1 Introduction
In 1931, Carnap and Neurath published a series of papers which included remarks sharply criticizing central positions of the Tractatus. In the Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap restated more explicitly his divergence from the Tractarian conception of philosophy and of logical syntax. Carnap’s rejection of the conception of logic in the Tractatus is generally considered an essential step towards his tolerant view about language and logic, such as it is expressed in his “Principle of Tolerance”. Indeed, the criticism of the Tractatus was essential for the view that a logical syntax is a matter of conventional choice. But Carnap’s and Neurath’s criticism of the Tractatus have to be placed into a broader context of the discussions of the Tractatus in the Vienna Circle since 1927. We will retrace the early reception of the Tractatus in the Vienna Circle, before looking at the criticism Neurath and Carnap addressed to central positions of the Tractatus in the early 1930s, at the moment when both developed their physicalist position.
In a first step, I will present a general overview of the early reception of the Tractatus in the Vienna Circle and of the main stages of the reading of that book within the Circle (section 2). In the two following sections (section 3 and 4) I will discuss Neurath’s and Carnap’s criticism of the Tractatus and place it within the context of this earlier reception.
2
The beginning of the reception of the Tractatus1 is generally dated with a talk the mathematician Kurt Reidemeister gave in the Vienna Circle in autumn 1924, a talk mentioned by Schlick in his first letter to Wittgenstein.2 But the interest in the Tractatus was already aroused earlier, despite the fact that the intense study of Wittgenstein’s book within the Circle began only around 1924/25. After the Erlangen conference that Carnap and Reichenbach had organized in 1923 on Russell’s logic and its application to epistemology, Carnap traveled for several weeks to the United States. In New York, he met several American mathematicians who told him about a new “mathematical philosophy” which, so they thought, was developing in England and the United States.3 In that context, the American mathematicians mentioned, among others, the Tractatus which had just appeared in its English translation the year before. As Carnap, together with Reichenbach and Schlick, was planning to edit a new journal on “exact philosophy”, he was looking for potential authors for that publication. In this matter, he wrote Reichenbach about the philosophers connected to the new “mathematical philosophy”, mentioning also Wittgenstein.4 Reichenbach forwarded the letter to Schlick, and the latter replied: “Wittgenstein, whose book is edited by Russell, lives here close to Vienna.”5
Slightly later, Schlick wrote to Russell about the planned journal and mentioning that he wanted to ask Wittgenstein to write a paper for the journal (which apparently he never did ask). It seems that this first interest in Wittgenstein also triggered Carnap’s first reading of the book. Indeed, Carnap read some parts of the Tractatus in Germany (Buchenbach), before his move to Vienna in 1926, but said later that he did not “very well understand” the book.6 In his Intellectual Autobiography, Carnap said about this first reading of Wittgenstein’s treatise: “I found in it many stimulating and interesting points. But at that time I did not make the great effort required to come to a clear understanding of the often obscure formulations; for this reason I had not read the whole treatise.”7
In the summer of 1924, Ramsey also met Schlick, a fact Schlick mentioned later in his first letter to Wittgenstein. At that time, Hahn was also preparing a seminar on Russell’s Principia Mathematica for the winter term of 1924/25 (Ramsey could not attend as he left Vienna slightly before the beginning of that seminar). It must have been in this context that Hahn or Schlick asked their colleague Reidemeister to give a talk about the Tractatus in Vienna, at a time the Circle was just at its very beginning. Neurath noted later in his history of the Vienna Circle: “On the initiative of Hans Hahn, we began to read and to discuss carefully Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.”11
The discussion of the Tractatus within the Vienna Circle can be divided into several phases: (1) the close reading of the Tractatus in the Circle (1925–27);
I went […] through the school of the logic of Russell and Wittgenstein and since then, I apply to philosophical thinking the highest standards, so that I can only reluctantly force myself to read most of the philosophical production. I consider the Tractatus logico-philosophicus of Wittgenstein to be the most ingenious and most important achievement of contemporary philosophy. Unfortunately it is written in such a baroque style, that we needed in my philosophical circle (attended mostly by mathematical colleagues) three terms of joint reading before we began to understand […], I have the firm belief that, through the stimulus of the new logic, philosophy reached a crossroad and that we approach Leibniz’ ideal of philosophy. We will have to draw a much sharper dividing-line than previously towards empty talk and questioning. We can quite unshakably rely upon the principle that all questions which have been correctly formulated can be answered in principle, either through logical analysis or through empirical assessment, and that “unsolvable problems” are only wrongly formulated questions.15
First divergences about the Tractatus appeared openly at the time of the meetings of the “Tafelrunde” (1927–28). These meetings began with the first encounter of Schlick with Wittgenstein (in February 1927), followed by frequent meetings with Carnap, Feigl and Waismann.17 There are several reasons for these divergences. Wittgenstein, Ramsey and the members of the Vienna Circle tried to develop solutions to problems the Tractatus had left open and these solutions did not always reach consensus. Furthermore, at the time the members of the Circle began their direct discussions with Wittgenstein, the latter had already doubts about some of the positions defended in the Tractatus. This was due essentially to his discussions with Ramsey in 1923–24 and to the critical comments Ramsey had made about the Tractatus.18
A central conflict in the phase of the “Tafelrunde” meetings was the relation of logic to mathematics. Hahn and Carnap had followed Russell’s logicist reduction of mathematics to logic. Some remarks of the Tractatus seemed to suggest support for logicism (for example proposition 6.2: “Mathematics is a logical method”). Ramsey’s paper “The Foundations of Mathematics” (1925) tried to use Wittgenstein’s conception of tautologies in order to extend it to mathematics. For Ramsey, mathematics was reducible to tautologies. Following Ramsey, the thesis of the “tautological character of mathematics” was adopted by the logicists in the Circle, so by Carnap and Hahn. It was proclaimed slightly later as a central thesis of the Vienna Circle in the Manifesto.19
In the third phase of the reception of the Tractatus (1929–31), the rejection of central theses of Wittgenstein’s book became more and more visible. Two critical strands developed now against the Tractatus: one coming from Wittgenstein and Waismann, the other from the physicalists.
On the one hand, Waismann stayed in close contact with Wittgenstein, who was now mostly in Cambridge. In their private conversations central positions of the Tractatus were revised or abandoned, as reported in Waismann’s notes.21 Waismann presented these revisions on several occasions in the Vienna Circle namely most prominently in a series of talks he gave in the Circle on the philosophy of Wittgenstein (1930)22 and slightly later through his so-called Theses. The Theses were a written comment on the Tractatus. They were extensively discussed in the Circle in 1931.23 Carnap was strongly involved in these discussions of the revisions, both in the Circle and through his frequent private meetings with Waismann.24
On the other hand, Carnap and Neurath developed in 1930 their physicalist position and in 1931, Carnap began to work on his Logical Syntax of Language. It is to be noted that the Manifesto, published in 1929, included multiple references to Wittgenstein all of which were positive and no criticism of Wittgenstein’s position was mentioned. But slightly later, in 1931, in Neurath’s and Carnap’s first papers on physicalism, central claims of the Tractatus were
In the context of the Vienna Circle, Carnap’s and Neurath’s criticism of the Tractatus seemed to be the most radical break with the Tractatus. But their criticism must be understood against the background of the revisions of the Tractarian positions formulated by Ramsey, Waismann and Wittgenstein before 1931. These revisions have introduced major changes to the original conceptions of the Tractatus. Carnap’s and Neurath’s criticism of the Tractatus cannot be sharply separated from these previous critical revisions of the Tractatus. In the next two sections, I can only focus on the criticism by the physicalists. For the revisions of the Tractatus in Wittgenstein’s discussions with Waismann and its impact on the Circle, see Limbeck-Lilienau (2019 and 2023).
3 Neurath: against the Tractatus
Neurath and Carnap began to publish their papers on physicalism in 1931, which contained an implicit criticism of central theses of the Tractatus. Furthermore, at this moment, central positions of the Tractarian framework had already been changed, revised or abandoned due to discussions in the Circle and in its periphery. Carnap credited Neurath for his early and persistent objections to the Tractatus. It is difficult to reconstruct at which moment Neurath began to reject the Tractatus and at which moment he rejected which position; this is due to the fact that Neurath published his objections only in 1931 and later. Before that, Neurath did not mention Wittgenstein, with the exception of the positive remarks about him in the Manifesto. Carnap mentioned a certain number of Tractarian positions, which Neurath was “the first in the Vienna Circle” to criticize and to reject: the phenomenal language as the basic or primary language, the comparison of language and reality, i.e., the picture-theory of meaning, and the view of elucidation as pseudo-propositions.26 Indeed these three aspects cover the main points Neurath would criticize in Wittgenstein’s philosophy in his publications from 1931 onward. The first point, phenomenal language, is related to the post-Tractarian interpretation of elementary propositions which Wittgenstein had adopted in his paper on “Some Remarks on Logical Form” (1929), the issue of the picture-theory and of elucidations touched on the central issue of the “metaphysics” of the Tractatus. Indeed
Neurath’s objections to the Tractatus were first formulated in two of his physicalist papers: “Physicalism” (1931) and “Sociology and Physicalism” (1932). Carnap acknowledged the importance of Neurath’s criticism in his own first physicalist paper.27 Neurath’s criticism here and in other papers can be summarized in the following points: we do not need elementary propositions, but only empirically given protocol sentences; there is no need of a “phenomenal language” in order to formulate the protocol sentences, a physicalist language is enough; sentences are not justified through the confrontation of language with reality; Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as “elucidations” has to be rejected, as elucidations are a metaphysical and mystical element in his philosophy; and contrary to Wittgenstein’s claim, it is possible to speak about language and its logical form. This last point also meant that Neurath completely rejected Wittgenstein’s distinction between “showing” and “saying”.
In his “elucidations”, which may also be characterized as “mythological introductory remarks”, Wittgenstein seems to be attempting to investigate, as it were, a pre-linguistic state from the point of view of a pre-linguistic stage of development. These attempts must not only be rejected as meaningless; they are also not required as a preliminary step towards unified science. One part of language can, to be sure, be used to discuss other parts; but one cannot make pronouncements concerning language as a whole from a “not yet linguistic” standpoint, as Wittgenstein and certain representatives of the “Vienna Circle” seek to do. A part of these endeavors, although in a modified form, may be suitably incorporated into scientific work. The rest would have to be discarded. Nor may language as a whole be set against “experience as a whole”, “the world” or “the given”.28
Let us look first at what appeared to Neurath as the metaphysical rests in the Tractatus, especially the conception of philosophy as an activity of “elucidation” before we address his objections against elementary propositions.
What were Neurath’s objections against Wittgenstein’s metaphysics of “elucidations”?
Neurath explicitly emphasized Wittgenstein’s role in the rejection of metaphysics and his influence on the Circle’s anti-metaphysics. He underlined that logical analysis was a means to get rid of meaningless metaphysical “pseudo-propositions”, as Wittgenstein had stated in the Tractatus (tlp 6.53). Indeed, Wittgenstein said there that “the right method in philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i. e., the propositions of natural science”, while all other statements would be relegated to meaningless metaphysics. Despite this positive reference to Wittgenstein’s “right method”, Neurath rejected Wittgenstein’s conception of “elucidations” and his distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. The meaningful propositions, that is, the propositions of the natural sciences say something (about facts), while at the same time they show the logical form of the facts because they share that form with them. The central Tractarian claim that we cannot speak about the logical form (of propositions and language) was rejected by Neurath. Several reasons may have motivated this.
Since the beginning, Neurath seemed to have rejected the picture theory of meaning. He rejected the view that “language pictures reality”29 and therefore also the Tractarian position that language and reality share a logical form. Furthermore, he thought that linguistic expressions (written signs or sounds) are facts like any other physical fact. It is therefore possible to speak about them like about any other physical fact. It is also possible to speak about the form of sentences no less than it is possible to speak about the form of tables. For Neurath, there was, therefore, no need for inexpressible logical forms and philosophical “elucidations” which aim to “show” the inexpressible. Wittgenstein would agree that we can speak about propositional signs (written signs or sounds) as well as about their configuration. But for Wittgenstein, it was not possible to speak about what a sentence shared with the fact it represented, namely its logical form. In a certain sense, this was also impossible for Neurath, simply because there was no logical form a sentence shared with
Neurath’s complete rejection of the picture theory and the implications it had for the saying/showing distinction meant also a complete rejection of Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning and representation. Despite Neurath’s radical rejection of this theory, it was not clear what should replace such a theory. Neurath indicated only in a very fragmentary way that a kind of behaviorist theory of language was sufficient to explain how language describes and represents something, how one sentence can be said to have the same meaning as another, or how meaningful sentences can be distinguished from meaningless ones.
Naturally Wittgenstein’s picture theory and his theory of logical form was also at the center of his conception of elementary propositions. In the Vienna Circle, Hans Hahn had attacked the idea that logical analysis led to elementary propositions which cannot be further analyzed into simpler propositions.30 Wittgenstein’s idea was that an elementary proposition is composed of names (primitive signs) which designate simple objects (tlp 2.02). The configuration of such names in a sentence is a picture of a state of affairs. Once we get to the names which designate simple objects, the analysis stops. In his paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form” (1929), Wittgenstein claimed that elementary propositions should reflect the basic structure of the phenomena (contrary to the position in the Tractatus). This interpretation of elementary propositions as propositions about the phenomena was extensively discussed in the Circle. As the logical form of elementary propositions was supposed to reflect the structure of the phenomena, an analysis of the phenomena was an essential task. For Neurath, there was no need for such a task. There was no need to analyze complex propositions into propositions which immediately pictured states of affairs. The rejection of the picture theory implied also a rejection of such an analysis into elementary propositions, i.e., pictures of states of affairs. Furthermore, the basic empirical statements should not be formulated in a phenomenal language, but in a physicalist language speaking about observable objects and their properties.
I do not now have phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language.31
At the time, Carnap was still defending the view that the basic empirical statements are to be formulated in a phenomenal language. It is certain that Neurath’s criticism of a phenomenal language had a strong effect on Carnap, but such a language was not a dogma anymore in the Circle.
How can Neurath’s criticism of Wittgenstein be evaluated in the general context of the discussions of the Tractatus? Like the Wittgensteinians and like Carnap, Neurath thought that the task of philosophy consisted in the development of a logical syntax. But at the same time, he completely rejected the picture theory, a theory Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap still accepted in one form or another. Neurath’s vehement rejection of the picture theory had two consequences: there was for him no need to investigate the nature of elementary propositions, which were thought to be pictures of states of affairs and were thought constitutive of all propositions. Firstly, one could begin with the empirically given statements of the sciences instead of looking for elementary propositions. Secondly, the logical syntax could speak about language and its form. There was no need for Wittgenstein’s distinction between what could be said and what could only be shown. There was no need for mysterious “elucidations”. There was no difference between the statements of science and the statements of logical syntax. Logical syntax was just one branch of the sciences with no special status. The mystical aspect of elucidations disappeared.
But this different conception of a logical syntax did not imply logical pluralism for Neurath, nor did he accept a meta-language. It seems that for him there still was one logical syntax. And despite the fact that the logical syntax described language and its forms, this had to be done in the object language itself.
4
Carnap’s view of the Tractatus at the time he was working on the Logical Syntax was shaped both by his physicalist alliance with Neurath and by his frequent discussions with Waismann. His alliance with Neurath in the common project of physicalism led to the rejection of the picture theory and of a phenomenalist basis for protocol sentences. His extensive discussions with Waismann led to the project of a new logical syntax and to the insight that the version of logical syntax presented in the Tractatus had to be radically revised.
I will briefly describe here the impact of his conversations with Waismann, which are described in more detail in Limbeck-Lilienau (2019 and 2023). The Tractatus had claimed that elementary propositions must be independent one from another, which meant that from one elementary proposition we cannot infer another one (tlp 6.3751). Or in conversations with Waismann, Wittgenstein began to strongly doubt this claim, especially due to the so-called “color exclusion problem”: if this spatio-temporal spot is red, this implied that it cannot for example be green. Therefore, color attributions cannot be elementary propositions, but the problem could generalize to any other kind of property. But if elementary propositions were not independent, then the logical syntax of the Tractatus would need substantial revision.32 In conversations with Waismann, Carnap was thinking about possible revisions of such a logical syntax. Wittgenstein himself had proposed such a revision in his 1929 paper. Not only the need for a new logical syntax was felt, but further questions about the nature of a logical syntax were raised: Was there only one possible syntax or several? And how could the choice of syntax be justified? Was it possible to freely choose a syntax and freely lay down its rules?33 These questions were the consequence of a substantial revision of the Tractarian position as reflected in Waismann’s Theses and their discussion in the Circle. Discussions of these questions mainly took place between 1929 and 1931, before Carnap left Vienna for Prague.
The first absolutism was initially mentioned by Carnap in “On Protocol Statements” (1932/33). The rejection of this absolutism was linked to Neurath’s rejection of the picture theory and of the phenomenal basis for protocol sentences. The second absolutism was most extensively discussed in the Logical Syntax.34 It was not only connected to the discussions with Neurath, but also to his long conversations with Waismann about the nature of syntax in the Tractatus. Carnap’s view of the Tractatus at the time he was working on the Logical Syntax can be seen as a synthesis of these two strands of criticism coming respectively from Neurath and from Waismann. I will briefly discuss these two absolutisms, before situating Carnap’s position within the general discussion of the Tractatus in the Circle.
Since at least 1929, when Wittgenstein published “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, Carnap had shared with the latter the project of an analysis of the logical form of elementary propositions formulated in a phenomenal language.35 In the Vienna Circle the question of the logical form of such propositions was repeatedly discussed. Carnap defended the view that elementary propositions had a relational form, while Wittgenstein and Waismann remained skeptical about this claim.36 Still in his first paper on physicalism, Carnap thought that the form of a protocol sentence depended on the form of experience and of “the given”. The protocol language was still conceived as a “phenomenal language” or a “language of experience”.37 This position followed Wittgenstein’s suggestion from 1929, that an analysis of the phenomena would lead to the logical form of elementary propositions. It is only in his response to Neurath’s conception
Let us look at the second absolutism. In the Logical Syntax, Carnap had analyzed more extensively his disagreement with the Tractatus. His main focus there was “Wittgenstein’s absolutist conception of language”39 and more generally his difference to Wittgenstein’s conception of syntax. Before we look at these differences, it is important to emphasize that Carnap also expressed his agreement with Wittgenstein on essential points. He agreed with Wittgenstein that philosophy was the analysis of language and he agreed that such an analysis was a purely formal logical analysis, that is, an analysis of language was not supposed to take into account the sense (“Sinn”) or the reference (“Bedeutung”) of expressions.40 But besides this agreement, Carnap mentioned in § 73 of the Logical Syntax two theses of Wittgenstein that he vigorously criticized and rejected: (1) there cannot be propositions about the logical form of sentence, therefore no syntax can be formulated and (2) philosophy consists in “elucidations”, that is, in pseudo-propositions.
Carnap’s argument in the Logical Syntax against the second thesis was that “elucidations” did not permit a purely syntactic treatment of logic. The thesis about “elucidations” still blended the project of a logical syntax with considerations about the meaning of expressions. For Carnap, “elucidations” were still connected to considerations about the “sense” (“Sinn”) of expressions. Carnap made special reference here to Schlick’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as an “activity of giving meaning”.41 In his programmatic paper “The Turning point in Philosophy”, Schlick had defined philosophy as “a system of acts” which consisted in the “activity through which the meaning of statements is revealed or determined”.42 For Schlick “meaning” is revealed through “acts of verification”.43 Carnap objected that logical syntax could be
We saw that Carnap was involved in the discussions which led Wittgenstein and Waismann to question the Tractarian view of a logical syntax and to consider different syntaxes. Nevertheless, it is not completely clear to what degree Carnap was aware of this. In the Logical Syntax he said that there is “a multiplicity of possible languages” while “Wittgenstein speaks always about ‘the’ language”.44 So, at the time of the Logical Syntax, he thought there was a strong contrast between his logical pluralism and Wittgenstein’s “absolutism” about language. But in the “Preface” to the Logical Syntax, Carnap mentioned that “in opposition to Wittgenstein’s former dogmatic standpoint, Professor Schlick now informs me that for some time past, in writings as yet unpublished, Wittgenstein has agreed that the rules of language may be chosen with complete freedom.”45 At least at the time of the publication of the Logical Syntax, Carnap was aware that Wittgenstein had abandoned his absolutism about language. Carnap’s Logical Syntax is certainly a rejection of the Tractarian view of logic, but it is much less a rejection of the view Wittgenstein (and Waismann) had around 1930. It can be seen as synthesis of Neurath’s criticism of the Tractatus and the revisions of the Tractarian position in the Wittgensteinian wing of the Circle.
Schlick to Wittgenstein, Dec. 25, 1924.
See Limbeck-Lilienau 2010, pp. 94–96.
Carnap to Reichenbach, May 7, 1923.
Schlick to Reichenbach, July 14, 1923.
Carnap Papers rc 102-78-06 (Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Pittsburgh University).
Carnap 1963, p. 23.
For a reconstruction of the introduction of the Tractatus in the Vienna Circle, emphasizing especially Ramsey’s role in it, see Misak 2019, pp. 2–4.
Misak 2020, p. 166.
Misak 2020, pp. 172–173.
Neurath 1937/1981, p. 697. Though Feigl said that the initiative came from Reidemeister. He writes: “It was Reidemeister who in 1924, or perhaps 1925, suggested to us a project that was to become decisive in the development of the Circle’s philosophical outlook. We read and discussed at length Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, Feigl 1969, p. 60.
Wittgenstein called the group “Tafelrunde” in a letter to Schlick, Feb. 18, 1929. The meetings of the “Tafelrunde” took place separately from the meetings of the Vienna Circle, as Wittgenstein never was present in the latter.
Schlick to Carnap, Nov. 29, 1925 (trans. C.L.-L).
Schlick to Cassirer, March 30, 1927 (trans. C.L.-L).
Neurath confirms this anecdote in a letter to Carnap from June 16, 1945, published in Cat and Tuboly (2019: 640).
Feigl writes also about these meetings, see Feigl 1969, pp. 63–64.
See Ramsey 1923.
Carnap et al. 1929, p. 32.
On Wittgenstein’s view about logicism and classes, see Marion 1998, pp. 21–47.
This series of 7 talks were given in the Vienna Circle from May to July 1930. Carnap made extensive notes about the talks which have been preserved, Carnap Papers rc 102-76-10 (Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Pittsburgh University) and have been published in Stadler (2023: 332–44).
Waismann’s Theses are published in McGuinness 1984, pp. 233–261. The Theses were discussed in the Circle in February and May/June 1931, see the “Protocols of the Schlick Circle” in Stadler (2015, pp. 79–89 and pp. 97–107).
On Carnap’s discussions with Waismann, see Limbeck-Lilienau 2019.
Neurath 1931 and 1932; Carnap 1931.
Carnap 1931, p. 452 and 1934/1937, p. 283.
Carnap 1931. This same paper triggered a violent reaction of Wittgenstein, including the accusation of plagarism, see Hintikka 1993.
Neurath 1932/1959, p. 285.
If we follow Rose Rand’s famous overview of the “Development of the Theses of the Vienna Circle” relative to the Tractatus (Stadler 2015, pp. 143–145), Neurath rejected the thesis “Language pictures reality” already before the reading of the Tractatus.
Hahn in a discussion in the Vienna Circle on Feb. 5 and 12, 1931, see Stadler, 2015, pp. 80–83.
Wittgenstein 1984, p. 51.
Due to the dependence of elementary propositions, a conjunction of propositions such as “X is red” and “X is green” is impossible, although “X is red and X is green” is not a contradiction. Therefore, a syntax is needed which excludes such impossible combinations, a syntax which reflects the internal dependence of elementary propositions. For a detailed analysis of the need for a new logical syntax given the dependence of elementary propositions, see Waismann (1939/40).
These questions were for example raised in the meeting of the Vienna Circle from Feb. 12, 1931, see Protocols of that meeting in Stadler 2015, pp. 81–85, see also Limbeck-Lilienau 2023.
Carnap speaks about the “absolutism of basic propositions” in Carnap, 1932/33, p. 228. In the Logical Syntax he discusses “Wittgenstein’s absolutist conception of language”, see Carnap 1934/37, § 52 and § 73. Awodey and Carus (2009) describe these absolutisms as “Wittgenstein’s prison”.
In Rose Rand’s survey about the Tractatus, Carnap initially endorsed the view that there are elementary propositions (“Atomsätze”), while Neurath always rejected it, see thesis 13 in Rand’s survey, Stadler 2015, p. 144.
For the relational option, see Rose Rand’s survey, thesis 16, endorsed by Carnap during the Tractatus reading: “The atomic sentences have the form of a relation, e.g. the relation of memory between two names, which designate experiences.” For Wittgenstein’s skepticism about that option, see McGuinness 1984, p. 42.
Carnap 1931, pp. 438–439.
Carnap 1932/33, p. 228.
Carnap 1934/37, § 52.
Carnap 1934/37, § 73.
Schlick 1930, p. 56. Wittgenstein’s view as stated in the Tractatus was that “Philosophy is not a theory but an activity”, namely “the logical clarification of thoughts” (tlp 4.112).
Schlick 1930, p. 56.
Schlick 1930, p. 55.
Carnap 1934/37, § 67.
Carnap 1934/37, p. xvi. Uebel (2009) analyzes how Schlick tried to remind Carnap about earlier discussions of tolerance by Wittgenstein and Waismann. Uebel also discusses whether Carnap may have been influenced by these earlier discussions mentioned to him by Schlick but thinks that he was not.
Acknowledgments
I thank the following persons for comments on a talk in Graz which presented this material: Marian David, Christian Damböck, Johannes Friedl, Ulf Höfer,
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