Chapter 8 On Extending Sympathy: Herder, Mencius and Adam Smith
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Herder’s “reflective sentimentalism” (to employ Michael Frazer’s expression) does not simply prioritize emotion over reason, but agrees with Adam Smith’s account of the development of principles of justice from the capacity for sympathetic identification with others and for seeing oneself from their point of view. The principles that evolve from this process may in some respects be similar to Kantian ones, but the sentimentalist account of their etiology carries the implication that empathetic imagination must be actively cultivated and extended in order for these principles to be genuinely grasped and applied in a contextually sensitive manner. In this simultaneous emphasis on the primacy of sympathy, but also the need for its reflective cultivation, Herder’s moral theory is strikingly like that of the Confucian philosopher Mengzi (Mencius). Shared elements include their views of human nature as intrinsically good; their employment of agricultural rather than manufacturing metaphors; and, crucially, their understanding of the complex interrelation between reasoning and sympathy in moral understanding. A comparative examination of their accounts challenges the opposition between sentimentalism and reason within contemporary debates on morality, while presenting a richer and more accurate picture of the role of sympathy in effective moral practice.