Among the nomadic peoples who migrated to Europe, the Pechenegs seem to have occupied a relatively weak position. After all, they never built a great empire and never became a dominant force in the political relations of the south-eastern part of the continent. Their role and significance was smaller than that of their contemporaries, the Khazars. Yet this seemingly obvious statement is based on the false notion that the Pechenegs differed from other steppe ethne that could claim more spectacular achievements. This is not necessarily true. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the Arab historian and philosopher, claimed that empires built by nomads tended to last no longer than 120 years. By the third generation, signs of decline were usually already visible. It is difficult to deny the accuracy of the Muslim scholar’s insight. It should be added, though, that the lifespan of some of the great states created by nomads was even shorter. Against this background, the over 300-year history of the Khazar Khaganate seems a remarkable achievement. Even the best organized nomad political structures usually collapsed, often due to the disintegration of the ethnos that had formed it. In this respect, the fate of such empire builders as the Huns, Avars, and Khazars was no different than that of the Pechenegs. After a period of strength and vitality, all of these peoples disappeared without a trace. As the old Rus’ proverb quoted in the introduction of the present book says, they all ‘perished like the Avars’. It is true, of course, that the lack of a strong political centre greatly influenced how the Pechenegs related to the outside world. Their loose, segmentary structure made them capable of defending their independence, but prevented effective expansion and longer-term policy planning. The Pechenegs’ actions were most often merely reactions to external political stimuli. Yet they existed as an independent ethnos despite their segmentary structure for some 300 years, almost as long as the imperial Khazars. Over those three centuries they also enjoyed significant political importance, the peak of which fell in the mid-10th century. At that time, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus saw them as being key to maintaining equilibrium in Eastern Europe. Their loose political structures should therefore be viewed as an alternative model of community formation that contrasted sharply with those found in strongly centralized nomadic states.
Previous academic studies have underestimated the strength of the Pechenegs’ ethnic identity. The most eminent experts on the subject have tended to believe they lacked a strong sense of unity and solidarity. This was said to be proven by the internal conflicts that arose among them. However, a people like the Pechenegs, who were able to defend their independence for a substantial period of time, must have felt a strong community bond. The scarcity of available sources makes it impossible to determine more precisely what cultural values served to strengthen this bond. In general, we can only infer what comprised the content of the Pechenegs’ traditions, the influence of which was clearly revealed in their contacts with outsiders. This is particularly evident in the late period of the Pechenegs’ history. Finding themselves in a foreign environment – both in terms of the natural conditions and the cultural patterns of the majority population – they strove to preserve their individuality. The consequences of this were dramatic. The Pechenegs’ continuation of their old way of life led to an acute conflict with Byzantium, which ultimately brought about the annihilation of the steppe-dwellers’ independence. Their situation in Rus’ and Hungary was very different – but even there, a change in the political loyalties of Pecheneg groups was accompanied by a demonstration of their distinctiveness.
However, the relationship between these nomads and the outside world cannot be described only in terms of violence. It is true, of course, that the Pechenegs were a warrior people, capable at times of great cruelty. Valour, measured by the number of enemies killed, was among the virtues they appreciated most. Their aggression, however, had a rational basis and was often a response to the expansive actions of their neighbours. The history of relations between the Rus’ and the Pechenegs at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries provides examples that support this thesis. The growth of Kiev and the accompanying shift in the southern border of Rus’ and the political and economic expansion of the Rurik dynasty clearly threatened the interests of the Pechenegs. Rus’ rulers disrupted the Pechenegs’ trade relations and took control of their trade routes. The chronicle tradition presents the actions of Kiev’s rulers, especially those of Vladimir the Great, as a defence against the aggression of the steppe-dwellers. It seems, however, that this account is heavily marked by the founding myth of Rus’, according to which the Rurik princely dynasty was established to create the foundations for terrestrial and cosmic order, and to oppose the dark forces of chaos. As a group that was radically different culturally, the Pechenegs were well suited for the role of ‘dark forces of chaos’ and functioned ideally as an Other. Blame for various bloody border conflicts was always placed on them, though the truth was more complicated and much less unambiguous.
The role of the Pechenegs in trade is likewise underestimated. Among researchers the dominant stereotype of the Pecheneg nomads is one of a group whose activities contributed largely to a decline in trade. However, data from written sources indicate that the Pechenegs may have also played a significant role in the conduct of trade. In the 10th century, they acted as valuable intermediaries between the Byzantine Kherson and the lands adjacent to the steppe. They also made use of trade routes established earlier by the Khazars. It is worth remembering that the development of Kiev and Volga Bulgaria was possible due to the destruction of the Pax Chazarica and the weakening of the Pechenegs in the late 10th century. New political power centres in the north created a more favourable trade network for them, while also disrupting older trade relations.
The fate of the Pechenegs depended largely on the situation not only on the steppe itself, but also in the lands surrounding it. In the latter half of the 10th century, the Black Sea steppe became a niche, surrounded by strong political powers everywhere but in the east. Such an orientation in geopolitical relations was generally quite unfavourable to these nomads, as it precluded the establishment of relations with both the North (dominated by steppe-dwelling nomads and their hinterland) and the South (agricultural civilizations); the development of such a north-south alignment would have been much more favourable to the Pechenegs. After the steppe became a political niche, the role of its inhabitants rapidly diminished. Their territory was seen by neighbouring states as, at best, a kind of buffer zone separating different spheres of influence. However, the demographic dominance of agricultural communities pushed nomadic groups, even forced them, to expand their area of migratory settlement. This could lead to the displacement of nomads from their lands, a process which, as the example of the Pechenegs proves, they were unable to halt. The transformation of the Black Sea steppe into a niche also coincided with the collapse of the Khazar Khaganate. This created a terrible situation for the Pechenegs, because the fall of the Khazar Empire also brought down a bulwark that had slowed the migration of nomadic peoples. As a result of these ethnic shifts, the Pechenegs’ Black Sea niche became boxed-in on three sides, making it impossible to move out of the area without crossing into the lands of neighbouring states. The Pechenegs were the first people in the history of Europe to face this problem. The Hungarians, who had been driven out by them earlier, were able to simply migrate beyond the Carpathians and, like the Avars had in the past, occupy steppe lowlands on the Tisza and central Danube. For the Pechenegs, such a flight to the west was no longer possible.
Although migration beyond the steppe theoretically did not have to bring about the end of their history as an independent people, it triggered processes that, at best, would have led to a radical transformation of the nomads’ cultural universe. The examples of the Hungarians and the Danube and Volga Bulgars show that under such conditions nomadic communities could maintain their independence and create strong political organisms capable of surviving for centuries after leaving the steppe. The price for such success, however, was the complete abandonment of their former nomadic identity, and the loss of many of the values associated with it. Much depended on the political traditions cultivated by a given ethnos. Accustomed to living in an egalitarian community, the Pechenegs were not able to create an early state in the Balkans, like those of the Bulgars or Hungarians. For them, leaving the Black Sea steppe was tantamount to the end of their role as an actor in the region’s history. The Pechenegs’ final half century of conflicts with Byzantium was merely an epilogue to their story as a free people.