16 Adams, *Soekarno*, p. 34.

17 Van Niel, *The emergence*, p. 56.

18 M. Balfas, *Dr Tjipto Mangoekoesoemo, demokrat sedjati*, Seri Tjermin Kehidupan (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1952), pp. 36, 46.

better vehicle for inducing radical change in the Indies. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was of a similar mind. However, their efforts to transform Boedi Oetomo into a socialist party dedicated to improving the masses failed, as they found the Boedi Oetomo environment too entrenched in Javanese aristocratic values. Tirto and Tjipto then took separate paths in their common efforts. Tirto, betting on the dynamism of the Muslim trading class, established the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trading Union) together with Hadji Samanhoedi. Tjipto joined the socialist Indische Partij (Indies' Party) in 1911.[19]

The Sarekat Dagang Islam was the first embodiment of what would later be known as Sarekat Islam. It originated as an organization whose main stated aim was the economic protection of Muslim batik traders against the powerful Chinese textile industry.[20] In a statute submitted to the Dutch authorities, Tirto portrayed Sarekat Islam as 'an association of Muslims working for *progress*', in which Islam, as Shiraishi has argued, was the signifier of nativeness.[21] As Laffan has shown, this group soon developed as the political organization that 'formed the true basis for the nationalist movement'.[22]

In its early years, Sarekat Islam's strength lay in Tjokroaminoto's ability to create a bridge between socialism and Islam. From a mixed *santri-priyai* background, Tjokroaminoto succeeded in reaching farmers, coolies and intellectuals alike, addressing issues of social and economic inequality as well as pointing to Islam as the foundation of society. Tjokroaminoto assumed leadership in 1912 and retained it until his death in 1934. He had attended the Opleidingsschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (OSVIA, Training School for Native Officials) in Magelang and the Burgerlijke Avondschool (Civil Evening School) in Surabaya, where he became proficient in the English language and at the same time received a religious education. As long as Tjokroaminoto led the group, Sarekat Islam was primarily concerned with advancing the socio-economic conditions of the widely exploited Javanese peasantry.

19 Bob Hering, *Soekarno: Founding father of Indonesia*, KITLV Verhandelingen n.192 (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002), pp. 32-4; Van Niel, *The emergence*, pp. 58-9.

20 For different reconstructions of the origins of Sarekat Islam, see Safrizal Rambe, *Sarekat Islam: Pelopor nasionalisme Indonesia, 1905-1942* (Jakarta: Yayasan Kebangkitan Insan Cendekia, 2008), pp. 2-3. Benda, *The crescent and the rising sun*, p. 42; Ruth Thomas McVey, *The rise of Indonesian communism*, (Singapore: 1st Equinox ed., 2006), p. 8; Van Niel, *The emergence*, p. 90; Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadhrami awakening: Community and identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1999); Shiraishi, *An age in motion*, pp. 41-3; Laffan, *Islamic nationhood*, p. 167.

21 Shiraishi, *An age in motion*, p. 43.

22 Laffan, *Islamic nationhood*, pp. 166-7.

Despite the fact that Tjokroaminoto's socialism had its philosophical foundations in Islam, thereby rejecting Marx's theory of historical materialism, he was still able to ensure close cooperation between Sarekat Islam and the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (Indies' Social-Democratic Association). Charisma and political strategy allowed Tjokroaminoto to attract those elite factions concerned with the economic and social conditions of the Indies, as well as the disaffected masses. Shiraishi describes the fascination and excitement surrounding the peasants' experience at the rallies, and interestingly reverses the traditional understanding of Tjokroaminoto as the Just King: people did not 'flock to the SI out of their "millenarian" and "messianic expectations"', but 'rather the unusual and strange experiences people had […] generated the language of the Ratu Adil'.[23]

Tjokroaminoto was soon aided by Hadji Agoes Salim, also a Dutch-educated intellectual, whose religious understanding had been influenced by his cousin Ahmad Khatib, a Shafi'i *imam* in Mecca. Hadji Agoes Salim had joined Sarekat Islam in 1915 as an informant for the colonial secret police, but he soon converted to the cause, becoming the party's religious soul and second only to Tjokroaminoto in the party structure. Salim's influence on the young recruit Kartosuwiryo is undeniable, and it emerges with particular clarity when considering Salim's dedication to the pan-Islamic ideology. Working at the Dutch consulate in Jeddah had shaped both Salim's religious piety and his way of interacting with the colonial authorities. On the one hand, he should be seen as the figure who most significantly contributed to the Islamization of Sarekat Islam's policies, and on the other hand, as the one who favoured cooperation with the colonial authorities.

In the late 1910s, as the Indies' manufacturing industry was booming, increasing the number of industrial workers as well as accelerating urbanization, Sarekat Islam rapidly expanded across and outside of Java. Pointing to the violence sparked in Central Sulawesi and West Java in the name of Sarekat Islam's struggle for economic justice, and to the colonial authorities' reaction, Shiraishi sees 1919 as a turning point for Tjokroaminoto's decline and eventual failure to reconcile the communist and religious souls of Sarekat Islam.[24] During Tjokroaminoto's jail term, Salim took control of the 1919 Congress, and capitalizing on his familiarity with both the colonial and religious elites, he pushed SI towards

23 Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto: Hidup dan perdjuangannja* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), vol. 1, pp. 48-111; Shiraishi, *An age in motion*, pp. 66-7.

24 Shiraishi, *An age in motion*, pp. 113-6.

Islam and away from communism. The 1923 Madiun Congress proclaimed 'party discipline' against members of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party) and changed the organization's name to Partai Sarekat Islam-Hindia Timoer (Islamic Union Party-East Indies), marking the beginning of its existence as an explicitly Islamic party.

In the early 1920s, the party was increasingly Islamized. Tjokroaminoto's attempts to maintain a focus on the socio-economic empowerment of the indigenous population were overpowered by the impact of Mustafa Kemal's decision to abolish the Caliphate in March 1924. The activities of the Khilafat movement in India had stirred admiration across the Muslim world in general, and in Java in particular, such that in 1925 the al-Islam Congress in Yogyakarta decided that an envoy would be sent to India to establish relations with the Central Khilafat Committee. In 1924, Sarekat Islam party leaders had already established a Central Comite Chilafat in Surabaya, and later that year the same city hosted the al-Islam Congress to discuss how to approach the Caliphate question. Tjokroaminoto attended the Meccan Moe'tamar 'Alam Islami (International Islamic Congress) in 1926, and Hadji Agoes Salim was sent as the Indies' delegate in 1927.[25] The al-Islam movement would re-emerge in 1930, but with a different aim (see Chapter 2).

As the Middle East was hit by the internal dismantling of the caliphal institution and the external fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, pan-Islamism was also losing support in favour of pan-Arabism and nationalism. Yet it is at this historical juncture that Muslims 'at the periphery' of the Islamic world began to play a crucial role in the revival of the caliphate ideal.[26] The fact that the Caliphate question began to gain support in the Dutch Indies only in the 1920s, when the rest of the Islamic world was shifting from pan-Islamism to nationalism, should be analysed in conjunction with the state of political activism in the archipelago. Hadji Agoes Salim first asserted the centrality of religion as the founding principle of Sarekat Islam with the establishment of the al-Islam Congress in 1923. On this same year Salim had reoriented Sarekat Islam's approach to the colonial administration by pushing for the approval of the non-cooperation *hijrah* policy.[27]

25 Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, pp. 163-51, 174. For an extensive investigation of the Indies' Muslims' reaction to the abrogation of the caliphate, see Martin van Bruinessen, 'Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate question', *Studia Islamika* 2-3 (1995): pp. 115-40.

26 For more on the Khilafat movement, see A.C. Niemeijer, *The Khilafat movement in India, 1919–1924* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972); and S. Oliver-Dee, *The Caliphate question: The British government and Islamic governance* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).

27 McVey, *The rise*, pp. 76-104; Rambe, *Sarekat Islam*, pp. 90-145.

Before the 1920s the Indies' anti-colonial movement had not yet been ideologically defined. I suggest that the Indonesian nationalist movement emerged as a result of a transformation that took place in the 1910s. Accepting the fact that the first organizations to advocate independence from colonial rule were Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Dagang Islam, I argue that the nationalist movement emerged from fractures within, and reorganizations of, these two groups, a reshaping that occurred along ideological lines.

This process of moving away from a general idea of 'indigenous advancement' towards the formation of well-defined Islamic, communist and nationalist parties, with agendas molded according to domestic needs and international models, passed through a transitional period in which each organization had multiple political souls. Sarekat Islam had split into a socialist and an Islamic wing in the mid 1920s. In following years, the caliphate issue, the Islamic state ideal and the pan-Islamic project would quickly become important elements in rallying support among the Indies Muslims, and in further widening the chasm between the various groups. Appeals to a transnational network of alliances based on Islam strengthened Sarekat Islam's position against Soekarno's nationalism and Semaoen's socialism. The case for independence from colonial rule as part of a transnational religious movement was made even stronger by the argument that striving for the unity of the *ummah* was a religious duty.

The abrogation of the Caliphate, together with the Saudi conquest of Mecca in the Arabian Peninsula and the already heated Palestinian question, dominated political debates in Indonesia as in other Muslim countries. These became powerful elements to rally Muslims' sympathies and channel them into the anti-colonial struggle, but the goals of the religious groups were to gradually shift away from the creation of a transnational caliphate and instead towards the establishment of an independent nation-state.

Scholars of colonial Indonesia have argued that by the mid 1920s, political Islam in the Dutch East Indies was in steep decline, with communism and secular nationalism taking its place among the indigenous population. I contend, however, that although Sarekat Islam had been seriously weakened by its internal division, and by the soaring enthusiasm for Soekarno's Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia, the Islamic party did not decline but, instead, entered a new phase. The party's focus was no longer on relieving the indigenous population from colonial mistreatments, but on laying out the platform for an independent state of Indonesia based on Islamic precepts.

Amidst these events Kartosuwiryo moved to Surabaya in 1923. It is unclear how he entered the Sarekat Islam circle, but it is likely that during his days at the medical school, his interest in politics brought him to the steps of Tjokroaminoto's house. In the 1910s and early 1920s Tjokroaminoto's residence also functioned as Sarekat Islam's office and was a known hub for socio-political discussions. Soekarno would recall his boarding days at Tjokroaminoto's in 1915-16 as crucial to his political formation.[28] In 1962, Kartosuwiryo reportedly stated that it had been during a trip with Tjokroaminoto to Cimahi, north of Bandung, West Java, that he had first met Soekarno in 1927.[29] This meeting could be connected to Kartosuwiryo's presence at the Pekalongan Congress discussed below, a congress in which both Tjokroaminoto and Soekarno participated. The congress would also explain Kartosuwiryo's presence in Batavia in early 1928, soon after Tjokroaminoto's moving there and establishing *Fadjar Asia*'s office in Weltevreden in November 1927.[30]

Batavia

What Kartosuwiryo did in the aftermath of his expulsion from medical school in 1927 has not been recorded. However, by March 1928 he was in Batavia, dedicating much of his time to Sarekat Islam activities. It is possible that he served as General Secretary at the 12th PSI Congress held in Pekalongan between 28 September and 2 October 1927, as a Dutch account reports a 'Kartodiwirjo' fulfilling this position, a name that does not appear before or after this congress and could have been a misspelling of 'Kartosuwirjo' by the Dutch administrator.[31]

This congress highlighted Tjokroaminoto and Salim's differences over what to prioritize within the wider context of the anti-colonial struggle. Salim's speech focused on Islam, Islamism and nationalism, as well as on the party's organization and its connection with the international anti-imperialism league, while Tjokroaminoto highlighted the relevance of the unfair economic conditions of the Indonesian people in the fight for political free-

28 Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, p. 55.

29 Kartosuwiryo's confession letter to Kodam Siliwangi VI in Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan*, p. 34.

30 Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, pp. 172-7.

31 'Programma van het XIVe Congres der Partij Sarekat Islam Oost-Indië to Pekalongan vanaf 28 September tot 2 October 1927' [1927], Archief van het Ministerie van Koloniën, 1900-1963 [hereafter AMK]: Geheime Mailrapporten [hereafter GMr], no. 52, Het Nationaal Archief [hereafter NA], The Hague.

dom, stating that 'the intellectuals should not be oriented towards capitalism'.[32] It seems that Kartosuwiryo did not participate in two events on the Sarekat Islam agenda in January 1928. These were the Cianjur open meeting and the al-Islam Congress. While the former was a local event,[33] the latter involved 150 delegates representing more than forty branches across Java. As Salim had requested at the 1927 congress in Pekalongan,[34] Salim and Tjokroaminoto established the Majelis Oelama (Assembly of Islamic Scholars) as an institution representing the *ulil amri* as a form of Islamic consultative and judicial authority.[35]

Documentary evidence marks Kartosuwiryo's first unequivocal participation in the party's activities in March 1928, when his name appears in *Fadjar Asia* as a donor to the 'Indonesian Students' Mutual-Help Committee', and then again on 2 April when his first article was published. From then on, he would be a regular contributor to the party's daily newspaper.[36] In his early articles, Kartosuwiryo reported news of socio-political relevance and wrote about religious-political issues, but his focus gradually shifted towards Islam, Islamic nationalism and Islamic law.

Kartosuwiryo's interest in Islam as a political instrument soon attracted the Dutch authorities' attention. They started reporting news about this young journalist's 'religious fanaticism' and commenting on his articles in the pages of their press overviews.[37] This attention began in August 1928 and continued for several months, with the authors of the *Overzicht van de Inlandsche (Maleisisch-Chineesche en Arabische) Pers* even suggesting that publishing Kartosuwiryo's opinions and giving him too much space was compromising Sarekat Islam Party's leadership.[38] Kartosuwiryo was described as a young anti-European journalist who was fanatical in his religious views and behaviour.[39]

32 'Het congres der Partij Sarekat Islam te Pekalongan van 28 September – 2 October 1927' [1927], pp. 23, 26-7, AMK GMr, no. 53, NA.

33 'Verslag der openbare P.S.I. Vergadering te Tjandjoer op 22 Januari 1928' [1928], AMK GMr, no. 57, NA.

34 Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, p. 175.

35 'Islam Congres' [1928], AMK GMr, no. 57, NA.

36 *Fadjar Asia* is stored at the Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI) in Jakarta, where continuous issues are available from 8 November 1927 until 31 July 1930 with a gap between 15 November 1929 and 1 January 1930. For a list of Kartosuwiryo's contributions, see the Appendix.

37 See the General Overview of the Indigenous (Malay-Chinese and Arab) Press, *Algemeen Overzicht van de Inlandsche (Maleisisch-Chineesche en Arabische) Pers*, and the weekly Overview of the Indigenous and Malay-Chinese Press, *Overzicht van der Inlandsche en Maleisisch-Chineesche Pers*.

38 *Algemeen overzicht*, August 1928.

39 *Algemeen overzicht*, August 1928 and October 1929.

Kartosuwiryo made his first official appearance at the second Youth Congress, held in Weltevreden on 27-28 October 1928. On this occasion, representatives from several youth organizations and newspapers – including Jong Java, Jong Batak Bond, Jong Islamieten Bond, and the Chinese daily *Keng Po* – issued a pledge, the *Sumpah Pemuda*, affirming their commitment to the establishment of an Indonesian nation in which the unity of the homeland would prevail over different ethnic and linguistic communities. The *Sumpah Pemuda* was a milestone on the road towards the formation of a politically conscious youth and future political elite who were attempting to articulate an anti-colonial discourse in terms broader than ethnicity or religion. The conclusion of the pledge, signed by Kartosuwiryo and others, stated: 'We, young men and women of Indonesia, accept to belong to one motherland, Indonesia; we, young men and women of Indonesia, accept to belong to one nation, Indonesia; we, young men and women of Indonesia, hold high one language, Indonesian.'[40]

Kartosuwiryo, however, could not refrain from pointing to Islam as a necessary element of the anti-colonial discourse in Indonesia. He later reported on *Fadjar Asia* that

> this writer, as a child of Indonesia, and especially as a child of Indonesia who embraces Islam, meaning the religion of the Indonesian nation (*kebangsaan Indonesia*), [reminds you] that because this is the religion embraced by a large part of the Indonesian people in general, and also the religion that functions as a bond between several groups and peoples that have settled in our homeland Indonesia, it is because of that that it is appropriate and not far from the truth to say that if in this meeting [the Youth Congress] we want to talk, our opinions should be exclusively based on Islam and Islamization.

His speech was interrupted soon after he started it, as the chair of the congress argued that, 'Certainly unity does not demand religion, especially not Islam'. To this statement, Kartosuwiryo answered: 'Even foreigners see the truth of this, that Islam is an important and big issue – if not the biggest – in our motherland,

40 Suswadi, and Endang Pristiwaningsih (eds), *Sumpah Pemuda: Latar sejarah dan pengaruhnya bagi pergerakan nasional* (Jakarta: Kementerian Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Indonesia, 2003), pp. 87, 100. For a discussion of the significance of this pledge and the congress in the pre- and post-independence periods, see Keith Foulcher, '*Sumpah Pemuda*: The making and meaning of a symbol on Indonesian nationhood', *Asian Studies Review* 24-3 (2000): pp. 377-410.

especially in relation to colonization politics […] Why, then, do those youth still not see it?'[41]

Two months later, Kartosuwiryo represented the party at the Jong Islamieten Bond Congress in Bandung (22-26 December 1928).[42] The Islamic Youth League had been established in 1925 as an off-shoot of Jong Java, with the explicit mission to 'Islamize educated people' and breed future cadres for the religious nationalist movement.[43] According to a Dutch press report, on this occasion Kartosuwiryo called for 'peace through religion'.[44] However, his speech seemed far from peaceful, as the only available excerpt quotes him accusing the colonial government of implementing policies of Christianization with the specific intent of weakening the Islamic political movement.[45]

Throughout 1929, Kartosuwiryo was extremely active in *Fadjar Asia* as well as in the Jakarta branch of PSI. On 1 March, the party announced the creation, under Kartosuwiryo's initiative, of a *Komite Zakat-Fitrah*,[46] a committee for the collection of Islamic tax, which can be considered a prototype for the Japanese-era *bait al-mal* (Islamic treasury). More than a decade later, during the occupation, Kartosuwiryo would create this treasury within the structure of the Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia (MIAI, Islamic Superior Council of Indonesia).[47] As Agoes Salim organized his journey to Geneva to attend the International Labour Conference, which was hosted by the League of Nations in July 1929, the editorial team of *Fadjar Asia* was restructured, and on the eve of Salim's departure aboard the *Prins der Nederlanden*, Kartosuwiryo became editor.[48]

41 Kartosuwiryo, 'Lahir dan bathin', *Fadjar Asia*, 29 October 1928. On the second day of the congress, he was also reported as replying to Anta Permana's speech on the need to abolish polygamy so hastily that the congress chairman felt it necessary to ask participants not to discuss issues linked to religion; see Kholid Santosa, *Jejak-jejak sang pejuang pemberontak: Pemikiran, gerakan & ekspresi politik S.M. Kartosuwirjo dan Daud Beureueh*, 2nd ed. (Bandung: Sega Arsy, 2006), p. 64.

42 'Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken Verslag van het 4e congres den JIB gehouden te Bandung' [1929], AMK GMr, no. 384x/29, in Abdurrahman, 'Jong Islamieten Bond, 1925-1942 (sejarah, pemikiran, dan gerakan)' (thesis, IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, 1999, p. 139). I have not seen the original document.

43 For more details on JIB, see Deliar Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973) and Yudi Latif, *Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia and power* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 203-11 (quote on p. 204).

44 *'Vrede door religie'*, in *Algemeen overzicht*, 22 December 1928.

45 Abdurrahman, 'Jong Islamieten Bond', pp. 139-40.

46 Kartosuwiryo, 'Seroean oemoem komite zakat fitrah', *Fadjar Asia*, 1 March 1929.

47 See Chapter 2.

48 *Algemeen overzicht*, July 1929 and *Fadjar Asia*, 30 April 1929. Salim's journey was announced by Tjokroaminoto and Kartosuwiryo, 'Ma'loemat Loedjnah Tanfidhijah P.S.I. Indonesia', *Fadjar Asia*, 20 April 1929 and Kartosuwiryo, 'Selamat djalan', *Fadjar Asia*, 2 May 1929.

From then on, Kartosuwiryo's contributions appeared in the newspaper almost every day, providing a clear picture of his activities and the development and reception of his ideas in 1929 and 1930. As Kartosuwiryo was gaining attention on the political scene, his statements became part of journalistic debates, as *Darmokondo*, *Bintang Timoer* and *Oetoesan Hindia* often reacted to his writings.[49]

BACK TO THE DESA: BUILDING LOCAL NETWORKS

West Java

In mid August 1929, Kartosuwiryo was in Garut at the West Java Provincial Congress acting as Secretary of the party's executive committee (a position he had held since March).[50] On this occasion Tjokroaminoto changed the party's name to Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII, Party of the Islamic Association of Indonesia) to further stress the party's nationalist stance and its vision of a future Indonesian nation.

The August provincial congress, which marked Kartosuwiryo's entry to the West Java branch of the party, was attended by 800-1,200 representatives of Islamic as well as secular organizations, including some who in later years would become prominent figures in local Islamic politics. In the absence of the West Java chairman, Abdoelmoetallib Sangadji, the congress was opened by Tjokroaminoto and Kadar, who was president of the Jakarta branch, and was chaired by Aroedji Kartawinata, the director of the PSII school in Garut who in the 1940s would become a military commander in the Tasikmalaya area. Among those who participated were Kiyai Ardiwisastra (president of PSII-Malangbong), Kiyai Joesoef Taoeziri (chairman of the Garut branch of the Majelis Oemmat Islam [MOI, Council of the Islamic Ummah]), Kiyai Hadji Moestafa Kamil (national MOI leader) and the PSII-Garut women's organization, along with vari-

49 It is on one of such occasions that Kartosuwiryo's disgruntled comments on Dutch attempts to establish a National Bank of Indonesia (Bank Kebangsaan Indonesia) were picked up and used as an example of his unwillingness to cooperate, and his 'fixation' with linking nationalism to Islam. *Bintang Timoer* excerpt republished in Kartosuwiryo's 'Lagi tentang persatoean I', *Fadjar Asia*, 12 March 1929; Kartosuwiryo, 'Naik tiang pengantungan', *Fadjar Asia*, 25 July 1929; 'Oentoek collega S.M.K. I', *Darmokondo*, 9 July 1929 and 'Oentoek collega S.M.K. II', *Darmokondo*, 10 July 1929. The content of the articles and the nature of the dispute are analysed in the last section of this chapter.

50 'Klachten gehuit [*sic.*] tydens de provinciale congressen van de PSII' [1929], AMK GMr, no. 70, NA. The congress was held on 16-19 August 1929.

ous members of Persis (Bandung), the Majelis Ahli's-Soennah and Persatoean Oelama (Madjalengka). In addition to these Islamic nationalists, also in attendance were Soekarno and Gatot Mangkoepradja from the Bandung branch of PNI, Mirza Wali Ahmad Bey of the Yogyakarta-based Lahori Ahmadiyah, and the Perserikatan Chauffeurs (Drivers' Union).

It is interesting to note that despite the conflict between Sarekat Islam and PNI leadership on the establishment of PPPKI (discussed below), Soekarno participated at this congress. The most notable absentee was, in fact, Muhammadiyah.[51] In 1925 Tjokroaminoto had begun translating into Malay the English version and commentary of the Qur'an made by the Ahmadi scholar Maulvi Muhammad Ali. The project – and the Ahmadi group of Yogyakarta in general – had been initially supported by Muhammadiyah's Kiyai Haji Mas Mansur. However, as this particular instance of the Qur'an's translatability was brought to the attention of Rashid Rida in Cairo, Muhammadiyah felt compelled to withdraw its support and comply with its own alignment to Cairene modernism. Rashid Rida's legal opinion against this translation was published in *al-Manār* in July 1928, yet in September the Sarekat Islam council allowed Tjokroaminoto to continue his work, which was published later the same year.[52]

Sarekat Islam, then, reaffirmed its character as a modernist, yet Indonesia-centred, Islamic organization, of which Kartosuwiryo was an exemplary representative. In April 1928, in his effort to deconstruct the misperception of Islam as an element foreign to the Indies' culture, Kartosuwiryo argued that the Qur'an speaks to all peoples, at all times and in all languages, and that a Malay translation would have been a step in the direction of the consolidation of nationalism, while at the same time strengthening individual piety.[53]

At the 1929 provincial congress, speeches addressing socio-economic issues related to rural life went hand-in-hand with pow-

51 Muhammadiyah was established by Ahmad Dahlan upon his return from Mecca, in 1912; this organization had the stated goal of 'purifying' Indonesian Islam from innovation and local traditions.

52 Nur Ichwan has looked at this instance of Qur'an translation to conclude that Rashid Rida's objection to a Malay (English, Dutch or Turkish) Qur'anic text was a marker of 'the attitudes of Arabic-speaking Muslims towards non-Arabic-speaking Muslims'. The absence of such debates in Indonesia, Nur Ichwan continues, should then not be seen as a deviation from Islamic modernist thought, but rather as a practical implication of the fact that most Muslims did not speak Arabic. See Moch Nur Ichwan, 'Differing responses to an Ahmadi translation and exegesis: The Holy Qur'ān in Egypt and Indonesia', *Archipel* 62 (2001): pp. 143-61.

53 Kartosuwiryo, 'Bertoekar fikiran: Agama dan politiek II', *Fadjar Asia*, 4 April 1928.

erful speeches on the Islamic basis of nationalism and recitations of Qur'anic verses accompanied by *takbir*. Notably, Kartosuwiryo's contribution stands out for its lack of references to nationalism and Islam, focusing instead on problems of irrigation and land ownership. Beginning with a complaint about the contamination of waterways, which had caused the death by malaria of about 90 people in the Cianjur area, Kartosuwiryo then swiftly moved to criticize the granting of agricultural land to Indo-Europeans at advantageous premiums. Kartosuwiryo pointed to local and national implications of these policies: on the one hand villagers from Lampung, afraid of government authorities and the police, had fled their villages, burning houses and trees, and on the other hand he was concerned that once independence was achieved, this land still would not belong to the Indonesian people.[54] Kartosuwiryo's words suggest that he saw Indo-Europeans as more European than Indonesian. The issue of the relationship between ethnicity and citizenry would become an important aspect of the nationalist debate, as Indonesian Chinese and Arabs were gradually pushed out of the picture as 'foreigners'.

Gatot Mangkoepradja and Soekarno delivered their speeches in Malay rather than Sundanese, and the content – as well as the medium – shows how PNI gatherings would usually address an urban audience. They focused on the Russo-Japanese war, labour workers, and the necessity of overcoming differences in the name of cooperation. It is only in looking at the political milieu of these congresses that we can understand the balancing act attempted by Tjokroaminoto, who in his concluding speech mentioned the evils of imperialism and capitalism, comparing them to Gog and Magog, at the same time invoking the blessing of the One and Only God.

At the aftermath of this congress, Kartosuwiryo spent some time in West Java, and between August and October 1929, he often visited the Priangan region to represent the central executive committee.[55] Nonetheless, it is evident that he was still based

54 'Aanbieding van verslagen van Provinciale PSII congressen in Midden-Java van 2 tot 5 Augustus en in West-Java van 16 tot 1[9] Augustus' [1929], AMK GMr, no. 69, NA. This issue is also discussed in Kartosuwiryo, 'Perkara tanah: Bangsa mendjadi oekoeran hak', *Fadjar Asia*, 16 August 1929. Another aspect of Dutch policies mentioned in his speech is colonial expansion through religion, land and trade. The adviser for internal affairs, Gobee, commented on Kartosuwiryo's speech, saying that 'even though this case might be important, the speech was useless because of the unbelievably incorrect one-sided view of affairs'. See also *Politiek-politioneele overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indië* [hereafter PPO], August 1929, pp. 184-5.

55 *Fadjar Asia*, 13 August 1929. Kartosuwiryo is sent to Cianjur together with other party officers to solve unspecified 'party problems'; in *Fadjar Asia*, 5 October 1929 and 8 October 1929, Kartosuwiryo is representing the Ladjnah Tanfidziyah (executive committee) of PSII at a propaganda meeting in Nagrek (Cicalengka).

in Jakarta, where he was active in the youth group. In August he established the Taman Marsoedi Kasoesastran, an educational institution that held classes on subjects ranging from science and English to Dutch and Arabic, and which also had a bookshop.[56] During these months Kartosuwiryo regularly lectured members of the Sarekat Islam Angkatan Pemoeda (SIAP, SI Youth Group) in Jakarta, cultivating these youngsters' morals and strengthening their debating skills.[57] Every Thursday night, his house would host educational *tabligh* sessions, during which he focused on the fundamental principles of Islam, the sciences, and the youth movement in general.[58]

We can see the importance Kartosuwiryo placed on the youth branch through his own eyes: when introducing the new Solo-Surabaya PMI (Pemoeda Moeslimin Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Youth) branch, which was another local youth wing of Sarekat Islam not appreciably different from SIAP,[59] Kartosuwiryo explained that Islamic youth groups had great potential to combine strong religious dedication, a deep desire to act for the benefit of the people, the nation and religion, and a thirst for knowledge of Islam, general sciences and speech-giving. All this, he argued, would eventually create a group of 'perfect Muslims', whose minds would be filled with faith and knowledge and whose actions would be fully dedicated to the implementation of Islam.[60]

Malangbong

The complicated nature of local network politics during this time is evident in Kartosuwiryo's connection to Malangbong, a village situated on the busy winding road that connects Bandung to Ciamis and Banjar in the heartland of the Priangan region in the mountainous province of West Java.

The Jakarta branch of PSII, where Kartosuwiryo was actively involved, established a women's wing in late August 1929. The Sarekat Islam Bagian Isteri (SI Women's Group) was, in a way, led by 'party wives', as its chairwoman was Siti Roehati, wife of the PSII Jakarta vice-president, and its vice-secretary was Siti Kalsoem, iden-

56 *Fadjar Asia*, 15 August 1929, 16 September 1929 and 26 September 1929.

57 *Fadjar Asia*, 18 September 1929: *untuk mendidik budi pekerti*, the same expression later used to describe the Soeffah Institute.

58 *Fadjar Asia*, 22 October 1929.

59 Kartosuwiryo, 'Pergerakan pemoeda dan politiek', *Fadjar Asia*, 19 April 1929.

60 Kartosuwiryo, 'Halangan PMI Solo', *Fadjar Asia*, 28 June 1929.

tified as Kartosuwiryo's wife.[61] In a society in which socio-political networks dictated one's fortune and misfortune, such a marriage was quite likely to represent an alliance between Kartosuwiryo and PSII in West Java, as Siti Kalsoem was the daughter of Kiyai Ardiwisastra, chairman of the party's Malangbong branch.

A second important aspect related to this union is the social status brought along by Kiyai Ardiwisastra's position as a representative of an important aristocratic (*menak*) Sundanese family and a revered Islamic scholar. These two elements played an important role in transforming Kartosuwiryo into a bearer of traditional authority in the years that followed, as well as in the deepening of his own religious knowledge.

Reportedly, Kartosuwiryo used to spend long hours with local *kiyai*, among whom were party leaders Moestafa Kamil and Joesoef Taoeziri, mentioned above.[62] Moestafa Kamil (born 1884) was himself the son of a well known *kiyai* in Garut and had long studied in *pesantren* in West and East Java and also in Mecca. It was in Mecca that he first encountered Hadji Agoes Salim, and first heard of Sarekat Islam. Upon his return to Garut, Moestafa Kamil joined the ranks of the local branch and soon became a prominent political figure who was also often imprisoned by the colonial police.

Joesoef Taoeziri (died 1982), too, was renowned for his religious knowledge and was among the early members of the Sarekat Islam branch in Ciparay. Both *kiyai* were arrested with Tjokroaminoto in relation with the Cimareme *Afdeeling B* affair in 1919, during which the Dutch authorities suspected some Sarekat Islam members of having established a 'section B' of the party aimed at exterminating all Europeans and Chinese in Java.[63]

Taoeziri entered the Party Central Board in 1931 and left in 1938, one year before Moestafa Kamil became a member. Where these two politicians differed was in their approach to Islamic politics during the Japanese occupation. In the 1940s Moestafa Kamil was recruited as a lecturer for West Java's armed wing of the Islamic

61 *Fadjar Asia*, 29 August 1929. This seemed to happen quite often. See also the women's wing of PSI in Sungai Batang, Meninjau, Sumatra, in *Fadjar Asia*, 1 August 1929. *Pandji Poestaka* reported that the initiative of creating a women section of PSI had been spearheaded by Tjokroaminoto's wife, and that this group's leadership reflected that of the general Sarekat Islam party. 'Kroniek Hindia', *Pandji Poestaka* no. 72, 6 September 1929, p. 1144.

62 Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan*, pp. 24-5, and an interview conducted by the author in Malangbong, 6 February 2008.

63 On *Afdeeling B* see Else Ensering, 'Afdeeling B of Sarekat Islam. A rebellious islamic movement', in Dick Kooiman, Otto van den Muijzenberg, and Peter van der Veer (eds), *Conversion, competition, and conflict: Essays on the role of religion in Asia* (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1984); William A. Oates, 'The Afdeeling B: An Indonesian case study', *Journal of Southeast Asian History* (March 1968).

party, the Hizboellah (literally 'Party of God') troops, and after the capitulation, he joined Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam. Taoeziri, on the other hand, rejected military intervention and established his own school in Ciparay, *pesantren* Daroel Salam (Abode of Peace), dedicating his full attention to teaching.[64]

Islam, authority and leadership in the Priangan

In 1925, Adviser for Domestic Affairs (Inlandsche Zaken) R.A. Kern observed that the Dutch East India Company's takeover in West Java had increased the religious authority of the *bupati* (regents), as they were called *imam* or *khalifa* and considered substitutes of the kings of Mataram, the sixteenth-century Islamic empire of Central Java.[65] More recently it has been suggested that in rural West Java the local aristocracy – the *menak* – had been transformed into a political elite by the Mataram Empire and kept as such by the Dutch East India Company and the colonial government. Herlina Lubis has argued that this phenomenon eventually resulted in the merging of the roles of *bupati* and *ulama* (religious scholar), as the *menak* succeeded in maintaining both the political power bestowed upon them by the Dutch and the people's recognition as bearers of traditional authority.[66]

Ardiwisastra was not only a member of the *menak* aristocracy and a *kiyai pesantren*, but also the local PSII chairman, and the vice-*bupati*. By marrying his daughter, Kartosuwiryo strengthened his political standing in Sarekat Islam and gained a position within traditional patterns of authority. In the 1970s, Karl Jackson argued that Darul Islam followers joined in the rebellion because of networks of authority. However, he referred to individual village *kiyai*, while downplaying Kartosuwiryo's role as the movement's leader.[67] What

64 Biographic data for Moestafa Kamil are from Ismail, 'Perjuangan K.H. Mustofa Kamil pada masa penjajahan dan kemerdekaan di Garut antara tahun 1914-1945' (thesis, IAIN Sunan Gunung Jati, 1998). For Joesoef Taoeziri, see Dudung, 'Peristiwa Cipari' (thesis, Universitas Padjadjaran, 1987) and Wahyudi, 'Aktivitas K.H. Yusuf Tauzirie dalam mengembangkan syiar Islam di desa Cipari kecamatan Wanaraja kabupaten Garut (1926-1981)' (thesis, UIN Sunan Gunung Jati, 2006). On Moestafa Kamil as *dewan partij* member, see *Berita Priangan*, 17 July 1939.

65 Letter from R.A. Kern, 9 June 1925, p. 12, in Mohammad Iskandar, *Para pengemban amanah: Pergulatan pemikiran kiai dan ulama di Jawa Barat, 1900-1950* (Yogyakarta: MataBangsa, 2001), p. 66.

66 Nina Herlina Lubis, 'Religious thoughts and practices of the *kaum menak*: Strengthening traditional power', *Studia Islamika* 10-2 (2003): pp. 5-7.

67 Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional authority and national integration: A study of Indonesian political behaviour* (Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1980 [1971]). His argument is further analysed in the concluding chapter to this book.

I am suggesting, instead, is that traditional networks of authority worked to the advantage of Kartosuwiryo's career, allowing him to start creating a following well before the rebellion began.

Herlina Lubis develops her argument from the observation that Priangan society displayed several examples in which the link between local aristocracy and Islam is embodied in members of the *menak* group who were also *ulama*, as in the cases of Hadji Hasan Moestafa of Garut (1852-1930) and Raden Hadji Moehammad Moesa (1822-1886). While recognizing the exceptionalism of these figures, Lubis nonetheless concludes that 'all *kaum menak* were required to make Islam a factor in their political thoughts and practices'. The *kaum menak* obtained religious legitimation by closely aligning their social and political life with Islamic values and institutions. For example, they often attended and sponsored the building of *pesantren*, thereby creating strong bonds with local *ulama*. A body of legends claiming that *kaum menak* families descended from the Sultan of Pajang – an extension of the Demak Sultanate in sixteenth-century Java – or from Prabu Siliwangi of Pajajaran – the pre-Islamic Sundanese Empire – also served to further strengthen their connections with traditional religious and political authority.

More relevant to Kartosuwiryo's case, the political authority embodied by this elite was founded on local concepts of power, described as *pulung* in Javanese or *wahyu* in Arabic, a term that also indicates a 'divine revelation'. These local ideologies tended to identify authority as something bestowed either from a previous king or a *bupati*, or directly through God's blessing. When considered alongside the fact that a *bupati* who could display religious knowledge and understanding was held in higher regard than one who could not, it can be concluded that the adoption of Islamic values in *kaum menak*'s traditions was pursued in favour of their own political interests.[68]

Villagers often perceived these *bupati* as 'holy people', from whom blessings could be obtained because of their alleged supernatural abilities and connections with the world of magic. Nonetheless, among these *ulama-bupati* aristocrats there was still a strong tendency towards orthodoxy and towards the implementation of sharia law. Material testimony of Priangan *menak*'s syncretism can be found in the maintenance of their heirlooms, which usually consisted of *keris* (daggers with undulated blades deemed to possess spiritual essence), spears, swords, books, puppets, and the like. These were deemed to possess magical powers, but at the same time were considered religious symbols, as they often featured Qur'anic inscriptions, and were

68 Lubis, 'Religious thoughts': pp. 10-8.

used in Islamic ceremonies, such as the Prophet's birthday (*Maulid Nabi*).[69] This characterization of Sundanese *menak* as bridge between the supernatural world of magic and Islamic orthodoxy fits well with later tales of Kartosuwiryo's charismatic leadership.

In his first biography, published in 1963, just one year after his capture and execution, Kartosuwiryo was presented as having a complex character. He was described as a mystic, believed by his followers to practice the *ilmu Joyoboyo* ('science of prophecy', see footnote) and to be the *Imam Mahdi* (Islamic messianic figure) or *Ratu Adil* (Just King).[70] In this biography, much attention is dedicated to the accounts of Kartosuwiryo's followers, some of whom maintained that God had chosen him as their leader through divine revelation. Others claimed that he had received the *wahyu Cakraningrat Sadar*, which among all the *wahyu* is the only one bestowed upon kings, and that he had been invested with the title of *Kalifatullah seluruh ummat manusia*, or representative of God to the entire Islamic community. It was said that he owned amulets (*jimat*) that protected him even from bullets, as well as a *keris* and a *cundrik* (a small *keris* with a straight blade). Put simply, his followers deemed him to have *sakti* (divine power) .[71]

This representation of Kartosuwiryo as both a fanatical Muslim and a mystic quickly became predominant in the literature, especially as writers made increasing use of tales recounted by Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI-TII) members. Pinardi, the author of Kartosuwiryo's other major biography, reports the comment of one TII militiaman, who recalled Kartosuwiryo as

> a very fanatical religious man with strong mystical beliefs. To several of his followers he once admitted to be the reincarnation of Raden Patah, one of the most famous men of religion and the first sultan of Demak, the first Sultanate of Java. He told his devotees that for long he had desired to establish the NII [Negara Islam Indonesia] and that only he could become the leader, or *imam*, because he had been predestined for that by God […] Kartosuwiryo once said he had received the *wahyu Cakraningrat Sadar* from God, this was like a beam of bright light from the sky down onto him.[72]

69 Lubis, 'Religious thoughts': pp. 18-20, 26.

70 *Joyoboyo* (or *Jayabaya*) is, generally speaking, a mystical foretelling (*ramalan*). Nancy Florida describes *Joyoboyo* texts as follows: 'texts of this genre turn on historical periodization, political symbology, and, especially, prophecy.' Florida, *Writing the past, inscribing the future: History as prophecy in colonial Java* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 273.

71 Amak Sjariffudin, *Kisah Kartosuwirjo dan menjerahnja*, 3rd ed. (Surabaya: Grip, 1963), pp. 7, 20-1. This text contains several biographical mistakes; nonetheless, it is still worth discussing its approach to the character of Kartosuwiryo.

72 Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan*, p. 41.

The story goes that whilst Kartosuwiryo was in the jungle, a ray of light appeared in front of him and an 'essence' (*zat*) drew the *kalimat shahadat* (Islamic profession of faith) on his forehead. Pinardi concluded that this aura of mystery, mysticism and fanaticism was Kartosuwiryo's key 'leadership skill', or *seni kepemimpinan*.[73]

In the mid 1970s, the idea of mysticism as an aspect of Kartosuwiryo's leadership was reaffirmed in the pages of his psychological evaluation:[74]

> Kartosuwiryo's intelligence is great, […] Intuition has empowered him as a leader, […] and has also induced his interest in mysticism and metaphysics. At the same time, his rationality was so developed that his objective critical capacity was dominant, and it has become representative of his thinking and actions. His mystical activities were neither essential nor fundamental to him, and he approached them in a critical way. So the mystical path that he might have experienced was maybe something meaningful on a personal level. His mystical activities – the little available news on these – were used as a tool to strengthen the implementation of his ideas. Thus, he used mysticism as a tool neither essential nor crucial to him, but rather as an element of authority in the face of the masses he led.[75]

Hiroko Horikoshi, in her study of Darul Islam's following, takes a similar approach. In explaining the initial success of the Darul Islam, she places the appeal of Kartosuwiryo's charisma on the same level as the failure of national Islamic parties, and the parallel military and historical circumstances. Horikoshi ultimately concludes that Kartosuwiryo succeeded in gathering support as a result of the combination of military-political circumstances, Islamic politics, and personal characteristics:

> He evidently possessed the invaluable quality, typical among Java's *jago* (champions) of being *gagah* (translated in a colloquial sense as 'having guts') [...] Men who are *gagah* fear nothing but God and are strongly convinced of their cause (*yakin).* They tell the truth

73 Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan*, p. 45.

74 This investigation examined intelligence, emotional behaviour, motivation, personal development since 1950 and prognoses for the future. It is interesting to note that the doctors explicitly stated that Kartosuwiryo's motivation for pursuing the rebellion was rooted in childhood developments and therefore impossible to assess at that point in time.

75 Dinas Sedjarah TNI, *Penumpasan pemberontakan D.I./T.I.I., S.M. Kartosuwiryo di Jawa Barat* (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, 1982 [1974]), p. 35, quote p. 33.

> even to the authorities without any fear of the consequences. Such a charismatic man inspires awe (*segan*) in his followers. […] Where *gagah* behavior is associated with a high cause, it commands great respect and obedience. In rural Java high causes have traditionally been based on the values of communal peace, prosperity, and social justice, and expressed either in indigenous (*Ratu Adil*) or Islamic (*Imam Mahdi*) idioms.[76]

Mysticism and 'uncompromising advocacy of Islamic ideals' are the markers of Kartosuwiryo's success, an ideal combination for being recognized as a leader in Java.[77] It is surprising that subsequent scholars have not taken this suggestion more seriously, focusing instead on either belittling Kartosuwiryo's commitment to the establishment of an Islamic state or sanctifying his endeavours while erasing his charisma and mysticism. I further address this point in the concluding chapter of this book. To Horikoshi's analysis, I would add that Kartosuwiryo's becoming part of a *menak bupati-ulama* family in the early stages of his career in West Java further enhanced his appeal as a successful leader in the Priangan.

DEVELOPING AN ISLAMIC NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY

Within the first four months of beginning to contribute to *Fadjar Asia*, Kartosuwiryo had already addressed the major topics that would constitute his ideology: criticism of colonial policies, socio-economic injustice, abuse of power by police, governmental interference in religious matters, religious and political neutrality, the internal nationalist debate, Islam's modernity and the international dimensions of the nationalist struggle.

Kartosuwiryo's articles appeared in *Fadjar Asia* between April 1928 and May 1930 and show a coherent, if somewhat fragmented, picture of how he viewed the state of the indigenous population and its relation both to the colonial administration and to the international anti-colonial and anti-capitalist movements. In April 1929 Kartosuwiryo lamented that

> in politics, economics, but also society, the world still searches and gropes in the dark. The strong ones inevitably rule, and the weak

76 Hiroko Horikoshi, 'The Dar-ul-Islam movement in West Java (1942-62): An experience in the historical process', *Indonesia* 20 (1975): p. 73.

77 Hiroko Horikoshi, 'The Dar-ul-Islam movement', p. 73.

> are governed, the rich accumulate material things and the poor fail to do so, and every day the burden to be carried increases. Hundreds of thousands of traders and businessmen fail in their trades. Hundreds of thousands are the old farmers who don't own any land anymore because it has been bought off by someone else, and they are now transformed into labourers, [dragged] deep into slavery and humiliation.[78]

Kartosuwiryo applied his understanding of socio-economic oppression, which emerged from his direct experience in Java, to similar situations across the world and history. The examples he produced were from Russia, China, and France, but his heart and mind were in Sukabumi, where taxes and the cost of living had increased to the point that local farmers were forced to sell their land to pay current expenses, and then to rent back smaller pieces of their own *sawah* paddy field to sustain their families.

The absence of, and quest for, justice is at the centre of more than twenty articles, in which socio-economic injustice takes several different forms in various aspects of the indigenous population's life. In addition to focusing on the constant economic harassment by the colonial administration at the local and national levels, Kartosuwiryo dedicates considerable attention to police intrusions at political activities and religious gatherings. Sarekat Islam party members were jailed, party cadres questioned and prayer sessions broken up with little apparent reason other than creating difficulties for the *gerakan*, in the rural areas as much as in Batavia.

Such occurrences were lessons Kartosuwiryo would use to enlighten his readership on the party's political strategy and on the reasons Islamic nationalism offered a more solid foundation upon which to build an anti-colonial movement than did secular nationalism, which professed neutrality towards religion.

The very first article Kartosuwiryo wrote for *Fadjar Asia* was titled 'Religion and politics', and it imagines a fictional debate between a 'modern' Muslim, and a pious 'conservative' Muslim.[79] The figures are opposed to explain how being pious does not mean being 'traditional', but rather means looking at the socio-political prob-

78 Kartosuwiryo, 'Keber'atan ra'iat', *Fadjar Asia*, 27 April 1929.

79 This debate between *kaum muda* and *kaum kolot* (or *kaum tua*) was also often featured in *Taman Pewarta*; however, here the modernized man works within the framework of the colonial policy, whilst the 'traditional' man is the one that fears the loss of his Javaneseness because of the Dutch-ification of customs, rather than his religious values. See Paul Tickell, 'Taman Pewarta: Malay medium-Indonesian message', in *The Indonesian press: Its past, its people, its problems*, Paul Tickell (ed.), Annual Indonesian Lecture Series (Melbourne: Monash University, 1987).

lems of the Indies' through the lens of religion. The pious man addresses the modern man, saying,

> Maybe, then, you don't know that religion embodies rules, rules for this world and the hereafter. Hence, religion is political. Aren't you aware that in the history of Islam there are Islamic empires, Islamic wars, and so forth? Colonial politics itself is founded on religion, especially the Christian religion; there is a policy named *Kersteningspolitiek*, aimed at Christianizing the Indonesian population. Hence, religion is an important factor in colonial politics.

Upon hearing this statement, the modern Muslim, who works for the Dutch administration, is easily convinced and sets aside the common, secular understanding of religion as a private matter. He replies: 'If that is so, Islam is also political.'[80]

Throughout Kartosuwiryo's writings, the focus is on the need to obtain freedom, independence, *merdeka*. Achieving independence, however, is not important for its own sake, but rather for the sake of creating an environment favourable to the implementation of Islamic laws and the establishment of a government based on Islam.[81] In this understanding, the way out of oppression and poverty is religion:

> Hold on to the ties connecting the Islamic *ummah*! Hold on to Islam truly! Follow the orders of Allah, and stay away from that which He forbids. Clearly this is the noble way to obtain freedom for the people and the motherland in a more encompassing and true sense, liberated from all forms of slavery, humiliation and subjugation, which are still now affecting us Indonesians in general and Muslims in particular.[82]

But these are not just empty words of propaganda, aimed at rallying the support of disenchanted peasants; this is a political platform, in which 'Islam' and 'the orders of Allah' are to be translated into a free, independent, sovereign Islamic state:

> We must prioritize and put our deepest efforts into establishing and building such [Islamic] government, so that we can succeed in becoming one *ummah*, holding its laws, implementing such laws

80 Kartosuwiryo, 'Bertoekar fikiran: Agama dan politiek', *Fadjar Asia*, 3 April 1928.
81 Kartosuwiryo, 'Faham koeno dan faham moeda', *Fadjar Asia*, 12 September 1928.
82 Kartosuwiryo, 'Keber'atan ra'iat', *Fadjar Asia*, 27 April 1929.

> independently, and having sovereignity over our own land. In short: [we have to do this] so that we can follow Islamic sharia law in its most perfect and complete way, in all matters.[83]

Such a bold statement, made in May 1930, must be seen in relation to the repeated intrusions of the colonial government in the activities of the Sarekat Islam Party and in its religious gatherings in Malangbong. His claim should be read in light of the debate on the government's supposed 'neutrality' towards religion, a stand that, according to Kartosuwiryo, had been broken when the government requested that each mosque obtain official permission to hold congregational prayers on Fridays.[84]

This concept of being 'neutral' towards religion was first formulated by Snouck Hurgronje, who, according to Kartosuwiryo, had suggested that

> the government must be careful on matters relating to Islam. On Islamic understanding, the government must be *neutraal*. Never make a comment on the Caliphate question, especially on pan-Islamism […], educate Indonesian children, and give them classes on all subjects but religion […], seek friendship between Holland and Indonesia on matters of politics and nationalism, but do not envisage friendship in religion.

This effort towards establishing 'neutral education' is defined by Kartosuwiryo as 'associationist' and an attempt to westernize not just education but, ultimately, the Indies' population by stripping it of its nationalist sentiment.[85]

Himself the product of Dutch schooling, Kartosuwiryo felt that the imposition of higher education in the language of the colonial administration was part of the Dutch policy to 'divide and rule', ultimately aimed at fragmenting the unity of the Indonesian people. It is along these lines that Kartosuwiryo argued in favour of the use of Malay for intellectuals and nationalist leaders.[86]

Neutrality soon became the core issue of the debate within the nationalist movement. However, the exact meaning of 'neutrality' was far from clear. Secular nationalists took it to mean a rejection of religion as a political ideology in favour of 'nationalism'. For

83 Kartosuwiryo, 'Lagi tentang oelil amri', *Fadjar Asia*, 24 May 1930.
84 Kartosuwiryo, 'Boepati dan agama Islam', *Fadjar Asia*, 21 April 1930.
85 Kartosuwiryo, 'Politiek djadjahan dan igama IV', *Fadjar Asia*, 14 June 1928.
86 Kartosuwiryo, 'Bangsa dan bahasa', *Fadjar Asia*, 8 May 1928, and Kartosuwiryo, 'Politiek djadjahan dan igama V', *Fadjar Asia*, 16 June 1928.

many religious organizations, including Muhammadiyah, 'neutrality' entailed safeguarding their own survival by stepping out of the political arena entirely, and concerning themselves only with social activities without opposing those organizations that involved themselves with it. For Kartosuwiryo, neither attitude made sense, nor could either lead to success.

In another fictional conversation, Kartosuwiryo presents the 'modern' man as employed in the colonial bureaucracy and convinced that only by being 'neutral' can he keep his position. For him, neutrality means 'not mixing with Indonesian political organizations', especially Sarekat Islam.[87] It was this very audience, the Indonesians employed in the colonial administration and fearful of political-religious involvement, that Kartosuwiryo targeted when explaining that it is impossible to be neutral. To those who argued that the principle behind their organizations is 'only Indonesian nationalism' – as did Jong Java and Pemoeda Indonesia – Kartosuwiryo answered that the 'neutral effort' was an 'empty effort': 'Our measures are the Qur'an and the *hadith* [prophetic traditions]. Instead they have… science, intelligence, and whatever else. But most people would admit that science changes and expands, depending on theories; in a word, science is not constant'.[88]

To Kartosuwiryo, those who based their nationalism solely on their love of the motherland without recognizing any higher unchanging principle were doomed to become political 'chameleons'.[89] Similarly, when commenting on the nationalist anthem, *Indonesia Raya*, which refers to the motherland as *Ibu* and *Dewi*, Kartosuwiryo deplored this form of nationalism as 'chauvinistic' and easy to 'turn into capitalism and imperialism'.[90]

Where Kartosuwiryo interpreted the Dutch 'divide and rule' approach as an attempt to fragment indigenous society and one that might have been countered, for example, by using the Malay language, Soekarno instead saw it as the ideological fragmentation of the anti-colonial front from within, which could only be overcome through internal collaboration. Following on his early attempt to merge the nationalist, religious and socialist movements into one, which he expressed in his 1926 *Islamisme, nasionalisme, dan Marxisme* pamphlet, in 1927 Soekarno succeeded in establishing the Permoefakatan Perhimpoenan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (PPPKI, Agreement of Indonesian People's Political Associations).

87 Kartosuwiryo, 'Pertjakapan di dalam kereta api', *Fadjar Asia*, 15 May 1928.
88 Kartosuwiryo, 'Sambil laloe: Soeara baroe! Model lama', *Fadjar Asia*, 4 May 1929.
89 Kartosuwiryo, 'Faham koeno dan faham moeda', *Fadjar Asia*, 12 September 1928.
90 Kartosuwiryo, 'Indonesia Raja dan… kerbau', *Fadjar Asia*, 6 August 1929.

This federation was the outcome of the collaborative efforts of Soekarno, Tjokroaminoto and Salim, and was an attempt at unifying the nationalist front.

For the first two years Sarekat Islam argued that PPPKI was just a federation of parties and not a union (*persatuan*), and therefore allowed participating organizations to maintain their autonomy. In March 1929, however, Sarekat Islam took a stronger position against PPPKI and its attitude of cooperation with the colonial authorities (a point further discussed in the next chapter), and it gradually distanced itself from the federation. As several branches of PSII had not obtained permission from the party's executive committee to participate in the August 1929 PPPKI congress, a rumour began circulating in secular circles that Kartosuwiryo had influenced the decision to exclude these groups in support of his anti-cooperationist approach. *Fadjar Asia* responded to this accusation by explaining that the decision had been made on financial grounds. To this official response, Kartosuwiryo added his personal perspective on the issue of 'unity', stating that a true and genuine union can only be based on Islam, as any other form of *persatuan* would only be based on fear of the enemy.[91]

Kartosuwiryo took the idea that genuine unity could only be obtained within the frame of Islamic groups and extended it to the international dimensions of the anti-colonial struggle. As Tjokroaminoto had already pointed out in his *Islam dan sosialisme*, socialism and Islamism both relied on international networks for the achievement of their socio-political goals. However, where Tjokroaminoto and Soekarno had used this commonality to bridge differences, Kartosuwiryo used it to prove Islam's superiority over secular ideologies.

Even though it might appear to conflict with the nationalist objectives of the Sarekat Islam party, what follows shows that the shifts between Islamic nationalism and pan-Islamic transnationalism cannot be understood apart from their historical contingencies, an approach that I also apply to understanding this same phenomenon in the 1930s-1950s period.[92]

91 On PSI and PPPKI see Kartosuwiryo, 'Sambil laloe: Lagi tentang persatoean', *Fadjar Asia*, 12 March 1929; 'Sambil laloe: Lagi tentang persatoean II', *Fadjar Asia*, 15 March 1929; 'Kongres P3KI kedoea', *Fadjar Asia*, 10 August 1929; 'Liga, Perhimpoenan Indonesia dan kita', *Fadjar Asia*, 31 August 1929; 'Boekan merintangi, melainkan tidak toeroet', *Fadjar Asia*, 4 September 1929; 'Sambil laloe: Pikiran sehat', *Fadjar Asia,* 7 September 1929; 'Soe'al persatoean', *Fadjar Asia,* 10 September 1929; 'Warta bagi pers', *Fadjar Asia*, 13 September 1929. See also PPO, August 1929, p. 177.

92 An earlier draft of this section has been published in Formichi, 'Pan-Islam and religious nationalism'.

Kartosuwiryo first raised the issue of Islamic transnationalism in July 1928. Arguing for the primacy of Islam, Kartosuwiryo pointed to the socio-political dimensions of the *hajj* pilgrimage as a physical manifestation of Islamic brotherhood, crossing boundaries of ethnicity, language and nationality.[93]

The term pan-Islamism appears for the first time in late September 1928. When commenting on the colonial authorities' mismanagement of justice, Kartosuwiryo calls for Indonesian Muslims to 'wake up' and join the one organization, PSII, that defends the people and is ready to sacrifice itself to ensure its top priority, pan-Islamism: 'Our movement dedicates each and every bone of its body to *pan-Islamisme*.'[94] At this point in time Kartosuwiryo saw pan-Islamism not as a goal *per se*, but rather as a political tool, an orientation that became clearer in subsequent articles.

I am not suggesting that Sarekat Islam was instrumentalizing pan-Islamism as an element of its political propaganda, but rather that the idea of a global community united by the same religious beliefs and striving for the same freedom from foreign domination was considered a powerful rallying point for political action. It would only be in the 1950s that Kartosuwiryo developed a vision of pan-Islamism as the final goal of his struggle. This he would represent as the creation of a transnational political entity, namely, a state based on Islamic laws that unified the *ummah* worldwide. Despite the existence of several secular political parties that claimed to be inter-Asiatic, Kartosuwiryo believed that only Islam called for pure and genuine cooperation across borders, untainted by political opportunism.

Showing how difficult it was to balance nationalism and pan-Islamism intellectually, Kartosuwiryo added that an additional function of Islamic internationalism – which he also referred to as inter-Islamism – was the creation of a network of Islamic countries that desired to cooperate with one another on the road to nationalism.[95] This apparent contradiction, which recalls the ideological shift in the Indian Khilafat movement, soon attracted the attention of the Chinese-Malay newspaper *Keng Po*. In November 1928 its lead article argued that, 'In Islam there is neither nationalism nor internationalism'. But this polemic, instead of harming the Islamic faction, became an ideal platform for *Fadjar Asia* to further enlighten its readership about the political duties of Muslims.

93 Kartosuwiryo, 'Perdjalanan ketanah soetji', *Fadjar Asia*, 20 July 1928.
94 Kartosuwiryo, 'Aniajaan dan siksaan', *Fadjar Asia*, 26 September 1928.
95 Kartosuwiryo, 'Pertjaja kepada diri sendiri dan …', *Fadjar Asia*, 31 October 1928.

Kartosuwiryo's argument was twofold. On the one hand he demonstrated Islam's commitment to nationalism by invoking the Prophet's alleged saying, 'Love for the homeland is a part of faith'. On the other hand, he identified the struggle to become one unified Muslim nation as the political implication of the religious concept of *ummah*, and pointed to the duty to perform pilgrimage as the 'broadest, purest, and holiest' manifestation of this struggle. Kartosuwiryo thus concluded that secular nationalists did not fully understand the complexity of Islamic nationalism, which was aimed not at the freedom and promotion of one people, one race or one kingdom, but was instead pursued for the prosperity of 'the One God, One belief, One Prophet, One flag' of Islam.[96]

Kartosuwiryo's articles published in 1929 focused on domestic politics, but as the debate among indigenous parties intensified, Kartosuwiryo offered his reflections on the different characteristics of nationalist ideologies in the Indies. In 'Islam dan nasionalisme', Kartosuwiryo succeeded in balancing his warnings that national pride might result in international confrontations together with his effort to preserve the notion that one should love the motherland. To avoid this potentially 'deviationist attitude', Kartosuwiryo argued that patriotism should follow the model of monotheism, and thus should be directed towards what he called '*Mono-Hoemanisme*', a term here used to described 'the unity of the human race to become one *ummah*' (*persatoean manoesia mendjadi satoe Oemmat*).

Islam is 'not just a way to establish relations between humans and God', but it can guide relations between humans and organizations. As such, it can help shape a wider concept of nationality (*kebangsaan)* that is not limited to its 'usual understanding'.[97] A couple of months later Kartosuwiryo explained these differences, contributing to the vigorous public debate over how nationhood should be perceived under colonial rule. For Boedi Oetomo, nationalism is 'Javanese nationalism'; for Soekarno's PNI, it is 'pan-Asianism'. But for Kartosuwiryo and the PSII, *kebangsaan* was not to be linked to worldly desires nor was it limited by any territorial boundary. It was wide and broad, and connected only to religious affiliation and to the unity of Islam: Islamic nationalism was solely committed to the prosperity of God.[98]

96 Kartosuwiryo, 'Islamisme, nasionalisme dan internasionalisme I', *Fadjar Asia,* 3 November 1928, and 'Islamisme, nasionalisme dan internasionalisme II', *Fadjar Asia,* 7 November 1928. Quote from *Keng Po* and Qur'anic verse (in Indonesian) included in: Kartosuwiryo, 'Islamisme, nasionalisme dan internasionalisme I'.

97 Kartosuwiryo, 'Islam dan nasionalisme', *Fadjar Asia,* 24 May 1929.

98 Kartosuwiryo, 'Berekor pandjang (pers dan politiek)', *Fadjar Asia,* 2 July 1929.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Born in a low-*priyayi* family and educated in the Dutch system, Kartosuwiryo was to become a prominent political proponent of anti-colonialism and anti-Western ideologies. He soon gained the attention of authorities for his work as a journalist and the attention of Tjokroaminoto for his political engagement. And while the former accused him of fanaticism, the latter reared him as a godson.

Gradually shifting his attention from socio-economic concerns towards Islamic modernism, from condemning the colonial state for ignoring the importance of religion in Indonesians' lives to accusing secular nationalists of doing the same in politics, Kartosuwiryo's own development mirrored the changes in the Sarekat Islam party. Initially incorporating socialists and Islamists and embodying this double soul in its leader, Tjokroaminoto, Sarekat Islam had clearly defined itself as an Islamic political party in opposition to Soekarno's secularism and Semaoen's socialism by the end of the 1920s. Exposed to international dynamics originating both in Europe and the Middle East, regional and ethnic cultural organizations were transformed into political parties that were increasingly defined by their founding ideologies.

Kartosuwiryo's dedication to gathering popular support in the countryside, fostering the urban youth as 'perfect Muslims', and creating new family connections in order to be recognizable as a bearer of local and traditional authority were all key elements in his leadership in subsequent decades. As the Dutch curbed political activities, the anti-colonial front became increasingly fragmented, with each party further radicalizing its position.