A: at-taqsīm ad-daulī li-l-ʿamal. – F: division internationale du travail. – G: internationale Arbeitsteilung – R: meždunarodnoe razdelenie truda. – S: división internacional del trabajo. – C: guójì fēngōng 国际分工
The IDL brings different modes of production together under the domination of the capitalist world market. Upon the basis of the division of labour within society, it realises itself in part through the power relations in the world market, and partly through the centre’s imperialist domination over the periphery or direct violence, which furthers an ‘uneven and combined development’ (Mandel 1976, 70) of the productive forces and wealth. Conditioned by crises of capital accumulation, class struggles and wars, impelled by colonialism, imperialism, trans-nationalisation, and globalisation, the expansion of the capitalist mode of production through consolidation and differentiation of the IDL is a medium of transformation that is fought over with respect to traditional social conditions and the ensuring of capital’s profitability. At least three historical forms can be differentiated: colonial, Fordist, and the so-called “new IDL”.
The IDL played a significant role under state socialism, too. Until 1990 ‘socialist economic integration of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance’ was sought after (Komplexprogramm 1971, 3). Even though it failed because of the contradictions of the Stalinist bureaucratic command economies, national overheads as well as pressure from the arms race, the orientation of organising the IDL in such a way as to avoid unilateral advantages (4) remains essential to the quest for a more just economic order.
1. For Adam Smith, expressing one of the central demands of the rising bourgeoisie, free trade provided for a productivity-enhancing division of labour, because ‘[b]y means of it the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection’ (Wealth, 178). The market is understood as the world market, regulated by the IDL on the basis of the ‘natural or acquired’ advantages which one country has over another (204). Building on this, David Ricardo developed the so-called theory of comparative advantage: even if a nation is capable of producing all of its internationally marketable commodities more cheaply than other nations, seen comparatively – i.e. by comparing the cost of goods for export – it is advantageous for it to specialise in the most cost-effective products. Ricardo’s example is the division of labour between England and Portugal. Although Portugal could produce not only wine, but also cloth more cheaply than England (Principles, 159) it imports cloth in order to produce wine with the freed up capital, ‘for which she would obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth’ (ibid.). The wealth of both countries increases (provided an even balance of trade), because labour can be allocated more profitably. In general, no extension of foreign trade will ‘increase the amount of value in a country, although it will very powerfully contribute to increase the mass of commodities, and therefore the sum of enjoyments’ (146).
Classical political economy was largely able to abstract from labour migration and capital flows. Ricardo drew upon experience to show that the ‘insecurity of capital, when not under the immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every man has to quit the country of his birth […] [can] check the emigration of capital’ (161), even if only ‘a low rate of profits’ (162) is to be expected. The nascent character of international capital flows made it impossible to develop a general rate of profit. Ricardo modified the law of value accordingly: ‘The same rule which regulates the relative value of commodities in one country, does not regulate the relative value of the commodities exchanged between two or more countries’ (156).
2. As early as his “Speech on the Question of Free Trade”, Marx expected that free trade and the IDL ‘carries the antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the uttermost point’ and so ‘hastens the Social Revolution’ (MECW 6/465 [4/458]). The “Manifesto” notes, without sorrow, the destruction of the ‘old-established national industries’ by the ‘new industries’, whose raw materials are drawn from ‘the remotest zones’ and ‘whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe’. ‘In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations’ (MECW 6/488 [4/466]).
The British world market hegemonised the IDL between the metropoles and the colonies in the 19th cent. It was this hegemony, and not a ‘natural destiny’ of the colonies, as the proponents of free trade contended, restricted the production of the colonies to raw materials or more specifically to semi-luxury items such as coffee and sugar. Marx then wrote in Capital: ‘By constantly making a part of the hands “supernumerary”, modern industry, in all countries where it has taken root, gives a spur to emigration and to the colonisation of foreign lands, which are thereby converted into settlements for growing the raw material of the mother country’ (MECW 35/454 [23/475]). Through this a ‘new and IDL, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres of modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field’ (ibid.).
With this argument it became possible to answer the unsolvable question, raised by partisans of free trade, ‘how one nation can grow rich at the expense of another’ (MECW 6/464 [4/457]). Ricardo, for example, conceives of ‘foreign trade […] as simple circulation’ (MECW 28/242 [42/236]) or ‘simple exchange’ (276 [268]). Instead of developing the contradictions of the ‘IDL’ out of an analysis of the process of the creation of surplus value, Ricardo ‘rather shifts them off by considering the value in exchange as indifferent for the formation of wealth’ (277 [269, fn. 19]). This is why there could, theoretically, be neither overproduction nor crises for Ricardo (and his epigones); actual economic crises were accounted for on extra-economic grounds.
In C I, Marx addresses the question how commodities that rely on different conditions of production and are therefore incomparable in terms of labour output can nevertheless be compared on the world market. The ‘contemporaneous difference of national wages’ leads Marx to take into consideration ‘the price and the extent of the prime necessaries of life as naturally and historically developed, the cost of training the labourers, the part played by the labour of women and children, the productiveness of labour, its extensive and intensive magnitude’ (MECW 35/558 [23/583]). These are so different that to assume equalised labour and socially average conditions at the level of the world market is unrealistic. As a ‘unit of measure’ of the national averages of labour with their ‘scale’ of uneven intensities and productivities, the ‘average unit of universal labour’ emerges on the world market (559 [584]). ‘The more intense national labour, therefore, as compared with the less intense, produces in the same time more value, which expresses itself in more money. But the law of value in its international application is yet more modified by this, that on the world market the more productive national labour reckons also as the more intense, so long as the more productive nation is not compelled by competition to lower the selling price of its commodities to the level of their value’ (ibid.). The quantities of commodities produced during the same working time but on different levels of development have ‘unequal international values, which are expressed in different prices’, and the relative value of money will be higher in lesser developed economies (ibid.). Nonetheless Marx sees ‘the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic régime’ (750 [790]) as a precondition for a future supersession of capitalism.
3. Rosa Luxemburg shows, against Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Bauer (see Anti-Critique), and in an original perspective often simplistically criticised as ‘under-consumptionist’, that capital accumulation cannot proceed in such an ‘unlimited’ way as they had seen it in the Marxian schema of enlarged reproduction, because the ‘conditions of direct exploitation and those of the realisation of surplus-value are not identical. They are separated logically as well as by time and space’ (Accu, 324). Marx does not account for this contradiction in C II. Counterfactually, he assumes a society consisting of wage labourers and capitalists only. Against this, Luxemburg maintains: ‘Since the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute domination of the capitalist mode of production’ (Accu, 345). From this point of view, she redefines how internal and external sales markets are to be understood, in economic and no longer merely in politico-geographic terms, as ‘strict and precise’ concepts in the sense of the reproductive schemes: ‘[T]he internal market is the capitalist market […] The external market is the non-capitalist social environment […] Thus, from the point of view of economics, Germany and England traffic in commodities chiefly on an internal, capitalist market, whilst the give and take between German industry and German peasants is transacted on an external market as far as German capital is concerned’ (347). This leads her to analyse a contradiction that results from this and is important for the theory of imperialism, namely ‘that the old capitalist countries provide ever larger markets for, and become increasingly dependent upon, one another, yet on the other hand compete ever more ruthlessly for trade relations with non-capitalist countries’ (ibid.). From the fact that on the one hand, capitalism is on a mission to reshape the entire world in its image, while on the other, it cannot subsist without its Other, Luxemburg deduces the prospect that capitalism will shatter by virtue of its being ‘immanently incapable of becoming a universal form of production’ (447). She makes clear, in opposition to the claims of the Ricardian School, that the IDL based upon ‘an international system of Free Trade’ was nothing more than a ‘passing phase in the history of capitalist accumulation’ (430). This is precisely because it ‘never expressed the interests of capitalist accumulation as a whole’ (427).
For Karl Kautsky, imperialism is the ‘annexation of agrarian regions by industrial nation-states’, and the colonial form of the IDL is by no means ‘an economic condition’ of capitalist accumulation (1929, IV, 554). By contrast, Nikolai Bukharin defines the IDL as a ‘system of relations of production with corresponding exchange relations on an international scale’, pertaining to pre-capitalist, semi-capitalist, and late capitalist formations, bound together by the world market and dominated by the imperialist states (1929, 25). Pursuant to this, Lenin considers the notion that the imperialist ‘division of the world’ consists in the appropriation of purely agrarian regions to have been practically refuted (Imp, CW 22/258). Lenin characterises finance capital as the driving force (226 et sq.), just as Hilferding had done (1910, 223). Lenin argues that the commodity exports that dominate the period of free trade are replaced, under imperialism, by capital exports (CW 22/241). Capital is seen as lacking ‘a field for “profitable” investment’ (242) within the developed countries, and the progressive exploitation of foreign territories and labour power as going hand in hand both with a capitalist development of these countries that ‘greatly accelerates’ (243) and with increased commodity exports (244). Unequal development is seen as acquiring the status of a necessity (248 et sq.). Beside the ‘two main groups of countries’ – colonial powers and colonies – there emerge, according to this account, ‘the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, typical of this epoch’ (263).
‘In the newly-opened countries themselves’, according to Hilferding, ‘the introduction of capitalism intensifies contradictions and arouses growing resistance to the invaders among the people, whose national consciousness has been awakened’ (1910/1981, 322). Integrated into the IDL, the ‘old social relations are completely revolutionized, the age-old bondage to the soil of the “nations without a history” is disrupted and they are swept into the capitalist maelstrom. Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjected people with the ways and means for their own liberation. They adopt as their own the ideal that was once the highest aspiration of the European nations; namely, the formation of a unified national state as an instrument of economic and cultural freedom’. (Ibid.) This prognosis was verified by the national liberation movements active from the 1940s until the 1970s.
4. Lenin’s theory of imperialism became the basis for the ‘Tricontinental’ critique of the world market. Following Raúl Prebisch (1950) and Paul A. Baran (1957), dependency theory traces the impoverishment of the ‘three continents’ back to the unfavourable structural integration of peripheral countries into the IDL. Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1977) emphasise the aspect of indirect exploitation through the transfer of real incomes, a phenomenon that becomes evident as the “terms of trade” (the exchange relations within international trade) worsen. The Group of 77’s demand for a new international economic order (UN 1974) was an expression of this position.
Arghiri Emmanuel developed the model of ‘unequal exchange’ and denounces ‘trade imperialism’ (1972). He proceeds from Ricardo’s approach but believes he has found, in Ricardo’s exclusive attention to commodity as opposed to capital flows, the reason for the theoretical failure to account for the impoverishment of trading partners (40 et sq.). The income gap between the centres and peripheries is far greater than the difference of productivity levels (290). Dieter Senghaas also sees the IDL as an ‘exchange of less for more labour and consequently a transfer of value from the peripheries to the metropolises’ (1974, 31). Immanuel Wallerstein similarly diagnoses the ‘centre countries’ appropriation of the economic surplus of the whole world economy’ (1979, 47).
André Gunder Frank (1969) describes a politico-economic cycle of sorts. The IDL initially takes the form of a division between industries according to the principle of absolute cost advantages. The industrial export of finished products from the centres (especially production goods and consumables for the higher income classes) goes hand in hand with the export of raw materials and unprocessed agrarian products from the periphery, where only export-oriented sectors record significant productivity growth. Whatever opposes itself to this arrangement is repressed through direct violence. Crises and wars cause world trade to collapse, and sources of direct investment and credit in the periphery dry up. The turmoil of the world wars leads the imperialist countries to concentrate on themselves. The national liberation struggles (which only begin after the Second World War in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) are associated with a new relationship between the former colonial peripheries and the centres. It is in this situation, when attachment to the metropolitan states is weakest, that the peripheral countries succeed in boosting development more strongly (ibid.; Emmanuel 1972, 246 et sq.). Attempts at import substitution are made with simple consumer goods. And yet the longer this strategy of self-industrialisation is pursued, the more foreign capital and technology are required, and so reintegration into the now regenerated and structurally renewed world market becomes necessary again.
This goes hand in hand with a second form of the IDL, predominantly based on specialisation within industrial production, preferably using unskilled and cheap labour. Low incomes prevent a rise in demand for mass consumer goods, which would allow for a transition to intense accumulation. This leads to growing impoverishment, while a small part of the population is able to afford a certain degree of luxury consumption owing to its export earnings. The open rule of the centres over the periphery is transformed into indirect forms of neo-colonialism, and direct violence is replaced by ‘structural violence’ (Galtung 1969, 170). Whatever form of specialisation the peripheries opt for within the IDL, it is not freely chosen, but determined by the needs of the metropoles.
Building on dependency theory, Dieter Senghaas (1974) developed the concept of ‘peripheral capitalism’ (see also Córdova 1973; Prebisch 1981). On this account, integration into the IDL leads to the formation of ‘export enclaves’ that are fully integrated into the metropolitan economies ‘and are dependent upon their dynamics of reproduction, be they positive (growth during the boom phase) or negative (phases of stagnation)’ (1977, 38). ‘The sector of the periphery that isn’t an enclave is degraded, becoming a supplier of cheap labour and its subsistence needs, dependent on the business cycle […] so it is in no way isolated from the export activities of the enclave. Instead it is symbiotically aligned to the production needs of the enclave’ (ibid.). Underdevelopment is therefore an expression of this structurally induced heterogeneity of the IDL, which bars a self-sufficient development of the productive forces (1974, 24). Representatives of dependency theory or peripheral capitalism accordingly advocate ‘dissociation’ or ‘de-linking’ from the metropolises (1977, 261; Amin 1977, 1). The rise of the East Asian “Tigers” shows the limits to such an approach.
5. Christian Palloix explains that ‘there is no transfer’ of values through the IDL (1969, 114). Ernest Mandel qualifies this by adding that in any case, no transfer of values is based on ‘unequal exchange’, this being a matter of the equivalent exchange of ‘equal international values’ that ‘represent unequal quantities of labour’ (1976, 359). He refers to Marx: in foreign trade ‘the more advanced country sells its commodities above their value even though cheaper than the competing countries. In so far as the labour of the more advanced country is here realised as labour of a higher specific weight, the rate of profit rises, because labour which has not been paid as being of a higher quality is sold as such’ (MECW 37/236 [25/247 et sq.]). The capital of this country ‘secures a surplus profit’ and the less advanced country ‘may offer more objectified labour in natura than it receives, and yet thereby receive commodities cheaper than it could produce them’ (ibid). It can gain ‘absolutely’ in the IDL, but ‘it will nonetheless suffer relative impoverishment’ (Mandel 1976, 73). Because ‘of these differences in the value of commodities and the productivity of labour […] the law of value inexorably compels the backward countries with a low level of labour productivity to specialize on the world market in a manner disadvantageous to themselves’ within the IDL (74). The modest ‘extension of the market is kept within extremely narrow confines by the low level of real wages’ and ‘acts as a limit on the further accumulation of capital’ (68).
Until the late 1940s, the IDL was shaped by the monopolistic-colonial exploitation of raw materials, bound up with a direct transfer of products and profits to the metropolitan countries. The low composition of capital, by comparison to industrialised countries, within colonial forms of production (with stagnant labour productivity) led to a rise in the price of raw materials, thus becoming ‘an obstacle to the further expansion of capital’ in the metropolitan countries (62). This led to a ‘massive penetration of capital into the sphere of raw materials’ (ibid.) while simultaneously causing the centres to focus on the ‘export of elements of fixed capital’ (65). Both factors explain the relative interest in a (partial) industrialisation of the developing countries (ibid.). ‘Thus the reproduction of the division of labour created in the 19th century is slowly but surely collapsing in face of the sudden extension of the production of raw materials and an alteration in the differential rates of profit from the production of raw materials and the production of finished goods’ (64 et sq.).
As Marx has elaborated, the deterioration of the ‘terms of Trade’ for the developing countries rests upon the ‘proportionate decrease in the value of the raw material arising from the growing productivity of the labour employed in its own production’ (MECW 37/109 [25/119]). Instead of the direct appropriation of ‘colonial surplus profits’, the ‘chief form of the metropolitan exploitation of the Third World at that time’ (Mandel 1976, 345), an indirect transfer of value on the basis of divergent productivity levels becomes the more important form. It is precisely the higher profitability in the metropolitan centres that leads to capital exports being redirected, such that they are now effected ‘between the metropolitan states themselves’ (346).
6. In contrast to dependency theory, Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye stress the dynamics of the ‘radical change in the world economy’ (1986), which leads to the ‘industrialisation of the developing countries’. A ‘new IDL’ becomes discernible. It is marked by the ‘breaking down of the production process into different partial operations in different sites worldwide’ (1977, 62). This is quite different from the former partial industrialisation of ‘import substitution in protected markets’ (1986, 105). In the 1960s, a liberal system of world trade leads to the progressive ‘internationalisation of capital and labour’ (1973, 429). The crisis of Fordism brings about a ‘valorisation-optimal’ redistribution and recombination of ‘production sites and forms of organisation […], with an eye to increasing flexibility and reducing production costs’ (1986, 37 et sq.) through ‘worldwide sourcing’ (101 et sqq.). What proves decisive for the restoration of profitability is expanded access to a ‘reservoir of potential cheap labour comprising hundreds of millions of workers’ (46), though the need for a basic minimum of skills acts as a limiting factor. In any case, labour is cheaper in the developing countries because workers’ individual reproduction is ‘subsidised’ by extensive subsistence production in the informal sector (ibid.; see Meillassoux 1975). The value of labour power is further depressed by the integration of women as ‘domestic workers’ within the framework of ‘international subcontracting’ (464 et sq.; see Mies 1991).
On the ‘world market for labour power’ with low skills, workers in the centres find themselves competing with workers from other world regions; this leads to a deterioration in working conditions and structural unemployment (Fröbel/Heinrichs/Kreye 1986, 47). The ‘crisis of the centre’ is not however ‘synonymous with an equally profound crisis of capital operating on a global scale’ (1977, 64). A ‘massive growth of the developing countries’ share of world exports of processed products’ (1986, 54) takes place. The competition on the ‘world market for production sites’ compels the state to provide ‘the best possible conditions for accumulation’ leading to the dismantling of ‘the guarantees provided by the welfare state and labour protection’ in the centres and to the ‘constitution of free production zones’ (48) and ‘world market factories’ in the periphery (101). This does not occur automatically, but rather as a process that needed first to be made ‘politico-institutionally and technologically possible’ (102), including through the use of force (475 et sq.).
John Walton proposes that it is better to speak of a ‘third IDL’ (1985, 3). This proposal is taken up by Danièle Leborgne and Alain Lipietz (1996, 704 et sq.). To Lipietz, the ‘new IDL’ portrayed by Fröbel et al. is merely the Fordist form of the integration of newly industrialised countries into the world market (1997, 15). It is based on the price differentials of labour inputs in various segments of the production process. The specific form of the Fordist division of labour – the separation of conceptual work, planning and the organisation of work, of skilled manufacturing and routine, unskilled activities – ‘allows for a geographical separation’. Unskilled activities are accordingly moved to countries with a great supply of cheap labour – a form of ‘primitive Taylorisation’ associated with high rates of exploitation with respect to wages, working hours, and working intensity, as well as with rigid discipline. Skilled manufacturing is relegated to countries with enough skilled workers, but comparatively low wages, whereas the first type of tasks (conceptual work and planning) remains in high-wage countries disposing of the requisite technical and organisational know-how. This is a division of labour between various segments of the production process within the same sector (ibid.).
Both of the (still existing) former forms of the IDL are eclipsed by a third one (18). It is made up neither (as in the first form) of the ‘production of very different products in different ways’, nor of the specialisation (the second form) of ‘different tasks’ within the Fordist production process, but of ‘the production of similar products in different ways’ (Leborgne/Lipietz 1996, 705). Here, Ricardo’s theorem of comparative cost advantages is at work in a modified form: specialisation does not take place according to the availability of capital and labour (these are more or less mobile), but according to the way they are combined, hence according to the form of the relation between capital and labour, which develops via corresponding state regimes (ibid.). Every country will specialise in sectors, production segments, and forms of organisation in which it ‘can most intensively use the “factor” ’ that ‘it has the best supply of, i.e. either flexible and Taylorised work or the skilled work with negotiated integration’ (Lipietz 1997, 26). ‘Thus the observable centre-periphery patterns’ arise ‘because the industrial working class and reserve army are exploited by capital […], but in different ways’ (Ferrão/Jensen-Butler 1984, 399).
Lipietz calculates the ability of a country to sell its products of labour to other countries above their actual value through an ‘index of international value’ (the relation of per capita GDP to current exchange rates by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity) – which yields markedly higher coefficients for the centres (1997, 22). A ‘new hierarchy’ of space becomes discernible (21), based on different forms of labour relations and business relations, a specific combination of the production of absolute and relative surplus-value, and particular state forms within regime competition and specific capacities to control capital flows (Candeias 1999, 80 et sq.). Lipietz only refers to forms of the IDL between national economies, without taking into consideration the structures of transnational production rendered possible by the development of the productive forces. Elmar Altvater relates old and new IDL s to various forms of ‘environmental plundering’ (1992, 142 et sq.): the overexploitation of natural resources is complemented by a market-friendly environmental policy that itself becomes a site of capital accumulation (such as emissions trading), such that the destruction of the Earth’s atmosphere perpetrated by the industrialised countries becomes institutionalised through the buying up of rights to pollute in less developed states.
7. At the beginning of the 21st cent., the IDL is increasingly characterised by flexibly integrated transnational production networks that combine the advantages of a differentiation of forms of production and labour that is based both on competition and on complementarity. At the same time, the tight interlocking of single, fragmented stages of production according to the just-in-time principle raises the risk of breakdown and opens the potential for the organisation of a counter-power (Candeias 2000, 712). Information technology and the computer industries are pioneers of local-global networking (Lüthje 1998, 561 et sq.). Silicon Valley is an example of this: as a prototype of intra-regional networking and clustering, it is also at the centre of a global system of production, in which leading businesses set technological standards. They thus exert a strict control over the fragmented processes of production (with the relative autonomy of respective sites). Processes of this kind are similarly underway in the automobile industry (Revelli 1999, 62 et sq.). One thus has here a contradictory process, in which the centralism of production planning ‘counteracts the often proclaimed autonomy of labour organisation on site’ (Candeias 2000, 711). The factory, once a place where the working class was physically present, is now experiencing its fragmented globalisation – from the maquiladoras to the glass factory, from informal putting out workers to modern teleworkers – based upon the high-technology mode of production. Gramsci formulated the concept of the ‘dispersed factory’ (Gef 7, 925) even without being able to know the extent to which this fragmentation would take place. The disintegration and globally fragmented restructuring of socially collective labour results in the shift of social power relations to the disadvantage of wage labourers (Candeias 2003, 77 et sq.). Their organisational forms, based on the old-fashioned nation state, come under pressure. The perpetual restructuring of employment structures through the interplay of in/outsourcing and restructuring ensures far greater control over the workforce and potential countermovements. The result is a state-backed precarisation of labour and the formation of extensive low-wage segments, while the labour aristocracy experiences high income growth; women’s entry into the labour market destabilises traditional male worker identities. Middle-class women in affluent countries are able to take up gainful employment and free themselves from the restrictive nuclear family by resorting to the cheap labour of (often illegalised) migrants for domestic reproductive labour. In this way, ‘global care chains’ are formed (Hochschild 2001). In the peripheries, the hyper-exploitation mainly of female labour power is accompanied by rising capital intensity within highly skilled production and service tasks and associated with the emergence of new middle classes. The result is a complex overlap of national divisions of labour transformed by the scientification and flexibilisation of labour, a radical transformation of the gender division of labour and the recombination of the global societal collective worker within the framework of the IDL.
Mario Candeias
Translated by Daren Roso
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